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RECHTSTHEORIE 29 (1998), S.

387 - 424
Duncker & Humblot, 12165 Berlin

LAW-ORIENTED BEHAVIOUR AND THE STRUCTURE


OF LEGAL NORMS

By Athanasios Gromitsaris, Jena

I. Introduction

For a very long time légal positivists hâve theorised about thé form of
thé légal norm. As early as thé late eighteenth century, Jeremy Bentham
had developed a theory on norm individuation; it offers a means of sing-
ling out that which is to count as "a law", a légal norm. On thé one hand,
Lon Fuller challenged thé idea that individual légal norms or rules could
serve as an appropriate focus in légal philosophy. He is not interested in
what he once described as thé intramural squabbling of thé légal positiv-
ists on thé form of thé légal norm. He sees their approach as stérile, for it
is not thé products (légal norms, légal rules) of légal processes that lay
bare thé distinctive features of thé law but rather, thé processes them-
selves.1 On thé other hand, A. M. Honoré, abandoning reconstruction and
reductivism and letting thé Benthamite program f ail away, tried to turn to
what he called "real laws".2 He embarked on an enterprise constituting "a
minor pièce of descriptive sociology"3 and tried to describe "real laws", as
opposed to thé laws which thé theorist remodels in thé shape of his thé-
ories. He turned to laws and rules as they exist in professional discourse
and argument but he had no appropriate sociological theory of descrip-
tion. He remained if not chez Hart, then at least du côté de chez Hart. In
thé following it is "légal processes" and "real laws" that are in thé focus
of our analysis. We use Max Weber's theory and sociology of law which is
a combination of a textual with a contextual approach to law in order to
find out which are thé basic prerequisites of a non-positivistic description
of law-oriented behaviour.

1 Fuller, 1981, p. 243; see thé book review by Paulson, 1984.


2 Honoré, 1977.
3
Honoré, 1977, p. 99. Hart saw his theory as "an essay in descriptive sociology":
Hart, 1961, p. iv.
26 RECHTSTHEOBIE, 3 - 4/98
388 Athanasios Gromitsaris [130] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 389

II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to press
beyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of their
Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other ways impracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealization
of thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political and process. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System"
moral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4 and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complex
and no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit of
1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law ideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of law
and morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "claim to correctness is a
This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion of necessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulygin
an extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légal points out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescrip-
norms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé eva- tions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statements
luative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On thé about norms on thé other.11
other hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstances Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thé
a requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral point business of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Given
of view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethi- that neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are.
cal content judges view them as evaluative standards which they must Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcement
respect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint of policies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé most
positive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility can bénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consen-
be modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy déci- sus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood in
sion effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutional terms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualization
framework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his per- and argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs and
sonal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâve thé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thé
to be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of thé relation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity of
evaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude toward real laws?
thé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, one
needs thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évalua-
tion which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude toward 2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence
law implies.8
Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légal
Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguish norm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholar
between moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé via employs thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thé
negativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé ampler behaviour of various actors in thé légal System including thé behaviour
demands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to of those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judge-
ments of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correct
•* By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a) meaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé
"Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skat-
erkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point see
Krawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7. 10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177.
11
5
Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder
"Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch inter-
'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren. pretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nient seine Sache, darilber in
6 seinem Urteil zu reden.
See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sind 12
das natùrliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht." Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concrète 'juristische Wahr-
heit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsatzen aïs solche 'gelten'
7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52. sotte oder hàtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de facto
s Kronman, 1983, p. 10. empirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fàllen aïs kausale
9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122. 'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist."
26*
388 Athanasios Gromitsaris [130] [131] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 389

II. Three Ways of Thinking About Law outrun thé limits of practicable achievability and enables us to press
beyond thé confines of institutional practice. Ideals, regardless of their
Max Weber contrasts thé sociological study of law with two other ways impracticability, can yield benefits as by-products of thé idealization
of thinking about légal norms and institutions: (1) The political and process. Still, they function "as simply one component within a System"
moral attitude toward law and (2) thé dogmatic jurisprudence.4 and can be pursued only "within thé limits of thé possible in a complex
and no doubt imperfect world". Accordingly, unrealism in thé pursuit of
1. The Political and Moral Attitude Toward Law ideals blocks thé way to other desiderata. As far as thé connection of law
and morality is concerned, thé view, that thé "daim to correctness is a
This attitude is distinguished by thé fact that it employs a criterion of necessary élément of thé concept of law"10 has - as Eugenio Bulygin
an extra-légal sort in terms of which thé moral goodness of spécifie légal points out - to pay more attention to thé distinction between prescrip-
norms may be assessed.5 On thé one hand thé normative force of thé eva- tions, directives and norms on thé one hand and descriptive statements
luative standards does not dépend upon their being rules of law. On thé about norms on thé other.11
other hand thé légal order contains within itself in certain circumstances Given thé moral pluralism prevailing in modem societies, it is not thé
a requirement that its component rules be justifiable from a moral point business of modem démocratie states to deal in suprême values. Given
of view. But even if a légal order contains norms with an explicitly ethi- that neutrality, it is not always easy to know what right and wrong are.
cal content judges view them as evaluative standards which they must Any group will always argue that its own moral codes and enforcement
respect solely because they are légal norms.6 From thé standpoint of policies or experiments are worthy of support by thé state and thé most
positive law, thé currently normativ ascription of légal responsibility can bénéficiai to mankind. Even if it would be possible to establish a consen-
be modified only within thé institutional framework of légal policy déci- sus by means of a rational discourse, which in turn is understood in
sion effecting a change in thé law, not, however, within thé institutional terms of a non-institutionalized process of reasoned conceptualization
framework of morality.7 As thé judge is not permitted to rely on his per- and argument (Habermas), nobody can tell what thé state of affairs and
sonal view of what is morally right and wrong, his moral judgments hâve thé structure of action after this consensus will be. Who will regulate thé
to be supported by a reasoning that proves thé presumed validity of thé relation between thé validity of thé idéal discourse and thé validity of
evaluative standard. Therefore, to describe thé judge's attitude toward real laws?
thé validity of moral judgements and thé validity of légal norms, one
needs thé distinction between légal and extra légal standards of évalua-
2. The Dogmatic Jurisprudence
tion which Weber's conception of thé political and moral attitude toward
law implies.8
Légal scholars need not take an evaluative attitude toward thé légal
Furthermore, as Nicholas Rescher emphasizes, we hâve to distinguish norm whose correct légal meaning they are expounding.12 A légal scholar
between moral norms and ideals. The latter "reach out beyond thé via employs thé norm as an evaluative standard by using it to assess thé
negativa of those 'thou shalt not' commandments, toward thé ampler behaviour of varions actors in thé légal System including thé behaviour
demands of a utopian order of things".9 Surely, idealization strives to of those responsible for applying thé norm in question. The value judge-
ments of thé légal scholar are based upon his conception of thé correct
4 By using thé "paradigm of thé game scat", Weber distinguishes between (a) meaning of a légal norm which he treats as a standard for assessing thé
"Skatjurisprudenz", (b) "Skatpolitik" or "skatsittliche Normen" and (c) "Skat-
erkenntnis" or "Skaterfahrung". Weber, 1988 a, p. 337 et sequ. On this point see
Krawietz, 1993, p. 48. See further Kronman, 1983, p. 7. 10 Alexy, 1989, p. 177.
11
5
Weber, 1988a, p. 345: "(M)an kann von ethischen Prinzipien aus seine (des Bulygin, 1993, p. 24: "Die Aufgabe des Richters ist, den Angeklagten entweder
"Paragraphen") normative 'Berechtigung', () seinen Wert oder Unwert () oder seinen zu verurteilen oder freizusprechen. Ob er dabei das Recht richtig oder falsch inter-
'Nutzen' oder 'Schaden' fur (bestimmte) Interessen diskutieren. pretiert hat, wird aus seinem Urteil hervorgehen; es ist nicht seine Sache, daruber in
6 seinem Urteil zu reden.
See Art. 6 of thé German Constitution: "Pflege und Erziehung der Kinder sind
das naturliche Recht der Eltern und die zuvôrderst ihnen obliegende Pflicht." 12 Weber, 1988a, p. 348: "(D)ie Frage nach dem, was in concreto 'juristische Wahr-
heit' ist, d. h. gedanklich nach 'wissenschaftlichen' Grundsàtzen aïs solche 'gelten'
7 Krawietz, 1992, p. 52. sotte oder hdtte 'gelten' sollen, ist logisch gànzlich verschieden von der: was de facto
s Kronman, 1983, p. 10. empirisch in einem konkreten Fall oder in einer Vielheit von Fâllen aïs kausale
9 Rescher, 1987, p. 122. 'Folge' des 'Geltens' eines bestimmten 'Paragraphen' eingetreten ist."
26'
390 Athanasios Gromitsaris [132] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 391
13
correctness of thé norm's application in various cases and contexts. thé law and by their beliefs regarding thé similar commitments of
This does not imply that jurists hâve to be formalists and légal positiv- others.18 It gives an account of thé identification and misidentification of
ists. On thé contrary, they are obliged to hâve a contextual approach to thé relevant normative expectancies in légal processes and of thé consé-
thé légal norms they deal with in thé application and singularization quent commitment of individuals to action and law-oriented behaviour.
process. Before continuing, we should emphasize that thé doctrinal atti- From this point of view illégal behaviour is a légal phenomenon, and thé
tude toward law is not restricted to légal scholars in law faculties. gap between thé applied and thé formai law (law which is "corrupted"
Judges and légal practitioners base their arguments on légal dogmatics by real-world interests) disappears.19 There are countries where formai
as well.14 But this does not mean that thé dogmatic jurisprudence is in litigation is used to perpetuate and obscure rather than résolve disputes;
possession of thé sole right to expound thé correct légal meaning of jural-bureaucratic maneuvers is used to keep conflicts open but bureau-
norms, or that we should défend thé idea of a "unity of rationality" and cratically tied up until an extrajudicial, political, and politic solution
of a "unity of argumentation".15 Rather, we hâve to differentiate thé can be secured. Thus, illégal appropriation is a basic means of land
rationality of thé légal institutions from thé rationality of thé sciences.16 acquisition, and illegality is a common mode of social organisation. Illé-
According to Schelsky's concept of a légal institutional rationality,17 gal résidence becomes a common and reliable way for some catégories of
based on législation, légal administration and jurisdiction, thé corréla- people to win légal access to land and housing that would otherwise be
tion between légal science and juridical institutional practices cannot beyond their means. Usurpation initiâtes settlement and précipitâtes thé
bring about a rational unity of dogmatic jurisprudence and thé practical légitimation of thé land claims. Executive or législative institutions of
institutions of légal life. Légal science is an institution itself that inter- government usually will hâve to intervene to déclare thé judicial System
acts with ist various environments. Thus, thé falsification of thé correct checkmated, to legalize usurpation and thereby insinuate illégal and
légal meaning of a norm takes place not only in thé scientific community extralegal practices into thé law.20
of thé dogmatic jurisprudence, but also in thé juridical institutions.
According to Weber's classical example, so long as a thief conceals his
Furthermore, institutional practices produce their own criteria of "cor-
activity because he believes he is violating binding légal rules, his con-
rectness" which are confirmed or changed in thé light of subséquent
duct constitutes a légal phenomenon; efforts to break thé law and actions
décisions and practices. undertaken because of a misunderstanding as to what thé law requires
are legally relevant as well.21 But while thé sociologist of law does not
3. The Sociology of Law
treat thé value-commitments of law-oriented behaviour as normative cri-
teria in his own investigation, he must be able to understand thé norma-
According to Max Weber, one can investigate thé légal order from a
tive commitments of those whose behaviour he is studying. His attitude
sociological point of view without judging thé moral quality of thé law is characterized by a "combination of empathy and detachment". To be
or seeking to expound thé correct meaning of légal norms in a légal dog- able to know, what is accepted and valid as law, an outside observer
matic sensé. A sociological theory of law seeks to describe how thé behav-
must understand thé behaviour of thé members of thé community. This
iour of individuals is influenced by their own normative commitments to
18 Weber, 1988 a, p. 350: "Das 'empirische Sein' des Redits aïs Maxime-bildenden
13 Weber, 1976, p. 181: "(W)elcher normative Sinn einem aïs Rechtsnorm auftre- 'Wissens' konkreter Menschen nannten wir hier die empirische 'Rechtsordnung'."
tenden sprachlichen Gebilde logisch ricfttzgerweise zukommen sollte". 19 Weber, 1976, p. 17: "Zwischen Geltung und Nichtgeltung einer bestimmten
« Schelsky, 1959, p. 113, speaks of "verwissenschaftlichte Praxis". Ordnung besteht also fur die Soziologie nicht, wie fur die Jurisprudenz (nach deren
is According to Habermas, 1981, pp. 62 - 63 and 339 - 340: "juristische Argumen- unvermeidlichem Zweck) absolute Alternative. Sondern es bestehen fltissige Ueber-
tation (musse) in allen ihren institutionellen Auspragungen aïs Sonderfall des prak- gànge zwischen beiden Fâllen, und es kônnen () einander widersprechende Ordnun-
tischen Diskurses begriffen werden" (pp. 62 f.), and further: "die Einheit der Ratio- gen nebeneinander 'gelten', jede () in einem Umfang, aïs die Chance besteht, daB das
nalitàt (sei) in der Mannigfaltigkeit der eigensinnig rationalisierten Wertsphàren Handeln tatsachlich an ihr orientiert wird."
gesichert" (p. 339). 20 Holston, 1991, pp. 695, 697, 702, 722. There are similar expériences in Greece
16 This is clearly expressed in one of Cari Schmitt's first books, Schmitt, 1969, with an extrême form of "parallel economy" called "para-oikonomia". Papayanna-
p. 4: "Das in der Praxis aïs geltend anzunehmende Merkmal der Richtigkeit einer kis, 1989, p. 147: "En fait, elle (thé parallel economy) comprend des activités illé-
Entscheidung und das, was die juristische Verarbeitung des Rechtsstoftes aïs gales et poursuivies, d'autres qui ne le sont jamais, d'autres qui tout simplement ne
'geltendes Recht' herausarbeitet, stehen sich aïs zwei Geltungen gegenuber." See sont pas déclarées illégales, d'autres enfin qui sont poursuivies sans être punies et
further ibid., p. 98. enfin toutes celles qui, légales ou pas, sont légalisées a posteriori et souvent con-
" Schelsky, 1980, p. 53. On this point Krawietz, 1984 and Werner, 1995, pp. 129, sidérées légitimes! "
144. 21 Weber, 1976, p. 16.
392 Athanasios Gromitsaris [134] 1 1 :t!i| Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 393

