The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History Vol. 37, No. 4, December 2009, pp.

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The Wicked Machinery of Government:1 Malta and the Problems of Continuity under the New Model Administration
Barry Hough and Howard Davis

This is a study focused on the early years of British rule in Malta (180013). It explores the application to the island of the new model of colonial government, one based on direct rule from London mediated by the continuation of existing laws and institutions. Systemic deciencies are identied. These tended to undermine the effectiveness of direct British rule. This study also reveals, in the context of legal and constitutional continuity, unresolved tensions between modernity and tradition. The political stability of the island was damaged and the possibility of continued British possession was threatened.

I This is a study of British policy for the governance of Malta and its implementation in the early period of British rule (180013).2 Malta is an under-studied and early example of the new imperial system3 which was based on governance responsible to London, the refusal by the British to establish representative institutions and the continuation of the legal and constitutional system established prior to British occupation. Implementing this system in Malta proved very difcult. The political goals set for the British administration lacked coherence and were often poorly operationalised; further difculties derived from inadequacies in the system for establishing and monitoring the standards of effective public administration. This article, rst, surveys the new system and its intended benets, before examining the political and constitutional context within Malta and, in particular, the deepening political division between the British and Maltese nationalists. This division resulted in a crisis of legitimacy in 180506 which, for a time, seriously destabilised British rule. The article continues with a discussion of how the continuity strategy, which
Correspondence to: Barry Hough, The Law Department, Business School, Bournemouth University, 5th Floor Executive Business Centre, 89 Holdenhurst Road, Bournemouth, BH8 8EB, UK. Email: bhough@bmth.ac.uk ISSN 0308-6534 print/1743-9329 online/09/04055519 DOI: 10.1080/03086530903327069 # 2009 Taylor & Francis

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continued the law and constitutional forms of the previous regime, further exacerbated problems for the British administration. II The close of the American Revolutionary War in 1783 marked a swing4 away from the so-called rst empire, which has been described as an attempt to reconcile the incompatible ideals of liberty and empire,5 towards the so-called second, oriental, empire of the Indian and Pacic oceans.6 Historians now dispute this supposed bifurcation in the narrative of British imperial power.7 However, from the perspective of the student of constitutional history, the two decades after 1783 witnessed a broad shift in the preferred model of colonial government.8 The dominant, but (from the imperial viewpoint) unsatisfactory ideology of the rst empire had been one of assimilation. It had not been an empire of conquest but an outpost of British norms, founded predominantly on oceanic commerce and Protestantism and inhabited by metropolitan migrants.9 In territories intended for investment and settlement, the British had favoured a constitutional and legal settlement that would, in substance, replicate the constitutional and legal rights available to British subjects in the metropolitan territory.10 Colonial society was, at this time, to be founded upon parliamentary democracy, rights of property, rule of law and civil and political rights. H. T. Mannings classic work11 describes how the old system had at its centre a royal governor who ruled with an appointed council and a representative assembly.12 However, it was not universally successful because the provincial assemblies could become a rival source of legitimacy.13 Where their interests diverged from those of the imperial power, the governing elites obstructed and frustrated imperial policymakers, who felt themselves practically if not legally powerless to overcome resistance.14 After the loss of the American colonies the Westminster parliament was unwilling to use legislation to override an obdurate colony for fear that it would iname secessionist opinion.15 The nal resort, namely legislation passed by the crown under prerogative powers, was also removed after the land-mark decision of Lord Manseld in Campbell v Hall16 in 1774a decision that fundamentally weakened imperial control by removing the powers of ministers to make orders in council for territories where a representative constitution had been conferred.17 Imperial politicians were compelled to adopt a policy of compromise. In sum, the lack of a politically acceptable coercive power meant that recalcitrant assemblies could not always be forced to submit.18 This prompted the British imperial government, at the close of the eighteenth century, to move towards a new model of government, considered below. However, it would be wrong to conclude that the response to these problems was always the imposition of the same model of governance. The new model in Malta can be contrasted, for example, with Sicily. Here, where British control was exercised from 1806 to 1815, major changes to the constitutional and social system were attempted, unlike in Malta where the status quo was preserved. In Sicily, under the

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rst commissioner (Lord William Bentinck) and the Prince of Belmonte, a constitution nominally based on that of the United Kingdom was introduced and the old Sicilian parliament re-opened. The constitution sought to abolish vassalage, villeinage and other incidents of feudalism. Politically it was a failure (though British subsidy did produce a period of urban economic prosperity). After 1815, British troops were withdrawn and absolute monarchy was restored and whatever elements of a liberal spirit that had been released were crushed. The particular social, cultural and political situation in Sicily and also British policy and ambition were different, generally and in detail, from Malta. Nevertheless the fact that a policy of major constitutional reform failed could only conrm in British eyes the point and importance of the new system of imperial governance for the colonies that Britain wished to keep and develop.19 III Malta was an early example of the new system in which the governor/civil commissioner ruled on the basis of royal instructions from London20 and, emphatically, without a representative assembly. Malta was not valued as a potential source of wealth and raw materials but, rather, as a place of strategic military value.21 As with other territories, however, the overriding aim of British policy was to maintain domestic stability and the acceptance of the legitimacy of British rule by the local population,22 at least the elites. In Malta, after May 1801, all executive, legislative and ultimate judicial power was placed in the hands of a civil commissioner who acted on instructions from ministers in London. The general policy, however, was continuity: to continue in operation the laws, the legal and administrative system and public-spending policies of the last legitimate government, namely that of the Knights Hospitaller of the Order of St John of Jerusalem (the Order). Only necessary interference with the existing corpus juris should be attempted. This policy was grounded in the terms of the royal instructions dated 14 May 1801 that were issued to the rst civil commissioner, Charles Cameron.23 Continuing the legal, constitutional and administrative status quo suggested the possibility of compatibility between British and Maltese public reason and values. These instructions delegated some prerogative powers to Cameron that could be exercised locally under the general direction of the secretary of state communicated in despatches. The instructions and despatches had the force of a royal command (making the commissioner politically accountable to London), but they were not a constitutional code, dening the ofce and limiting the powers of the commissioner and enforceable, on the ultra vires principle, in the local courts.24 There were, however, unforeseen, but not unforeseeable, risks in the continuity policy. The British were ex hypothesi reinstating an autocratic constitution. Under the Order in the eighteenth century there had been no separation of powers. The grand master had autocratic legislative, executive and judicial powers which the British civil commissioner took over.25 The secretary of states uncritical assumption that this constitutional architecture would be acceptable to the Maltese was always contestable and eventually caused political difculties.

