Antichresis RAMIREZ v. CA G.R. No. L-38185. September 24, 1986 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.

: Procedural History: For resolution is an appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed in toto the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal rendered in the petition for review of the decree of registration issued in Land Registration Case No. N-2597, L.R.C. Record No. N-17939. Statement of Facts: On September 15, 1959, petitioners-spouses Hilario Ramirez and Valentina Bonifacio filed an application for registration of a parcel of riceland in Pamplona, Las Pinas, Rizal. After notice and publication, nobody appeared to oppose the application. An order of general default was issued and the court allowed the petitioners to present evidence in support of their claim. Thereafter, the petitioners presented parole evidence that they acquired the land in question by purchase from Gregoria Pascual during the early part of the American regime but the corresponding contract of sale was lost and no copy or record of the same was available. On January 30, 1960, the court ordered the issuance of the decree of registration and consequently, Original Certificate of Title No. 2273 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal was issued in the petitioners names. On March 30, 1960, private respondents filed a petition to review the decree of registration on the ground of fraud. The respondents alleged among others that they obtained a loan of P400.00 from the petitioners in which they secured with a mortgage on the land in question by way of antichresis and that there were several attempts to redeem the land but were refused by the petitioners. The trial court ordered the cancellation of the original certificate of title. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision. Issue: Can an antichretic creditor acquire land of debtor by prescription? Answer: No, an antichretic creditor cannot acquire the land of a debtor by prescription. Reasoning: An antichretic creditor is not a possessor in the concept of owner but a mere holder placed in possession of the land by its owners. Thus, possession of an antichretic creditor cannot serve as a title for acquiring dominion. The court, from other cases like Trillana v. Manansala, Valencia v. Acala and Barretto v. Barretto, held that the antichretic creditor cannot ordinarily acquire by prescription the land surrendered to him by the debtor. Holding:

The decision appealed from is affirmed with a modification that the respondents are ordered to pay the petitioners the amount of P400.00 as principal for the contract of antichresis, the fruits obtained from the possession of the land having been applied to the interests on the loan. Real Mortgage DURAN v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. L-64159. September 10, 1985 Relova, J.: Procedural History: For resolution is a petition for review on the decision by the respondent court modifying the decision of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal declaring private respondents spouses Tiangco as lawful owners of the land in question. Statement of Facts: Petitioner Duran owned two parcels of land. She left the Philippines in June 1954 and returned in May 1966. On May 13, 1963, a Deed of Sale of the two lots mentioned was made in favor of Durans mother, Fe Duran who, on December 3, 1965, mortgaged the same property to private respondent Erlinda B. Marcelo-Tiangco. When Duran came to know about the mortgage made by her mother, she wrote the Register of Deeds informing the latter that she had not given her mother any authority to sell or mortgage any of her properties in the Philippines. Meanwhile, foreclosure proceedings were initiated by Marcelo-Tiangco upon the failure of Durans mother to redeem the mortgaged properties. Duran claims that the Deed of Sale is a forgery, saying that at the time of its execution in 1963, she was in the United States. In effect, the petitioner further assails the validity of the subsequent mortgage. Respondent Court ruled that there is a presumption of regularity in the case of a public document. Issue: Whether the Deed of Mortgage is valid with respect to the mortgagees. Answer: Yes. The Deed of Mortgage is valid with respect to the mortgagees. Reasoning: While it is true that under Article 2085 of the Civil Code, it is essential that the mortgagor be the absolute owner of the property mortgaged, and while as between the daughter and her mother, it was the daughter who still owns the lots, STILL insofar as innocent third persons are concerned, the owner was already the mother inasmuch as she had already become the registered owner. The mortgagee has the right to rely on what appears in the certificate of title and, in the absence of anything to excite suspicion, he is under no obligation to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the mortgagor appearing on the face of the said certificate. Every person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the correctness of the certificate of title issued therefore and the law will in no way oblige him to go behind the certificate to determine the condition of the property. If the rule were otherwise, the efficacy and conclusiveness of the Torrens Certificate of Titles would be futile and nugatory. Thus the rule is simple: the fraudulent and forged document of sale may become the root of a valid title if the

certificate has already been transferred from the name of the true owner to the name indicated by the forger. Holding: Petition is dismissed for lack of merit and the decision of respondent appellate court promulgated on August 12, 1981 is affirmed in toto.

