A helping hand from David Hume

Robert Keurntjes, s9114793

Throughout history the debate on free will has been about free will versus determinism. In contemporary psychology experiments by Benjamin Libet created a debate on free will versus unconscious causation of action. If an act is not initiated consciously one can question whether it is a free act or a determined act. The experiments by Libet seem to suggest that there is a problem concerning our free will. Unconscious processes play a role in initiation of actions prior to our conscious will and therefore our will might not be as free as we think. On the one hand this has led to acknowledge a larger role for unconscious processes in our behaviour, but on the other hand it has put our liberty in question. What I want to show with this paper is that the definition of free will by David Hume, dating from the eighteenth century, shows that free will is not at risk in the Libet experiment. I will also argue that the distinction between conscious and unconscious processes are irrelevant to David Humes arguments and that his theory of free will covers both conscious and unconscious processes. In other words Hume already gave a theory that shows a free will that is not disputed by the data obtained by Libets experiment. Instead, the outcome of the experiment leaves the questions concerning free will untouched. I will first explain in short the experiment performed by Benjamin Libet and his conclusions. After that I will argue that his conclusions boil down to a neglect of the (necessary) relation between conscious and unconscious processes, both in his description of the experiment as well as in his attempt to save free will. Third, I will give an account of Humes theory on liberty and necessity and finally use this to review the outcome of the experiment. The experiment of Benjamin Libet In the early eighties of the twentieth century Benjamin Libet performed an experiment of which the outcome has changed the way we look at the relation between conscious and unconscious causes for actions. He asked subjects to perform a sudden flick of the wrist whenever he/she freely wanted to do so (Libet 1999, p.50) several times during the experiment. The experiment showed that brainactivity started 550 ms before the actual movement. The next thing Libet wanted to find out was at what time the conscious decision to move was made. He did not expect that this would be earlier than this 550 ms. In addition to the experiment he asked the subjects to report the time a single-handed clock pointed out the moment they were first aware of their wish or urge (Libet 1999, p.49) to flick their wrist. The brainactivity of the subjects was monitored during the experiment and the results of this monitoring showed that:

Robert Keurntjes

Freely voluntary acts are preceded by a specific electrical change in the brain (the readiness potential, RP) that begins 550 ms before the act. Human subjects became aware of intention to act 350-400 ms after RP starts, but 200 ms before the motor act. The volitional process is therefore initiated unconsciously. Libet (1999), p. 47

This shows that in the brain the activity necessary for the voluntary movement started already before the subjects were aware of their will to do so. More precise we should say there was brain activity in relation to the movement prior to the time that was reported as the moment of becoming first aware of the will to perform the act.
In the traditional view of conscious will and free will, one would expect conscious will to appear before, or at the onset, of the RP, and thus command the brain to perform the intended act. Libet (1999), p.49

In case of the experiment the outcome is that an act is initiated before the reported first awareness of the wish to act. This means voluntary acts do not follow after a conscious will, but that they are initiated unconsciously by the brain. Leaving out the previous conscious decision to participate in the experiment this means the initiation of the action is out of control of our consciousness. According to Libet we do not hold people responsible for actions that are out of control of consciousness and are regarded not to be free actions. On basis of other experiments it seems that the overall readiness potential, 550 ms prior to the actual act, is involved in all acts, and even when an experiment included conscious pre-planning the result was the same concerning the moment the subject was aware of the wish to act. This suggests that there is reason to expect that the results are valid in all situations. Therefore Libet comes to the conclusion that free will, as cause for our actions, does not exist. Although to Libet there is no difference between free will and conscious will he does not want to give up free will yet. Therefore he is looking to another possible role that can be given to consciousness. The solution Libet argues for in his article Do We Have Free Will (Libet 1999) is a conscious, and therefore free, will as a controlling factor. When the first awareness of the wish to act occurs 200 ms before the act, there is still 150 ms between the awareness and the activation of the muscles by the motor cortex. Within this rather small period of time there is still a possibility to interfere the process. Libets idea is that the conscious will could use a veto to affect the process. After becoming aware of the wish to act you could still decide not to perform the act. To Libet this is enough to save a role for conscious free will. Instead of initiating the process it has the function of controlling processes. That we sometimes do have urges we do not really bring into action seems obvious and also experiments by Libet1 show the possibility to veto an action within this time period. When discussing such a short time period, and considering the results of the experiments that show actions are initiated unconsciously, there is a possibility that conscious vetoing has its origin in unconscious processes as well. [T]he choice to veto would then become an unconscious choice of which we become conscious, rather than a consciously causal event (Libet 1999, p.52). In such a case, according to Libet, we
1

