CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II BY ATTY. GLENN C. CARAMPATANA CASE DIGESTS INTERPRETATION/CONSTRUCTION OF THE CONSTITUTION: FRANCISCO VS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, GR No.

160261, November 10, 2003 FACTS On June 2, 2003, former President Joseph Estrada filed an impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario Davide for culpable violation of the Constitution, betrayal of public trust and other high crimes. In accordance with the provisions of the Constitution, the impeachment complaint was endorsed by members of the House of Representatives. The House Committee on Justice ruled that the complaint was sufficient in form but voted to dismiss is for being insufficient in substance. On October 23, 2003, a second impeachment complaint was filed with the Secretary General of the House by two other Representatives against Chief Justice Davide. The complaint was accompanied by a Resolution of Endorsement/Impeachment which was signed by at least 1/3 of all the Members of the House of Representatives as expressly stated in Sec 3 of Article XI of the Constitution. According to Section 3 paragraph 5 of Article XI of the Constitution No impeachment proceedings shall be initiated against the same official more than once within a period of one year. Pursuant to the said article, two petitions were filed praying for the declaration of the House Impeachment Rules null and void for being unconstitutional. The 12th Congress of the House of Representatives adopted and approved the Rules of Procedure in Impeachment Proceedings (House Impeachment Rules) on November 28, 2001, superseding the previous House Impeachment Rules approved by the 11th Congress. Under Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules, impeachment proceedings are deemed initiated (1) if there is a finding by the House Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is sufficient in substance, or (2) once the House itself affirms or overturns the finding of the Committee on Justice that the verified complaint and/or resolution is not sufficient in substance or (3) by the filing or endorsement before the Secretary-General of the House of Representatives of a verified complaint or a resolution of impeachment by at least 1/3 of the members of the House. ISSUE: WON the impeachment proceedings initiated against the Chief Justice transgressed the constitutionally imposed one-year time bar rule. RULING: YES. INTERPRETATION OF THE WORD INITIATE It means to file the complaint and take action on it. To determine the merits of the issues, it is wise to employ the well-settled principles of constitutional construction. Verba Legis. (Ordinary meaning) The language of the Constitution the Constitution being the voice of the sovereign people and as the fundamental law of the land as much as possible should be understood in the sense they have in common use.

Ratio Legis Est Anima. (Intent of the framers) The object is to achieve the purpose sought to be achieved by the provisions. Ut Magis Valeat Quam Pereat. (To be Interpreted as a whole) To assure the realization of the purpose of the framers, it is important to construe every section in conjunction with all other sections and provisions. The court must lean in favour of a construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words idle and nugatory. Debate and Proceedings. This should be consulted when other guides fail. People s understanding. Although the debates and proceedings expose us to the reasons of the individual members during the constitutional convention, these do not give us the opinions of the large majority who were not given the chance to speak. IMPEACHMENT CASE VS IMPEACHMENT PROCEEDING An impeachment case is initiated when the Articles of Impeachment are prepared and transmitted to the Senate after at least one third of all the Members upholds the impeachment complaint. An impeachment proceeding is initiated when a verified complaint is filed and referred to the Committee on Justice for action. Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules clearly contravene Section 3 (5) of Article XI since the rules give the term "initiate" a meaning different meaning from filing and referral. DECISION Sections 16 and 17 of Rule V of the House Impeachment Rules are unconstitutional. Consequently, the second impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide Jr. is barred under Sec3(5) of Article XI of the Constitution.

SELF-EXECUTING PROVISIONS: MANILA PRINCE HOTEL vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156. February 3, 1997 FACTS: Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, GSIS decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two bidders participated, Manila Prince Hotel (MPH) and Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad (RB). MPH s bid was at P41.58/per share while RB s bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RB s bid and invoked the Filipino First policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution, but GSIS refused to accept. In turn MPH filed a TRO to avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that: 1. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing); 2. Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national patrimony. ISSUE: Whether or not Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII, of the 1987 Constitution (Filipino First Policy) is a not selfexecuting provision. RULING: Yes. Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the

fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every statute and contract. Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades Manila Hotel has bore mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood. Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The term qualified Filipinos simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and inimical to the common good. In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be made between a qualified foreigner and a qualified Filipino, the latter shall be chosen over the former. Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos. In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos. The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities. PAMATONG vs. COMELEC, GR. No. 161872, April 13, 2004 DIGEST FACTS: Petitioner Pamatong filed his COC for President on December 2003. COMELEC refused to give due course to his COC in a Resolution. Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the said resolution. Again, COMELEC denied his motion pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 6604. COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 nuisance candidates who could not wage a nationwide campaign and/or not nominated by a political party or are not supported by registered political parties with a national constituency. In the present case for certiorari, petitioner seeks to reverse Resolution 6558 contending that his alleged right to equal access to opportunities for public service under S26AII has been violated. Petitioner argues that the COMELEC indirectly amended the constitutional provisions on the electoral process and limited the power of the sovereign people to choose their leaders. ISSUE: WON S26A2 is self-executory RULING: No. Implicit in the petitioner s invocation of the constitutional provision ensuring "equal access to opportunities for public office" is the claim that there is a constitutional right to run for or hold public office and, particularly in his case, to seek the presidency. There is none. What is recognized is merely a privilege subject to limitations imposed by law. Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither bestows such a right nor elevates the privilege to the level of an enforceable right. There is nothing in the plain language of the provision which suggests such a thrust or justifies an interpretation of the sort.

The "equal access" provision is a subsumed part of Article II of the Constitution, entitled "Declaration of Principles and State Policies." The provisions under the Article are generally considered not selfexecuting, and there is no plausible reason for according a different treatment to the "equal access" provision. Like the rest of the policies enumerated in Article II, the provision does not contain any judicially enforceable constitutional right but merely specifies a guideline for legislative or executive action. The disregard of the provision does not give rise to any cause of action before the courts. AMENDMENT/REVISION; STEPS IN THE AMENDATORY PROCESS: SANTIAGO vs. COMELEC, GR No. 127325 DIGEST FACTS: Private respondent deflin filed in the comelec a petition to amend the constitution, lifting term limits of elective officials via peoples initiative. He alleged that he and members of the movement for people s initiative intended to exercise the power to directly propose amendments to the constitution under article xvii. Comelec issued an order directing Delfin to publish and follow the procedural steps. While the petition was pending, petitioners herein, filed a special civil action for prohibition contending that the constitutional provision on people s initiative to amend the constitution is not self-executory and that no such law has been passed and that while ra 6735 provides for initiative, such law is defective in that it only provides for local and national initiative and referendum but not for constitutional amendments. Petitioners also contend that comelec s giving cognizance of delfin s petition was ultra vires or with grave abuse of discretion. ISSUE: a. WON ra 6735 was intended to include or cover initiative on constitutional amendments and if so WON the act is adequate b. WON the portion of comelec regarding amendments to the constitution is valid RULING: a. Yes. Ra 6735 was intended to cover initiative to propose amendments to the constitution. However, the act is not a full compliance with the power and duty of congress to provide for the implementation and exercise of the right as mentioned in axvii of the constitution. While it is true that the act does define initiative on amendments to the constitution, states the requirements as to the percentage of votes but unlike the other systems of initiative, the act does not provide for contents of a petition for initiative on the constitution. In addition, while the act provides subtitles for national and local initiative, there is no subtitle for constitutional initiative. This simply means that the main thrust of the ra is local and national initiative. b. No. Since it is established that ra6735 is not adequate to cover amendments to the constitution, there is no valid law that authorizes comelec to implement rules. Therefore, that part of comelec s resolution involving constitutional amendments is null and void. LAMBINO vs COMELEC, GR No. 174153 Petition for certiorari and mandamus. FACTS: Petition for Initiative to Amend the Constitution filed by Lambino with some 6.3 million registered voters who affixed their signatures (12% and 3% requirement verified by election officers). Petition is to change the present bicameral-presidential to a unicameral-parliamentary system of government in order to achieve greater efficiency, simplicity, and economy in the government and providing Article XVIII as