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The problems encountered by the British, which indirect control from London coupled with continuity proved to be ill-adapted to resolve, emanated from deepening social and political divisions between the Maltese and the British. These became more acute as Sir Alexander Ball (the most prominent civil commissioner whose second administration lasted from between 1802 until his death in 1809) strove to establish a society subjugated almost entirely to his will. A fundamental tension between Maltese nationalists and the British administration emerged at the very outset of British rule and went to the heart of the Maltese identity. The dispute concerned whether (as the British argued) the British acquired possession of Malta by conquest or, as the Maltese asserted, by a subsequent voluntary informal cession of sovereignty by the Maltese people. The latter view, which stressed the role of the Maltese themselves in rising up against the French and, in effect, ceding the island to Britain, was stressed by opposition nationalists, including their British supporters.26 Voluntary informal cession meant there were conditions limiting British rule. This made it unpopular with London and supporters of strong colonialism who, unsurprisingly, supported justication in terms of conquest.27 Later historians have broadly accepted informal voluntary cession28 but there remains no consensus on the issue of both the moment and cause of British lawful authority on Malta.29 A related issue was a consequence of the popular Maltese uprising against the French (17981800) which the British and Portuguese eventually aided. A promise to Maltese troops of a share in the prize money was broken, later to be restored. Even so, the terms under which prize money could be claimed excluded many individuals whom the Maltese saw as deserving. A large volume of litigation over this debacle was still being resolved (largely by rejecting claims) ve years later, which kept the lack of trust in British promises to the forefront of Maltese political consciousness. A further historiographical issue relating to the period involves the abilities and policies of Sir Alexander Ball. As a Royal Navy captain, Ball, acting in the name of the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, had rst administered the islands during the siege and blockade between 1799 and 1800. He seems to have won public support30 and, because he shared the privations of the siege, the inhabitants of Valletta composed the Maltese national song in his honour.31 In The Friend, S. T. Coleridge went to some lengths to recount how fond a regard the Maltese had for Father Ball.32 The orthodox narrative of his period in ofce remains strongly inuenced by ofcial and informal support for Ball, a position fully aligned with the British imperial agenda. On these accounts, Ball was a successful and popular administrator who brought prosperity to the Maltese after the hardships of the economic depression of 180004. This analysis nonetheless admits that numerous formal and serious complaints were made to the secretary of state in London about the civil commissioners administration. These allegations were, inter alia, that Ball was incompetent, not least in maintaining law and order, that he crushed political opposition by resorting to summary justice, disregarded Maltese political rights, breached the constitution and exercised in harsh and uncompromising ways the despotic powers bestowed upon him under the Maltese constitution.

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Although, at rst, the complaints were taken seriously and investigated by the secretary of state (inicting temporary damage to Balls reputation), Ball was eventually exonerated. The ofcial view became that the complaints were orchestrated by known agitators many of whom had grievances against Ball and (a somewhat convenient non-sequitur) that all the complaints were, ipso facto, baseless.33 The surviving historical record portrays Ball differently from this orthodox narrative. Condence in British rule declined after 1802 and reached a dangerous nadir in 180506, placing the stability of the islands temporarily in grave danger. The Treaty of Amiens, under which the British would have returned the government of Malta to the Order had created a political context of mutual cynicism. Charles Cameron, the rst British civil commissioner, reported to Lord Hobart that the Treaty has occasioned most violent fermentation locally.34 The nationalist campaign for political pluralism was re-energised. Calls for the restoration of the Consiglio Popolare, a popular council which, the Maltese alleged, had not only deliberative but also legislative powers, became more strident. Despite this, the British continued their refusal to share power.35 During Balls second administration there were other sources of friction. Crime remained high, because (as Ball admitted) the enhanced international commercial activity centred on the port attracted bad characters to the island.36 The murder rate, combined with low levels of detection and prosecution, was also causing popular anxiety.37 Balls image as a competent administrator began to suffer. Matters deteriorated when, following an unpopular change in policy, Jewish immigrants began to arrive in late 1804. By 1805, many had set up in trade as rivals to the Maltese artisans and tradespeople who feared that competition might return them to poverty just as the economy lifted from a severe economic depression. Violent antiSemitic public disorder erupted in May 1805. Two thousand demonstrators protested in Valletta heading en masse to the seat of government, signalling that the Maltese held the British responsible for their economic ills. The acting public secretary later reported that the crisis had been a difcult emergency.38 Balls harsh response was to determine the sentences in the trials of those accused and to direct the trial judge to implement them. These sentences were more severe than the maximum sentences permitted under the Maltese Code de Rohan. For example, a 12-year-old boy who had been implicated in the spreading of the ancient blood-libel that the Jews killed children for religious purposes was exiled for life. The nationalists complaint to the secretary of state that Balls government exercised thundering vengeance and despotic powers was therefore not entirely without foundation.39 But this was not all. The civil commissioner was also becoming unpopular (and anxious) about resentments arising from a new tax burden.40 This was so because formal promises had earlier been made not to raise taxation.41 Ball, who, as we shall see below, had misunderstood the islands revenues and expenditure, found that he was unable to afford the promised welfare policies, including the crucially important subsidy on the retail price of bread. Resurrecting excise duties on wine was a breach of faith with the Maltese and somewhat dubious steps were taken to convince the