Libet is referring to Libet, B., Wright and Gleason, C.A., Preparation or intention-to-act, in relation to pre-event potentials recorded at the vertex, Electroenceph. & Clin. Neuropsychology, 56, pp. 367-72, 1983

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cannot call this an act of free will, because then it would be exactly the same situation as in the initiation of voluntary acts. His main argument is that we do not have direct conscious control over unconscious processes. That is the reason, according to Libet, why we do not hold someone responsible for unconscious behaviour. At least not in the case of psychopathological disorders. Then why should an act unconsciously developed by a normal individual, a process over which he also has no conscious control, be regarded as an act of free will? (Libet 1999, p.52-53)
I propose, instead, that the conscious veto may not require or be the direct result of preceding unconscious processes. The conscious veto is a control function, different from simply becoming aware of the wish to act. There is no logical imperative in any mind-brain theory, even identity theory, that requires specific neural activity to precede and determine the nature of a conscious control function. And, there is no experimental evidence against the possibility that the control process may appear without development by prior unconscious processes. (Libet 1999, p.53)

Criticism of Libets conclusions The experiment and the results can provoke a lot of questions, such as whether reporting conscious free will is the same as the actual free will and whether someone can notice the occurrence of free will and a clock at the same time. The data provided by the experiment are very limited and it is doubtful whether the conclusions Libet draws from them can be done without a lot of assumptions. The most obvious presumption is that free will is synonymous to conscious will which immediately leads to the conclusion that unconscious will is unfree. Nevertheless I will take the outcome of the experiment as it is. To the arguments I will use, it is not relevant whether these questions will be answered. When an act is caused, or initiated, by unconscious processes it might be relevant to know how these unconscious processes came into being in the first place. One of the most striking things is the total neglect of the prior decision to join the experiment and the agreement to the terms of the experiment. As if the wrist movement is a random (not thought of before) action. But the fact is that there was an agreement that there would be some wrist movement. The subject knew all along during the experiment that he (or she) was going to want to move his wrist, because he agreed upon doing so. He was more or less waiting for the moment he felt the urge to do so. I dont see how it can be avoided in an experiment to have a decision prior to the monitored actions. I dont know either whether this is a problem, but it is a problem when you do not take this into account when discussing causation of actions. If I want to wake up tomorrow at seven oclock I will set the alarm, because I will not wake up in time without an alarm. Tomorrow morning I will wake up by the alarm. If I take that situation, the waking up at the sound of the alarm, as a single case it is pretty easy to say there is no free will in waking up. On the other hand, taking into account that I myself, deliberately, set the alarm makes my waking up something that was initiated by my will to wake up at seven oclock. That I was not conscious, at the moment of waking up, of the fact that I did want to wake up does not change it to be a result of my own (free) will. I dont think it changes anything to the outcome of the experiment but it does make a difference to what conclusion one can draw. The action might be initiated unconsciously but when the unconscious process is initiated, influenced or otherwise caused by a previous decision, the relation between the action and conscious will is different than it is in a