Transitory Provisions for the orderly shift. Several organizations opposed the petition. COMELEC denied the petition citing Santiago vs COMELEC decision. ISSUE WON petition for Initiative to Amend be approved. HELD SC denied the petition. Doctrine of stare decisis with Santiago case. Changes proposed constitute a revision and not just amendment as it affects the separation of powers, and will have ripple effects to the other provisions in order to conform to the new system of government. Petitioners are not proper parties to file Initiative Section 1 and 2, Article XVII of the Constitution RA 6735 JUDICIAL REVIEW; WHO EXERCISES: MIRASOL vs. CA, GR. No. 128448 DIGEST FACTS: Private respondent PNB financed petitioners sugar production venture under a crop loan financing scheme. Under said scheme, petitioners signed Credit Agreements, a Chattel Mortgage on Standing Crops, and a Real Estate Mortgage in favor of PNB. The agreement empowered PNB as the petitioners attorney-in-fact to negotiate and sell petitioners sugar domestically and internationally and to apply the proceeds to the payment of their obligations to it. Subsequently, PD 5792 was issed. This decree authorized private respondent to purchase sugar allocated for export to foreign markets. The price and quantity was determined by SQA, PNB, DTI and the Office of the President. The decree further authorized PNB to finance PHILEX s purchases. Finally, the decree directed that whatever profit PHILEX might realize from sales of sugar abroad was to be remitted net expenses and liabilities to a special govt fund. PNB continued to finance the sugar production of the Mirasols. Petitioners, believing that the proceeds of their sugar sales to PNB, if accounted for, were enough to pay their debts, asked PNB for an accounting of their sales to the latter. PNB ignored said request. PNB then asked petitioners to settle their due and demandable accounts. Consequently, petitioners conveyed to PNB real properties by dacion en pago. Despite demands, the Mirasols failed to settle their accounts. As a result PNB extrajudicially forclosed the mortgaged properties. Petitioners then filed a suit for accounting, mandamus and damages against PNB in the RTC, where the latter ruled in favor of petitioners. Unsatisfied with the decision, since the dacion en pago and the mortgage contracts and foreclosures were not nullified, petitioners filed an appeal where respondent court declared the latter valid. Petitioners moved for reconsideration but was denied; hence, the present petition. ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction to declare a statute unconstitutional without notice to the OSG RULING: Yes. It is settled that RTCs have the authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute, PD, or EO. The constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to declare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, PD, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in

this Court, but in all RTCs. In JM Tuason vs. CA, we held: Plainly, the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." However, it was not proper for the trial court to have exercised judicial review. Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that it was improper for the trial court to have declared P.D. No. 57912 unconstitutional, since petitioners had not complied with Rule 64, Section 3, of the Rules of Court. Petitioners contend that said Rule specifically refers only to actions for declaratory relief and not to an ordinary action for accounting, specific performance, and damages. Petitioners' contentions are bereft of merit. Rule 64, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides: "SEC. 3. Notice to Solicitor General. - In any action which involves the validity of a statute, or executive order or regulation, the Solicitor General shall be notified by the party attacking the statute, executive order, or regulation, and shall be entitled to be heard upon such question."

JUDICIAL REVIEW; REQUISITES; ACTUAL CASE/CONTROVERSY: LACSON vs. PEREZ, GR. No. 147780 DIGEST FACTS: Faced by an angry mob armed with deadly weapons attempting to break into Malacaang, President Arroyo issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring a state of rebellion in the NCR and directed the AFP and PNP to suppress such rebellion. Warantless arrests of several alleged leaders and promoters of the rebellion were effected. Allegedly aggrieved by the warrantless arrests and the declaration of a state of rebellion, petitions were filed before the court; (1) (2) GR No. 147780 for prohibition, injunction, mandamus and habeas corpus filed by Lacson, among others. GR No. 147781 for mandamus and/or review of the factual basis for the suspension of the privilege of the writ of HC with prayer for suspension of the privilege of the writ and TRO filed by Defensor-Santiago GR No. 147799 for prohibition and injunction and RO by Lumbao GR No. 147810 for certiorari and prohibition filed by the political party Laban ng Demokratikong Pilipino

(3) (4)

On May 6, 2001, Arroyo ordered the lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion. ISSUE: WON Proclamation No. 38, along with the warrantless arrests and hold departure orders were valid RULING: Since Arroyo lifted the state of rebellion, all petitions were rendered moot and academic. In addition, petitioners claim that the proclamation of a state of rebellion was being used to justify warrantless arrests, is also laid to rest by the declaration of the Secretary of Justice to wit: It is already the declared intention of the Justice Department and police authorities to obtain regular warrants of arrests from the courts for all acts committed prior to and until May 1, 2001 which means that preliminary investigations will henceforth be conducted. Moreover, petitioners contention in GRs 147780-81 and 14799 that they are under imminent danger of being arrested without warrant does not justify their resort to the extraordinary remedies of mandamus

and prohibition since an individual subjected to warrantless arrests has other adequate remedies under the Rules of Court and the RPC and may claim for damages under the NCC. ENRILE vs. SET, GR No. 132986 DIGEST FACTS: In 1995, Senator Pimentel, private respondent herein, filed with the SET an election protest against Senator Enrile, petitioner, among others, who won in the May 1995 senatorial elections. Subsequently, in August 1997, the SET, without resolving the election protest, held a press conference announcing the partial and tentative results of the revision of ballots in the pilot precincts. In a press release entitled th th Partial Results in Pimentel s Protest , the name of petitioner dropped from 11 to 15 . Petitioner filed a motion to set aside the said protest and to conduct another appreciation of ballots in the presence of all parties. Petitioner alleged that the partial results were erroneous. Despite votes being given back to petitioner from tallies in Ilocos Norte, the SET denied petitioner s motion, holding that there is no sufficient basis to discard its partial tabulation. Petitioner filed his motion for reconsideration but was again denied; hence, this petition. Petitioner contends that the partial results released by the SET are erroneous because they are improbable and not supported by evidence. In their comments, respondent and the OSG maintain that the SET did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed resolutions. Furthermore, the OSG asserts that the present petition has become moot and academic because the tenure of the contested senatorial position subject of respondent s protest where the assailed Resolutions originated expired on June 30, 1998. ISSUE: WON the SET committed grave abuse of discretion in denying petitioner s Motion to Set Aside Partial Results in Pimentel s Protest and to Conduct Another Appreciation of Ballots in the Presence of all Parties. RULING: Petition Denied by Mootness. The SC sided with the SET in its Resolutions explaining why the tally of petitioner did not match that of the SET s. However, at any rate, the petition has become moot and academic. The tenure of the contested senatorial position which is the gist of the petition expired as early as June 30, 1998. OBITER DICTUM: A case becomes moot and academic when there is no more actual controversy between the parties or no useful purpose can be served in passing upon the merits. In Garcia vs. COMELEC, we held that where issues have become moot and academic, there is no justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or value. DAVID v. GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, G.R. No. 171396, May 3, 2006 DIGEST Seven consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition allege that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo committed grave abuse of discretion. Petitioners contend that respondent officials of the Government, in their professed efforts to defend and preserve democratic institutions, are actually trampling upon the very freedom guaranteed and protected by the Constitution. FACTS: On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued Presidential Proclamation No. 1017 declaring a state of national emergency. On the same day, the President issued General Order No. 5 implementing PP 1017. On March 3, 2006, exactly one week after the declaration of a state of national emergency and after all

