of-rorrror".

r,

FMECAJA64lO-O

Deepuren Honlzot't
AND FAILURE MODESEFFECTS ANALYSIS CRITICALITY

Author: Date: Approval:

PJN/JB/JM/AM 01.06.09

UNIT 3 DP CLASS DR]LLING HORIZON DEEPWATER EFFECTS AND MODES, FAILURE ANALYSIS CRITICALITY OF THEDP SYSTEM JUNE2OO9
B OINDC/O/PJN/JB/JM/C AO41

01.06.09

lssuedto Client

PJN/JBlJ M/AM

tclsc
PJNM/I

PM

Draftfor Client Review tablesto be amended 1 2 . 0 3 . 0 8 (criticality postreceiptof TQ answers) B A 14 10.07 UpdatedFollowingReview For InternalReview

PM/JB PM/JB PM/JB

01.10.07 Date

Rev

Description

By

Check

Approved

".$lll&lL'-';'t-L
r.r
--;

.-,

\.
h

Holdings LLC Eonfidential Treatrnent by Requested Transocean

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010352 TRN-MDL-00052089

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FMEC.A/A64 t0.0

9.
9.1 9.1.1

SAFEry CONTROLSYSTEM
Introduction and arralysisu,hich follows is basedou the References: The ESD/F&Gdescliption fbllowingdocunrentation :
I 2 3 No. Cause and Effect Mau'ix for Fire and GasSystenrDrar.ving HRBS-169-000H0025Rev K. Shut Dowu SystemDrarving No. HRBSCause and Effect Matrix lor Eniergenc-v 169-000-H0025 K. Rev Section9 Safeq Systems. Deeprvater Horizon OperationsJv{anual

9.t.2

and Description:The SafetyControl Sysrerr(SCS)maintainssafetylevelsfor personnel fi'our damaqe. lt pelformstu,o nrain assists protectingthe installationalrd equipnrent in functions:Emergencl, Shutdoru (ESD) and Fire and Gas (F&C). Both sl,sterns be can corrtrolledby' the user frorn operator stations.r,r4rich arc located in the CCR. The both capable ol'calr-ving all out operator stalionsprovidedual redundancfin that tlrel ar-c the functionsof the SCS. Safety SystemCommunications and usesfire resistant cable. SafetvNetwork: The AIM safetynetwork is dual redundant which ensures from the rest ofthe Ethernetnetwork a gatervay. by that bus It is separated rrafTicis not comnrunicated the safetynet. lt is designedsuch that tlre nehvorkload to shouldneverbe above70%. and manualcall points are connected the fire central. smokedetectors to Heat detectors, with the fire centralon a redundant The Deepwater Horizon F&C nodes cotnmunicate serial line; All field signals in the ESD systemare interfacedby the field ternination boardsand tJrel/O cards. SignalsbetweenF&G and ESD go thloughthe network. Redundancv/Cornmonality: ABS requirements that Net A and B slrouldrun alons are routesin separate fire zonesto avoid failure of both rretsas a result of local separate rvheretlre corrmunication netrvorks interference damage the cablerlal,'.ln areas to run or the together.particularlywhere thel' cornpromise redundanc)'of tu'o operatorstations. protected from danage. the net cablesrnustbe adequately The Fire and Gas (F&G) System The F&C svstem provides detection of fir'e and gas hazards and initiates certain protcctive aclions. High-levcl shutdorvus earricd out bv tire ES[-tsvstem. F&G are perforrnslorv-levelshutdo'rvn suchas slruning fire danrpers operations and sritclring off fans. is io precautions F&G Concernslclr DP: The F&G s-vslcm designed take the necessar-v in tlre event of a fire such as closing fire dampersand shuning off fans. This has the potentialto trip engines protectionfunctions air starvation. on or

9.2 9.2.1

9.?.2

Oi
9.?.3

9.3 9 . 3r.

9.3.2

l']age of429 309

QonnOential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010670
TRN-MDL-00052407

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A64t0.0

9.3.3

Modesof ooeration: The F&G systemoperates two modes:'automatic'and 'rnanual in advisory'. In autornatic modc, the following actions,which are carried out by the ESD systern,can be initiated by the F&c system:shutdownof EDG, shutdownof telecom equipmenl shutdown accommodation of non-essential equipmeng shutdownof wellhead valves and oil productionfacilities. [n manualadvisory mode, the F&G system will advise when these actions should be taken and the operator must decide whether tlre action is appropriate.lt is assumed that the F&G systemwill always operatein manual advisorymodeduringDP operations. Release CO': The CQ systernis not automatically of released the F&G system. This by can only bc actiratedmanually from local release cabinetsoutsideof the room. If the CO: is io be released, ventilatiotl u,ill be stoppedand flaps closedautornatically and if pri<;r necessary manuall.v" to any release, Worst CaseFailure of the F&G System The F&G systeln has the potential to shutdou,nenginerooms. rdrich could resul( in effects as great as or more severethan the wont casefailure. However, it is assumed that the F&G systemwill alwaysoperatein manualadvisorymodeduring DP operations. Criticalirv: See criticality uble entries 080-010-001 002. The highest criticality for lo this subsection a LOW. A tableshowingcriticality is given below: is
ConfigunfiorFClosedor Splil Rino
Enpias

9.3.4

9.4 9.4.1

9.4.2

Tharb|t

UL
4

8/B 2

oil..
8

s/B
0

LOW

.-Lolil$.. }'f,DII]M

}IEDIIIM

,.MEDIT'M-. bf,tGU 0

rras

9.5

oi

The EmergencyShufdown @SD) System The ESD systemis designedto minimise the effectsof an emergency situation,suchas an uncontrolled release ofhydrocarbonsor a firc. It perfornrs higlr level safetyfirnctions such as engineroomshutdown via the dual processstation. Full details of tlre ESD Systern furrctionsqan be detenninEd fiom the Cause and Effect Matrix for Emergency Shutdown No System HRBS-169-000-H0025 K. Rev ESD Concernsfor DP: The function of the ESD system is designed to perfornr a shutdown-which if carried out inappropriately capableof significantlyexceediug is the \vorst casefailure design irrtent. This could lead to a loss of position. u,hich has the potentialto cause seriousdamage equipment personnel. to and Operationof ESD: Tlre slrutdorvn levelsperformedb1'theESD s),sterll shownin the are table belorv. ESD levels l -8 and l -9 havethe potentialto exceed worsr casefailure. the Thesehigh level functionscan only bc initiatedmanuallyby pressing pushbuttons. whiclr are located in the ECR and CCR. Level 4 rvhich can be operatedmanualll' try the pushbutton via the soffware,concerns or drilling operations doesrrotaffect DP. and

9.5. r

9.5.2

9.5.3

Page of429 310

-]

lConfidential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010671
TRN-MDL-00052408

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATEIT I{ORIZON

FMECA/A6410-0

9.5.4

ESD Buttons: The pushbutfons all coveredto preventinadvertent are operation. They are all line rnonitored. loop faults, open/shoftcircuits and earth faults. All triggera i.e. system alarm andthe hardware designednot to activate shutdownon suchfauJts.See is a Figure 9.1. The expected current in normal operations (with the switch open) is 5mA. On depression thc pushbutton.the cxpectedcurrent is l9mA, rvhich triggers AlarmHH of and activatesa shutdorvn.Any other current is detectedas a line fault and alarmed. +
RI

T I
SECTIOil OF CABLE VULNERABLETO FAULIS

A COTIPUTER

Svqrcri CLOSO ;=1SftA Svr{T3H OPEI'I i=sna

ESD PUSHSUT?q\

Ai >

| coMnuTtRE

PROCESS ST3.TlOil

Figure9.1

Exampleof Typicat ESDPushbutton Circuit

9.5.5

ESDLevels

!:

Page I of429 3t

)onfidential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-0AA10672
TRN-MDL-00052409