Robert Keurntjes

situation where an action is initiated unconsciously without any previous decision of which one was aware. Libets argument that we do not hold someone responsible for unconscious behaviour might hold for psychopathological disorders, but not necessarily in normal situations. The question is whether the reason for holding someone less accountable really boils down to the unconscious aspect of the behaviour. What might be more important is the question whether the behaviour is out of control of a person. In a way this is where Libet is aiming at as well. He tries to save the free will by suggesting that it is a control function, just before the actual behaviour should start. But when we influence our unconscious behaviour through prior conscious decisions, as seems to be the case in the experiments, the control of unconscious behaviour is not only to be found in a veto function. When we hold someone responsible for an act the argument of the psychological disorder might be used to dispute this responsibility. But if the behaviour is not in contradiction to the normal behaviour of the person (including his beliefs and desires) the question whether it is unconscious initiated doesnt really matter. Therefor the answer to his question why we should regard an unconsciously developed act as an act of free will is that it is influenced by behaviour and beliefs the person was holding already prior to the development of the act. The results of the experiments are significant in regard to conscious versus unconscious causation for actions but, as far as it tells us something about free will, it shows something else then Libet tells us. What is interesting in regard of free will is that after there was a decision of participating in the experiment, the required act was initiated unconsciously, even before it was noticed consciously. It shows, at least, that we are capable of consciously making a decision (or an agreement) which can lead to unconscious initiation of an action. In trying to save free will Libet is looking for a conscious process without any influence of unconscious processes. But whether his solution will lessen the amount of problems is doubtful. Consciousness as a controlling function as such isnt a strange thought, but through his identification of free will with conscious will, a conscious will is only free when not influenced by unconscious processes. After we become aware of our wish or urge we can consciously decide not to do it. What makes us decide not to do it, doesnt have to be (or cant be, to be free) an unconscious process, according to Libet. But what else can it be? Conscious deliberation might take more time to arrive to a decision then 150 ms, I suppose. Otherwise I can only think of one thing that can happen in such a short notice: my consciousness is confronted with two disputing unconscious initiated wishes. I want to take the cookie, and at the same time I want to quit eating cookies. Suddenly becoming aware of this dispute I can consciously decide to withdraw my hand from the cookiejar. Making the decision might be entirely conscious, but then again, is 150 ms enough to be aware of both wishes and make a conscious decision which one to follow? Besides where do the moral values we use to make the decision come from? Are we conscious of what we hold to be right or wrong? So it seems unconscious processes are required but Libet doesnt agree with this:
The awareness of the decision to veto could be thought to require preceding unconscious processes, but the content of that awareness (the actual decision to veto) is a separate feature that need not have the same requirement. (Libet 1999, p.53)

Although I am in favour of making the distinction between awareness and the content of awareness, I find it rather peculiar to use content in this sense. In general I would understand the content of awareness to be something outside the awareness. Like the

Robert Keurntjes

awareness of the will in case of the experiment. What he seems to say is something like: I am aware of myself making the decision to veto. He seems to make a distinction here between will and decision. It is not that one is aware of the will but of making the decision. But then again, isnt it the wish that lead you to making the decision, and is that thinkable without unconscious processes? Libet tries to save free will with the distinction between awareness and the content of awareness but the way he makes the distinction is not clear enough to be convincing. Although he says there is no experimental evidence against the possibility that the control process may appear without development by prior unconscious processes (Libet 1999, p.53) it is difficult to imagine it without. David Hume on free will When David Hume gave his definition of the will as the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we knowingly give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind(Treatise 2.3.2.1 p. 257), it would take almost 250 years before Libets experiment would challenge it. The outcome of Libets experiment seems to suggest that the knowingly give rise to is a misconception and therefore the definition should be changed. There could be two solutions. One possibility is: the internal motivation of which we become aware before we give rise to any new motion of our body, or new perception of our mind. In this case we regard will as an unconscious motivation that is the cause for the initiation of actions. The other possibility would be: the internal impression we feel and are conscious of, when we become aware of the rise of any new voluntary motion of our body, or new perception of our mind. In this case the experience is what we refer to as the will. In both cases we have to differentiate between the conscious experience of will and the cause that gives rise to an action. Either way the core of Humes philosophy wont change by it. This definition, in regard to freedom of act, is overruled by his definition of motives. Our motives are influenced by what we take to be good and evil actions and we may give to this influence what name we please; but, as it is usually conjoined with the action, it must be esteemed a cause (Enquiry VIII, II, 76, p.98). Whether the will is a cause for our actions or an afterwards experienced feeling isnt the real problem. Whether there is liberty depends on the conjunction between the cause, no matter whether the experienced will is this actual cause, and our actions. To make this clear David Hume makes a distinction in the Treatise between freedom of spontaneity and freedom of indifference.
Few are capable of distinguishing betwixt the liberty of spontaneity, as it is calld in the schools, and the liberty of indifference; betwixt that which is opposd to violence, and that which means a negation of necessity and causes. The first is even the most common sense of the word; and as tis only that species of liberty, which it concerns us to preserve, our thoughts have been principally turnd towards it, and have almost universally confounded it with the other. (Treatise 2.3.2.1 p. 262)