understanding is always based, as Aulis Aarnio emphasizes, partially on 2. The Epistemological Status of thé Sociological Theory of Law
thé internai view, and this means that "one can never be a 'pure'
external observer".22 When empirical research focuses on thé applicability of socially recog-
nized sanctions in thé event of disappointment of normative expecta-
III. Légal Theory as a Multi-Level-Approach to Law tions, or when it turns out to be a sociology of thé légal professions and
of thé possibilities of access to law, instead of setting its sights on thé
Légal knowledge remains highly dépendent on theory. The problem is, expectation-governed character of human behaviour independently of
what kind of theory? We cannot make out a case for a général theory of state intervention and coercion, it limits itself to thé sectional study of
law that is other than supported and tested by confirmed observations. thé pathology of légal expectations, ignoring thé actual ongoing regulat-
General theory of law should be regarded as an intégration of légal ing and problem-solving activities. Systems theory seeks to résolve this
theory and sociology of law which can take into account thé way légal problem by obtaining an access to law as it présents itself. This is an
practitioners, légal scholars and social action in général describe and approach that takes profit of empirical research but can also go beyond
présent themselves.23 its restricted possibilities.25
Nevertheless, thé question - what's a légal System? - cannot be
1. The Standpoint of Légal Practitioners answered with a single concept: autopoiesis. The answer lies in a séries
of conceptual distinctions produced in thé processes of a second order
Légal practitioners usually say they know more than anybody else
feedback that characterize thé relations between général Systems theory
about thé reality of law, because they know more about their own jobs and middle range théories.28 On thé other hand, général Systems theory
than dogmaticians or scholars of sociology of law could ever describe.
may take advantage of thé plurality of middle range théories; it may use
Thus, thé best thing légal scholars and theorists should do is to help
their results in order to establish a plurality of conflicting generaliza-
them résolve thé practical problems of their professional routine or to
tions that may subsequently be capable of respecification by means of
get out of their way. Of course, thé people who are closest to thé work
middle range théories. This seems to be a reasonable "empirical" way of
really do know it better; but what they don't know is how to describe it.
finding out what thé boundaries and structural constraints of légal com-
Because this is another type of work. Practitioners operate with only a
munication are. The indeterminacy of thé theory with respect to explic-
partial model in mind about why they are doing whatever it is they are
able facts does not necessarily imply a useless redundancy within thé
doing, and what causes and principles lie behind it. When they describe
theory itself. It rather implies a kind of theoretic multiplicity. The multi-
their work they often leave out thé fact that their description tailors
plicity of théories explaining thé "same facts" does not reduce their
itself to fit their professional ideology and ambitions.24 Further, this
explanatory value. Différence between théories hinges on what they
best-practices-approach cannot address légal activities which thé practi- cannot describe rather than on what they consider to be their common
tioners ignore or are not ready to acknowledge. Therefore, a sociological object of observation.27
theory of légal practical institutions and law-oriented behaviour tries to
cast new light on uncontroversial facts by means of exposing established Systems theory présents itself in thé rôle of thé external observer, who
behavioural possibilities to a comparison with other functionally équiva- reveals and construes thé paradoxes that block and entangle thé self-
lent possibilities. Under such conditions descriptions of what practi- description of thé légal System. Systems theory is an observer, and it
tioners actually do can induce a positively evaluated innovation in thé doesn't claim for itself an exceptional position, with priviledged access
observed behavioural structure. Légal practitioners might then - theore- to law-oriented behaviour. It does not introduce a différence between
tically - make a décision with regard to thé question as to whether an 25
See on this point Intzessiloglou, 1993, p. 255 et sequ. who - unlike Luhmann -
external inducement of "new" problem solving stratégies is to be consid- regards thé "model-system of Law merely (as) a concept, an analytical instrument
ered as more of a nuisance than anything else, or as a positive new addi- that thé () theoretician of Law can use in order to ascertain thé absence or thé pré-
tion to and change of thé structure. sence and thé degree of constitution, intégration, compétition and complementarity
of légal Systems coexisting within thé same social environment".
26 Opp/Hummell, 1973, pp. 13 - 26.
22 Aarnio, 1992, pp. 10, 11. 27 Atlan, 1991, p. 140: Every theory "est capable de construire un monde qui est le
23
On thé concept of thé "multi-level approach" see Krawietz, 1993, pp. 102,104. même - celui des faits que nous observons - mais qui est différent en ce qui concerne
24 Schelsky, 1959, p. 137. ce que nous n'observons pas".
394 Athanasios Gromitsaris [136] li.r/l Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 395