Deposit YHT REALTY v. CA G.R. No. 126780. February 17, 2005 TINGA, J: Procedural History: Before this Court is a petition for review of the decision the Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the RTC, finding YHT Realty Corporation, Brunhilda Mata-Tan, Erlinda Lainez and Anicia Payam jointly and solidarily liable for damages in an action filed by Maurice McLoughlin for the loss of his American and Australian dollars deposited in the safety deposit box of Tropicana Copacabana Apartment Hotel, owned and operated by YHT Realty Corporation. Statement of Facts: Private respondent McLoughlin, an Australian businessman-philanthropist, used stay at Sheraton Hotel during his trips in the Philippines but was convinced by Tan to transfer to Tropicana Hotel. On 30 October 1987, McLoughlin arrived from Australia and registered with Tropicana. He rented a safety deposit box, which could only be opened through the use of two keys, one of which is given to the registered guest, and the other remaining in the possession of the management of the hotel. When he went abroad, a few dollars were missing and the jewelry he bought was likewise missing. Eventually, he confronted Lainez and Paiyam who admitted that Tan opened the safety deposit box with the key assigned to him. McLoughlin went up to his room where Tan was staying and confronted her. Tan admitted that she had stolen McLouglins key and was able to open the safety deposit box with the assistance of Lopez, Paiyam and Lainez. Lopez also told McLoughlin that Tan stole the key assigned to McLouglin while the latter was asleep. McLoughlin insisted that it must be the hotel who must assume responsibility for the loss he suffered. Lopez refused to accept responsibility relying on the conditions for renting the safety deposit box entitled Undertaking For the Use of Safety Deposit Box. Issue: Whether Tropicana Hotel may evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests, by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss. Answer: No, Tropicana Hotel cannot evade liability for the loss of items left with it for safekeeping by its guests by having these guests execute written waivers holding the establishment or its employees free from blame for such loss. Reasoning: Paragraphs (2) and (4) of the undertaking manifestly contravene Article 2003, CC for they allow Tropicana to be released from liability arising from any loss in the contents and/or use of the safety deposit box for any cause whatsoever. Evidently, the undertaking was intended to bar any claim against Tropicana for any loss of the contents of the safety deposit box whether or not negligence was incurred by Tropicana or its employees. Article 2003 was incorporated in the New

Civil Code as an expression of public policy precisely to apply to situations such as that presented in this case. Catering to the public, hotelkeepers are bound to provide not only lodging for hotel guests and security to their persons and belongings. The twin duty constitutes the essence of the business. The law in turn does not allow such duty to the public to be negated or diluted by any contrary stipulation in so-called undertakings that ordinarily appear in prepared forms imposed by hotelkeepers on guests for their signature. Holding: Petition is dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed.

Guaranty
DE GUZMAN, v. SANTOS G.R. No. L-45571. June 30, 1939 IMPERIAL, J.: Procedural History: For resolution is an appeal taken by the defendant from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, which sentenced him to pay the plaintiff the sum of P3,665.55, plus legal interest thereon from February 10, 1932, until fully paid, and the costs. Statement of Facts: Jerry O. Toole, Antonio Abad and Anastacio Santos formed a general mercantile partnership, Philippine American Construction Company, with a capital of P14k, P10k of which was taken by way of loan from Paulino Candelaria. The partnership and the co-partners undertook and bound themselves to pay jointly and severally the indebtedness. Upon default, Paulino filed civil case against Philippine American Construction Company and co-partners for the recovery of loan. The trial court ordered all defendants to pay jointly and severally; this decision was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Upon filing of complaint, Paulino obtained a writ of attachment against the defendants. The Sheriff attached properties of three partners. Partnership offered to post a bond of P10k. Philippine American Construction Company as principal then represented by the partner Antonio Abad, Santiago Lucero and Meliton Carlos as guarantors executed a bond of P10k in favor of Paulino for the lifting of the attachment. After issuance of writ of execution, Sheriff found no property of the judgment debtors. Paulino moved for the issuance of writ of execution against the guarantors of defendants. Guarantor-plaintiff and co-guarantor Meliton Carlos later paid the creditor and was able to recover from Antonio Abad a sum of P3800, which they divided equally. It appeared that the payment made by the plaintiff to Paulino was reduced to the sum of P3665. Plaintiff now demands from Anastacio Santos the return of the aforesaid sum but Anastacio refused. Issue: Whether or not defendant is bound to pay plaintiff what he had advanced to Paulino? Answer: Yes, the defendant is bound to pay the plaintiff for the amount that he had advanced to Paulino. Reasoning: Article 2066 provides that any guarantor who pays for the debtor shall be indemnified by the latter even should the guaranty have been undertaken without the knowledge of the debtor. In this case, The guarantor was the deceased Santiago

Lucero, now represented by the plaintiff in her capacity as judicial administratrix, and the debtor is the defendant-appellant. Applying the provision cited, it is obvious that the defendant is legally bound to pay what the plaintiff had advanced to the creditor upon the judgment, notwithstanding the fact that the bond had been given without his knowledge. The obligation of the appellant to pay the plaintiff what the latter had advanced is further sanctioned by the general provisions of the Civil Code regarding obligations. Article 1158 provides that "payment may be made by any person, whether he has an interest in the performance of the obligation or not, and whether the payment is known and approved by the debtor or whether he is unaware of it. Any person who makes a payment for the account of another may recover from the debtor the amount of the payment, unless it was made against the express will of the latter. In the latter case he can only recover from the debtor in so far as the payment has been beneficial to the latter." According to this legal provision, it is evident that the plaintiff-appellant is bound to pay to the plaintiff what the latter had advanced to the creditor upon the judgment, and this is the more so because it appears that although Lucero executed the bond without his knowledge, nevertheless he did not object thereto or repudiate the same at any time. Holding: The appealed judgment is affirmed, with costs of this instance to the defendant appellant.

Chattel Mortgage FILIPINAS INVESTMENT & FINANCE CORPORATION v. VITUG, JR and SUPREME SALES & DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION G.R. No. L-25951. June 30, 1969 BARREDO, J.: Procedural History: For resolution is an appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil Case No. 60915, of the amended complaint of July 16, 1965 of plaintiff-appellant Filipinas Investment & Finance Corporation whereby it sought to recover from defendant-appellee Supreme Sales & Development Corporation the deficiency that resulted after it had foreclosed the chattel mortgage on and sold at public auction, the car of the other defendant, Julian Vitug, Jr. who had failed to pay to appellee installments due on the promissory note representing the purchase price of said car which he had bought from the same, appellant being the assignee of appellee of its rights in the said promissory note. Statement of Facts: Julian Vitug executed a promissory note to Supreme Sales in the amount of Php 14,605 payable in monthly installments for purchasing a car and was secured by a chattel mortgage. On the same day, Supreme Sales negotiated the promissory note to plaintiff, Filipinas Investment assigning all the rights, title and interest including the right of recourse against Supreme Sales should Julian Vitug fail to pay. Defendant defaulted in payment. Plaintiff secured possession of the mortgaged vehicle by means of a writ of replevin duly obtained from the court, but defendant Vitug voluntarily surrendered the car to appellant. Thereafter, said car was sold in public auction but the proceeds left a deficiency of Php 8,349. According to the plaintiff, Supreme Sales is still liable to Filipinas Investment by virtue of their negotiated promissory note with a right of recourse. The lower court decided the case in favor of Supreme Sales.

Issue: Whether or not Filipinas Investment can recover the deficiency of Php 8,349 against Supreme Sales by virtue of their agreement with recourse? Answer: Yes, Filipinas Investment can recover the balance from Supreme Sales. Reasoning: The assignment made by the appellee (Supreme Sales) to appellant (Filipinas Investment) of the promissory note and mortgage of defendant Vitug was on a with-recourse basis. In other words, there was a definite and clear agreement between appellant and appellee that should appellant fail to secure full recovery from defendant Vitug, the right was reserved to appellant to seek recourse for the deficiency against appellee. It is the contention of appellee that since what were assigned to appellant were only whatever rights it had against the buyer, it should follow that inasmuch as appellee has no right to recover from the defendant beyond the proceeds of the foreclosure sale, the appellant, as assignee, should also have no right to recover any deficiency. The Court does not view the matter that way. The very fact that the assignee was given the stipulated right of recourse against the assignor negates the idea that the parties contemplated to limit the recovery of the assignee to only the proceeds of the mortgage sale. Holding: The order of dismissal of the lower court is reversed and the case is ordered remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.