It might seem that freedom of indifference is a kind of ultimate freedom. Not hindered by any force or influence to make a choice. To Hume this is the kind of freedom a madman might have. You will never know how he will respond, neither will he know it himself. It rules out causation because it is not determined by anything. When you look a little bit closer it is easy to see that it is not the kind of freedom we would experience as freedom. What we do experience as freedom is when we can act according to our wishes and desires without being forced by anything, or anyone, else. An action is free

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when we experience it as caused by ourselves and for that there has to be a regularity between our motives and our actions. There has to be the constant union and conjunction of the like objects, or an inference in the mind from the one to the other (T 2.3.2.4 p.263). This relation, the constant conjunction of A and B, is what we, according to Hume, call a causal relation. Because of the constant conjunction necessity is an essential part of a cause. Liberty and necessity are closely interlinked. In case of actions the conjunction, or inference, is between motivation or character on the hand and actions on the other. Only if this is the case we can speak of freedom of spontaneity. Even were we might experience a kind of liberty of indifference Hume says that a spectator can commonly infer our actions from our motives and character; and even where he cannot, he concludes in general, that he might, were he perfectly acquainted with every circumstances of our situation and temper, and the most secret springs of our complexion and disposition (T 2.3.2.2 p.262). In other words we expect regularity in an agents behaviour which is normally the case. Although Hume is to be considered a compatibilist in regard to freedom and determination somehow he seems to say freedom is nothing more than an experience of constant conjunction between motives and actions. The only thing that is threatening our freedom according to Libet, is the very basis for our experience of freedom. That free actions are caused actions. His attempt to relocate freedom in our conscious vetoing is futile because when it is true that this vetoing is an act of indifference it would not follow our motives and character and therefore it would not be free in the Humean sense that it is our own action, and when there is a conjunction between our motives and character on the one hand and the conscious vetoing on the other, it isnt more free than when this conjunction takes place in unconscious processes. David Hume was not aware of the existence of unconscious processes, or at least the distinction between unconscious and conscious processes was not a part of psychological language in those days. To his point of view we are always conscious of our motives. Despite this he established a theory of liberty and necessity that remains valid as well when there are unconscious processes involved. The essence of his theory is that a free act is an act that is in correspondence with our character and motivation. There is no reason to deny the likeliness that most unconscious processes are in correspondence with our character and motives. Since 19th century psychologists like Freud have invented, or discovered, the subconsciousness we know that unconscious processes do influence our motives, character and behaviour, and the other way around. When behaviour is generated through subconscious processes that are out of control of the person we can label this as a pathological disorder. In such a case we regard the agent to be less accountable. The reason is not that it is generated unconsciously but that it is out of control. Whether someone is to be held responsible for his actions is therefore depending on whether an action is initiated conscious or unconsciously. The question whether it was a free act should focus on a different aspect. The theory of Hume makes clear what is required for an action to be free, without having to make the distinction between conscious or unconscious processes. The distinction between freedom of indifference and liberty of spontaneity even shows that we even have more freedom when our acts are initiated by unconscious processes that follow our motives and character than when we consciously initiated an action out of indifference. As I tried to make clear in criticising Libet there is a constant relation between conscious and unconscious

