TACTICS OF THE SOVIET ARMY REGIMENT

Document Title : Tactics of the Soviet Army Regiment.

AD Number: ADA076180 Subject Categories: MILITARY OPERATIONS, STRATEGY AND TACTICS Corporate Author: ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLL FORT LEAVENWORTH KS Title: Tactics of the Soviet Army Regiment. Descriptive Note: Final rept., Personal Authors: Conroy,Bruce ; Report Date: 14 MAY 1979 Pages: 144 PAGES Supplementary Note: Master's thesis. Descriptors: *MILITARY TACTICS, USSR, MILITARY FORCES(FOREIGN), MILITARY DOCTRINE, THESES, WAR GAMES, TACTICAL ANALYSIS, ARMY OPERATIONS, TACTICAL WARFARE, REGIMENT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS. Abstract: This research project is designed to facilitate an understanding of Soviet tactics at the regimental level and below and to draw attention to material available for additional study of Soviet tactics. This paper is the result of analyzing numerous primary and secondary sources to ascertain which forms of tactics the Soviets use and which forms we, as US authors, say they use. A review of recent Soviet tactical exercises was used to confirm their implementation of espoused tactical doctrine. The meeting engagement, the offense, the defense, and the withdrawal are the forms of tactics. A chapter is devoted to each form and possible implementation under given circumstances if postulated. Organization for combat and necessary support elements are included to serve as an aid to wargamers. (Author) Limitation Code: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE Source Code: 037260

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The o p i n i o n s and c o n c l u s i o n s e x p r e s s e d h e r e i n a r e t h o s e c ? t h e i n d i . v i d u a 1 s t u d e n t a u t h c r and d o n o t n e c e s s a r i l y rel:res e n t t h e v i e w s o f e i t h e r t h e US Army Corr,;r,and and . G e n e r a l Z.:af? T c l l e p e o r rtry o.ti:er ; : , o v e r n r e r t a l w - e x : , ' . ( : ? e f e r e n c e e 'to t t i s s t u d y s!iould i n c l u d e t k e f o r e r o i r : ? ; s t a t e m e n t . )

ii

ABSTRACT TACTICS OF THE SOVIET ARMY REGIMENT, by Bruce Conroy, Major, USA, 14) pages. This research project is designed to facilitate an understanding of Soviet tactics at the regimental level and below and to draw attention to material available for additional study of Soviet tactics. This paper is

the result of analyzing numerous primary and secondary sources to ascertain which forms of tactics the Soviets use and which forms we, as US authors, say they use. review of recent Soviet tactical exercises was used to confirm their implementation of espoused tactical doctrine. The meeting engagement, the offense, the defense, and the withdrawal are the forms of tactics. A chapter A

is devoted to (lach form and possible implementation under given circumstances if postulated. Organization for com-

bat and necessary support elements are included to serve as an aid to wargamers.

iii

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The author is indebted t o personnel from both t h e

Threats Division, CACDA, and t h e Command and General

staff College L i b r a r y f o r t h e i r h e l p i n o b t a i n i n g source

m a t e r i a l and providing guidance f o r t h i s p r o j e c t .
Sug-

g e s t i o n s , comments, and recommended changes t o t h i s publ i c a t i o n a r e s o l i c i t e d and may be made t o t Commander

USACACDA ATTNI ATZLCA-DLT

F o r t Leavenworth, KS 66027 o r I Autovon 68~-34~/4472

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TAN25 01.' CONTENTS

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THESIS APPROVAL PAGE ASSTRACT.

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. . . . TAiiLE O? CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . L l S T Or" FIGURES ..................

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
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V

viii

CXAFTER

INTRCDUCTICN

1-1
1-2

1-3
2.

............. PURPOSE .. SCOPE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

~J~CKGROUND
a

1-1

1-3
1-4

SOVIET TACTICS 2-1 2-2

2-3

ANOTHER VIEW

TACTICS DEFINED METHODOLOGY

............
*

2-1 2-1 2-2

2-a

THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT THE WITHDRAWAL

2-4

2-5
2-6

CONCLUSIONS
ENDNOTES

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*

-.

2-16

2-17

3.

ZCXELONS AijOVE REGIMENT

3-1
3-2

GENERAL
2'RONT ARMY.

3-3

.............. ............... ...............

V

3- 1
3-2

3- 8

Fage

3-4

3-5

3-6
4-1
4-2

.............. ....... DEFINITIONS ENDNOTES . . .........

DIVISION
a

3-13
3-22 3-28

TEE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

GENERAL
CONDUCT

4-3
4-4

4-5
4-6

.............. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT . . . . . . . . SPECIAL TROOFS SUPDORT . . . . . . . DEFINITIONS . . ........ ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

a

. .........

4-1

4-3
4-19
4-20

4-20 4-25

TI-iE OFFENSE

5-1
5-2

5-3
5-4

5-5
6

5-6
6-1
6-2

.. ........ CONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . From t h e March . . . . . . . . . . From D i r e c t C o n t a c t . . . . . . . Breakthrough . . . . . . . . . . . Fursuit . . . . . . . . . . . . . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT . . . . . . . . SPECIAL TROOPS SUPPORT . . . . . . . DEFINITIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
GENERAL
e e

5-1
5-4
5-4
5-10

5-11

5-14

5-16

5-17
5-18
5-21

TIHE DEFENSE

GENERAL

CONDUCT

.............. Hasty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Deliberate . . . . . . . . . . . .

vi

..............

6-1

6-3

6-3
6-7

6-3
6-4

OPERATIONAL SUPPORT SPECIAL TROOPS SUPPORT DEFINITIONS ENDNOTES

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Page

6-9
6-10

6-5

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6-6

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s

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* *
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6-10

6-14

THE WITHDRAWAL

7-1 GENERAL
7-2

7-3
8
8-1
8-2
APPENDIX
A

. .... CONDUCT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ENDNOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

7-1
7-2

7-3
8- 1

CONCLUSIONS TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS

.. ....
....

TECHNOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

8-1

Bibliography

US Government Documents

.........

Manuals. Circulars. and T r a i n i n g Texts

Translations

BOOkS

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-3 I n t e l l i g e n c e Reports . . . . . . . . . . A-7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A-9 P e r i o d i c a l s and Articles . . . . . . . . . 12-9 O t h e r References . . . . . . . . . . . . . A - 1 4

A-1

A-1

Initial Distribution L i s t

.........

3-1

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LIST OF XGURES

Figure

1 2

3
4
5
6

..................... 3-4 Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-9 S e l e c t e d Elements of Group o f S o v i e t F o r c e s Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-10 Tank D i v i s i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3-14
Front Notorized R i f l e C i v i s i o n N o t o r i z e d R i f l e Regiment Tank Regiment

Page

7
6
9

.................
............

........... ...........

3-15
4-5 4-6
4-11
4-12

Regimental iviarch Column

Regimental O r g a n i z a t i o n f o r Combat

......

viii

CHAFTER 1
INTRODUCTION

1-1

3ACKGROUND.

T h e r e h a s been a f o r m a l i z e d s t r u c t u r e f o r T h r e a t Development w i t h i n t h e U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command S

(TRADOC) s i n c e 19 J u l y 1976, when TRADOC f i r s t i s s u e d Regu-

l a t i o n 381-1.

This regulation required subordinate schools

t o p r e p a r e a Threat Appendix i n s u p p o r t of each combat o r

t r a i n i n g developments s t u d y .
The T h r e a t Appendix was t o be

prepared u n d e r t h e s u p e r v i s i o n of t h e s c h o o l ' s T h r e a t Nanager.

I n i t i a t i o n o f a T h r e a t Appendix s t a r t e d w i t h a r e v i e w of a l l approved f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e documents; i n t e l l i g e n c e gaps

wm 4

were i d e n t i f i e d and means t a k e n t o r e s o l v e them; and t h e n t h e

T h r e a t Manager began t o assemble t h e comprehensive i n s t r u ment.

Each T h r e a t Appendix had t o stand on i t s own and be

Meanwhile, i f t h e simulation,

validated through a p p r o p r i a t e channels.

s t u d y r e q u i r e d manual wargaming o r f o r c e - o n - f o r c e

t h e proponent had begun these e f f o r t s w i t h o u t t h e b a s i s of h a v i n g a v a l i d a t e d Threat. Although each TRADOC s c h o o l pre-

p a r e d i t s s e p a r a t e s p e c i f i c T h r e a t Appendixes, t h e r e was a common d e n o m i n a t o r , S o v i e t t a c t i c s and t a b l e s of o r g a n i z a t i o n

and equipment.

Thus, t h r o u g h o u t TRADOC t h e r e h a s been con-

s i d e r a b l e d u p l i c a t i o n of e f f o r t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of numerous
T h r e a t Appendixes.

The need f o r a common, n o n - s p e c i f i c T h r e a t

Appendix t o a i d i n t h e i n i t i a l p h a s e s of s t u d i e s h a s been

1-1

recognized a t v i r t u a l l y every l e v e l w i t h i n TRADOC.

This

paper i s intended t o serve as t h e basis f o r such a non-

s p e c i f i c Threat.

The US Army Combined A r m s Combat Develop-

ments A c t i v i t y (CACDA) has made p l a n s t o augment t h i s e f f o r t

w i t h a d d i t i o n a l c l a s s i f i e d volumes concerning equipment
I

c h a r a c t e r i s t i c s and performance d a t a , TOES, and system

s p e c i f i c Threats.
a p e r i o d i c basis.
A l l of these w r i t i n g s w i l l be updated on
T h i s p o r t i o n of t h e s t u d y e f f o r t has been

kept u n c l a s s i f i e d t o a l l o w t h e w i d e s t p o s s i b l e dissemination.

Within t h e l a s t few y e a r s t h e r e has been a s i g n i f i c a n t e f f o r t by t h e Defense I n t e l l i g e n c e Agency (DIA) and t h e

Office of t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of Staff f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e
( O A C S I ) t o provide u n c l a s s i f i e d l i t e r a t u r e concerning

S o v i e t t a c t i c s t o a i d i n wargaming and service school instruction.

Many of these documents have been reviewed and
T h i s e f f o r t i s designed

p o r t i o n s included i n t h i s paper.

n o t t o replace these documents, b u t t o s y n t h e s i z e them and

c a l l a t t e n t i o n t o s p e c i f i c p u b l i c a t i o n s which can provide

a d d i t i o n a l information.

I n o t h e r words, view t h i s t r e a t i s e

as a base upon which one can b u i l d r a t h e r t h a n a f i n a l prod-

u c t unto i t s e l f .

I t h a s been w r i t t e n t o provide a c c e s s t o

t h o s e u n c l a s s i f i e d documents already available and encourage personnel t o seek a d d i t i o n a l information from p e r t i n e n t documents.
I t would be presumptuous t o assume t h i s a n a l y s i s
h a s reviewed a l l u n c l a s s i f i e d documents a v a i l a b l e , and Threat

Managers should t a k e note of a d d i t i o n a l primary and seconda r y source material w h i c h can h e l p them.
1-2

1-2. PURPOSE.
T h i s document i s intended t o provide T h r e a t Managers

w i t h a s t a r t i n g p o i n t i n t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of T h r e a t Appen-

d i x e s p e r t a i n i n g t o regimental s i z e S o v i e t t a n k and motorized r i f l e units.

T h i s paper is designed t o a i d i n combat

and t r a i n i n g developments s t u d i e s r e q u i r i n g T h r e a t i n p u t

and may be used t o assist e i t h e r s e r v i c e s c h o o l i n s t r u c t o r s

or t a c t i c a l u n i t intelligence officers.
T h i s assessment has

been prepared t o s e r v e as a s t a r t i n g p o i n t and should not be i n t e r p r e t e d as t h e f i n a l e f f o r t by i t s e l f . Because of

t h e u n c l a s s i . f i e d form t h e r e a r e c e r t a i n refinements which

must be added p r i o r t o use i n formulating a s p e c i f i c Threat

r e l e v a n t t o combat and t r a i n i n g developments s t u d y e f f o r t s . The t h e s i s i s s u f f i c i e n t l y complete t o enable wargamers and i n t e l l i g e n c e personnel t o c o n s t r u c t u n c l a s s i f i e d p o r t r a y a l s of S o v i e t units d u r i n g v a r i o u s phases of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s . h r t h e r m o r e , t h i s paper is designed t o c l a r i f y c e r t a i n a s p e c t s of S o v i e t t a c t i c s , s p e c i f i c a l l y whether t h e meeting engagement and t h e w i t h d r a w a l a r e t o be considered as separ a t e c a t e g o r i e s of t a c t i c s . T r a d i t i o n a l l y , most US a u t h o r s

have includod t h e meeting engagement a s p a r t of an o f f e n s i v e ,

while i n c l u d i n g t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a form of d e f e n s e .

Within

t h i s s t u d y t h e meeting engagement has been placed i n t o a

c a t e g o r y by i t s e l f .

Although p r i m a r i l y o f f e n s i v e i n n a t u r e ,

t h e meeting engagement can be planned f o r and u t i l i z e d d u r -

i n g a l l phases of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s . been placed i n t o a s e p a r a t e category.

1-3

Withdrawal has a l s o

1-3. SCOPE.
The preponderance of Threat a n a l y t i c a l e f f o r t s i n support of s c h o o l s t u d i e s h a s focused on t h e regimental l e v e l o r lower.
Thus, t h i s s t u d y h a s surveyed echelons

.i

above regiment and placed t h e main t h r u s t on regimental operations. Within t h e source m a t e r i a l t h e r e are s e v e r a l interchangeable terms used t o d e s c r i b e various f a c e t s of S o v i e t tactics.
A p o r t i o n of each r e l e v a n t c h a p t e r h a s been dedi.I

..

'

cated t o d e f i n i n g p e r t i n e n t terms t o provide c l a r i t y .

Other

s e c t i o n s w i t h i n a p p r o p r i a t e c h a p t e r s d e s c r i b e t y p i c a l opera t i o n a l and s p e c i a l t r o o p s support f o r t h a t phase of operations.

No information i s of value u n l e s s i t can be r e a d i l y

obtained by a p o t e n t i a l user. bibliography.

Thus complete i d e n t i f y i n g

d a t a has been provided f o r a l l r e f e r e n c e s l i s t e d i n t h e

Persons reading t h i s s t u d y w i l l r e a d i l y

recognize there i s an abundance of a d d i t i o n a l source mater i a l from which f u r t h e r information can be obtained.

Readers

a r e encouraged t o provide full i d e n t i f i c a t i o n of a d d i t i o n a l source m a t e r i a l t o CACDA. The information c u t o f f d a t e f o r r e f e r e n c e material is 1 February 1979.
A l l r e f e r e n c e s used i n t h i s r e s e a r c h e f f o r t a r e un-

classified.

Where possible,primary source material, t h a t Secondary

w r i t t e n by S o v i e t a u t h o r s , was used f o r a n a l y s i s .

source m a t e r i a l , prepared by US, i l r i t i s h , Austrian, German,

1-4

and Canadian a u t h o r s , was s t u d i e d t o f i l l gaps or t o corrobo r a t e S o v i e t works.

The second c h a p t e r d e f i n e s t a c t i c s and

e s t a b l i s h e s t h e precedent f o r separate d i s c u s s i o n of t h e meeting engagement and t h e withdrawal. The next c h a p t e r

surveys echelons above regiment and suggests c o n s i d e r a t i o n s when organizing u n i t s f o r combat. Chapters 4, 5, 6 , and 7 d i s c u s s t h e meeting engagement, o f f e n s e , defense, and w i t h drawal, r e s p e c t i v e l y .

The conduct of each phase of t a c t i c a l

o p e r a t i o n s is discussed, t y p i c a l reinforcements are suggested,

and a p p r o p r i a t e terms a r e defined w i t h i n each c h a p t e r .

The

concluding c h a p t e r r e f l e c t s on p o t e n t i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n a l and t e c h n o l o g i c a l changes which might impact on S o v i e t t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e , and provides r e l e v a n t conclusions. Within q u o t a t i o n s from t r a n s l a t i o n s t h e r e a r e some apparent punctuation and grammatical errors. author had a c t u a l l y w r i t t e n . the applicable translation. I n i t i a l l y , one of t h e d r i v i n g f a c t o r s f o r t h i s paper
was t o e x p l a i n t h e e f f e c t of s p e c i a l c o n d i t i o n s , such as

The o r i g i n a l

documents were n o t always available t o a s c e r t a i n what t h e Therefore, although a l i t t l e

awkward a t times, t h e . q u o t e s appear a s t h e y a r e l i s t e d i n

d e s e r t o r mountain environments, on combat o p e r a t i o n s . c a r e f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n and extensive r e s e a r c h i t h a s been decided n o t t o include t h i s information.

After

River c r o s s i n g s

a r e r e a l l y not considered s p e c i a l o p e r a t i o n s and a r e planned f o r whenever t h e s i t u a t i o n so d i c t a t e s . Also m i l i t a r y

1-5

o p e r a t i o n s on urban t e r r a i n , c a l l e d WOUT i n US parlance, a r e planned for when necessary, rather t h a n considered separately. There is no q u e s t i o n t h a t extreme c o l d , h e a t

and mountains have e f f e c t s on o p e r a t i o n s , but these are

r a r e l y gained as t h e y a r e n o t r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of t h e e n t i r e . spectrum of t a c t i c s . Should you decide t o conduct a wargame

where MOUT, river c r o s s i n g s , or n i g h t o p e r a t i o n s are d r i v i n g

f a c t o r s , t h e r e a r e several approved sources which d e s c r i b e these operations i n great d e t a i l .

Also, t h e r e a r e numerous

S o v i e t documents which d e s c r i b e t h e e f f e c t s of extreme c o l d ,

heat and mountains on t h e conduct of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s .

Although h a r d t o game, a i r b o r n e f o r c e 8 both a i r dropped and a i r landed should be considered for employment w i t h i n any s c e n a r i o . Airborne f o r c e s u t i l i z a t i o n should be of

primary i n t e r e s t w i t h i n any s t u d y done t o support U combat S s e r v i c e support. Our t r a i n s , DISCOMS and COSCQMs w i l l o f f e r Further,

l u c r a t i v e targets for S o v i e t a i r b o r n e f o r c e s .

t h e r e a r e numerous approved s t u d i e s and S o v i e t l i t e r a t u r e a v a i l a b l e t o a i d i n wargaming such s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n s and

t h i s paper w i l l n o t address them.

1-6

CHAPTER 2

SOVIET TACTICS
2 - 1 . TACTICSDEFINED.

ANOTFIER VIEW

TAKTIKA (VOYENNAYA) ( m i l i t a r y t a c t i c s ) A s p e c i a l f i e l d i n t h e t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e of m i l i t a r y a r t which s t u d i e s t h e o b j e c t i v e laws of comb a t and d e v e l o p s methods of p r e p a r i n g f o r combat and c o n d u c t i n g i t , on l a n d , a t sea, and i n t h e a i r . M i l i t a r y tactics occupies a subordiante p o s i t i o n w i t h r e s p e c t t o o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and s t r a t e g y , a c t i n g i n t h e i r i n t e r e s t s , and s e r v i n g t o a c h i e v e t h e g o a l s s e t f o r i t by t h e operat i o n a l a r t . Each S e r v i c e and b r a n c h , by v i r t u e of it:; i n t r i n s i c p e c u l i a r i t i e s , h a s i t s own t h e o r y and p r a c t i c e f o r t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n and c o n d u c t o f combat a n d , c o n s e q u e n t l y , i t s own t a c t i c s t o o , w h i c h arf c a l l e d S e r v i c e t a c t i c s o r branch (arms)
tactics.
The S o v i e t s c l e a r l y d e f i n e t h e i r development o f d o c t r i n e

as a s c i e n c e which h a s t h r e e p h a s e s :
art, and t a c t i c s .

strategy, operational

The s t u d y of f o r e i g n and domestic pub-

l i c a t i o n s shows t h e t h r u s t of t a c t i c s t o be c e n t e r e d a t d i v i s i o n l e v e l and below. An i n t e r e s t i n g i s s u e i s t h e

a p p a r e n t d i s c r e p a n c y between American and S o v i e t a u t h o r s

as t o t h e number of t y p e s of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s conducted

by t h e S o v i e t s .
2-2.

KETFICDCLCGJ.
The purpose o f t h i s c h a p t e r is t o r e s o l v e t h i s d i s c r e p -

ancy by e x p l a i n i n g how t h e S o v i e t s s a y t h e y w i l l conduct t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s , and compare t h i s w i t h how we s a y t h e S o v i e t s w i l l conduct t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s .

2- 1

I n most US

documents d e a l i n g w i t h S o v i e t t a c t i c s we c r e d i t them w i t h c o n d u c t i n g o f f e n s i v e , d e f e n s i v e , and r e t r o g r a d e o p e r a t i o n s .

T h i s s e c t i o n should prove t h e S o v i e t s conduct meeting en-

gagements, o f f e n s i v e , d e f e n s i v e , and w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s , Perhaps t h e d i f f e r e n c e s m i g h t be minor, b u t t h e y should

place t h e meeting engagement i n i t s p r o p e r r o l e , t h a t of

t h e predominant form of S o v i e t combat on t h e modern b a t t l e field.

2 - 3 . TYE WEETISG ENGAGEMENT.

"The S o v i e t s p e r c e i v e t h r e e major t y p e s o f o f f e n s i v e action: t h e meeting engagement w h i c h i n c l u d e s advance t o

I

c o n t a c t t t h e breakthrough

and t h e p u r s u i t .

'I2

T h i s theme

shows t h e meeting engagement t o be i n c l u d e d as a form of o f f e n s i v e combat.

"The meeting engagement i s p e r c e i v e d as

t h e most common o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n on t h e n u c l e a r b a t t l e -

field.'I3

One c a n h a r d l y q u e s t i o n t h e v a l i d i t y of t h e meet-

i n g engagement as a common form of combat when t h e r a p i d i t y

of change and a n t i c i p a t e d f l u i d i t y of modern combat are

considered.

S o v i e t Army Operations c h a r a c t e r i z e d S o v i e t

o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as t h e meeting engagement, a t t a c k of a d e f e n d i n g enemy, and p u r s u i t . '

U Army ? i e l d Manual 30-40 S

b r e a k s t h e o f f e n s e i n t o t h e meeting engagement, engagement of d e f e n s e , and p u r s u i t . 5 Another s e r v i c e s c h o o l p u b l i c a t i o n

t y p i f i e s t h e o f f e n s e as i n c l u d i n g t h e meeting engagement,
d e l i b e r a t e a t t a c k a g a i n s t a d e f e n d i n g f o r c e , and p u r s u i t . 6
'I

. . . the

meeting engagement

. . . i n c l u d e s advance t o

2-2

contactr engagement of defense and breakthrough1 and the p~rsuit."~This definition of phases of an offensive operation appeared in an earlier booklet from the same school. The most recent handbook on the Soviet Army contains the following definition of the offensive: "The Soviets classify offensive actions into three major types8 the meeting engagement, and the pursuit.
l''

the breakthrough,

Even manuals

dealing with small unit tactics have also included the meetXowever, one reing engagement as a form of the ~ f f e n s e . ~ port dealing with tank battalion tactics does treat the meeting engagement as a separate form of combat action. T h e Soviets consider the meeting engagement to be the most important battalion operation and it frequently is the focus of training exercises. ,110 Perhaps we should change our terminology for this operation to the encounter battle, to align ourselves with the British, Canadians, and the Soviets. VSTRECSNOYE SRAZHENIYE (BOY) (encounter battle) - A clash between opposing sides when they are simultaneously striving to fulfill assigned missions by means of offensive actions. An encounter battle may occur during a march (maneuver) or in the course of an attack mounted to repel enemy counterattacks or counterblows, and also when reserves or second echelons move up to counterattack or to inflict counterblows when in defense. An encounter battle is characterized by obscurity of the situation and by abrupt changes in it, by the rapid movement to contact of the two sides and by the decisiveness and dynamic nature of their encounter, by rapid changes in march, approachmarch and combat formations, by the swift build-up of effort from depth, by an intense struggle to
2-3

g a i n time and t o s e i z e and hold t h e i n i t i a t i v e , and by t h e presence of open f l a n k s , and f r e e maneuv e r . R e s e n t - d a y s e a and a i r b a t t l e s arelpredomi n a n t l y i n t h e encounter b a t t l e c a t e g o r y . Although t h e o f f e n s i v e i s a necessary i n g r e d i e n t once t h e meeting engagement has begun, i t may be conducted d u r i n g offensive o r defensive operations.
A review of S o v i e t w r i t -

e r s ' opinions of t h e meeting engagement i s i n o r d e r . The S o v i e t s d r a w h e a v i l y upon t h e i r experiences i n "The Great P a t r i o t i c War," t h a t p o r t i o n of t h e Second World War fought by them. The defending s i d e , s e t t i n g up powerful f i r e means, and a l s o mobile and deep r e s e r v e s and second echel o n s , introduced them f o r executing c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and f o r i n f l i c t i n g counterblows w i t h d e c i s i v e g o a l s . A s a r e s u l t of such a c t i o n s , meeting engagements began t o appear i n both o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a t a l l s t a g e s and under t h e most h i g h l y varied c o n d i t i o n s of a s i t u a t i o n a l 2
The a u t h o r c o n t i n u e s t o d e s c r i b e l e s s o n s l e a r n e d from enemy

combat I I n t h e o f f e n s i v e , meeting engagements appeared when r e p u l s i n g enemy c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and counterblows and when overcoming t h e t a c t i c a l zone of h i s defense ( t r o o p o f f e n s i v e of t h e South-Western f r o n t i n t h e d i r e c t i o n of Kharkov i n Kay o f 1 9 4 2 ) ; d u r i n g t h e development of succes8 i n a s t r a t e g i c depth (meeting engagement and combat of t h e Voronezh f r o n t i n t h e Belgorod-Kharkov o p e r a t i o n i n August, 1943, and t h e f o u r t h guards tank army i n t h e Sandomirsk-Sllesian o p e r a t i o n i n January, 1945, and o t h e r s ) ; d u r i n g p u r s u i t (meeting engagements of t h e 38th and 3 r d tank armies i n November, 1943, toward Z h i t o m i r and K a z a t i n ) ; i n r e p e l l i n g enemy attempts t o b r e a k t h e i n t e r n a l o r e x t e r n a l f r o n t o f an enc i r c l e m e n t (meeting engagements of l a r g e Cormations o f t h e 2nd and 6 t h t a n k armies i n t h e Morsun'Shevchenko o p e r a t i o n , t h e r i f t h g u a r d s tank armi s i n t h e Eastern-Frussian o p e r a t i o n , and o t h e r s ) . 13 2-4

3 e f u r t h e r e x p l a i n s t h e need f o r t h e p r a c t i c e of t h e meeting engagement t o meet e x i g e n c i e s of t h e modern b a t t l e f i e l d . The most f r e q u e n t time t h i s form of combat w i l l o c c u r i s
a f t e r i n i t i a l p e n e t r a t i o n o f a d e f e n s e h a s o c c u r r e d and manu-

v e r i n g r e s e r v e s w i l l be encountered.

The meeting engagement

is a p p l i c a b l e t o b o t h n u c l e a r and non-nuclear b a t t l e f i e l d s .

"- d e f e n s e , as e x p e r i e n c e of t h e l a s t war shows, meetIn

i n g engagements c a n o c c u r c h i e f l y d u r i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s and counterblows on advancing enemy groups. '"' :iowever, t h i s

w i l l n o t be t h e o n l y time f o r an e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e d u r i n g
t h e defense.

I n contemporary c o n d i t i o n s , meeting engagements i n d e f e n s e c a n o c c u r n o t o n l y d u r i n g c o u n t e r a t t a c k s a g a i n s t a p e n e t r a t i n g enemy, b u t a l s o when e n c o u n t e r i n g a n advancing enemy w i t h s u b u n i t s which have advanced t o s h u t o f f b r e a c h e s and b r e a k s w h i c h have formed t h e combat deployment of t r o o s, a n d t o c o v e r i m p o r t a n t p o s i t i o n s and d i r e c t i o n s .

5 i

:le goes on f u r t h e r t o s t a t e l
The v a r i e t y of c o n d i t i o n s of t h e appearance of meeting engagements depends n o t o n l y on t h e form of combat a c t i o n i n w h i c h t h e y a p p e a r , b u t a l s o on t h e l o c a t i o n of u n i t s and s u b u n i t s i n t h e combat c o n s t r u c t i o n of t r o o p s , which w i l l i n f l u e n c e t h e grouping of f o r c e s and equipment, t h e p r e p a r a t i o n f o r combat a c t i o n , and t h e a r a c t e r of deployment and e n t r y i n t o combat.

The meeting engagement a p p e a r s t o be a f l e x i b l e form of comb a t w i t h great h i s t o r i c a l p e r s p e c t i v e s , and r e a d i l y a d a p t a b l e

t o modern combat.
Small u n i t t a c t i c s a l s o emphasize t h e meeting engage-

ment as a separate and unique form of combat.

2-5

Meeting engagements, t h e r e f o r e , can occur d u r i n g an o f f e n s i v e , a s w e l l as a d e f e n s i v e , o p e r a t i o n . They a l s o are p o s s i b l e when our t r o o p s are w i t h drawing, i n which c a s e t h e b a t t a l i o n w i l l have t o a c t as t h e r e a r guard, and o f t e n may be forced t o attack a pursuing enemy i n o r d e r t o d e l a y him a t a c e r t a i n l i n e and g a i n time.17 S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n s a l s o r e c o g n i z e t h a t t h e meeting engagement
w i l l be a r a p i d l y developing i f n o t somewhat confusing s i t u -

ation.

"The b a t t a l i o n ' s d i s p o s i t i o n o f t e n w i l l n o t be t h a t

r e q u i r e d f o r t h e concept of a meeting engagement, and r e d i s p o s i t i o n w i l l take time t h a t may n o t always be a v a i l a b l e . ,,I8 The d e f e n s e a l s o o f f e r s unique problems f o r t h e defender.
"The s p e c i a l f e a t u r e s of t h e meeting engagement f o r t h e de-

f e n s e can i n c l u d e t h e enemy u s u a l l y having s u p e r i o r i t y i n f o r c e s and weapons, as w e l l as t h e i n i t i a t i v e i n choosing

t h e p l a c e and time of t h e a t t a c k . 't19
Other authors a l s o

emphasize t h e multi-faced approach t o t h e meeting engagement

f o r small u n i t s , a g a i n w i t h emphasis on l e s s o n s l e a r n e d i n

t h e i r last w a r .

"Experience gained i n t h e Second World W r a

i n d i c a t e s t h a t t h e encounter b a t t l e is n o t only an o f f e n s i v e a c t i v e .'2I' Although o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n w i l l be involved even-

t u a l l y , t h e encounter can take place d u r i n g d e f e n s i v e operations. "An encounter b a t t l e can occur i n t h e course of a

d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e when t h e r e s e r v e s and t h e second echelon

a r e moving up f o r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k , and a l s o when a i r b o r n e

and sea l a n d i n g s a r e being engaged.

lVz1

blost a v a i l a b l e

S o v i e t primary source m a t e r i a l was published p r i o r t o t h e advent of a i r m o b i l e o p e r a t i o n s of t h e t y p e which can b e

2-6

e n v i s i o n e d i n a modern war.

The p o s s i b i l i t y of e n c o u n t e r i n g

a h e l i b o r n e a s s a u l t , w h i l e occupying d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s ,
c a n n o t be p r e c l u d e d . The t r a d i t i o n a l use of p a r a c h u t e f o r c e s

a l s o o f f e r s opportunities f o r encounters.
COL V. Ye. S a v k i n , a l e a d i n g S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n , a l s o

i n c l u d e s t h e e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e as a s e p a r a t e form of a c t i o n i n combat i The given p r i n c i p l e of o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and t a c t i c s f i n d s its expression i n practice i n constant i n f l u e n c e on t h e enemy w i t h an u n i n t e r r u p t e d b u i l d up of t h e f o r c e of a t t a c k s , i n a n t i c i p a t i n g t h e enemy i n d e s t r u c t i o n by f i r e , i n d e l i v e r i n g a t t a c k s and executing maneuver, and i n making u s e of f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s of t h e s i t u a t i o n f o r imposing o n e ' s w i l l on t h e enemy i n a l l forms of combat a c t i o n s . I n examining t h i s p r i n c i p l e it i s i m p o r t a n t t o d i r e c t a t t e n t i o n p r i m a r i l y on i t s a p p l i c a t i o n i n d i f f e r e n t forms of combat a c t i o n s i n t h e o f f e n s e , d e f e n s e , and m e e t i n g engagement ( o r b a t t l e ) . 22

I n A r t i l l e r y I n Suecia1 C o n d i t i o n s , COL S. N . Dudarev

i s c a r e f u l t o make d i s t i n c t i o n between s u p p o r t i n g t h e en-

c o u n t e r b a t t l e , as opposed t o o f f e n s i v e o r d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , when o p e r a t i n g i n mountains, i n t h e d e s e r t , and i n northern regions.