TMNSOCEAN Level

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FlvlECAiA64l0-0

Shutdown
room shutdown: Engine #I ENGINE SHUTDOWN(FUEL OIL) #I C/B GENERA'IOR TNCJOMER TRIP (CFIARGE AIR) ENGINE#I SI{UTDOWN #1 ENGINE F.O VALVE CLOSE GENBEARINGL.O PUMPS(DE.NDE)#I TRIP PRELUBEOIL PUMP#ITRIP MAIN DIESELOIL FEEDPUMP#I TRIP #I FAN TRIP ENG.ROOM SUPPLY/EXH AUX. MACH ROOM SUPPLYFAN #I TRIP ATRCON I (PAC-I )TRIP # PACKACE ENG.ROOM FIREDAMPERCI-OSE #I BASE OII-TRANSFER PUMP#I TRIP #2'I OIL TRANSFER PUf\4P RIP BASE PUMP#I,2 TRIP DO TRANSFI'R I WASTI OIL PI-IMP/OIL\' \\'ATER SEP.# TRIP PUMPPUMP#I TRIP DOiLOSERVICE #t.? DO PLIRIFIER TRIP TRIP HELICOPTER REFUELLINCPUlvlP BOPMIXINCSKIDLUBE OIL PUMPTRIP BOPMIXINC SKIDCLYCOLPUMPTRIP F.OSERVICE PORT TANK VALVE CLOSE PORTF.OSETTI,IN(iTANK VALVE CLOSE TANK VALVE CLOSE PORTL.O STORACE PORTL.O PURIFIER TANK VALVE CLOSE Fuel and oil systems Stbd DO TMNSFER PUMP#3.4TRIP .IRIP WATER SEP.#2 WASTE OII- PUIV{P/OILY DO SERVICE PUMPPUMP#2TRIP #3.4TRIP DO PI'RIFIER PUMPTR]P THRUSTER LUBE OIL TRANSFER TANK VALVE CLOSE STBDF.OSERVICE STBDF.O SETTLING TANK VALVE CLOSE HYD OIL STORAGETK VAI-VE CLOSE THRUSTER LUBE OIL TK VALVE CLOSE

Initiafion
Manually by opcrator activation of pushbutton ESD l-l through1-6or 38 (locatedin CCR and ECR)

t-l to l-6

lvlanualll, operaror b1' activationof pushbrrtron ESD l-8 (locatc'd CCR in andECR)

l-8

Manualll, b)'operator activationof pu-shbunon ESD l-9 (located CCR in andECRI

t-9

!:
2-1
to

Thrustens
#I THRUSTER I IKV BREAKERTRIP #I THRUSTER CONVERTERruPS TRIP #1 TI IRUSTER LUBE OIL PUMPTRIP MAINTENANCE IIYD PIJMPTRIP PI.JN4P OILY WAI'ERSI.:PARA'IOR/T)RAIN TRIP THR#4 TFMR C.'OOLINC FAN #I.2 I-RIP ATRCONS(PAC-r0.r r ) IRrP TUNNEL SUPPI-Y FAN TRII) ACCESS Table9.t
Shutdown Systems

Marually h,voperaror activalion pushbutton of ESD2-l to 2-8(located in and [:C.:R l-.CR)

2-E

9.6 9.6.1

Worst CaseFailure and Criticalifr of the SafetyControl Svstem Worst Case Failure:ESD l-8 or l-9. Seecriticalitvtable entries 080-020-001 005. to 'l otal shutdou,n fuel distributionon one sideof the generatioll of svstem.

Page312of 429

Oa'f*,oential Treatment Requested Transocean by Hotdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010673
TRN-MDL-00052410

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPU/ATER HORIZON

FMECA/A64t0-0

9.7 9 . 71 .

Failure Modes of the Safety Control System FailureModesof the SafetyControl Systern are: I. Failureto opemteon activationof ESD pushbutton 2. Spurious actit,ation ofLevel l-l to l-6 3. Spurious acrivatiorr Level l-8 r.lrl-9 of 4. Spurious activation ofLevel 2-l to 2-g

9.8 9 . 8 .I

Failure Effectsof the Safety Control Sl,stem This thilure is not an issLre Dp for redundancy. However. failure of the ESD function to operatervhen requiredcould compound situationthaf is alread-v a extrenlel-\,serious. This rvould resultin loss of one generatorin one engineroom due to isolationof the enginefuel supply and ventilation dampers closilrg spulqus activation of ;it!@,e:s!.-!:&-sr_!_:9; This could exceedthe worst case failure desigrrintent if they were spuriouslyacrivated. TSis would shuroff fuel to one side. the rig and up to threeenginescould be lost in ClosedRing of configurationor three engines and four thrusters irr Sprit Ring Configuration. prividinj the syster' is configured correctl,vand dependingon tlie loads this slrould not reiult in a loss of position,howel'ertheremay be considerable electricaldisturbance a resultof the loss as of generators. qpurtous acttvatton ole..bSI)Level fonn 2-l or 2-8: would resultin the of lossof one thrusterdue to trippingof the thrusterHV bieakerand por.r,er auxiliaries. to Hidden Failures of the Safe(v Contr.ol Sl,stem Hiddcn failuresshouldbc kcpt to a rrinimunrlrv line rnonitoring. Failur.e rlre line of trlonitoring ro rvork. hou'ever.could representa significant hiJden thilure. sun.,fl. tesring couldbe carried pefiodicall,r.to out increase "rifid.n".. Maloperation of the Safety Control Systern It is unliketi'thafpet'sonnel acciderrtally rlill triggera shurdorvn fi.omthe CCR because the pushbuttons co\/eredand locatedat a ded-icated are operatorstation. personnel are arvareof the significance the shutdownbuftonsso inadvertent of operation unlikely. is

9.8.2

e.8.3

!;
9.8.4 9.9 9'9'l

9.10 9'l0'I

Page3l3 f429 o

Od*,oential rreatment Requested Transocean by Hordings LLc

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010674
TRN-MDL-o0a52411

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FMECA/A6410-0

10.5 10.5.1

ComparhnentAnalysis With referenceto provision of passive and active fire protection and DP Class 3 requirements relatedto the risk of fire, the stowageof oils and chemicalswithin the machineryspacehas beenexaminedto ensurethal it is suitably containedand the method of transportalion to the rnachinery space assessedto detennine any threat it could possiblypose. Fuel storageis forward and outboard of the generatorrooms with there being settling and service tanks on both the port arrd starboard side. The fuel treatment facilities are threat to the generator imrnediately of thesetanks. As such there is no imnrediate aft roonrsfrom thc bulk storagcfacilitiesof readyusefuel. with transferpunrps thenrselves The main fuel storagetanksare locatcd in the pontoons to tlueatto tlre to move fuel as required the settlingtanks. Again th is posesrro irnrnediate generator regardingfire hazard. roorns spaceas the fuel settlirrgand storage Lubricatingoil storage tanksare locatedin tlre sarne carrhe punrped tanks. Oil can be run down to the requiredareaand oil from fhe engines to one ofthe tanksfor purification. roorn for fuel or lubricatingoil. The There is no storagefacility within each generator accessible only immediately bulk fuel sourceis the headertankusedin the eventof the there is no reason to fuel pumpfailure. Providedthe pipework for tlris tank is maintaincd bclieve that there is a seriousfire hazardfrorn this source. Table l0.l providcs infonnation about essential equipment contained within conlDanmenbof the vessel:

10.5.2

10.5.3

10.5.4

10.5.5

I 0.5.6

Loss of KongsbergDP, SVC and STC controls. (dependenton fire backup in ECR to input commandsto DP) Inmarsaldemodulator. equip.rm. Stbdprocess

l.ossof DPC-32" Gyro2, N D U8 1 . 1 UPS I, P S 2 5 ,5 A . 2 6 . 2

L o s so f N D U A l . Gyro 3, U P SI O .

Port process equip.rm.

fire Lossof SDP-12 backup systeln. Gyrol. NDU ,A3. MCC4. PS27.
Page 5 of 429 31

tf.r

Holdings LLC by Requested Transocean Confidential Treatment

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010677
TRN-MDL-00052414

IRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A64 t0-0

I lkV switchboard secrion, DCI A Arrurt.r-PnS M C CI 5 PS9

Switchboard loonr 2 I l0Vdc battervch llkV srvitchboard section,DG2 & thruster P,{6 MCC I6 P SI O I lOVdc and distribution I I kV su,itchboard section.DG3 & thrusterPF7 MCCI7 P SI I I l0Vdc baffen'charger distributiorr and

Srvitchboard roorn3

Su,itchboard loorn'{

ttfVslvim.,Se: M C Ci 8 P S1 2 I l0Vdc battery charger distribution and

I lkV switchboardsection.DC5 & thr.uster SA3

Switchboard room 5

M C CI 9 P S1 3 I t0Vdcba

o
Switchboard room 7 PF 480V Su,bdroom PA 480V Svr.bd roonr

section.DG6 & thrusterSA4 I I kV srvitchboard MCC 20 P S1 4 I l0Vdc batterychargerand distribution I I kV srvitchboard sectionand thruster PF8 NDU 84.