these petitions had been filed, the President lifted PP 1017 and issued Proclamation No. 1021 stating that the AFP and PNP have effectively prevented, suppressed and quelled the acts lawless violence and rebellion, and declaring that the state of national emergency has ceased to exist. In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, the Solicitor General stated that the proximate cause behind the executive issuances was the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist insurgents of the New People s Army (NPA), and some members of the political opposition in a plot to unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They considered the aim to oust or assassinate the President and take-over the reigns of government as a clear and present danger. During the oral arguments, the Solicitor General specified the facts leading to the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. The Solicitor General argued that the intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out the armed forces. For their part, petitioners cited the events that followed after the issuance of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. The Office of the President announced the cancellation of all programs and activities related to the 20th anniversary celebration of Edsa People Power I and revoked the permits to hold rallies issued earlier by the local governments. The police cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies. During the dispersal of the rallyists along EDSA, police arrested (without warrant) petitioner Randolf S. David, a professor at the University of the Philippines and newspaper columnist. Also arrested was his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of party-list Akbayan. At around 12:20 in the early morning of February 25, 2006, operatives of the CIDG of the PNP, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, raided the Daily Tribune offices in Manila. The raiding team confiscated news stories by reporters, documents, pictures, and mock-ups of the Saturday issue. Policemen from Camp Crame in Quezon City were stationed inside the editorial and business offices of the newspaper; while policemen from the Manila Police District were stationed outside the building. Further, a few minutes after the search and seizure at the Daily Tribune offices, the police surrounded the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante. In G.R. No. 171396, petitioners Randolf S. David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. In G.R. No. 171409, petitioners Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. challenged the CIDG s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices as a clear case of "censorship" or "prior restraint." They also claimed that the term "emergency" refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence, there is "absolutely no emergency" that warrants the issuance of PP 1017. In G.R. No. 171485, petitioners herein are Representative Francis Joseph G. Escudero, and 21 other members of the House of Representatives, including Representatives Satur Ocampo, Rafael Mariano, Teodoro Casio, Liza Maza, and Josel Virador. They asserted that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute "usurpation of legislative powers"; "violation of freedom of expression" and "a declaration of martial law." They alleged that President Arroyo "gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to do so." In G.R. No. 171483,petitioners KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members averred that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because (1) they arrogate unto President Arroyo the power to enact laws and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances. In G.R. No. 171400, petitioner Alternative Law Groups, Inc. (ALGI) alleged that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate (a) Section 4 of Article II, (b) Sections 1, 2 and 4 of Article III, (c) Section 23 of Article VI, and (d) Section 17 of Article XII of the Constitution. In G.R. No. 171489, petitioners Jose Anselmo I. Cadiz et al., alleged that PP 1017 is an "arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers." And assuming that PP 1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, petitioners argued that "it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency powers without congressional approval." In addition, petitioners asserted that PP 1017 "goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as defined under the Revised Administrative Code."

And lastly, in G.R. No. 171424,petitionerLoren B. Legarda maintained that PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are "unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public concern, all guaranteed under Article III, Section 4 of the 1987 Constitution." In this regard, she stated that these issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal. ISSUES: Whether or not PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional. RULING: The Court finds and so holds that PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence. The proclamation is sustained by Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution and the relevant jurisprudence discussed earlier. However, PP 1017 s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are ultra vires and unconstitutional. The Court also rules that under Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-owned public utility and private business affected with public interest. In the same vein, the Court finds G.O. No. 5 valid. It is an Order issued by the President acting as Commander-in-Chief addressed to subalterns in the AFP to carry out the provisions of PP 1017. Significantly, it also provides a valid standard that the military and the police should take only the "necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence."But the words "acts of terrorism" found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O. While "terrorism" has been denounced generally in media, no law has been enacted to guide the military, and eventually the courts, to determine the limits of the AFP s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5. On the basis of the relevant and uncontested facts narrated earlier, it is also pristine clear that (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence. Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5. SANLAKAS vs EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, GR. No. 159085 FACTS: Some three hundred junior officers and enlisted men of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) stormed into the Oakwood Premiere apartments in Makati City. Bewailing the corruption in the AFP, the soldiers demanded, among other things, the resignation of the President, the Secretary of Defense and the Chief of the Philippine National Police (PNP). In the wake of the Oakwood occupation, the President issued later in the day Proclamation No. 427 and General Order No. 4, both declaring a state of rebellion and calling out the Armed Forces to suppress the rebellion. Party-list organizations Sanlakas and Partido ng Manggagawa (PM), contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Constitution does not require the declaration of a state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. They further submit that, because of the cessation of the Oakwood occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis for the proclamation by the President of a state of rebellion for an indefinite period. ISSUE: Whether or not there is still an actual controversy upon the proclamation of the President that the rebellion has ceased. RULING:

The court agrees with the Solicitor General that the case has been rendered moot upon the proclamation of the President that the rebellion has ceased. As a rule, courts do not adjudicate moot cases, judicial power being limited to the determination of actual controversies. Yet the case at bar is one of those cases where courts will decide on a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable of repetition yet evading review. The jurisdiction of this Court, even in cases involving constitutional questions, is limited by the case and controversy requirement of Art. VIII, par. 5. This requirement lies at the very heart of the judicial function. It is what differentiates decision making in the courts from decision making in the political departments of the government and bars the bringing of suits by just any party. Even granting these petitioners have standing on the ground that the issues they raise are of transcendental importance, the petitions must fail. It is true that for the purpose of exercising the calling out power the Constitution does not require the President to make a declaration of a state of rebellion. Section 18, Article VII provides: Sec. 18. The President shall be the Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of the Philippines and whenever it becomes necessary, he may call out such armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. However, as we observed in Integrated Bar of the Philippines v. Zamora, these conditions are not required in the exercise of the calling out power. The only criterion is that whenever it becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. The foregoing discussion notwithstanding, in calling out the armed forces, a declaration of a state of rebellion is an utter superfluity. At most, it only gives notice to the nation that such a state exists and that the armed forces may be called to prevent or suppress it. Perhaps the declaration may wreak emotional effects upon the perceived enemies of the State, even on the entire nation. But this Court s mandate is to probe only into the legal consequences of the declaration. This Court finds that such a declaration is devoid of any legal significance. For all legal intents, the declaration is deemed not written. The petitions do not cite a specific instance where the President has attempted to or has exercised powers beyond her powers as Chief Executive or as Commander-in-Chief. The President, in declaring a state of rebellion and in calling out the armed forces, was merely exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely executive powers, vested on the President by Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the delegated legislative powers contemplated by Section 23 (2), Article VI. WHEREFORE, the petitions are hereby DISMISSED. ID; ID; PROPER PARTY: INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. HON. RONALDO B. ZAMORA, et.al., G.R. No. 141284, August 15, 2000 DIGEST FACTS: President Joseph Ejercito Estrada commanded the Philippine National Police and the Philippine Marines to conduct joint visibility patrols in Metro Manila on view of the alarming increase in violent crimes. The President confirmed his previous directive in a Memorandum. He further stated that the participation of the Armed Forces of the Philippines is necessary to heighten police visibility in Metro Manila. He also mentioned that the program is only temporary.

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines, asserting itself as the official organization of the Filipino lawyers who are tasked with the duty to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution, challenged the Letter of Instruction and it sought to declare null and void the deployment of the Marines. The Court asked the Solicitor General to submit his Comment. The Solicitor General defends the constitutionality of the act of the President. Furthermore, he contends that IBP has no legal standing. ISSUE: Whether or not IBP has legal standing RULING: NO. IBP has no legal standing. Legal standing or locus standi has been defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged. IBP failed to show any specific injury which it has suffered or may suffer by virtue of the challenged act of the government. What IBP projects as injurious is the supposed militarization of law enforcement which might threaten Philippine democratic institution. The injury, however, is too vague and highly speculative that it did not satisfy the requirement for locus standi. IBP anchored it standing on its alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of law and the Constitution. They had no other basis to support their standing. Moreover, there was no citizen who complained that his political or civil rights have been violated as a result of the deployment. The petition is merely anchored on fear. SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ERMITA, G.R. No. 169777, July 14, 2006 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition proffer that the President has abused power by issuing E.O. 464 Ensuring Observance of the Principles of Separation of Powers, Adherence to the Rule on Executive Privilege and Respect for the Rights of Public Officials Appearing in Legislative Inquiries in Aid of Legislation Under the Constitution, and for Other Purposes . Petitioners pray for its declaration as null and void for being unconstitutional. In the exercise of its legislative power, the Senate of the Philippines, through its various Senate Committees, conducts inquiries or investigations in aid of legislation which call for, inter alia, the attendance of officials and employees of the executive department, bureaus, and offices including those employed in Government Owned and Controlled Corporations, the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP), and the Philippine National Police (PNP). The Committee of the Senate issued invitations to various officials of the Executive Department for them to appear as resource speakers in a public hearing on the railway project, others on the issues of massive election fraud in the Philippine elections, wire tapping, and the role of military in the so-called Gloriagate Scandal . Said officials were not able to attend due to lack of consent from the President as provided by E.O. 464, Section 3 which requires all the public officials enumerated in Section 2(b) to secure the consent of the President prior to appearing before either house of Congress. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner is a proper party to assail the constitutionality of EO 464. RULING: Yes. The tentative prevention of an official from appearing before Congress pending discussion of the matter on inquiry with the President cannot, however, be properly deemed an exercise of executive privilege, not even one for practical purposes. Any such discussion is meant precisely to allow the President to determine whether the information sought falls under the privilege. Before such determination, the claim of privilege could only be based on mere speculation that the information