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Maltese that the taxes were necessary and only to be used to support important Maltese interests (bank depositors and deserving causes).42 In fact, the bulk of the funds raised were to relieve the burden on the British Treasury of governing Malta.43 Other issues also caused simmering dissatisfaction with British rule. There was the collapse of the cotton markets. There were tensions when enlisted Maltese troops deserted rather than face the overseas general service demanded by the British and the authorities made unlawful attempts to threaten families who sheltered the deserters.44 Wasted expenditure (thousands of pounds sterling were disappearing from Maltese institutions, which Ball and his ofcials conspicuously failed to monitor), Balls civil service stafng policy (which favoured incompetent but loyal supporters) and the diminution in weight of bread also featured in Maltese grievances. Each of these complaints can be supported by the historical record.45 By mid-1806, grafti lampooning Ball and his administration appeared all over Valletta.46 Thus, there were substantial grounds to question the effectiveness and competence of Balls administration in 180506. These issues, taken together, caused a crisis of condence in the British administration and, in particular, in Ball as the embodiment of British rule and British values. The problem was that the implementation of the new model of colonial government tended to weaken rather than equip the British to deal with these crises and win back popular support. The British had failed to understand that continuing an unpopular constitution would entrench social friction. Reliance on unprofessional administrators left the secretary of state inadequately informed of Maltese affairs and ill-equipped to offer advice and direct strategy. The weakness in the system of reporting meant that judicial and legislative action inconsistent with just civil and political aspirations of the Maltese were unknown in London until political opponents petitioned the crown. Malta, an early example of the new model of colonial government, discloses signicant limitations in British strategy. Some of the more prominent of these weaknesses are examined in the next section. IV The royal instructions of May 1801 established the constitutional and political principles for British rule and the policy framework for the new British administration. The detail in these instructions was derived from a singularly important memorandum on the state of the island and its institutions prepared in 1800 by Captain Ball.47 The signicant characteristic of this report concerned its omissions. The document did not accurately reect the perilous nancial state of the island or the limited revenue available to fund the policies and institutions the continuation which the secretary of state subsequently ordered. These omissions had a critical and detrimental inuence on the royal instructions. They misled the secretary of state who, as a result, prescribed unachievable political goals. The framework policies in the instructions were translated into publicly announced political commitments by proclamations of 19 February and 15 July 1801.48 These contained promises to uphold the laws and the dearest rights of the Maltese, their

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churches, holy religion, persons and property, promises which were to cause some embarrassment as the British became more aware of the strait-jacket they had created for themselves. The continuity policy, as framed in the instructions, proved to be internally incoherent. Maintaining the system of subsidised basic food (the market in wheat was ` under the monopoly control of an institution known as the Universita), a state-run ` pawnbroker offering cheap loans (the Monte di Pieta), a system of state-funded alms and workhouses and, above all, the provision of free hospital treatment were expensive undertakings. In reliance on Balls supposed local knowledge, the instructions assumed that the revenue of the Maltese government would meet these obligations. It was even supposed that a surplus could be spent on government and defence projects. In the memorandum Ball had reported that the costs of governing Malta for the British Treasury would be minimal, with any burden being reduced by economies to be made in the hospital management. In fact, the nancial state of the island was parlous. The welfare policies had relied upon revenue from the private estates of the knights in the Order. The French had abolished the Order in France in 1792 and conscated its assets, thereby reducing revenue to Malta by about two thirdseffectively rendering the government bankrupt.49 During their occupation, the French had looted various assets, including private bank deposits and the property of wealthy religious foundations. By 1801 the economy had collapsed, the poor were starving and, from 1804, when hostilities with Spain began, the cotton trade (the major source of export revenue) lost its most important market. Balls Memorandum, albeit largely by omission, had seriously misrepresented the true nancial position of the island. The reason for the misrepresentation is unclear. Civil servants may have misled the civil commissioner about the nancial standing of Maltas most important institutions. This evidence for this is clearest in Balls second administration (180209), but it can be speculated that this undiscovered tendency to mislead was already endemic by 1800. The role and effectiveness of the civil service is considered more fully below. A tension inherent in the new system of colonial government is, therefore, clearly revealed in the case of Malta. A strong policy of continuity required proper diligence by ministers in informing themselves of the system they determined to continue. This was not done in the early period in Malta. A conclusion to be drawn is that the decisions made in London about the strategic goals of the British administration in Malta were founded on inadequate information and a possibly negligent assessment of the Maltese revenues. As a result, the version of continuity for Malta created almost insuperable difculties in implementation because of the lack of coherence in the political goals. Early in his second administration, Ball found himself in an embarrassing dilemma. He had insufcient revenue to maintain spending, he was burdened by his claim that Malta would not be a nancial cost on Britain and there was no possibility of raising further funds from Maltese sources. As discussed above, one way of escaping this strait-jacket was to break with one of the main incidents of continuity: the undertaking not to impose additional taxation.

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The new system of governance involved implementing local policy on the basis of central direction from London. But ofcials in London lacked detailed knowledge of local affairs. They had to rely on information from the civil commissioner or governor in the territory. Failure to achieve an effective information ow could lead to problems. This can be illustrated in respect to law-making in Malta. Ironically, under the new centralised system, the secretary of state in London had less knowledge of and inuence over the process of law making than under the old, superseded, approach to colonial governance. Previously the application of any new law was to be suspended until approved by London. Under the new model, as it applied on Malta, this approach was abandoned (because there was to be no local assembly and law-making remained under exclusively British control). However, the secretary of state had not apparently appreciated the importance of imposing distinct and systematic processes of scrutiny to ensure the legislative accountability of the civil commissioners. Nothing in the instructions to Cameron required the civil commissioner to obtain prior approval for legislative changes he was allowed and wanted to introduce. There was not even a reporting requirement to notify London of the text or burden of such new laws. The extent to which London was informed of new colonial laws seems to have been entirely a matter of the commissioners discretion.50 The instructions allowed legislation for safety and defence and where the proposals were evidently benecial and desirable. The civil commissioners began to assume they had broad legislative powers and could intervene in many areas of Maltese life. Sir Alexander Ball, for example, saw himself as having a general paternalist concern for the welfare of the population and from this the new laws could be justied. Taxation, consumer protection, street nuisances, anti-social behaviour, the regulation of alcohol, public order, immigrants and even military desertions were areas of public policy that became subject to legal change in the period 180109. The discretionary, under-used, system of reporting to London meant that the secretary of state had little scope for knowing about and perhaps remedying any abuse of power by the civil commissioners in the laws they purported to promulgate. This was problematic. A survey of the laws promulgated in 1805 indicates instances of inconsistency with basic assumptions of the rule of law. There were problems of comprehensibility, in the sense that obligations of a highly uncertain scope were imposed on the population; likewise the executive would sometimes seek to change the law, even create criminal offences, by the sufcient action of issuing a public notice (Avviso) rather than a formal enactment of a legal rule. An Avviso of 22 May 180551 illustrates both points. It purported to oblige any person hearing false rumours to point out their falsehood and undeceive listeners or risk conviction. No indication of what this required was given; no prior proclamation had been issued and the offence was not otherwise a part of the Maltese corpus juris. In a similar case, there were ofcial threats to punish those who did not hand in counterfeit coins; the authority for the punishment was not disclosed. Death by shooting is expressed as a possible consequence for a person who moved a navigational aid in Valletta harbour. The text of this public notice is ineptly drafted and it is quite unclear whether death is the