480Vswitchboards. Portandstandbv
I lkV switchboardsectionand thrusterSFI NDU A'4. 480V su,itchboards. Starboard

Lossof 480Vdistribution. N D UA I / B I . Loss 480Vdistribution. of N D UA 3 . PS29. 208/120V distribution e l s .

Lossof 480V distribution.

SF 480V S'g.bd room

M C Ct 3 . MCC3.
SA 480V Srvbdroom Lossof 480V distribution. NDU 84. U P SI 3 . P S3 0 . 208/120V distribu tion panels. Lossof DC l. relatedcablingand auxiliarysystems. FW coo #l and#Z
Page3l6of429

^\
-.l

-Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010678
TRN-MDL-00052415

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATF,R

FMECA/A64r0-0

2 Ensineroom Engineroom 3

cabling auxiliary and systens. Lossof DG2.related

Loss of DG3, related cabling and auxiliary systems. Due to tlre cable routing, failure can leave a switchboard operatingas arr oonfiguration of two generators/fl'rrusters isolated "island", and three generatorssupportingfive switchboards(five thrustersand total drill load), Lossof DC4, relatedcablingand auxiliary systems. Due to the cable routing, failure can leave a switchboard operatingas an configuration of two gencrators/thrusters fir,e and supportilrg isolatedo'isJand". threegeneratols switchboards(five lhrustersand total drill load). cablins and auxilia Lossof DG5- related Loss of DG6, relatedcabling and auxiliar"vsystems #3 FW cooline DumDs and#4 valvecabinet andHPll. Solenoid Headerand gravity tanks- thrusters. PLC cabinet. NDU A2. P S2 I & P S2 I A . PS22. equipment No DP essential Tlrrustcr PF7 transformer, SAMI Megastardrive. control unit (ACU). Aquamaster MCC 27. PS 7. U P S7 . AlC#22 Thrustel PF8 transformer. SAMI Megastardrive. ACU. MCL- 8 MCC28. PS 8. U P S8 . U P SI 4 . AlC#24.#25 I hrustermotors#7 or #8. pump#3, Main SW sen,ic SW hull valves. LO urrit. ThlusterSW servicepump#7. Drain punrp. SW hull valves.

4 Engineroom

5 Engineroonr 6 Engineroom

and nontoon Portsidecolumns

PFcolumn 28.5m

f:

PF column 24.0m PF column Thrusterdrive roorl, PF'1 ( u p p e r -1 ? . l m & l o w e r- 9 . l m )

PFcolumn driveroorn, Thruster PF8 ( u p p e ri- . l m 2 & lorver9,1m)

PF column- Pontoon ( 5 .I r n )

pumproom. PFcolumn
PF column room PF7 Thruster

Page3.ll of 429

-! -.r

-eonfidential

Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

TRN-HCEC-00010679
TRN-MDL-00052416

CONFIDENTIAL

IRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/Aflt0-0

PF column Thruster roorn PF8

LO unit. MainSW ssrvice pump #l Thruster service pump#8. SW Drainpump. SWhullvalves.

Solenoid valve cabinet and HPU. Headerand grat,it1, tanks- thrusters. PLC cabinet. NDU 42, P S 1 9& P S I 9 A . PS20. No DP essential equiptrrent ThrustcrPA5 transforrner'. SAMI Megastar drive. ACU. MCC 25. P S5 .
ul'S ).

PA column 28.5nr

PA column 24.Oni PA column Thrusterdrive roonr. PA5 ( u p p e r -2 . l m i & lou,er 9.1nr)

I

PA column Tlrruster driverootn. PA6 (upper l2.l nr & lower 9.lnr)

A / C# 1 8 , # t 9 .
Thruster PA6 transformer. SAMI Megastar drive. ACU. MCC I OMCC 26. PS 6. UPS 6. A/C#20.

I,A coluflln - P()ntoon (5.1m)

T'lrruster motors ar #6. #5

Main SW service purnp#5. SW hullvalves.

PA column pump room.

PA column Thruster roonrPA5

LO unit. MainSWsen,ice pump #7. Thruster sen,ice punrp SW #5. pump. Drain SWhullvalves.
LO unit. TlrrustcrSW scrvieepunrp#6. Drain purnlt. S W h u l lv a l v e s . | Lossof port HpR srsrern.

PA column Thruster roourPA6

Pot'tlou'er access \\'a]

Starboard sidc columnsand

Page3lSol'429

.-,
I -.i'

-confidential rreatmenl Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010680
TRN-MDL-00052417

1'RANSOC:EAN
aiira 1l:t'i4;

D!':EPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A6410-0

piF**

SFcolumn 28.5m

$.f;;;1ti:;l +;ii F*ffi,fffiihtiFfrLtry$ 1rt++*i

SF column 24.0m

Solenoidvalve cabinet and HPU. Header and gravity tanks- thrusters. PLC cabinet. NDU 82. P S1 s& P S l 5 A . P SI 6 . equiprnent No DP essential

SFcolumn Thruster driveroom. SFI (upper 12.1m l o n e r 9 . Im ) &

SFcolumn Thruster driveloom, SF2 (upperl2.lrn & lower9.1m)

SF column- Pontoon ( 5 .I m ) SF columnpurnproom. SF colunn Thrustelroom SFI

Thruster transfonner. SFI drivc. SAMI Megastar ACU. MCC7 M C C? I . P SI . U P SI . UPS 5. I A / C# 1 0 . l . I Thruster SF2transformer. SAMI Megastar drive. ACU. MCC22. PS2. UPS 2. A/C#12. rnotors or #2. #l Thruster
pump#4. Main SW service SW hull valves.

LO unit pump#2 MainSW sen,ice pump #1. Thruster service SW Drainpump. SWhullvalves.
LO unit. ThrusterSW scrvicepump #2. Drain pump. SW hull valves. valve cabinet HPLJ. Solenoid and Headerand gravifytanks- thrusters, PLC cabirret. NDU A4. P S 1 7& P S I 7 A . P SI 8 . equipment No DP essential

SF column Thrusterroom SF2

SA column 28.5m

SA colunrn 24.0m

Pase3l9 of 429

QontiOential Treatrnent Requested Transocean by Hotdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010681
TRN-MDL-00052418

.I'RANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HOITIZON

FMECA/A64IO-O

SA column Thruster driveroom, S43 (upperl2.lm & Iower 9.lm)

PA column Thrustel driveroorn SA4 ( u p p e rl ? . l m & lorver 9.lnr)

SA column- Pontoon (5.1m) SA colunrn puntploonl. SA colurnn Tlrrusterroonr SA3

Thruster SA3transfonner. SAMI Megastar drive. ACU. MCC9. MCC23. P S3 . UPS 3. A l C# l 4 .

TlrrusterSA4 transfonner. SAMI Megastardrir,e. ACU. MCC ?4. P S4 . IJPS4. AlC #t 6. t7. Thruster motors#3 or'#4.

MainSW service purrrp #6. SWhull valves.

SW scrvicepump#3. Drain pump. SW hull valves. LO unit Main SW seruice pump#8. Thmster SW servicepump#4. Drain pump. SW hull valves. Lossof starboard HPR system. LO unit. 'lhruster

SA colurnn Tlrruster roomSA4

SB lower access \\.ay

Table l0.l

Compartment Anatysis

r0.6 I0 . 6 . I

Power Cable Routing I lkV Cable Routes beru'eenER and Switchboard rooms: Tlre respective engiue roonr HV stlitchtroards on the seconddeck. locatedabovethe au.riliary, are rnachinerl, spaces belorr on the third deck. HV cabling, for the supplv of thrusters. su,itchboard for intcrconllections and for the six 500kVA transfonners feedingeugineauxiliaries. dropsdorvn into the fespecti\' auxiliarl nrachineryspaces lrelort. Cableruns betu,een su,itcihboar<Js then rtrn throuch the auxiliary spaceson the deck head level. Cableseparatiorr the for suppll of po\\ef to thruslersand transforners is adequate if rerrrains as *'ithin its oun A60-rated enclosule. The initial rottte taken by cables fl'orn llre srvitchboards the thrursters to are u,ell illustratedin drarvingno. HRBS-890-U05-P6000. lt rna-v help to rcfcr to this dfaunine u,hile readingthe descriptions bclow.

10.6':

Page320 of429

-ii.

-Confidential Treatrnent Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010682
TRN-MDL-00052419

,IRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECAA64IO-O

10.6'3

llkV CableRoute for Thruster SFI: The thrusterSFI llkV power cabte is fed from switchboard 8, which is located on the inboard side of the starboardpontoon on the seconddeck. The cable exits the switchboard room through a floor penetrationinto a longitudinal460 separationin the double bottom. lt then exits the double bottom throug! and entersan A0 r,erlical protectcd utility trunk. Thc vertisal trunk does have 460 separation the 33000 Double Bottom Level. Note that where the adiacenr at tlrrusters. SFI and SF2, HV cablesin separate trunks,the trunks themselv-es e.g. AO are approxirnatelynine metres apan. Ef,flectively, HV cables in a column for adjacent the thrusteB are separatedby two AO bulkheadsand a nine metre air gap betweenthe A0 bulkheads.This is true for all four pairsof adjacent HV cablesin thJ four colurnns.Tlre cablethen travelsdown. exits the utility trunk and cntersthc top of the lorverelecrrical thrusterroom. It then entersthe upper electricalthrusterroonr.tentrinating the dr-ive at transforlner. From the SAMI Megastarthruster drive. the cable transirJftrough tlre lower electt'ical thrusterroom, exiting it via the utiliq' channelto connect thJ rnail ro tlrruster drive motor in the pontoon. 480V CableRoutefor ThrusterSFI: Sr.vitclrboard 8 supplies a feeder SF 480V via the srvitchboard. The I I kV cableexits dre switchboard room andenters doublebottornit the then follows an A60 channelto terminateat the 2500kVA transformer (the tie-line from the SA 480V srvitchboardfollo'ivs a sirnilar route, but this oonfigurationis not usedrvhile on DP). A 480V cable frorn this switchboard then dcscends into the utility trunk which penetrates double bottorn. Note that where the adjacentthrusters,e.g. SFI and SF2, the 480V cab.les in separateAO trunks. the trunks themselves approximately are are nine metres apart. Ef-fectively, the 480V cables in a column for adjacent thrusters are separated two AO bulkheadsand a nine metre air gap betweenthe A0 bulkhcads. by This is true for all four sets of adjacent480V cablesin the four columns.' The cable continuesdown the A0 protectedvertical utility trunk and entersthe lorver electrical thrusterroom and connectingto MCC 7, which then suppliesMCC 2l in the upper electrical thrusterroom. llkV CableRoute for ThrusterSF2: The thrusterSF2 llkV powercableis fed from switchboard which is locatedbetween 4, switchboard rooms 7 and5 on the starboard side of the seconddeck. The cable exi6 the switchboard room through a floor penetration into an A60 separation the doublebottom. It therrexits the doublebottomtlrrouehand in enters an A0 rated cable trunk. The trunk lras ,460 separarion the 33000 double at Bottorn Level. The cable sontinuesto travel down this trunk, exiting into the loraer thrusterelectricalroom and passes into the uppertlrrusterelectrical room, terrninating at the drive transfornrer.From the SAMI Megastar thrusterdrive. the cabletransits throietr the lower electricalthrusterroom. exiting it via the utilih, channel connectto the rna]n to thrusterdrive motor in the oontoon. 480V CableRoute for TlrrusterSF2: Tl're480V cablesroutesfor thrusterSF2.srnotor control centre(MCC I 8) follorv a similar route to thoseof the I l kV main powercables. MCC l8 exits the seconddeck via a floor penetration passthroughthe thirrJ deck and enteruan .460 channel.then entersand passes dorrn through an A0 prolectedvertical cableducrtermirratirrg MCC 22. at

l0-6.4

10.6.5

l0'6.6

Page32lof429

onfidential Treatrnent Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010683
TRN-MDL-o0052420

I'RANSOCEAN

DEEPWATI.:R I{ORIZON

FMECA/A64I04

10.6.7 I I kY Cablc Route for Thruster sA3: The rhrusrer SA3 I I kv power cable is fed from

switchboard which is locatedadjacentto switchboardroom 6, 5 on the starboard side of the seconddeck. The cableexits the switchboardroom through a floor penetration into an 460 separation the double bottom. It then exits the double in bottom through and entersan A0 rated vertical cable trunk. The cablc continues to travel down this-trunk. exiting into the lower thrusterelectrical roorn and passes into ttt. upp.r ttrruri.;'"1;;;;;i Ioom, termirrating the drive transfonner. From the SAMI Megastar at thnrsterd;";,;; cabletmnsits tbroughthe lower electricalthrusterroom. exiting it via the utility channel to connectto the mainthrusterdrjve motor in the pontoon.

l0'6'E

480v cable RouteforThrusterSAi: The 480V cables routes forthrusterSA3,snroror control centre(MCC l9) follor,' a similar route to thoseof tlre I I kV main power cables. MCC l9 exits the seconddeck via a floor penen'ation passtlrroughttre ttrir.,:rlec:k and entersan .4'60channel.then enters and passes down through an A0 prot.cted vertical cableductto MCC 13. llkV Cable Routefr-rr ThrusterSA4: The thru.ster SA4 llkV porvercableis fbd fiorrr srvitchboard which is locatedbetu'een 5. sr.vitchboard rooms4 and 6 on the starboard side of the seconddeck. Tlre cable exits the switchboardroom through a floor p"nct.ution iilto an 460 separation the double bonom. It then cxits the doubie in bottorn tlr|oughuna entersan A0 protected verticalutility trunk. Tlre cablethentravelsdown,exitsthe-utility trunk and entes the top of the lower electricalthrusterroom. lt then enters tlr. upp", electricalthrusterroom, tenninating at the drive transfonner. From the SAMI Megastar thrusterdrive, the cabletransitsthrough the lower electricalthrusteruoor, e^itilgr:t uiu the utility channelto cot'lnect the mainthrusterdrive nrotorin the pontoon to

l0'6.9

oj

l 0 ' 6 ' 1 0 4 8 0 V C a b l e R o u t e f o r T h r u s t e r S AT h e 4 8 0 V c a b l e s r o u t e s f o r t h r u s t e r S A 4 ' s n r o t o r 4: controlcentre(MCC 20) follou'a similarrouteto thoseof the I lkV main porver cables. Mcc 20 exits the seconddeck via a floor penetration passthroughure tliird deck and enter an 460 channel. lt thert enlers via a penerration the vertical utility in trunk and passes dowu, ter-minating MCC 24. al 10'6'll IlkV Cable Routefor ThrusterPA5: The thrusterPA5 llkV power cableis fed from srT'itchboard wltich is locatedbetweenswitchboardrooms I and 3 on the porl 2, side of the seconddeck. The cableexits the switchboard room througha floor penetratiol into an 460 separationin the double lrottonr. It then exits the double bottonrthrough and elrters A0 protected an verticalutilin'trunk. Tlre cablethentravelsdown.exitsthe utilir,* u'unk and entersthe top of the lou'er electricalthrusterroom. lt then enters ,t,a ,pp.i electricalthrusterroom. tenninatingat the drive transformer.l.-rom the SAMI Me-sasta,. thrtrster drive. the cabletransitsthroughthe lower electricalthrusterroom. exiting it r,ia the utilif* channelto connect the nrainthrusterdrive urotorin the pontoon. to 480v cable Rotrrefbr Thrrrster PA5: The 480v catrles pA5's rrotor routcsfor tlrrusrer (MCC I5) follotr a similarrouteto those the IIkV controlc'entre of rnainpot.ercables.

l0'6 I2

Page322of 429

onfidential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010684
TRN-MDL-o0052421

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A64t0.0

10'6'13 llkV CableRoutefor Thruster PA6: The thruster PA6 llkV powercable is fed frorn switchboard l,_which is located adjacent to s\ryitchboard room i on the port side of the seconddeck. The cable exits the switchboard room through a floor penetration into an 460 separation the double botlorn. It then exits the double bottomihrough and enters in an A60-ratedcable trunk. The cable continuesto travel down this trunk, ex'lting into tlre lower thruster electrical room and passes into the upper thruster elecfiJal roorn, terminating at the drive transformcr. Frorn the SAMI Migastar tlrrusterdrive, the cable transits through the lower electrical tlrruster roorn, exiting it via the utility chanlel to connectto the main thrusterdrive motor in the pontoon. l0'6.14 480V Cable Routefor ThrusterPA6: The 480V cablesroutesfor thrusterpA6.s moror control centre(MCC l6) follow a similar route to thoseof the I ikV rnainpower cables. MCC l6 exits the seconddeck via a floor penetration passthroughthe third deck and entersan 460 channel,then enters and passes douin through an A0 protectedvertical cableduct to MCC 26.

10'6'15 llkV CableRoutefor ThrusterPF7: The thruster PF7 llkV porvercable is fed frorn switchboard which is locatedbeiw*een 3. switchboard rooms 8 and 4 on the port side of the seconddeck. The cable exits the switchboard room through a floor penetration into an A60 separationin the double bottorn. It then exirs the double borrom throush arrd entersan A60-rated cable trunk. The cable continuesto travel down this trunk, ixiting into the lower thruster electrical roorn and passes into the upper tlrrusterelectrical room, terminating at the drive transformer. From the SAMI Megastarthrustcr drive, the cable transits through the lower electrical thruster room. exiting il via the utility chanlel to connectto the main tlrrusterdrive molor in the pontoon.

o,

l0'6.16

480V Cable Routefor ThrusterPF7: The 480V cablesmutes for thrusterpF7.s motor oontrolcentre(MCC l7) follow a similar route to thoseof the I I kV main power cables. MCC l9 exits the seconddeck viaa floor penetration passthroughthe thirO deck and enters an 460 channel, then enters and passesdown through an A0 protected vertical cableductto MCC 23.

)0.6.17 llkV Cable Roule.forThrusterPF8: The thruster PF8 llkV powercable is fed from switchboard7, which is locatedon thc inboardside of the port pontoonon the second deck. The cable exits the switchboard roorn through i floor penetr:ation into a longitudinal 460 separationin the double bottom. It then exits ihe double bottorr through and entersan A0 protectedvertical utility ffunk. Tlre cablethen travels dorvn. exits the utilir.v" trunk and entersthe top of the lower electricalthrusrerroonr. lt then entersthe upper electrical thruster roonr- terminating at tlre drive transformer. Frorn the SAMI Megastarthruster drive. the cabte transitsthrough the lower electrical thrusrer roonr.exiting it via the utility channelto connectto the rnainthrusterdrive motor in the polltooll.

Page323of 429

r]

onfidential rreatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLc

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010685
TRN-MDL-00052422

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A64t0-0

10.6.18 480V CableRoutefor Thruster PF8: Switchboard supplies a feeder ? via the pF 4g0V switchboard.The I I kV cableexits the switchboard room and enters doublebonom it the then follows an 460 channelto terminateat the 2500kVA transfbrmer (the tie-line fiom the PA 480V switchboard follows a similar route,but this configuration not usedrvhile is on DP). A 480V cablcfiom tlris switchboard then descends into thc utility trunk which the irenetrates doublebottotn. The cable continues down the A0 protected verticalutility trutrk and enrcIr the lolver electrical thruster room and connecthg to MCC 8, wlrich tSen suppliesMCC 28 in the upperelectricalthrusterroom. 10.7 10.7. 1 Thruster E-Stop Wire Routing All the enlergencv stop \\'iresexit the CCR (STC OS l) r'ia a penetration the CO2 irrto room. All sixteen lr,ites are erouped at this point. llorr.errer, thrusterelnergenc.\' the stops utilise nonrrallliopen and norn.ralll,'closed contacts. both haveto be operaiecl so to activatca shutdown. Thcrcfore.a fire i' this locationthat dcstlcrys u.ircs i.l,ould thc lra'e a ren'loteprobabilii" of actually stopping all thrusrers. FI\4ECA pror.ingtr.ialsfaile4 to confirnr this functionalityas drrustersshut down on a single wire bleak. Thereforerhe risk of losingmultiple thrusters a fire situationmay exist. in The rvires enter the seconddeck u4rerethey split into fivo route.s: four wires go to the starboardfonvard column and the other 12 wires penetratethe port fonvard colulnn utilitl" trunk. The starboardroute containing 4 wires penetrates utility trunk arrd the travelsdo\vnto the 9.1m flat bcforeconrrectins the thrusterdrives. to The ellergerrcystop wires routedalong the port side includes l2 wires. They enterthe utilily trunk on the seconddeck. Eight wires exit at the third deck level allowirrgall wires except foul to exit. The fcrur wires left in the trunk travel dorvn to the thrusler drives. On the third deck tire E u,ireswlrich exited tl'letrunk split again inro nvo groupsof four and transitto the aft port and starboard columnswherethey transitclownthe utility trurrks beforeterminatingat the drives. Eight vvires ate connected S'lC OS2 in the ECR.'['hese to rviresexit fhe ECR on the seconddeck via a floor perretlatiorr and enterthe double bottorn*'ltere a pair of wires entcr the A0 r.r'ire trunk in eaclrcolumn beforetransitirrg dorm to the 2l.lrn flat. The1, then etrtera non specific rt'ire channeland desceud the 9. lni flat ulrere tlre,r, to term;nate witlr tlrcir resDeclive thrustcrdrives. Nefn,ork Cable Routing NetrvorkA; Net A cablirrgcxits thc CCR via tlre port for\,\ard electrical srvitchboarcl room to the port process equiprnent room to NDU Al. u'hiclris connected PS 23- 24. ro 25. 254 and 26. Net A then enters tlre ,460 channel in the double bottom where it tratrsitsdou'n the cable trurrk arrderrtersthe 28.5rnflat nhere NDU A2 and PS 22 ar.e Iocated.Cables thentransitto the l2.lrn flat rvhere 7 and 8. on eitherside the460 PS of bulkheadbetweenthrustcrsections.

10.7.2

,l0.7.3

lA.7.4

10.7.5

I0.8 10.8.1

Page 324 of429

onfidential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010686
TRN-MDL-00052423

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A6410-0

!,

10.8.2 NDU 42 is thenconnected NDU A,3via a crossconnecting opticin thedoublc to fibrc bottom. Thefibre opticpenetrates double the bottornandis thenroutedup to tlresecond deckwere NDU 43 is located switchboard in room7. PS9, 10,I I and29 areconnected directly NDU A3. PS 5, 6 and20, located the portaft colurnn, connected to hr are with dropcables.
10.8.3 NDU A4 is connected NDU A3 via a fibre optic crossconnector.As rvith NDU A2, it to is locatedon the 28.5m flat in the starboardaft column. The cross connectorfrom NDU 43 hansit through the second deck to the utitity duct where it penetratesthe double bottom along rvith the cablesfor PS 12, 13 and 14. The cablesfor PS 3. 4 and 18 are protected within 460 routes. Extendeddrop cablesalso connectPS l. 2. 16. adequately 28 and 28A via tlre doublebonom. Netrvork B: Net B cabling exits the CCR via the port fonvard electricalsrvitchboard room to the starboard process equipmentroom to NDU ts1.u'hich is connected PS 23, to 24,25,25A and 26. The PF electricalswitchboard room is a commotlcompartment and phi'sicalseparation been achicvcd by runningthe fibre optic cabling to NDU Bl in has 460 in order to ensure that a fire in the srvitchboard room could onl.vaflect NDU Al. The net exits the processequipment room via a peneffation into the 480V port forwarcl switchboard room whereit entersthe utiiity rrunk on its way to the doublebottom. The cableenters double bottom in the 4'60 protectedutilitv trunk, travelswithin the the utility trunk and enters 28.5m flat to connectto NDU 82. The fibre opticsfor PS l. 2. the 16,28 and 28A arc alsoconnected NDU 82. to A crossconnecting fibre optic connects NDU 82 to NDU 84. Ttris cableagaintravelsup the utility trunk before penetratingthe double bottom and transiting the length of the rig in the channelassociated witlr switchboardarrd thruster SFl. NDU 84 is locatedin switchboard room 8, allowingeasyconnections PS I2, 13, 14,30 and DPC-I2, PS 3 for and 4 fortbe thrusters locatedat the 12.lm level whereA,60separation networks are of and all other cablesis acceptable. NDU 84 is then connected NDIJ 83 which like to NDU 82 is locateddown a column at the 28.5mflat in the port aft colurnn. Tlre Ethernet network is described detail in the Section7 on the SVC and is clearlv illustratedin in Figure7.3 Redundant EthernctNetwork. Effects of Fire and Flood and Measuresto Prevent Them - DP Control Arcas NavigationBridge and Main DP Control: Tlre navigation bridgealso houses rrrain the DP control centreand is locatedabovethe accomrnodation undemeath helideckat dre the starboardforu'ard quarter. The after pan looks out over the riser storageareaand the derrick. The bulkheads. decksand deckheads ofthe utcelhouseare ,{60 rated.

10.8.4

10.8.5

10.8,6

10.9 10.9.1

Page325 429 of

-_t

1,

-Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010687
TRN-MDL-00052424

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATERHORIZON

FMECA/464t0.0

.l0.9.2

Firc risk: Fire risksto the navigation bridge can be subdividedinto tlo areas;external and internal. I. External: The greateslexternalfire threat to the DP control is from two places: An isnited release from the denick. The main alea of concernhere is from any p r e s s u r e w a v e g e n e r a t e d a s a r e s u l t o f t h e i g n i t i o n o f t h e w e l l r e l e au e t.o t h e D se distancefron thc derrick arrd the fact that there are no rear facing windows and the containment measures available on tlre drill floor. it is nrost likely that an-v pressurc r\.'ar.e r+ill havedissipated the extent from an ignitedrelease lo -qenerated that it n'ill not compromise tlre DP conn'olarea. .lhis b. A helicopter crash. has the potenlial to allou' fuel fi'orn fhe crashed 'l'lrere helicopter spill and ignite. to shouldbe linritedopportuniqfor tlrefirel ro come into contactu,ith the rlheelhouse surfrces due ro the gutterin-s aroundthe hclideck and the firc fighting facitities available around the lrelideck. The helideck firefightin-estations are rnanned corrtinuousl.v dulirrs helicopter operatious n'ainedoperati ves. by' ?. Internal: a. The tlueab posedinternally are similar lo those in any control room. narnelyLV electricalequiprnent and conrbustiblematerialssuch as paper.funriture and floor and wall eoverinss.

10.9.3

Fire Protection: COl and fbam fire extinguishers. ManuallyActivated A Catl (MAC) for activatingthe fire alann is locatedat poirrtsaroundthe wheelhouse. FloodRisk: Insignificant. Flood Protection:This is onl.vwith respecttotlrearnbienteonditionssuchas considered rain and waves. The construction tlre DP coutrolareawindorvsand doorsaresuchthat of ingressfronr rvatershould rrot be a concem- During lreavyweathelit rlay be necessarl., to restric{ useofaccess the doorsto the outside. EnsineConlrol Room; The enginecontrolloom is located the centl'e the aftel end in of of therig at the secondlevel and providestlre lrackupDP corrtrolceutr-e the evenl rhal in the Lrridse contplomised calt n(r longelbe used the primart'control is and as centre. File Risk: The fire risks in the coutrol roollrare sinrilarto thoseon tlre bridgeas rhere are no storagefhcilities for flamrnableor volatile liquids in that space. lnrn'rediarel.r tt'l port and stbd of the control room is the drilling HV arrd LV su'itchboaldroornsw.hich have several potential ignition sources but feu. conrbustibleitcms containedthercin. There is a fire subdivisiort lretu,eeneach side ol" the control loorn arrd the drilline switchboards.

10.9.4 10.9.5

10,9.6

10.9.7

Page326 of 429

-ll
- l

-Confidential Treatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010688
TRN-MDL-00052425

TRANSOCEAN 10.9.8

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A6410-0

Fire Protection: A fixed CO2 flooding system, is part of the centre generatorroom protection systsm, Further protection is providod by CO2 and foam fire extinguishers and the Emergency Shut Down - Main Generators in the engine control room. A Manually Activated Call (MAC) for activating the fire alarm is located at points around the six generator rooms. The fuel handling spacesare below and forward of the control room atthe outboardsides ofthe third deck level. Flood Risk: There is no seriousthreat of flooding in this compartment thereare no as seawaterinlets to the space. The location of the control room renders it safe from the immediate consequences hull rupture. By the time flooding from hull rupture is a of concernDP operation the vesselwill no longer be the prirnary concenl for those on of boald. Effects of Fire snd Flood and Measures to Prevenl Them - Generator Spaces rooms each housinga 7 MW generator Therearesix genefator set. Thescare located on level 2 and 3 at the after end of level 3.The switchboardroom for each seneratorroom is situatedat the after end ofeach seneratorroom at level 2.

10.9.9

10.10 10.10.I

generator 10.10.2 The 3 port and 3 starboard roomsarealmostmirror imageof eachother. 'fhere are 460 doors allowing 10.10.3 All generator rooms are separated 460 bulkheads. by accessbetweenthe generatorrooms on the port and stbd side of the rig. Theseare closed locally by spring loaded door closers. The integrity of the A60 bulkheadsis dependent on these door closers working effectively to 'ensure positive closure of thc interconnecting doors. 10.10.4 Fire Risk: Fire hazards in the generatorrooms are mainly frorn firel oil and lubricating oil, and ignition sources are hot surfaces and high voltage electrical equipment Adherence to the maintenanceDrosramme should ensure that the risk of fire is minimised.
t

10.10.5 Fire Protection: Fixed CO: floodirrg svstem. CO: and foam fire extinguishers, EmergencyShut Down for each of the generatorenginesin tlre engine control room, A Manually ActivatedCall (MAC) for activatingthe fire alarm is locatedat pointsaround eachofthe six generator rooms. 10.| 0.6 Flood Risk: Failureof largebore pipervork.

,l0. 10.7 Flood Protection: Tlre only seriousthreat of flooding in this comparfinentis frorn the seawater systemin the space. The locatiouof tlre generatorrooms rcndersthem safe frorn the inrmediate consequences hull rupture. By the time flooding frorn hull rupture of is a considerationDP operation of the vesselwill no longer be the primar."" concem fcrr thoseon board

of429 Page327

Confidential Treatrnent Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

TRN-HCEC-00010689
TRN-MDL-00052426

CONFIDENTIAL

TRANSOCF,AN

DEF,PWAI'F.IT HORIZON

FMECA/A6410-0

10'1I l0'l l'l

Elfects of Fire and Flood and Measures to Prevent Them - one Generator Room A fire or flood in a generator roorn would result in the loss of generating capacityfrom the machine in that space. swil.chboard protection shoulcl .nru.. fhui-uni ruur, developing as a result of the flood or fire is not' transfened to the power generation system' It may, however.be prudentto disconnectthe generatorfrom the uus oi ofen ttre bustiesto that sectionon detectionof fire in r,ty g"n.,itorroom. circumstances rvould dictate rvhetherthis should be done before of ud", of a o*Juv g.n"r.tor. "or,n".tion The thruster associated with thc afected srvitchboard would be lost if the friiir, ,o u particularsectionwere opened. Thesecould be reconnected once it had beendeterlrrined that there was no fault condition in existencewithin that section of the disrribution s)/Stem' Effects of Fire and Flootl and Measuresto Prevent Them - Thruster Spaces Tlre thrusrcrspaces eachcornerofthe rig can be accessed at from eithera spiralstaircase. or a lift, in eachcolunrn. At eachlet'ei.belouthe operatingu,aterline tlre of rig. access to each level is via.a.sliding watertight door. Each ihruster-ishoused in a spale rl*t-.un only be accessed a sliding rvatertight door. There is no direct b1' accessbetwee' tlre thruster spaces. Each of the thrusten is fed directly from its respective r*it.r1lo*a. Each thruster space contaitts its own transformer. ir"quanay con\,grter, drive motor. steerirrg hydraulics.lubricatiot't systernarcl-coolingrvatei systenr. The configuration of the thrusterspaces the forward end and affer end of the pontoonare al minor iliage. The port and starboardpontoon spacesare also effectively minor images of eachother. A degree of redundancyis also afforded by virtue of the facr that there are two thrusters mountedon the outboardside of each pontoon and fwo on the inboard side. Further redundancy providedas the thrusters not in line across pontoons is are the suchthat in the eventof seriouscollision forward or aft fwo thrustersat tlreaffectedend shouldsurvive. Each thruster spacecan be accessedfi'om either fonvard or the after end ofthe po,rtoon. Ttris leveI of separation ensurestlrat there would need to be multiple hull breac6es for nrorc than one ofthe thrustersto be incapacitated flooding. by Fire Risk: Fire ha:eards the thrusler in room includehydraulic and lubricating rhe oil oil. ignition sources from high voltageelectricalequiprirent. are Fire Protection:Fi.redCO1 flooding s)'stem. Col e.rtinguishers.Ir4anuall.r, a Acti'ared Call (MAC) for acrivating fire alarnr. rlre

l0'lz I 0' | 2' I

10'12'2

o
I 0' | 2'3 l0'12'4

I 0. 12.5 FloodRisk: Hull breaclr / or failureof pipervor.k. and l0'12'6 Flood Protection: Autotnatic air operatedbilge pumps and alarnrspror,ide sorne . protection againstthe effectsofllou'r,olurne leaks. The biige pump cuts in automatical6, lo renloveslnall leakageinto rhe space. Should the pump run tbr over ten nr;nut., ai: alann w'ill be triggeredin the SVC.

Page of429 328

onfidential rreatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010690
TRN-MDL-00a52427

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWATER HORIZON

FMECA/A64I04

t0.13

Effccts of Fire and Flood and Measures to Prevent Them - Thruster Rooms

10.13.1 A fire in a thruster room has the potential to stop the thruster and cause darnageto preventits use. The period of tirne it would be unavailable would be dependent the on extentofdamaee. 10.14 10.I4.1 Main Switchboards Six of mainswitchboards both HV and LV are locatedimmediatelyaft of their respective generatorrooms on levcl 2. Each room is independentofthe others and is separated by an ,{60 bulkhead. Each room consists of two compartmen6 which have an 460 bulkheadand accessdoor belrveenthem. lnboard of the generatorswitchboards. on either sideof the enginecontrol room are the HV and LV drilling srvitchboards. Tlrese eachsuppliedfiom them and areprotected A'60bulkheads. also haveonetlrruster by

10.14.2 Locatedunderneath drilling switchboardsanclthe engineconfrol roour are the port the and starboard drilling drives, re-generationurrit switchboardsand transfonnerrooms. Each of the switchboards and transformer rooms are contained within an 460 compartment. 10,14.3 Floodingof any generator room by pipe breachwill result in the loss of the generating capacityof that room. As dre deck of the switchboardrooms are locatedat seconddeck level (third level for the drilling drive switchboards) which is well abovethe operating water line the switclrboard rooms will not be affccted in the short tenn. If any room is lost to flooding due to pipeworkfailure, the vesselwill lose the usc switchboard of one thruster if the switchboards are configured in a closed ring. This is seen as an ertremelyremotepossibi ity. I 10.14.4 Fire in any singleswitchboard room will result in the loss of one thruster. 10.14.5 Fire risk Thereis very little in the way of fire hazards the switchboard in rooms but the HV and LV electrical equipment provide potential do ignition sources. 10.14.6 Fire nrotection: CO: flooding s-ystem. CO2 extinguishem. Manually Activated Call a (MAC) for activatingthe fire alarm. 10.14.7 Flood risk: Cooling n'aterpipesfor spacecooling. t 0 . I 4 . 8 Flood protection: Each switchboardroom is affordedthe same flood protectionas its machinery space. associated 10-15 l0.l5.l Effects of Fire and Flood and Measures to Prevent Them - Switchboard Rooms Fire or flood in a swilchboardroom u'ould causethe loss ofone gencratorand one thruster in a closed ring configuration. If the busties connectedto the affected switchboardhave not already opened,they should be opened to prevent the remaining I lkV powersystemlrom clearinga fault on thetie-line.
Page 329 of429

confidential rreatment Requested Transocean by Holdings LLC

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010691
TRN-MDL-o0052428

TRANSOCEAN

DEEPWA'TER HORIZON

FMECAJA64I04

10.16

Effects Fire andFloodandMeasurtsto preventThem- cable Routes of

10.16.l The cable routes for each maclrinery space are completely independentand selfcontained rvithin each machinery space. Each aft thruster space is adjacent to its respectivemachinery spacethus the loss of one machinery spacervill only accountfor tlre loss ofone thrusteraft. The forrvardport andstarboard thrusters also indeDendent are and have self-contairred systemswithin their respectivespaces. 10-17 10.I 7.I Effects of Fire and Flood and Measuresto Prevent Them - pipe Routes The pipe routesfor eachmachinery, spaceare cornpletellindependent self-contained and w'ithin each maclrinery space. Each aft thruster space is adjacentto its lespective nrachinen'space.thus the lossof one machineryspacewill only accountfor the lossof one thrusteraft. The forrvardtlrrusters port and starboard also independent have are and self-contained rvithin their respectivepaces. s)'stcnts s

o',

Page 330 of429

Qifioentiat

by Holdings Treatment Requested Transocean LLc

TRN-HCEC-00010692
TRN-MDL-00052429

CONFIDENTIAL

11

Or

Holdings LLC by onfidential Requested Transocean Treatment

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010693
TRN-MDL-00052430

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FMECA/A6410-0

1I.
It.l I l.t.l

CONCLUSIONS
GeneralConclusions drilling unit. Tltc Horizonis a dynamically positionedsemi subrnersiblc The Deepwater poweredby up to six propulsionsysternis Dieselellctric with eiglrt largeFPP thrusters are gener"tors in located six enginerooms.The enginerooms locatedaft. The dynamic positionings),stetnof the DeepwaterHorizon has been subjectedto a there are detailedFaiture Modes.Effects ancl CriticaliqvAnalysisto determiner'r'hether dueto drift offor driveoff. thatcould resultin a lossof position anl,singlepohrtfailures flie aratyiis also examinedthe effects of potential hidden failures. contmon ntode failuresand actsof nraloperation. arrd a probabilitv of Criticaliw: The failure effects r^rerealso assigneda severit-v or to rvhich allowedtlrern to be ranked accordirtg criticality (Higlr. N4ediurr oocurrence modecan [:e found in the criticali4'tables ro l,ow). The criticaliq,assigned eachfailure in Appendix A f; Cloied Ring Configuration and Appendix B for Split Rittg Configuration. of with the reqtrirerrents Cornoliance:The designof the DP systembroadlycomplies rvhich is equivalcnt to ABS DPS 3. Whcn all esscntial 3 IMO Dp EguipmentCJass in fit the systenls iutiy operational. vesselis considered to conductDP operations this are Class provided ir is operated in such a way that it can maintain position dquiplnent foilowing the rvoist case failure. only one HIGH and three MEDILIM to HICH of u,ererevealedby the analysis the ClosedRing Configuration' nrodes criticality t-ailure with the HV SwitchboardI l0Vdc system. Only were associated All four failure rnodes by orreIIIGII and one MEDIUM to HICH failure rverercvealed the analysisof the Split configuration failure modes associatedwith the Power Generation' Power Ring with and power Distribution Systems. Again both failures are associated Management designhas in improvernent the I loVdc system the HV Switchboard1 l0Vdc systemsand them' to beenrecomrnended renrove The Worst CaseFailureDesign Interrt:This can be definedfbr eachof the follou'ing tr'vo modes. o;rerating 'No singlc failureas dcfined for DP Equipment l. Closed Rins OperationModc:u'ill have a greatereffect on the vessel'sabilitl' to Class 3 r DpS 3 *t"t''on maintain positionthan the loss of one thrusterand the loss of one sectiol'lof HV srvitchboard. ln the case of HV srvitchboardsI to 6 this rtill have the loss consequential of orregenerator'' 'No singlefailureas defined DP Equiprnent Class for Mode:i. Split Ring Operating pp$fiotutiot the vcssel's abilitl to maintain ruitt havc a grcater effect on : or positionthan the lossof one thrusterarrdthe lossof onesectionof HV srvitchboard. lossof one 11the caseof HV switchboardsI to 6 this rvill havethe consequential generator. This "Worst CaseFailure Design lntent' for split ring operatingrnodeis Jependenton which generatorsare connected. lf DGl. DG2. DC4 and DC5 are not running on the systern,then more than one sectionof HV switchboardand therefore morc than one thruster will be lost'
Page I of429 33

11.1.2

| 1.1.3

I1.1.4

O,1
I I .l .i

'Confidential LLC Holdings by Requested Transocean Treatment

CONFIDENTIAL

,!

TRN-HCEC-00010694
TRN-MDL-00052431

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FMECA/A6410-0

11.2 I 1.2.1

Worst Case Failure: Thereis a risk of blackout due to a governoror AVR failure when the power plant is run with common modc failurc as a common system. There also a risk of drift-of associated of thrusters exposed to a severe voltage dip on the I lkV distribution system. It is in difficult ro quanti$rthe risk from thesefailure modesas they will only succeed certain said is that the failure effest is only catastrophic operating conditions but what can be when the power plant is run as a common s)'stem. In the Split Ring configuration the critically analysis shows that tlrcre is a higher potential for the loss of rrore than one thrusterdue to a srvitchboardfault Mitigafion of Hidden Failures conccptdepends the has identifieda nunrberofareas ra4rete redundancy The analysis or offline redundancy. Hidderr heavily on the correct action of protective l"unctions failures n,ithin this equiprnent could increasethe risk of a loss of position if the failed to operui. on denrand. As it is not practicalto have alr alarm for every equipment to acceptable fauli that could preventthe correct operationofequipnren! it is considered level of confidence or test suclrequipmenr functionsperiodicallyso that there is a high are rvhenrequired. The following furrctions identified that tlrey *ill bp.tut. successfully thesefunctionsaretestedalreadyaspart of planned as being in thijcategory. Many of Societysurveys: or maintenance for Classification l. generator stafting. Load dependent

11.3 ll.3.l

relaysand interlocks. includingcircuit breakers. protectionsystems Z. All electrical 3. 4. 5. 6. l'l .3.2 DP thrustlimitation and reduction. Drilling Phaseback. Blackout recoverYkW transducerfailure alarms in PMS'

for Closed Ring Distributionof Criticalitv: A total of 34E failure modeswere examined (ieneration, A t"t"l .f 160 failure modeswere examinedfor the Power configuration. in Closed Ring Configuration' A and Power Distribution systems Power Management PorverManagement total of i 60 failure modeswere examinedfor the Power Generation, power Distribuion systemsin Split Ring Configuration. In many cass'tlre failure and so such as-six generators man!' mole modes apply'to rnultiples of identical eqrriprnent rvith single potential i.ilur.. are covered. There are a nunber of failures associated transienteffects in Split Rit'tg Configuration generatorfailure that do have rlrore severe and than in closed Ring Configuration and theseare included in the Pou'erGeneration Tables' PowerDistributionCriticali$

332of429 Page

r-I

-i.

.-,

LLC Holdings by Requested Transocean Y|onfidential Treatment

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010695
TRN-MDL-00052432

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FMECAJA64I()-O

is: in RineConfisuration for I1.3..3 Thedistribution criticalities all systems Closed of

Endncr.
::lllraltttl'.

' ;:r..:i':1.i

oil,
H\i Closed Rino (Strbtotrll lJ\j Closcd Rins (t/o)

s,B o1L
t

S/B'. , IiGDP';
0
(,1
l)t tl

MEDtrNI rtr.H(fr

HIGX.:
l{l

4 4

E
I

72

t2

t)

0.8

11.3.4

The distribution of criticalities for the 167 failure modes associatedwitlr Porver and Power Distribution in Closed Ring Confiquration Generation, Power Management is:Engira
Thnrirtert:

"&owri,,
: ]f{EDIUM

o/L I sn
HV Olosed
Rirro /Srrhtotrll

ATL. s/B
E
I

MEIXI'M ioHIffi

EIGE
l(ll

0 0

E6

40

28
I /.f,

_t

[{\r (]loscd llino 1./-l

:)

l.(,

0.1

| 1.3.5

u'ith Power The distributionof criticalitiesfol the 166 lailure nrodesassociated and Power Management PorverDistributionirt Split Ring Confieurationis:Cenerarion,
Eneiacri Thm|ecr! olL s/B o,N' s/B
HV Splil Ring lSubtotlll H\'' Splil Ring
lo/"\

-}'EDIIM

,,id:trtGts

.SIGE
lil)

1
l

I It 0

60 37.5

48 30

50
J I

rri

0.5 _

l 1.3.6

Note (l ) - Ttre HIGH criticalit-v only applies \\'hen two I l0Vdc systems are mode. and interconnected this is ttot the nonnal operating in Fifti, one MEDIUM criticalityfailureswere revealed the ClosedRine Confieuratio-g but failureswere revealedin the Split Ring Configuration, and fifty MF.DIIJM criticalit_v and rvith any one particularset of subsystems are spreadacross theseare not associated the follorvings)'stems: logic ControlandProtection l, Getterator ?. Switchgcar 3. Synchronisers 4. Irrterlocks 5. Governors 6, AVR'S 7. Mode Corttrol 8. Standbr,selection starts 9. |.oaddependent i 0. Loadsharing pleventioD I l, Blackout 12. Blackoutrestaft 1 3 .l l k V d i s t r i b u t i o n I 4. I l0Vdc distribution
Page of439 333

11.3.7

LLC Holdings by onfidential Requested Transocean Treatment

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010696
TRN-MDL-00052433

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FMECA/46410-0

15.Generator and thrusterconfigurationon the HV systcm 16.Configurationof the 480V system I 7. Thruster ntotor and mechanicalfaiiures stops 18.Thrusteremergency 19.Process statiorls 20. Networks 21.The Main DPC32controllers 2 2 .T J P S 2 3 ,E S D . I1.i.8 that could lravetheir criticaliry of Sonre theseMEDIUM criticalitvfailureshaveeftbcts that and the anal1,9i5 raiseda nurlber of recontnrertdations may be rt'orthvof has reduced to considelation Trarrsocean further inrprovethc safeq-and reliabilitv of the design, by to are These latter recornmendations llot uncornn'ron tran1,of the Diesel electric DP Horizotl. vessels buih aroundtlrc sametinre as the Deepu'ater

Page334of 429

-=r

-donfidential Treatment LLC Holdings by Requested Transocean

CONFIDENTIAL

TRN-HCEC-00010697
TRN-MDL-00052434

TRANSOCEAN

HORIZON DEEPWATER

FMECAiA64l0-0

I0.
l0.l 10.1.1

PROTECTION AGAINST FIRE AND F'LOOD

lntroduction of IMO DP The DeepwaterHorizon has been designedto meet the requiremeuts are standards ableto rnaintain built to these Vessels Class3 and ABS DPS-3. Equiprnent failureofanyactivccon'lponentandcanalsotolerate porltionandl1"udingfollowirrgthe theeffectsofafire-orfloodinanyonecornpartment.Toaclrievetheselevelsoffault compartnlentscontaining tolerance,the machinery spaces, and otlrer DP essential by bulkheadsand deckheadsbuilt to of elenteuts ttre desigrl, are protected reclundant threateitherby' hull breactt comply u,ith 460 classification.\Vlrereflooding is a cledible within their orvn of elements the designare contained redundant or frorn internalsources. cablcrvays to extcnds pipc routc-alld This levcl of scgregation water-tightcompartments. vitS the cornpliance connecting,.,.,'ing red'ndant elernentsofthi design. To verifl' identified as containing compaftrnetrt requirerrentsof 6pS: each normalll' accessible to surveyed confirnrthe fisk of fire and flooding to relatecl the f)P sYstem\va.s equipment providedwithin the conrpafilnent' and active fir'eprotectiorr and tlrenatureof tl.lepassive Fire Subdivisions navigationbridgeand Fire subdivisionin the living quartersand on tlre level of the is identifrid on the Hyundai docurnentAnangementof Ventilation backup op station 050' All steel System for iecond Deck Plan Drawing No HRBS-H68-000-Hi throughthose divisionsare penetrations A60 and an1' ratedto classification subdivisions and decks are of a lesserrating and detailedrvithin tlre docunrenl. Several bulkheads divisionsthey are notedin the document' whereverthereis a ratingfor tlrese WatertightSubdivisions vvatertightsubdivisiollsis available in the seriesof lnformation on the provision of 'Fxtent {As of watertight and weatlrerproofIntegrit-v cirawingsHRBS-05S-000-p0504, .HRBS-058-000.P0607 and rvatertight txtent of weathertight sheetsI to 12, and built) and decks within the pontoonsare integrity drawirrgs1 to 4. In general,all bulkheads doors whose operationis rnonitoredand rvatcrtightrvith hydraulic slidirrg u'ateltight availableand are the controlledby the kongsberg ICS s1'stems'Local controlsare also All rvatertighttloors are kept closed wlren lhe vesselis at norrrrall'eans of operitiorr. danrpers.cable n'allsitsare assumed sea. velrtilation drrctsare provided $'ith rvatertight draft. to tlre rig operating equivalent at to be rvatertight a headctifferential ComPartments Essentialto DP contained which conlpartmenls A survev of the vesselrvas carried ou{ to deternrine are The fire and flood risks fbr eaclrcompaftInellt equipmentrelatedto the DP s)'stem. tlrat follorv alorrgrvith the effectsof losing that compaftlnent irr cliscussed the sections to and tlre protectiorrpr.ovided counter the risk of fire and flood.

10.2 10.?.1

10.3 10.3.1

10.4 104. I

31 Page 4 of429

Ori.r,o

LLC Holdings by ent ia ent I rreatrn Requested Transocean

TRN-HCEC-00010676
TRN-MDL-00052413

CONFIDENTIAL