analytical and real facts. It refers - throught its constructs - directly to will qualify as a real System. And those concrète System that do not fit thé
what is reality for it.28 Science meets itself rather than thé outside description just do not qualify. Despite this, Systems theory is corrigible,
world.29 The position of «an observer at ail initiated» - to use a phrase if not exactly refutable in thé light of empirical research.
of Henry James (The Awkward Age) - is abandoned in favour of thé The application of Systems theory to spécifie situations requires some
restricted point of view. Surely, Systems theory is not to be confirmed in spécifie, substantive knowledge of thé latter; only this can provide a suit-
thé classical way. We hâve been taught that a hypothesis is scientific to able interprétation and sélection of an équivalent form of thé theory in
thé extend to which it entails empirically testable conséquences. But question. The complexity of thé observed System cannot be reduced to a
whether it passes thé test of observation or of experiment in thé market homogeneous corpus of empirical data. Without concrète items of spé-
of scientific réfutations is essential in order to détermine not its scienti- cifie information one would be unable to pose thé problem, and hence to
fic character but its truth value. A hypothesis may be false yet scientific, solve it. The point is that concrète items of spécifie information are
or true yet unscientific; it may be logically impossible yet empirically unobtainable without thé help of observations supported by spécifie thé-
possible. Whether an observer makes a mistake or not has nothing to do ories. That means that every application of Systems theory calls for thé
with thé reality of his opérations; it simply présupposes thé existence of formation of new théories or thé use of already existing various spécifie
a second observer evaluating thé methods and skills of thé first. On thé théories, which contribute to thé formation of a spécifie model of thé
level of perception thé distinction between reality and illusion is not pos- System of interest. The model is of course to be built with thé concepts of
sible. Neither thé content nor thé validity sources of knowledge stem thé Systems theory, if it is to be coupled to thé latter.33 In other words,
from individual consciousness. Truth is based on external sélection30 and Systems theory becomes a spécifie theory of thé standard type when
is not relative: to put an end to a disagreement about thé meaning of a enriched with spécifie information concerning thé System to which it is
word, somebody has to look it up in a dictionary. Truth tolérâtes no rela- to be applied. And this spécifie theory is subject to thé canons of empiri-
tivity despite thé variety of opinions. The truth value of an assertion cal testability, that is to say, it is corrigible if we can find possible coun-
does not dépend on thé will or thé interest of any participant. Such a ter examples. Systems theory is confirmable in a sui generis way. It is
thing would mean that every observer's relative truth would be cancel- confirmed by fitting whole familles of théories and by helping in thé for-
ling out everybody else's. mation of spécifie middle range théories that are testable in thé classical
Furthermore, we hâve been conditioned to accept that a theory is scien- way. That means that several points of view could be combined with sev-
tific if it entails empirically testable conséquences. The main difficulty is eral perceptions of thé self-présentation of thé object. Consequently Sys-
determining what is to be meant by "testable". It has been equated with tems theory is scientific if it is compatible with thé bulk of scientific
confirmable, or having possible examples, and with refutable, or having knowledge and if - jointly with subsidiary hypothèses and observer-
possible counter examples. Systems theory is so général as to be unable to dependent empirical data - it entails middle range théories that in turn
yield any prédictions, not even when enriched with empirical data. There entail corrigible and testable conséquences.34 Middle range théories hâve
is a "sous-détermination de la théorie par les faits".31 Systems theory a scientific character because they can be falsified by other research.
décides about and conditions its own applicability. Consequently thé con- Systems theory is scientific if, enriched with suitable subsidiary assump-
cepts of degrees of confirmation and testability are pointless with regard tions "it becomes empirically testable either directly or vicariously, i.e.
to this theory.32 Any real System that happens to conform to thé theory through some (spécifie) theory".35 This resuit is of décisive importance
for thé formation of a général theory of law.
28 Luhmann, 1990, pp. 92, 698 et sequ.; on this point see Nassehi, 1992. At thé level of thé binary code: légal/illégal, no sélection, décision or
29 "Nous n'avons aucune communication à l'estre" Montaigne writes in his Apolo- définition are ever possible. Without spécial programs and criteria of
gie de Raimond Sebond, 1985, p. 586.
so Luhmann /De Giorgi, 1993, p. 123: "Si parla di verità solo quando la selezione sélection, such as norms, régulations, value-commitments, directives and
dell'informazione non viene imputata a nessuno dei partecipanti () ciô non tocca il contracts, thé rigid disjunction between légal and illégal behaviour
fatto che nei sistemi psichici le opinioni necessariamente si differenzino." Atlan,
1991, p. speaks of "dédoublement du jugement": "Le jugement de vérité implique
toujours une procédure de vérification () un jugement sur le caractère vrai ou faux 33 Bunge, ibid.; Marin, 1990: "La pensée complexe ne résoud pas d'elle même les
du jugement." problèmes, mais elle constitue une aide à la stratégie qui peut les résoudre."
si Atlan, 1991, p. 130 et sequ. 34 See Merton, 1957, pp. 5 - 10; Bunge, 1977, p. 35 et sequ.
32 On this point and on what follows Bunge, 1977, pp. 33, 35 et sequ. 35 Bunge, 1977, p. 35.
Athanasios Gromitsaris [138] IKlill Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 397

remains a blind distinction. It has thé meaning that in thé modem func- .1 scparate, spocijjli/.i'd enforcement staff has thé meaning that normative
tionally differentiated society science, religion, politics, morality or éco- standards for thé évaluation of conduct can be accompanied by rules
nomies cannot replace légal decision-making. But it says nothing about (Hart's secondary rules) regulating thé sanctioning process by which
thé institutionalization and boundary maintenance of thé processes that Infractions of first-order rules applying directly to conduct are identified
produce, change and reproduce normative expectational structures at thé .•mil punished. The existence of binding norms at thé sanctioning level
level of programs. The need for an intégration of middle range théories ilr.iinr.uishes thé law from other normative orders.39
into thé systems-theory-approach to law results from thé necessity to However, thé significance of second-order rules should not be over-
describe how law-oriented behaviour can be identified in concrète insti- omphasized. The 'foundations' of Weber's theory of law are not found in
tutional settings. As law is, primarily, not thé product of thé décisions of "Kconomy and Society" and therefore, not in his "Sociology of Law"
a state légal staff but is a System of human expérience, actions and oither. Rather, thé foundations are found in his critique of Stammaler's
norms, it is activities and opérations that actualize and modify institu- logal theory, published in 1907 and in his essay about thé catégories of
tionally established expectational structures that should be thé object of thé interprétative sociology, published in 1913. There Weber establishes
légal theory and sociology of law. Interprétation of behaviour by means his sociological theory of norms and an expectational approach to law
of thé code légal/illégal always takes place within a "frame" of institu- and social action in général.40 It is thé simultaneous diversification of
tionalized expectations. We hâve to turn to a sociological understanding différent mechanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionaliza-
of norms and activities not only at thé level of Systems theory but also at tion of behavioural expectations rather than thé potential for collective,
thé level of middle range théories. The latter can help détermine and organized reaction in thé form of sanction that is of primary importance
reconstruct thé meaning that actors (decision-making units, corporate for thé légal ordering of life. According to Weber's concept of "Einver-
groups or individuals) assign to their action and expérience.36 stândnis" (common understanding),41 social communication opérâtes on
This leads us to thé conclusion that thé access to légal order can only thé basis of expectational structures, not by any prior establishment of
be obtained by a multi-level-approach to law-oriented behaviour. In this rules, even if rules can be inferred from thé way people speak and act.
sensé Systems theory is only a part of thé général theory of law (légal This is a crucial aspect not only of markets and languages but also of
theory) which comprises ail thé théories that describe or explain thé law-oriented behaviour.
social realities and thé normative meaning of thé légal phenomena.
Accordingly, thé sociology of organizations, thé institutional theory of 1. Action-Norms and Reaction-Norms
law, thé cost-benefit analysis of law or risk analysis are part of a socio-
logical conception of law that is able to investigate thé relations between In defining law as he does, Weber views law-oriented behaviour as a
thé textual and contextual understanding of thé social dimension of law. social action, oriented not simply to thé anticipated conduct of others
but also to thé probability that violation of some particular norms will
VI. From 'Real Laws' to 'Real Rules' bring about a social situation in which crédit and discrédit or rights and
duties will hâve to be attributed ex post according to already established
Max Weber rejects thé view that defines légal norms as norms that are binding norms that tolerate no ambiguity. In other words, law oriented
sanctioned in a particular way.37 The sanctions that accompany légal
norms can be physical, psychological or économie in character. He also 38 For example, thé internai affairs of thé household or religious behaviour: Weber,
1976, pp. 212 - 233. Even thé main légal distinction between is and ought seems to
rejects thé view that defines law in terms of thé types of conduct it seeks be thé resuit of seemingly extra-légal divination practices: Weber, 1976, pp. 262, 317.
to regulate, because ail aspects of human behaviour can become object of 39 Weber, 1976, p. 18. On this point Kronman, 1983, pp. 30 - 31; see further thé
distinction between "gesellschaftsbezogenes" and "gesellschaftsgeregeltes Han-
légal régulation.38 He finally rejects a third way of defining law in terms deln" Weber, 1988b, pp. 445, 447.
of thé procédure by which légal norms are established. The existence of 40 On this point Krawietz, 1989. According to Krawietz, Weber's expectational
approach lies entirely within thé intellectual tradition of German theory and sociol-
36
"The meaning thé subjects assign to thé situation they are in and thé behavior ogy of law ranging over Ihering and Theodor Geiger to Helmut Schelsky and Luh-
they are carrying out plays a greater rôle in determining thé generalizability of an mann. On thé development and methodological shifts of German public law tradi-
experiment's outcome than does thé sample's démographie representativeness or thé tion which has had a significant influence - at least via Georg Jellinek - upon
setting's surface realism": Berkowitz /Donnerstein, 1982, p. 249. Weber's work, see Pauly, 1993.
« Weber, 1988b, p. 456.
37 Weber, 1976, p. 18.
[140] Ml Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 399
398
Athanasios Gromitsaris