S o , b e s i d e s t h e S o v i e t maneuver commanders

p l a n n i n g f o r s e p a r a t e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e s u p p o r t i n g arms make p l a n s t o s u p p o r t e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e s as a s e p a r a t e e n t i t y . Thus, S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n s p l a n f o r t h e conduct of t h e

meeting engagement d u r i n g a l l p h a s e s of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s .
T h e preponderance of e n c o u n t e r b a t t l e s w i l l p r o b a b l y take

p l a c e d u r i n g t h e o f f e n s i v e , b u t meeting engagements d u r i n g
t h e d e f e n s e are viewed as a d i s t i n c t p r o b a b i l i t y by t h e

2-7

Soviets.

iieliborne f o r c e s , parachute t r o o p s , and naval

assaults a l s o o f f e r a d d i t i o n a l chances f o r encounters d u r i n g

a l l phases of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s .

The meeting engagement

i s viewed by t h e S o v i e t s as t h e preponderance o f combat i n

a f u t u r e war.

I n t e r e s t i n g l y , a US p u b l i c a t i o n has t h e

following observation: The S o v i e t s d e f i n e t h e meeting engagement as combat between opposing columns r a p i d l y advanci n g towards each o t h e r . They p r e d i c t i t w i l l occur I a. A t t h e outbreak of h o s t i l i t i e s when t h e enemy h a s been s u r p r i s e d and i s a t t e m p t i n g t o deploy i n t o forward d e f e n s i v e a r e a s . b. During a breakthrough when t h e enemy's t a c t i c a l r e s e r v e is deploying f o r a countera t t a c k o r t o ' p l u g a gap. I c . I n t h e depth of t h e defense where t h e enemy's r e s e r v e is deploying t o blocking positions. d . During an enemy w i t h d r a w a l when he i s flanked. e . I n a d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n when t h e enemy axes of advance a r e i d e n t i f i e d o r when a counterattack i s launched.23 2-4. THE WITHDRAWAL.
T h i s s e c t i o n p r e s e n t s U and S o v i e t views concerning S

the withdrawal.

Some U S p u b l i c a t i o n s i n c l u d e it as a por-

t i o n of t h e defense, while t h e S o v i e t s a l s o view i t as a s e p a r a t e form of combat.

OTKHOD ( w i t h d r a w a l ) - An o b l i g a t o r y type of combat o p e r a t i o n , a s s o c i a t e d w i t h l e a v i n g occupied r e g i o n s ( l i n e s , p o s i t i o n s ) . A w i t h d r a w a l i s c a r r i e d o u t f o r t h e purpose of e x t r i c a t i n g t r o o p s f r o m s t r i k e s by s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s , p e r m i t t i n g them t o occupy p o s i t i o n s more advantageous f o r subsequent o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , s a v i n g time f o r c o n c e n t r a t i o n of f o r c e s i n a given s e c t o r , s h o r t e n i n g t h e f r o n t , e t c . A

w i t h d r a w a l may be made o n l y w i t h t h e p e r m i s s i o n

of t h e s e n i o r commander.24

J u s t from t h e d e f i n i t i o n a l o n e , it i s obvious t h e S o v i e t s view t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a f l e x i b l e form of t a c t i c a l operations. view. However, n o t a l l of U a n a l y s t s t a k e t h e same S

"Three t y p e s of d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s a r e employed i n

r e t r o g r a d e movements.

They are t h e d e l a y i n g a c t i o n , t h e
T h i s first e f f o r t a t

w i t h d r a w a l , and t h e retirement.

w i d e s t p o s s i b l e u n c l a s s i f i e d d i s s e m i n a t i o n of S o v i e t t a c t i c s

s e e s t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a form of t h e d e f e n s e . view i s modified s l i g h t l y 1

However, t h i s

L o c a l w i t h d r a w a l s are normal t o a n area d e f e n s e and a r e omployed t o r e d u c e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o n u c l e a r f i r e s , t o c a n a l i z e t h e enemy, and t o r e g r o u p def e n s i v e f o r c e s . The S o v i e t r a r e l y e x e c u t e s a g e n e r a l w i t h d r a w a l , p r e f e r r i n g t o conduct d e l a y i n g a c t i o n s . 2% An e a r l i e r p u b l i c a t i o n d i s c u s s e s t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a n i n t e g r a l p o r t i o n of t h e d e f e n s e 1 S o v i e t d o c t r i n e stresses sudden disengagement, p r e f e r a b l y d u r i n g d a r k n e s s . A r e a r guard c o v e r s w i t h d r a w a l of t h e main f o r c e . E i t h e r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k o r massed f i r e s may be used t o b r e a k cont a c t , w i t h w i t h d r a w a l t o r e v i o u s l y prepared p o s i t i o n s when p o s s i b l e . 2?
A s e r v i c e s c h o o l pamphlet m i r r o r s t h e same i n t e r p r e t a t i o n 1

W i t h d r a w a l p l a n s a r e made when p l a n n i n g t h e d e f e n s e . Enemy d o c t r i n e stresses sudden d i s e n gagement, p r e f e r a b l y d u r i n g d a r k n e s s . A rear guard c o v e r s w i t h d r a w a l of t h e main f o r c e . E i t h e r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k o r massed f i r e s may be used t o break contact t o allow a w i t h d r a w a l t o r e v i o u s l y :prepared p o s i t i o n s , when p o s s i b l e . 38
h l a t e r p u b l i c a t i o n from t h e same s c h o o l d e a l i n g w i t h t h e

S o v i e t conduct of t h e d e f e n s e c o n t a i n s e s s e n t i a l l y t h e same view I

2-9

The S o v i e t s view t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a d e f e n s i v e measure t o g a i n t i me t o p r e p a r e f o r a c o u n t e r a t t a c k . Whenever p o s s i b l e , w i t h d r a w a l begins d u r i n g t h e h o u r s o f d a r k n e s s o r reduced v i s i b i l i t y . C o n t a c t i s broken, a c o v e r i n g f o r c e and r e a r guard are e s t a b l i s h e d , and t h e main body o c c u p i e s new d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e r e a r . The S o v i e t s employ d e f e n s i v e f i r e s and smoke and use armor f o r c e s t o c o n f u s e and d e l a y t h e enemy as much as p o s s i b l e . A c o u n t e r a t t a c k can be e x p e c t e d as soon as t h e main bod h a s t i me t o o r g a n i z e and c o n s o l i d a t e i t s f o r c e s . 3-9
S dowever, n o t a l l U p u b l i c a t i o n s d e a l i n g w i t h S o v i e t

t a c t i c s p l a c e t h e w i t h d r a w a l as p u r e l y a d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n . While t h e w i t h d r a w a l i s u s u a l l y a s s o c i a t e d w i t h t h e d e f e n s e ,

i t i s a l s o used when s h i f t i n g f o r c e s f o r t h e o f f e n s e t o
a n o t h e r s e c t o r o r t o s t r e n g t h e n a n o t h e r s e c t o r which i s c o n s i d e r e d e s p e c i a l l y d a n g e r o u s.
w~~

Other publications,

e s p e c i a l l y t h o s e d e a l i n g w i t h small u n i t t a c t i c s , a l s o t r e a t t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a s e p a r a t e form o f combat: B e f o r e a s u c c e s s f u l w i t h d r a w a l c a n be made, disengagement from c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy is r e q u i r e d . The S o v i e t s withdraw o n l y on o r d e r s of a s e n i o r commander. The p u r p o s e s of a w i t h d r a w a l by a t a n k b a t t a l i o n a r e a a. To occupy more advantageous t e r r a i n . b. To auoid enemy n u c l e a r o r c o n v e n t i o n a l fires. c . To a d j u s t a p o s i t i o n t o s e c u r e a n exposed f l a n k d u r i n g a d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e . d . To r e g r o u p a f t e r a s u c c e s s f u l c o n c l u s i o n o f a meeting engagement o r a f t e r s t u b b o r n enemy resistance. e . To avoid e n c i r c l e m e n t . f . To s h o r t e n l i n e s o f communication. g. To f r e e men and equipment f o r o t h e r operations. The t e n o r o f S o v i e t m i l i t a r y w r i t i n g on t h e w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n i s t h a t i t is a u s e f u l t a c t i c t o f r e e a f o r c e f o r a new m i s s i o n b u t i s n o t t o be d i c t a t e d by enemy p r e s s u r e . 31
2-10

The a u t h o r e n v i s i o n s a m o d i f i c a t i o n of S o v i e t t a c t i c s i n o r d e r t o accomplish t h e w i t h d r a w a l 8 The t a c t i c s employed by t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n i n w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s show t h a t t h e S o v i e t s , though normally p r e f e r r i n g t o maneuver as one u n i t , are t r a i n e d t o move by bounds of companies o r even p l a t o o n s when t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n requires. 32 Company l e v e l t a c t i c s are also espoused as u s i n g t h e
w i t h d r a w a l as a s e p a r a t e form of combat:

S o v i e t c o n c e p t s a l l o w w i t h d r a w a l t o avoid enemy n u c l e a r s t r i k e s o r t o occupy a more advantageous p o s i t i o n . I n t h e defense t h e operation is carried out t o reposition a unit's front towards a f l a n k i n r e s p o n s e t o enemy a c t i o n o r t o r e d u c e t h e l e n g t h of a t h r e a t e n e d s u p p l y l i n e . During advance t o c o n t a c t , a w i t h d r a w a l can be o r d e r e d when s t u b b o r n enemy o p p o s i t i o n i s met o r a t t h e c o n c l u s i o n of an u n s u c c e s s f u l meeting engagement. 33 The a p p r o v a l o f a h i g h e r commander i s n e c e s s a r y t o conduct
a w i t h d r a w a l , and t h e enemy should n o t f o r c e t h e o p e r a t i o n 8
"A w i t h d r a w a l is u s u a l l y c a r r i e d o u t i n f a c e of enemy a c t i o n

I t is i m p l i e d , however, t h a t t h e enemy w i l l n o t be allowed

t o dictate a withdrawal.

Another company-level t a c t i c s

manual a l s o t 3 t r e s s e s t h e m u l t i p l e f a c e t s and complicated n a t u r e of t h e w i t h d r a w a l 1

Withdrawal o p e r a t i o n s a r e conducted f o r purposes of r e g r o u p i n g , occupying more f a v o r a b l e t e r r a i n , o r due t o enemy p r e s s u r e . The m i s s i o n of a withdrawing u n i t is t o p r e s e r v e i t s i n t e g r i t y , t o conduct an o r d e r l y withdrawal t o a d e s i g n a t e d a r e a , and t o be r e a d y t o e x e c u t e o f f e n a i v e m i s s i o n s . The S o v i e t s r e c o g n i z e t h e complicated n a t u r e of t h i s o p e r a t i o n and p r e f e r t o w i t h d r a w on m u l t i p l e r o u t e s w i t h o u t occupying i n t e r m e d i a t e phase l i n e s . Whenever p o s s i b l e , t h e S o v i e t s w i l l w i t h d r a w a t n i g h t or du ng o t h e r c o n d i t i o n s of l i m i t e d visibility.

3i

2-11

Another U paper a s s e s s e s t h e meeting engagement a s S a n o t h e r a r e a i n which t h e w i t h d r a w a l may be conducted by the Soviets: The meeting engagement ends when one opponent adopts a new t a c t i c such as, e s t a b l i s h i n g a defens i v e p o s i t i o n o r w i t h d r a w i n g . According t o t h e t a c t i c a l s i t u a t i o n the Soviets i n i t i a t e a elib! e r a t e a t t a c k , a pursuit, o r a withdrawal.3t Although some o f t h e e a r l i e r p u b l i c a t i o n s tended t o p l a c e t h e w i t h d r a w a l a s a f o r m of r e t r o g r a d e o p e r a t i o n s o r w i t h i n t h e conduct of t h e d e f e n s e , t h e r e h a s been a t r e n d t o cons i d e r t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a s e p a r a t e form o f combat a c t i v i t y .
A l o g i c a l e x t e n s i o n i s t o examine how t h e S o v i e t s view t h e

conduct of w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s . The withdrawal h a s h i s t o r i c a l precedence w i t h i n t h e minds of S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n s . "On t h e broad and mobile f r o n t s

of t h e C i v i l War, t h e enemy, a f t e r t h e first d e f e a t s , could withdraw h i s t r o o p s and r e o r g a n i z e a defense o r even o f f e n s e . ,,37 Kowever, t h i s l e s s o n l e a r n e d by t h e i3olsheviks was a p p a r e n t l y ignored d u r i n g t h e period p r i o r t o The Great P a t r i o t i c War:

I n p r i n c i p l e , our prewar t h e o r y allowed f o r t h e forced r e t r e a t of t h e t r o o p s i n i s o l a t e d s e c t o r s . !lowever, t h e problem o f w i t h d r a w a l of l a r g e f o r c e s f r o m under enemy s t r i k e s was n t developed, e i t h e r theoretically o r practically.3

The a u t h o r f u r t h e r c i t e s experience i n t h e i r l a s t war and t h e need t o be prepared t o conduct w i t h d r a w a l o p e r a t i o n s : During t h e war i n i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s a s i t u a t i o n may a r i s e i n which f o r c e s can be saved from i n e v i t a b l e d e f e a t o n l y a t t h e c o s t of g i v i n g up conquered t e r r i t o r y by means o f a temporary v B d r a w a l . Troops may be forced t o withdraw a s a
2-12

unprovided f o r o f f e n s i v e by i n d i v i d u a l g r o u p s . Sometimes t h e w i t h d r a w a l w i l l be p r e m e d i t a t e d s o t h a t t h e t r o o p s c a n g a i n a more a d v a n ta g e o u s p o s i t i o n f o r subsequent a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n s . Withdrawal h a s always been n e g l e c t e d i n a l l armies. iiowever, h i s t o r y h a s t a u g h t t h a t armed f o r c e d which have n o t mastered t h e o r g a n i z e d w i t h d r a w a l c a n n o t be c o n s i d e r e d as b a t t l e - r e a d y , s i n c e s u c h t r o o p s a r e most o f t e n d e f e a t e d . The R u s s i a n army i n t h e p a s t h a s s u f f e r e d most o f i t s l o s s e s d u r i n g w i t h d r a w a l . Lenin t a u g h t t h a t : I one who knows how t o advance and h a s n o t l e a r n e d how i n c e r t a i n d i f f i c u l t circumstances t o adapt t o i t , t o withdraw, w i l l l o s e t h e war. Wars w h i c h have begun arid ended w i t h a v i c t o r i o u s o f f e n s i v e a r e n o t e v i d e n t from world h i s t o r y o r i f t h e y have occurred, a r e exceptions. '39

r e s u l t o f an unsuccessful d e f e n s i v e b a t t l e o r an

...

As i s ,the c a s e w i t h most S o v i e t m i l i t a r y t h e o r y books a

c o n s i d e r a b l e emphasis i s p l a c e d on h i s t o r i c a l l e s s o n s l e a r n e d and t h e need t o be pre p a re d f o r t h e f u t u r e . m i l i t a r y t h e o r i s t s view t h e w i t h d r a w a l i n And f i n a l l y , a b o u t w i t h d r a w a l .
R

Other S o v i e t

similar v e i n .

consequences stemming t h e r e f r o m . I n d i v i d u a l c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , t h e placement of f i r e b a r r i e r s on t h e p a t h s of t h e a t t a c k e r o r t h e p u r s u i n g enemy, t h e f i r m h o l d i n g o f c o n s e c u t i v e l y occupied l i n e s by r e a r g u a r d s , l e a d i n g t h e enemy a s t r a y by d i v e r s i o n s , s e t t i n g up ambushes, o b s t a c l e s , and d e s t r u c t i o n on t h e a x e s o f t h e enemy attack a l l these are forms i n which t h e a c t i v e n e s s of t r o o p s is m a n i f e s t e d i n a w i t h d r a w a l . 4 0 Withdrawal must be conducted i n a n o r g a n i z e d manner w i t h t h e a p p r o v a l o r d i r e c t i o n o f h i g h e r a u t h o r i t y and f o r a s p e c i f i c pur pos e. %he S o v i e t s a r e p a i n f u l l y aware of t h e r e s u l t s o f

a w i t h d r a w a l activeness a l s o f i n d s wide applicat i o n . I n t h e opposite i n s t a n c e , w i t h d r a w a l is transformed i n t o a p a n ic k y f l i g h t w i t h a l l t h e

I n making

a n ad hoc w i t h d r a w a l .

2-13

General-Major V. G . Reznichenko, a n o t h e r l e a d i n g S o v i e t t a c t i c i a n , h a s similar views on t h e purpose and conduct o f

t h e withdrawal:

W i t h d r a w a l is a f o r m o f combat a c t i o n a p p l i e d f o r t h e purpose o f regrouping, occupying more s u i t a b l e p o s i t i o n s , o r withdrawing ones own t r o o p s from under p o s s i b l e a t t a c k s of t h e enemy. Usually, t h e n e c e s s i t y of w i t h d r a w a l appears i n t h e course o f d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s , when only by t h e temporary l e a v i n g of p a r t of t h e t e r r i t o r y i s i t p o s s i b l e t o withdraw ones t r o o p s from under i t s attack o f s u p e r i o r forces of t h e enemy, and s e t them i n more p r o f i t a b l e p o s i t i o n . The n e c e s s i t y of withdrawal can appear w i t h t h e u n s u c c e s s f u l o u t come o f meeting engagement and t o g e t o u t of an encirclement.41

Although withdrawal appears t o b e most predominant d u r i n g

d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s , t h e a u t h o r opines t h a t o f f e n s i v e oper-

a t i o n s may have t o be included i n t h e withdrawal.

However,

speed o f t h e o p e r a t i o n and i f p o s s i b l e a breaking o f t h e

contact o f f e r advantages.
During a c t i v e o p e r a t i o n of t h e enemy t h e withdrawing t r o o p s are forced t o c o u n t e r a c t him w i t h p a r t and sometimes a l l of t h e f o r c e s , cond u c t p e r s i s t e n t b a t t l e on s u i t a b l e l i n e s t o d e l a y t h e advance of t h e enemy, i n f l i c t l o s s e s on h i m , g a i n time, and c r e a t e p r o f i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r going i n t o t h e designated area. Although a c t i v e , d e c i s i v e combat a c t i o n s by withdrawing t r o o p s i s t h e basis of such a w i t h d r a w a l , t h i s method i s l e s s p r o f i t a b l e . i t i s considered more expedient t o accomplish w i t h d r a w a l without occupation o f intermediate l i n e s and on as many r o u t e s as p o s s i b l e , i n o r d e r t o reduce t h e d e p t h s of columns and t h e time f o r accomplishing t h e withdrawal .42 Proponents o f a book f o r b a t t a l i o n - l e v e l t a c t i c s have t h e i r views of t h e w i t h d r a w a l :
A withdrawal may b e undertaken

f o r t h e purpose o f occupying more s u i t a b l e l i n e s o r to

2-14

remove o n e ' s s u b - u n i t s from under a p o s s i b l e enemy a t t a c k , e s p e c i a l l y one i n f l i c t e d on t h e f l a n k and i n t h e r e a r of o u r s u b - u n i t s . 1143 Again, emphasis i s placed on a p p r o v a l from hi.gher e c h e l o n s and t h e f a c t i t may be conducted i n a v a r i e t y of c i r c u m s t a n c e s . I n an a t t a c k , i t is c a r r i e d o u t when t h e enemy o f f e r s s t u b b o r n r e s i s t a n c e i n one s e c t o r , w h i l e i n a n o t h e r s e c t o r c i r c u m s t a n c e s are f a v o u r a b l e f o r d e v e l o p i n g t h e attack o r c o m p l e t i n g newly a r i s i n g m i s s i o n s . A w i t h d r a w a l may a l s o be u n d e r t a k e n when t h e o u t m of a n e n c o u n t e r e battle is unsuccessful.

$8

The w i t h d r a w a l a l s o h a s a p p l i c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s e :

I n carrying out a defensive operation, the n e c e s s i t y f o r a w i t h d r a w a l may a r i s e when moving t h e b a t t a l i o n from one s e c t o r t o a n o t h e r t h r e a t ened s e c t o r , f o r c o v e r i n g gaps formed i n t h e d e f e n c e as a r e s u l t of enemy n u c l e a r s t r i k e s , o r t o s e c u r e open f l a n k s . 4 5
The w i t h d r a w a l h a s o t h e r a p p l i c a t i o n s w h i c h have both

o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e i m p l i c a t i o n s .

" A w i t h d r a w a l may

a l s o be u n d e r t a k e n d u r i n g a n e n c i r c l e m e n t b a t t l e .

In this

c a s e , t h e w i t h d r a w a l i s c a r r i e d o u t w i t h t h e aim of r e i n f o r c i n g t h e defence i n a threatened s e c t o r , o r t o break through t h e e n v e l o p i n g f r o n t . " 46 Emphasis c o n t i n u e s t o be

placed on t h e preplanned u t i l i z a t i o n of t h e w i t h d r a w a l t o e f f e c t f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e t a c t i c a l commander. " I n a number of s i t u a t i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n t h e d e f e n c e , w i t h d r a w a l may be carried o u t d e l i b e r a t e l y f o r t h e purpose of

s h o r t e n i n g t h e f r o n t , and t o r e l e a s e f o r c e s and weapons. ,,47

I t a p p e a r s t h e S o v i e t s f e e l t h e w i t h d r a w a l c a n be conducted

2-15

d u r i n g a l l phases of t a c t i c a l o p e r a t i o n s , although t h e preponderance of c a s e s should occur d u r i n g t h e d e f e n s i v e .

2-5. CCNCLUSIONS.
T h e meeting engagement i s viewed by t h e S o v i e t s as a

s e p a r a t e form of combat w h i c h can t a k e p l a c e d u r i n g o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .

W should r e a l i g n o u r t h i n k i n g e

and r e l e v a n t p u b l i c a t i o n s and take t h e same view as t h e Soviets.

The meeting engagement o r encounter b a t t l e can

t a k e place under t h e f o l l o w i n g circumstances:

A t t h e i n i t i a t i o n of h o s t i l i t i e s when t h e enemy is

moving i n t o d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .

. After a r u p t u r e
of a defense.

of i n i t i a l p o s i t i o n s has o c c u r r e d

and r e s e r v e s a r e being redeployed.

, Against h a s t i l y prepared p o s i t i o n s i n t h e d e p t h s

. Against r e s e r v e s
initiated.

moving t o assist pursued f o r c e s .

, I n t h e d e f e n s e when a c o u n t e r a t t a c k h a s been

, N i t h t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of h e l i b o r n e , p a r a c h u t e , o r
sea-landed f o r c e s i n t o t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . The w i t h d r a w a l a l s o has a p p l i c a t i o n as a s e p a r a t e f o r m o f combat and is viewed as such by t h e S o v i e t s .

Most times

t h e w i t h d r a w a l w i l l be conducted i n a d e f e n s i v e mode, b u t

i t d e f i n i t e l y h a s a p p l i c a t i o n d u r i n g t h e o f f e n s i v e and meet-

i n g engagement.

W s h o u l d t a k e t h e same view and c o r r e c t e 2-16

our d o c t r i n a l publications. when I

The withdrawal c a n o c c u r

. Conducting economy of f o r c e measures. . To g a i n t i m e . . To r e a l i g n o r "tidy-up" t h e b a t t l e f i e l d . . To make a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s f o r i n t r o d u c t i o n i n t o t h e

f r a y i n o t h e r areas.

. To occupy more f a v o r a b l e t e r r a i n . . To avoid c o n t a c t w i t h a v a s t l y s u p e r i o r f o r c e .

, To s h o r t e n l i n e s of communication o r f r o n t a g e s .

. To t e r m i n a t e a meeting engagement. . To r e o r g a n i z e o r r e g r o u p f o r c e s . . To avoid e n c i r c l e m e n t .

2-6.

ENDNOTES..
_ I

'A. I . Radziyevskiy, e d . , D i c t i o n a r y of a a s i c M i l i t a x Terms, T r a n s l a t e d by t h e DCIS h l u l t i l i n g u a l S e c t i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n u u r e a u , S e c r e t a r y of S t a t e Department, Ottawa, Canada, and p u b l i s h e d under t h e a u s p i c e s of t h e USA?'. (Washington1 GPO, 1 9 7 6 ) , 218. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r a s Rad z i y e v s k i y , D i c t i o n a r y .

. P

2 > l i l i t a r y O p e r a t i o n s of t h e S o v i e t Army (LIOSA) ( A r l i n g t o n i USAI'TAD, 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 13 ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as

. a.)

'Soviet Army O p e r a t i o n s ( S A O ) ( A r l i n g t o n 1 U S A I T A C , A p r i l 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 3-7. ( C i t e d - h e r e a f t e r as S&.) 5'iandbook on S o v i e t Ground Forces (?I; 30-40). (Washi n g t o n r G P 0 , 1 9 7 5 ) , p. 5-7. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as 1% 30-40.) 'Soviet T a c t i c s i n t h e Gffense (PT 100-3, 'JCL 1 1 . ') ( 7 o r t Leavenworthi U S A C G X , J u l y 1 9 7 8 ) , pp. 2 , 7 , and 4.C. 2-17

USJACGLC,

7T1:?e Enemy Torte (RB 30-1 ( T o r t Leavenworth: 1 9 7 5 ) , p . 2-7. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as R3 30-1.)

>.

%andbook on t h e S o v i e t hrmed F o r c e s i i l ~ ~ - 2 6 8 0 - 4 0 - 7 8 ) . ( N a s h i n g t o n : D I A , r'ebruary 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 8-15. 'Soviet Tank Company T a c t i c s (DDI-1120-129-76). (Washi n g t o n : Din, Liay 19761, p. 31, and The S o v i e t ivlotorized R i f l e Company (001-llOC-77-76). (Washington: D i A , OctoTer 19761, p. 5 . ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as DCi-1120-129-76 and D D I 1100-77-76.) "Soviet Tank B a t t a l i o n Tactics (DDi-1120-1C-77). (Washington: DIA, August 1 9 7 7 ) , p. 11. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as DDi-1120-10-77.) "Radziyevskiy,
I2V.

D i c t i o n a r y , p . 51.
ed.,

G . Reznichenko,

USAL:. ( W i g h t - P a t t e r s o n U B : 1 6 ) 97,. as Reznichenko, Tactics.)

l3Ibid.
"Tbid ~t 151bid.
_ _ I

T a c t i c s . T r a n s l a t e d by t h e 130. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r

P * 132.

16i5id.

I 7 G . I . Garbuz, D . F. Loza, and I . F . Sazonov, .T h e Motorized R i f l e Z a t t a l i o n i n B a t t l e , 2d e d . T r a n s l a t e d by Office of t h e Assistant Chief OP S t a f f f o r i n t e l l i g e n c e . (Washington: 1978), p . 55.

'%bid -'

p . 57.

l9U., 5 8 . p.
2oF. I . Itonoplya and M. A . Maykov, The Tank B a t t a l i o n i n Combat, C h a p t e r s 3 , 4, 5 . T r a n s l a t e d b y h e M u l t i l i n g u a l

S e r v i d e s D i v i s i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n Bureau, Department of t h e S e c r e t a r y o f S t a t e , Canada. (Ottawa; O c t o b e r 1 9 7 4 ) , p . 32. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as Konoplyn, y , 4, 5 . ) T " i p 3. 2 l w . , p , 34.

22V. Ye. S a v k i n , T h e B a s i c F r i n c i p l e s of O p e r a t i o n a l Art and T a c t i c s . T r a n s l a t e d and p u b l i s h e d u n d e r t h e a u s p i c e s of t h e USJW. ( l a s h i n g t o n : SFO, 1 9 7 6 ) , p . 249. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as S a v k i n , P r i n c i p l e s . )

2-18

23:;oviet Tactics I The Meeting EnPagement (DDI-1100-1437 6 ) . (Washington: D I A , December 1 9 7 6 ) , p a 1. ( C i t e d h e r e a f t e r as DDI-1100-143-76,)

24Radziyevskiy, D i c t i o n a r x , p . 150.

-9

P. ~25.

261bidI 27FK 30-40, p . 5-19.

28RB 30-1,

p . 2-17.

2 9 S o v i e t Tactics i n t h e Defense ( F T 100-3, VOL V ) ( F o r t Leavenworthi USBCGSC, J u l y 1 9 7 8 ) , p . 28.

3OsA0, p. 4-18,
31DDI-1120-10-77, 3 2 w . , p . 48. 33~DI-1120-129-76, p . 53.
341bid.

p . 45.

p . 9.

3 5 ~ ~ ~ - 1 1 C 0 - 7 7 - 7 6 ,. 10. p 36DDI-1100-143-76,

37V. D . S o k o l o v s k i y , e d . , S o v i e t M i l i t a r y S t r a t e g y , 3d ed. T r a n s l a t i o n , commentary and a n a l y s i s by H a r r i e t F a s t S c o t t . (New Yorkt Crane, Russak and Co., I n c . , 1 9 7 5 ) , p . 123.

38w., p . 133.
3 9 -b i d 1
9

p . 296.

Savkin,

P r i n c i p l e s , p . 251. T a c t i c s , p . 242.

41Reznichenchko,
].bid.

m,

, 3. 1. Konoplya and N. A . hlaykov, The Tank B a t t a l i o n i n Combat, C h a p t e r s 6 , 7 , 8 , 9. T r a n s l a t e d by t h e K u l t i l i n g u a l S e r v i c e s D i v i s i o n , T r a n s l a t i o n d u r e a u , De artrnent of S t a t e , Canada. (Ottawa; October 1 9 7 4 ; , p . 79. ?Cited 6 , 7, 8, 9.) h e r e a f t e r as Konoplya,

2-19

2-20

CHAPTER 3
ECHELONS ABOVE REGIMENT

3-1

GENERAL
A review of units l a r g e r t h a n r e g i m e n t a l s i z e i s

e s s e n t i a l i n o r d e r t o p o s t u l a t e w h a t regiments may be doing i n specified situations. S o v i e t commanders weight

main a t t a c k s and primary d e f e n s i v e s e c t o r s w i t h o p e r a t i o n a l , and s p e c i a l t r o o p s s u p p o r t .

T h u s , one must examine t h e

s t r u c t u r e o f l a r g e r u n i t s i n o r d e r t o determine what is a v a i l a b l e for apportionment t o lower u n i t s . The Front

commander w i l l determine w h a t support he w i l l provide t o

h i s v a r i o u s armies.

I n t u r n , t h e Army commander must con-

s i d e r what support he h a s r e c e i v e d , examine h i s organic a s s e t s , a n d t h e n provide support among h i s d i v i s i o n s . Then,

t h e D i v i s i o n Commander must c r i t i c a l l y look a t t h e support he h a s r e c e i v e d , a l s o balance t h i s a g a i n s t h i s i n t r i n s i c f o r c e s , and then make n e c e s s a r y a l l o c a t i o n s t o t h e regiments.

A f a c t o r t o bear i n mind i s t h e S o v i e t s do n o t p r a c t i c e c r o s s

attachment as we s e n s e t h e term, r a t h e r t h e y provide r e i n forcements.

So,

a S o v i e t commander does n o t have t o g i v e

up a p o r t i o n of h i s f o r c e s i n o r d e r t o g a i n a complementary arm. Let u s e s t a b l i s h t h e premise t h a t t h e S o v i e t s p r a c t i c e S o v i e t and U f o r c e s S

and preach combined arms warfare.

prepared a f t e r - a c t i o n r e p o r t s of f i g h t i n g i n t h e 1973 Yom Kippur W a r .

3-1

3-2. FRONT.

FRONT ( F r o n t )

formation of armed formations, and major f i e l d f o r c e s o r s t r a t e g i c formations of ground t r o o p s , a i r f o r c e s , and sometimesleven n a v a l f o r c e s ( r i v e r f l o t i l l a s , e t c . ) ; Note on S o v i e t Nomenclature and Terms. A number o f S o v i e t terms have no e x a c t English e q u i v a l e n t . The terms l i s t e d below a r e t h o s e used f r e q u e n t l y i n t h i s d i c t i o n a r y . F r o n t - Highest l e v e l of an ob"yedineniye. A f r o n t may be formed from major f i e rorces ( s t r a t e g i c formations, soyedineniyi: and u n i t s from t h e v a r i o u s S e r v i c e s o f t h e armed f o r c e s ) . ' F r o n t ' may a l s o be used as an a d j e c t i v e when r e f e r r i n g t o u n i t s organic t o a f r o n t . 0b"yedinenive - Major F i e l d Forces o r S t r a t e g i c Tormation. An o-oerational and o r a a n i z a t i o n a l ent i t y i n t h e d i f f e r e n t S e r v i c e s of-the armed f o r c e s , an ob"yedineniue is formed from v a r i o u s s e r v i c e branches ( o r arms) f o r t h e purpose of conducting m i l i t a r y operations. Soyedineniye - Formation. The h i g h e s t l e v e l of m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n 1 Corps, D i v i s i o n , o r 3rigade l e v e l e q u i v a l e n t . I t may be formed from a s i n g l e branch of v a r i o u s branches and S e r v i c e s , i n c l u d i n g navalZsquadronst

-o r(1)sTheI h i g h e sitn c lt u a tee g nci t s , s r i f ce . t may d u

. . .American E d i t o r ' s

...

...

A Front i s a wartime o r g a n i z a t i o n without a f i x e d

s t r u c t u r e and w i l l be comprised of v a r i o u s o p e r a t i o n a l a n d s p e c i a l t r o o p s support u n i t s .

A preponderance of what we

would c a l l combat s e r v i c e support t r o o p s w i l l have t o be activated from the reserves. The b e s t e q u i v a l e n t peace-

time u n i t would be a group of S o v i e t f o r c e s , such as Group

o f S o v i e t Forces Germany (GSFG), o r one of t h e 16 m i l i t a r y

d i s t r i c t s w i t h i n t h e Union of S o v i e t S o c i a l i s t Republics (USSR).

