Sie sind auf Seite 1von 16

Corroboration

1 Introduction
As a general rule, a conviction may rest upon the uncorroborated testimony of one witness. There are, however, many instances in which we may feel that the testimony of one witness is not sufficient weighty to produce belief beyond reasonable doubt. The witnesss mode of speaking may be unconvincing, the facts to which he deposes may be improbable, we may find his account confused or entertain suspicion because he has a motive of lying, and we mistrust his intellectual faculties, and so on. In such situations we have ground for doubting the witnesss account and for seeking independent confirmation before accepting it. Legal rules of corroboration take the matter further and attempt to forestall unwarranted reliance on testimony by formal means. Basically, English law employs two methods of seeking confirmation for potentially unreliable witnesses. The statutory method consists in providing that a conviction cannot be supported in the absence of the prescribed support. Of far greater importance are the common law rules which require the trial judge to warn the jury that it is dangerous to rely on certain kinds of evidence .On the face of it the common law rule stipulate that which common sense dictates: A search for confirmation. They require the judge to give a direction which is frequently likely to confuse the jury and distract attention from the need to treat the suspect evidence with circumspection. The rules are so complex that judges can easily overlook their 1

consequences and place even sound convictions at the risk of being over tuned on appeal.

2 The meaning of corroboration


The word corroboration connotes support or confirmation, and indicates, in relation to the law of evidence, that certain evidence is confirmed in its tenor and effect by other admissible and independent evidence. In any case where on piece of evidence confirms and supports another, corroboration therefore takes place if both pieces of evidence are accepted by the tribunal of fact. As pointed out by Lord Reid in DPP v. Kilbourne (1973): There is nothing technical in the idea of corroboration. When in the ordinary affairs of life one is doubtful whether or not to believe a particular statement one naturally looks to see whether it fits in with other statements or circumstances relating to the particular matter, the better it fits in ,the more one is inclined to believe it

3 Corroboration is not required but one witness is sufficient


Thus in a criminal trial, provided that the jury is satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused, a conviction may be based on the testimony of a single witness who swears that he saw the accused commit the crime in question, and this remains the case even if part or all of his evidence is contradicted by the testimony of one or more witnesses called by the defence. A party is, of course, free to adduce evidence which corroborates or supports the other evidence that he has tendered and to the extent that this would strengthen an otherwise weak case, as a matter of

common sense he would be well advised to do so. As a general rule, however, there is (a) no requirement that evidence be corroborated and (b) no requirement that the tribunal of fact be warned of the danger of acting on uncorroborated evidence. In Paruit v.R(1968)MR 27 the following comments were made: A part from those cases specifically provided for by statute or by long established rules of practice, there is no rule of law that requires corroboration of the evidence of a single witness and a magistrate is perfectly entitled to convict in appropriate cases on the evidence of that witness

4 The necessary qualities of corroborative evidence were laid down in Rv Baskerville where for evidence to be corroborative evidence it must
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) be relevant be credible be independent Confirm in a material particular evidence tending to show not only the

commission of the offence but also the involvement of the accused .

5 Three categories of exception where corroboration must be required or may be required A Corroboration required as a matter of law
In cases falling within this category, the ambit of which is defined ,comprising as it does four cases governed by statute(speeding ,treason, perjury and attempts to commit such offences), a conviction cannot be based on uncorroborated evidence 3

and ,if it is, will be reversed on appeal. Thus in the absence of such corroboration, the judge should direct an acquittal. a. Speeding The opinion evidence of non-experts is generally inadmissible and one of the exceptions to this rule is opinion evidence relating to speed .The opinion evidence of two or more people that a vehicle was exceeding the speed limit is sufficient to justify a conviction under this provision provided that their evidence relates to the speed of the vehicle at the same place and time. The provision only applies to evidence of mere opinion and not to evidence of fact. Thus in Nicholas v Penny it was held that magistrates could convict on the evidence of a police officer who had checked a vehicles speed from the speedometer of his own car which was driven at an even distance behind the defendants car. Speedometers and other similar devices will be presumed, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, to have been working at the material time. In Crossland v DPP Bingham LJ said, It is plain that the subsection is intended to prevent the conviction of a defendant on evidence given by a single witness of his unsupported visual impression of a defendants speed. An expert in accident reconstruction testified that he had inspected the scene of a road traffic accident, including skid marks and damage to the defendants car .,carried out speed and braking tests on the car, and calculated that its speed had been not less than 41 mph. It was held that this was not solely the opinion evidence of one witness: the expert had also described the objectively-determined phenomena on which his opinion was based.

b.