behaviour forces a system of social action to achieve reflexion and expli- norms" (verbal norms, norms expressed in words) that sustain a
citly confirm or modify its expectational structure. According to a legal- "demand expectation", an "expectation of conduct" specified for a cer-
istic view, disputes require access to a forum external to thé original tain situation and, by way of support from thé respective system-bearing
social setting of thé dispute in order to become legally relevant, Accord- group, directed to thé "conduct" of thé respective norm addressees.44 By
ing to Weber's concept of law, as defined above, individual parties find a contrast, a rule is thé actual process of selecting norm-oriented behaviour
variety of solutions out of or away from thé governance structures of thé and of confirming or innovating thé normative expectational structure
state. Weber's view of law includes a 'légal order' that falls outside "thé used to sélect norm-oriented behaviour. Rules are thé continuous corréla-
province of thé state".42 We hâve to deny that law only exists when and tion between structure and process, they are not substantive structures
where légal coercion is guaranteed by thé political authority. Most dis- with a built-in determinacy. They are a good remedy for complexity,45 but
putes that under current state rules could be brought to a court are their reproduction is based on a built-in indeterminacy. No reproduction
resolved by avoidance and selfhelp away from thé auspices of thé légal of normative expectations is possible without an amount of intrinsic
centralism by devising private orderings. Nevertheless, thèse solutions uncertainty: information "cannot be obtained unless there exists uncer-
acquire a légal character when found at thé level of reflexive regulated tainty about thé outcome of an event prior to thé event"; that is to say that
processes determining ex post compliance, violation and violated rules. thé amount of information obtained from any event "is a function of what
This doesn't exclude an additional access to state decision-making could hâve happened but didn't"; it is determined "by thé amount by
bureaucracy which then attributes right and wrong anew, in accordance which thé uncertainty has been reduced".46 According to research into thé
with state law. Therefore, in accordance with Max Weber and Theodor precommitment and discrétion of monetary authorities (central banks),
Geiger, we think it appropriate to distinguish between action norms and credibility can be used as substitute of lacking information. But credibility
is itself a scarce resource. It is defined as thé speed with which an observer
reaction norms and between norm-sentences and rules.
(for instance, thé public) realises that a shift in préférences has occured.47
As Theodor Geiger puts it, "action norms" and "reaction norms" (or Credibility is an institutional product. It can replace information about
primary and secondary norms) may, but need not be, coupled with one valid rules only in a context where systematic behaviour of particular
another.43 A purely state concept of law is customarily understood to agents is possible. This is for example not thé case in an international con-
reflect thé view that only behavioural expectations expressed tay thé bu- text where governments change frequently and thé game-theoretic condi-
raucratic décision units or somehow derived therefrom are worthy of tions which govern their behaviour lack more than short-term stability.48
légal character. Légal norms are thus considered to be a médium of poli- Anyway, observer-dependent descriptive or prescriptive représentations of
tical action. But thé légal order is not inextricably interwoven with thé that which is to count as relevant rule, are to be regarded as semantic arte-
state. We can conceive of law as consisting primarily of clusters of nor- facts which contribute to thé use, confirmation, spécification or generali-
mative expectations, by means of which persons order their conduct and zation of normative expectations.49
only secondarily of norms for state décision making developed by thé
Black letter law represents an "unorganized textbook knowledge"50 in
courts and législation. The formai structures of thé state such as thé
a network that associâtes concepts to other concepts and prescriptions to
judiciary, thé législature, thé executive and thé administrative agency
other prescriptions. At thé level of valid norm-sentences thé function of
produce and enforce only a part of thé bulk of valid légal expectations.
légal dogmatics lies, on thé one hand, in operating as an "inheritance
They claim to hâve a jurisdiction extending to ail thé inhabitants of thé
mechanism" in thé network, so that more spécifie concepts or prescrip-
territory of a politically organized régional society.
44 Geiger, 1987, p. 23 et sequ., 34 et sequ.
2. Norm-Sentences and Expectations of Conduct 45 Von Hayek, 1969, p. 171: "Regeln beschrànken immer den Bereich der in
Betracht zu ziehenden Umstânde auf einen Teil der môglicherweise bedeutsamen,
um so eine Entscheidung praktisch môglich zu machen."
We follow Weber and Geiger in resisting thé tendency to identify 46 Garner, 1975, pp. 3, 7; see further Mathiesen, 1960 and Atlan, 1983.
norm-sentence and rule. Norm-sentences are "linguistically formulated 47 Blackburn, 1992, p. 171.
« Epstein I Gintis, 1992, p. 175.
42 Krawietz, 1994, p. 48. Evan, 1976, p. 171. Evan bases his distinction between 49 Weber, 1988, p. 355 speaks of thé "'Regel' - Charakter der 'empirischen
Rechtsordnung' ".
public and private légal Systems on Weber and Ehrlich. 50 Elio I Scharf, 1990, p. 591.
43 Geiger, 1987, p. 105.
Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 401
Athanasios Gromitsaris [142]
400
processes are legitimate, décisions good and organisations well managed.
tions can inherit features of more général concept classes. On thé other What information is satisfactory for décision making is negotiated
hand, doctrinal commentaries rest on an interpretational argument that umong participating organizations. The resuit is "a negotiated informa-
cannot be properly conceived of "in simply bivalent true-or-false ternis" i n n i order"55 that détermines what information will be used in décision
but has to enter "thé realms of thé better-or-worse, thé arguable, thé m . i k i n g and which organizations "pay" for collecting and using new
préférable, thé more or less persuasive".51 Thus, it has to view norm-sen- Information. The negotiated information order is an interorganizational
tences as being open ended. itructure that helps détermine when an administration unit will "opti-
Now, thé représentation of légal problems contained in textbook IMI/.C and when it will satisfice". Information needs to be socially suffi-
knowledge is not to be identified with problem représentation at thé ciciit and technically sufficient, but thé two are to some degree indepen-
level of thé playing rules. The efficient récognition and application of dent, so as socially sufficient information need not be technically suffi-
relevant knowledge about cognitive and normative expectations to thé rit-nt and vice versa. A negotiated information order is established when
problem at hand is always domain-specific. Appropriate domain spécifie a System of criteria for thé social sufficiency of information is worked
knowledge and problem-type schémas émerge with expérience in social out which in turn bring about an ordering of organizational specializa-
institutions which functionally organize and represent related domain- tion in thé application of décision criteria. This theory would apply on
specific expectations, inferences, and methods for solving problems. The thé environmental impact statements of environmental administrative
shift in problem prototypes and stratégies is a by-product of thé per- agencies. When agencies - and environmental groups - hâve thé formai
ceived différence between previous and new expériences. Therefore, as right to review thé environmental impact statements of other agencies, a
one solves a problem, thé problem's représentation becomes "enhanced"5 renégociation of thé information order can occur.56
with social domain spécifie inference rules, facts, and solution méthodol-
ogies. Social institutions modify thé textbook problem description by 3. Law-Oriented Behaviour
variablizing or constraining thé values on descriptors or by introducing
new descriptors into thé sphère of activity. "Enhanced problem représen- By comparing thé rules of a game to légal rules, using thé paradigm of
tation" means that a problem's descriptors are determined by thé prob- thé game scat, Weber shows that thé rules of a game, like thé rules of thé
lem-solving process in thé respective social institutions and not by thé law, form a System of orientational points of view, imposing constraints
problem statement's original textbook form. on thé players' sphère of activity.57 Playing rules permit one to make
better guesses about thé moves of thé other players than one could make
According to this view, administration, and bureaucratie organizations without thé rules, for playing rules are supposed to be considered bind-
in général, seem to deal with information in a différent way from that ing by other players too. The décisive function of playing rules lies in thé
anticipated from a simple reading of thé theory of décision making. Most fact that they restrict thé field of possibilities at hand, and thus, they
organizational décision processes are found to be "solution centered".53 clarify relevant expectations, so that every player can orient his own
Much of thé textbook-knowledge and thé information gathered and com- action to thé normative commitments of thé other players.
municated by individuals and organizations before thé décision hâve
little décision relevance. Much of thé information that is used to justify a As Weber emphasizes, this 'sociological' attitude toward légal rules is
décision is collected and interpreted after thé décision has been made. not restricted to social scientists, but is an attitude that is equally
There seems to be rather a prior calculation of needed information than adopted by social actors as well as those performing certain rôles within
a kind of thermostatic linkage between observations and actions. The thé légal order, such as a practicing attorney who, preparing a case for a
information phenomena noted in organizations provide reasons for trial or advising a client, must act like a "scat player" in a stratégie
decoupling information from décisions.54 The idea of intelligent choice environment, and try to predict how thé behaviour of judges, administra-
and thé systematic application of information to décision seem to be tive agencies and clients will be influenced by his own interprétation of
values belonging to thé core of western ideology. They symbolize that thé légal norms and normative commitments to thé law.58 To a certain
55 On this concept and on what follows, see Heimer, 1985, pp. 395, 397.
51 MacCormick, 1994, p. 139. 56 Heimer, 1985, p. 414.
52 Elio / Scharf, 1990, p. 588 et sequ. 57 Weber, 1988a, p. 338.
53 Nutt, 1984, p. 447. 58 Weber, 1988a, p. 338 et sequ.; Kronman, 1983, p. 13.
54 Feldman / March, 1981, pp. 171 - 186.
402 Athanasios Gromitsaris [144| ll-ll.l Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 403

extent, social actors and légal practitioners must be a kind of sociologist 'Sociological' understanding of légal norms is equally indispensable in
of law, because they are in need of information about norms and institu- Miicinl areas beyond thé professional activities of légal practitioners. In
tional facts in oder to use them as a means to a practical-professional f n r t , social actors are met with thé difficulty to identify and harmonize
end - promoting a client's interests or predicting particular outcomes. rimlïicting normative expectations as they go about their business. As
Thus, sociological understanding of law-oriented behaviour is to be con- nppmpriate expectations are embedded in institutional settings that eut
sidered a décisive prerequisite for being a successful légal practitioner. llmuigh thé usual distinctions between state and society, formai and
Successful lawyers are distinguished by their légal skills not only in informai behaviour, or markets and hiérarchies, thé problem is to find
responding to problems and causes of action once begun but also by «ml. how access to thé appropriate institutional setting and problem défi-
their ability to anticipate that problems might arise. "Préventive lawyer- n i lion becomes possible. From a normativist point of view, thé difficulty
ing" seeks to ensure that client behaviour takes a course with least lies with thé récognition of thé appropriate rules. But this is actually an
potential légal hazard.59 Further, it is taken to include attempts to influ- aspect of thé wider problem of meaning. Meaning arises for Weber in
ence law création or reform. Lawyer's capacity to influence practical multiple settings and can be looked at differently depending on its rela-
business behaviour consists in scanning thé environment in order to I ionship to various observers. We can distinguish64 at least: a) thé actor's
identify emerging légal issues on thé one hand and in staying in touch mlonted meaning b) meaning to thé other participants c) meaning on
with developments in thé business (which has to run as a business and is .•ivorage d) meaning in terms of a dogmatic System e) meaning in ideal-
not there for lawyers) on thé other. The successful integrated lawyer (in- l.ypical terms f) meaning as discovered by social scientists or historians
house business lawyer) hat to be a translater that can move out of his H) meaning to self and h) institutional meaning. In addition, there are thé
own language System and put things in a way managers can understand. possibilités of corrélation, feed-back and second-order observation or
Given thé fact that problems are observer-dependent, problem représen- double hermeneutic.65 Thus, thé self-description of law-oriented behav-
tations hâve to be translated,60 and as we ail know, every translation is lour is described by thé sociologist or evaluated by thé légal scholar, but
bound to betray thé original: traduttore, traditore! Learning to be an i h c i r concepts are in turn reinterpreted or incorporated into features of
effective translater61 contains a number of skills basic to professional law-oriented behaviour.
practice: a common language between business management and légal However, it is not clear how a person becomes aware of rules. We
management has to be developed which makes it possible for thé lawyer rarely hear a subject announce a rule in recognizable form while acting.
to shift between self-referencing and other-referencing; légal judgement The fact that persons seldom mention a rule in abstract form seems to be
has to take into considération commercial judgement, and vice versa. consistent with thé hypothesis that ail knowledge is encoded in highly
This close relationship to thé business world led légal practitioners62 to instantiated, episodic form, called cases. Rule violation is easier to be
abandon thé conceptualist utopia (not thé conceptual constructions) of detected. But how does an actor become aware of a rule? Would she or
thé Pandectists and dévote their attention to developing légal instru- ne pause for a while then mumble "l'd better not do that again", or
ments that could advance thé purposes of corporate economy and help would she carry on without interrupting her activity?66 In most cases, at
law expand into new areas of social life.63 thé level of action norms thé process will go on without visible pauses.
Contrarily, thé firings of secondary rules always manifest themselves as
59 Mackie, 1989, p. 74 et sequ. interruptions of normal processing in thé actions System. This is due to
eo Deleuze / Guattari, 1991, p. 32 are aware of this problem, and they even see it as thé fact that action has, now, to take place at a new level, that of reflex-
thé main problem of philosophera: "on se fait parfois de la philosophie l'idée d'une ive processes.
perpétuelle discussion comme 'rationalité communicationelle" ou comme 'conver-
sation démocratique universelle'. Rien n'est moins exact () Les interlocuteurs ne Still, while we explain much of people's behaviour in terms of rule-
parlent jamais de la même chose."
61 Mackie, 1989, p. 94 et sequ., 102 et sequ.
making, rule-breaking or rule-following, we cannot explain ail of it in
62 Osiel, 1990, p. 2058: "It is thé skill in practical reason and complex judgement this way. Compliance does not always occur because of extrême risk
that thé practicing bar and bench most esteem in their peers." aversion, that is to say, because individuals overweight low probability
63 According to Dezalay, 1992, p. 118 et sequ., 131 et sequ., thé foreign offices of
thé "Big Eight" accounting firms and Wall Street law firms hâve seized virtually thé 64
entire european market for advice concerning thé law of corporate and public See on this systematization Albrow, 1990, p. 211.
finance partly because european lawyers are not trained and experienced as "légal 65 Ibid.,p. 279etsequ.
entrepreneurs". 66 See VanLehn, 1991, p. 3.
27 RECHTSTHEOHIE, 3 - 4/98
404 Athanasios Gromitsaris 1146] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 405

events - for instance thé low probability of audit, combined with high iiiis|i(ikcii customs and values and more on laws and formai statements
penalty on detected tax évasion. Compliance also occurs when there is < > f cl lues. Obligations to friends, family, and countrymen are not of thé
no chance of détection or thé expected value of thé rule-breaking (say, une nature as obligations to Etrangers in thé sphère of non-intimate
thé tax évasion gamble) is négative. Furthermore, compliance does not n u l distant social relations.71 The internationalization of thé economy
necessarily occur from a belief by individuals that rule-breaking (éva- i un:, |>;ii allol with thé process of producing normative commitments that
sion) is wrong, "since their behaviour is unchanged by either (morally) i i i r v.-ilid everywhere. Nevertheless, familial and national amoralism as
loaded or neutral instructions".67 Therefore, compliance can be \ v r l l as corruption in thé political, judiciary, and civil service continue to
explained neither by thé probability of sanctions nor by thé distinction c - i r a i ! - barriers to entry into local business. The growing sensé of légal
between légal and illégal or right and wrong. Besides, we should not . u n i inoral responsibility to Etrangers doesn't replace thé informai net-
loose sight of how much external perceptions really matter. If thé wni'ks based on local personal connections or money relationships. Inde-
amount of ambiguity is too high, outsiders (external perceptions) may liriulcncies and interdependencies go hand in hand. On thé one hand, as
demand a formalization of what people already do into norm-sentences institutions like church, family, éducation, and thé state are less effective
setting out thé way in which people behave. The System has thus to al shaping shared values and norms in citizens, global organizations and
demonstrate to thé outside world that there really are rules, and put in international business hâve to create formalized norms to guide employ-
place some visible policing mechanisms.68 t'cs, shareholders and other stakeholders, while at thé same time tolerat-
The available évidence indicates that an individual's normative beliefs iiii; a variety of local and individual values.
are not consistent with his behaviour and that norms can change rapidly On thé other hand, participating in thé international System leads to
and without intensive resocialization. Rules do not merely refer to "shared .iilupUng outward oriented policies, and accepting thé respective interna-
beliefs about ranking norms, membership norms, and reality assump- i n mal norms and assumptions about states and their management as well
tions".69 They also affect behaviour by specifying thé actions and attri- OH ubout contractual and other légal commitments.72 For instance, it has
butes that will validate particular identities. The behaviour of individ- bccn proved that state interests in Africa are not determined solely by a
uals tends to be consistent with thé norms of older colleagues, insofar patrimonial or patronage-oriented political logic. The world community of
as their professional identity is controlled by thèse colleagues. Ail this states and thé international System of political, économie and légal com-
suggests that lacking direct information about thé subjects' norm- munication develop not only broadly accepted patterns of action and
oriented behaviour and rule acquisition practices, one must use thé sub- norms but they also institutionalize new rôles for traditional and new
jects' overt behaviour and - especially - thé respective situation context actors.73 As a resuit, changes and international predictability are induced
to inf er normative-commitments or changes in attitude and problem-solv- in local settings. Thus, investment codes hâve been rewritten in many
ing rules. Thus, we can conclude: We can learn a lot about appropriate countries so as to favour thé foreign investment.74 Further, inclusion in thé
'situation-expectations fits' by studying misfits,70 but we may not identify international System can be used as a resource of legitimacy for an estab-
norm- and law-oriented behaviour with thé probability of sanctions. lished local authority. Lacking an anti-colonial struggle to refer to, a gov-
ernment can tie thé legitimacy of its authority to thé inclusion of thé state
4. Globalization and Formalization of Law-Oriented Behaviour in thé international System, "to a new économie deal for thé people".75 The
highly developed set of international institutions for finance renders busi-
Law-oriented behaviour takes place in a world, in which local and ness indépendant of thé patrimonial features of states and local patron-
global modes of coordination and guidance are intertwinned. Global client networks.
economy requires formalized communication networks. Large companies
are likely to hâve workers, supplier s, shareholders and customers from n On this point and on what follows, see Ciulla, 1991, pp. 75,77, 83.
différent value Systems. Normative commitments dépend less on shared, 72 Fischer, 1990, p. 58; Huntington, 1996, p. 524 et sequ. overlooks this argu-
ment laying .stress upon «shared values».
73 For example thé institutionalization of thé kin State's rôle in protecting eth-
67 Alm, étal., 1992, p. 36. nie minorities, Varsanyi, 1989, p. 133. On thé rôle of other participants in thé
68 This point has been very important for thé formalization of thé rules of thé City international légal order (besides thé states) see Attar, 1994, p. 56 et sequ. who
Code on Takeovers and Mergers, see Hobson, 1990, pp. 168, 252. speaks of "les intervenants" or "sujets dérivés", parcellaires, fragmentaires.
es On this point and what follows, see Cancian, 1976, pp. 355, 362 - 363. 74 Ngwasiri, 1989, p. 200.
'0 See Hochschild, 1980, p. 568. 75 Fearon, 1988, pp. 136, 137.
Athanasios Gromitsaris [148] I I i ''I Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 407
406

5. International Communication and National Laws kets. Conversely, thé securities industry, facing increasing compétition
for business from electronic, régional and international exchange,
Law-oriented behaviour of global players (mostly large organizations) i M i r i ' . l r i l to attract listings from foreign companies whereas thé regula-
is characterized by thé simultaneous orientation toward différent I I I I N bodies for securities markets had to reach compromises on disclo-
national and international légal Systems. Organizations hâve an informa- rules with thé foreign companies. Regulators had to relax their
tional or a resource perspective on their societal environment and other IQI "imting requirements in order not to de ter foreigners from thé local
organizations in it.76 According to thé first perspective, environment l ' M - k exchange, while foreign listing companies had to provide an infor-
is conceived as information-uncertainty, and power dépends on control mation bridge for local investors.79 Globally minded international com-
over uncertainty. From thé resource perspective thé environment is a punies who obtained a full listing for their shares on several stock
source of scarce resources, which are sought after by a population of c«xchanges around thé world had access to various capital pools, but they
organizations that competes for as well as shares them. Accounting stand- hud to deal with thé diversity of international accounting and auditing
ards and financial régulation are thé main tools used by thé national laws practice and thé indeterminacy of "true and fair view".80 They had to
to regulate thé way organizations manage both their information uncer- exercise in restating their accounts according to différent standards.81 It
tainty and resource dependence. Dependence and uncertainty may vary lurncd out that thé main influence on disclosure was based on thé pat-
independently of each other but it is their joint effect that explains thé Ici-ii of ownership, thé scope of companies' opérations and thé distinction
interrelation of money, uncertainty and authority in interorganizational Ix'tween market oriented and bank oriented financial Systems.82
networks. An appropriate explanation of such joint effects is conditional Companies of thé bank oriented type83 (Germany, Japan) tend to under-
upon thé description of thé existent institutipnal environments77 of global roport earnings and book values because of accelerated dépréciation poli-
organizations. We hâve to emphasize that institutions are not to be identi- cics and unrestricted provisions ("hidden reserves"). Bank oriented finan-
fied with organizations. Institutionalization processes eut through thé n.il Systems hâve normaly a less developed market for risk capital, so that
boundaries of organizations and function Systems. Therefore, to give an savings are primarily transformed in thé form of crédits through banks.
example, thé "Geldmarktabhangigkeit des deutschen Kapitalmarktes"78 is Shareholdings are less dispersed and commercial banks ("Hausbank"-
to count as an institution although it cannot be adequately described in rnncept) hâve very often large shareholdings in individual firms.84 Thus,
ternis of interorganizational networks. rnntrolling blocs of shares are relatively seldom transacted and hostile
In what follows, we give an example of how a Systems theory approach l.ikrover bids ar not common. In Germany private companies (GmbH) are
can incorporate an institutional approach to law. The institutional con- mon; important relative to public ones. For a second or third génération
straints of international law-oriented behaviour cannot be distilled from (iwner of a Mittelstand company, loyalty to his company, to thé community
thé plurality of national blackletter laws. Whith thé help of Systems in which it is based and to thé workforce is likely to be more important
theory we focus our attention on law-oriented behaviour as a type of lhan thé shorttermism of a purchaser of thé market oriented type. Com-
social communication that occurs under thé auspices of thé distinction mrivial banks use financial distress or insolvency to reorganize problem
légal/illégal. National laws are programs that détermine thé use of this l i i i n s . 8 5 They act as reorganization specialists, whereas - in market
distinction by constraining thé values on its two descriptors. By means ni icnted Systems - this rôle is normally played by an external group of
of thé institution theory we concentrate on rulegoverned behaviour as it Hhareholders. Access to international capital markets and exposure to thé
présents itself in relation to a spécifie issue, combining thus, a textual disclosure and control demands of foreign institutional investors could
and contextual norm-theoretic approach. iiow bring this ownership structure under a higher amount of stock
As thé flow of information around thé world has increased greatly,
7" See Moran, 1991.
investors hâve begun looking abroad for better returns on their portfo- "<> From a german point of view, see Grofifeld, 1986, p. 196 et sequ.
lios, and companies hâve seeked access to thé international capital mar- »i See Kirchner, 1978.
»2 CIFAR 1993.
76
For a discussion of thé distinction and an extended bibliography, see: ":l On thé distinction between bank-oriented and market-oriented financial sys-
l.cins, see Berglôf, 1990 and further Roe, 1991.
Aldrich / Mindlin, 1978. 11/1
Adams, 1994; Bundesverband deutscher Banken, 1994.
77 Tolbert, 1985, pp. 2, 3. 85 Zimmerer, 1993; Hess/Fechner, 1991.
78 Fuchs, 1989.
408 Athanasios Gromitsaris [150] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 409

market pressure and cause some changes in thé cross-holdings, voting r m i t i .11-1 nal l'reedom produces both inclusion and exclusion: on thé one
strength of préférence chares and takeover prévention devices of thé com- i i n u l , rvery légal person can enter a contract, but on thé other hand,
panies of thé bank oriented type. ' "iitracts create law only for thé parties. Further, thé effect of contrac-
As thé two main types of financial Systems are fundamentally différ- I M i l aurccments on thé rights of third parties is a spécial problem, which
ent, global players find themselves in différent stratégie environments86 K i lu I » ' solved from an external point of view in thé various institu-
To identify thé officiai and 'invisible' barriers for foreign actors as well i ii mal settings in which contracts are embedded. The behaviour of non-
as thé institutionalized forms of légal, political and économie con- |. H i ii i|i;mts, although of gréât importance to thé parties, cannot be
straints, they hâve to develop their own 'sociology of law', which in turn iilmlnistered by thé contractual order. The rest of society becomes rele-
has to be taken into account by thé scientific analysis of their law- vfiut. «nly in ternis of a réservoir of extra-contractual prerequisites of thé
r n n l i .H I
oriented behaviour.
2. Organizations
V. Social Intégration Through Law-Oriented Behaviour?
A r i - o n l i i i g to Weber, thé development and continuai spread of thé
1. Contracts
dern form of thé organization of corporate groups in ail fields of
..M i . i l ad.ivity is besides purposive contracts thé most crucial phenom-
Max Weber has associated thé growing importance of contracts in
riioii of modem society. On thé one hand bureaucratie organization is
modem society as a source of légal rights and obligations with thé
cnmpli'tely indispensable for thé needs of mass administration today. On
expansion of thé market as a form of économie organization and thé rôle
I h c ot.her hand there are clusters of normative expectations which hâve
played by money. The contractual character of modem society allows a
I h c i r l'ocus on formai or informai organizations relatively independent of
decentralization of thé law-making process. Modem contracts are purpo-
i l i c 1 bureaucratie exercise of state control on thé basis of technical
sive contracts. Unlike status contracts, which effect a total change in thé
Knowledge. The validity of thèse normative expectations and thé possibil-
personalities of thé individuals involved and create an ail-inclusive fra-
it.ii-s l'or their enforcement extend only to thé members of thé organisa-
ternal relationship, purposive contracts are delimited in thé sensé that
I ion or organizations-set. This means that thé inner-directedness of organ-
they neither affect thé status of thé parties nor give rise to new qualifies
i/.;it,ions doesn't affect thé behaviour of non-members which is subject to
and obligations of comradeship and brotherliness but aim solely at some
ni lier mechanisms of guidance and control, such as market coordination,
spécifie performance, commodity or resuit.87 Modem individuals find
l>i)lit.ical power, public opinion, formai légal authority, or generalized
themselves - as légal persons - at thé centre of a web of contractual asso-
média of social communication. The question of what constitutes a part
ciations; their identity is irreducible to thé séries of relationships created
ni an organization or a member of interorganizational relationships is, if
by thé contracts themselves, because they can always enter an additional
poscd in isolation, a spurious one.91 A formalistic définition that
contract without acquiring a new or losing their identity. Contract law
u n - I n d e s or excludes ex ante clients, suppliers, independent organiza-
has its foundation in thé ancient dualism of légal relations within thé
i i i m s , departments or merely temporary commitees is due to thé concep-
kinship group and between différent kindship groups. It begins where
t i o n of organization as an organism and implies a reification of interor-
thé self-sufficient houshold community ends and régulâtes thé imper- i'..nii/.,-iUonal sets.
sonal relationships of formai économie exchange with outsiders within
thé market community.88 The contract itself, as an institution, has thé 'Tins becomes obvious in thé cases of failure in network organizations
ability to transform social relationships, thé two crucial effects being (a) Ih.-il. seek to use an 'internai market' as an alternative to hierarchy as a
thé convergence of 'kinsmen' and 'strangers' that générâtes migrant modo of internai coordination within thé firm. Hère organizational units
labour groups and extra-familial labour89 and (b) thé independence of buy and sell goods and services among themselves at priées established
(international) business of (local) personal relationships.90 Nevertheless, and verified in thé open market. The most common mistep in such inter-

8» On thé corrélation between migrant labour, money contract and freedom, see
se Diïser, 1990, p. 117 et sequ., 122 et sequ. Weber, 1988e, pp. 489, 506.
87 Weber, 1976, p. 401; Kronman, 1983, p. 100 et sequ. 90 Roitman, 1990, p. 686.
88 Weber, 1976, p. 402. 91 Negandhi, 1975. p. 251 et sequ.
410 Athanasios Gromitsaris [152] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 411

nal networks turned out to be corporate intervention in resource flows or M i o i l c ' i n society as well. Modem law has created anew a gréât mass of
in thé détermination of transaction priées. Corporate décision making i i r i l p ii I icularisms but, as Weber points out, it has done so upon a dif-
inclines to rather dictate priées and processes than simply manage inter- i. 1 1 n i liasis, which refers to économie or technical qualities.96
nai economy. This means that bureaucracy turns thé essential relation- Wlini cconomic contacts between strangers became necessary an inde-
ships among autonomous network's components into relationships i" i n l c n l body of norms had to be developped. Thèse norms were con-
among included organisation-members: they can no longer be external - - i l lïom thé beginning as norms of thé market or as norms of a wider
and thus highly visible to ail parties - and they can no longer reflect I H I | I | M - . I | community, distinct from thé légal orders of thé various groups
voluntary and explicit commitments. Hierarchical politics, power and in \ \ l n r l i différent individuals belonged. They regulated thé relationships
influence rather than performance are guiding members behaviour.92 At "i i i . n i ^ c r s in law.97 The modem, western concept of thé state (and
thé level of network intégration thé concept of membership refers to n . i l mil state) is based on thé émergence of thé political community as
firms and to thé network's ability to efficiently allocate member firms, w r l l ;is !ho notions of citizenship and legal-rational authority; it suggests
uncoupling and recoupling them with minimum cost and minimum loss n i un i l y of political and légal sovereignty.98 An individual's membership
of operating time as well as of visibility and explicitness in thé essential in i l i r pohUcal community - his citizenship - came to be conceived in thé
normative relationships among components. Therefore, we hâve to con- iinr .-ik'ilr.-ict terms as thé légal personality of thé parties to a modem,
clude that thé concept of membership in organizations does not stand for kct-oriented contract.
a général principle of social intégration; rather, it is a symbol of inter-
dependence and independence, of inclusion and exclusion at thé same Thr significance of thé fact that membership in thé political commu-
time.93 But a général principle of social intégration should perhaps be n i i v r i n i l d be treated as a légal construction for which personal charac-
sought at a completely différent level, that of thé inclusion of individuals i. 1 1 h.'s were ultimately irrelevant, becomes clearer if we take into con-
in thé légal order as a totality representing thé whole of society. ii li i i l ion thé ability of thé colonial state to create new catégories of
Ubjei is. In thé libéral tradition in thé West, thé theorisation of rights is
• il i u n i l'rom an inévitable opposition between thé state and thé individ-
3. Citizenship
H i l This aspect has tended to be reproduced in thé colonial setting: ail
r p identities and idéologies were regarded as nothing but a "carry-
The distinction between inclusion and exlusion in thé légal System
i i v r i of 'tradition'".99 The colonial practice in relation to group iden-
illuminâtes a problem that premodern societies solved by creating and
n i i r s tended to exhibit a sharp duality. On thé one hand, déniai of thé
separating various "spécial law communities".94 In those social segments
l i r.iiiinacy of any identity apart from that statutorily defined by thé
(religious, ethnie groups or politically autonomous clans and cities)
i î l e ; on thé other, a statutory récognition of "frozen identities" as thé
which were politically integrated by a common suprême authority, like
i . ri.s of community (résidence), or work (job réservation and rémunéra-
thé Roman empire or thé islamic states, thé body of laws to be applied
t i o n ) , or provision of services (schools, hospitals), or political processes
by thé judicial officers differed in accordance with thé characteristics of
i i ! • . lions, constituencies). This duality reflects thé tension between thé
thé component groups. Thus, an individual had thé right to be treated as
br.inry of state formation (thé political history of countries) and that of
thé member of a spécial law community and to demand that thé norms
"' i . i l transformation (thé social history of peoples). A comparison of thé
of that légal order be applied to his dealings with other members and
I.M i l K H I of thé sub-categories of colonial subjects with that of metropoli-
sometimes even with outsiders. An individual's cognizable légal identity
i n i i i l i/.ens100 shows that new distinctions were used to treat ail colonial
and total légal status were determined by his membership in thé law
i i l > | i r t s (natives and non-natives) "as a resource to be managed by thé
community to which he belonged. This meant that relations with stran-
i oloniul state for thé saké of 'économie development'". Finally, thé end
gers were beyond thé law.95 According to Weber, despite thé émergence
of thé political community, spécial law is a widespread phenomenon in 11(1
Wtber, 1976, pp. 410, 503 - 504; Kronman, 1983, pp. 109 - 112.
»'' Weber, 1976, p. 503.
11
92 See Miles/Snow, 1992, pp. 55, 65 et sequ. : .!•!• on this point Pauly. 1995; on Weber's concept of thé state and thé correla-
93 See Luhmann/De Giorgi, 1993, p. 327 et sequ. l i m i between bureaucracy, democracy and nationality see Anter, 1995, p. 83 et
94 "Sonderrechte": Weber, 1976, p. 410; Kronman, 1983, p. 108. Ncqu., 131 et sequ.
95 "Der Einzelne tràgt (seine) Rechtskonfession mit sich herum": Weber, 1976, H" On this point and on what follows, see Mamdani, 1990, pp. 372 - 373.
p. 418. i»« On this point, see Sack, 1993, p. 429.
Athanasios Gromitsaris [154] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 413
412

of colonialism didn't mean thé end of thé state in thé colonies. It is with n.M H n i , - i l speech communities with symbolic resources for voicing critical
thé 'independence' that entire communities became 'non-citizens' in for- ini'Ti'sts in hard times of social and économie exclusion.
eign territories, and thé significance of cross-border migrant labour - in I n ;i functionally differentiated society, thé nation as 'community' may,
Africa, a traditional institution feeding thé labour needs of commodity l i n l need not play thé rôle of a symbolic substitute for thé non existent
agriculture - became enormous.101 Moreover, a host of secessionist move- Norlrl.iil représentation and intégration.110 The view of thé nation as
ments brought about thé invevitable balkanisation. n illonal community, endowed with thé attributes of independence, con-
In thé West, thé notion of citizenship disjoins thé concept of member- I l i i n a n e e for thé future and sovereignty, may, but need not be thé focus of
ship in a political community from thé identity of thé person. Ideally, i" ople's sensé of belonging and identification as well as a major compo-
while nationality, religion and state are delinked, political unity fuses i i r n i of their personal identities. However, even under thé régime of func-
with légal unity.102 On thé other hand, participation in thé welfare h o n . i l diffcrentiation and globalization, thé symbolic resources of thé
state doesn't encompass political participation.103 The voting rights of mil ion as community to which "we" belong, "our" forfathers belonged
immigrants is thé most famous example. As immigrants hâve mostly no iind "our" descendants will belong, are significant.111 The national com-
access to thé central104 aspects of thé realm and order of symbols, of n i i i i i i l y supplies thé function Systems of society with semantic artefacts
values and beliefs which govern thé host country, they implicitly culti- I H h ;is national éducation, national law, national literature, national
vate thé myth of repatriation and social intégration "at home". They paiiics or national church. Nations still put limits to thé multinatio-
tacitly establish an instrumental, monofunctional106 relation to thé host n . i l i / a l ion of shareholdings in thé parent companies of global enterprise
country. On thé one side - according to Weber's concept of closure10' r i o u p s . On thé other hand, although thé global company is exposed to
System boundaries are maintained against outsiders and procédures are n i . i i i v nirisdictions, and even though its management and workforce are
developed to maintain distinctions of honour and prestige within thé i n i i l i in.ilional, it usually has a home government and a home tax author-
System. On thé other side, immigrants show thé tendency to be a '"non- >\\ i h . M matters to it more than others.112
political' speech community".107 Being parasitical as well as oppositional Hi Miles, in certain religious environments, for example Eastern Ortho-
in nature, their vocabulary of politics stands both against and in need of i l i n i v , nationality fuses with religion and thus,'diverges markedly from
thé dominant political vocabulary and culture. Thus, it confirms a domi- U n 1 Western secular notion of thé nationstate. In this case, those of
nant/subordinate cultural relationship and is not likely to work for thé .nu il lier religion, even if citizens of thé nation-state, are not viewed as
cause of thé "Verfassungspatriotismus".108 Rather, it restricts thé discur- I I . I M H J ; a national identity. This is due to thé "millet System"1 3 of thé
sive reproduction of thé immigrants' political culture in its ability to i il l o i n,-in empire which replaced Byzantium and enhanced thé Orthodox
promote interests and needs effectively. The immigrants' political dis- l ' I n i r e l i ' s power as ruler over thé Orthodox community within thé con-
course shares thèse characteristics with other "nonpolitical" speech com- MiniInl.N of Ottoman rule by delegating to it administrative and civil
munities such as workers.109 But nationality supplies 'nonpolitical', M i i l i o r i l . y , and merging religious and political functions. As a resuit, thé
.1 nietion of thé national identity incorporated religion as a crucial
101 Mamdani, 1990, P. 367. iponent of thé personal identity. Under thé rule of thé newly con-
102 See thé example of thé citizenship of thé "Volksdeutschen" Seeler, 1960. I M M led nation-state, this led (and leads) to restrictions on thé exercise
i°3 Alpa, 1992, p. 32: "la cittadinanza si trasforma in 'appartenenza' a una cate- ..I i e h | > i o i i s freedom which violate thé European Convention on Human
goria sociale () un significato più pregnante di quelle ancora corrente che désigna
il vincolo tra un soggetto e uno stato". Idr.lii. 1 . and thé underlying values of thé European Community.114 As a
104
On thé distinction between center and periphery see Eisenstadt, 1968,
pp. XXX, XXXIII.
105 On this point, see Weber, 1972, p. 27: "Denn daB die blofie Tatsache des Hei- H" l'uni n, 1995, p. 54 et sequ.
matwechsels bei der Arbeit zu den mâchtigsten Mitteln ihrer Intensivierung n i / / i / , 1992, p. 124.
gehôrt, steht durchaus fest." According to Weber, a "polish girl" or a "migratory H ' !.. pp. 114, 117.
italian laborer" get transformed as if by miracle into virtuous workers when II
' Tins means that thé question of ethnie minorities could only be addressed
placed in an industrial setting in a capitalist country. h mu ,-i western point of view and in western catégories. To this problem: Afshar,
106 Weber, 1976, p. 23. r i ' M . | > . 132.
I I I
107 Huspek/Kendall, 1991, p. 15. l'ollis, 1993, pp. 347, 349-350; see further Makrides, 1994, p. 76. Charges
i°8 On this concept, see Habermas, 1992, p. 642. hnvc been brought against Greece before thé European Commission and thé
K u i n p e a n Court of Human Rights; see EuGRZ 1993, p. 228.
109 Ibid., p. 14.
Athanasios Gromitsaris [156] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 11!)
414

resuit, we conclude that citizenship implies a partial inclusion. It does i - l l ;is l'or allons, has an at least symbolic integrative effect.120 Ac-
not run parallel with participation in thé welfare state, in thé national inclusion occurs at thé level of "intermediate" institutions: Local
community or in thé central aspects of thé symbolic and institutional ii.ni|',«' and trading Systems, community planning and socially respon-
order. i M c mvrstment, community associations, neighbourhood partnerships,
m n i i i | > l n y m < > n t action centres, resource and support centres, religious
4. Individual Rights mmnities and urban or community studies and technical aid centres,
H" \ . i l l play a very important rôle in determining thé conditions of
In a functionally differentiated society religions righteousness, finan- I Iniion,121
cial distress and légal assertions are subject to différent mechanisms of i l " - légal construction of thé political membership and thé inclusion in
sélection. For instance, economists see law as a "giant pricing U n |")lit,ical System do not détermine thé multi-inclusion of thé person in
machine".115 Their problem is that before policies - introduced by rule- l i n "Hier sub-systems. The multi-inclusion is guaranteed by means of
making - become economically effective, they "suffer thé ravages" of thé I h r mdividual rights provisions of thé modem constitutions, but thé con-
political and légal Systems.116 On thé other hand, jurists base their work i i i n l m n a l protection of rights doesn't explicitly address thé question of
and their reality assumptions on thé distinction between norms and h" lias thé ability and compétence to define thé content of thé individ-
facts, taking, thus, thé risk of intervening in an institutionally irrelevant H i l i i/'.hts. 122 Distinctions such as libertarianism and légal paternalism
reality. "i i r|'.iilat,ory state and social selfregulation are partly due to thé contin-
The constitutional protection of civil and political rights on thé one n..M l'ffort to answer this question. Libertarians place gréât emphasis
side, of social, économie and cultural ones, on thé other side, symbolizes ni vnluntariness: a person gives shape to her or his rights by means of
thé multi-inclusion of persons in thé functionally differentiated society. M i i i i i ; voluntarily. The state has no right to legislate what people should
From a normative point of view, under thé influence of thé doctrine of ' I " i long as their actions harm no one else. On thé contrary, according
indivisibility of human rights, thé idea of a global approach - which no i" l'r.'il p.it.ernalism, thé state law and légal institutions may thwart a
longer distinguishes between thé two catégories of rights - is gaining i 's own goals if it is for thé person's own good. But there's thé rub,
some ground.117 Nevertheless, although thé multi-inclusion of persons in I l l i r i larians reply: thé state goals for a person do not coincide with his
sub-systems is legally protected, it can only partly be prescribed and ils l'or himself.123 The solution seems to lie with a compromise, an
enforced, let alone coordinated. Légal décisions and enforcement i | i | > i ï > . - i r h that privilèges neither thé action and self-détermination of thé
processes can neither replace thé opérations of thé other societal sub- m i l i v i i l t i a l nor thé demands of thé institutional totality.124
systems nor totally neutralize thé informai rules of inclusion adminis-
tered within patron-client networks.118 Therein lies thé difficulty of thé 5. Constitutions and Issue Avoidance
so-called state intervention. Every effort in designing général rules of
inclusion seems to be met with thé fact that "every good regulator of a No matter how thé content of human rights is defined, thé rights pro-
System must be a model of that System".119 The protection of inclusion i i i i i - d by a constitution are not subject to political revision. For thosé
cannot replace inclusion because direct control of sub-systems by law is wli" believe that there is a conflict between constitutionalism and
not attainable. The légal enforcement of inclusion would hâve to ade- i l ' in'icracy, thé tension stems from thé fact that constitutions remove cer-
quately represent thé internai complexity of thé controlled sub-system.
This either leads to over-simplification by de-differentiation or to ungo- 1
" Viola, 1992, p. 68: "Per vivere insieme qualche cosa deve essere commune,
vernability because of hypercomplexity. Nevertheless, thé mère existence ftiNN'mirhe solo le regole formali"; Zincone, 1992, p. 243: "Per integrazione inten-
i l i . i i n i ) la capacità di fare accetare ai vecchi e ai nuovi membri di una comniunità
of formai rules of inclusion which are valid for everybody, for nationals i l i - ' nmmuni di convivenza civile."
i:n Sec IFP "Lokale Ôkonomie", 1994.
1
H5 Veljanovski, 1990, p. 15. ' ' I.iensee, 1980; Badura, 1989, p. 43.
1
ne Ibid., p. 85. ••' < Hospers, 1980, p. 265.
H' Trindade, 1990. 12* On thé définition of matrimony, see Friauf, 1986, p. 2600: "Art. 6 I GG aïs
118
On thé conflict between 'statalismo" and "Catena clientelare", sçe Zincone, Frciheitsrecht und personal geprâgte Institutsgarantie"; further Louven, 1993,
1992, p. 156 et sequ. p. 13: "Die Beurteilung der Gleichgeschlechtlichkeit mag sich verândern. Das
us Canant/Ashby, 1970. Kochtsinstitut Ehe darf darunter nicht leiden."
Athanasios Gromitsaris [158] Law-oriented Behaviour and thé Structure of Légal Norms 417
416
ic(|uiic I l i c status of a right is relatively small, thé removal of issues
tain topics from collective délibération and public review: Paradoxically,
h c i n i i h c public sphère remains limited. AU this suggests that "issue-
it is thé removal of subjects from thé public sphère that is regarded as a
i lance" and "stratégie self-censorship" cannot bring about social
means of ensuring thé proper functioning of thé démocratie process and
m i e l ' i . i h n n ; they will sometimes promote thé proper functioning of thé
social intégration. The removal is also supposed to divert resources from
i ci i l •! i i - :.|)here, but sometimes they will not.
unresolvable problems to soluble ones.125 The distinction between thé
universal suppression of a thème and thé mère transferral of that thème
to a différent institutional context makes clear that everything dépends VI. Conclusions
on thé agenda to which forbidden décisions are transferred. To exclude a
topic (for instance, voting rights of immigrants)126 from thé national lég- i c i ; . i l norms are symbolized by norm-sentences which should not be
islative agenda may be to place it on thé local agenda and to subject it to i c i . ni il'u-d with thé norms as such. They are thé product of processes
thé control of local majorities. On thé other hand, a décision may be « l i n h Imt.h regulate behaviour and confirm or modify thé normative
withdrawn from thé jurisdiction of ail branches and levels of govern- i . i i n l . i n l usrd to regulate behaviour. In this sensé légal norms are 'rules'
ment and consigned to private individuals.127 The classical example is i n . I ( I r p r i i t l on thé formation of social expectations of a normative char-
thé exclusion of religion from politics: religious disputation might factio- ic in in private and public institutions. The concept of rule is a token of
nalize thé System and pose a threat to inclusive political citizenship. U n i-nrrrl.-il.ion between normative expectational structures and thé on
"Neutral territory" or "institutional neutrality"128 hâve played an essen- l ' . m i i ' M-IccUon of anticipated or unanticipated events. Déviation and
tial rôle in unifying multidenominational societies, whereas religious | i h . n i c c make sensé only in thé light of existing normative expecta-
indoctrinators remained free to practice their arts outside school walls -. w l i i i - h , in turn, are modified or confirmed by déviation and compli-
and public institutions.129 By imposing "gag rules" on themselves, both i .t % nal décisions seem to be premissed on normative information
thé political and thé légal System avoid issues that might threaten inté- n, i i i u n ml l»t> distilled from textbooks or précédents. On thé contrary, it
gration and democracy. But privatization of issues like abortion, redistri- I n - lirought into connection with them, ex post. Therefore, instead of
bution of property, thé rôle of women in society or thé rights of racial . H . I I I I I I : l'or "real laws" (A. M. Honoré) we should search for "real
and ethnie minorities and homosexuals through constitutional law Mil.

immunizes them from public scrutiny.130 In addition, if resolution


through political and légal processes is unavailable, people may lose W i n l i - I I if command or imperative theory of légal norms départs from
faith in thé system and resort to extralegal means. The distinction i l H i n . i h i n of a state monopoly in thé powers of law making, thé recogni-
between issues that produce conflict and issues that do not, is thus i n u i ihi-ory sees thé légal character of thé norm depending not on thé
inadéquate to décide which issues to remove from law-making and i » > i l n i i l y of state intervention, but on a discource deciding about thé
normal politics. This brings up thé main difficulty - thé problem of iden- I . H i whH.her thé norm is reasonably acceptable or worthy of recogni-
tification of thé issues that should be justifiably privatized on thé i n in Arrurding to Max Weber it is thé simultaneous diversification of
grounds of thé fear of factionalization and draining of public resources i h l l i M ni mrchanisms for thé formation, innovation and institutionaliza-
to insoluble problems.131 A sélection criterion is viewed in thé question I I . . M "I c-xpt'ctations rather than coercion as such that is of primary
whether thé issue sought to be privatized by constitutional law can be i n i p i i i i.nicc for thé légal ordering of action. Law-oriented behaviour
considered a right. Rights provisions are designed to fence off certain i ' i INCS u vast range of actions. A social action is law-oriented if (a) a
areas from majoritarian control. But as thé category of interests that can n i . i h v r standard for thé évaluation of conduct and (b) thé possibility
. i l i r l l r r i i i i ) ' , on compliance and déviation are among thé background
125 Holmes, 1988, pp. 24, 26. . . M n M u n i s of thé action itself.
126 From thé point of view of german constitutional law thé définition of l i n - , implies a shift from a legalistic perspective to a more sociologi-
"Staatsvolk" coïncides with thé one of "Gemeindevolk", therefore an issue
removal is not possible.
c n l l y Ncnsitive one which is bare of prefabricated reality assumptions
127 Holmes, 1988, p. 41. il i Hit 1 rôle of thé state, modernization and functional differentiation.
128 Schlaich, 1972, p. 129. Tlion'fore, describing law-oriented behaviour as it understands and pre-
129 Ibid., p. 44. . n i i l self, is an enterprise that présupposes thé successful intégration
iso Sunstein, 1988, p. 340. ni l'T,al theory and sociology of law. It has to entail middle range thé-
13l Ibid., pp. 340 - 342.
Ml
|llll| l i i i w n r l r n l e i l I t e l i a v i o n r and Ihe Sli urlure of Legul Nomis 41!)
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