3-2

U n i t s from o t h e r members of t h e Warsaw P a c t could a l s o

be i n c l u d e d i n

a Front.

F r o n t - l e v e l s t a f f s a r e planned o n l y f o r U n t i l 1968, t h e Headquart e r s f o r t h e Southwest F r o n t was t o have been formed from p a r t s of MOD Prague and t h e h e a d q u a r t e r s of M i l i t a r y D i s t r i c t Tabor. S i n c e t h e n , p l a n s are t o form t h i s headq u a r t e r s s t r i c t l y from CGF assets. I n 1971/ 1972, however, Czech o f f i c e r s were a g a i n a s s i g n e d t o t h e Southwest F r o n t S t a f f , probably f o r p s y c h o l o g i c a l r e a s o n s . 3
t h e S o v i e t Army.

Thus, t h e a d d i t i o n of non-Soviet f o r c e s i n t o F r o n t s would

have t o be c o n s i d e r e d i n f o r m u l a t i n g f o r c e s t r u c t u r e s .

The Northern Group o f F o r c e s ( N G F ) , C e n t r a l Group of Forces (CGF), from Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, could be F r o n t s as w e l l as GSFG.
So a t l e a s t f o u r F r o n t s would be

immediately a v a i l a b l e f o r t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n of a Theater
a t t a c k against NATO, and t h e three most w e s t e r n m i l i t a r y

d i s t r i c t s of t h e USSR ( a a l t i c , B e l o r u s s i a n , and C a r p a t h i a n )

could a e r v e as t h e Theater's second e c h e l o n F r o n t s . F i g u r e 1 i s a diagram of a "Type" F r o n t .

3ear i n mind

each F r o n t could be organized d i f f e r e n t l y , and many s u p p o r t

units would have t o b e a c t i v a t e d from t h e reserves p r i o r
t o t h e i r commitment i n t o b a t t l e .
The main p o i n t i s t h e

a v a i l a b i l i t y of a r t i l l e r y , engineer, a i r defense, s i g n a l , chemical, and o t h e r u n i t s t o r e i n f o r c e t h e s u b o r d i n a t e

Armies.

Also, t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of a i r b o r n e u n i . t s , o r g a n i c

3-3

FRONT

F I
SSM
Ferry Units

T a c t i c a1

Airborne Division

Lridging Units

Signal Units

biaint Units

Medical Units

Transport Units

Intel Units

IIGURE 1

3-4

h i g h performance and r o t a r y wing a i r c r a f t must be t a k e n

i n t o c o n s i d e r a t i o n when o r g a n i z i n g t h e Armies f o r combat.

Approved s c e n a r i o s s h o u l d be used f o r gaming t o a s c e r t a i n w h i c h F r o n t i s t o be p l a y e d , and w h a t assets t h e y have f o r a l l o c a t i o n t o t h e Armies. ;or example, GSFG h a s

an a r t i l l e r y d i v i s i o n w h i c h s u p p o r t s i t as a matter of
routine,and
t h e same i s t r u e w i t h t h e 1 6 t h Tactical A i r

Army, which p r o v i d e s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e , f i g h t e r , f i g h t e r bomber, and bomber a i r c r a f t .

A r e v i e w of t h e m i s s i o n s

assigned t o s u b o r d i n a t e Armies s h o u l d p r o v i d e a basis f o r

r e i n f o r c e m e n t ; of t h e Armies w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e s u p p o r t . N i s s i o n and t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s s h o u l d h e l p d e t e r m i n e t h e number of s o r t i e s a l l o c a t e d t o t h e Armies from F r o n t ' s

Tactical A i r Army.

I t would n o t be u n u s u a l t o r e i n f o r c e

t h e main s t r i k e Army, o r Army i n t h e primary d e f e n s i v e s e c t o r , w i t h o n e - t h i r d t o o n e - h a l f of t h e a v a i l a b l e F r o n t artillery. Yhe same p r o p o r t i o n c o u l d hold t r u e f o r a i r Engi-

d e f e n s e a r t i l l e r y , e n g i n e e r s and chemical s u p p o r t .

n e e r s u p p o r t a l l o c a t i o n woiild have t o be b a s e d upon t h e m i s s i o n and e s p e c i a l l y on t h e t e r r a i n f a c i n g t h e Army. S u p p o r t i n g Armies o f t h e F r o n t would r e c e i v e smaller p o r t i o n s of a p p r o p r i a t e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s .

Most s t a n d a r d s c e n a r i o s have a l r e a d y a l l o c a t e d s u p p o r t
t o Armies from t h e F r o n t .
avoid u s i n g
3 .

Care must 3e t a k e n , however, t o

I n o t h e r words,

"Cookie C u t t e r " approac!].

d o n ' t t a k e a v a i l a b l e a s s e t s and s i m p l y a p p o r t i o n them

3-5

equally t o subordinate units.

The S o v i e t s take i n t o consider-

a t i o n t h e same f a c t o r s w do when planning combat o p e r a t i o n s , e

ie:
able.

Mission, Enemy, T e r r a i n , Time, and Troops (METTT) availThus it i s imperative t o analyze t h e mission and perT h i s same procedure holds t r u e for t h e
What is b e s t

form a t e r r a i n a n a l y s i s p r i o r t o a l l o c a t i n g support t o subo r d i n a t e elements.

reinforcement process down t o company l e v e l .

f o r one u n i t may n o t be t h e best f o r an adjacent u n i t . n o t mean t h a t each Army should receive a regiment.

Just

because one Army receives an e n t i r e a r t i l l e r y regiment does Also, do n o t f o r g e t t o include special t r o o p s support w i t h t h e opera t i o n a l troops support. t o us.
Repair, t r a n s p o r t a t i o n , POL and

ammunition are j u s t as important t o t h e S o v i e t s as they a r e

Again, a n a l y s i s must be performed p r i o r t o assignment

of augmentation t o lower l e v e l s .

As an example, a d d i t i o n a l

a r t i l l e r y support might e n t a i l a d d i t i o n a l t r a n s p o r t a t i o n support i n o r d e r t o h a u l t h e required amount of ammunition.

The mission of t h e a r t i l l e r y and t h e amounts of ammunition

t o be expended i n preplanned a r t i l l e r y f i r e s w i l l d r i v e t h e ammunition h a u l i n g requirement more than j u s t t h e number of a r t i l l e r y tubes. I n o t h e r words, develop a thorough

o p e r a t i o n w h i l e organizing a u n i t or combat.
A F r o n t i s capable of independent o p e r a t i o n s w i t h i n
t h e t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s , b u t t h e F r o n t s w i l l probably

work i n conjunction t o s a t i s f y t h e s t r a t e g i c mission

assigned t o t h e t h e a t e r .

To repeat, missions w i l l vary

3-6

from circumstance to circumstance.

Don't

fall into the

trap of always assigning the same missions to the same type units. Bear in mind that Front objectives will be both The immediate objective for the This

immediate and followup.

Front will be the followup objective for the Army.

step down process holds true through battalion level. Another major consideration is whether the planned battle will be nuclear or non-nuclear. This has a tremendous

impact on the missions and widths of zones of attack assigned to Armies. There also is a strong impact on the width and

depth of assigned defensive sectors. Also, the play of electronic warfare will have an impact on organizing the forces for combat. The same con-

siderations for other force allocations are valid for the distribution of radio-technical troop assets to lower levels. The integration of jamming with the physical

destruction of' facilities by artillery is called radioelectronic combat. The Soviets plan to neutralize our

command and control communications by jamming one-quarter to one-third of o u r critical nets and destroying an additional one-quarter to one-third of our command and control facilities. Thus, if they can incapacitate fifty percent

of o u r necessary communication8 links, they feel they have effectively destroyed o u r command and control capabilities. The integration of radio-electronic combat into all wargames is an essential task. This is another area which

3- 7

must be c a r e f u l l y planned when making a l l o c a t i o n s t o subordinate units.

3-3.

ARMY.
c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l formations of v a r i o u s branches and s p e c i a l t r o o p s , and intended f o r t h e conduct of o p e r a t i o n s (combat a c t i v i t i e s ) ; (2) ground t r o o p s ( f o r c e s ) ; ( 3 ) sometimes t h e word army i s used t o d e s i g n a t e t h e armed f o r c e s of a t a t e , e.g., t h e Red Army o r t h e So v i e t Army.

ARMIYR (army) (1) An o p e r a t i o n a l grouping o f one or another S e r v i c e of t h e armed f o r c e s ,

Ground Armies w i t h i n t h e Front can be of two t y p e s , e i t h e r Tank or Combined A r m s .

A s is the case w i t h Front,

t h e r e is no f i x e d s t r u c t u r e for a n Army a n d some s p e c i a l t r o o p s s u p p o r t must be mobilized from t h e r e s e r v e s . An

Army w i l l u s u a l l y have from t h r e e t o f i v e D i v i s i o n a , along

w i t h a p p r o p r i a t e o p e r a t i o n a l and s p e c i a l t r o o p s s u p p o r t .
A type Army i s i l l u s t r a t e d i n Figure 2 .

The T a c t i c a l A i r

Army w i l l n o t be discussed i n t h i s paper.

A T a n k Army may have from two t o f o u r tank d i v i s i o n s ,

and a t l e a s t one motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n .

A Combined A r m s

Army has a r e v e r s e r a t i o , w i t h two t o f o u r motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n s , and u s u a l l y a tank d i v i s i o n . The l i s t i n g of

u n i t s a t Figure 3 shows t h e d i f f e r e n t combinations of d i v i s i o n s w i t h i n CSFG.

The d e s i g n a t i o n s , 'Guards A r m x , ' 'Guards Armg' have only h i s Tank A r m ? , ' and 'S:ock t o r i c a l h o n o r i f i c s i g n i f i c a n c e , and have

3-8

.'iGURE 2

3-9

S e l e c t e d Elements of Group of S o v i e t F o r c e s Germany

1st Guards T'ank Army 6 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 7 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 9 t h Tank Division 1 1 t h G u a r d s Tank D i v i s i o n 2 7 t h Guards Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n
2d Guards Army 1 6 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 2 1 s t blotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n 25th Tank D i v i s i o n 9 4 t h Guards Niotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n 3d Shock Army 1 0 t h G u a r d s Tank D i v i s i o n 1 2 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 4 7 t h Guards Tank D i v i s i o n 207th Guards iviotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n 8 t h Guards Army 2 0 t h Guards 3 9 t h Guards 5 7 t h Guards 79th Guards Motorized R i f l e g i v i s i o n Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n Xotorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n Tank D i v i s i o n

20th Guards A r m y 6 t h Guards Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n 1 4 t h Guards X o i o r i z e d R i f l e D i v i s i o n 3 5 t h Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n

( E x t r a c t e d from page 6 2 , The 'iiarsaw ---'I a c t Armies P

'

TICURE

3-10

nothing t o do w i t h t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n o r funct i o n of t h e armies. The term 'Guards' does not r e f e r t o an e l i t e u n i t w i t h s p e c i a l t r a i n i n g and equipment. The d e s i g n a t i o n i s given t o u n i t s f o r t r a d i t i o n a l r e a s o n s or f o r s p e c i a l r e c o g n i t i o n o f acheivement i n t r a i n i n g or p o l i t i c a l o r i e n t a t i o n . 5 The preponderance of S o v i e t u n i t s earned t h e i r "Guards" d e s i g n a t i o n d u r i n g "The Great P a t r i o t i c War."
I t was used

as a morale b u i l d e r and f r e q u e n t l y i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h
l a r g e numbers of t h e u n i t becoming members of t h e Communist P a r t y , t o ensure l o y a l t y t o "Mother Russia."

An Army i s capable of independent o p e r a t i o n s , but

most of t h e time it w i l l o p e r a t e as p a r t of a designated Front. H i s t o r i c a l l y , t h e S o v i e t s used an "Army Corps,"

which was a combined arms u n i t of a t l e a s t two d i v i s i o n s , which could o p e r a t e as a s u b o r d i n a t e u n i t of a n Army, or perform independent missions.
I t could be f o r m e d w i t h

a p p r o p r i a t e o p e r a t i o n a l and s p e c i a l t r o o p s s u p p o r t , t o

c a r r y o u t s p e c i a l missions i n a p a r t i c u l a r s e c t o r .

There

is no known Army Corps i n e x i s t e n c e today, and i t s use i n

a f u t u r e war i s q u e s t i o n a b l e .
iviost approved s c e n a r i o s have a l r e a d y designated which

Army w i l l be played, what i t s mission w i l l be, and provided t h e a p p r o p r i a t e s l i c e of o p e r a t i o n a l end s p e c i a l t r o o p s support. The s t e p s i n a l l o c a t i n g support t o d i v i s i o n s a r e aeware of t h e "Cookie

t h e same a s a l l o c a t i n g t o t h e Army. Cutter"1

Remember, t h e followup o b j e c t i v e f o r t h e Army is

3-11

t h e F r o n t ' s immediate o b j e c t i v e , w h i l e a D i v i s i o n ' s follow-

up o b j e c t i v e i s t h e Army's immediate o b j e c t i v e . Usually, Combined A r m s Armies l e a d a Front a t t a c k , w i t h t h e Tank Army o r Armies i n t h e F r o n t ' s second echelon as an e x p l o i t a t i o n force.
The same g e n e r a l a r r a y may hold t r u e

f o r t h e d e f e n s e as w e l l , due t o second echelon Armies being

used as t h e F r o n t ' s c o u n t e r a t t a c k force. g e t hung up w i t h "Always." t o t h e f a c t o r s of METTT.

Do n o t , however,

3e f l e x i b l e , and p l a n according

Within a Combined Am Army t h e r s

forward element is u s u a l l y a motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n , w i t h

a t a n k d i v i s i o n r e t a i n e d a s an e x p l o i t a t i o n o r c o u n t e r attack force. Again, t h i s i s n o t a h a r d and f a s t r u l e and

each s p e c i f i c s i t u a t i o n will have t o be judged on i t s own

merit.

C o n s i d e r a t i o n must b e given t o t h e formation o f an Army A r t i l l e r y Group ( A A G ) . The purpose o f such a group

is t o provide c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l o f a r t i l l e r y assets f o r
a s p e c i f i c purpose o r period of time. Long range a r t i l l e r y

p i e c e s such as m u l t i p l e r o c k e t l a u n c h e r s and i%-46 l 3 O m m F i e l d Guns would be i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r such a grouping.

The probable i n t r o d u c t i o n of r o c k e t a s s i s t e d p r o j e c t i l e s
( R A P ) w i l l make almost any a r t i l l e r y piece s u i t a b l e f o r
t h i s mission.

The d e c i s i o n t o f o r m an AAG may be s p e c i f i e d

i n t h e s c e n a r i o , o r made by t h e gamer.

3-12

3-4. D I V I S I O N , .
DIVIZIYA (division) The basic t a c t i c a l f o r m a t i o n of t h e v a r i o u s s e r v i c e b r a n c h e s (arms), c o n s i s t i n g of s e v e r a l units and s u b u n i t s . I n foreign armies, a ground f o r c e s d i v i s i o n cons i s t s of' b r i g a d e s , combat g r o u p s , i n d i v i d u a l b a t t a l i o n s , and o t h e r u n i t s and subu i t s of v a r i o u s b r a n c h e s and s p e c i a l t r o o p s .

S o v i e t Army D i v i s i o n s i n c l u d e Tank, Motorized R i f l e ,

and A i r b o r n e .

T h i s s t u d y w i l l h i g h l i g h t t h e u s e of Tank Although t h e r e a r e a l o t

and Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n s .

of mechanized i n f a n t r y c a r r i e r s i n t h e S o v i e t Army, t h e preponderance of t h e i r armored p e r s o n n e l c a r r i e r s a r e wheeled v e h i c l e s . The o f f i c i a l s c e n a r i o s h o u l d p r o v i d e

t h e TOE of t h e u n i t b e i n g played and t h e a p p r o p r i a t e v e h i c l e s t o be gamed.

A s a r u l e of thumb, p l a n f o r GSFG

u n i t s t o have one r e g i m e n t equipped w i t h i n f a n t r y combat v e h i c l e s (IjbIPs) i n each motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n , w i t h t h e o t h e r two motorized r i f l e r e g i m e n t s h a v i n g armored p e r s o n n e l

carriers (bTRs).

The Tank D i v i s i o n s w i t h i n GSFG have JMP Soviet

equipped t r o o p s w i t h i n t h e motorized r i f l e r e g i m e n t .

units outside

GSr'G may have o l d e r APCs and t h e above r a t i o

may n o t be a p p r o p r i a t e .

The approved s c e n a r i o o r t h e D I A

O r g a n i z a t i o n Guide must be used t o d e t e r m i n e e x a c t amounts of equipment, by t y p e , t o be u s e d . Z i g u r e s 4 and For information purposes,

5 a r e t y p e Tank and Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n s .

Numbers of t a n k s , A P C s or Armored I n f a n t r y F i g h t i n g V e h i c l e s (AlFVs), and numbers and t y p e s of a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s w i l l v a r y w i d e l y t h r o u g h o u t t h e Warsaw F a c t . S t i c k t o approved s o u r c e s

3-13

TANK
DIVISION

I
Div

KQ

1sJ Cp -ni O :

l-I-1

Control Co

FIGURE 4

3-14

MOTORIZED RIFLE 3I'lISIO?I

I
Regt

I "" [

1-1
Chem Def

Engineer

Transport

l'ralfic
C o n t r o l Co

1 I aakery I

FI.GURE

3-15

f o r determining types and numbers of combat v e h i c l e s t o be

gamed.
As an example, t h e type and q u a n t i t y of a r t i l l e r y

pieces w i l l v a r y between Tank and Motorized i t i f l o D i v i s i o n s .

Usually, s t a n d a r d , approved s c e n a r i o s provide t h e gamer
w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n o r g a n i z a t i o n and t h e p o r t i o n of F r o n t and

Army reinforcements t o be gamed.

The c r i t i c a l d e c i s i o n

t h e n i s t o f u r t h e r a l l o c a t e t h e assets r e c e i v e d from h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s and d i s p e r s e o r g a n i c elements t o o r g a n i z e t h e d i v i s i o n f o r combat.

The f a c t o r s o f METTT a r e j u s t as

a p p l i c a b l e t o t h i s p r o c e s s as t h e y were t o previous considerations.

The zone of a c t i o n f o r t h e d i v i s i o n , o r

s e c t o r i n t h e defense, is u s u a l l y given i n t h e s c e n a r i o , and t h e gamer must a s s i g n boundaries, c a l l e d d i v i d i n g l i n e s , f o r t h e regiments.

A prime c o n s i d e r a t i o n a t d i v i s i o n l e v e l i s w h e t h e r o r

not t o form a D i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y Group ( D A G ) .

Long range

a r t i l l e r y from F r o n t and Army, as well as o r g a n i c m u l t i p l e r o c k e t l a u n c h e r s , are i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r t h i s mission. you form a DAG mix t h e a r t i l l e r y c a l i b e r s t o avoid pres e n t i n g a unique s i g n a t u r e . The FROG b a t t a l i o n i s u s u a l l y
If

c o n t r o l l e d s e p a r a t e l y by t h e d i v i s i o n commander, d u e t o

i t s l o n g range n u c l e a r c a p a b i l i t y .

T h e c a p a b i l i t y of t h e

S o v i e t s t o mass t h e i r a r t i l l e r y f i r e s allows f o r d i s p e r s i o n

o f f i r i n g elements throughout t h e b a t t l e f i e l d .

Most com-

p u t e r a s s i s t e d wargames have l i m i t e d t e r r a i n a v a i l a b l e , although t h i s problem is being c o r r e c t e d .

T h e formation

3-16

o f a DAG may e t o p a l o t of a r t i l l e r y f i r e from z o i n g i n t o

t h e t e r r a i n b e i n g gamed, but t h i s i s a c c e p t a b l e , as l o n g as p r o p e r m i s s i o n s have been a s s i g n e d t o t h e DAG, and r e g i m e n t a l a r t i l l e r y a s s e t s a r e a v a i l a b l e t o p r o v i d e i n d i r e c t f i r e support.
A l s o , a r t i l l e r y from second e c h e l o n d i v i s i o n s o f t h e

Army might be made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e d i v i s i o n commander f o r h i s employment d u r i n g a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d . The f o l l o w i n g i s a s h o r t l i s t i n g o f d i v i s i o n o p e r a t i o n a l capabilities1

Tank D i v i s i o n

Offense

. O p e r a t e as r mhs e oer xTanki tArmyn t of o er cxep lofi t t plo atio Combined A o

g a p s i n enemy f o r m a t i o n s . weak and good t e r r a i n i s a v a i l a b l e .
is enemy and s e c u r e Army o b j e c t i v e s .

A t t a c k as a f i r s t e c h e l o n d i v i s i o n of a T a n k Army t o p e n e t r a t e enemy d e f e n s i v e positions.

a

. Attack asA am fs i Army ewhenever i vhi es i oenemy as rst chelon d n of Combined r t i

. Conduct pwirtshudirta wipnegr,a tti oo nds ,e swhenevere t h e u o enemy troy th

Defense

. Conducto smobiles woi tuhnitne roart t behindp etrhaet i o n s c ack o from p i t i o n

Army's second e c h e l o n .

. Defends fi o rpcl aocnet i nt o i n g i a n t iamea ct k . 7mass n ga n o force u tt

Motorized R i f l e D i v i s i o n
O f 1:ense

. A tCombined aA fr mrs sot r e Tankl o Armyi v ti o i opne noft r a t e t a c k as i che n d s a e

o p p o si n g d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .

3-17

. Attack a s aAsecond echelon d i v i s i ot hne o f a Combined r s Army t o maintain m

momentum and engage enemy r e s e r v e s .

. Operate weak o r i s o l a t ef do r enemyf t a regr ieot d .s independently brie p against s

. Operate a s F r o n t Reserve.
Defense

. Defende CombinednA tr h es Army defenset r o e land a zone i main b t of th m to des

c a n a l i z e t h e a t t a c k i n g enemy f o r c e . B o t h t y p e s o f ground d i v i s i o n s have a s u f f i c i e n t mix
o f o p e r a t i o n a l s u p p o r t and s p e c i a l t r o o p s s u p p o r t t o en-

a b l e them t o undertake independent o p e r a t i o n s f o r l i m i t e d p e r i o d s of time. Usually, however, they o p e r a t e as an

If a

i n t e g r a l p a r t o f a Tank o r Combined A r m s Army.

d i v i s i o n were t o be assigned an independent mission f o r

a s u s t a i n e d p e r i o d , a d d i t i o n a l r e i n f o r c e m e n t s would have
t o be provided from e i t h e r F r o n t o r Army a s s e t s . irlithin T a n k D i v i s i o n s assigned t o SSFG, each Tank Xegiment h a s an o r g a n i c h o t o r i z e d R i f l e Company.
This

may be increased t o a b a t t a l i o n s i z e u n i t , o r i t could be

a s p e c i a l mission u n i t .

ae

s u r e t o check approved TOES Tank D i v i s i o n s

p r i o r t o o r g a n i z i n g your f o r c e f o r t h e game.

tend t o be used f o r e x p l o i t a t i o n and c o u n t e r a t t a c k f o r c e s , although t h i s i s n o t a hard and f a s t r u l e , Kotorized R i f l e

D i v i s i o n s p o s s e s s more f i r e power than Tank D i v i s i o n s , e s p e c i a l l y i n d i r e c t means, and a r e i d e a l l y s u i t e d f o r l e a d i n g a t t a c k s o r t o be t h e f i r s t echelon i n Army d e f e n s i v e

3-it3

positions.

:!owever, Tank u n i t s a r e c a p a b l e of d e f e n d i n g .

Whenever o r g a n i z i n g a f o r c e f o r combat, t h i n k combined

arms 1
The f o l l o w i n g i s a sequence f o r p l a n n i n g and o r g a n i z i n g
t h e f o r c e f o r combat which i s n o t a l l i n c l u s i v e , b u t m i g h t

prove u s e f u l i n p r e p a r i n g f o r t h e wargamei

a.

Mission Analysis.
(1) Determine m i s s i o n . (2)

Determine t r o o p s a v a i l a b l e .
(a)
('3)

Organic. Front. Army. Other.

(c)
(d)
b.

Analyze t e r r a i n .
(1) I n t h e O f f e n s e .

( a ) Determine a t l e a s t two r o u t e s of advance

f o r the Division, preferably three o r four.
(b)

A D i v i s i o n w i l l be r e s p o n s i b l e f o r a n e n t i r e zone of a c t i o n , b u t need n o t occupy t h e e n t i r e zone.

(c)

Where are l i k e l y l o c a t i o n s f o r t h e enemy's:

.-

1.

Covering ? o r c e ? :>lain 3 a t t l e Area?

2.
4. 5.

2. Command and C o n t r o l ?
Logistics f a c i l i t i e s ? Artillery? Reserves?

-. 6

3-19

Gbstacles?
Cover and c o n c e a l e d w i t h d r a w a l routes? Likely points f o r counterattacks? K i l l i n g z o n e s? Key a x i a l and l a t e r a l r o u t e s' ? L i n e s o f Communication? >oundaries? Strongpoints'?

jattle areas/positions?
Overwatch p o s i t i o n s ? Alternate/supplemental N uc l e a r d e l i v e r y means?
EIJ a s s e t s ?

positions?

Airfields? ?orward Observers'? Any o t h e r known l o c a t i o n s o r e x p l o i t a b l e weaknesses? Ascertain canalizing t e r r a i n . Determine natural/manmade o b s t a c l e s t o movement. Analyze r i v e r s / s t r e a m s which w i l l have t o be c r o s s e d , i n o r d e r t o assess e n g i n e e r s u p p o r t requirements. Choose key t e r r a i n . Analyze r o a d and r a i l networks t o d e t e r mine l o g i c a l c h o k e p o i n t s f o r l i n e s o f communication. Determine areas where you w i l l oe v u l n e r a b l e t o f l a n k a t t a c k s and/or ambushes.
3-20

(j)

A s c e r t a i n t e r r a i n w h i c h o l Y e r s inasking : f o r f r i e n d l y and enemy employment 0' attack h e l i c o p t e r s .

(2)

I n t h e Defense.
(a)

Determine enemy r o u t e s o f advance, avenues of a p p r o a c h , i n t o y o u r d e f e n s i v e s e c t o r . F i g u r e two l e v e l s down, i f you a r e t h e d i v i s i o n commander, l o o k f o r b a t t a l i o n s i z e avenues of a p p r o a c h . 'dhere a r e l i k e l y l o c a t i o n s :or enemy's I the

(b)

1. -. 2

Objectives? Locations? Command and C o n t r o l Logistics f a c i l i t i e s Artillery Nuclear d e l i v e r y means - EW a s s e t s Airfields Assembly areas Forward o b s e r v e r s Overwatch p o s i t i o n s O t h e r , as s u i t a b l e

(c)

Look a t t h e t e r r a i n from a X u e p o i n t o f view. I n o t h e r words, l o o k a t t h e t e r r a i n as i f you h a d t o a t t a c k i n t o your own p o s i t i o n s . T h i s w i l l a i d i n determining where t o p l a c e o b s t a c l e s , minefields, e t c .

(d)

Determine t e r r a i n which a f f o r d s covered and c o n c e a l e d o b s e r v a n c e of avenues o f approach i n t o y o u r p o s i t i o n s . s i z e strong points.

( e ) Choose t e r r a i n which c a n s u p p o r t b a t t a l i o n
(f)
(g)

Look f o r s u b s e q u e n t t e r r a i n f o r a n i n depth defense. Ascertain locations f o r platoon s i z e ambushes a l o n g avenues of a p p r o a c h . Determine o t h e r l o c a t i o n s n e c e s s a r y f o r building an all-around defense.

(h)

3-21

c.

Determine enemy s t r e n g t h . (1) I n t h e o f f e n s e t h i s w i l l b e n e c e s s a r y t o know i n o r d e r t o d e t e r m i n e t h e n e c e s s a r y f o r c e s t o attack A u e p o s i t i o n s .

(2)

I n t h e d e f e n s e t h i s w i l l a l l o w you t o a d j u s t
y o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat and f o r c e d i s p o s i t i o n , i n o r d e r t o meet a n a n t i c i p a t e d a t t a c k . I t w i l l also a i d i n t h e s t r u c t u r i n g of r e s e r v e f o r c e s .

d.

Assign o b j e c t i v e s and d i v i d i n g l i n e s .for t h e offense, dividing l i n e s i n t h e defense.

9 a s e d on y o u r a s s e s s m e n t , o r g a n i z e t h e d i v i s i o n f o r combat and a l l o c a t e n e c e s s a r y f o r c e s t o t h e regiments. Based on y o u r o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r combat and m i s s i o n s assigned t o subordinates, prepare a supporting a r t i l l e r y p l a n . Don't f o r g e t t o u s e smoke, where appropriate.

e.

f.

O e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n on what might c o n s t i t u t e t y p i c a l o r t y p e r e i n f o r c e m e n t s t o r e g i m e n t s w i l l be p r o v i d e d i n t h e following chapters.

3-5. DE.?IAI%IONS. A l l d e f i n i t i o n s are t a k e n from D i c t i o n a r x

of Yasic X i l i t a r y Terms, by A . I. R a d z i u e v sk i y . The number o r i o r t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n Eefers t o t h e ehtry item w i t h i n the dictionary.

48 AVTGMOdIL'NYYE VGYSKA (motor t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s ) - S p e c i a l t r o o p s i n t e n d e d t o t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s and m i s c e l l a n e o u s material by motor v e h i c l e . Liotor t r a n s p o r t t r o o p s are o r g a n i z e d i n u n i t s and s u b u n i t s .

72 ARNEYSKAYA ARTILLERISDAYA GRUPFA (army a r t i l l e r y g r o u p ) An a r t i l l e r y g r o u p d i r e c t l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o a n army commander, and i n t e n d e d t o p e r f o r m f i r e m i s s i o n s i n t h e i n t e r e s t of t h e army o p e r a t i o n as a whole.

73 ARIViE~SIUYA ARTILLERIA (army a r t i l l e r y ) Organic army a r t i l l e r y , d i r e c t l y s u b o r d i n a t e t o t h e army commander.

86 ARTILLERIYSKAYA GRUPPA ( a r t i l l e r y g r o u p ) - A temporary g r o u p i n g c o n s i s t i n g o f several a r t i l l e r y u n i t s o r s u b u n i t s
3-22

u n d e r one command f o r t h e purpose of e x e c u t i n g m i s s i o n s i n combat. T h e c o m p o s i t i o n o f a n a r t i l l e r y g r o u p i s determined i n each case oy t h e s i t u a t i o n .

158 BLIZXAYSEAYA ZADACHA (immediate o b j e c t i v e ) - T h a t p a r t of t h e o v e r a l l combat m i s s i o n of t r o o p s i n a n o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n which must be accomplished f i r s t . Depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n , a n i n i t i a l o b j e c t i v e may be t o a n n i h i l a t e t h e enemy's means of n u c l e a r a t t a c k , b r e a k up h i s basic g r o u p i n g , o r t o t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of r e g i o n s , l i n e s , o r p o s i t i o n s , t h e c a p t u r e of which w i l l e n s u r e s u c c e s s f u l execution of a f u t u r e ( t h e next) mission.
242 VVGD V 50Y (commitment t o combat) An o r g a n i z e d movement f o r w a r d , deployment and engagement o f u n i t s of t h e second e c h e l o n and combined-arms r e s e r v e i n o r d e r t o i n c r e a s e t h e e f f o r t along a given axis, t o develop t h e success a c h i e v e d by t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n , t o r e p l a c e t h e t r o o p s o f t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n when t h e l a t t e r h a s l o s t i t s combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s as a r e s u l t of enemy n u c l e a r a t t a c k , and a l s o t o f u l fill new combat m i s s i o n s .

243 VVGD V SRAZSENIYE (commitment t o b a t t l e ) An o r g a n i z e d advance of a f o r m a t i o n of t h e second e c h e l o n (combined-arms r e s e r v e ) of a f r o n t (army) i n t o t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n , and t h e i r deployment i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e o p e r a t i o n t o i n c r e a s e t h e e f f o r t a l o n g t h e a x i s of t h e main a t t a c k , t o d e v e l o p t h e s u c c e s s achieved by t h e first e c h e l o n , t o t a k e p o s s e s s i o n of i m p o r t a n t areas, o r t o c a r r y o u t o t h e r m i s s i o n s .
Troops a i r l i f t e d t o t h e enemy rear t o conduct combat a c t i v i t i e s t h e r e . Accordi n g t o i t s s c a l e , a n a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t may b e t a c t i c a l , o p e r a t i o n a l , o r s t r a t e g i c . The a s s a u l t may b e e f f e c t e d e i t h e r by p a r a c h u t e o r from landed a i r c r a f t , o r by a c o m b i n a t i o n of b o t h .

344 VOZDUSXNYY DESANT ( a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t )

376 VTOROY ES:!ELGN (second e c h e l o n ) The p a r t of a n o p e r a t i o n a l f o r m a t i o n o r combat f o r m a t i o n of t r o o p s which i s n o t d i r e c t l y p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n a n engagement ( b a t t l e ) a t a g i v e n moment, b u t which i s i n t e n d e d t o be used t o b u i l d UF t h e f o r c e of a s t r i k e d u r i n g a n o f f e n s i v e , t o i n c r e a s e t h e s t a b i l i t y and a g g r e s s i v e n e s s of d e f e n s e , and t o r e p l a c e t r o o p s of t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n i n t h e e v e n t t h a t t h e l a t t e r s u s t a i n s heavy l o s s e s . The e x i s t e n c e of a second e c h e l o n c r e a t e s f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r b u i l d i n g up s t r e n g t h , c a r r y i n g o u t a maneuver, o r r a p i d l y t r a n s f e r r i n g e f 3 o r t from one s e c t o r t o a n o t h e r d u r i n g a n o p e r a t i o n ( b a t t l e ) . i n cont r a s t t o a combined-arms r e s e r v e , combat m i s s i o n s f o r a second e c h e l o n a r e a s s i g n e d a t t h e same time as t h o s e f o r t h e first echelon.

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436 GLAVNYY UDAR (main s t r i k e ) The a g g r e g a t e o f n u c l e a r s t r i k e s and c o o r d i n a t e d s t r i k e s d e a l t by main e l e m e n t s o f n a v a l f o r c e s i n t h e s e c t o r o r r e g i o n o f d e c i s i v e i mp o r t a n c e for p u t t i n g t h e enemy t o r o u t and c o m p l e t i n g t h e combat m i s s i o n . T h e main s t r i k e i s d e l i v e r e d i n a c c o r d a n c e w i t h t h e p ur p o s e o f t h e o p e r a t i o n o r b a t t l e and t h e s p e c i f i c c o n d i t i o n s of t h e s i t u a t i o n .
ZADACFA ( f ollowup objective) The p o r t i o n of t h e o v e r a l l combat m i s s i o n i n an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n ( o r combat) c a r r i e d o u t on c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e i n i t i a l m i s s i o n . Envisaged i n t h e f o l l o w u p m i s s i o n a r e t h e d e s t r u c t i o n o f any f u r t h e r n u c l e a r a t t a c k capab i l i t y m a n i f e s t e d by t h e enemy, t h e d e s t r u c t i o n of h i s r e s e r v e s , and a t t a i n m e n t of t h e g o a l of t h e o p e r a t i o n (combat )

469 DAL'NEYSXAYA (POSLEDUVUS!-'CiIAYA)

A r t i l l e r y w i t h a g r e a t f i r i n g r a n g e , p r e d o m i n a n t l y gun a r t i l l e r y , used t o n e u t r a l i z e and d e s t r o y i m p o r t a n t targets l o c a t e d beyond t h e range o f h o w i t z e r a r t i l l e r y and m o r t a r s .

470 D A L ' N O X Y N A Y A ARTILLBRlk'A ( l o n g - r a n & e a r t i l l e r y )

507 DLVIZIOrdNAYA ARli'ILLERiYSKAYA GRUPPA ( D A G ) ( d i v i s i o n A r t i l l e r y a t t h e direct d i s p o s a l of t h e a r t i l l e r y group) d i v i s i o n commander, c o n s i s t i n g o f more t h a n one b a t t a l i o n , c r e a t e d f o r t h e d u r a t i o n o f combat t o f u l f i l l m i s s i o n s on b e h a l f of t h e d i v i s i o n , and u n i t e d by a common command. A d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y g r o u p i s made up of d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y and attached a r t i l l e r y , and b e a r s t h e d i v i s i o n ' s number. The main p u r p o s e of a d i v i s i o n a r t i l l e r y g r o u p i s t o s u p p o r t r e g i m e n t s w i t h f i r e , and t o engage t h e enemy's t a c t i c a l weapons, a r t i l l e r y , and m o r t a r s .

574 ZAXYSEL OPERATSII ( 3 O Y A ) ( c o n c e p t o f a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r

battle)) T h e i d e a e x p r e s s i n g t h e b a s i c t h o u g h t and cont e n t of t h e d e c i s i o n o f t h e commanding g e n e r a l ( o r commande r ) . The concept o f an operation ( o r b a t t l e ) includes! t h e o b j e c t i v e t o be a t t a i n e d i n t h e f o r t h c o m i n g o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) and t h e method of a t t a i n i n g i t ; t h e zone ( o r s e c t o r ) o f c o n c e n t r a t i o n o f t h e main e f f o r t s of t h e t r o o p s and t h e g r o u p i n g of f o r c e s and f a c i l i t i e s by s e c t o r 1 a p o s s i b l e maneuver o f f o r c e s and weapons i n t h e c o u r s e of t h e combat a c t i v i t i e s , and t h e measures n e c e s s a r y t o e n s u r e t i m e l y c o m p l e t i o n o f t h e o p e r a t i o n a l ( o r combat) m i s s i o n .
742 ISONTRATAKA ( c o u n t e r a t t a c k ) An a t t a c k u n d e r t a k e n by d e f e n d i n g t r o o p s a g a i n s t a n a t t a c k i n g enemy f o r t h e p u r p o se o f p u t t i n g him t o r o u t ( o r d e s t r o y i n g h i m ) and a c h i e v i n g c ompl e t e o r p a r t i a l r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n l o s t by t h e d e f e n d i n g t r o o p s . A c o u n t e r a t t a c k i s u s u a l l y mounted r;y t h e second e c h e l o n s and r e s e r v e s 0.C u n i t s and f o r m a t i o n s , and a l s o by p a r t o f t h e f o r c e s o f t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n from s e c t o r s n o t under a t t a c k .

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810 LETSYY RESLJRS ( s o r t i e r a t e ) a s t r a t e g i c formation (formation, f o r ( o r assigned t o ) a n o p e r a t i o n p r e s s e d i n army s o r t i e s , d i v i s i o n o r individual aircraft s o r t i e s .

The number of s o r t i e s of u n i t ) which may b e planned o r combat m i s s i o n , exs o r t i e s , regimental s o r t i e s ,

( s u p p o r t of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) ) - The a g g r e g a t e of m u t u a l l y - c o o r d i n a t e d measu r e s t a k e n by t h e command, s t a f f s , and t r o o p s ( o r f o r c e s ) f o r t h e purpose of c r e a t i n g t h e most f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r combat o p e r a t i o n s , both i n t h e p r e p a r a t o r y s t a g e and i n t h e c o u r s e of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) . The n a t u r e of such measures is determined by t h e a c t u a l s i t u a t i o n and by t h e missions assigned t o t h e troops. T h e basic t y p e s of o p e r a t i o n a l support, a p p l i c a b l e t o a l l s e r v i c e s , are: r e c o n n a i s s a n c e i p r o t e c t i o n of t r o o p s ( o r f o r c e s ) and r e a r i n s t a l l a t i o n s from weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n 1 e n g i n e e r i n g s u p p o r t ; camouflage1 r a d i o - e l e c t r o n i c c o u n t e r m e a s u r e s ; and t o p o g e o d e s i c , h y d r o m e t e o r o l o g i c a l , and r e a r s u p p o r t .

952 OSESPECHENIYE OFERATSII (:3OYA)

s e r v i c e branches ( o r f o r c e s ) , used t o c a r r y o u t m i s s i o n s which a r i s e suddenly i n t h e c o u r s e of a n o p e r a t i o n . Opera t i o n a l r e s e r v e s a r e p a r t of an o p e r a t i o n a l o r d e r of b a t t l e of major f i e l d f o r c e s .

1027 OPORNYY PUNKT ( s t r o n g p o i n t ) - T h a t p a r t of a d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n w h i c h i s most f o r t i f i e d , c o n t a i n s t h e most weapons, and i s most r e i n f o r c e d w i t h o b s t a c l e s , and which i s equipped f o r all-round defense, primarily a g a i n s t tanks. A s t r o n g p o i n t is t h e main d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n , and i s organized i n t h e most p r o b a b l e s e c t o r of enemy a t t a c k . S t r o n g p o i n t s a r e equipped w i t h t r e n c h e s , communication t r e n c h e s , s h e l t e r s , and o t h e r d e f e n s i v e s t r u c t u r e s . They must he w e l l camouf l a g e d , and connected t o each o t h e r f r o n t a l l y and i n d e p t h by a u n i f i e d f i r e and o b s t a c l e p l a n .
1029 G R G A N I Z A T S I Y A OGNYA ( o r g a n i z a t i o n of f i r e ) - Implement a t i o n of measures e n s u r i n g completion of f i r e m i s s i o n s i n accordance w i t h t h e c o n c e p t of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) , i n c l u d i n g t h e assignment of f o r c e s and weapons t o d e l i v e r f i r e ; c o o r d i n a t i o n of' f i r e w i t h t r o o p o p e r a t i o n s a s r e g a r d s m i s s i o n , p l a c e , and timer a l l - r o u n d s u p p o r t o f t h e conduct of f i r e 1 and a l s o e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a p r o c e d u r e g o v e r n i n z c a l l s f o r f i r e , opening f i r e , and c e s s a t i o n of f i r e .

arms f o r m a t i o n s , and a l s o f o r m a t i o n s ( o r u n i t s ) of v a r i o u s

1016 OPERASIVNYYE REZERVY ( o p e r a t i o n a l r e s e r v e s )

Combined-

1076 PERWY ESEELON ( f i r s t e c h e l o n ) - T h a t p a r t of a n o p e r a t i o n a l o r d e r of b a t t l e o r combat o r d e r of t r o o p s which is i n t h e f i r s t l i n e o r i n c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, and i s used t o c a r r y o u t s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n s . 3-25

1102 ~LJW GFERATSII ( o p e r a t i o n p l a n ) - An o p e r a t i o n a l document f o r m u l a t e d by t h e s t a f f 0.P a major f i e l d r o r c e j o i n t l y w i t h t h e c h i e f s of s e r v i c e b r a n c h e s , s p e c i a l t r o o p s , and s e r v i c e s , on t h e b a s i s of a d e c i s i o n by, and on t h e i n s t r u c t i o n s of t h e commanding g e n e r a l . I n d i c a t e d i n a n o p e r a t i o n p l a n a r e t h e g r o u p i n g o f enemy I'orces and l a c i l i t i e s , and t h e p o s s i b l e n a t u r e of h i s a c t i v i t i e s , t h e i n i t i a l and s u b s e q u e n t m i s s i o n s of t h e major f i e l d f o r c e , t h e i r d e p t h , t h e time limits I'or t h e i r c o m p l e t i o n , and t h e . r a t e of advance: t h e s e c t o r s of t h e main, and o t h e r , t h r u s t s ; t h e o b j e c t i v e s t o b e d e s t r o y e d by n u c l e a r weapons a t t h e o u t s e t and i n t h e course of t h e o p e r a t i o n ! t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e , t h e m i s s i o n s of t h e t r o o p s , and t h e d i v i d i n g l i n e s between them! a d j a c e n t u n i t s and t h e i r m i s s i o n s : t h e d i s p o s i t i o n of t h e c o n t r o l p o s t s . Also determined i n a n o p e r a t i o n a l plan are t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n of nuclear munitions, of r e i n f o r c e m e n t s and a i r s u p p o r t , t h e r a t i o s of f o r c e s and weapons, and a l s o t h e d i s t r i b u t i o n o f m a t e r i e l r e s o u r c e s .

i'ODCERZ:.IIVIYUS.iC%AYA ARTiLLERZYA ( s u p p o r t i n g a r t ill e r y ) - ; i r t i l l e r y which, w h i l e remaining subordinated t o t h e s e n i o r a r t i l l e r y commander, c a r r i e s o u t f i r e m i s s i o n s a s s i g n e d by t h e commander o f t h e combined-arms f'ormation ( o r u n i t ) 5 e i n g s u p p o r t e d . A r t i l l e r y t e m p o r a r i l y drawn i'rom second e c h e l o n s t o s u p p o r t combat o p e r a t i o n s 0: u n i t s o r . f o r m a t i o n s of t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n i s a l s o regarded as s u p p o r t i n g a r t i l l e r y i n r e l a t i o n t o such u n i t s o r f o r m a t i o n s . RilDIOTElil-I:IIC~iESKI"9 VCY:ii:.,i ( r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s ) 1287 S p e c i a l t r o o p s intended t o conduct r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l reconn a i s s a n c e o f the l a n d , s e a , and a i r enemy, t o c r e a t e i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h h i s r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l f a c i l i t i e s , and t o ensure r a d i o remote c o n t r o l of weapons and a i r b o r n e v e h i c l e s . R a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s c o n s i s t oE u n i . t s ( o r s u b u n i t s ) , and c o n s t i t u t e p a r t o f t h e v a r i o u s Services, service branches, and s p e c i a l t r o o p s .

1135

1312 RXZGRANIC'<ITEL'NYYZ L1;SIi ( d i v i d i n c l i n e s ) .'ypothetical l i n e s on t h e t e r r a i n , c o n s t i t u t i n g t h e b o u n d a r i e s between t h e zones ( o r a r e a s ) of a c t i o n o f a d j a c e n t major f i e l d f o r c e s o r strategic formations ( o r formations, units, s u b u n i t s ) . 3 i v i d i n g l i n e s a r e d e f i n e d ( o r changed) upon a s s i y n m e n t o f missions.

1344 REZERVNYYE VOYSKA (reserve t r o o p s ) X i l i t a r y echelons n o t i n c l u d e d i n the c o m p o s i t i o n 03 f r o n t s , f l e e t s , major f i e l d formations o r s t r a t e g i c formations of n a t i o n a l a i r d e f e n s e f o r c e s , o r s t r a t e g i c m i s s i l e f o r c e s . Under modern c o n d i t i o n s , t h e r o l e and i m p o r t a n c e o f r e s e r v e t r o o p s h a s i n c r e a s e d c o n s i d e r a b l e i n comparison w i t h t h e p a s t .

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1345 RLZERVY ( r e s e r v e s ) (1) .-iuman a n d material r e s o u r c e s which may o e used i n a viar as a whole, o r i n a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t 1 e ) i ( 2 ) p a r t of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e of a major f i e l d f o r c e o r s t r a t e g i c f o r m a t i o n , o r p a r t of t h e combat o r d e r of a f o r m a t i o n ( o r u n i t ) .
1356 RODA SUK'-;OPUTNYK-IVCYSK ( b r a n c h e s o f t h e ground f o r c e s ) Components of t h e ground f o r c e s , d i f f e r i n g from one ano t h e r i n t h e i r o r g a n i z a t i o n , armament, and r o l e i n combat. i n each b r a n c h , s u b u n i t s , u n i t s , and f o r m a t i o n s have t h e same basic armament, and t h e a p p r o p r i a t e o r g a n i z a t i o n and t a c t i c s . T h e b r a n c h e s are missile t r o o p s and a r t i l l e r y a i r d e f e n s e t r o o p s , motor r i f l e t r o o p s , t a n k t r o o p s , and a i r - a s s a u l t t r o o p s . Ljesides t h e b r a n c h e s , t h e ground f o r c e s a l s o i n c l u d e s p e c i a l t r o o p s , namely: e n g i n e e r , c h e m i c a l , communications, r a d i o and r a d i o - t e c 9 n i c a 1 , m o t o r - t r a n s p o r t , highway, and o t h e r s .

1443 SREDSTVA USILENIYA ( r e i n f o r c e m e n t s ) A subunit, unit, o r f o r m a t i o n , n o t o r g a n i c t o a u n i t , f o r m a t i o n , o r major f i e l d f o r c e o r s t r a t e g i c formation, r e s p e c t i v e l y , but a t t a c h e d t o i t by 'nigher a u t h o r i t y f o r a c e r t a i n time t o r e i n f o r c e i t q u a n t i t a t i v e l y and q u a l i t a t i v e l y , t h e r e b y e n s u r i n g more s u c c e s s f u l accomplishment of m i s s i o n s i n a n o p e r a t i o n (or b a t t l e ) .
1521 TEATR VCYENNYK:-! DEYSTVIY ( t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s ) - A particular t e r r i t o r y , together w i t h the associated air s p a c e and s e a areas, i n c l u d i n g i s l a n d s ( a r c h i p e l a g o s ) , w i t n i n whose limits a known p a r t of t h e armed .Forces of t n e c o u n t r y (or c o a l i t i o n ) o p e r a t e s i n w a r t i m e , engaged i n s t r a t e g i c m i s s i o n s w h i c h e n s u e from t h e war p l a n . X t h e a t e r of o p e r a t i o n s may be ground, m a r i t i m e , or i n t e r c o n t i n e n t a l . According t o t h e i r m i l i t a r y - p o l i t i c a l and economi.c i m p o r t a n c e , t h e a t e r s of o p e r a t i o n s a r e c l a s s i f i e d as main or s e c o n d a r y .
1522 TEATR vOYNY ( t h e a t e r of war) The t e r r i t o r y of any one c o n t i n e n t , t o g e t h e r w i t h t h e s e a areas a d j o i n i n g i t and t h e a i r s p a c e above i t , on w h i c h h o s t i l i t i e s may dev e l o p ( f o r example, t h e European t h e a t e r of war). A t h e a t e r of war u s u a l l y i n c l u d e s s e v e r a l t h e a t e r s of o p e r ations.
1610 !iSEL' OPERATSII (.jOYA) ( g o a l of a n o p e r a t i o n ( o r T h e end r e s u l t w h i c h must be a t t a i n e d i n a g i v e n battle)) s p e c i f i c o e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) . ':?le g o a l o.f an o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e 7 is t h e u t t e r d e f e a t of t h e enemy main o p p o s i n e g r o u p i n g . To t h i s may be added, i n the c a s e of a n o l f e n -

s i v e , t h e t a k i n g of a n i m p o r t a n t a r e a o r l i n e , t h u s ens u r i n g f u r t h e r development of t h e o f f e n s i v e ; and i n d e f e n s e ,

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frustrating the enemy attack, holding occupied areas, and creating conditions for going over to the offensive.

1635 ESHELONIROVANIYE VOYSK (SIL I of troops (forces and facilities)) formations, and major field forces in depth (in the case of aviation, accordance with the concept of the combat operations or maneuver.
3-6. ENDNOTES.

SREDSTV) (echeloning Deployment of units, or strategic formations also by altitude), in plan f o r the impending

Radziyevskiy, Dictionarx, p. 230. Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p v. . 3William J. Lewis and ?riedrich Wiener, The Warsaw Pact Armies. (Vienna: Carl Uberreuter Publishers, nm, p. 62. (Cited hereafter as Lewis and Wiener, WF Armies.) 4Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 10-11. 5Lewis and Wiener, WP Armies, p. 60-61. 6Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 68-69.

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CHAPTER 4 THE MEETING ENGAGEMENT

4-1. GENERAL.
Chapter 2 establishes the basis for considering the meeting engagement as a separate form of combat. The

Soviets view the meeting engagement as the predominant form of combat on the modern battlefield. "Therefore, the

encounter battle is the most frequently used form of combat, particularly for tank sub-units."' Widely dispersed forces

in a rapidly changing combat environment will facilitate meeting engagements at various stages of the overall battle. In a nuclear environment the meeting engagement takes on additional importance due to the large number of gape which will probably be created in defensive positions. Chapter 2

also describes various conditions under which the Soviets feel a meeting engagement can be anticipated. In antici-

pation of a meeting engagement, the Soviet6 will array their forces in such a manner to be able to take advantage of the situation.

A reduction of the organization time for destroying an enemy in the meeting engagement can be achieved by the decision of a number of questions ahead of time. Thus, when organizing a march in the expectation of a meeting engagement, the commander, on the basis of available data about the situation, can determine possible points of encounter with enemy and conditions for troop maneuver during deployment and in the course of the
4- 1

f i g h t , and, proceeding from t h i s , o u t l i n e a c t i o n d u r i n g t h e encounter w i t h t h e enemy a t one p o i n t or another and t h e corresponding formation of t h e march order.2

Detailed planning is u s u a l l y n o t a c h a r a c t e r i s t i c of
t h e meeting engagement.

The Soviets f e e l t h a t surprise

and speed a r e e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t s f o r v i c t o r y i n t h e engagement, r a t h e r than l e n g t h y p l a n s . "Thus, t h e n a t u r e of

t h e encounter b a t t l e demands s k i l l t o analyze t h e combat

mission q u i c k l y and c o r r e c t l y under any circumstances, and

t h e a b i l i t y t o determine t h e b a t t a l i o n ' s r o l e i n t h e exe-

c u t i o n of t h e o v e r a l l u n i t mission.1s3 Also, t h e f l u i d s i t u a t i o n would preclude u s i n g any p l a n w h i c h t r i e d t o cover a l l possible situations.

The engagement w i l l be c h a r a c t e r i z e d

by rapid changes i n t h e s i t u a t i o n and speed t r u l y becomes t h e

essence of maneuver, as seconds and minutes become important

i n g r e d i e n t s i n t h e mixture of b a t t l e . and win.

The S o v i e t s a l s o f e e l

a u n i t can i n i t i a t e a meeting engagement when outnumbered

" S a t i s f a c t i o n of a l l these requirements will per-

m i t achieving success i n a meeting engagement and o f t e n may

lead t o t h e u t t e r d e f e a t not only of equal f o r c e s b u t even

of s u p e r i o r forces."4

Rapid, v i o l e n t execution by a smaller,

h i g h l y t r a i n e d f o r c e can overcome a much l a r g e r f o r c e .

It

w i l l be d i f f i c u l t t o maintain an exact p i c t u r e of w h a t i s

t a k i n g place on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d as t h e meeting engagement unfolds. Therefore, a u n i t which is well-trained t o conduct

t h e meeting engagement w i l l have an advantage.

4- 2

Chapter 2 d e a l s w i t h only one form of t h e meeting engagement; i n a c t u a l i t y t h e r e a r e t h r e e f o r m s . The d i f -

f e r e n c e i s i n t h e l e v e l of o r g a n i z a t i o n f o r execution. Regiments and D i v i s i o n s conduct meeting engagements a t t h e tactical level. Armies conduct meeting encounters a t t h e

o p e r a t i o n a l leve1,and Fronts conduct encounters a t t h e strategic level.

T h i s chapter w i l l c o n c e n t r a t e on t h e

t a c t i c a l execution of t h e meeting engagement by a r e g i mental s i z e f o r c e . The essence of t h e meeting engagement i s when two opposing f o r c e s are t r y i n g simultaneously t o f u l f i l l t h e i r own o b j e c t i v e s and e n t e r i n t o b a t t l e w i t h each o t h e r . The

meeting engagement ends, from t h e S o v i e t p e r s p e c t i v e , when one of t h e opposing f o r c e s assumes a n o t h e r form o f combat, such as defending o r withdrawing.
I f t h e i r opponent does

t h i s t h e S o v i e t s w i l l t h e n execute a n a t t a c k , a p u r s u i t , o r

a withdrawal.

T h e i r a c t i o n w i l l be based on t h e p r e v i o u s l y

mentioned f a c t o r s of METTT. The outcome of t h e f i g h t f o r t h e i n i t i a t i v e determines t h e f i n a l r e s u l t of t h e e n t i r e b a t t l e . As soon as one enemy g i v e s up t h e i n i t i a t i v e and changes t o defense o r begins t o w i t h d r a w , t h e meeti n g engagement immediately l o s e e i t s s p e c i f i c c h a r a c t e r and grows i n t o o t h e r forms of combat action i n t o defense f o r one s i d e a n d o f f e n s e a g a i n s t t h e defending t r o o p s f o r t h e o t h e r , o r i n t o w i hdrawal f o r one and p u r s u i t f o r t h e o t h e r side.

4-2. CONDUCT.
T h e e x a c t formation of t r o o p s a t t h e i n i t i a t i o n o f

t h e meeting engagement w i l l vary from s i t u a t i o n t o s i t u a t i o n .

4-3

To try and capture the meaning and execution of the meeting

engagement, a short scenario will be used.
A

Motorized Rifle Regiment of a Motorized Rifle Di-

vision has been assigned the mission of being an advance guard for the division in an advance to contact. To assist

the regimental commander in the execution of his mission the division commander reinforced the regiment with a tank battalion from the division's tank regiment, one battalion of self-propelled l52mm howitzers, one battery of SA-6 air defense artillery SAMs, one bridging company from Army assets, one engineer company, one motor transport company, and one chemical defense company. Figure 6 is a diagram of a Motorized Rifle Regiment. l.'igure 7 is a diagram of a Tank Regiment, which is also capable of conducting the same mission, but would have to be reinforced with motorized rifle assets. Be sure to

check approved TOEs in the scenario to ensure the proper unit organization and equipment are portrayed in the wargame The following listing of equipment is considered to be representative of several Warsaw Pact armies. The regimental commander received copies of the division's operation and reconnaissance plans. He gathered his

staff together and posted the division's boundaries on the map and plotted the reconnaissance zones and routes planned for the division's reconnaissance battalion. He noted the

reconnaissance battalion was going to eotablish three

4-4

I I r
b.OT'GR1 ZED

RIPLE REGIXEN?

FIGURE 6

4- 5

4-6

reconnaissance detachments, each r e i n f o r c e d w i t h engineers and chemical reconnaissance elements, t o proceed along t h r e e main r o u t e s i n t h e d i v i s i o n ' s zone of a c t i o n . Along each reconnaissance r o u t e t h e r e were points of i n t e r e s t w h i c h would have t o be reconnoitered by reconnaissance p a t r o l s from t h e r e s p e c t i v e detachments. The o p e r a t i o n p l a n i n d i c a t e d a s u r p r i s e attack a c r o s s
t h e i n t e r n a t i o n a l boundary a t H-hour, D-day.

The i n t e l l i -

gence s i t u a t i o n was vague,and t h e exact l o c a t i o n of t h e enemy's main b a t t l e area could not be determined.
The regimental commander hoped he could proceed r a p i d l y through
t h e enemy's covering f o r c e area before t h e y could occupy

b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s and b a t t l e areas.

The regimental commander

concurred i n t h e a n a l y s i s of t h r e e major r o u t e s w i t h i n t h e d i v i s i o n ' s zone of a c t i o n , b u t was concerned over areas between t h e reconnaissance r o u t e s which o f f e r e d many s u i t a b l e l o c a t i o n s f o r platoon and company s i z e b a t t l e p o s i t i o n s .

He a l s o noted s e v e r a l areas which could impede t h e i r progress

i f t h e areas were r e i n f o r c e d w i t h o b s t a c l e s . O f special

i n t e r e s t were t h e numerous small v i l l a g e s and many b r i d g e s a c r o s s minor and major waterways. easy one. Properly covered by f i r e and w i t h t h e b r i d g e s destroyed h i s mission would not be an
H e a l s o noted i n t h e o p e r a t i o n p l a n t h e d i v i s i o n

was conducting a secondary attack i n support of t h e Army,

which had been designated t h e main attack f o r c e f o r t h e

Front.

The assigned d i v i s i o n zone of a c t i o n varied from

4-7

22 t o 26 kilometers i n w i d t h .

He a l s o noted t h e d i v i s i o n

on t h e l e f t f l a n k , w h i c h was conducting t h e Army's main

a t t a c k , had a zone of a c t i o n from 1 2 t o 14 kilometers i n
width.

The r i g h t f l a n k d i v i s i o n of t h e Army, a l s o con-

d u c t i n g a secondary a t t a c k , had a zone of a c t i o n s i m i l a r t o h i s own.

H checked t h e o f f e n s i v e f i r e p l a n and noted t h e d i v i e

s i o n commander had formed a DAG t o f i r e p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s and provide long range f i r e s t o support h i s regiment. noted t h e DAG included two b a t t a l i o n s of 122mm MRL, one b a t t a l i o n of l 3 O m m M-46 f i e l d guns, and two b a t t a l i o n s o f
152mm howitzers.

He

H a l s o noted h e had received second e

p r i o r i t y f o r attack h e l i c o p t e r s , w i t h first p r i o r i t y going

t o the Army's main a t t a c k d i v i s i o n . The d i v i s i o n had re-

ceived f o u r reconnaissance s o r t i e s and e i g h t fighter-bomber

s o r t i e s f o r t h e first day of combat.

The d i v i s i o n commander

had i n s t r u c t e d h i s i n t e l l i g e n c e staff t o make p l a n s f o r

t a r g e t i n g s u i t a b l e items f o r d e s t r u c t i o n by t h e f i g h t e r bombers.
He e s p e c i a l l y wanted t o d e s t r o y any enemy n u c l e a r

d e l i v e r y means or s t o c k p i l e s of n u c l e a r munitions.

He a l s o

wanted key b r i d g e s over major waterways reconnoitered t o

ensure t h e y would be s t a n d i n g when c r i t i c a l c r o s s i n g s had t o be made.

The regimental commander was disappointed i n t h e l a c k
o f knowledge concerning enemy d i s p o s i t i o n s , b u t h e f e l t t h e

value of s u r p r i s e i n conducting t h e a t t a c k outweighed t h e

4-8

lack of intelligence.

He would have to ensure thorough

tactical reconnaissance and march security for all elements. He then called on his reconnaissance company commander and informed him of his plans for the company to conduct a zone reconnaissance with emphasis on locating any enemy units between routes reconnoitered by division elements. He also

told the reconnaissance chief he would receive an engineer platoon and a chemical reconnaissance platoon to aid in accomplishing his mission. He informed the company commander

he might be operating out of range of supporting artillery

and would not be under an air defense umbrella,

80

stealth

would have to be employed in gathering terrain reconnaissance. He told the company commander to organize his forces for the mission and to operate no more than twenty to thirty minutes in front of the regiments leading elements. He

was to maintain contact with division reconnaissance elements and stay about 10 to 20 kilometers behind them. The reconnaissance leader annotated his map and decided to establish one reconnaissance detachment and one reconnaissance patrol. He constructed the elements as shown below:

Reconnaislrance Patrol Reconnaissance Detachment 1-BMP-R 1-BRDM-2U (Command) 1-BRDM-2 2-BMP-R 1-Motorcycle 2-BRDM- 2 1-BRDM-Rkh (Chemical 2-Motorcycles Recon) 2-i3RDM-Rkh 1-6TR-152 (Engineer) 2-BTR-152 The reconnaissance company commander then briefed his subordinate officers on the concept of the operation and
4- 9

began p r e p a r a t i o n o f h i s r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p l a n .

Ye i n s t r u c t e d

h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s t o f u l l y arm and f u e l a l l v e h i c l e s and t o

await f u r t h e r i n s t r u c t i o n s .

He noted t h e r e would be a

t we n t y minute a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n on known and s u s p e c t e d l o c a t i o n s , s o h e wanted t o e n s u r e h i s e l e m e n t s would n o t be

near any p r e p l a n n e d f i r e s .
The r e g i m e n t a l commander t h e n c a l l e d i n h i s a r t i l l e r y

c h i e f , b a t t a l i o n commanders, and t h e r e m a i n i n g members of t h e regimental s t a f f . He b r i e f e d them a l l on h i s c o n c e p t

o f t h e o p e r a t i o n , a v a i l a b l e i n t e l l i g e n c e , and d e s i g n a t e d t h e 1st b a t t a l i o n t o b e t h e r e g i m e n t a l advance g u a r d .

:Ie

wanted t h e advance guard t o send forward a n advance p a r t y

a n d a combat r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a t r o l .

!.'e i n s t r u c t e d t h e

2d b a t t a l i o n commander t o d i s p a t c h two f l a n k s e c u r i t y detachments t o p r o t e c t t h e main body. He a l s o i n s t r u c t e d t h e

3 r d b a t t a l i o n commander t o d e s i g n a t e a r e a r guard t o prot e c t t h e main body.

He p i c t u r e d t h e r e g i m e n t a l march
Ee p r o v i d e d a p p r o p r i a t e r e i n -

column t o l o o k l i k e F i g u r e 8.

f o r c e m e n t s t o t h e b a t t a l i o n s and h i s o r g a n i z a t i o n i s shown

a t F i g u r e 9.

He i n s t r u c t e d t h e 1st b a t t a l i o n commander t o

have t h e combat r e c o n n a i s s a n c e p a t r o l a b o u t f i v e t o t e n k i l o m e t e r s ahead o f t h e advance p a r t y .

He a l s o wanted t h e

advance p a r t y n o t more t h a n 10 k i l o m e t e r s ahead o f t h e a d vance g u a r d . He a l s o wanted t h e advance guard t o be no more

t h a n 1 5 k i l o m e t e r s ahead o f t h e r e g i m e n t a l main body and t h e r e a r guard t o be no more t h a n f i v e k i l o m e t e r s behind t h e

4-10

of k a r c h

-~

Regimental Reconnaissance

I
1
I
:.lank security

Combat Rec o rinai ssanc e Satrol

I
1
I

Ad vanc e

Farty

Advance Guard

1
be c u r it y Oetachment

REGIMENTAL ORGANIZATION FOR COM3AT Combat Reconnaissance Patrol 1-Motorized Rifle Platoon 2-Tanks Advance Party 1-Xotorixed Rifle Company (minus one platoon) 1-Tank Platoon (minus two tanks) 1-Engineer Squad 1-Chemical Reconnaissance Squad 1-Mortar Battery 1-SP Artillery dattery (with observers) 1-Antitank Platoon 1-Air Defense Section (2-ZSU-23-4) Advance Guard 1-Motorized Rifle aattalion (minus one company) 1-Tank Company (minus one platoon) 1-Engineer Platoon (minus one squad) 1-Chemical Reconnaissance Platoon (minus one squad) 1-SP Artillery Battalion (minus one battery) 1-Antitank ijattery (minus one platoon) 1-Air Defense Platoon (minus one section) 1-aridging Company 1-Transportation Platoon 1-hiaintenance Platoon I-Medical Platoon Main Body Remaining elements of regiment (minus Flank Security Detachments and Rear Guard) ?lank Security Detachment (two) 1-Motorized Rifle Platoon 2-Tanks Rear Guard 1-Motorized Rifle Platoon

FIGURE 9
4-12

regimental main body.

He weighed t h e advantages and d i s -

advantages of moving along m u l t i p l e r o u t e s i n a broad advance t o c o n t a c t , but d e c i d e d t h e c e n t e r r o u t e i n t h e d i v i s i o n zone o f f e r e d t h e b e s t cover, concealment, and p o t e n t i a l f o r
a r a p i d r a t e of advance.
He coordinated w i t h t h e d i v i s i o n

commander,and it was decided t h e advance guards of t h e followi n g two motorized r i f l e regiments would be on t h e extreme

two r o u t e s , w h i l e t h e d i v i s i o n r e s e r v e would follow on t h e center route. I n t h i s manner, t h e d i v i s i o n commander could He d i s m i s s e d

r a p i d l y react t o t h e s i t u a t i o n as it developed.
a l l preliminary p l a n s had been formulated.

t h e conference and a s k e d i t be resumed i n two hours a f t e r

I n less than

twenty-four hours t h e regiment would c r o s s t h e border.

The regimental commander looked a t h i s planning map
and noted h e had r e i n f o r c e d each of t h e t w o motorized r i f l e

b a t t a l i o n s i n t h e main body w i t h a tank company.

as an e x p l o i t a t i o n f o r c e .

H was e

going t o save t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n he received from d i v i s i o n

He had decided t o uae h i s a v a i l able a r t i l l e r y as accompanying a r t i l l e r y and provided one

b a t t a l i o n for t h e advance guard and would l e a p f r o g t h e remaining b a t t a l i o n along t h e regimental march r o u t e i n o r d e r t o provide continuoua i n d i r e c t f i r e coverage f o r t h e regiment.
He had h i s bridge assets w e l l forward i n t h e main body t o
r a p i d l y assist elements which would need t h e i r h e l p .

He had

d e c i d e d t o mix h i s SA-9s w i t h t h e SA-6s provided by t h e

d i v i s i o n i n order t o provide in-depth, complementary coverage

4-13

along t h e march r o u t e .

He had t h e ZSU-22-49 w e l l f o r w a r d

i n t h e column t o provide l e a d i n g elements as much a i r def e n s e coverage as p o s s i b l e . 3e a l s o had provided supply, maintenance, medical and t r a n s p o r t a t i o n support t o l e a d i n g elements. He was s a t i s f i e d w i t h h i s plan and looked a t t h e
The following morning should s e e

l a t e s t weather f o r e c a s t .

e x t e n s i v e fog, e s p e c i a l l y i n low l y i n g aream, f o r a t l e a s t t h e first t h r e e hours a f t e r t h e Beginning of Morning N a u t i c a l

T w i l i g h t (BMNT).

If t h e f o r e c a s t h e l d t r u e i t would h e l p

him i n h i s mission.

The subordinate commanders and s t a f f

returned and b r i e f e d him o n t h e i r plans t o implement t h e operation. He was pleased w i t h t h e i r plans and t o l d t h e 4 t h b a t t a l i o n commander t o accompany him w i t h o t h e r command post u n i t s t o a d v i s e and a s s i s t him, as a l l of t h e t a n k b a t t a l i o n had been used t o r e i n f o r c e t h e t h r e e motorized
rifle battalions.

The i n t e l l i g e n c e o f f i c e r provided some

i n d i c a t i o n s of enemy reconnaissance l o c a t i o n s and t h e commander i n s t r u c t e d t h e a r t i l l e r y c h i e f t o t a r g e t t h e s e l o cations. 3e i n s t r u c t e d t h e reconnaissance company commander The a r t i l l e r y

t o c r o s s t h e border t h r e e hours p r i o r t o BMNT.

p r e p a r a t i o n would be from 20 minutes p r i o r t o BMNT u n t i l

BMNT.

A t t h e conclusion of t h e p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e s t h e r e g i -

ment would be moving and c r o s s t h e border.

He advised t h e

reconnaissance c h i e f of two l o c a t i o n s where long range p a t r o l s from d i v i s i o n had enemy b a t t a l i o n s under observation. He

announced t h e s i g n and countersign f o r t h e o p e r a t i o n and dismissed h i s subordinates. 4-14

S i x hours p r i o r t o BMNT t h e d i v i s i o n reconnaissance elements crossed t h e border and began t h e i r work. They

ventured almost 1 2 k i l o m e t e r s west b e f o r e they l o c a t e d t h e

first enemy c a v a l r y u n i t s .

The l o c a t i o n s were noted and

p l o t t e d as t a r g e t s by t h e d i v i s i o n ' s Chief of Rocket Troops and A r t i l l e r y .

The r e g i m e n t a l reconnaissance commander

noted t h e l o c a t i o n s and informed h i s s u b o r d i n a t e s .

Three

hours p r i o r t o BMNT t h e r e g i m e n t a l reconnaissance elements began t h e i r westward t r e k . They c l e a r e d t h e f i r s t t e n

kilometers i n about two and one h a l f hours and r e p o r t e d

t h e i r f i n d i n g s t o t h e r e g i m e n t a l commander.
The a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n s t a r t e d on time and l a s t e d

for e x a c t l y twenty minutes.

appointed time.

The regiment began t o move

d u r i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n and crossed t h e border a t t h e

Ths r e g i m e n t a l reconnaissance c h i e f h a d

s p o t t e d a n enemy p l a t o o n a s t r i d e t h e r e g i m e n t a l march r o u t e
which had been emplaced s i n c e t h e passage of t h e d i v i s i o n a l

reconnaissance elements.

The l o c a t i o n was n o t e d , passed

t o t h e a r t i l l e r y personnel f o r t a r g e t i n g and a n o b s e r v a t i o n

p o s t detached from t h e r e g i m e n t a l reconnaissance detachment t o keep t h e enemy under o b s e r v a t i o n .

The advance guard commander had heard t h e t r a n s m i s s i o n

from t h e reconnaissance detachment and a l e r t e d t h e advance p a r t y commander t o t h e enemy's l o c a t i o n .

The advance p a r t y

commander i n s t r u c t e d h i s a r t i l l e r y b a t t e r y commander t o
prepare t o f i r e i n s u p p o r t of an a t t a c k from t h e march.

He

4-15

f e l t he had s u f f i c i e n t combat power t o r a p i d l y overwhelm

t h e enemy f o r c e .

About twenty minutes l a t e r t h e a r t i l l e r y

began t o impact on t h e enemy platoon,and t h e advance p a r t y

swept o v e r t h e l o c a t i o n l o s i n g two t a n k s and one BMP.
had destroyed one enemy t a n k and one enemy APC.

They

lie c a l l e d

t h e r e s u l t s of t h e i r first s k i r m i s h back t o t h e advance

guard commander.

The r e g i m e n t a l commander monitored t h e

t r a n s m i s s i o n and annotated h i s map.

A motorcycle r i d e r appeared from t h e dense f o g and

passed a message t o t h e r e g i m e n t a l commander.

The d i v i s i o n ' s

Radio Reconnaissance Company had i n t e r c e p t e d a message i n d i c a t i n g an enemy b a t t a l i o n was moving t o w a r d s t h e r e g i m e n t ' s

march r o u t e .
T h i s i n f o r m a t i o n had been confirmed by t h e

long range reconnaissance p a t r o l o b s e r v i n g t h e enemy f o r c e .

The regimental commander a l e r t e d h i s f o r c e s t o t h e p o s s i -

b i l i t y of a n o t h e r s k i r m i s h .
The combat reconnaissance p a t r o l r e p o r t e d t h e y had

found an estimated company s i z e enemy u n i t i n p o s i t i o n

a s t r i d e t h e r e g i m e n t a l march r o u t e , and i t could not be

bypassed.

The advance guard commander d e c i d e d t h e advance

p a r t y was n o t s t r o n g enough t o t a c k l e t h i s f o r c e , so h e

i n s t r u c t e d h i s l e a d i n g commander t o assume p o s i t i o n s t o t h e f r o n t o f t h e enemy and provide a base of f i r e w h i l e h e l e d

h i s forces i n from t h e c'outhern f l a n k t o c l e a r t h e p o s i t i o n .

Appropriate c o o r d i n a t i o n was made w i t h t h e accompanying a r t i l l e r y commander and w i t h DAG. About t h i r t y minutes

4-16

l a t e r t h e b a t t l e started,and t h e advance guard was successful. However, they had taken heavy c a s u a l t i e s and had l o s t

1 0 tanks and

13 BMPs.

He estimated t h e enemy c a s u a l t i e s The advance guard was regrouping

t o be 4 tanka and 2 APCs.

when t h e regimental commander i n s t r u c t e d t h e 2d b a t t a l i o n commander t o assume t h e mission as t h e advance guard f o r t h e regiment.

It took about t h i r t y minutes f o r t h e new

During t h i s time,

advance guard t o reach t h e b a t t l e s i t e .

t h e regimental reconnaissance commander c a l l e d back and s t a t e d they had been bypassed by an enemy f o r c e . He d i d

not know t h e s i z e , b u t estimated it t o be a t l e a s t a b a t t a l ion. The regiment s t a r t e d t o move again, and t h e commander informed a l l subordinates about t h e approaching enemy f o r c e . Suddenly, t h e combat reconnaissance p a t r o l commander c a l l e d t o say he had been taken under f i r e by an enemy force,and he had l o a t h a l f of h i s element. He could s e e enemy recon-

naissance elements moving towards h i s l o c a t i o n , b u t he no longer had any long range d i r e c t f i r e weapons systems t o engage them. The a r t i l l e r y u n i t s took n o t i c e , began t h e i r The advance guard complanning sequence, and t h e mortars responded w i t h smoke t o p r o t e c t t h e remnants of t h e p a t r o l . mander t o l d t h e advance p a r t y t o go o f f of t h e march r o u t e
and attempt t o f i n d o u t t h e depth and w i d t h of t h e approach-

i n g enemy f o r c e .

The regimental commander asked d i v i s i o n f o r

a t t a c k h e l i c o p t e r s , but t h e f o g was s t i l l too t h i c k f o r t h e i r

4-17

employment.

Meanwhile, both d i v i s i o n and r e g i m e n t a l recon-

n a i s s a n c e elements had been taken under f i r e and s u f f e r e d l o s s e s amounting t o about one h a l f of t h e i r v e h i c l e s .

A

d i v i s i o n a l reconnaissance detachment had radioed back t h e y

had found two enemy b a t t a l i o n s

i n prepared p o s i t i o n s blocking

t h e r e g i m e n t a l march r o u t e about 22 k i l o m e t e r s west of t h e border.

I t appeared t h e main b a t t l e a r e a had been found.

About twenty minutes a f t e r t h e p a t r o l had r e p o r t e d cont a c t , t h e advance p a r t y passed t o t h e i r s o u t h and began t o r e c o n n o i t e r t h e enemy f o r c e . which were q u i c k l y destroyed. They had s e e n two enemy APCs They assumed p o s i t i o n s on a

h i l l t o t h e s o u t h of t h e march r o u t e and began t o observe

enemy a c t i v i t y .

The advance p a r t y commander determined t h e r e

were a t l e a s t t h r e e enemy companies moving t o w a r d s t h e e a s t .

The r e g i m e n t a l commander decided t o l e a v e t h e advance p a r t y

on t h e h i l l , r e i n f o r c e t h e p a t r o l w i t h t h e advance guard,
and send h i s remaining r e i n f o r c e d motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n

t o t h e n o r t h t o h i t t h e enemy f o r c e on t h e f l a n k .

In this

manner he would have f l a n k i n g f i r e from t h e advance p a r t y ,

a base of f i r e from t h e advance guard, and a f l a n k maneuver

by h i s o t h e r b a t t a l i o n . About t h i r t y minutes l a t e r t h e advance guard commander r e p o r t e d t h e y had been engaged by t h e a t t a c k i n g enemy f o r c e

and he was being supported by t h e advance p a r t y .
had begun t o f a l l on t h e enemy and t h e

Artillery

3d b a t t a l i o n was
The enemy f o r c e h a l t e d

about 45 minutes away from t h e f r a y .

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f o r a few minutes due t o t h e e f f e c t i v e f l a n k i n g f i r e and began t o maneuver t o escape t h e w i t h e r i n g f i r e .

A

following

enemy company hnd moved towards t h e n o r t h t o t r y and bypass

t h e advance g u a r d .

Suddenly, t h e enemy company was taken

under f i r e by t h e 3d b a t t a l i o n w h i c h had reached t h e b a t t l e

site.

Now, both t h e advance guard and t h e 3d b a t t a l i o n

from t h e main body were r a p i d l y a t t a c k i n g t h e enemy f o r c e .

The remainder of t h e b a t t l e l a s t e d about twenty minutes and

t h e enemy began t o w i t h d r a w .

The regiment had been success-

f u l , b u t had taken heavy c a s u a l t i e s .

mander began t o ponder h i s next move.

The r e g i m e n t a l com-

4-3. OPERATIONAL SUPPORT.

I n t h e s c e n a r i o above, t h e commander provided f o r reconnaissance, s e c u r i t y , engineer support and rear s u p p o r t ,
Had t h e s c e n a r i o been portrayed i n a Nuclear, B i o l o g i c a l , o r

Chemical (NBC) environment, t h e commander would have t o cons i d e r measures f o r p r o t e c t i o n from weapons of maes d e a t r u c -

tion.

He d i d , however, provide chemical reconnaissance

elements t o a l e r t h i m t o any change i n t h e s i t u a t i o n .

He

a l s o took t h e a v a i l a b l e f o r c e s and organized them i n t o com-

bined arms elements t o accomplish t h e mission. Not covered i n t h e s c e n a r i o , but a c r u c i a l p a r t of any o p e r a t i o n , is t h e u s e o f camouflage by a l l elements. Some S o v i e t v e h i c l e s have been s e e n w i t h camouflage p a i n t p a t t e r n s , and t h e y w i l l make a l l attempts t o maximize t h e use of l o c a l v e g e t a t i o n . Camouflage n e t s w i l l a l s o be used

4-19

f o r h a l t e d u n i t s , e s p e c i a l l y a r t i l l e r y f i r i n g s i t e s , command p o s t s , and r e a r u n i t s . The s c e n a r i o w i l l have t o be c a r e f u l l y evaluated and measures t a k e n t o ensure t h a t mutually s u p p o r t i v e measures a r e taken t o p l a n f o r a s u c c e s s f u l o p e r a t i o n .
A lot of

what w i l l be done is l i m i t e d by t h e type of support a v a i l -

a b l e and t h e time a v a i l a b l e t o conduct t h e wargame.

The pre-

v i o u s s c e n a r i o i s o n l y i l l u s t r a t i v e and by no means t h e only way of e n s u r i n g support f o r a n o p e r a t i o n .

4-4. SPECIAL TROOPS S' U .P

Again, t h e u t i l i z a t i o n o f s p e c i a l t r o o p s w i l l vary from s i t u a t i o n t o s i t u a t i o n . I n t h i s c a s e a type u t i l i -

z a t i o n of chemical, e n g i n e e r , motor t r a n s p o r t , and r a d i o t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s was' shown.

A d e t a i l e d march plan would

have t o be formulated and t h e t r a f f i c c o n t r o l elements from w i t h i n t h e d i v i s i o n and regiment would be u t i l i z e d extensively. The use of t r a f f i c c o n t r o l t r o o p s and march planning Highway t r o o p s

is detailed i n readily available publications.

would only be used by elements h i g h e r t h a n regiment and w i l l not be included i n t h i s paper. Communication t r o o p s could

a l s o be played and t h e i r u s e must be considered i n planning the operation.

4-5. DEFINITIONS. All d e f i n i t i o n s a r e t a k e n from D i c t i o n a r x

o f a a s i c M i l i t a r y Terms, by A . I . Radziyevskiy. The number p r i o r t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e e n t r y item w i t h i n the dictionary.
4-20

ground f o r c e s , and t o ensure s u i t a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t h e main body t o deploy and e n t e r t h e b a t t l e .

1 AVANGNiD (advanced g u a r d ) A detachment preceeding a t a f i x e d d i s t a n c e ahead of t h e main body of a marching f o r mation ( u n i t ) i n o r d e r t o p r o t e c t t h e t r o o p s making t h e march, t o safeguard them from s u r p r i s e a t t a c k by h o s t i l e

95 AFt'YERGARD ( r e a r guard) March p r o t e c t i o n element, i n tended t o safeguard t r o o p s moving from t h e f r o n t t o t h e r e a r . The s t r e n g t h , composition, missions and distance o f a r e a r guard (from t h e main body) w i l l depend on t h e s i z e of t h e main body column being guarded and on t h e s i t u a t i o n .
99 ATAKA ( a t t a c k ) The most important element i n t h e t a c t i c a l a c t i v i t i e s of a i r , naval and ground f o r c e s , c o n s t i t u t i n g a combination of s w i f t maneuver and f i r e ( s t r i k e ) aimed a t enemy personnel and weapons f o r t h e purpose of t h e i r annihil a t i o n . An attack by ground f o r c e s is carried o u t immedi a t e l y following nuclear and conventional weapons s t r i k e s , and i s culminated by t h e u t t e r defeat of t h e enemy and by capture of h i s defensive areas and s t r u c t u r e s . An a i r attack i s a r a p i d a c t i o n by a i r c r a f t a g a i n s t t h e enemy f o r t h e purpose of f i r i n g or s t r i k i n g a t c l o s e range. Annihil a t i o n of h o s t i l e a i r c r a f t i n t h e a i r d u r i n g an a i r attack i s accomplished by f i g h t e r a v i a t i o n . A torpedo ( m i s s i l e ) attack i s t h e maneuvering of a w a r s h i p ( a i r c r a f t ) f o r t h e purpose of assuming a f a v o r a b l e p o s i t i o n and f i r i n g t o r pedoes (missi1es)at t h e t a r g e t .
832 MANEVR (maneuver) A transfer of t r o o p s or naval f o r c e s , o r a r e d i r e c t i o n of weapons ( r e d i s t r i b u t i o n of material and technical f a c i l i t i e s ) , f o r t h e purpose of gaining an advantage over t h e enemy under c o n d i t i o n s f o r conducting m i l i t a r y o p e r a t i o n s . As a r e s u l t of a maneuver, a f a v o r a b l e groupi n g of men and equipment i s created in a given s e c t o r or theater of o p e r a t i o n s . According t o i t s scale, a maneuver may be strategic, o p e r a t i o n a l , o r t a c t i c a l . 954 OBESPECHENIYE FLANGOV (STYKOV) ( s e c u r i t y of f l a n k s (or of l i m i t i n g p o i n t s ) ) Operational (or t a c t i c a l ) measures t o f o r e s t a l l s u r p r i s e s t r i k e s by t h e enemy on open f l a n k s ( o r l i m i t i n g p o i n t s ) , and t o ensure s u c c e s s f u l repulse of these s t r i k e s i n t h e course of accomplishing t h e main mission. P l a n k s e c u r i t y is achieved by conducting unint e r r u p t e d reconnaissance, and by maintaining t h e f o r c e s and weapons assigned f o r t h i s purpose i n a c o n s t a n t s t a t e

of r e a d i n e s s .

1047 OTRYAD ((I.) & (2) detachment; (3) f l i g h t ) (1) A temporary u n i f i c a t i o n of ground t r o o p ( o r n a v a l ) u n i t s o r subu n i t s (sometimes even i n d i v i d u a l servicemen) f o r completion
4-21

of a p a r t i c u l a r o r s p e c i a l mission ( s e c u r i t y , s e i z u r e of a beachhead o r bridgehead, reconnaissance, s e t t i n g o b s t a c l e s , e t c . ) ; (2) i n f r o n t i e r t r o o p s , a m i l i t a r y u n i t ; ( 3 ) i n t h e a i r force, a t a c t i c a l subunit.

1050 OTRYAD OSESPECHENIYA DVIZHENIYA (OOD) movement-support detachment) - A temporarily-created roup of e n g i n e e r subu n i t s (mostly road engineer s u b u n i t s , t o g e t h e r w i t h chemi c a l and r a d i o l o g i c a l reconnaissance s u b u n i t s , assigned by a combined-arms formation or u n i t t o s u p p o r t t h e movement o f t r o o p s . A movement-supported detachment c a r r i e s o u t reconnaissance, removes o b s t a c l e s from t h e r o u t e t o be used, o r g a n i z e s by-passes around d e b r i s and o b s t a c l e s , marks t h e r o u t e , and a l s o does a l i m i t e d amount of road r e p a i r work.

A type o f support f o r combat o p e r a t i o n s o f t r o o p s ( o r naval f o r c e s ) , e f f e c t e d i n o r d e r t o f o r e s t a l l s u r p r i s e enemy a t t a c k s , and t o prevent enemy reconnaissance from p e n e t r a t i n g a r e a s occupied by f r i e n d l y t r o o p s ( o r naval f o r c e s ) . S e c u r i t y a l s o e n s u r e s f r i e n d l y t r o o p s time and advantageous c o n d i t i o n s f o r deployment and e n t e r i n g b a t t l e . S e c u r i t y on t h e march, a t t h e h a l t , and i n b a t t l e , a r e c a l l e d : "march s e c u r i t y , I' "bivouac s e c u r i t y , " and "combat s e c u r i t y , r e s p e c t i v e l y .
'I

1060 O M R A N E N I Y E ( s e c u r i t y )

1087 PEREDOVOY OTRYAD (forward detachment) (1) A detachment of t r o o p s c o n s i s t i n g o f a tank (or motorized i n f a n t r y ) s u b u n i t ( o r u n i t ) , r e i n f o r c e d by s u b u n i t s of s p e c i a l t r o o p s . I n o f f e n s i v e combat, a forward detachment is put o u t ahead of a combined-arms u n i t ( o r formation) t o s e i z e and hold important l i n e s and o b j e c t i v e s , major road j u n c t i o n s , mountain p a s s e s , bridgeheads on t h e o p p o s i t e bank of a r i v e r , pending a r r i v a l of t h e main body. In d e f e n s i v e combat, a forward detachment is s e n t o u t t o conduct def e n s i v e a c t i o n s i n t h e s e c u r i t y zone. ( 2 ) P a r t of an amphibious a s s a u l t f o r c e used t o s e i z e a beachhead on t h e enemy c o a s t and t o support t h e c o n t i n u i n g landing. The forward detachment of an amphibious assault f o r c e is u s u a l l y subdivided i n t o t h e f o r c e s making t h e first a s s a u l t and t h e main body o f t h e forward detachment.

1104 PLAN RAZVEJIKI (reconnaissance p l a n ) - A staff working document, s e t t i n g o u t t h e o r g a n i z a t i o n of reconnaissance for a d e f i n i t e period o f time. A reconnaissance plan i s a component p a r t of an o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) p l a n , and i s s e t o u t i n w r i t i n g o r g r a p h i c a l l y (on a map). Reflected i n a reconnaissance plan a r e t h e g o a l and missions of reconnaissance, who i s t o c a r r y i t o u t , and time limits f o r completion of t h e missions, t h e d e a d l i n e s and procedures f o r r e n d e r i n g reconnaissance r e p o r t s ( t h e data o b t a i n e d ) , and t h e r e s e r v e of reconnaissance f o r c e s and f a c i l i t i e s .
4-22

When necessary, reconnaissance p l a n s i n d i c a t e t h e methods t o be used t o complete reconnaissance missions, and t h e procedure f o r p r e p a r i n g reconnaissance elements and supporting t h e i r a c t i v i t i e s . 1169 POLOSA RAZVEDKI (reconnaissance zone) - A zone of t e r r a i n a t t h e d i s p o s a l of t h e enemy, bounded t o t h e r i g h t and t o t h e l e f t by h y p o t h e t i c a l demarcation l i n e s w i t h i n which reconnaissance must be conducted by t h e f o r c e s and f a c i l i t i e s of a major f i e l d f o r c e (formation, u n i t ) . I t i s u s u a l l y t o a s s i g n a reconnaissance zone which i s wider t h a n t h e zone of a c t i o n of t h e e n t i r e major f i e l d f o r c e (formation, u n i t ) , and no less deep t h a n t h e depth of t h e o p e r a t i o n a l (or combat) mission of t h e major f i e l d f o r c e (formation, u n i t ) . 1185 POICHODNAYA ZASSTAVA (march s e c u r i t y p a t r o l ) - A element n of march s e c u r i t y . The march s e c u r i t y p a t r o l i s d e t a i l e d from t h e advance guard, or d i r e c t l y from s u b u n i t s ( o r u n i t s ) f o r which s e c u r . i t y i s provided. A march s e c u r i t y p a t r o l may be i n t h e forward or f l a n k c a t e g o r y . 1186 POKHODNOYE OKHRANENIYE ( ( 1 ) march s e c u r i t y ! ( 2 ) screen(1) The safeguarding of t r o o p s i n g of s h i p s i n passage) on t h e march, t h i s being accomplished by advance guards, r e a r guards, detachments, o u t p o s t s , and p a t r o l s . ( 2 ) The s c r e e n i n g of s h i p s d u r i n g passage by s e a , e i t h e r s i n g l y o r i n formation, such p r o t e c t i o n being organized t o i n c l u d e timely d e t e c t i o n of enemy presence! a p p r o p r i a t e warning of t h e e s c o r t e d s h i p s 1 r e p u l s i n g enemy a t t a c k s 1 and t h e use of reconnaissance counter-measures, The s c r e e n i n g f o r c e is a component p a r t of t h e c r u i s i n g formation and may c o n s i s t of s e v e r a l s c r e e n s 1 an o u t e r one, f o r warning, and i n t e r f e r e n c e w i t h enemy f o r c e e l and an i n n e r one, f o r r e p u l s i n g attacks by enemy f o r c e s which have p e n e t r a t e d t h e o u t e r screen.

1187 POKHODNYY PORYADOK ( ( 1 ) march formation! ( 2 ) t a c t i c a l formation (of w a r s h i p s ) ) (1) A t r o o p formation, c o n s i s t i n g of columns, f o r use on a march. I t must ensure t h e f o l l o w i n g i high speed of advance and maneuver! r a p i d deployment f o r combat; t h e l e a s t p o s s i b l e v u l n e r a b i l i t y t o t h e e f f e c t s of enemy weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n i cons e r v a t i o n of s t r e n g t h of personnel and v e h i c l e e l and e a s e of t r o o p c o n t r o l . ( 2 ) The mutual p o s i t i o n i n g o f w a r s h i p s i n passage, a s a group, by s e a , ensuring t h e i r s a f e t y , r a p i d reformini: i n t o a b a t t l e formation, and ease i n cont r o l l i n g forces.

1297 RAZVEDKA (VOYSKOVAYA) ( t r o o p - u n i t reconnaissance) The a c q u i s i t i o n of i n t e l l i g e n c e information concerning t h e

4-23

location, grouping, composition, numbering, armament, combat capability, and intentions of the enemy, as well as the nature of his activities with respect to an operation (or battle).

- Keasures taken to study the roads (cross-country routes) in a zone o f impending action, and to determine their state, traffic capacity, vulnerable sectors, comouflage conditions, degree of demolition and contamination, and the availability of materials for road and bridge repair, so as to ensure the movement of troops, and combat and other materiel.
1299 RAZVEDKA U R S H R U T O V (route reconnaissance)
1300 RAZVEDKA M E S T N O S T I (terrain reconnaissance and intelligence) Measures taken f o r the collection and refinement of information on the character and peculiarities of the relief, hydrography, built-up areas, roads, soil, and plant cover, and the degree to which these conditions affect the arrangement and combat operations of friendly and enemy troops; on the presence and character of natural cover and obstacles; on the protective features and passability of the terrain; on conditions for orientation, camouflage, and observation; etc.

1304 RAZVEDYVATEL'NAYA GRUPPA (reconnaissance group) - An element of troop reconnaissance sent out by formations or units to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and terrain in mobile types of combat, on the march, and in a defensive situation when there is no contact with the enemy.
1308 RAZVEDYVATEL'NYY DOZOR (reconnaissance patrol) A reconnaissance element which is sent out from a reconnaissance detachment to the front, to the flanks, or to the rear, for the purpose of conducting reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain.

1309 RAZVEDYVATEL'NYY OTRYN) (reconnaissance detachment) An element of troop-unit reconnaissance sent out by formations and major field forces or strategic formations to conduct reconnaissance of the enemy and the terrain in mobile types of combat, on the march, and also in defence. A reconnaissance detachment is made up of reconnaissance subunits or motor rifle (or tank) subunits, from company to battalion strength, and reinforced by artillery, tanks, field engineer subunits, and chemical subunits. A reconnaissance detachment is assigned a reconnaissance zone or axis.
1512 TAKTICKESKAYA RAZVEDKA (tactical reconnaissance) A component part of military reconnaissance. It obtains such information about the enemy, terrain, weather, and the
4- 24

area of impending a c t i o n as is needed t o support t h e combat o p e r a t i o n s o f t r o o p s . Tactical reconnaissance is organized by t h e commanders and staffs of formations, u n i t s , ( s u b u n i t s ) of a l l s e r v i c e branches t o t h e depth of t h e i r own combat missl.on, o r t o t h e depth of t h e e n t i r e d i s p o s i t i o n of enemy combat formations.
4-6.
ENDNOTES,

'I<onoplya,

m, 3 ,

4, 5, p. 33.

2Reznichenko, Tactics, p. 139. 3Konoplya, -- I C , 3, 4, 5, p. 39. TB

4G. I . Garbuz. D . F. Loza. and I . 1. Sazonov. The Motorized R i f l e a a t t a l i o n i n Modern Combat. T r a n s i a t z by T r a n s l a t i o n Consultants L t d . , f o r Redstone Arsenal and t h e

?oreign Science and Technology Center. ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e r 1972)s Ps 18. 5Reznichenko, Tactics, p . 133.

4-25

CHAPTER 5

THE OFFENSE KASTUPLENIYE ( o f f e n s i v e ) A b a s i c t y p e of combat o p e r a t i o n , o f d e c i s i v e i m p o r t a n c e i n a t t a i n i n g v i c t o r y o v e r t h e enemy. An o f f e n s i v e i s conducted i n o r d e r t o s e c u r e t h e prompt and u t t e r d e f e a t of a n enemy occupying d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s , and i n o r d e r t o t a k e i m p o r t a n t areas ( o r o b j e c t i v e s ) . T h i s i s achieved by b r e a k i n g up enemy main g r o u p i n g s and weapons of mass d e s t r u c t i o n 5y u s i n g n u c l e a r and c o n v e n t i o n a l weapons, e n e r g e t i c a t t a c k s by ground f o r c e s w i t h h i g h speed and t o great d e p t h , c o o r d i n a t e d w i t h a v i a t i o n and a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t f o r c e s , bold movement by t h e l a t t e r o n t o enemy f l a n k s and r e a r , and d e s t r o y i n g h i m p i e c e by p i e c e . 1
5-1 * GEMERAL.
Kost w r i t e r s of S o v i e t t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e claim t h e o f f e n s i v e i s t h e o n l y way t o a c h i e v e a d e c i s i v e v i c t o r y .
COL A . A . S i d o r e n k o states1

The o f f e n s i v e i s t h e o n l y t y p e

of combat a c t i o n s of t h e t r o o p s , t h e employment of w h i c h
a t t a i n s t h e complete r o u t of t h e enemy and t h e s e i z u r e o f i m p o r t a n t o b j e c t i v e s and areas.*I2 I n o t h e r words, t h e d e f e n s e may be used when i t i s a d v a n t a g e o u s , b u t t h e o f f e n s i v e a s s u r e s a r a p i d and thorough d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy. i d e a l l y , i.n a n o f f e n s i v e , t h e a d v a n c i n g t r o o p s w i l l byp a s s h e a v i l y defended areas and s e e k gaps between enemy u n i t s o r conduct a t t a c k s from t h e march a g a i n s t weakly defended p o s i t i o n s t o proceed i n t o t h e enemy rear. 2owever, t h e

S o v i e t commander may be f o r c e d i n t o c o n d u c t i n g a b r e a k t h r o u g h .

I n many p u b l i c a t i o n s t h e word b r e a k t h r o u g h i s synonymous

with

a r u p t u r e of enemy p o s i t i o n s .

I n t h e r e m a i n d e r of

t h i s c h a p t e r t h e word b r e a k t h r o u g h w i l l be used o n l y t o c o n n o t e a s p e c i f i c t y p e of o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n . The break-

i n g t h r o u g h of enemy p o s i t i o n s by a t t a c k s from t h e march

w i l l be r e f e r r e d t o as a r u p t u r e of enemy d e f e n s e s .
The b r e a k t h r o u g h is t h e most d i s c u s s e d form of S o v i e t o f f e n s e w i t h i n US Army d o c t r i n a l p u b l i c a t i o n s , b u t i t i s p r o b a b l y t h e l e a s t understood form of S o v i e t t a c t i c s . The

c l a s s i c S o v i e t b r e a k t h r o u g h c o n j u r e s up v i s i o n s o f massed a r t i l l e r y , t a n k s , and APCs i n o r d e r t o l i t e r a l l y overwhelm

t h e defender.

The i n t r o d u c t i o n of n u c l e a r weapons a l t e r e d

t h e S o v i e t p h i l o s o p h y f o r t h e c o n d u c t of t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h . I t i s t h e l e a s t p r e f e r r e d of S o v i e t o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s d u e t o t h e massive c o o r d i n a t i o n problems, p l u s t h e v u l n e r a b i l i t y o f massed ground f o r c e s t o d e s t r u c t i o n by n u c l e a r weapons. F e r h a p s COL S i d o r e n k o s t a t e s t h i s changed p h i l o s -

ophy t h e b e s t s i n t h e p e r i o d of World W r iI, e s s e n t i a l l y a t h e o n l y method f o r i n t e n s i f y i n g t h e e f f o r t s of t h e first e c h e l o n was t h e commitment and engagement of r i f l e and armored c h a s t i and s o e d i n e n i a o f t h e second e c h e l o n s o r r e s e r v e s , o - % + r by I maneuver o f t r o o p s from o t h e r axes s u p p o r t e d by a r t i l l e r y and a v i a t i o n . T h i s a t t a i n e d t h e c r e a t i o n of h i g h d e n s i t i e s , a n u m e r i c a l s u p e r i o r i t y o v e r t h e enemy i n men and m a t e r i e l , and s u c c e s s f u l development o.f the a t t a c k i n t o t h e d e p t h . Under modern c o n d i t i o n s n u c l e a r weapons a r e t h e c h i e f means of d e s t r u c t i o n . The means f o r t h e i r d e l i v e r y p o s s e s s w i d e c a p a b i l i t i e s f o r maneuver and can d e l i v e r powerful s t r i k e s where and when i t is n e c e s s a r y and a d v i s a b l e . dy employing

5-2

n u c l e a r weapons one can i n a s h o r t time achieve t h e e f f e c t i v e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy and rapi d l y change t h e r a t i o o f men and materiel, t h u s changing t h e s i t u a t i o n i n one's f a v o r . T h i s w i l l ensure t h e s u c c e s s f u l development of t h e a t t a c k by t h e first echelon a t h i g h e r r a t e s . Moreover, t h e d e l i v e r y of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s p e r m i t s one t o avoid a dangerous c o n c e n t r a t i o n of t r o o p s and an i n e v i t a b l e compacting of combat formations i n volved w i t h t h e commitment of f r e s h f o r c e s from t h e d e p t h and t h e i r e x e c u t i o n of maneuver under d i f f i c u l t c o n d i t i o n s of t h e ground s i t u a t i o n . 3 Soyedineniye Formation. The h i g h e s t l e v e l o f m i l i t a r y o r g a n i z a t i o n 1 Corps, D i v i s i o n , o r J r i g a d e l e v e l e q u i v a l e n t . I t may be formed from a s i n g l e branch of variousqbranches and S e r v i c e s , i n c l u d i n g naval squadrons.
C h a s t ' - Unit. Any a d m i n i s t r a t i v e , l i n e , o r housekeeping u n i t of r e g i m e n t a l s i z e o r smalle r t h a t i s a d m i n i s t r a t i v e l y s e l f - c o n t a i n e d and h a s i t s own d e s i g n a t i o n , number, and banner. It is t h e basic t a c t i c a l (combat) and independent o r g a n i z a t i o n a l u n i t up t o , and i n c l u d i n g t h e regiment. Each c o n s i s t s o f s u b u n i t s . 5

Thus, d u r i n g t h e conduct of a breakthrough, t h e maneuver

f o r c e s e x p l o i t t h e s u c c e s s of t h e f i r e s u p p o r t .
T h i s maxim

ie a p p l i c a b l e i n e i t h e r n u c l e a r o r non-nuclear warfare.
The p u r s u i t is t h e f i n a l form of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n and
has one g o a l , t h e u l t i m a t e d e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy f o r c e .

The remainder of t h i s c h a p t e r i s an e x p l a n a t i o n of t h e vari o u s phases of o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .

To a g a i n p l a c e t h e

breakthrough i n i t s proper p e r s p e c t i v e a f i n a l quote from

COL Sidorenko is o f f e r e d 1

Troops a t t a c k i n g i n a d i f f e r e n t way w i l l overcome t h e enemy's defense, not by "gnawing through" on narrow s e c t o r s and s o l i d f r o n t , as was t h e c a s e i n past wars, but simultaneously across a broad f r o n t , along axes, f r o m t h e march, a t h i g h tempos, r i g h t a f t e r n u c l e a r

5-3

s t r i k e s , t a k i n g advantage of breaches, i n t e r v a l s , and gaps i n t h e enemy's comb t deployment, and by wide employment of maneuver. 8

5-2. CONDUCT.
There a r e two methods o f t r a n s f e r t o t h e o f f e n s i v e , e i t h e r from t h e march o r from a p o s i t i o n i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy.
If t h e s e methods f a i l t o r u p t u r e t h e enemy's p o s i -

t i o n s , o r i f t h e enemy has c o n s t r u c t e d a formidable, i n depth defense which cannot be r e a d i l y bypassed, a breakthrough must be conducted t o f o r c e a gap i n t h e enemy's formation. S u c c e s s f u l l y breaking through t h e enemy's deAssuming t h e defense as p a r t

f e n s e s may l e a d t o a p u r s u i t .

of an o f f e n s i v e is a v i a b l e t a c t i c and i s u s u a l l y r e f e r r e d

t o as t h e h a s t y defense.

T h i s p o r t i o n of d e f e n s i v e combat

w i l l be covered i n t h e next c h a p t e r .
a.

3rom t h e March.

An advance t o c o n t a c t i s conducted i n march column and may r e s u l t i n a meeting engagement o r an a t t a c k from t h e march.
A

t y p i c a l regimental march formation was discussed The composition of t h e march

i n t h e previous c h a p t e r .

column w i l l vary depending upon t h e mission and t h e t r o o p s available. Xowever, t h e p r e v i o u s l y discussed regimental

march column i s considered t o be r e p r e s e n t a t i v e . The s c e n a r i o w i t h i n t h e l a s t c h a p t e r d e s c r i b e s a r e g i ment which made two a t t a c k s f r o m t h e march p r i o r t o conducti n g a meeting engagement. A enemy l o c a t i o n i s chosen f o r n

5-4

an attack e i t h e r p r i o r t o o r d u r i n g t h e march.

The l e a d i n g

r e c o n n a i s s a n c e elements a t t e m p t t o l o c a t e enemy f o r c e s a n d
bypass s t r o n g p o i n t s of enemy r e s i s t a n c e .

When a p o s i t i o n

is found w h i c h cannot be r e a d i l y bypassed t h e r e c o n n a i s s a n c e

elements t r y t o a s c e r t a i n t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e f o r c e and t h e
w i d t h and d e p t h of t h e p o s i t i o n .

They may a l s o be used t o The

o b s e r v e t h e p o s i t i o n t o r e p o r t any changes i n s t a t u s .

advance guard miry be used t o p r o v i d e s u p p o r t i n g d i r e c t f i r e s from t h e f r o n t of t h e p o s i t i o n t o f i x t h e enemy, w h i l e a p a r t o r a l l of t h e r e g i m e n t a l main body maneuvers t o t h e

f l a n k s o r r e a r , o r b o t h , of t h e p o s i t i o n t o conduct a n

assault.

They w i l l a t t e m p t t o r u p t u r e t h e p o s i t i o n and pro-

ceed i n t o t h e enemy r e a r .
A t a predetermined d i s t a n c e from t h e o b j e c t i v e , t h e

r e g i m e n t a l march column w i l l b r e a k i n t o b a t t a l i o n march columns, t h e n company march columns, t h e n p l a t o o n march columns and f i n a l l y i n t o an a s s a u l t l i n e . The r e g i m e n t a l

S o r c e s w i l l assault t h e o b j e c t i v e u s i n g t h e maximum amount

of direct f i r e .

The a s s a u l t p o s i t i o n l i n e from w h i c h t h e

r e g i m e n t ' s s u b o r d i n a t e elements a s s a u l t t h e o b j e c t i v e i s u s u a l l y no more t h a n one t o two k i l o m e t e r s from t h e o b j e c t i v e and i t normalljr w i l l be t h e l a s t covered and concealed a r e a nearest the objective. I n wide open t e r r a i n smoke w i l l be

used t o mask maneuvers i n t o t h e a s s a u l t f o r m a t i o n .

S m a l l u n i t f o r m a t i o n s f o r t h e a s s a u l t , and d i s t a n c e s

between t a n k s and BMPs a r e w e l l d e s c r i b e d i n DIA manuals

5-5

c o v e r i n g b a t t a l i o n and company t a c t i c s .

A r t i l l e r y organi-

z a t i o n and s e q u e n c i n g o f f i r e s a r e w e l l a r t i c u l a t e d i n s e v e r a l approved f o r e i g n i n t e l l i g e n c e documents. '?he S o v i e t s

have a l s o w r i t t e n numerous books which c o v e r t h e s e d e t a i l s

i n depth.

Voyenni Vestnik, ( ; ; i l i t a r y :Ierald) f r e q u e n t l y

d e s c r i b e s f i e l d problems and on o c c a s i o n p o s e s a problem f o r t h e readers t o solve. Working t h e s e problems and check-

i n g t h e answer i n f o l l o w i n g i s s u e s is a good way of v a l i d a t i n g knowledge of S o v i e t t a c t i c s .

-i e t Sov

X i l i t a r y Reviex, is

a n o t h e r p e r i o d i c a l which f r e q u e n t l y d i s c u s s e s f i e l d problems
and shows t h e means applied by S o v i e t commanders t o s o l v e

t r a i n i n g problems.

The magazine i s w r i t t e n f o r u s e by p e r s o n s

o u t s i d e t h e USSR, and was n o t p u b l i s h e d i n R u s s i a n u n t i l t h e

f i r s t i s s u e of 1978.
I t c o n t a i n s c o n s i d e r a b l y more propa-

ganda than does Voyenni V e s t n i k . The S o v i e t s employ two t y p e s o f r e s e r v e s , combined arms and s p e c i a l i z e d . Examples o f t h e l a t t e r m i g h t b e a n e n g i n e e r
The s i z e o f a r e s e r v e v a r i e s

r e s e r v e o r an a n t i t a n k reserve.

w i t h t h e s i t u a t i o n , b u t a combined arms r e s e r v e o f a p l a t o o n

f o r a b a t t a l i o n , a company f o r a r e g i m e n t , and a b a t t a l i o n f o r a d i v i s i o n might b e good p l a n n i n g f a c t o r s . The motor-

i z e d r i f l e d i v i s i o n h a s a n o r g a n i c independent t a n k b a t t a l i o n wnich makes a n e x c e l l e n t combined arms r e s e r v e f o r t h a t d i v i sion.

i;v'ithin motorized r i f l e u n i t s , t h e a n t i t a n k b a t t a l i o n

a t d i v i s i o n , t h e a n t i t a n k b a t t e r y a t r e g i m e n t , and i n 3TR

equipped u n i t s t h e a n t i t a n k p l a t o o n a t b a t t a l i o n l e v e l , a r e

well s u i t e d f o r a n t i t a n k r e s e r v e s .

I n t h e s c e n a r i o :For t h e

meeting engagement w i t h i n Chapter 4, t h e r e g i m e n t ' s a n t i t a n k b a t t e r y was deployed well forward t o meet c o n t i n g e n c i e s .

T h i s u n i t possesses a c c u r a t e long range f i r e s , is h i g h l y

mobile, and c a n be employed under many d i f f e r e n t circum-

stances.
i i a t t a l i o n j.s t h e l o w e s t l e v e l w h i c h may r e t a i n a r e s e r v e

o r a t t a c k w i t h two e c h e l o n s .

Company and p l a t o o n attacks biore t h a n

a r e a l m o s t always conducted w i t h o u t a r e s e r v e .

one l i n e may be used i n t h e company a t t a c k s , b u t t h e c l o u e n e s s of t h e l i n e s i s viewed as a d d i n g d e p t h , r a t h e r t h a n t h e u s e of a second e c h e l o n .

The d i f f e r e n c e between a second

e c h e l o n and a r e s e r v e i s t h e second e c h e l o n has been i n c l u d e d i n t h e o p e r a t i o n p l a n w i t h an a s s i g n e d m i s s i o n , w h i l e t h e r e s e r v e w i l l be employed t o r e s o l v e u n f o r e s e e n c i r c u m s t a n c e s .

A r e g i m e n t a l zone of a c t i o n , i n d i c a t e d by b o u n d a r i e s ,

c a n v a r y from f i v e t o e i g h t k i l o m e t e r s i n a main a t t a c k t o
1 0 t o 15 k i l o m e t e r s i n a secondary a t t a c k .

The regiment

w i l l have a t l e a s t one march r o u t e w i t h i n t h e zone, b u t two

march r o u t e s a r e p r e f e r r e d , e s p e c i a l l y under NBC c o n d i t i o n s .

Whether t h e r e g i m e n t e v e n t u a l l y attacks w i t h t h r e e r e i n f o r c e d b a t t a l i o n s abreast, o r two up and one b a c k , depends on t h e w i d t h of t h e a s s i g n e d zone, t h e s t r e n g t h of t h e a t t a c k i n g and d e f e n d i n g u n i t s , and i f t h e commander d e s i r e s d e p t h t o h i s attack. Again, n u c l e a r w a r f a r e w i l l s t r e t c h t h e s e

f r o n t a g e s t o avoid l o s i n g more t h a n one b a t t a l i o n t o a s i n g l e

5-7

strike.

Also, t h e regimental a n t i t a n k b a t t e r y o r accompany-

i n g a r t i l l e r y may be used t o provide a base of f i r e , o r i n

U terminology t o provide ovenvatch. S
BhWs may a l s o be

assigned a similar mission. The formation of a r e g i m e n t a l a r t i l l e r y group ( R A G ) i s based on t h e amount of a r t i l l e r y made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e r e g i mental commander, o r upon d i r e c t i o n o f t h e d i v i s i o n commander. E s u a l l y a RAG w i l l be formed f r o m two t o f o u r b a t t a l i o n s of a r t i l l e r y t o provide c e n t r a l i z e d c o n t r o l f o r a s p e c i f i e d period o r t o perform a s p e c i f i c m i s s i o n , then t h e RAG w i l l be d i s s o l v e d and u n i t s r e t u r n e d t o t h e i r normal h e a d q u a r t e r s . Kotorized r i f l e regiments have an organic a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n and each s u b o r d i n a t e motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n has a mortar battery.
Tank regiments do n o t have t h i s c a p a b i l i t y , b u t

they have a unique use f o r t h e i r tank guns.

About f i f t y

p e r c e n t of t h e S o v i e t t a n k ' s u n i t o f f i r e c o n s i s t s of high e x p l o s i v e fragmentation rounds .7 S o v i e t t a n k gunners a r e When f i r e d i n an

taught and p r a c t i c e i n d i r e c t f i r e gunnery.

i n d i r e c t mode, t h e smoothbore guns o f today's S o v i e t t a n k s a r e n o t as a c c u r a t e as t h e o l d e r r i f l e d guns. ifowever, a

tank u n i t possesses t h e c a p a b i l i t y t o provide s u p p r e s s i v e f i r e w i t h t h e i r main guns.

T h i s i n d i r e c t f i r e , o r f i r e from

beyond t h e maximum e f f e c t i v e range f o r d i r e c t f i r e , i s not a c c u r a t e enough f o r p i n p o i n t engagement o f hard t a r g e t s ,

b u t can provide an impressive volume of f i r e t o suppress
ATGM

gunners o r dismounted t r o o p s .

S o v i e t d o c t r i n e c a l l s f o r d i r e c t f i r e of a r t i l l e r y whenever f e a s i b l e . By d i r e c t l y observing t h e impact

or

the

rounds an a r e a t a r g e t can be n e u t r a l i z e d f a s t e r , w i t h l e s s expenditure o f rounds, t h a n can unobserved o r t r a j e c t o r y fire.

Also, S o v i e t a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s possess an a n t i t a n k
Most of t h e s e a n t i t a n k

capability f o r self-protection.' a r t i l l e r y rounds a r e HEAT.

The amount of a r t i l l e r y rounds t o be placed on a t a r g e t

i s s u b j e c t t o t h e following c o n s i d e r a t i o n s :
1.

The gun/howitzer c a l i b e r . The gun-target range. The type of t a r g e t . The s i z e o f t h e t a r g e t . The degree .of damage d e s i r e d .

2.

3.
4.

5.

The S o v i e t s have c h a r t s which l i s t how many rounds of w h a t type have t o be! f i r e d i n t o each h e c t a r e of t h e t a r g e t t o achieve s p e c i f i e d r e s u l t s . There a r e many d i f f e r e n t ways

t o conduct a r t i l l e r y f i r e and some of t h e p e r t i n e n t d e f i n i -

t i o n s a r e included a t t h e end of t h i s c h a p t e r .

So, an

a n a l y s i s of t h e t a r g e t and t h e a v a i l a b l e a r t i l l e r y i s necessary prior t o f i r i n g a t a target. The Sovie'ts s e e t h e a t t a c k from t h e march t o be t h e predominant form o f o f f e n s i v e combat. The march column is

a p p r o p r i a t e f o r t h e meeting engagement, a t t a c k from t h e march, p u r s u i t , and perhaps w i t h i n o t h e r forms o f combat.

5- 9

b.

i:rom Direct C o n t a c t .

T h i s s i t u a t i o n c a n t a k e p l a c e when a n attack h a s been

s t a l l e d and t h e o f f e n s i v e is being resumed, o r when a b a t t l e s t a r t e d i n a d e f e n s i v e mode and t h e d e c i s i o n h a s been made t o assume a n o f f e n s i v e p o s t u r e . I t w i l l be u n d e r t a k e n t o r u p t u r e t h e enemys f o r m a t i o n and e n t e r h i s r e a r a r e a .
It

p r o b a b l y w i l l be accompanied by a s h o r t a r t i l l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n and t h e i n i t i a l f o r m a t i o n s w i l l depend on t r o o p d i s p o s i t i o n s p r i o r t o beginning t h e a t t a c k .

T h e a t t a c k could b e s t a r t e d

by a second e c h e l o n f o r c e p a s s i n g through o r n e a r t h e defending troops. U s u a l l y , t h e a t t a c k is i n i t i a t e d by f o r c e s from Troops

behind o r a d j a c e n t t o t h e i n i t i a l d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .

from w i t h i n t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s c a n s u p p o r t t h e a t t a c k e r s
w i t h d i r e c t fire. The a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s a r e marshaled i n

a t t a c k p o s i t i o n s near t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n .

The a t t a c k

p o s i t i o n s should p r o v i d e c o v e r and p r e c l u d e enemy o b s e r v a t i o n t o r e t a i n t h e element o f s u r p r i s e . The a s s a u l t w i l l be

similar i n form t o t h e a t t a c k from t h e march d e s c r i b e d above. There a r e o t h e r f a c t o r s w h i c h must be c o n s i d e r e d when p l a n n i n g a n a t t a c k , p r i m a r i l y whether o r n o t t h e i n f a n t r y

will remain mounted.

S i n c e t h e i n t r o d u c t i o n of t h e 9PW

t h e r e has been c o n s i d e r a b l e d i s c u s s i o n c o n c e r n i n g t h e cond u c t of an assault by i n f a n t r y accompanied by t a n k s .

Cis-

mounting t h e i n f a n t r y slows t h e a t t a c k , l e a v e s t h e i n f a n t r y v u l n e r a b l e t o a r t i l l e r y f i r e , and t h e t a n k s could outrut? nem. 30, t h e p r e f e r r e d method of c o n d u c t i n g an i r C a n t r y

L I

5-10

a s s a u l t i s t o r e m a i n mounted t o c o n t i n u e t h e speed oL' t h e offensive. The f o l l o w i n g l i s t p r e s e n t s some s i t u a t i o n s

when a dismounted a t t a c k m i g h t prove bene.Cicialr

1.

iihen t h e r e a r e o b s t a c l e s which c a n n o t be c l e a r e d

by mechanical means.
2.

ifhen the enemy p o s i t i o n ' s a n t i t a n k weapons have

n o t been s u f f i c i e n t l y n e u t r a l i z e d by i n d i r e c t f i r e .

3.
4.

:Tien t h e r e a r e e n t r e n c n e d enemy i n f a n t r y on t h e

o b j e c t i v e vrnich must be c l e a r e d . ':lhen t h e p o s i t i o n must be c o n s o l i d a t e d o r h e l d f o r

a following f o r c e .

5.

When t h e r e i s a d e s i r e t o maximize f i r e p o w e r such

as t h e u s e o r hand g r e n a d e s and f l a m e t h r o w e r s .
Another c o n s i d e r a t i o n when p l a n n i n g t h e a t t a c k i s what t y p e s o f maneuver tne a t t a c k i n g r'orce w i l l u s e .
A the t

t a c t i c a l l e v e l t h e ways t o conduct t h e a t t a c k a r e , f r o n t a l l y ,
from t h e f l a n k , o r by u s e of a n envelopment.
lhe flank

a t t a c k and envelopment c a n b e combined t o make a f o u r t h form o f maneuver. 'The f r o n t a l a t t a c k i s r a r e l y used due xiowever, i t s h o u l d n o t be

to its inherent disadvantages.

t o t a l l y excludcd from c o n s i d e r a t i o n as t h e enemy f o r c e could

be

v u l n e r a b l e ?ram t h e f r o n t .
c. jreakthrough.

'The c o n c e p t or' t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h h a s changed s i n c e t h e

i n t r o d u c t i o n O C n u c l e a r weapons.

The a d v a n t a g e o f u s i n g a

s i n g l e weapon t o c r e a t e a gap i n a n enemy's d e f e n s e is q u i t e

5-11

obvious.

However, t h e c l a s s i c b r e a k t h r o u g h had u n i t s mass-

ing on l i m i t e d f r o n t a g e s which would l e a v e t h e a t t a c k e r

vulnerable t o a nuclear s t r i k e .
A breakthrough

i s an o p e r a t i o n a l form o f combat and i s

T h e d i v i s i o n s and

c o n t r o l l e d by Army elements o r h i g h e r .

r e g i m e n t s e x e c u t e p o r t i o n s of t h e b r e a k t h r o u g h , b u t i t is planned by t h e Army s t a f f . There would be s u f f i c i e n t a r t i l -

l e r y a v a i l a b l e f o r a n Army t o s u p p o r t one b r e a k t h r o u g h i n

i t s zone.

I d e a l l y , t h e S o v i e t s would l i k e t o have a n a r t i l -

l e r y d e n s i t y of a t l e a s t 60 t u b e s p e r k i l o m e t e r of breakthrough area. The d i v i s i o n c o n d u c t i n g t h e breakthrough

would narrow i t s f r o n t a g e t o a b o u t f o u r k i l o m e t e r s and u s e

a t l e a s t t w o - t h i r d s of i t s combat power i n t h a t narrowed

area.
The remainder o f t h e d i v i s i o n would conduct economy

of f o r c e measures i n t h e r e s t o f t h e zone.

The attacking

f o r c e s would n o t s t a y massed f o r prolonged p e r i o d s , b u t would assemble i n d i s p e r s e d s t a g i n g areas. Once t h e a r t i l -

l e r y p r e p a r a t i o n had begun t h e u n i t s would begin t o concent r a t e i n t h e breakthrough a r e a .

The u n i t s would be echeloned

i n d e p t h and t h r e e e c h e l o n s would n o t be uncommon.

Once t h e

f o r c e s had succeeded i n b r e a k i n g through t h e enemy's d e f e n s e and i n t o h i s r e a r a r e a t h o u g h t s would be g i v e n t o commencing pursuit operations. Creating a s u f f i c i e n t d e n s i t y of a r t i l l e r y f o r breakthrough o p e r a t i o n s is a r e l a t i v e l y easy t a s k .
A l l mortars

w i t h i n motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s a r e c o n s i d e r e d a r t i l l e r y 5-12

and t h e y would be used i n p r e p a t o r y f i r e s .

T h i s p a ra g rap h

w i . 1 1 d i s c u s s a motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n o f a combined arms

army.

The army c o n s i s t s o f t h r e e motorized r i f l e d i v i s i o n s

in t h e first e c h e l o n and a t a n k d i v i s i o n i n t h e second echelon. Wi t hi n t h e d i v i s i o n t h e r e would be 54 120mm mortars The o r g a n i c a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t h a s 36 122mm The t h r e e motorized r i f l e The F r o n t

available.

h o w i t z e r s and 18 152mm h o w i t z e r s .

r e g i m e n t s have i a d d i t i o n a l 54 122mm h o w i t z e r s . m commander would p r o v i d e a minimum of

54 a d d i t i o n a l a r t i l l e r y

p i e c e s , p r o b a b l y 36 l 3 O m m f i e l d guns and 18 l52mm h o w i t z e r s . The Army commander c o u l d a d d 18 l 3 O m m guns and 18 l52mm h o w i t z e r s from h i s a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t , or a d d i t i o n a l p i e c e s
i f more t h a n one regiment was a v a i l a b l e .

The Army commander

coul d a l s o p r o v i d e 72 122mm h o w i t z e r s from t h e second e c h e l o n t a n k d i v i s i o n , 54 from t h e a r t i l l e r y r e g i m e n t and 1 8 from t h e motorized r i f l e regiment, and a d d i t i o n a l mortars.

Mor-

tars from t h e t a n k d i v i s i o n w i l l n o t be counted i n t h i s case.

Thus, t h e r e a r e a t o t a l o f 324 a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s t o f i r e i n t o
a f o u r k i l o m e t e r b r e a k t h r o u g h area w i t h a d e n s i t y o f o v e r

80 a r t i l l e r y p i e c e s p e r k i l o m e t e r .

T h i s d e n s i t y could be
The

i n c r e a s e d by a d d i n g a d d i t i o n a l F r o n t o r Army a r t i l l e r y .

a r t i l l e r y would remain d i s p e r s e d and would mass t h e i r f i r e s i n t o t h e br eakt hr ough area. I d e a l l y , when t h e a s s a u l t began

t h e a r e a would be devoid of a n t i t a n k weapons and i n f a n t r y p e r s o n n e l would n o t have recovered from t h e f i r e p r e p a r a t i o n . T h i s may n o t o c c u r , s o t h e a t t a c k i n g f o r c e w i l l r a p i d l y

5-13

converge i n t o t h e designated a r e a , arrayed i n depth t o sust a i n t h e momentum, and proceed w i t h t h e a s s a u l t . Once t h e breakthrough has met w i t h i n i t i a l s u c c e s s , u n i t s w i l l hold t h e s h o u l d e r s of t h e p e n e t r a t i o n and each f o l l o w i n g u n i t w i l l attempt t o widen t h e gap. The l e a d i n g

units w i l l d e s t r o y t h e enemy's r e s e r v e s and l o g i s t i c a l a r e a s .

The p e n e t r a t i n g u n i t w i l l probably go i n t o a march formation

t o be prepared f o r a meeting engagement w i t h enemy r e s e r v e s moving t o w a r d s t h e a r e a o f t h e breakthrough.

If t h e enemy

w i t h d r a w s p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s must a l s o be considered.

Remember, t h e r e i s a l o t o f planning t h a t must t a k e place f o r a breakthrough. Tremendous amounts of ammunition

a r e r e q u i r e d f o r t h e a r t i l l e r y u n i t s and f i r e planning its e l f w i l l take a l o n g time. I t is t h e l e a s t p r e f e r r e d of a l l

o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s and w i l l be undertaken only when o t h e r means have f a i l e d t o c r e a t e a r u p t u r e i n t h e d e f e n s e , and when t h e enemy's defense h a s c r e a t e d a l i n e a r element w h i c h cannot be bypassed. n o t occur t h a t o f t e n .
d.

I t i s t h e worst c a s e f o r u s , b u t w i l l

Pursuit.

Once a r u p t u r e has been e f f e c t e d i n t h e enemy's d e f e n s e ,

or a s u c c e s s f u l breakthrough has been accomplished, t h e

a t t a c k i n g units w i l l continue t h e a t t a c k i n t o t h e enemy r e a r ,
If t h e enemy s t a r t s t o w i t h d r a w , e i t h e r v o l u n t a r i l y o r a s

a r e s u l t o f combat a c t i o n , t h e time i s r i g h t t o s t a r t a pur-

suit.

A p u r s u i t i s a v i a b l e o p t i o n i f .the enemy w i t h d r a w s

5-14.

a t t h e end of a meeting engagement.

The remainder of t h i s

s e c t i o n w i l l address t a c t i c a l p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s conducted by a regiment. There a r e t h r e e forms of p u r s u i t and combined.

frontal, parallel,

The f r o n t a l p u r s u i t i s f r e q u e n t l y c a l l e d t h e

d i r e c t p u r s u i t , and c o n s t a n t p r e s s u r e i s kept on t h e r e a r of withdrawing enemy f o r c e s . F a r a l l e l p u r s u i t means t h e

pursuing f o r c e t r a v e l s on r o u t e s p a r a l l e l t o t h e withdrawing enemy f o r c e , o u t d i s t a n c e s p a r t of h i s f o r c e s , c u t s off a p o r t i o n of t h e f o r c e from t h e f l a n k and d e f e a t s i t i n d e t a i l . Combined p u r s u i t is no more t h a n u s i n g a p o r t i o n o f t h e purs u i n g f o r c e t o maintain p r e s s u r e on t h e r e a r o f t h e w i t h drawing enemy, while a l a r g e r p o r t i o n of t h e f o r c e conducts
a parallel pursuit.

S p e c i a l o r g a n i z a t i o n s may be formed f o r t h e p u r s u i t t o ensure t h e enemy w i t h d r a w a l i s slowed, a s speed o r execution

i s v i t a l f o r the pursuer.

Nuclear weapons, e x t e n s i v e use of

a r t i l l e r y , attack h e l i c o p t e r s , c l o s e a i r s u p p o r t , and a i r borne o p e r a t i o n s a r e a l l i d e a l l y s u i t e d t o slow down o r i s o l a t e a withdrawing enemy. Attacks a g a i n s t i s o l a t e d enemy

f o r c e s a r e u s u a l l y conducted from t h e march. Planning p l a y s a key p a r t i n p u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s . Care-

f u l c o n s i d e r a t i o n must be given t o proper r o u t e s e l e c t i o n and providing s u f f i c i e n t and a p p r o p r i a t e u n i t s t o the pur-

suing force.

The pursuers must always be on t h e a l e r t f o r

a p o t e n t i a l meeting engagement and reconnaissance and

5-15

s e c u r i t y f o r c e s p l a y a key r o l e .

P u r s u i n g f o r c e s must be

a l e r t f o r p o t e n t i a l enemy c o u n t e r a t t a c k s .
The p u r s u i t should be stopped when one o r more of t h e

following conditions apply:

1.

D e s t r u c t i o n of t h e enemy i s completed.
The enemy h a s r e c o n s t i t u t e d a s t r o n g d e f e n s e .
The p u r s u e r s have o u t d i s t a n c e d e s s e n t i a l s u p p o r t . The p u r s u i n g f o r c e has p e n e t r a t e d q u i t e d e e p l y

2.

3.
4.

and h a s become v u l n e r a b l e t o d e s t r u c t i o n .

5.

Any o t h e r s i t u a t i o n where i t does n o t a p p e a r t h e

p u r s u e r s p o s s e s s a marked advantage. The a u t h o r i t y t o s t o p a p u r s u i t must come from h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s , b u t t h e p u r s u i n g commander may recommend t e r m i n a t i o n a t any time.

5-3. OPERATI ONAL SUPPORT.

P l a n n i n g f o r o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s c e n t e r s around organi z i n g e f f e c t i v e combined arms u n i t s r e i n f o r c e d w i t h complementary f o r c e s t o maximize t h e i r combat e f f e c t i v e n e s s . Within a motorized r i f l e regiment i t i s t y p i c a l p r a c t i c e t o p r o v i d e a t a n k company t o each motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n

i n t h e first e c h e l o n of t h e r e g i m e n t .
t h i r d motorized r i f l e b a t t a l i o n .

T h e remaining tank

company could be a r e s e r v e f o r c e , o r used t o r e i n f o r c e t h e

If a d d i t i o n a l t a n k s a r e

provided from d i v i s i o n a l assets, t h e r e i n f o r c e m e n t o f t h e

t h i r d b a t t a l i o n would be almont a u t o m a t i c .

The motorized

r i f l e b a t t a l i o n s u s u a l l y p r o v i d e a tank p l a t o o n t o each

rirst

e c h e l o n company, and c a n keep t h e t h i r d t a n k p l a t o o n as a r e s e r v e , o r r e i n f o r c e t h e t h i r d company. 3 a t t a l i o n s per-

forming e s s e n t i a l missions may be g i v e n an a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n t o a i d i n the accomplishment of t h e i r m i s s i o n . An a t t a c k from t h e march h a s t h e same s u p p o r t problems

as d i s c u s s e d f o r t h e meeting engagement.

Attack a g a i n s t a

f o r c e i n c o n t a c t r e q u i r e s c a r e f u l p l a n n i n g and s e l e c t i o n of
a t t a c k position:;:.

S e l e c t i o n of r o u t e s of advance through Extra engineers

or around d e f e n d i n g f o r c e s i s a l s o c r i t i c a l .

mag be n e c e s s a r y t o overcome f r i e n d l y o b s t a c l e s .
I n t h e breakthrough i t i s c r i t i c a l t o p r o v i d e enough a r t i l l e r y and ammunition t o accomplish t h e j o b . Assembly

areas and r o u t e s i n t o t h e breakthrough a r e a must be c a r e f u l l y s e l e c t e d t o avoid compromising t h e o p e r a t i o n .

F u r s u i t o p e r a t i o n s have t o be planned c a r e f u l l y and

t h e p u r s u i n g f o r c e s must be provided e s s e n t i a l s u p p o r t .

It

might be more advantageous t o e q u i p a second e c h e l o n f o r c e

f o r t h e p u r s u i , t and a l l o w t h e f i r s t e c h e l o n t o r e g r o u p .

5-4. SPECiAL TROOPS SUPPORT.

Each f a c e t of t h e o f f e n s i v e has unique r e q u i r e m e n t s f o r support.
A l l p h a s e s of t h e o f f e n s i v e w i l l be concerned w i t h

e n s u r i n g t h e p r o p e r amounts oi^ PCL and ammunition a r e made available. The breakthrough would c a u s e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n

u n i t s t o c a r r y more ammunition t h a n POL, w h i l e t h e r e v e r s e

5-17

would be t r u e d u r i n g a p u r s u i t .

A f a s t moving regiment

in

t h e p u r s u i t would need e x t r a s i g n a l support t o ensure commun i c a t i o n over extended r a n g e s . T r a f f i c control troops a r e

e s s e n t i a l f o r any march formation t o avoid t r a f f i c jams and t o ensure t h e march plan proceeded according t o s c h e d u l e . The r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l t r o o p s can provide i n t e l l i g e n c e t o a s s i s t t h e commander, and chemical t r o o p s can be i n v a l u a b l e i n an NBC environment.
A l l of these f a c t o r s must be con-

s i d e r e d when organizing t h e f o r c e f o r combat.

5-5. DEFINITIONS.

A l l d e f i n i t i o n s a r e taken from D i c t i o n a q of Easic M i l i t a r T e r m s , by A . I .

i e r prior t o the d e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e e n t r y item w i t h i n the d i c t i o n a r y .

188 BOYEVOY KOMPLEKT ( u n i t of f i r e ) The supply-and-accounti n g u n i t adopted for o p e r a t i o n a l and t a c t i c a l planning w i t h regard t o m a t e r i e l and t e c h n i c a l s u p p o r t r e q u i r e d by troops ( a v i a t i o n ) i n o r d e r t h a t a p a r t i c u l a r combat mission may

be accomplished.

689 ISKHODNYY RAYON ( a t t a c k p o s i t i o n ) - An a r e a of t e r r a i n a l l o c a t e d t o troops f o r occupation by them p r i o r t o going over t o t h e a t t a c k from a p o s i t i o n of c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy. An a t t a c k p o s i t i o n i s prepared i n accordance w i t h t h e concept of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) and t h e o p e r a t i o n a l formation ( o r o r d e r of b a t t l e ) o f t h e a t t a c k i n g t r o o p s , and is organized i n t h e e n g i n e e r i n g s e n s e s o as t o conceal t h e i r presence, t o f a c i l i t a t e t h e i r deployment and t r a n s i t i o n t o t h e a t t a c k , and t o p r o t e c t them f r o m a l l the weapons a t t h e enemy's d i s p o s a l .

690 ISKFIODNYY RUBEZH ( a s s a u l t l i n e ; l i n e of d e p a r t u r e ) A prearranged l i n e from which a u n i t o r formation proceeds t o f u l f i l l a combat mission ( a march, an a t t a c k , e t c . ) . An a s s a u l t l i n e o r l i n e of d e p a r t u r e i s defined by c l e a r l y v i s i b l e landmarks (on t h e t e r r a i n o r on a map).

853 .MASSIROVANNYY OGON' ARTiLLERII (massed a r t i l l e r y f i r e ) - l.- i r e from a l l , o r t h e g r e a t e r p a r t o f , t h e a r t i l l e r y of

a combined-arms formation, d e l i v e r e d simultaneously a g a i n s t

5-18

t h e most important enemy grouping o r o b j e c t i v e f o r t h e purpoee of i n f l h t i n g considerable damage upon t h e enemy i n t h e s h o r t e s t p o s s i b l e time.

866 METODICHESKIY OGON' ( d e l i b e r a t e f i r e ) P i r e conducted with a c o n s t a n t time i n t e r v a l between rounds. The purpose of d e l i b e r a t e f i r e is t o hold t h e t a r g e t i n a suppressed state between f i r e onslaughts, o r t o maintain t h e necessary smoke concentration a f t e r f i r e onslaughts when f i r i n g smoke p r o j e c t i l e s . D e l i b e r a t e f i r e may a l s o be conducted independ e n t l y f o r t h e purpose of exhausting t h e enemy.
927 NASTUPATEL'NAYA OPERATSIYA ( o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n ) The aggregate of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s , coordinated and i n t e r r e l a t e d w i t h regard t o , t a r g e t , time, and place, and t h e vigorous, o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n s o f t h e t r o o p s of a f r o n t ( o r an army), accomplished i n accordance w i t h a u n i f i e d concept f o r t h e attainment of o p e r a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c goals. The general purpose of an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n is t o d e s t r o y enemy means of nuclear a t t a c k , break up enemy main groupings, and s e i z e regions of o p e r a t i o n a l o r s t r a t e g i c importance. According t o i t s s c a l e and t h e f o r c e s and weapons involved, an offens i v e o p e r a t i o n may be an army o p e r a t i o n o r a f r o n t operation, but i n e i t h e r case it will be conducted by ground troops i n coordination w i t h the other Services.

967 OBKHOD (deep envelopment) A t r o o p maneuver i n d e p t h which is performed in t a c t i c a l ( o r o p e r a t i o n a l ) coordinated a c t i o n w i t h troops advancing from t h e f r o n t . Deep envelopment i0 used f o r t h e purpose of i n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i v e , aurp r i s e s t r i k e s on enemy f l a n k s ( o r f l a n k ) and r e a r .
976 OGNEVAYA PODGOTOVKA ((1) p r e p a r a t i o n f i r e ( s o f t e n i n g up) I ( 2 ) weapons t r a i n i n g ) (1) Powerful prepared s t r i k e s w i t h a r t i l l e r y and a v i a t i o n d e l i v e r e d p r i o r t o t h e start of an attack, f o r t h e purpose of n e u t r a l i z i n g and deatroyi n g t h e most important enemy i n s t a l l a t i o n e which a r e not t o be destroyed by n u c l e a r weapons, and f o r t h e purpose of r e n d e r i n g t h e enemy incapable o f o f f e r i n g organized r e s i s t a n c e t o t h e advancing t r o o p s ; ( 2 ) a s u b j e c t i n t h e t r a i n i n g curriculum f o r personnel of subunita and u n i t s of t h e armed f o r c e s .

980 OGNEVOYE NABLYUDENIYE ( n e u t r a l i z a t i o n f i r e ) F i r e by s i n g l e rounds o r b u r a t s a t w i l l , conducted d u r i n g t h e i n t e r v a l s between concentrated f i r e a g a i n s t t h e same t a r g e t , b u t w i t h considerably l e s s d e n s i t y . The purpose of f i r e observ a t i o n is t o keep t h e t a r g e t n e u t r a l i z e d . 981 OGNEVOY VA:L ( r o l l i n g b a r r a g e ) A method of a r t i l l e r y support f o r troops on t h e o f f e n s i v e , c o n s i s t i n g o f success i v e s h i f t s of high-density f i r e from one f i r i n g l i n e t o 5-19

A r o l l i n g barrage may be s i n g l e

another, ahead of t h e combat formations of advancing t r o o p s . or double.

982 OGNEVOY NALET (concentrated f i r e ) Method of conducting a r t i l l e r y f i r e f o r t h e purpose of d e s t r o y i n g enemy personnel, weapons, and combat materiel, envisaging a high d e n s i t y of f i r e d u r i n g a s h o r t i n t e r v a l of time. A s a r u l e , concentrated f i r e begins with f i r e from more than one weapon, w i t h a subsequent t r a n s i t i o n t o d e l i b e r a t e f i r e , reckoned on t h e basis of expending t h e assigned amount of ammunition i n a predetermined period of time.
1058 OKHVAT ( c l o s e envelopment) A t r o o p maneuver accomplished i n t a c t i c a l a n d f i r e c o o r d i n a t i o n w i t h t h e t r o o p s

acting from t h e f r o n t . Close envelopment i s used f o r t h e purpose of i n f l i c t i n g d e c i s i v e and sudden s t r i k e s on enemy f l a n k s ( o r f l a n k ) and r e a r .
1 56 POLKOVAYA ARTILLERIYSKAYA GRUPPA ( P A G ) (regimental 1 a r t i l l e r y group) A r t i l l e r y c o n s i s t i n g of more t h a n one a r t i l l e r y b a t t a l i o n , a t t h e d i r e c t d i s p o s a l of a regimental commander, assigned a t t h e time of a b a t t l e t o c a r r y o u t missions on behalf of t h e regiment, and u n i f i e d by a common command.

1200 PRESLEDOVANIYE ( p u r s u i t ) An a t t a c k on a withdrawing enemy, undertaken i n t h e course o f an o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) f o r t h e purpose of f i n a l l y d e s t r o y i n g o r c a p t u r i n g h i s f o r c e s . D e s t r u c t i o n of a withdrawing enemy is achieved by h i t t i n g h i s main body w i t h s t r i k e s from m i s s i l e u n i t s and a i r c r a f t ; by a r t i l l e r y f i r e r by r e l e n t l e s s and e n e r g e t i c p a r a l l e l o r f r o n t a l p u r s u i t 1 by s t r a d d l i n g h i s withdrawal route8 and by t h e pursuing t r o o p s a t t a c k i n g h i s f l a n k and r e a r . P u r s u i t i s conducted i n march o r approach-march formation (or i n combat f o r m a t i o n ) . For deep p e n e t r a t i o n i n t o t h e enemy's w i t h d r a w a l r o u t e , tank troops a r e used i n t h e first i n s t a n c e , b u t a i r b o r n e a s s a u l t f o r c e s may a l s o be employed. 1212 PRORYV (breakthrough) A method of o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n used when conducting; an o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n (or b a t t l e ) , d i r e c t e d toward p e n e t r a t i n g a continuous f r o n t , which i s prepared i n t h e engineering sense, echeloned, and occupied by enemy defense t r o o p s , by making breaches (gaps) i n i t f o r t h e purpose of subsequent maneuver i n t o t h e depth or toward t h e f l a n k s .

1336 RASKHOD BOYEPRIPASOV (ammunition expenditure) The number of p r o j e c t i l e s (or bombe, mortar rounds, b u l l e t s ) a l l o t t e d f o r , or a c t u a l l y expended on, t h e f u l f i l l m e n t of a p a r t i c u l a r f i r e mission. However, f o r a considerable
5-20

number of f i r e missions performed d u r i n g a s p e c i f i e d p e r i o d of time ( f o r example, i n t h e course of a n a i r bombardment, i n p r e p a r a t o r y f i r e , i n a day of combat), ammunition exp e n d i t u r e i s expressed i n units of f i r e .

1358 RUBEZH ATAKI (assault p o s i t i o n l i n e )

terrain

A s e c t o r of designated by t h e commander of a formation ( u n i t , subunit!, from which t h e t r o o p s begin t h e i r a t t a c k on t h e enemy.

1364 RUBEZH RAZVERTYVANIYA (deployment l i n e ) The s e c t o r of t e r r a i n on which t r o o p s deploy from march formation, or approach-march formation, i n t o combat formation.

1365 RUBEZHI REGULIROVANIYA ( c o n t r o l l i n e s ) T e r r a i n l i n e s , designated i n advance by t h e s e n i o r commander, which t h e t r o o p s must r e a c h o r go through a t a c e r t a i n time and i n a c e r t a i n formation.
An a t t a c k d i r e c t e d a t 1581 X A N G O V Y Y UDAR ( f l a n k a t t a c k ) t h e f l a n k of an o p e r a t i o n a l (or combat) or march formation o f t r o o p s . A flank attack is one of t h e types (methods) of maneuver.

5-6

ENDNOTES.

'Radziyekakiy,

D i c t i o n a r y , p. 132.

2A. A. Sidorenko, The Offeneive. T r a n s l a t e d by t h e United S t a t e s A i r Force. (Washington1 GPO 1 9 7 6 ) , p. 1. (Cited h e r e a f t e r as Sidorenko, Offensive.
31bid -*

* p. 148-149.
V.

4Radziyevskiy, D i c t i o n a x , p.
51bid.

p. 8.

6Sidorenko, Offensive, p. 221. 7DDI-1120-129-76,

'A. N . Latukhin, Modern A r t i l l e r x . Translated by t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of S t a f f f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e , Department of t h e Army, f o r t h e r'oreign Science and Technology Center. ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e l PSTC, l g ' l l ) , p. 16 and p. 111.

5-21

CHAPTER 6

THE DEFENSE
OBORON ( d e f e n s e ) A type of coe-at opera t i o n conducted for t h e purpose of r e p u l s i n g an attack mounted by s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s , causing heavy c a s u a l t i e s , r e t a i n i n g important r e g i o n s of t h e t e r r a i n , and c r e a t i n g f a v o r a b l e c o n d i t i o n s f o r going over t o a d e c i s i v e o f f e n s i v e . Defense is based on s t r i k e s by n u c l e a r and a l l o t h e r types of weapons; on extensive maneuver w i t h f i r e , f o r c e s and weapons ; on c o u n t e r a t t a c k a (or c o u n t e r s t r i k e a f w i t h simultaneous stubborn r e t e n t i o n of important r e g i o n s whi.ch i n t e r c e p t t h e enemy d i r e c t i o n of advance; and a l s o on t h e extensive use of v a r i o u s o b s t a c l e s . Defense makes it p o s s i b l e t o g a i n time and t o e f f e c t an economy i n forces and weapons i n some s e c t o r s , thereby c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s for an offensive i n others.

6-1. GENERAL.
The defense may be assumed by t h e S o v i e t s a t any time
it would be advantageous f o r them, o r they may be forced

i n t o it a s a r e s u l t of offensive action.

l o s i n g a meeting engagement or an

The purpose of d e f e n s i v e a c t i o n s i s t o r e p e l t h e attack of s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s , t o i n f l i c t c o n s i d e r a b l e l o s s e s on t h e enemy, t o hold occupied

p o s i t i o n s and t o c r e a t e c o n d i t i o n s f o r t r a n s i t i o n t o the offensive derived from the f a c t o r of ine q u a l i t y of f o r c e s . The defendere t r y t o make up for a l a c k of f o r c e s and means by s e l e c t i n g 2 t a c t i c a l l y s u i t a b l e t e r r a i n and f o r t i f y i n g i t .

The two forms of t h e defense t o be discussed a r e the h a s t y

defense, as p a r t o f t h e o f f e n s e , and t h e d e l i b e r a t e or preplanned defense. S o v i e t m i l i t a r y h i s t o r y is r e p l e t e w i t h 6-1

examples of c l a s s i c d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s .

The b a t t l e s of

Kursk, Leningrad, and S t a l i n g r a d a r e used today as examples

of t e n a c i o u s defense.

Any form of defense should be viewed as an expedient u n t i l o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s can be resumed. Recognizing t h e a t t a c k t o be t h e b a s i c and d e c i s i v e form of armed c o n f l i c t , Lenin a l s o devoted much a t t e n t i o n t o t h e defense, but he viewed i t n o t as a g o a l i n i t s e l f , but a8 temporary a c t i o n s forced by t h e s i t u a t i o n a n d s u b j e c t t o t h e o v e r a l l i n t e r e s t s of d e f e a t o f t h e enemy.
M. V. Prunze noted t h a t o n l y t h e one who f i n d s w i t h i n himself t h e r e s o l v e t o a t t a c k w i l l win. A s i d e w hich o n l y defends i s i n e v i t a b l y A t t h e same time, doomed t o d e f e a t . Frunze recognized t h e p o s s i b i l i t y , under c e r t a i n c o n d i t i o n s , of s h i f t i n g t o t h e defense, and sometimes t o a w i t h d r a w a l , viewing i t as one o f t h e a s p e c t s of a f u t u r e a t t a c k . 3

...

...

A d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n should n o t b e viewed as a l e t h a r g i c

e f f o r t designed s o l e l y t o s t o p an invading f o r c e .

I t is a

dynamic o p e r a t i o n f i l l e d w i t h counterblows, c o u n t e r a t t a c k s ,
and c o u n t e r p r e p a r a t i o n a r t i l l e r y f i r e s .

Here t h e combat s i t u a t i o n can change even more o f t e n and more a b r u p t l y than e a r l i e r i n f a v o r of now one, and now t h e o t h e r s i d e . A s a r e s u l t , none of them a r e guaranteed t h a t t h e y w i l l n o t be forced n o t only t o e x p l o i t b u t a l s o t o c o n s o l i d a t e 8uccess, n o t only t o i n f l i c t blows, b u t a l s o t o p a r r y t h e enemy's b l o w s . And t h i s presupposes, depending on t h e s i t u a t i o n , t h e use of v a r i o u s t y p e s of combat o p e r a t i o n s , s w i t c h i n g from one t o t h e o t h e r , f o r example, from t e o f f e n s i v e t o t h e d e f e n s i v e , and v i c e v e r s a .

12

All u n i t s w i t h a second echelon o r r e s e r v e p l a n f o r t h e

conduct of c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , which may be executed w i t h t h e permission of t h e next h i g h e r h e a d q u a r t e r s .

6-2

A first echelon b a t t a l i o n may r e c e i v e a s i n g l e mission t o hold t h e area of defense; a second echelon tank b a t t a l i o n , however, may be assigned

o t h e r t a s k a , i n a d d i t i o n t o i t s basic mission f o r t h e defence of a p o s i t i o n i n depth, such as t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of c o u n t e r a t t a c k s i n two o r t h r e e s e c t o r s , i n cooperation w i t h a d j a c e n t u n i t s , f o r t h e purpose of d e f e a t i n g enemy f o r c e s t h a t have penetrated i n t o t h e defence, and t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of one o r two f i r i n g l i n e s f o r t h e r e p u l s e of an a t t a c k by i n f i l t r a t i n g enemy tanks.5
T h i s paper w i l l , as has been done i n previous

The defense can be s t r a t e g i c , o p e r a t i o n a l , o r t a c t i c a l

i n nature.

chapters, c o n c e n t r a t e on a regimental s i z e f o r c e conducting

a tactical defense.

6-2. CONDUCT.

a.

Hasty.
If a combat a c t i o n has ended unfavorably, there are

two choices f o r t h e commander, e i t h e r t o defend o r t o w i t h d ra w.

I n an o f f e n s i v e t h e r e may be t h e e when it is advanA few of t h e s e

tageous t o temporarily assume t h e defense. s i t u a t i o n s are a8 follows:

1.

To d e e t r o y c o u n t e r a t t a c k i n g f o r c e s from impor-

t a n t t e r r a i n positions.
2.

To provide support f o r o t h e r f o r c e s , such as

at r i v e r c r o s s h g s or t o clear obstacles.

3.
4.

To g a i n time.

To hold p o s i t i o n s .

*The

D I A manuals concerning b a t t a l i o n and company l e v e l

t a c t i c s are e x c e l l e n t sources for a d d i t i o n a l information.

6-3

5.
offensive,

To secure c o n d i t i o n s f a v o r a b l e f o r a d e c i s i v e

6. To regroup a f t e r r e c e i v i n g e f f e c t i v e N Y C ,
a r t i l l e r y , o r air strikes.
If t h e defense has been assumed as an adverse r e s u l t

of e i t h e r an o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n o r a meeting engagement t h e form of t h e defense cannot be predicted. Troops would d i s mount t h e i r i n f a n t r y carriers and provide cover f o r t h e w i t h drawal of t h e i r v e h i c l e s t o d e f i l a d e p o s i t i o n s .

Tanks would

move i n t o d e f i l a d e p o s i t i o n s and provide p r o t e c t i v e f i r e . The i n i t i a l p o r t i o n s of such a defense would be confusing a t

best.

The commander would t r y t o a s s e s s t h e s i t u a t i o n as The 1 o n g e r . t h e u n i t stayed i n t h e defensive mode

b e s t he could and attempt t o b r i n g some cohesion t o t h e defense. t h e more t h e p o s i t i o n would resemble a d e l i b e r a t e defense. The d i f f e r e n c e between t h e l a t t e r s t a g e s of a h a s t y defense and t h e beginning of a d e l i b e r a t e defense is a matter of degree, r a t h e r than design.
The more time given t o t h e de-

fenders, t h e more o b s t a c l e s and mines would be emplaced. Given s u f f i c i e n t time t h e troops would be dug-in and v e h i c l e s provided w i t h cover and camouflage. The key f a c t o r i n t h e Another f a c t o r

structure of a h a s t y defense would be t h e amount of time

given t o t h e u n i t t o prepare i t s p o s i t i o n s . t h e defensive p o s i t i o n s . would be t h e amount of support made a v a i l a b l e t o c o n s t r u c t

6-4

Assuming a defense as p a r t of an o f f e n s i v e w i l l be characteri.zed by p r i o r planning and a cohesive s t r u c t u r e , I n f a n t r y t r o o p s w i l l be i n t r e n c h e s o r bunkers i n f r o n t of t h e i r c a r r i e r s and tanks w i l l be i n t e g r a t e d i n t o t h e a n t i tank defense, f i r i n g from concealed p o s i t i o n s .
Based on t h e

amount of a r t i l l e r y made a v a i l a b l e and a need f o r increased

a n t i t a n k f i r e s , accompanying a r t i l l e r y may be dug i n and used

i n a d i r e c t f i r e antitank role.

Antitank a r t i l l e r y and

ATGMs w i l l be i n covered p o s i t i o n s and used t o d e s t r o y t h e

enemy a t long ranges.

Defensive a r t i l l e r y b a r r a g e s and

counterpreparatj.ons w i l l be planned t o a i d t h e defenders. Obstacles and m i n e f i e l d s w i l l be emplaced, both by engineers

and t h e t r o o p s themselves.
Engineers p 1 a y . a key r o l e i n t h e defense.
t o a i d i n creat.lng t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .

Soviet divi-

s i o n s have both mechanical minelayers and t r e n c h i n g machines Several Soviet

books a r e a v a i l a b l e which go i n t o g r e a t d e t a i l on how t o

prepare i n d i v i d u a l and u n i t p o s i t i o n s f o r t h e defense.

Cam-

ouflage and d e c e p t i o n play an important r o l e i n t h e defense

and engineers may be called upon t o a i d t h e s e e f f o r t s .

The

S o v i e t s , given s u f f i c i e n t time, w i l l c r e a t e dummy d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s t o confuse t h e enemy.

A s e c u r i t y zone may o r may not be e s t a b l i s h e d i n f r o n t

of t h e d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s .

I f e s t a b l i s h e d , p l a t o o n and

company s i z e combat o u t p o s t s w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d by f i r s t echelon b a t t a l i o n s of f i r s t echelon regiments. 6-5 These a r e

designed t o deceive and confuse t h e enemy f o r c e .

Also,

reconnaissance detachments and p a t r o l s may be used t o prov i d e e a r l i e r warning a n d d e t e c t t h e enemy's main t h r u s t .

Ambush p o s i t i o n s c o n s i s t i n g of platoon s i z e a n t i t a n k elements

may be used throughout t h e s e c u r i t y zone t o confuse t h e enemy and kill him. About t h r e e t o f i v e kilometers i n f r o n t of

t h e main defense b e l t , forward p o s i t i o n s w i l l be e s t a b l i s h e d . These w i l l be platoon and company size p o s i t i o n s designed t o confuse t h e enemy as t o t h e a c t u a l l o c a t i o n o f t h e defense, cause him t o deploy prematurely, t o d e t e c t t h e main e f f o r t of t h e enemy, t o k i l l h i m , and t o e l i m i n a t e any reconnaissance i n force. These p o s i t i o n s a r e u s u a l l y e s t a b l i s h e d by second
The

echelon b a t t a l i o n s from t h e first echelon regiments.

s e c u r i t y zone may eqtend o u t as f a r as 30 kilometers i n f r o n t of t h e main defense b e l t . The main defense b e l t is occupied by first echelon d i v i s i o n s of t h e f i r s t echelon armies and can be up to 15 kilometers i n depth. Usually, a d i v i s i o n defends w i t h two r e i n f o r c e d regiments i n t h e f i r s t echelon, each having a s e c t o r o f 1 0 t o 15 kilometers i n w i d t h , and a r e i n f o r c e d regiment i n t h e second echelon occupying defensive p o s i t i o n s a c r o s s t h e w i d t h of t h e d i v i s i o n ' s assigned s e c t o r . Based

on t h e w i d t h of t h e s e c t o r , t h e troops a v a i l a b l e , and t h e t e r r a i n , a f i r s t echelon regiment could defend i n a s i n g l e echelon. Regiment makes p r o v i s i o n s f o r combined a r m 8 and Assuming t h e defense a s p a r t o f an

antitank reserves.

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o f f e n s i v e is not as e l a b o r a t e as a d e l i b e r a t e or preplanned defense and t h e p r i n c i p l e f a c t o r s d r i v i n g t h e p r e p a r a t i o n and s t r u c t u r e of t h e defense a r e t h e time and support a v a i l able t o construct the positions.
b.

Deliberate. The eaaence of auch a

A d e l i b e r a t e defense is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by extensive

planning and engineer preparation.

defense i s a s e r i e s of mutually supporting, prepared, defensive positions.

The more time and m a t e r i e l devoted t o

t h e p r e p a r a t i o n , t h e more d i f f i c u l t i t w i l l be t o overcome t h e defense. The S o v i e t s f e e l an outnumbered f o r c e , given The array of such a defense i s s u f f i c i e n t time t o prepare i t s p o s i t i o n s , can d e f e a t a v a s t l y superior attacking force. t h e same as described i n t h e previous s e c t i o n .

More time i s u s u a l l y a l l o c a t e d t o t h e p r e p a r a t i o n of
a d e l i b e r a t e defense than is a l l o c a t e d t o assuming a def e n s e a s p a r t of an o f f e n s i v e . Such a defense w i l l be well The S o v i e t s w i l l They s t r u c t u r e d and s i g n i f i c a n t numbers of a n t i t a n k and a n t i personnel o b s t a c l e s w i l l be encountered.

cover t h e i r obt3tacles w i t h d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r e s . context of t h e defense. antitank f i r e s .

w i l l t r y t o c r e a t e f i r e pockets or f i r e sacks w i t h i n t h e

These a r e a s w i l l be gaps or s a l i e n t s

i n t o which t h e r e w i l l be planned extensive a r t i l l e r y and

A good way of s e t t i n g up such a pocket or

sack i s t o p o r t r a y a l i n e a r defense and use a dummy p o s i t i o n i n t h e middle. The t h i r d u n i t is positioned behind o r on

t h e f l a n k of t h e dummy p o s i t i o n .

The defending u n i t w i l l

t r y t o canalize the attacker i n t o the k i l l i n g area.

The b a t t a l i o n d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n i s a s e r i e s of m a l l e r

company and platoon s i z e p o s i t i o n s .

Gaps between u n i t s are

common and m i n e f i e l d s and o t h e r o b s t a c l e s may be found i n t h e gaps.

The gaps will a l s o be covered by d i r e c t and inEach p o s i t i o n must be c a p a b l e of f i r i n g onto

direct fires.

and i n s u p p o r t of a d j a c e n t p o s i t i o n s . The mission of t h e first echelon b a t t a l i o n s of t h e r e g i ment is t o h a l t any enemy f o r c e , and i f necessary t o r e s t o r e p o s i t i o n s w i t h a counterblow. The second echelon b a t t a l i o n

of t h e regiment is t o c o n t a i n any p e n e t r a t i o n and by i t s e l f ,

o r i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h t h e r e s e r v e s , t o e j e c t any enemy

p e n e t r a t i o n and r e s t o r e t h e c o n t i n u i t y o f t h e defense. Remember, t h e d e f e n s e is a temporary measure t o be used only u n t i l a n o f f e n s i v e c a n be mounted. Hence, p l a n s t o

assume an o f f e n s i v e w i l l be updated c o n s t a n t l y by a l l commanders and s t a f f s . The tempo of combat w i l l vary from

s e c t o r t o s e c t o r , w i t h some u n i t s conducting c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , while o t h e r s a r e conducting counterblows. Also, ambushes may

be s e t up by t a n k p l a t o o n s a d j a c e n t t o r o u t e s i n t o t h e de-

fensive positions.

S o , an a t t a c k e r may be s u b j e c t e d t o

f r o n t a l and f l a n k i n g f i r e from a number of d i f f e r e n t positions. Attack h e l i c o p t e r s w i l l be used t o d e s t r o y enemy

f o r c e s , and may b e employed i n c o n j u n c t i o n w i t h tank ambushes.

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6 - 3 . OPERATIONAL SUPPORT.
The s e l e c t i o n of t e r r a i n f o r t h e defense i s of extreme

importance t o t h e defender.

Commanders and s t a f f s w i l l Anti-

make extensive use of map and personal reconnaissance t o pick t h e b e s t p o s s i b l e l o c a t i o n from which t o defend.
t a n k weapons may be s i t e d i n d i v i d u a l l y , b u t as an i n t e g r a l
p a r t of t h e a n t i t a n k defense.
T a n k s may be s i t e d i n d i v i d -

u a l l y w i t h i n t h e scheme of t h e defense o r a8 small u n i t s t o provide f l a n k i n g o r ambush f i r e s . Gaps and f i r e pockets o r f i r e sacks w i l l be covered by d i r e c t and i n d i r e c t f i r e .
The defenders w i l l need extensive amounts of ammunition and
a l o t of i t may be pre-stocked near defensive p o s i t i o n s .

Highly mobile a n t i t a n k and combined arms r e s e r v e s must be l o c a t e d i n a r e a s where they can proceed r a p i d l y t o p o t e n t i a l
areas of employment.

The engineers a r e key t o t h e

and o t h e r o b s t a c l e s m a t e r i e l .

SUCCBBB

of t h e o p e r a t i o n

and may need a d d i t i o n a l support f o r emplacement o f mines I n d i v i d u a l u n i t s w i l l perform a l o t of engineer p r e p a r a t i o n themselves, b u t mechanical
a i d s should be made a v a i l a b l e wherever p o s s i b l e t o speed up

t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n of t h e defense.

Forward elements w i l l be When time

prepared first and then second echelon elements.

permits, a l t e r n a t e and switch p o s i t i o n s w i l l be prepared t o

a i d i n a s s i s t i n g t h e conduct of counterblows and counter-

attacks.

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6-4. SPECIAL TROOPS SUPPORT.

As discussed i n t h e previous s e c t i o n , j u d i c i o u s u s e
must be made of a v a i l a b l e t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o ensure a l l needed m a t e r i e l can be made a v a i l a b l e t o t h e defending f o r c e s .
The important r o l e of t h e engineers has been discussed pre-

viously.

Extensive use w i l l be made of w i r e communications

The r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l

f o r s e c u r i t y and c o n t i n u i t y r e a s o n s .

t r o o p s can a i d t h e commander i f t h e y can determine t h e a r e a of t h e enemys main e f f o r t o r d i s r u p t t h e enemys command and c o n t r o l by jamming. Radio-electronic combat can be

e s p e c i a l l y u s e f u l i n t h e defense.

6 - 5 . DETINITIONS. A l l d e f i n i t i o n s a r e taken from D i c t i o n a r y

of Basic M i l i t a r y Terms, by A . I . Radziyevskiy. The number p r i o r t o t h e d e f i n i t i o n r e f e r s t o t h e e n t r y item w i t h i n the dictionary.

562 ZAGRADITELNYY OGON ( b a r r a g e f i r e ) - A type of a r t i l l e r y f i r e consisting i n laying a f i r e barrage ( f r o n t a l o r f l a n k ) on a p r e s e l e c t e d l i n e ( o r l i n e s ) i n o r d e r t o i n t e r d i c t movement by enemy i n f a n t r y o r t a n k s . Barrage f i r e i s arranged beforehand, and i s conducted a t a d e f i n i t e r a t e f o r a c e r t a i n period o f time.

ment (guard o u t p o s t ) . ( 2 ) A s u b u n i t of border t r o o p s (company o f border t r o o p s ) guarding a s p e c i f i c s e c t o r o f t h e state frontier.

585 ZASTAVA ( o u t p o s t ) ( 1 ) The means o f guarding t r o o p s o n tine march (march s e c u r i t y detachment) and i n s t a t i c deploy-

742 KONTRATAKA ( c o u n t e r a t t a c k ) An a t t a c k undertaken by defending t r o o p s a g a i n s t an a t t a c k i n g enemy f o r t h e purpose of p u t t i n g him t o r o u t ( o r d e s t r o y i n g h i m ) and a c h i e v i n g complete o r p a r t i a l r e s t o r a t i o n of t h e p o s i t i o n l o s t by t h e defending t r o o p s . A c o u n t e r a t t a c k i s u s u a l l y mounted by t h e second echelons and r e s e r v e s of u n i t s and formations, and a l s o by p a r t of t h e f o r c e s of t h e S i r s t echelon from s e c t o r s not under a t t a c k .

751 KONTRPODGOTOVKA ( c o u n t e r p r e p a r a t i o n ) A pre-planned, b r i e f , powerful, s u r p r i s e b u r s t o f f i r e d e l i v e r e d by a defender a g a i n s t enemy groupings which a r e p r e p a r i n g f o r an

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o f f e n s i v e and, in p a r t i c u l a r , against enemy m i s s i l e launchi n g p o s i t i o n s , r a d i o - t e c h n i c a l f a c i l i t i e s , f u e l and ammun i t i o n dumps.

752 KONTRUDAR (counterblow) A blow i n f l i c t e d by troops f o r t h e purpose of d e s t r o y i n g a n a t t a c k i n g enemy, r e a t o r i n g a l o s t p o s i t i o n , and c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r going over t o t h e a t t a c k . A counterblow is t h e most important a c t of defensive engagement, expressing t h e a c t i v e and mobile c h a r a c t e r of present-day defense. During a defensive engagement, s e v e r a l consecutive counterblows may be d e l i v e r e d i n one o r more sectors.

823 LOZHNYY RAYON OBORONY (dummy defense r e g i o n ) An a r e a of t e r r a i n p a r t i a l l y equipped w i t h dummy defensive s t r u c t u r e s , but not occupied by t r o o p s .
960 OBORONITEL'NAYA OPERATSIYA (defensive o p e r a t i o n ) The aggregate of b a t t l e s fought i n i n d i v i d u a l s e c t o r s f o r t h e purpose of d i s r u p t i n g an enemy o f f e n s i v e s t i l l i n prepara t i o n o r already begun, and a l s o f o r t h e purpoae o f gaining time, and c r e a t i n g favorable c o n d i t i o n s f o r going over t o t h e attack. A contemporary d e f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n is baaed on t h e use of n u c l e a r s t r i k e s and s t r i k e s w i t h a l l o t h e r types of Weapons, on t h e extensive use of maneuver w i t h f i r e , f o r c e s and weapona, and on c o u n t e r a t t a c k s , imparting an aggreasive and d e c i s i v e c h a r a c t e r t o t h e defense.

961 OBORONTIEL'NAYA POZITSIYA ( d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n ) A s e c t o r o f t e r r a i n intended f o r conducting a defensive b a t t l e by motorized r i f l e and tank s u b u n i t s ( o r u n i t s ) . Defensive p o s i t i o n 6 have s t r o n g p o i n t s prepared by engineers, disposed a t i n t e r v a l s of 1-1.5 kilometers, w i t h f i r i n g l i n e s for tank s u b u n i t s and a n t i t a n k weapons, t r e n c h e s f o r v a r i o u s weapons, s h e l t e r s f o r personnel, and w i t h o t h e r defensive s t r u c t u r e s . Various o b s t a c l e s and dummy o b j e c t s may a l s o be s e t up a t defensive p o s i t i o n s .
s e c t o r s f o r t h e purpose of misleading t h e enemy concerning t h e t r u e l o c a t i o n of t h e forward edge of t h e defense, t o safeguaxd u n i t s ( o r a u b u n i t s ) of t h e first echelon from s u r p r i s e a t t a c k , t o r e p u l s e enemy reconnaissance i n f o r c e , and compel him t o deploy h i s main body prematurely. Subu n i t s from regiments of t h e first echelon a r e u s u a l l y assigned t o defend forward p o s i t i o n s .
1121 PODVIZHNYY ZAGRADITEL'NYY OGON' (PZO) ( r o l l i n g b a r r a g e ) A type of a r t i l l e r y f i r e used i n defense. A r o l l i n g barrage c o n s i s t s i n successive s h i f t s o f a powerful c u r t a i n

1084 PEREDOVAYA POZITSIYA (forward p o s i t i o n ) A position t h a t is s e t up i n f r o n t of t h e forward edge i n i n d i v i d u a l

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of f i r e from one p r e s e l e c t e d , observed l i n e t o a n o t h e r , during an enemy tank a t t a c k .

1134 PODGOTOVLENNAYA OBORONA (prepared defense p o s i t i o n ) A defense f u l l y prepared i n t h e engineering s e n s e , and

occupied by troops. I t i s c h a r a c t e r i z e d by t h e following f e a t u r e s 1 an organized f i r e plan, based on n u c l e a r - m i s s i l e s t r i k e s , supplemented by a i r s t r i k e s and a r t i l l e r y f i r e 1 thoroughly-organized c o o r d i n a t i o n between f o r c e s and weapons; and s t a b l e c o n t r o l .
1144 POZITSIYA ( p o s i t i o n ) - A s e c t o r of t e r r a i n e i t h e r organized o r n o t i n t h e engineering s e n s e f o r occupation by troops. P o s i t i o n s occur i n t h e following c a t e g o r i e s : forward, primary, switch, assembly, launching, f i r i n g , temporary, a l t e r n a t e , dummy, e t c .

1164 POLOSA OBESPECHENIYA ( s e c u r i t y zone) - A zone created ahead of t h e forward edge of defending troops. A s e c u r i t y zone i s c r e a t e d when t h e r e i s no c l o s e c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy, and u s u a l l y c o n s i s t s of s e v e r a l p o s i t i o n s , covered by o b s t a c l e s and defended by t h e troops i n a c t i o n i n t h e s e c u r i t y zone. The depth of a s e c u r i t y zone depends on t h e concept of t h e defense, t h e n a t u r e of t h e t e r r a i n , and t h e a v a i l a b i l i t y of time f o r i t s p r e p a r a t i o n .
1182 POSPESHNO ZANYATAYA ObORONA (hasty d e f e n s e ) A defense created by troops i n t h e course of combat o p e r a t i o n s . A t t h e beginning o f i t s o r g a n i z a t i o n , such a defense is chara c t e r i z e d by8 incomplete r e a d i n e s s and consequent reduced s t a b i l i t y ; an i n s u f f i c i e n t l y developed and organized f i r e plant hurriedly-organized coordination1 i n s u f f i c i e n t development of t h e system of engineer s t r u c t u r e s ; weak e x p l o i t a t i o n of t h e t e r r a i n ; and i n s u f f i c i e n t l y s t a b l e c o n t r o l . A h a s t y t r a n s i t i o n t o defense, under modern c o n d i t i o n s , may stem from t h e need t o r e p u l s e c o u n t e r s t r i k e s by s u p e r i o r enemy f o r c e s i n t h e c a u r ~ e o f f e n s i v e o p e r a t i o n s as a r e s u l t of of a n unsuccessful meeting engagement ( o r b a t t l e ) 1 t h e e f f o r t s of a defender t o h a l t , w i t h h i s r e s e r v e s , f u r t h e r advance of enemy troops which have broken through an some i n t e r m e d i a t e l i n e ; and a l s o , i n a w i t h d r a w a l , when t h e r e t r e a t i n g s i d e , defended by rear-guard elements on an i n t e r m e d i a t e l i n s , t r i e s t o e x t r i c a t e t h e main body under attack.

1184 FOSTROYENIYE OBORONY ( s t r u c t u r e of a d e f e n s e ) - A t r o o p s t r u c t u r e , a f i r e plan, and engineer o r g a n i z a t i o n of t h e t e r r a i n . The s t r u c t u r e of a defense must be i n accord w i t h t h e concept of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) and t h e p l a n o f conducting i t . The o r g a n i z a t i o n of a defense must be deeply echeloned, ensuring wide maneuver of forces and f a c i l i t i e s ,

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both f r o n t a l l y arid i n depth, e n s u r i n g concentrated and e f f e c t i v e use of n u c l e a r m i s s i l e s and o t h e r weapons a g a i n s t t h e most important groupings of t h e a t t a c k i n g enemy, and d e l i v e r y of c o u n t e r s t r i k e s ( o r conduct of c o u n t e r a t t a c k s ) by second echelons and r e s e r v e s .
1225 PROTIVOPEKHOTNYYE ZAGRAZHDENIYA ( a n t i - p e r s o n n e l obstacles) A r t i f i c i a l o b s t a c l e s e r e c t e d on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d , mainly i n s e c t o r s of t h e t e r r a i n which a r e not t r a v e r s i b l e by t a n k s , f o r t h e purpose of impeding movement by enemy i n f a n t r y , and i n f l i c t i n g c a s u a l t i e s . Anti-personnel obstac l e s i n c l u d e mine f i e l d s , barbed-wire, hidden o b s t a c l e s , c o n c e r t i n a w i r e , l o g o b s t a c l e s i n t e r t w i n e d w i t h barbed-wire, and strengthened w i t h land mines, e t c .

1231 PROTIVOTANKOVAYA OSORONA (PTO) ( a n t i - t a n k d e f e n s e ) The sum t o t a l of measures used t o ensure success i n combati n g t a n k s , i n c l u d i n g a f i r e p l a n conducted by a n t i - t a n k weapons, used i n conjunction w i t h o b s t a c l e s f o r t h e purpose of r e p e l l i n g enemy tank a t t a c k s i n a d e f e n s e . Anti-tank defense i s organized throughout t h e e n t i r e depth of an o p e r a t i o n a l defense, p r i m a r i l y i n t h e s e c t o r s of probable tank approach. An a n t i - t a n k p l a n i n c l u d e s company s t r o n g p o i n t s c o n t a i n i n g a n t i - t a n k weapons1 tank ambushes! f i r i n g l i n e s prepared f o r occupation by tank t r o o p s and by a n t i - t a n k r e s e r v e s 1 t a n k s of second echelons and of r e s e r v e s , ( a n t i tank r e s e r v e s ) ; a r t i l l e r y l o c a t e d i n s e c t o r s of probable t a n k approach; and a n t i - t a n k o b s t a c l e s .

1233 PROTIVOTANKOVYYE ZAGRAZHDENIYA ( a n t i - t a n k o b s t a c l e s ) A r t i f i c i a l o b s t a c l e s s e t up on t h e b a t t l e f i e l d f o r t h e p u r pose of s t o p p i n g o r slowing an advance by enemy t a n k s , and r e n d e r i n g them u n s e r v i c e a b l e . Anti-tank o b s t a c l e s make i t e a s i e r t o i n f l i . c t s t r i k e s on enemy t a n k s w i t h a r t i l l e r y f i r e and o t h e r a n t i - t a n k weapons. The main types of a n t i t a n k o b s t a c l e s are t h e mine f i e l d and t h e fougasse. Also used a r e d i t c h e s , escarpments, c o u n t e r - s c a r p s , (steel-beam) p o s t o b s t a c l e s , abatis, l a n d s l i d e s , and flooded o r marshy t e r r a i n s and i n wintertime, b e s i d e s , snow banks and i c y s l o p e s . A s a r u l e , a n t i - t a n k o b s t a c l e s a r e covered by a r t i l l e r y , mortar, and machine-gun f i r e .

1397 SISTEMA ZAGRAZHDENIY ( o b s t a c l e p l a n ) The aggregate of v a r i o u s engineering o b s t a c l e s (mine f i e l d s , mined s e c t o r s of r o a d s , i n d i v i d u a l o b j e c t s prepared f o r d e m o l i t i o n , o b s t a c l e c o n c e n t r a t i o n s , o b s t a c l e zones, e t c . ) , c r e a t e d f o r t h e purpose of h i n d e r i n g enemy advance, d e l a y i n g him while r e p u l s i n g h i s c o u n t e r s t r i k e , i n f l i c t i n g l o s s e s on him, and c r e a t i n g c o n d i t i o n s f o r d e f e a t i n g h i s t r o o p s w i t h n u c l e a r and o t h e r weapons.
6-13

1401 SISTEMA OGNYA V OSORONE ( d e f e n s i v e f i r e plan) A comb i n a t i o n of pre-arranged f i r e s t r i k e s on t h e approaches t a a defense, and t h e c r e a t i o n of zones of continuous multit i e r e d f i r e of a l l types ahead of t h e forward edge, on t h e f l a n k s , and i n t h e depth, of t h e defense, and a l s o concent r a t i o n of f i r e , i n b r i e f periods of time, on any threatened a x i s o r s e c t o r . A defensive f i r e plan is formulated i n accordance w i t h t h e concept of t h e o p e r a t i o n ( o r b a t t l e ) , t a k i n g i n t o account n u c l e a r and chemical attacks, and env i s a g i n g c l o s e c o o r d i n a t i o n of f i r e from a l l t y p e s of weapons and a i r s u p p o r t , i n conjunction w i t h o b s t a c l e p l a n s , and natural. b a r r i e r s . 1508 TAKTICHESKAYA GLUBINA OaORONY ( t a c t i c a l depth of a d e f e n s e ) - The s t r i p o f t e r r a i n which i s occupied and defended by d i v i s i o n s of t h e first echelon of an army.

6-6. ENDNOTES.
Radziyevskiy, Dictionary, p. 135. 2Reznichenko, Tactics, p. 207. 3Savkin, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 241-242.

V, M. Pedulov,and V. V. Turchenko, Defensive Operations DurinP An Offensive. Translated by Leo Kanner Associates f o r The rorei n Science and Technology Center. ( C h a r l o t t e s v i l l e : ?STCe 197 )I Po 13.

6-14

CHAPTER 7

THE WITIiDRAWAL

7-1 GENERAL.
Chapter 2 e s t a b l i s h e s t h e w i t h d r a w a l as a separate

form of combat which is a p p l i c a b l e w i t h i n t h e meeting engagement, t h e o f f e n s i v e , o r t h e defense. Soviet m i l i t a r y

h i s t o r y c o n t a i n s many r e f e r e n c e s t o t h e advantage of cond u c t i n g a w e l l organized withdrawal.

COL Savkin borrows a

phrase from Generalissimo A . V. Suvorov, which i l l u s t r a t e s t h e h i s t o r i c s i g n i f i c a n c e of t h e withdrawal: Suvorov wrote t o Baron Kray t h a t " t h e r e is no shame t o concede a p o s t t o an enemy s u p e r i o r i n numbers. On t h e c o n t r a r y , h e r e i n l i e s t h e m i l i t a r y art of withdrawing i n time without l o s s e s . A stubborn r e s i s t a n c e t o hold any p o s t would c o s t d e a r l y , while subsequently i t would s t i l l have t o be given up t o a s u p e r i o r enemy. A p o s t which has been conceded c a n be occupied a g a i n , while t h e loss i n personnel i s i r r e v e r s i b l e . Oftenlone man is more c o s t l y t h a n t h e p o s t itself.
COL Sidorenko s t r e s s e s t h e multi-faceted n a t u r e of t h e
withdrawall

I t j.s believed t h a t withdrawal o p e r a t i o n s may be conducted for v a r i o u s purposes: t o exhaust a t t a c k i n g enemy t r o o p s and i n f l i c t l o s s e s on themi t o avoid combat under unfavorable c o n d i t i o n s and p l a c e t h e enemy i n a disadvantageous p o s i t i o n i t o c r e a t e t h e opportunity t o t a k e advantage of one's own f o r c e s o r a p o r t i o n of them on o t h e r s e c t o r s of t h e f r o n t ! t o win time f o r b r i n g i n g up addit i o n a l f o r c e s from t h e depth, organize d e f e n s i v e p o s i t i o n s i n t h e r e a r , regroup t r o o p s , and prepare

an a t t a c k 1 and t o d raw t h e enemy i n t o c e r t a i n a r e a s where he can be destroyed by n u c l e a r weapons and c o u n t e r a t t a c k s . 2 The withdrawal and t h e h a s t y defense a r e t h e o n l y forms of combat which may be used a f t e r a n u n s u c c e s s f u l meeting engagement. Deception o p e r a t i o n s could i n c o r p o r a t e a w i t h -

drawal t o mask u n i t l o c a t i o n s o r t o d i s g u i s e f r i e n d l y combat

operations.
U Army a n a l y t i c a l e f f o r t s seldom use a withdrawal by S

Soviet forces within a simulation scenario.

Therefore, a

d e t a i l e d e x p l a n a t i o n on how t o conduct a withdrawal has not been included i n t h i s paper. The f o l l o w i n g s e c t i o n provides

g e n e r a l concepts f o r t h e conduct of t h e withdrawal.

7-2.

coNnucT.
"Organization of a w i t h d r a w a l begins only a f t e r r e c e i p t

of an o r d e r from t h e s u p e r i o r commander. 8'3 The withdrawal

may be made when i n o r out o f c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy.

When

n o t i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy i t may be viewed as a n o t h e r t a c t i c a l march and conducted accordingly. Conduct of a w i t h -

drawal when i n c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy becomes a much more difficult task.

The first s t e p , a f t e r o r g a n i z i n g t h e f o r c e

f o r t h e w i t h d r a w a l , is t o break c o n t a c t w i t h t h e enemy. Contact w i t h t h e enemy s h o u l d be broken d u r i n g p e r i o d s of l i m i t e d v i s i b i l i t y t o minimize d e t e c t i o n o f t h e w i t h drawal. #hen breaking c o n t a c t a r t i l l e r y f i r e and smoke may preclude o b s e r v a t i o n o f t h e f r i e n d l y u n i t s . Sev-

b e used t o

e r a l covered and concealed r o u t e s should be used t o a l l o w

7-2

t h e u n i t s breaking c o n t a c t t o conduct a r a p i d and s i m u l taneous e g r e s s . S e c u r i t y elements a r e key t o t h e s u c c e s s f u l conduct of

a withdrawal.

Flank s e c u r i t y detachments and r e a r guards

A com-

w i l l be formed t o p r o t e c t t h e withdrawing f o r c e .

prehensive p l a n must b e prepared t o ensure a l l u n i t s understand t h e sequence of t h e o p e r a t i o n . Mutual p r o t e c t i o n

between s e c u r i t y elements and withdrawing f o r c e s i s e s s e n t i a l t o a s u c c e s s f u l withdrawal.

7-3. ENDNOTES.
lSavkin, z r i n c i u l e s , p . 245. 2Sidorenko, Offensive, p. 167. 3Reznichenko, T a c t i c s , p. 242
a

7-3

CHAPTER

CONCLUSIONS

8-1. TACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS.

S o v i e t t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e i n c l u d e s f o u r forms of combat action

t h e meeting engagement, t h e o f f e n s e , t h e d e f e n s e ,
The meeting engagement or t h e w i t h -

and t h e w i t h d r a w a l .

d r a w a l may occur d u r i n g p o r t i o n s of o f f e n s i v e and d e f e n s i v e

operations.

The w i t h d r a w a l may be used t o t e r m i n a t e an

u n s u c c e s s f u l meeting engagement.
The S o v i e t s c o n s i d e r t h e e v o l u t i o n of t a c t i c s t o be a

dynamic and s c i a n t i f i c process.

The refinement of S o v i e t

t a c t i c s i s a c o n t i n u a l procedure, as described by COL Savkint

The p r i n c i p l e s of o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and t a c t i c s bear a h i s t o r i c a l c h a r a c t e r . A change i n o b j e c t i v e r e a l i t y , p r i m a r i l y i n t h e material basis of b a t t l e o r o p e r a t i o n , l e a d s t o a change i n p r i n c i p l e s , t o l d i s c a r d i n g outmoded ones and developing new ones.

Thus, t h e s t u d y of S o v i e t t a c t i c s should be an a c t i v e and continuous process t o keep pace w i t h t h e i r evolving t a c t i c a l doctrine.

8-2. TECHNOLOGI.CAL CONSIDERATIONS.

The advent of t h e n u c l e a r age had an immense impact on t h e development of S o v i e t t a c t i c a l d o c t r i n e . The i n t r o -

d u c t i o n of nuc:Lear weapons a l t e r e d S o v i e t concepts f o r cond u c t i n g combat o p e r a t i o n s . The f i e l d i n g of t e c h n o l o g i c a l l y

8-1

s u p e r i o r weapons by any army could impact on t h e e v o l u t i o n

of S o v i e t t a c t i c s .

Changes i n technology have also impacted on S o v i e t Army o r g a n i z a t i o n a l s t r u c t u r e . The dismounted infantryman Today,

was t h e base of t h e S o v i e t Army d u r i n g World W a r 11.

t h e S o v i e t Army i s a h i g h l y mechanized f o r c e capable of cond u c t i n g armored warfare i n s e v e r a l p a r t s o f t h e world. Improved technology h a s caused changes i n S o v i e t t a c t i c s i n t h e past, as s t a t e d by General-Major Reznichenko: Examination o f b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s o f contemporary t a c t i c s shows t h a t they d i f f e r from t a c t i c s of past wars, i n c l u d i n g t a c t i c s of t h e period of t h e Great P a t r i o t i c War. I n t h e development of t a c t i c s , j u s t as i n o p e r a t i o n a l a r t and s t r a t e g y , t h e r e has indeed occurred a r e v o l u t i o n which was caused by t h e wide a p p l i c a t i o n o f n u c l e a r weapons and means of t h e i r d e l i v e r y and a l s o by t h e uae of o t h e r o f t h e l a t e s t achievements i n s c i e n c e and technology i n m i l i t a r y affairs.2 Thus, one must s t a y attuned t o developments i n m i l i t a r y weaponry which impact on t h e e v o l u t i o n o f S o v i e t tactics. 8-3- ENDNOTES. 'Savkin, P r i n c i p l e s , p. 278. T a c t i c s , p. 252.

'Reznichenko,

8-2

APPENDIX A

31BLIOGRAPXY
U GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS S
A.

Manuals, Circulars and T r a i n i n g T e x t s

Appendixes t o Notes on t h e S o v i e t Ground l o r c e s . (SupR 69720) U Army I n t e l l i g e n c e C e n t e r and S c h o o l , Department of S t h e A r m y . IJSAINTS, 7 e b r u a r y 1976. Handbook on S o v i e t Ground F o r c e s . (ZM 30-40) Headquarters, Department of t h e Army. DA, 30 June 1975. H i s t o r i c a l S t u d y German Defense Tactics A g a i n s t Russian d r e a k t h r o u g h s . (DA Pam 20-233) H e a d q u a r t e r s , D e p z t m e n t of t h e Army. DA, October 1951. O r g a n i z a t i o n and Equipment of t h e S o v i e t A r m x . (HE( 550-2) Threats D i i d Literature D i r e c t o r a t e , U Army Combined A r m s Combat Developments S A c t i v i t y , Department of t h e Army. CACDA, 31 J u l y 1978. Range and L e t h a l i t y of U and S o v i e t Anti-Armor Weapons. S (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 1U) U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e S Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC, 30 September 1975. S e l e c t e d S o v i e t M i l i t a r y W r i t i n g s We-May 1 2. ( R 8 30-5, Vol I ) U A r m y Command and G e n e r a l S t a S College, Oepartment of t h e Army. CGSC, 4 August 1975.

S e l e c t e d US and S o v i e t Weapons and Equipment. (RE 30-2) U Army Command and G e n e r a l S t a f f C o l l e g e , Department S of t h e Army. CGSC, J u l y 1975. S o v i e t Artillery. (SupR 66230 ( D / N R I ) ) US Army I n t e l l i g e n c e C e n t e r and S c h o o l , Department of t h e A r m y . USAINTS, November 1967 S o v i e t A r t i l l e r y D o c t r i n e . (Ri3 30-3) U Army Command and S General S t a f f C o l l e g e , Department of t h e Army. C G S C , May 1976.
SOVIET ATGMs:

C a p a b i l i t i e s and Countermeasures. (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 2U) US Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command. Department of t h e Army. TRADCC, A p r i l 1975.

A- 1

S o v i e t Commander's T a c t i c a l Planning Worksheet. (9L8-1337) S Department o f Command, U Army Command and General S t a f f College, Department of t h e Army. CGSC, J u l y 1978. S o v i e t L o g i s t i c s . (XI! 550-3) Threats D i v i s i o n , Concepts and Force Design D i r e c t o r a t e , U Army Combined A r m s Combat S Developments A c t i v i t y , Department of t h e Army. CACDA, 1 August 1977. S o v i e t RPG-7 Antitank Grenade Launcher. (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 3lJ) U Army T r a i n i n g and Doctrine Command, Department S of t h e Army. TRADOC, November 1976. S o v i e t T a c t i c s A r t i l l e r y Organization and Employment. (PT 100-3, Vol 111) U Army Command and General S t a f f S College, Department o f - t h e Army. CGSC, July 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s i n t h e Defense. (PT 100-3, Vol V ) U Army S Command and General S t a f f Colleae. - Deaartment of t h e - . * Army. CGSC, J u l y 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s i n t h e Offense. (PT 100-3, Vol I V ) U Army S Command and General S t a f f College. Deaartment o f t h e - . A r m y . C G S C , J u l y 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s Organization o f S o v i e t D i v i s i o n s . ( p T 100-3, Vol 11) U Army Command and General S t a f f College, S Department of t h e Army. CGSC, J u l y 1978. S o v i e t T a c t i c s Organization of S o v i e t Front and A r m

&

Department of t h e Army. C G S C , J u l y 1978.

.College, (PT

TXE BMPI

C a p a b i l i t i e s and L i m i t a t i o n s . (TRADOC B u l l e t i n 7 ) U Army T r a i n i n g and Doctrine Command, Department of S t h e Army. TRADOC, 30 June 1977.

The Enemy Force. (RB 30-1) U Army Command and General S t a f f S College, Department of t h e A r m y . CGSC, 1 J u l y 1975. The Leavenworth Assessment of t h e Warsaw Pact Threat i n C e n t r a l Europe. ( H B 550 1 ) Thr e a t s D i v i s i o n , Concepts and Force Design D i r e c t o r a t e , U Army Combined A r m s S Combat Developments A c t i v i t y , Department of t h e Army. CACDA, 1 J u l y 1976.

The Motorized R i f l e RePiment. (TC 30-4) U Army I n t e l l i g e n c e S Center and School, Department of t h e Army. DA, 15 June 1975.
S The T ! m . ( T C 6-4-1) U Army Yield A r t i l l e r y School, Cepartment of t h e Army. USAFAS, May 1976.

A- 2

TXE THREAT ( D e s e r t O D e r a t i o n s ) . Annex C t o Supplemental

S M a t e r i a l (SC.05804), Command and S t a f f Department, U Army Armor S c h o o l , Department o f t h e Army. USAARK, August 1976.

,Threat Force Guidance. Deputy C h i e f of S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , S Readiness and I n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC L e t t e r , 27 Febr u a r y 1976, Threat Force Guidance. Deputy Chief of S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , Readiness and I n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e S Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC L e t t e r , 14 May

1976 *
T h r e a t Force Guidance. Deputy Chief of S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , S Readiness and K n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army 'Training and D o c t r i n e Command, Department of t h e Army. TRADOC L e t t e r , 30 August

I976
T!!REAT

MONOGRAPH A Comparison of Selected NATO and Warsaw Pact E n g i n e e r O r g a n i z a t i o n s and Equipment. Office of t h e Engineer/Deputy Chief o f S t a f f f o r O p e r a t i o n s , Readiness and I n t e l l i g e n c e , U Army T r a i n i n g and D o c t r i n e Command, S Department of t h e Army. TRADOC, 9 December 1977.

Y. T r a n s l a t i o n s

Ashkerov, V. P. A n t i a i r c r a f t M i s s i l e Troops and A n t i a i r c r a f t A r t i l l e r y . Translated by T e c h t r a n C o r p o r a t i o n .for t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology C e n t e r , DDC AD696188. FSTC, 12 September 1969. oabdzhanyan, A . Kh., ed. Tanks and Armored Troops. Transl a t e d by Gaylord F u b l i c a t i o n s f o r t h e US Army TankAutomotive Command, DDC AD762558. Warren, 1970. 2az, I . S., Koxlov, S . N., S i d o r o v , P. A , , and Smirnov, M. V. M i l i t a r y S c i e n c e . T r a n s l a t e d by F'oreign Technology D i v i s i o n , U A i r F o r c e , DDC An660949. W r i g h t S P a t t e r s o n A:%, 20 A p r i l 1967. ijeketov, A. A . , irelokon, A . P., and Chermashentsev. Camouf l a g e of t h e A c t i o n s of t h e S u b u n i t s of Land F o r c e s . S T r a n s l a t e d by F o r e i g n Technology D i v i s i o n , U A i r ; o r c e , DDC AD3021822L. W r i g h t - P a t t e r s o n A?B, 17 J a n u a r y 1977. delokon, A . P. EnPineer O r g a n i z a t i o n o f t h e R i f l e Company's Defense Area. T r a n s l a t e d by Techtran C o r p o r a t i o n f o r t h e F o r e i g n S c i e n c e and Technology C e n t e r , DDC AD709615 ?STC , 4 June 1970.

A-

Belokon, A. P. and Korneychuk, V. T. EnRineering Support f o r t h e Motorized R i f l e (Tank) -tB a Translated by Leo Kanner Associates for t h e Foreign Science and $ethnology Center, DDC AD748870. FSTE, 7 August 1972. Belykh, G. A. WeaDons of Mass D e s t r u c t i o n and P r o t e c t i o n AQainSt Them. Translated by T r a n s l a t i o n Division, Naval I n t e l l i g e n c e Support Center, Department of t h e Navy, __ DDC ADA626539. Washington, 3 June 1976. Chistov, A. A , , Chulkov, G. S. and Zelenskiy, V. D. Techn i c a l Supply of Tank and Motorized R i f l e Units i n Modern Combat. Translated by Leo Kanner Associates f o r t h e 2'oreign Science and Technology Center, DDC ADA012981. E'STC, 13 December 1974. Dudarev, S. N. and Shipov, B. V. A r t i l l e r y I n Special Cond i t i o n s . Translated by A s s i s t a n t Chief of S taff f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e for t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, DDC AD740120. FSTC, 27 January 1972. Fedulov, M. V. and Turchenko, V. V. Defensive Operations During an Offensive. Translated by Leo Kanner Associates f o r t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, _. DDC ADA005485. FSTC; 27 November 1974.
Perri, A l b e r t Jr., ed. S e l e c t i o n s From t h e S o v i e t Militar Press, 1968-1971. Translated and prepared by Strategi:

S t u d i e s Center f o r t h e O f f i c e , Chief of Research and S Development, U Army, DDC AD759961. Washington, May 1973.

F i e l d A r t i l l e r y Commander's Handbook. Translated by Techtran Coruoration f o r t h e P o r e i m Science and Technolokv -Center, DDC AD912561L. FSTC, 19 June 1973.
Gamezo, M. V.,

and Govorukhin, A. M. Officers' Handbook on M i l i t a r y Tonopraph 3rd ed. Translated by T r a n s l a t i o n Consultants L t d . , f o r Redstone Arsenal and t h e Foreign Science and Technology Center, FSTC-HT-23-119-73. FSTC, 28 J u l y 1972.

Garbuz, G. I . , Loza, D. F . , and Sazonov, I . P . The Motorized R i f l e B a t t a l i o n i n B a t t l e , 2d ed. T r a n s l a t e a by t h e A s s i s t a n t Chief of Staff f o r I n t e l l i g e n c e , K-6080. A C S I , 18 January 1978.
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Deane, Michael J. and Scharfen, John C . S o v i e t T a -- a l ctic Doctrine f o r Urban Warfare. S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s Center, Stanford Research I n s t i t u t e , DDC ADA022998. Arlington: December 1975. X a n n e r y , C . M . "Night Operations-The S o v i e t Approach. M A Thesis, US Army Command and General S t a f f College, MS 1978
'I

Kimball, John A.

"The S o v i e t Motorized R i f l e 3 a t t a l i o n i n t h e Meeting Engagement." M A Thesis, U Army Command MS S and General Staff College, 1977.

Kosevich, Richard S. The BMP-Equipped Motorized R i f l e j a t t a l i o n i n t h e Offense. Garmisch I US h r m y l ~ ~ t u t e f o r Advanced Russian and E a s t European S t u d i e s , 1977. S c o t t , X a r r i e t F a s t . S o v i e t M i l i t a r y C o c t r i n e : I t s Pormul a t i o n and Cissem'ination. S t r a t e g i c S t u d i e s Center, Stanford Research I n s t i t u t e , DDC Nl743909. Arlington: 17 June 1971.
Shaw, Harry. Punctuate I t R i g h t l . New York, Evanston, and San Trancisco: 3arnes and Noble uooks, 1963.

Turabian, Kate L. A Manual for Writers o f Term Pa e r g , 'Theses. and D i s s e r t a t i o n s . 4 t h ed. Chicago; T e University of Chicago P r e s s , 1973. Roget, P e t e r M. Roget's I n t e r n a t i o n a l Thesaurus. 3 r d ed. Edited by L e s t e r V. 3errey. Tokyo1 Toppan Company L t d . , 1962. The American College D i c t i o n a r Edited by C . L. Rarnhart. New Y o r k l Random .iouse, 1!?%8.

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APPENDIX

I K I T I A L D I S T R I B U T I O N LIST

C D R , T R A D O C . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
CDR,PORSCOM

................... CDR,CACDA .................... C ? I LTC Yoagland CDT,CGSC . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . C F I LTC G r i c i f e

MAJ Robison

..

1 1 1
2

.................. D I R , TiCKG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . D I R , TRASANA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . DiR,MSAA .................... C F I Ms. aru nsel C D R , 1st C a v Div . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CDR,USAAVNC ................... C F : COL Yurnett CDR,USAARMC . . C F I KAJ A l b r i g h t
C D R , V U Corps S C F I C O L Temperley
e .

1
1

1
1

KAJ a r i n k l e y IviAJ Rosenberg

PM,XiYi-l C F I Mr. C a r s o n

.....................

1
1

CDR,2dACR.. C F I MAJ Ferris

.................. CDR,3rdACR ................... C?: K A J S h i n a e k i C D R , 1 1 t h liCR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

C F I ivlAJ L i b e r t i SAJ X h i t e

1
2

3-1

AGENCY
D I R , D I A . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . CF: NAJ Frasche 'OACSi, DA
C F I L?'C Hope

COPIES

1
1

....................

C F I NAJ Siebert
Totall 22 Copies

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