sought might be confidential in nature. Certainly, Congress cannot be bound by such a tenuous invocation of the privilege. E.O. 464 hampers its legislative agenda and that the issues involved are of transcendental importance. CHAVEZ vs. GONZALES, GR. No. 168338 DIGEST FACTS: On June 5, 2005, Press Secretary Ignacio Bunye told reporters that the opposition was releasing an audiotape of a mobile phone conversation allegedly between President Arroyo and COMELEC Commissioner Garcillano. The conversation was audiotaped allegedly through wire-tapping. Secretary Bunye, in a press briefing produced two versions of the tape, one supposedly the authentic version and the other an altered version. On June 7, 2005, Atty. Alan Paguia released an alleged authentic tape recording of the wiretap. Respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the recording could be held liable under the Anti-Wiretapping Act. In another press briefing Gonzales ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused the spread, the playing and printing the contents of the tape. On June 11, 2005, the NTC issued a press release warning radio and television companies to observe the Anti-Wiretapping Law and pertinent circulars. NTC held a dialogue with the BoD of the Kapisanan ng mga Brodkaster ng Pilipinas (KBP). NTC assured the KBP that the press release did not violate the constitutional freedom of speech, of expression and the press, and the right to information. Accordingly, NTC and KBP issued a joint press statement. Subsequently, Petitioner Chavez filed a petition against respondents Gonzales and NTC praying for the issuance of the writs of certiorari and prohibition, to annul void proceedings, and to prevent the unlawful, unconstitutional and oppressive exercise of authority by the respondents. ISSUE: WON the petitioner has locus standi RULING: It would seem that petitioner has not met the requisite legal standing, having failed to allege such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy. However, we have already held that where serious constitutional questions are involved, the transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside technicalities of procedure. Thus, in line with the liberal policy of this Court on locus standi when a case involves an issue of overarching significance, we therefore brush aside technicalities of procedure and take cognizance of this petition, seeing as it involves a challenge to the most exalted of all civil rights, the freedom of expression. Decision: Petition Granted. Official statements made by respondents are declared null and void for constituting unconstitutional prior restraint on the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press Transcendental Importance Note by yours truly: Since there is no doctrinal definition of transcendental importance, former SC Judge Florentino Feliciano formulated determinants of TI. This is used as the instructive elements of TI: (CPL) 1. Character of the funds/assets involved in the case

2. 3.

Presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or staturory prohibition by a public respondent, agency or instrument of the gov t. Lack of any other party with a more direct and specific injury

The City Prosecutor of Navotas charged Ofelia Arceta for violation of BP Blg. 22 (THE REGION BANK). Arceta did not move to have the charge against her dismissed or quashed on the ground that BP22 was unconstitutional. She merely reasoned out that with the Lozano doctrine still in place, such move would be an exercise in futility for it was unlikely that the trial court would grant her motion and go against prevailing jurisprudence. On October 2002, Arceta was arraigned and peladed not guilty. However, she manifested that her arraignment should be without prejudice to the present petition. Arceta filed the instant petition. GR. 153151: The City Prosecutor of Caloocan filed a charge against Gloria Dy for violation of BP22 (PRUDENTIAL BANK). Like Arceta, Dy made no move to dismiss the charges against her on the ground of BP22 s unconstitutionality. Instead, she filed a petition with this Court for judicial review to have BP22 voided. Identical Issues Raised: (a) Does section 1 really penalize the act of issuing a check subsequently dishonored by the bank for lack of funds? (b) What is the effect if the dishonored check is not paid pursuant to S2BP22? (c) What is the effect if it is so paid? (d) Does S2 make BP22 a debt collecting law under threat of imprisonment? (e) Does BP22 violate the constitutional proscription against imprisonment for non-payment of debt? (f) Is BP22 a valid exercise of police power? ISSUE: WON BP22 is unconstitutional RULING: No. Petition Dismissed. When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, it is the established doctrine that the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy exists; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very lis mota of the case. Only when these requisites are satisfied may the Court assume jurisdiction over a question of unconstitutionality or invalidity of an act of Congress. With due regard to counsel s spirited advocacy in both cases, we are unable to agree that the abovecited requisites have been adequately met. In a special civil action of certiorari the only question that may be raised is whether or not the respondent has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion. Yet nowhere in these petitions is there any allegation that the respondent judges acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. A special civil action for certiorari will prosper only if a grave abuse of discretion is manifested. Actual Case or Controversy: Evidently, these petitions for a writ of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus do not qualify as the actual and appropriate cases contemplated by the rules as the first requisite for the exercise of this Court s power of judicial review. For as the petitions clearly show on their faces petitioners have not come to us with sufficient cause of action Earliest Possible Opportunity: Seeking judicial review at the earliest opportunity does not mean immediately elevating the matter to this Court. Earliest opportunity means that the question of unconstitutionality of the act in question should have been immediately raised in the proceedings in the court below. Thus, the petitioners should have moved to quash the separate indictments or moved to dismiss the cases in the proceedings in the trial courts on the ground of unconstitutionality of B.P. Blg. 22. But the records show that petitioners failed to initiate such moves in the proceedings below. Needless to emphasize, this Court could not

ID; ID; EARLIEST POSSIBLE OPPORTUNITY: MATIBAG vs. BENIPAYO, GR. No. 149036 DIGEST FACTS: On March 2001, Pres. Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Benipayo et al. as COMELEC chairman and officers. After taking their oath and assumed office, the Office of the President submitted to the Commission on Appointments the ad interim appointments of Benipayo et al. However, the CA did not act on said appointments. On June 2001, Arroyo renewed the ad interim appointments and for the same term of 7 years, took their oaths for the second time, and such appointments were submitted to the CA for confirmation. Congress adjourned before the CA could act. Thus, on June 8, 2001, Arroyo renewed again the said appointments. They took their oaths of office anew. In his capacity as COMELEC Chairman, Benipayo issued a memo addressing petitioner as Director IV reassigning petitioner to the Law Department. Petitioner filed an administrative and criminal complaint with the Law Department against Benipayo. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department, petitioner filed the instant petition questioning, among others, the appointment and the right to remain in office of Benipayo et al. Petitioner claims that the ad interim appointments violated the constitutional provisions on the independence of the COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and members. ISSUE: WON the instant petition satisfies all the requirements of judicial review RULING: YES. Benipayo reassigned petitioner from the EID where she was Acting Director, to the Law Department, where she was placed on detail service. The reassignment was pursuant to Benipayo s authority as Chairman of the COMELEC. Even if petitioner is only an Acting Director of the EID, her reassignment is without legal basis if Benipayo is not the lawful COMELEC Chairman. Respondents claim that the petition was not filed at the earliest possible opportunity as the petition was filed only on August 3,2001 when the first ad interim appointments were issued as early as March 22, 2001. However, it is not the date of filing of the petition that determines whether the constitutional issue was raised at the earliest opportunity. The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court can resolve the same, such that, if it is not raised in the pleadings, it cannot be considered at the trial, and if not considered at the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal. ID; ID; LIS MOTA: ARCETA vs. MANGROBANG, GR. No. 152895 DIGEST FACTS: GR. 152895:

entertain questions on the invalidity of a statute where that issue was not specifically raised, insisted upon, and adequately argued. Unavoidable Question (Lis Mota): Nor do we find the constitutional question herein raised to be the very lis mota presented in the controversy below. Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, and not one that is 13 doubtful, speculative or argumentative. We have examined the contentions of the petitioners carefully; but they still have to persuade us that B.P. Blg. 22 by itself or in its implementation transgressed a provision of the Constitution. INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; POLICE POWER; DEFINITION, DISTINCTION, LIMITS: Definition: Police Power has been defined as the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property. Police power easily outspaces the other two inherent powers as instruments of the State in interfering with private rights. The power of ED and TX involve only property rights. By contrast, PP regulates not only the property, but more importantly, the liberty of private persons and virtually all the people. It is regarded as infinitely more important than eminent domain or taxation. Characteristics: Police power is considered the most pervasive, the least limitable, and the most demanding of the three powers. It may be exercised as long as the activity or the property sought to be regulated has some relevance to the public welfare. Limits: It is virtually limitless. Owing to the need to protect society from the inordinate assertion of individual liberty, it has been held that the police power may not be bargained away by virtue of a contract or even a treaty, so long as it is regulated in order to promote the general welfare. ID; ID; SCOPE/CHARACTERISTICS: ICHONG vs HERNANDEZ, 101 Phil 1155 DIGEST Facts: Lao Ichong is a Chinese businessman who entered the country to take advantage of business opportunities particularly in the retail business. For some time he and his fellow Chinese businessmen enjoyed a monopoly in the local market in Pasay. Until in June 1954 when Congress passed the RA 1180 or the Retail Trade Nationalization Act purpose of which is to reserve to Filipinos the right to engage in the retail business. Ichong then petitioned for the nullification of the said Act on the ground that it contravened several treaties concluded by the RP which, according to him, violates the equal protection clause. He said that as a Chinese businessman engaged in the business here in the country who helps in the income generation of the country should be given equal opportunity. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. ISSUE: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. HELD: Yes it is valid. RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state. A law may supersede a treaty or a generally accepted principle. In this case, there is no conflict at all between the raised generally accepted principle and with