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processes, which is shown by his experiment as well. Our motives might be unconscious but on the other hand were influenced by conscious experiences. Whether someone is aware of his motives and character does not change anything to the relation between liberty and necessity. When an action is free in the sense of indifference neither praise nor blame can be rewarded to the person. We can only hold people responsible when there actions are in conjunction with their motives and character. When unconscious processes are in conjunction with our motives and character we are responsible. Therefore, as long as unconscious processes follow the motives and the character of the person, we can also hold the person responsible for his actions as being initiated out of free will. When unconscious processes do not follow the character there is a problem with our freedom and responsibility. We might say it is unusual behaviour without control which makes the person less responsible for actions following these processes. Back to the experiment When we look at the outcome of the experiment and wonder whether the act was done out of free will on basis of Humes definition we cant simply deny it is done out of free will. What the experiment does show is that unconscious processes that initiate actions, can follow upon conscious decisions (i.c. the agreement to participate in the experiment) and therefore the action of flicking the wrist can still be in conjunction with both character and motivation of the subject. The subject acts according to the expectation that someone performs a task in the way he agreed upon. He is not forced and it is expected he would do the same thing the next time. Therefore it is of no concern whether the task was initiated conscious or unconscious in respect to free will. From a Humean perspective the brain and unconscious processes are a part of the individual as far as they follow the character and motives, which we would not deny in normal situations. By equating free will with conscious will, Libet makes a strong distinction between conscious and unconscious processes and their relation to the liberty of a person. Unconscious processes are no free causes. Either this would imply that unconscious processes do not follow our character and motives (and are no part of our identity) or the only true freedom according to Libet would be liberty of indifference, because when an action is influenced by unconscious processes it is not a free action. As it is clear that the actions performed within the experiment are in accord with the subjects character and motivation it must be that Libet is arguing from a perspective of liberty of indifference. But how can he bring this together with his notion of a controlling consciousness? If the control of consciousness is not in conjunction with the sunbjects motivation but based upon a liberty of indifference, vetoing isnt free in the sense that we can hold a subject responsible. The solution Libet suggests of a control function of the conscious will to save freedom will have to be in conjunction with motives and character. Perhaps the moment of freedom might be a conscious moment but it would be a result of previous processes nevertheless. His remark that the conscious veto may not require or be the direct result of preceding unconscious processes (Libet 1999, p.53) therefore is problematic. There seem to be conscious and unconscious processes involved in our motives and character al of the time. If Libet wants to stick to his position that only conscious causation can be free he has to explain how that could be possible. In stead of doing so, it seems he tries to single out an action here in the same way as he does in the results of his experiments. Taking the vetoing as a single observable action without necessity, or cause, following

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previous processes, whether conscious or unconscious, would make the freedom that is involved a freedom of indifference. So the least we can say is that Libet is among those to whom Hume was referring to that are not capable of making the distinction between freedom of indifference and freedom of spontaneity. Conclusion On basis of David Humes philosophy of liberty and necessity we can conclude that the outcome of Benjamin Libets experiment does not change anything we know about free will. Free will remains as difficult to grasp as it has ever been due to the strong link between liberty and necessity. When liberty and necessity are so intertwined one can wonder whether there is liberty at all. A problem of which Hume is quite well aware.
It may be said, for instance, that, if voluntary actions be subjected to the same laws of necessity with the operations of matter, there is a continued chain of necessary causes, pre-ordained and pre-determined, reaching from the original cause of all to every single volition of every human creature. No contingency anywhere in the universe; no indifference; no liberty. (Enquiry VIII, II, 78 p.99)

Whether we become aware of our will before or after an action is initiated does not solve this puzzle. It only changes something in our knowledge about the causation of our actions. But this causation remains in correspondence with Humes philosophy, as unconscious processes, in general, follow our motives and character as much, or perhaps even more, than conscious processes do. To liberty of spontaneity it doesnt make any difference whether an act is initiated conscious or unconscious as long as the action is in conjunction with the character or motives of the agent. In the Libet experiment there is a clear cause for the initiated action in which both conscious and unconscious processes do play their part and follow character and motives.

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Bibliography David Fake Norton and Mary J. Norton ed., DAVID HUME, A Treatise of Human Nature, Being an attempt to introduce the experimental method of reasoning into moral subjects, Oxford Philosophical Texts, Oxford University Press Inc., New York, 2001, part 3 Hume, David, Enquiries concerning human understanding and concerning the principles of Morals, Ofxord: Clarendon Press, 1975 Libet, Benjamin, Do We Have Free Will? in: Journal of Consciousness Studies, 6, No. 8-9, 1999, pp. 47-57 Russell, P., `Hume on Free Will, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2008 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2008/entries/hume-freewill