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There were comparable developments in East Asia.

In 1986 the Marcos dictatorship was overthrown in the Philippines, and replaced by President Corazon Aquino who was brought into office on a tide of popular support. The following year, General Chun stepped down in South Korea and permitted the election of Roh Tae Woo as president. While the Taiwanese political system was not reformed in such a dramatic way, there was considerable democratic ferment below the surface after the death of Chiang Ching-kuo in January 1988. With the passing of much of the old guard in the ruling Guomindang party, there has been growing participation by other sectors of Taiwanese society in the Nationalist Parliament, including many native Taiwanese. And finally, the authoritarian government of Burma has been rocked by prodemocracy ferment.

The present crisis of authoritarianism has not necessarily led to the emergence of liberal democratic regimes, nor are all the new democracies which have emerged secure. The newly democratic countries of Eastern Europe face wrenching transformations of their economies, while the new democracies in Latin America are hobbled by a terrible legacy of prior economic mismanagement. Many of the fast developers in East Asia, while economically The Worldwide Liberal Revolution 45 liberal, have not accepted the challenge of political liberalization. The liberal revolution has left certain areas like the Middle East relatively untouched. It is altogether possible to imagine states like Peru or the Philippines relapsing into some kind of dictatorship under the weight of the crushing problems they face.

What is emerging victorious, in other words, is not so much liberal practice, as the liberal idea. That is to say, for a very large part of the world, there is now no ideology with pretensions to universality that is in a position to challenge liberal democracy, and no universal principle of legitimacy other than the sovereignty of the people. Monarchism in its various forms had been largely defeated by the beginning of this century. Fascism and communism, liberal democracy's main competitors up till now, have both discredited themselves. If the Soviet Union (or its successor states) fails to democratize, if Peru or the Philippines relapse into some form of authoritarianism, democracy will most likely have yielded to a colonel or bureaucrat who claims to speak in the name of the Russian, Peruvian, or Philippine people alone. Even non-democrats will have to speak the language of democracy in order to justify their deviation from the single universal standard.

To illustrate the homogenizing power of the division of labor, let us consider its effect on social relations in concrete cases. At the time of General Franco's victory over Republican forces in the Spanish civil war, Spain was a predominantly agricultural country. The social base of the Spanish Right rested on local notables

and landowners in the countryside, who were able to mobilize masses of peasant supporters on the basis of tradition and personal loyalty. The Mafia, whether operating out of New Jersey or Palermo, owes its cohesion to similar sorts of personal and family ties, as do the local warlords who continue to dominate rural politics in Third World countries like El Salvador and the Philippines. Spain's economic development in the 1950s and 60s introduced modern market relationships into the countryside, and thereby brought about an unplanned social revolution that destroyed these traditional patron-client relationships. Masses of peasants were drawn off the land into cities, depriving local no8


tables of supporters; the bosses themselves evolved into more efficient agricultural producers who were oriented outwards to national and international markets; and the peasants who remained on the land become contractual employees selling their labor. A modern-day, would-be Franco would lack the social basis on which to recruit any army. The pressure of economic rationalization also explains why the Mafia persists in the relatively underdeveloped south of Italy rather than in its industrialized north. Patron-client relationships based on non-economic ties obviously persist in modern societieseveryone knows of a boss' son who was promoted ahead of his colleagues, or old-boy networks used in hiringbut they are usually declared illegal and have to be carried out sub rosa.

has already achieved a high degree of social equality and consensus concerning certain basic values. But for societies that are highly polarized along lines of social class, nationality, or religion, democracy can be a formula for stalemate and stagnation. The most typical form of polarization is that of class conflict in countries with highly stratified and inegalitarian class structures left over from a feudal social order. Such was the situation in France at the time of the Revolution, and such continues to be the case in Third World countries like the Philippines and Peru. Society is dominated by a traditional elite, most often of large landowners, who are neither tolerant of other classes nor efficient entrepreneurs. The establishment of formal democracy in such a country masks enormous disparities in wealth, prestige, status, and power, which these elites can use to control the democratic process. A In the Land of Education 1 1 9 familiar social pathology ensues: the dominance of old social classes generates an equally intransigent leftist opposition that believes that the democratic system itself is corrupt and needs to be smashed, along with the social groups protected by it. A democracy that protects the interests of a class of inefficient, leisured landowners and engenders a social civil war cannot be said to be "functional" in economic terms.

A modernizing dictatorship can in principle be far more effective than a democracy in creating the social conditions that would permit both capitalist economic growth and, over time, the emergence of a stable democracy. Take, for example, the case of the Philippines. Filipino society to this day continues to be characterized by a highly inegalitarian social order in the countryside, where

a small number of traditional landowning families control a very large proportion of the country's agricultural land. Like other landowning upper classes, the Philippine version is not characterized by a lot of dynamism and efficiency. Nonetheless, through their social position they have managed to dominate much of postindependence Filipino politics. The continued dominance of this social group has in turn bred one of Southeast Asia's few remaining Maoist guerrilla movements, that of the Communist party of the Philippines and its military wing, the New People's Army. The fall of the Marcos dictatorship and his replacement by Corazon Aquino 120 THE OLD AGE OF MANKIND in 1986 did nothing to remedy either the problem of land distribution or the insurgency, not least because Mrs. Aquino's family was among the largest landowners in the Philippines. Since her election, efforts to implement a serious land reform program have foundered on the opposition of a legislature largely controlled by the very people who would be its targets. Democracy in this instance is constrained in bringing about the kind of egalitarian social order that would be necessary either as the ground for capitalist growth or for the long-term stability of democracy itself. In such circumstances, dictatorship could potentially be much more functional in bringing about a modern society, as it was when dictatorial power was used to bring about land reform during the American occupation of Japan.

There is considerable empirical evidence to indicate that market-oriented authoritarian modernizers do better economically than their democratic counterparts. Historically, some of the most impressive economic growth records have been compiled by this type of state, including Imperial Germany, Meiji Japan, the Russia of Witte and Stolypin, and, more recently, Brazil after the military takeover in 1964, Chile under Pinochet, and, of course, the NIEs of Asia. Between 1961 and 1968, for example, the average annual growth rate of the developing world's democracies, including India, Ceylon, the Philippines, Chile, and Costa Rica, was only 2.1 percent, whereas the group of conservative authoritarian regimes (Spain, Portugal, Iran, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and Pakistan) had an average growth rate of 5.2 percent.

Inclusion of a number of these states on a list of liberal democracies is likely to be controversial. For example, Bulgaria, Colombia, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Mexico, Peru, the Philippines, Singapore, Sri Lanka, and Turkey are classified by Freedom House as only "partly free," either because the fairness of recent elections was contested, or because of the state's failure to protect individual human rights. There has also been some backsliding: Thailand has ceased to be a democracy since 1990.- On the other hand, there are quite a number of states not on this list that as of 1991 became democracies, or have committed themselves to free elections in the near future. See Freedom House Survey, Freedom at Issue (JanuaryFebruary 1990).

26. Dictatorship in itself is obviously not sufficient to bring about egalitarian social reform. Ferdinand Marcos used the power of the state to reward his personal friends, thereby exacerbating existing social inequalities. But a modernizing dictatorship dedicated to economic efficiency could in theory achieve a thoroughgoing transformation of Philippine society in a much shorter period of time than a democracy.