RA 1180. Hence, Ichong can no longer assert his right to operate his market stalls in the Pasay city market. TIO vs VIDEOGRAM, 151 SCRA 208 DIGEST FACTS The petitioner questioned the constitutionality of Presidential Decree No. 1987 entitled "An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad powers to regulate and supervise the videogram industry . The purpose of creating a Regulatory Board through Presidential Decree was caused by the proliferation and unregulated circulation of videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or variation thereof, which basically have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government revenues. Moreover proper taxation of the activities of videogram establishments will not only alleviate the dire financial condition of the movie industry but also provide an additional source of revenue for the Government, and at the same time rationalize the heretofore uncontrolled distribution of videograms. Lastly, the rampant and unregulated showing of obscene videogram features constitutes a clear and present danger to the moral and spiritual well-being of the youth, and impairs the mandate of the Constitution for the State to support the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character and promote their physical, intellectual, and social well-being. With all the foregoing reasons, the petitioner s primary concern was PD s imposition of 30% Tax to the videogram establishments, claiming that the tax imposed was harsh, confiscatory, oppressive and/or in unlawful restraint of trade in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. ISSUE Whether or not the imposition of tax to regulate videogram industries was a valid exercise of Police Power? (Please take note that Police Power usually comes with Taxation; Police Power is basically for Regulation and Taxation is the mechanism of the state to regulate) RULING The Supreme Court ruled that the levy of the 30% tax was for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry, particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to protect the movie industry, the tax remains a valid imposition. The public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose the tax was to favor one industry over another; though in fact Theaters and Movie houses were also imposed with 30% tax. It is inherent in the power to tax, that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that "inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation". Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. As to the dispositive partition, the Supreme Court held that the Presidential Decree 1987 was not unconstitutional; hence the petition was dismissed. ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS vs. SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, 175 SCRA 434 DIGEST FACTS: GR No. 79777: Raised in this petition is the constitutionality of PD27, EO228 and 229, and RA6657. They contended, among others, that the said measures are violative of the Constitution, for failure to provide for retention limits to far retention limits for small landowners.

GR No. 79310: Petitioners claim that although the President could exercise legislative power until Congress was convened, she could only do so only to enact emergency measures during the transition period. Even assuming that the interim legislative power of the President was properly exercised, P131 and EO229 would still have to be annulled for violating the constitutional provisions on just compensation, due process, and equal protection. GR No. 78742: The petitioners in this case invoke the right of retention granted by PD27 to owners of rice and corn lands not exceeding 7 hectares as long as they are cultivating or intend to cultivate the same. Their respective lands do not exceed the statutory limit but are occupied by tenants who are actually cultivating such lands. ISSUE: WON the assailed laws are unconstitutional RULING: The SC in sustaining the constitutionality of the CARP Law, held that, like taxation, the power of eminent domain could be used as an implement of police power. The expressed objective of the law was the promotion of welfare of all farmers, which came under police power. To achieve this purpose the law provided for the expropriation of agricultural lands, though subject to the minimum retention limits for the landowner, to be distributed among the landless peasantry. ID; ID; WHO EXERCISES: MMDA v. BEL-AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., G.R. No. 135962, March 27, 2000 DIGEST FACTS: Bel-Air received from the MMDA a notice requesting respondent to open Neptune Street to public vehicular traffic. On January 2, 1996, respondent instituted against petitioner before the RTC for injunction, which issued a temporary restraining order the following day. After due hearing, the trial court denied issuance of a preliminary injunction. The appellate court conducted an ocular inspection of Neptune Street and issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the implementation of the MMDA's proposed action. On January 28, 1997, the appellate court rendered a Decision on the merits of the case finding that the MMDA has no authority to order the opening of Neptune Street, a private subdivision road and cause the demolition of its perimeter walls. It held that the authority is lodged in the City Council of Makati by ordinance. Petitioner MMDA claims that it has the authority to open Neptune Street to public traffic because it is an agent of the state endowed with police power in the delivery of basic services in Metro Manila. One of these basic services is traffic management which involves the regulation of the use of thoroughfares to insure the safety, convenience and welfare of the general public. It is alleged that the police power of MMDA was affirmed by this Court in the consolidated cases of Sangalang v. Intermediate Appellate Court. From the premise that it has police power, it is now urged that there is no need for the City of Makati to enact an ordinance opening Neptune street to the public. ISSUE: WON the MMDA has the mandate to open Neptune Street to public traffic pursuant to its regulatory and police powers. RULING: Petition is denied. Police power is an inherent attribute of sovereignty. It has been defined as the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the

Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. Police power is lodged primarily in the National Legislature. It cannot be exercised by any group or body of individuals not possessing legislative power. The National Legislature, however, may delegate this power to the President and administrative boards as well as the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or local government units. Once delegated, the agents can exercise only such legislative powers as are conferred on them by the national lawmaking body. The powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R.A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R.A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power. The Chairman of the MMDA is not an official elected by the people, but appointed by the President with the rank and privileges of a cabinet member. In fact, part of his function is to perform such other duties as may be assigned to him by the President, whereas in local government units, the President merely exercises supervisory authority. This emphasizes the administrative character of the MMDA. The MMDA has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. It is the local government units, acting through their respective legislative councils, that possess legislative power and police power. In the case at bar, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Makati City did not pass any ordinance or resolution ordering the opening of Neptune Street, hence, its proposed opening by petitioner MMDA is illegal. MMDA vs GARIN, GR. No. 130230 FACTS: The issue arose from an incident involving the respondent Dante O. Garin, a lawyer, who was issued a traffic violation receipt (TVR) and his driver s license confiscated for parking illegally along Gandara Street, Binondo, Manila, on 05 August 1995. The following statements were printed on the TVR: YOU ARE HEREBY DIRECTED TO REPORT TO THE MMDA TRAFFIC OPERATIONS CENTER PORT AREA MANILA AFTER 48 HOURS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION FOR DISPOSITION/APPROPRIATE ACTION THEREON. CRIMINAL CASE SHALL BE FILED FOR FAILURE TO REDEEM LICENSE AFTER 30 DAYS. VALID AS TEMPORARY DRIVER S LICENSE FOR SEVEN DAYS FROM DATE OF APPREHENSION. Shortly before the expiration of the TVR s validity, the respondent addressed a letter to then MMDA Chairman Prospero Oreta requesting the return of his driver s license, and expressing his preference for his case to be filed in court. Receiving no immediate reply, Garin filed the original complaint with application for preliminary injunction in Branch 260 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Paraaque, on 12 September 1995, contending that, in the absence of any implementing rules and regulations, Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 grants the MMDA unbridled discretion to deprive erring motorists of their licenses, pre-empting a judicial determination of the validity of the deprivation, thereby violating the due process clause of the Constitution. The respondent further contended that the provision violates the constitutional prohibition against undue delegation of legislative authority, allowing as it does the MMDA to fix and impose unspecified and therefore unlimited - fines and other penalties on erring motorists. ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA is exercising legislative power through the aforementioned regulation. RULING: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