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permitted judicial sentence, or that unspecied persons would, arbitrarily, use lethal force to prevent abuse. The lack of supervision of this legislation is exacerbated by the legal principle that the constitutionality and legality of the actions, including the legislative actions, of civil commissioners could not be challenged in the Maltese courts. Nor had the jurisdiction of the courts in England to set aside unauthorised colonial law been settled by this time.52 Thus, only the secretary of state had an acknowledged authority to intervene to require the rescission of defective laws, which was impossible if these had not been reported to him. It has been argued that that the effectiveness of the emerging new model of more centrally directed colonial government must depend for its effectiveness on the provision of accurate information to London. Inaccuracies and misunderstandings in the information ow from Malta derived, to some extent, from the poor quality of the advice that Sir Alexander Ball received from ofcials. This was partly the result of his own stafng policy. Londons policy on public appointments was to exclude the local population from major administrative posts. This enabled secretaries of state to maintain their powers of patronage. Excluding the Maltese from the senior public service had also been the policy of the grand masters and perhaps, therefore, an assumption inherent in the continuity strategy. Balls approach, to the contrary, was to bring the Maltese into the administration and, in particular, to use patronage to reward loyalty to the crown. The problem was that this system, like the one favoured by Balls superiors, resulted in appointments that were not based on merit. Some of Balls appointments placed almost no value on competence. The policy was also divisive in the sense that not only did the nationalist Maltese, whose opposition to British rule was beginning to develop, not benet, but it gave them entirely legitimate reasons for opposing Ball.53 In 1814, Sir Thomas Maitland, the rst governor, criticised the early British administrators for employing individuals who were too old, inrm or from other causes incompetent in their duties.54 Serious problems with the conduct of government resulted. Chaotic and disorderly ofce practices, needing external intervention to rectify, were identied.55 Particularly damaging for Ball was the identication, by the Royal Commission of 1812, of signicant problems with the hospitals dating from changes in the previous years.56 Reform of the hospitals, including the appointment of a new management team rewarded with signicantly higher pay, had been a major feature of Balls programme and budgeting in 180405.57 The inference was that, having made the reform, Ball lost interest in the hospitals. The systems of audit and accountability were too weak to prevent the recurrence of poor management and care standards.58 This failure was indicative of wider structural problems in Balls administration in so far as a proper, regular supervision of the public services was not taking place. The system failed to do what was essential for the new, emerging, policy on colonial governance: provide London with accurate and comprehensive information on which the colonial ofce could develop effective policy in the British imperial interest.

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` The best example from Malta involves the Universita and Balls disastrous attempt at ` speculation in the international wheat market. Under the Order, the Universita had a monopoly of the grain market. This was operated so as to maintain a broadly constant price for the population by subsidy when the international price was high, funding the subsidy by selling at a premium when the international price was low. One of the policies Ball pursued in 180406 in order to deal with the nancial crisis involved buying low-priced grain outside the Mediterranean region which could be sold in Malta at a prot. The credibility of this plan depended on the accuracy of Balls ` belief that the Universita system was protable and effective.59 In fact, in the last twenty years of the Orders rule (177898), it had been responsible for a loss of about 100,000.60 The grain speculation of 180506 was a asco. The purchased grain rotted because it could not be unloaded from the ships. Nevertheless, Ball released it onto the market and subsequently made misleading reports to London on the nancial success of the mission.61 In fact, this ill-informed policy resulted in a loss, exceeding 80,500, in 180506. The gravity of the situation was only exposed in a report by a professional ` accountant, Thornton, who described it as by far the greatest loss that the Universita 62 had then, or since, sustained. Thornton identied a loss of over 100,000 for the period 180407 which was largely, though not exclusively, attributable to the failed grain mission. The unresolved question is how the despatches suggesting a contrary outcome could continue to be so inaccurate for so long? If we discount the possibility that Ball was dishonest, the most plausible alternative explanation remains that he relied on dishonest, corrupt or inept staff and failed to maintain adequate supervisory arrangements. There is certainly evidence for both. In 1814, Governor Maitland reported that the ` Universita was one of the most corrupt institutions of government63 and this inference is conrmed by Thorntons subsequent investigations which found ctitious entries ` in the ledgers. Maitland had already concluded that the Universitas accounts had not 64 been scrutinised outside that department and this suspicion could convincingly explain why such inventions went undetected for so long. Whether deliberate or negligent, this account indicates an area of the public service in which there was a systemic failure of proper audit, supervision and reporting at all levels. Centrally directed colonial government would be very difcult under such circumstances and it is no surprise that failures such as these provide important evidence on which the Royal Commissions recommendations for more formally constituted British rule are based. V The royal instructions to Cameron required continuity in the administration of justice and police subject only to directions from London or from the military commander dealing with an unforeseen emergency.65 However, this policy sustained procedural inefciencies found in the existing Maltese legal system which threatened the commercial development and modernisation that British rule might bring. As we