Perjury The corroboration need relate only to the falsity of the statement in question. Thus if the accused admits that the statement was untrue, the prosecution need call no evidence to prove the fact. Perjury provides that if any person lawfully sworn as a witness willfully makes a statement material in the proceedings which he knows to be false or does not believe to be true, he shall be guilty of an offence. It is clear, form the words italicized, that proof of falsity is not a prerequisite to a conviction. Thus in those cases, albeit rare, in which the prosecution elects to proceed on the basis that the truth or falsehood of the statement forms no part of their case. It will be satisfied if two witnesses testify to having heard the accused admit the falsity of the statement on the same occasion c. Treason It provides that a person charged with the offence shall not be convicted except on the oaths of two lawful and credible witnesses d. Attempts Any provision whereby a person may not be convicted or committed for trial on the uncorroborated evidence of one witness(including any provision requiring the evidence of not less than two credible witnesses) shall have effect with respect to an offence of attempting to commit an offence as it has effect with respect to the offence attempted.

B Care warnings
1. Accomplices testifying for the prosecution and complainants in sexual cases Although corroboration was not required as a matter of law, the tribunal of fact had to be warned, as a matter of law, of the danger of acting on evidence if not corroborated. This obligatory warning was required in respect of the evidence of (a) Accomplices testifying on behalf of the prosecution Accomplices were defined as (i) parties to the offence in question (ii) handlers of stolen goods (iii)parties to the offence committed by the accused in respect of which evidence is admitted under the similar fact evidence doctrine. Whether a particular witness was an accomplice was a question usually answered by the witness himself, by confessing to participation, by pleading guilty to it or by being convicted of it. If not answered by the witness himself, the question whether he was in fact an accomplice was for the jury (provided that there was evidence on which a reasonable jury could have concluded that the witness was an accomplice) (b) complainants in sexual cases In sexual cases, the warning was required of the victims, whether male or female of sexual offences. There were only two exceptions to the requirement that a warning be given. a. A warning was not required where an accomplice gave evidence, on behalf of the prosecution, which was mainly favorable to the accused and more harm would have been done to the accused by giving the warning than by not giving it.

b. A warning was not required in sexual cases in which identification was in issue, but not the commission of the offence itself. Subject to these

exceptions, failure to give the warning furnished a good ground of appeal .The warning to be given to the jury became known as the full warning which comprised four parts:(i) the warning itself ,i.e. that it was dangerous to convict on the

uncorroborated evidence of the suspect witness but that if they were satisfied of the truth of such evidence, they might nonetheless convict (ii) (iii) an explanation of the meaning of corroboration in the technical sense an indication of what evidence was(and was not)capable in law of

amounting to corroboration (iv) an explanation that it fell to them, as the tribunal of fact, to decide

whether that evidence did in fact constitute corroboration The justification The justification given for the requirement of a warning in the case of an accomplice giving evidence for the prosecution was that such a witness may have a purpose of his own to serve: he may give false evidence against the accused out of spite, to exaggerate or even invent the accuseds role in the crime, or with a view to minimizing the extent of his own culpability. Concerning sexual offences, the requirement of a warning stemmed from an assumption that such a charge is easy to make but difficult to refute. There is also the danger that the complainant may have made a false accusation owing to sexual neurosis, jealousy, fantasy, spite or a girls refusal to admit that she consented to an

act of which she is now ashamed. Such a danger may be hidden, yet the nature of the evidence may well make jurors sympathetic to the complainant and so prejudice them against the accused The reasons in favor of the abolition of mandatory corroboration warnings (i) the rules applied irrespective of the circumstances of the particular

case and the credibility of the particular witness. Thus on the facts it may have been obvious that there was no danger of the suspect witness giving false evidence, yet the judge still had to give the warning (ii) Since many sexual offences are committed in circumstances in which

corroboration is difficult if not impossible to obtain, the requirement was capable of resulting in the acquittal of the guilty. In cases involving the sexual abuse of children, the mandatory warning simply compounded the difficulty of securing a conviction (iii) The full warning had become extremely complex, not least because of

the technical rules on what constituted corroboration, and this often led to successful appeals (iv) There was an element of self-contradiction in directing jurors that it

was dangerous to convict on uncorroborated evidence and then proceeding to direct them that they could nonetheless do so. (v) There was some evidence to suggest that where a warning was

given, far from operating as a safeguard for the accused, the jury were more likely to convict. The supporting material

If there is an evidential basis for suggesting that the witness may be unreliable ,and the trial judge decides to direct the jury that it would be wise to look for some supporting material,. It seems reasonably clear that such material may be furnished by the accused himself, as when evidence is given if an out of court confession or the accused makes a damaging admission in the course of giving his evidence. It seems equally clear that it may be furnished by (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) the accuseds lies, whether told in or out of court his silence his refusal to consent to the taking of samples his misconduct

Lies by the accused may amount to supporting material depending on the nature of the lie and the nature of the other evidence in the case .It is submitted that the criteria for determining whether a lie constitutes supporting material are the same as those previously employed for determining whether a lie amounted to corroboration in the technical sense. Those criteria, applicable to lies whether told in or out of court, were established in R v Lucas. To be capable of amounting to corroboration, the lie must first of all be deliberate. Secondly it must relate to a material issue. Thirdly the motive for the lie must be a realization of guilt and a fear of the truth. Fourthly the statement must clearly be shown to be a lie by evidence. Thus where an accused, charged with a sexual offence, tells the police that on the evening in question he did not leave his house, but subsequently admits that this statement was false,his lie may be used to support the evidence of the victim that

the offence had taken place near to the accuseds home, because a false statement .may give to a proved opportunity a different complexion from what it would have borne had no such false statement been made. R v Lucas itself concerned the fourth criterion. The appeal was allowed because the jury had been invited to prefer the evidence of an accomplice to that of the accused and then to use their disbelief of the accused as corroboration of the accomplice .The direction was erroneous because the lie told by the accused was not shown to be a lie by evidence other than that of the accomplice who was to be corroborated. Where a person is accused of a crime ,by a person speaking to him on even terms ,in circumstances such that it would be natural fro him to reply, evidence of his silence may be admitted to show that he admits the truth of the charge made and may constitute supporting material. Such material,it is submitted, may also be derived from inferences properly drawn from (i)the accuseds failure to mention facts when questioned by a constable or being charged with an offence(ii) his silence at trial (iii)his failure or refusal to account for objects ,substances, marks or presence at a particular place or (iv)his refusal to consent to the taking of intimate samples. Supporting material may also take the form of evidence of the accuseds misconduct on some other occasion admitted under the similar fact evidence doctrine as evidence relevant to the question of guilt on the charge before the court. Whether a given item of evidence is capable of amounting to supporting material is not always as easy as the above examples might suggest. For example ,in a case of rape in which the complainant is shown to have made previous false complaints and a warning is properly given ,should any of the following items be treated as

10

supporting material, and in any event, how should the judge direct the jury in their regard:(i)a recent complaint admitted under the exception to the rule against previous consistent statements(ii)evidence of the distressed condition of the complainant and (iii)medical evidence showing that someone had had intercourse with the complainant at a time consistent with her evidence? There are compelling reasons to suggest that each of these items, by itself, should not be treated as supporting material and the judge should direct the jury accordingly. As to recent complaint, the trial judge could explain to the jury that the evidence emanates from the complainant herself. As to evidence of distress, the same point could be made but such direction would be inappropriate if, for example, the distress was witnessed shortly after the offence and there is nothing to suggest that the complainant had put on an act and simulated distress. Concerning medical evidence of intercourse, the trial judge might sensibly direct the jury that it does not, by itself, show that intercourse took place without consent or that the accused was a party to it. Sexual cases in which identification is in issue Thus if the identity of the offender is in issue, but the fact that someone committed the offence is not in issue, either because formally admitted by the accused or, if not formally admitted ,because there has been no suggestion by the defence that there is any doubt as to the commission of the offence ,it will normally suffice to direct the jury, in accordance with R v Turnbull, about the need for caution before convicting on identification evidence; a further warning about the complainants evidence as to the offence is only required where there is an evidential basis for suggesting that her evidence in that regard is unreliable.

11

2. Other witnesses whose evidence may be tainted by an improper motive An accomplice who is a co-accused may incriminate another co-accused when giving evidence in his own defence. Because ,in these circumstances ,an accomplice may be regarded as having some purpose of his own to serve, it has been held that it is desirable ,but only as a matter of practice, to warn the jury of the danger of acting on his unsupported evidence ,and that every case must be looked at in the light of its own facts. In R v Cheema, following a full review of the authorities, lord Taylor CJ said: The effect of this considerable body of case law is to show that in recent years time and again the court has reiterated that although a warning in suitable terms as to the danger of a co-defendant having an axe to grind is desirable, there is no rule of law or practice requiring a full corroboration direction.. what is required when one defendant implicates another in evidence is simply to warn the jury of what may very often be obviousnamely that the defendant witness may have a purpose of his own to serve. It is unclear, from this dictum, whether the warning is discretionary or obligatory: a warning about an axe to grind or a purpose of his own to serve is said to be both desirable, which suggests a discretion, and required, which indicates an obligation. In R v Beck it was argued that an accomplice warning should be given in cases where a witness has a substantial interest of his own for giving false evidence even though there is no material to suggest any involvement by the witness in the crime. Although rejecting the argument, Ackner LJ said that the court did not wish to detract from obligation on a judge to advise a jury to proceed with caution where there is

12

material to suggest that a witnesss evidence may be tainted by an improper motive, continuing, and the strength of that advice must vary according to the facts of the case. Thus it would seem that such a warning should be given where, for example, there is evidence to suggest that a witness is acting out of spite or malevolence, has a financial or other personal interest in the outcome of the proceedings, or is otherwise biased or partial. For example ,where a witness, awaiting sentence, gives evidence for the prosecution in another casein circumstances in which he knows that at the very least by doing so he stands a chance of having his sentence reduced ,the potential fallibility of his evidence should be put squarely before the jury. 3. Children Where the unsworn evidence of a child was given on behalf of the prosecution, the accused was not liable to be convicted unless that evidence was corroborated by some other material evidence implicating him; and at common law, the sworn evidence of a child required a corroboration warning as a matter of law. It is obligatory for the court to give the jury a warning about convicting the accused on the uncorroborated evidence of a child. The rationale was the danger that the evidence of a child, especially if unsworn, but even if sworn, may be unreliable by reason of childish imagination, suggestibility, or fallibility of memory. In R v Pryce, it is submitted ,whether such a warning is given at all ,and if so, the strength of such warning, will depend upon the circumstances peculiar to the case, including, the age and intelligence of the child, whether the evidence is given on oath and, if the evidence is unsworn, how well the child in question understands the duty of

13

speaking the truth. The Court of Appeal thought that it was sufficient for the trial judge to have told the jury to take into account the fact that the witness was a child. 4. Matrimonial cases Where a matrimonial offence is alleged, the gravity of the consequences of proof of such an allegation and the risk of a miscarriage of justice in acting on the uncorroborated evidence of a spouse has led the courts to acknowledge the desirability of corroboration. Corroboration is sought as a matter of practice rather than as a matter of law

C Confession by the mentally handicapped


A person is mentally handicapped if if he is in a state of arrested or incomplete development of mind which includes significant impairment of intelligence and social functioning .An independent person is defined negatively as not including a police officer or a person employed for or engaged on ,police purposes and could include, for example , a relative or friend of the accused or his solicitor. Should a dispute arise on the issue of whether the accused is mentally handicapped or whether his confession was made in the presence of an independent person, evidence, as appropriate expert medical evidence, may be adduced to enable the judge to come to a decision. A person who is mentally handicapped must not interviewed in the absence of an appropriate adult unless an officer of the rank of superintendent or above considers that delay would be likely (a) To lead to interference with or harm to evidence or interference with or physical harm to other people.(b)to lead to the alerting of other people suspected of having committed an offence but not yet

14

arrested for it or (c) to hinder the recovery of property obtained in consequence of the commission of an offence To cases involving confessions by mentally handicapped, the court held that where (i) the prosecution case depends wholly on confessions (ii) the defendant suffers from a significant degree of mental handicap and (iii)the confessions are unconvincing to a point, the judge should withdraw the case. It was held that confessions may be unconvincing, for example, because they lack the incriminating details to be expected of a guilty and willing confessor, because they are inconsistent with other evidence, or because they are otherwise inherently improbable. In a case which is not withdrawn from the jury ,the fact that the confession was made by a mentally-handicapped person may be taken into account by the judge not only for the purpose of deciding whether it should be excluded as a matter of law but also in deciding whether to exercise his discretion to exclude. Thus in R v Moss it was held that confessions made by an accused on the borderline of mental handicap, in the absence of a solicitor or any other independent person, in the course of nine interviews held over nine days, should have been excluded. Where the confession of a mentally handicapped person is admitted in evidence, the court has a general duty, impose in certain circumstances, to warn the tribunal of fact of the dangers of convicting such a person in reliance on his confession. In R v Bailey it was held that in cases where the accused is significantly mentally

handicapped and the prosecution would not have a case in the absence of the accuseds confessions, the judge should give a full and proper statement of the accuseds case against the confessions being accepted by the jury as true and

15

accurate, which should include not only the points made on the accuseds behalf, but also any point which appear to the judge to be appropriate .The matters which in that case should have been put before the jury included(i) that the experience of the courts has shown that people with significant mental handicap do make false confessions for a variety of reasons(ii) the various possible reasons for the accused having made false confession and (iii)that without the confessions, there was no case against the accused.

16

Das könnte Ihnen auch gefallen