Among cited cases by the petitioner, the thread running through them is that it is the legislature, in the exercise of police power, which has the power and responsibility to regulate how and by whom motor vehicles may be operated on the state highways. Rep. Act No. 7924 does not grant the MMDA with police power, let alone legislative power, and that all its functions are administrative in nature. Tracing the legislative history of Rep. Act No. 7924 creating the MMDA, we concluded that the MMDA is not a local government unit or a public corporation endowed with legislative power, and, unlike its predecessor, the Metro Manila Commission, it has no power to enact ordinances for the welfare of the community. Thus, in the absence of an ordinance from the City of Makati, its own order to open the street was invalid. Police power, as an inherent attribute of sovereignty, is the power vested by the Constitution in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and for the subjects of the same. Metropolitan or Metro Manila is a body composed of several local government units. With the passage of Rep. Act No. 7924 in 1995, Metropolitan Manila was declared as a "special development and administrative region" and the administration of "metro-wide" basic services affecting the region placed under "a development authority" referred to as the MMDA. Thus: . . . [T]he powers of the MMDA are limited to the following acts: formulation, coordination, regulation, implementation, preparation, management, monitoring, setting of policies, installation of a system and administration. There is no syllable in R. A. No. 7924 that grants the MMDA police power, let alone legislative power. Even the Metro Manila Council has not been delegated any legislative power. Unlike the legislative bodies of the local government units, there is no provision in R. A. No. 7924 that empowers the MMDA or its Council to "enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the general welfare" of the inhabitants of Metro Manila. The MMDA is, as termed in the charter itself, a "development authority." It is an agency created for the purpose of laying down policies and coordinating with the various national government agencies, people's organizations, non-governmental organizations and the private sector for the efficient and expeditious delivery of basic services in the vast metropolitan area. All its functions are administrative in nature and these are actually summed up in the charter itself. Therefore, insofar as Sec. 5(f) of Rep. Act No. 7924 is understood by the lower court and by the petitioner to grant the MMDA the power to confiscate and suspend or revoke drivers licenses without need of any other legislative enactment, such is an unauthorized exercise of police power. FRANCISCO vs FERNANDO, G.R. No. 166501, November 16, 2006 FACTS Ernesto B. Francisco, Jr, as a taxpayer and as a member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines filed a petition to enjoin MMDA Chairman Bayani Fernando from further implementing its wet flag scheme. Petitioner contends that the Flag Scheme: (1) has no legal basis because the MMDA's governing body, the Metro Manila Council, did not authorize it; (2) violates the Due Process Clause because it is a summary punishment for jaywalking; (3) disregards the Constitutional protection against cruel, degrading, and inhuman punishment; and (4) violates 'pedestrian rights' as it exposes pedestrians to various potential hazards. . Petitioner also contended that he filed this petition directly with the Court because the issues raised in the petition deserve the direct intervention of the Court. Respondents moved for the dismissal of the case. Petitioner files his reply that the present case raises issues of transcendental importance. ISSUE Whether or not the MMDA Chairman be enjoined from further implementing the present anti-jay walking campaign

RULING NO. All the cities and municipalities within the MMDA's jurisdiction, except Valenzuela City, have each enacted anti-jaywalking ordinances or traffic management codes with provisions for pedestrian regulation. Such fact serves as sufficient basis for respondents' implementation of schemes, or ways and means, to enforce the anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar regulations. After all, the MMDA is an administrative agency tasked with the implementation of rules and regulations enacted by proper authorities In addition, petitioner failed to show that there is a clear constitutional and statutory violation. Therefore, he cannot raise the issue on transcendental importance. Further, the petition ultimately calls for a factual determination of whether the Flag Scheme is a reasonable enforcement of anti-jaywalking ordinances and similar enactments. This Court is not a trier of facts. This Court cannot determine the reasonableness of the Flag Scheme based on mere surmises and speculations. Lastly, petitioner violated the doctrine of hierarchy of courts when he filed this petition directly with us. MMDA, ET AL. v. VIRON TRANS. CO., INC., G.R. No. 170656-57, August 15, 2007 FACTS: The president Arroyo issued E.O. No. 179 providing for the establishment of Greater Manila Mass Transport System. Pursuant to such authority the MMDA which was designated to implement such project, recommended a plan to decongest traffic by eliminating the bus terminals now located along major Metro Manila thoroughfares and providing more and convenient access to the mass transport system to the commuting public through the provision of mass transport terminal facilities. Viron Transport Co., Inc. (Viron), a domestic corporation engaged in the business of public transportation with a provincial bus operation, filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC of Manila, alleging that the MMDA was poised to issue a Circular, Memorandum or Order closing, or tantamount to closing, all provincial bus terminals along EDSA and in the whole of the Metropolis under the pretext of traffic regulation. This impending move, it stressed, would mean the closure of its bus terminal in Sampaloc, Manila and two others in Quezon City. Alleging that the MMDA s authority does not include the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon their existing bus terminals to thus deprive them of the use of their property, Viron asked the court to construe the scope, extent and limitation of the power of the MMDA to regulate traffic under R.A. No. 7924, AN ACT CREATING THE METROPOLITAN MANILA DEVELOPMENT AUTHORITY, DEFINING ITS POWERS AND FUNCTIONS, PROVIDING FUNDS THEREFOR AND OTHER PURPOSES. Mencorp Transportation System, Inc. (Mencorp), another provincial bus operator, later filed a similar petition for declaratory relief against Executive Secretary Alberto G. Romulo and MMDA Chairman Fernando. Mencorp asked the court to declare the E.O. unconstitutional and illegal for transgressing the possessory rights of owners and operators of public land transportation units over their respective terminals. The RTC sustained the constitutionality of EO No. 179 pursuant to RA 7924 which empowered the MMDA to administer Metro Manila s basic services including those of transport and traffic management, based on the police power of the State. On Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC reversed itself and ruled that EO No. 179 is an unreasonable exercise of police power and its powers under the law does not

include the power to order the closure of the petitioners existing bus terminals. It further ruled that it is inconsistent with the Public Service Act. ISSUE: Whether or not the MMDA s power to regulate traffic in Metro Manila included the power to direct provincial bus operators to abandon and close their duly established and existing bus terminals in order to conduct business in a common terminal as a valid exercise of police power. RULING: No. Police power is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make, ordain, and establish wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes and ordinances, not repugnant to the Constitution, for the good and welfare of the people. This power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, education, good order or safety, and general welfare of the people flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex the welfare of the people is the supreme law. While police power rests primarily with the legislature, such power may be delegated, as it is in fact increasingly being delegated. By virtue of a valid delegation, the power may be exercised by the 37 President and administrative boards as well as by the lawmaking bodies of municipal corporations or 38 local governments under an express delegation by the Local Government Code of 1991. The authority of the President to order the implementation of the Project notwithstanding, the designation of the MMDA as the implementing agency for the Project may not be sustained. It is ultra vires, there being no legal basis therefor. Under the provisions of E.O. No. 125, as amended, it is the DOTC, and not the MMDA, which is authorized to establish and implement a project such as the one subject of the cases at bar. Thus, the President, although authorized to establish or cause the implementation of the Project, must exercise the authority through the instrumentality of the DOTC which, by law, is the primary implementing and administrative entity in the promotion, development and regulation of networks of transportation, and the one so authorized to establish and implement a project such as the Project in question. ID; ID; TESTS FOR VALID EXERCISE; LAWFUL SUBJECT: Lawful Subject simply means that the subject of the measure is within the scope of the police power, that is, that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. If it does, the enjoyment of private rights may be subordinated to the interests of the greater number, on the timehonored principle that the welfare of the people is the supreme law. LIM vs. PACQUING, 240 SCRA 649 DIGEST FACTS: The petition was dismissed by the First Division of the SC based on a finding that there was no abuse of discretion, much less lack or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge in issuing the questioned orders: (a) Ordering Lim to issue the permit to operate the jai-alai in favor of ADC (b) Ordering Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non compliance with such order (c) Reiterating the previous order directing Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to ADC The order was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue a permit from the ADC to operate the jai-alai under Manila Ordinance No. 7065. Subsequently, the RP, through the GAB, filed a motion for intervention. The national government contends that Manila Ordinance 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai

operation is void and ultra vires since RA954 was enacted very much earlier than the ordinance requires a LEGISLATIVE FRANCHISE, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. ISSUE: WON the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai. HELD: No. ADC does not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and conduct the jai-alai under RA954 and PD771. Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power to franchise wagers or betting, including the jai-alai. What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in RA409 was the power to license, permit, or regulate which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila would not amount to something meaningful unless the holder of the permit was also FRANCHISED by the national gov t to so operate. Since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if it has a license or permit from the City Mayor. POLLUTION ADJUDICATION BOARD vs. CA, 195 SCRA 112 DIGEST Petitioner PAB ass to review the Decision and Resolution by the CA entitled Solar Textile Finishing Corporation vs. PAB. In that Decision and Resolution, the CA reversed an order of the RTC dismissing respondent Solar s petition for certiorari and remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings. FACTS: Petitioner PAB issued an ex parte Order directing SOLAR to immediately cease and desist from utilizing its wastewater pollution source installations which were discharging untreated wastewater directly into a canal leading to the adjacent Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The said order was based on findings of 2 inpections of SOLAR s plant. The findings of these inspections were that SOLAR s wastewater treatment plant was non-operational and that its plant generated about 30 gallons per minute of wastewater, 80% of which was being directly discharged into a drainage canal leading to the Tullahan-Tinejeros River. The remaining 20% was being channeled through SOLAR s non-operational wastewater plant. Chemical analysis of samples of SOLAR s effluents showed the presence of pollutants on a higher level of what was permissible under PD984. SOLAR filed a motion for reconsideration allowing SOLAR to operate temporarily, to enable the PAB to conduct another inspection. Subsequently, however, SOLAR filed in the RTC on petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction against PAB. RTC dismissed SOLAR s petition on the grounds of, among others, mootness in that the PAB s subsequent order to allow SOLAR to operate temporarily. In the CA, the decision was reversed and was remanded to the RTC for further proceedings; hence, the present petition. Petitioner Board claims that under P.D. No. 984, Section 7(a), it has legal authority to issue ex parte orders to suspend the operations of an establishment when there is prima facie evidence that such establishment is discharging effluents or wastewater, the pollution level of which exceeds the maximum permissible standards set by the NPCC (now, the Board). Petitioner Board contends that the reports before it concerning the effluent discharges of Solar into the Tullahan-Tinejeros River provided prima facie evidence of violation by Solar of Section 5 of the 1982 Effluent Code. Solar, on the other hand, contends that under the Board's own rules and regulations, an ex parte order may issue only if the effluents discharged pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal and plant life." In the instant case, according to Solar, the inspection reports before the Board made no finding that Solar's wastewater discharged posed such a threat.

ISSUE: WON the ex parte order of PAB were issued in accordance with law RULING: We note that under Section 7(a) of P.D. No. 984, an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued by the PAB (a) whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life," or (b) whenever such discharges or wastes exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." On the one hand, it is not essential that the Board prove that an "immediate threat to life, public health, safety or welfare, or to animal or plant life" exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. It is enough if the Board finds that the wastes discharged do exceed "the allowable standards set by the [NPCC]." In respect of discharges of wastes as to which allowable standards have been set by the Commission, the Board may issue an ex parte cease and desist order when there is prima facie evidence of an establishment exceeding such allowable standards. In the instant case, the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the Pollution Adjudication Board, the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti-pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. Ex parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presented precisely because stopping the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the Philippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course, including multiple and sequential appeals such as those which Solar has taken, which of course may take several years. The relevant pollution control statute and implementing regulations were enacted and promulgated in the exercise of that pervasive, sovereign power to protect the safety, health, and general welfare and comfort of the public, as well as the protection of plant and animal life, commonly designated as the police power. It is a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved, through the exercise of police power. DECS vs SAN DIEGO, 180 SCRA 533 DIGEST FACTS Roberto Rey San Diego is a graduate of the University of the East with a degree of Bachelor of Science in Zoology. He took NMAT 3 times and flunked. He applied to take the test for the 4th time but was rejected by DECS. He went to RTC to compel his admission citing his constitutional rights to academic freedom and quality education. In agreement, he was allowed to take the test, subject to the outcome of his petition squarely challenging the constitutionality of MECS Order No. 12, Series of 1972, containing the rule that A student shall be allowed only three (3) chances to take the NMAT. After three (3) successive failures, a student shall not be allowed to take the NMAT for the fourth time. Additional grounds raised were due process and equal protection. RTC granted petition of San Diego. DECS appealed to SC to reverse decision of lower court. ISSUE WON a person who has thrice failed the National Medical Admission Test (NMAT) is entitled to take it again. HELD SC granted the petition of DECS and reversed the decision of RTC. San Diego can no longer take the NMAT for the 4th time. The State should take decisive steps to regulate and enrich our system of education by directing the student to the course for which he is best suited as determined by initial tests and evaluations. This is done for securing the health and safety of the general community.

SANGALANG vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, 148 SCRA 659 DIGEST FACTS: GRs 74376, 76394, 78182, and 82281 are efforts to enforce the deed restrictions against specific residents of Jupiter Street and, with respect to GR 78182, Reponso Street. The residents have allegedly converted their residences into commercial establishments in violation of the said restrictions. The mother case, GR 71169 is a petition to hold the vendor itself, AYALA CORP, liable for tearing down the perimeter wall along Jupiter Street that had theretofore closed its commercial section from the residences of Bel-Air Village and ushering in, as a consequence, the full commercialization of Jupiter Street, in violation of the very restrictions it had authored. The CA dismissed all 5 appeals in the basis of stare decisis on a prior ruling in which the appellate court explicity rejected claims under the same deed restrictions as a result of Ordinance 81 enacted by the Municipality of Makati, as well as the Comprehensive Zoning Ordinance 8101 promulgated by the Metropolitan Manila Commission, which two ordinances allegedly allowed the use of Jupiter Street for both residential and commercial purposes. It was likewise held that these twin measures were valid as a legitimate exercise of police power. ISSUE: WON the constitutional guarantee on non-impairment of contracts be raised as a deterrent to the exercise of police power. RULING: All contracts are subject to the overriding demands, needs, and interests of the greater number as the State may determine in the legitimate exercise of police power. The Court guarantees sanctity of contract and is said to be the law between the contracting parties, but while it is so, it cannot contravene law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. Above all, it cannot be raised as a deterrent to police power, designed precisely to promote health, safety, peace, and enhance the common good, at the expense of contractual rights, whenever necessary. Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of the people. Invariably described as the most essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers and in a sense, the greatest and most powerful attribute of government, the exercise of the power may be judicially inquired into and corrected only if it is capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, there having been a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional guarantee. Police power is elastic and must be responsive to various social conditions; it is not confined within narrow circumscriptions of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the legal progress of a democratic way of life. Public welfare, when clashing with the individual right to property, should be made to prevail through the state s exercise of its police power. Herein, the MMC Ordinance represents a legitimate exercise of police power, as the ordinance is neither capricious or arbitrary or unreasonable; but that it is based on compelling interests of general welfare. The restrictive easements are similar to any other contract, and should not deter the valid exercise of police power. The MMC has reclassified Jupiter Street into a high density commercial zone, pursuant to Ordinance 81-01. Sangalang, BAVA, et. al., thus have no cause of action on the strength alone of said deed restrictions. OPLE vs TORRES, 293 SCRA 141 FACTS: Former Senator Blas Ople prayed to invalidate Administrative Order 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds: one, it is a usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of privacy. The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and "computer application designs." This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned every time service or access is provided. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for

development planning." This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but the generation of other data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. ISSUE: Whether or not the issuance of Administrative Order 308 which promotes public welfare through improved governmental services, justifies the subordination of the people s right to privacy? RULING: The petition is granted and Adminisrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional as it violates the fundamental right of the People to Privacy. The Supreme Court held: unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest and that it is narrowly drawn. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the individual through his PRN. In the case at bar, the threat comes from the executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. The reason of basic services cannot overrule the constitutional safeguard of the people s right to privacy. NOTES: Lawful Subject simply means that the subject of the measure is within the scope of the police power, that is, that the activity or property sought to be regulated affects the public welfare. If it does, the enjoyment of private rights may be subordinated to the interests of the greater number, in consonance of the principle the welfare of the people is the supreme law . In the case at hand What is put to danger is the privacy of the people; this contemplates a situation contrary to the spirit and essence of the promotion of public welfare. Hence, the above AO does not contain a lawful subject. ID; ID; ID; LAWFUL MEANS: Even if the purpose be within the scope of the police power, the law will still be annulled if the subject is sought to be regulated in violation of the second requirement. In Constitutional Law, the end does not justify the means. The lawful objective, in other words, must be pursued through a lawful method; that is, both the end and the means must be legitimate. Lacking such concurrence, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary intrusion of private rights RESTITUTO YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, G.R. No. 74457, March 20, 1987 DIGEST FACTS: Ynot had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. Ynot sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. Ynot appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court, which upheld the trial court and he has now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional. RULING: Executive Order No. 626-A is unconstitutional. Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the police only but by a court of justice, which alone would

have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only after trial and conviction of the accused. The executive order defined the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. Ynot was not given a chance to be heard, thus denying him the centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play. The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for the promotion of the general welfare. By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead from the womb to beyond the tomb in practically everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the greater number. It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, that there be a lawful method. We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter, considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the sanction for violation of the prohibition which is outright confiscation of the carabao being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. JMM PROMOTION vs. CA, 260 SCRA 319 FACTS: The death of Maricris Sioson resulted to the order a total ban against the deployment of performing artists to Japan and other foreign destinations by President Cory Aquino. The ban was, however, rescinded after leaders of the overseas employment industry promised to extend full support for a program aimed at removing kinks in the system of deployment. In its place, the government, through the Secretary of Labor and Employment, subsequently issued Department Order No. 28, creating the Entertainment Industry Advisory Council (EIAC), which was tasked with issuing guidelines on the training, testing certification and deployment of performing artists abroad. Pursuant to the EIAC's recommendations, the Secretary of Labor, on January 6, 1994, issued Department Order No. 3 establishing various procedures and requirements for screening performing artists under a new system of training, testing, certification and deployment of the former. Performing artists successfully hurdling the test, training and certification requirement were to be issued an Artist's Record Book (ARB), a necessary prerequisite to processing of any contract of employment by the POEA.