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have seen, continuity also meant British endorsement of practices which were incompatible with the British conception of the rule of law and led to grave friction between the British administration and Maltese elites. The law in Malta was based on Grand Master Emmanuel de Rohan-Polducs codication of 1782. To British eyes in 1812, the laws, with the exception of commercial law (discussed below), were well founded on just and equitable principles,66 though some of the punishments allowed (but often not put into effect) were too severe and not obviously related to the enormity of the offence.67 The British continued in force the existing system by which Maltese judges were paid low salaries which they supplanted by court fees shared among themselves and the other judicial ofcers. About 90 per cent of the remuneration of judges in the high court of Valletta derived from court fees. Some other judges and court ofcials depended entirely on court fees.68 The royal instructions merely required the commissioner to publish a table of the court fees69 and examine whether the system undermined the pure and impartial administration of justice. If it did he was to take appropriate regulatory steps to remedy the problem and report these to London. In 1803, Ball reduced the number of judges on the grounds that too many in the system loaded potential litigants with disproportionate costs.70 The Royal Commissions evidence of 1812 suggested that more legal reforms were necessary; in any case Balls improvements were unlikely to deal with the problem of delay. In Malta, this system for paying judges exacerbated other problems within the judicial system. Judges controlled case management and, it was alleged, their discretion was often exercised in order to maximise these fees rather than in the interests of justice. Delay was widespread, although this was also a consequence of inadequate resources. In the view of the Royal Commission, the system (particularly the civil system) was by 1812 overwhelmed by its case load.71 These matters made the system ripe for corruption. The Royal Commission, reporting in 1812, hinted at instances of judicial malpractice among Maltese judges.72 Of concern, for example, was the practice of judges, in civil cases, of examining witnesses in private in their, the judges, own homes.73 But British judges, too, were implicated. The rst recorded debate in the Westminster parliament specically on Maltese affairs occurred in 1811 and concerned allegations of the extraction of extortionately high fees by the Vice Admiralty Court.74 The evolution of the new system of colonial governance required reform on grounds of both efciency and rule of law ideology. The Royal Commission of 1812 recommended large pay rises for judges, allowing their income to be the same as they currently enjoyed from fees. This recommendation was implemented by Governor Maitland after he took up ofce in 1813.75 Camerons instructions indicate that an aim of British administration should be to ensure to all the Maltese indiscriminately the full protection and benet of their laws. In so far as that implies rule of law values and judicial independence from the executive, there are a number of features of the Maltese system that were likely to bring the principle of continuity into conict with those values.

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In particular, the role of the grand master (and later the civil commissioner) in the Maltese legal system was incompatible with the idea of an independent judiciary. Judges were appointed under the personal authority of the grand master, their period of tenure was a year, they were dismissible at pleasure and their continuation in ofce depended upon annual scrutiny by the executive. This was an aspect of the continuation strategy the British were happy to adopt. In fact, there were few dismissals but judges did nd themselves frequently removed to other courts.76 The Royal Commission of 1812 considered that the power of dismissal should be curtailed. The grand master was also directly involved in the judicial process. In criminal cases, in particular, the grand master had recognised constitutional authority to conrm, revise, alter or annul the sentence laid down by the courts. This included the power to increase a sentence despite two judicial conrmations.77 Nothing in the royal instructions expressly forbad the civil commissioner exercising judicial functions78 and, as we have indicated, Sir Alexander Ball, justied by the continuity principle, performed judicial functions which he sometimes exercised in pursuit of policy objectives.79 The Royal Commission thought the system set the executive above the law, but it also noticed (somewhat surprisingly given the terms of the 1805 petition of the Maltese to the crown) that the grand masters/civil commissioners role did not cause dissent within the local population.80 Various aspects of Maltese criminal procedure81 appeared difcult to reconcile with the British conception of the rule of law. The detention of suspects, the absence of an oral hearing, the lack of an effective right to silence82 and presumption of innocence, even the lawful possibility of torture of those convicted of treason83 were, at least to British eyes, troubling aspect of criminal procedure, though whether such concerns were fair, is another matter. The Maltese system was similar to civilian systems elsewhere and, under any system, there is a great difference between the rules and their application. Juries were not used in Malta. The Royal Commission of 1812 did not recommend their introduction since this was thought likely to be unpopular with the local population. 1801 saw a serious jurisdictional dispute between the civil and military powers over whether a British soldier, accused of murdering a Maltese civilian, should be tried in the Maltese courts or by courts martial. Central to the dispute was not only the militarys claim of right to try its own soldiers under military law but, also, a wider argument about the unfairness of Maltese system given the absence of jury trial.84 The civil commissioners argument was rooted in his instructions requiring the continuity of Maltese law and legal system during British rule. This resulting impasse between the civil and military authorities was only resolved by the passing of legislation in Westminster. From 1805, a clause was inserted in the articles of war exempting the military accused of a criminal offence in Malta from local civil jurisdiction.85 The tradition of sanctuary was another source of difculty in reconciling continuity with the legitimisation of British rule through modernisation including formal equality under the law. By 1812, sanctuary represented a major interference with the authority of the criminal courts.86 The Royal Commission described it as a matter of particular resentment by the British soldiers who saw murderers of their

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comrades go unpunished. Immediate removal was not recommendedlocal superstition was too strong. The commission recommended that discussions with the Holy See should begin. The absence of a jury system and the right to sanctuary involved interesting dilemmas for the new system of colonial governance. Both, in their own ways, embody premodern forms which the self-interested, reforming drive of emerging colonialism would be concerned to end. Alternatively, it needs to be remembered, essential to the new system of governance is the absence of local challenge to British authority represented, in particular, by a representative, legislative assembly. Both the popular sovereignty of a jury and the independent authority of the church expressed in sanctuary could represent a challenge to the increasingly directional authority of the British state in the new system. Juries were, eventually introduced;88 sanctuary, however, had no endorsement in contemporary British traditions. VI The civil government of Malta after 1801 is an important early example of the emerging, centralised, approach to colonial administration. However, the Maltese experience suggests signicant aws and difculties that undermined the effectiveness of this approach. The key assumption of the new model was that ministers could govern indirectly by dictating the framework of policy in the royal instructions (amendable by later despatches) which was then put into effect under the supervision of local, British, ofcials. But the Maltese experience revealed how dependent the policy framework would be on the accuracy and fullness of the information received by ministers in London from local ofcials. In Malta Balls awed memorandum of 1800 on the economic position led ministers to set unattainable and incoherent policy goals whose failure seriously strained Maltese acceptance of British rule. Conversely, the effective adjustment of policy to make it coherent and compatible with British strategic goals (and perhaps Maltese interests) was undermined by misleading information supplied by inept or corrupt local ofcials. The outstanding ` example in Malta is Balls unjustied optimism about the robustness of the Universita. This led him to continue the traditional system of food subsidy and the disastrous and costly grain speculation in 180506. This not only reected badly on his ability to superintend and ensure effective accountability from local ofcials but also caused him to encourage ministers to continue support that burdened the British taxpayer and undermined the policy objective of balanced colonial budgets. The Maltese experience also suggests that the more centralised approach to colonial governance would come under strain without effective reporting to London by the commissioner or governor charged with implementing the royal instructions. Thus the royal instructions of 1801 failed to require the civil commissioners to report regularly to London on the laws enacted in Valletta. A more rigorous reporting system might have picked up tensions between some of these laws and British public values such as the rule of law.

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Of course these tensions were implicit in the policy of continuity with the constitution and law status quo ante the French occupation. British commissioners took over the autocratic powers of the grand masters. Londons assumption (again, perhaps, based on poor information) seems to have been that continuity was not only convenient but would also enhance the legitimacy of British rule with the Maltese. In fact there was ample evidence of the unpopularity of the knights and their regime and the failure of the British to establish the rule of law disappointed both progressive and traditionalist opinion on the island leading to the public assertion of a strong, vocal and critical nationalism. The British endured, in 180506, a crisis of legitimacy when orchestrated criticisms of Balls regime reached the secretary of state. These criticisms and their invective power may have shaken the condence of Balls superiors in the competence of his administration. Yet little came of it all. Root and branch reform would be required, a burdensome task that fell to the energetic rst governor, Sir Thomas Maitland, once Malta ceded to Great Britain in 1814. By then the administrations of 180013 had exposed serious defects in some of the most fundamental assumptions of the continuity model. Acknowledgements Many thanks to an anonymous review. Any errors remain those of the authors. The research for this project was made possible by a grant from the British Academy. Notes
[1] Coleridge, S.T. (acting public secretary in Malta, 18 Jan.21 Sept. 21 1805) to Daniel Stuart, in Griggs, Collected Letters, 1178, 22 August 1806. [2] The rst British civil commissioner, Charles Cameron was appointed in May 1801. The islands were formally ceded to Britain under the Treaty of Paris in 1814, though the rst governor had been appointed in 1813. Sir Thomas Maitlands appointment marked an important shift in British policy characterised by a willingness to modify the continuity strategy (see below) by implementing far-reaching reform. [3] Harlow, The New Imperial System. [4] Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire, Vol. 1. [5] Armitage, Ideological Origins of the British Empire, 8. It can be argued that the American Revolution grew from the former colonialists rejection of the British conception of the relationship between liberty and empire. [6] By the mid-eighteenth century, the rst empire comprised Great Britain, Ireland, the islands of the Caribbean and British colonies in North America. The second empire, following the Treaty of Paris 1783, describes the shift in policy towards India and includes parts of Southeast Asia, Australasia and parts of Africa. [7] The two empires had coexisted prior to 1783, and the differences between the maritime commercial colonies of the Americas and the territories of conquest in the east have been overstated: Armitage, Ideological Origins of the British Empire, 3ff.; See also Harlow, The Founding of the Second British Empire; Hyam, British Imperial Expansion in the Late Eighteenth Century, 113; Mackay, Direction and Purpose in British Imperial Policy, 1783 1801, 487. See generally, Bayly, Imperial Meridian; also Judd, Empire.

The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History

[8] [9] [10] [11] [12]

569

[13] [14]

[15]

[16] [17] [18]

[19]

[20]

[21] [22] [23] [24]

[25]

Hyam, British Imperial Expansion in the Late Eighteenth Century, 113, 115. Armitage, Ideological Origins of the British Empire, 3. Manning, British Colonial Government; Armitage, Ideological Origins of the British Empire. Manning, British Colonial Government. For a classical study on the origins of the colonial system, see Beer, Origins of the British Colonial System 1578 1660; also Manning, British Colonial Government, 61. On appointed councils, see Wight, Studies in Colonial Legislatures. See Rose et al., Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. 2. Lord Hobart advised one governor, open contest. . . cannot be too cautiously avoided. Hobart to Seaforth, 6 Jan. 1803, CO 29/29/25-6, The National Archive, Kew (TNA); see also Hobart to Seaforth, 20 Aug. 1801, CO 29/29/1, TNA, on the need for Prudence and Discretion in dealing with the executive government of Barbados. It should not be forgotten that the imperial government met the greater part of the expenses of the administration as well as the cost of defence and this acted as a restraint on ambitions for independence: Rose et al., Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. 2, 147. Ministerial policy was rmly opposed to the debate of colonial affairs in the Westminster parliament in order to avoid embarrassment: Rose et al., Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. 2, 149 50. (1774) 1 Cowp. 204. The prerogative law making power was lost unless expressly reserved to the crown at the time of the establishment of the local, legislative, assembly. An Act of the Westminster parliament could, as a matter of constitutional theory, have been available to ministers, but they were, prior to 1815, unwilling even to threaten such measures: Manning, British Colonial Government, 146. After that date ministers were prepared to support governors anxious to adopt a rmer stance with assemblies. For example, the governor was praised for dissolving the Bahamian assembly in 1817 after it ordered the imprisonment of the attorney-general: Bathhurst to Cameron, 30 April 1817, CO 24/17, TNA, quoted in Manning, British Colonial Government, 147. See generally Rosselli, Lord William Bentinck and the British Occupation of Sicily, 18111814; Gregory, Sicily: The Insecure Base. For British reactions and Italian sources, see Davis British Travellers and the Rediscovery of Sicily, 329 33. Until 1813 the relevant instructions remained those issued to the rst civil commissioner, Charles Cameron, on 14 May 1801, published, for example, in Hardman, History of Malta, 350 57 (Royal Instructions); see also CO158/1, TNA. Manning, British Colonial Government, 193. See Hardman, Royal Instructions, nal paragraph. The royal instructions gave the commissioners powers to introduce, inter alia, any new law that was evidently benecial and desirable. Civil commissioners were answerable in English courts for legal wrongs done in their name in the territory. Prior to Cameron v Kyte (1835) 3 Knapp 332, a civil commissioners actions were those of a viceroy and not effectively challengeable in local courts: Mostyn v Fabrigas (1774) 1 Cowp 161, 172. The Royal Commission of 1812 commented: The Grand masters made and un-made Laws reversed the decrees of the tribunals, prevented the Entertainment of Causesplaced and displaced the Magistrates, nominated to every ofceand dealt out punishments and rewards without lett or hindrance whatsoever. . . the Civil Commissioners succeeded to those same functions of the state, Report of H M Commissioners for Enquiring into the Affairs of Malta, 1812 (Royal Commission), CO158/19/224, TNA. Balls critics objected to the manner in which such wide powers were exercised. Most notable among these was William Eton, the absentee superintendent of quarantine (he left Malta in 1802 but remained in post until 1811), see Eton, Authentic Materials.

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[26] Especially Eton, ibid., ch. 1 and, writing in 1836, Mitrovich, The Cause of the People of Malta, whose book contains relevant documents. The British chief justice, Stoddart, reporting in 1836 on the legal system, also supported the voluntary cession thesis (CO158/91, appendices, TNA). [27] See Penn, Policy and Interest of Great Britain, for a contemporaneous view. Deliberating retrospectively, in 1836, Lord Glenelg, the secretary of state, criticising Stoddart, endorsed the conquest thesis, CO158/91. [28] See, for example, the views of Maltese and British constitutional lawyers and historians of the twentieth century: Cremona, The Maltese Constitution, ch. 1; Roberts-Wray, Commonwealth and Colonial Law, 685. [29] For discussion, see Davis and Hough, The British Claim to Rule Malta. [30] Maltese ofcials sent numerous expressions of gratitude to Ball on his quitting ofce: see Hardman, History of Malta, 343 44. [31] Coleridge, The Friend, Vol. 1, 566. [32] Ibid., Vol. 1, 555. [33] See Staines, Essays on Governing Malta. [34] Cameron to Hobart, 23 Oct. 1801, CO158/1/335, TNA. [35] Hardman, History of Malta, 498 99. [36] Ball to Windham, 28 Feb. 1807, CO158/13, TNA. [37] Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, CO158/12, TNA. [38] Coleridge, The Friend, Vol. 1, 544, also note 36 above. [39] Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated): CO158/10/151, TNA. [40] Bando of 8 March 1805, LIBR/MS 430 f2, National Library Malta (NLM). [41] Proclamation of 15 July 1801, LIBR/MS 4301/2, NLM. [42] See Bando of the 8 March 1805, LIBR/MS 430 f2, NLM. [43] He estimated that the duty on wine and spirits would raise surplus (after the sums for the relief of bank depositors and the increased salaries of public servants) of 6,000 per annum: Ball to Camden 19 April 1805 CO 158/10/132, TNA. [44] See Hough and Davis, Coleridges Laws. [45] Ibid. See also Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, CO158/12, TNA. The Maltese had suffered bad bread for the previous thirty months. [46] Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, CO158/12, TNA. [47] Ball to Dundas, Memorandum to Dundas, 26 Dec. 1800, CO158/1, TNA. Hobart (who had replaced Dundas in March 1801) wrote to Ball, 21 May 1801, expressing his appreciation of Balls conduct as governor, thanking him for the memorandum of December 1800 on which Camerons instructions had been founded, and further notifying him that a knighthood had been conferred upon him: CO 159/3/43, TNA. [48] Hardman, History of Malta, 341 42, 358 59. [49] The immediate effect was as follows. Income in 1788, expressed in pounds, as an average of the previous ten years, was 136,417.9 (annual expenditure, similarly assessed, was 128,533). By the date of the French occupation this revenue had declined to a mere 34,663.14s.2d; see W. Thornton, Memoir, as qtd in Hardman, History of Malta, 54748. [50] The surviving records suggest that, between 1801 and 1809, copies of very few local laws were sent to London. Ball reported only one legal reformon the revocation of passports (in fact he was reporting a public notice, which was not a law properly so called): Avviso 23 June 1805 (date of 23 crossed out and 25 substituted) LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f15, NLM. It seems likely that Ball acted only to record his compliance with specic requirements in the royal instructions. [51] LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814 f 8, NLM. [52] Swinfen, Imperial Control of Colonial Legislation; but note the dictum of Lord Manseld in Mostyn v Fabrigas (1774) 1 Cowp 161, 173.

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[53] Places are given not to the honest or meritorious but through favour to the worst people, Borg to Eton, 30 May 1806, CO158/12, TNA. [54] Maitland to Bathurst, 24 Oct. 1814, CO158/25/210, TNA. [55] See Mark, At Sea with Nelson, 125, qtd in Pirotta, The Maltese Public Service, 65. [56] Royal Commission, CO158/19 TNA. [57] For example, Macaulay to Ball, 10 Sept. 1804, CO158/9/51, TNA. Ball reported an increase in the presidents salary as an incentive to good management. Ball also emphasised considerable reforms, a likely reference to merging the Invalids and Foundlings Hospital. Costs fell in 1805: Ball to Camden 19 April 1805, CO158/10/147 49, TNA, but once Balls attention shifted elsewhere, costs rose again because of inefciencies (and possibly corruption); the Royal Commission 1812 criticised hospital mismanagement, Royal Commission, CO158/19, TNA. [58] Coburn, Notebooks, Vol. 2, 18041808, n. 2420 21.585, 28 Jan. 1805. [59] An early statement is Ball to Dundas, 6 March 1801, quoted in Hardman, History of Malta, 345, where he claimed that in the previous twenty years the government of Malta had derived a prot of 200,000 from the monopoly. Ball reiterated his belief in 1804 (CO158/9/21-22, TNA) when seeking substantial British funding for the grain speculation. [60] Thornton, Report to His Excellency the Governor on the Accounts of the University of Valletta from 4th September 180031st July 1814, (Report), 12 July 1816, CO 163/33/16, TNA (Report). [61] See, for example, Ball to Windham, 28 Feb. 1807, CO158/13/177, TNA. [62] Thornton Report, 12 July 1816, CO 163/33/16, TNA. [63] Maitland to Bathurst, 24 Oct. 1814, CO158/ 25/210, TNA. [64] Maitland to Bathurst, 13 Oct. 1814, CO158/25/169, 171, TNA. [65] Cf. the royal instructions for Santo Domingo and Martinique, for Manning a model of the new system: Manning, British Colonial Government, 343. [66] Royal Commission, CO158/19/9, TNA. The main exception was commercial law which was administered by the Consolato del Mare. Not only was it slow and inefcient but its jurisdiction clashed with that of the Vice-Admiralty Court established early in British rule. Its abolition was ordered in the royal instructions of 1801, see Hardman, History of Malta, 352. Despite this, no formal steps occurred until its abolition was recommended by the Royal Commission in 1812. This departure from the continuity principle was authorised by the law of nations at that time because the jurisdiction of the Consolato ought to have been vested in a Vice-Admiralty Court (which the British eventually established in 1803) once Malta became a dependency of the crown. [67] The kind of arbitrariness by which severe penalties are available but their use is discretionary and unpredictable, is, of course, precisely the point made about the domestic British use of the death penalty in the eighteenth century by Hay, Property, Authority and the Criminal Law. [68] For a full discussion of remuneration of Maltese judges, including a table of amounts, in the period before 1812, see Royal Commission, CO158/19/41 47. [69] Remuneration of judges from court fees was hardly unusual in the colonies, including those based on a common law system; see, for example, Manning, British Colonial Government, 115 19, ch. 6. [70] Despatch to London, 15 Nov. 1803, CO158/7/437, TNA, qtd in Laferla, British Malta, 53. [71] The Royal Commission therefore advised the creation of a third rst instance civil judge in the High Court in Valletta. [72] For example, a reference to judges acting on grounds of caprice or even baser motives, Royal Commission, CO158/20 and 53. Not all attempts at bribery were successful: see Avviso of 14 June 1805, Bandi 1805 AL 1814, f.11, NLM. [73] Royal Commission, CO158/19/ 31. [74] Cobbetts Parliamentary Debates, Vol. 20, 1811, 46470. Of course corruption was a feature of the old colonial system.

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[75] CO158/25/ 215, TNA; see CO158/25/ 284 85, TNA, enclosure 13 for a table of wage increases. [76] Royal Commission, CO158/19/ 20. [77] Eton, Authentic Materials, 132: this Grand master Pinto ordered by his sign-manual, which constitutes a law, certain thieves to be hanged, who had been by three concurring sentences condemned to be banished to Sicily, and they were executed. [78] Governors of Santo Domingo and Martinique had such powers but other governors working under constitutions for which those places were models, did not. Manning, British Colonial Government, 343, fn. 4. [79] A probable example is Balls apparent instruction to the judge regarding the punishment of Fortunata Tagliana. She was convicted of offences connected with the anti-Semitic uprising and banished to Gozo for as long as the commissioner saw t; likewise a 12-year-old boy, Bonello, exiled for his role in anti-Semitic riots. NAM 92/04 1805 box 05, National Archive Malta (NAM). Bonello was later pardoned. Registro dei Memoriale e Decreti da Sua Excellenza etc. Volume N NAM LIBR 43/11, f 173, 19 June 1805, NAM. [80] Royal Commission, CO158/19/82-83, TNA. However, this conclusion conicts with strong expressions of discontent concerning Balls use of summary punishment and his willingness to overrule the judiciary and increase the sentence in criminal matters: Memorial and Petition of the Maltese (unsigned and undated), CO158/10/151, TNA; see also, Eton, Authentic Materials, 143. [81] Criminal procedure was based on Book 2 of the Code de Rohan. There is a translation in Eton, Authentic Materials. [82] Code de Rohan Book 2, Eton, Authentic Materials, nos 33, 34. [83] Code de Rohan Book 2, Eton, Authentic Materials, no. 27. [84] See the correspondence between Lieutenant Colonel Pigot and Charles Cameron, CO158/2/50, TNA (Pigots letter book, 16 Aug. 1801). [85] Harding Maltese Legal History, 10ff. [86] Royal Commission, CO158/19/ 24, TNA. [87] Implied by Royal Commission, CO158/19/ 28, TNA. [88] In the Court of Privacy, 1815; a more extensive scheme was introduced in 1829, see Cremona, The Jury System in Malta. According to the increasingly nationalist opposition, juries were formerly a part of Maltese traditions though they had been removed by the Order.

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Davis, L. British Travellers and the Rediscovery of Sicily: 16th 19th Centuries, PhD diss, Southampton Solent University, 2006. Eton, W. Authentic Materials for a History of the People of Malta. London, 180207. Gregory, D. Sicily: The Insecure Base: A History of the British Occupation of Sicily, 18061815. Rutherford, NJ: Farleigh Dickinson University Press, 1988. Griggs, E. L. Collected Letters of Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Vol. 2, 1801 1806. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956. Harding, H. W. Maltese Legal History Under British Rule (1801 1836). Malta: Progress Press, 1968. Hardman, W. , ed. A History of Malta during the French and British Occupations, 17981815. London: Longmans, Green, 1909. Harlow, V. T. The New Imperial System, 17831815. In The Cambridge History of the British Empire, edited by J.H. Rose and et al. 8 vols, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 192959. . The Founding of the Second British Empire, Vol. 1, Discovery and Revolution. 2 vols. London: Longmans, Green, 195264. Hay, D. Property, Authority and the Criminal Law. In Albions Fatal Tree, edited by Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson and Cal Winslow. London: Allen Lane, 1976. Hough, B. and H. Davis. Coleridges Laws: A Study of Coleridge in Malta. Cambridge: Openbook, 2009, forthcoming. Hyam, R. British Imperial Expansion in the Late Eighteenth Century. The Historical Journal 10 (1967): 113. Judd, D. Empire: The British Imperial Experience from 1765 to the Present. London: HarperCollins, 1996. Laferla, A. V. British Malta. 2 vols. Valetta: Government Printing Ofce, 1938. Mackay, D. L. Direction and Purpose in British Imperial Policy, 17831801. The Historical Journal 17 (1974): 487. Manning, H. Taft. British Colonial Government after the American Revolution 17821820. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1933. Mark, W. At Sea with Nelson. London: Sampson Low, 1929. Mitrovich, G. The Cause of the People of Malta: Now Before Parliament. London: Efngham Wilson, 1836. Penn, G. The Policy and Interest of Great Britain, With Respect to Malta, Summarily Considered. London: J. Hatchard, 1805. Pirotta, G. A. The Maltese Public Service 18001940: The Administrative Politics of a Micro-State. Msida: Mireva, 1996. Roberts-Wray, K. Sir. Commonwealth and Colonial Law. London: Stevens, 1966. Rose, J. H. et al., eds. The Cambridge History of the British Empire, Vol. 2, The Growth of the New Empire 1783 1870. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1940. Rosselli, J. Lord William Bentinck and the British Occupation of Sicily, 18111814. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1956. Staines, P. Essays on Governing Malta, 1800 1813. San Gwan: Publishers Enterprise Group, 2008. Swinfen, D. B. Imperial Control of Colonial Legislation 18131865. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970. Thornton, W. Memoir on the Finances of Malta. Malta: Government Press, 1836. Wight, M. Studies in Colonial Legislatures, Vol. 1, The Development of the Legislative Council 1606 1945. London: Faber, 1946.

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