In Civil Case No. 95-72750, the Federation of Entertainment Talent Managers of the Philippines (FETMOP), on January 27, 1995 filed a class suit assailing these department orders, principally contending that said orders 1) violated the constitutional right to travel; 2) abridged existing contracts for employment; and 3) deprived individual artists of their licenses without due process of law. FETMOP, likewise, averred that the issuance of the Artist Record Book (ARB) was discriminatory and illegal and "in gross violation of the constitutional right... to life liberty and property." Said Federation consequently prayed for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction against the aforestated orders. JMM Promotion and Management were petitioners in intervention. ISSUE: Whether or not the abovementioned Department Order is valid. RULING: The latin maxim salus populi est suprema lex embodies the character of the entire spectrum of public laws aimed at promoting the general welfare of the people under the State's police power. As an inherent attribute of sovereignty which virtually "extends to all public needs," this "least limitable" of governmental powers grants a wide panoply of instruments through which the state, as parens patriae gives effect to a host of its regulatory powers. It was during the same period that this Court took judicial notice not only of the trend, but also of the fact that most of our women, a large number employed as domestic helpers and entertainers, worked under exploitative conditions "marked by physical and personal abuse." Even then, we noted that "the sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers" compelled "urgent government action." Clearly, the welfare of Filipino performing artists, particularly the women was paramount in the issuance of Department Order No. 3. Short of a total and absolute ban against the deployment of performing artists to "high risk" destinations, a measure which would only drive recruitment further underground, the new scheme at the very least rationalizes the method of screening performing artists by requiring reasonable educational and artistic skills from them and limits deployment to only those individuals adequately prepared for the unpredictable demands of employment as artists abroad. It cannot be gainsaid that this scheme at least lessens the room for exploitation by unscrupulous individuals and agencies. In any event, apart from the State's police power, the Constitution itself mandates government to extend the fullest protection to our overseas workers. The basic constitutional statement on labor, embodied in Section 18 of Article II of the Constitution provides: Sec. 18. The State affirms labor as a primary social economic force. It shall protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare. More emphatically, the social justice provision on labor of the 1987 Constitution in its first paragraph states: The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. Obviously, protection to labor does not indicate promotion of employment alone. Under the welfare and social justice provisions of the Constitution, the promotion of full employment, while desirable, cannot take a backseat to the government's constitutional duty to provide mechanisms for the protection of our workforce, local or overseas. WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision sought to be reviewed, petition is hereby DENIED. CITY GOV T OF QUEZON CITY vs. ERICTA, 122 SCRA 759

FACTS Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64, entitled "ORDINANCE REGULATING THE ESTABLISHMENT, MAINTENANCE AND OPERATION OF PRIVATE MEMORIAL TYPE CEMETERY OR BURIAL GROUND WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF QUEZON CITY AND PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION THEREOF" provides: Sec. 9. At least six (6) percent of the total area of the memorial park cemetery shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of Quezon City for at least 5 years prior to their death, to be determined by competent City Authorities. The area so designated shall immediately be developed and should be open for operation not later than six months from the date of approval of the application.

This section of the Ordinance was not enforced by city authorities but seven years after the enactment of the ordinance, the Quezon City Council through a resolution ordered owners of memorial park lots in Quezon City who have failed to donate the required 6% space intended for the burial of paupers to stop the selling and/or transaction of memorial park lots. Pursuant to this petition, the Quezon City Engineer notified respondent Himlayang Pilipino, Inc. Respondent Himlayang Pilipino reacted by filing with the Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XVIII at Quezon City and prayed for the annulment of Section 9 of the Ordinance in question. The respondent alleged that the same is contrary to the Constitution, the Quezon City Charter, the Local Autonomy Act, and the Revised Administrative Code. The respondent court, therefore, rendered the decision declaring Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, S-64 null and void. Hence this petition. ISSUE Whether or not Section 9 of the ordinance in question is a valid exercise of police power RULING No. Petition is dismissed. Sec9 of Ordinance No 6118 is null and void. It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due process of law, nay, even without compensation. It does not involve the taking or confiscation of property with the exception of a few cases where there is a necessity to confiscate private property in order to destroy it for the purpose of protecting the peace and order and of promoting the general welfare as for instance, the confiscation of an illegally possessed article, such as opium and firearms. The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by the Section in question. Moreover, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but the Court cannot stretch it to cover this particular taking.

LUCENA GRAND CENTRAL TERMINAL, INC., vs. JAC LINER, INC., G.R. No. 148339. February 23, 2005 FACTS: Respondent, JAC Liner, Inc., a common carrier operating buses which ply various routes to and from Lucena City, assailed, via a petition for prohibition and injunction against the City of Lucena, its Mayor, and the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Lucena before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Lucena City, City Ordinance Nos. 1631 and 1778 which grants an exclusive franchise for twenty five years, renewable for another twenty five years, to one entity for the construction and operation of one common bus and jeepney terminal facility in Lucena City, to be located outside the city proper, were professedly aimed towards alleviating the traffic congestion alleged to have been caused by the existence of various bus and jeepney terminals within the city,as unconstitutional on the ground that, inter alia, the same constituted an invalid exercise of police power, an undue taking of private property, and a violation of the constitutional prohibition against monopolies. ISSUE: Whether the City of Lucena properly exercised its police power when it enacted the subject ordinances.

ID; ID; ID; PRIVATE PROPERTY:

ID; ID; ID; TAKING IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL SENSE:

ID; ID; ID; PUBLIC USE:

ID; ID; ID; JUST COMPENSATION; CONCEPT:

ID; ID; ID; ID; JUDICIAL PREROGATIVE: RULING: Petition denied. As with the State, the local government may be considered as having properly exercised its police power only if the following requisites are met: (1) the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the interference of the State, and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. Otherwise stated, there must be a concurrence of a lawful subject and lawful method. From the memorandum filed before this Court by petitioner, it is gathered that the Sangguniang Panlungsod had identified the cause of traffic congestion to be the indiscriminate loading and unloading of passengers by buses on the streets of the city proper, hence, the conclusion that the terminals contributed to the proliferation of buses obstructing traffic on the city streets. Bus terminals per se do not, however, impede or help impede the flow of traffic; how the outright proscription against the existence of all terminals, apart from that franchised to petitioner, can be considered as reasonably necessary to solve the traffic problem, this Court has not been enlightened. If terminals lack adequate space such that bus drivers are compelled to load and unload passengers on the streets instead of inside the terminals, then reasonable specifications for the size of terminals could be instituted, with permits to operate the same denied those which are unable to meet the specifications. Absent any showing, nay allegation, that the terminals are encroaching upon public roads, they are not obstacles. The buses which indiscriminately load and unload passengers on the city streets are. The power then of the Sangguniang Panlungsod to prohibit encroachments and obstacles does not extend to terminals. ID; POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN; SCOPE: ID; ID; ID; ID; NEED TO APPOINT COMMISSIONERS:

ID; ID; ID; ID; FORM OF COMPENSATION:

ID; ID; ID; ID; RECKONING POINT OF MARKET VALUE OF THE PROPERTY:

ID; ID; ID; ID; ENTITLEMENT OF OWNER TO INTEREST:

ID; ID; WHO MAY EXERCISE:

ID; ID; REQUISITES FOR EXERCISE; NECESSITY: