“What does (or should) Italian Public Opinion Know?

”
by Riccardo Cappelli1

It would take many hours to comprehensively cover the subject I am about to talk on, but,
making a supreme effort to synthesise it, it could be summarised as follows: “What does
Italian public opinion know?” Not very much; “What should it know?” A lot.

The Military’s Position on Chemical-Biological War

First of all, NBC defence is still a problem for military planners. For example, according to a
Pentagon study, the complete NBC uniform would greatly reduce the soldier’s fighting
capacity, as he would be subject to heat stroke and dehydration, incapable of understanding
verbal and radio communication well, prevented from using night vision systems and able to
carry out assigned tasks only when tripling the normal time for execution (Stone 1999).
Furthermore, for example, most marines equipped with individual NBC protection when
carrying out a simulated naval disembarkation in a contaminated environment, were hit by
“seasickness” well before being in sight of the beach (Utgoff 1990). In general, the United
States’ NBC defence exercises demonstrated that the use of mass-destruction weapons by the
enemy provokes losses (physical and psychological), slows movement and greatly lowers
military capacities (operations co-ordination, precision and intensity of fire, etc. v. Orton e
Neumann 1993). Other military exercises in the NBC field have shown that 10-20% of
participants become anxious, claustrophobic or panic and some try to flee, taking off their
protective clothing (Singh 1992). All this obviously leads to a greater logistic effort to
maintain operations given that the fighting units need on average more men, more resources
and more time to finish the assigned tasks (Mojecki 1992). Finally, also the health services
are greatly stretched by an NBC emergency both due to the high forecasted number of
victims and the complexity of therapeutic treatment, which has to be as quick as possible.
During the Cold War, NATO feared a Soviet blitzkrieg accompanied by the launch
of chemical substances on a tactical level, given that the Red Army had impressive quantities
of toxic arms of all types at their disposal as well as a chemical service made up of about
95,000 specialists (Hemsley 1987). However, it is interesting to observe that in a recently
declassified CIA document dedicated to analysing hypothetical developments in the armed

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Paper presented to the conference “Perspectives towards the Chemical Weapons Convention’s
Fourth Year”, Firenze, Italy, December 4, 2000.
forces and the doctrine of the countries belonging to the Warsaw Pact in the nineties, there is
no hint of the chemical and biological enemy threat (CIA 1989).
In the preparations for the 1991 Gulf War, analysis of the chemical attacks that took
place during the Iran-Iraq war and the Iraqi arsenal of prohibited arms meant the allied
coalition probably have to operate in a contaminated environment. However, despite years of
asserted preparations to confront a Soviet chemical and biological offensive in grand style,
the American and British forces arrived badly equipped and even worse trained in the NBC
defence sector in the Persian Gulf. In fact, for example, the 24th USA infantry division’s Fox
vehicles for detecting NBC gave false alarms a good eight times (DoD 1997). The latter had
negative repercussions both on the troops’ morale and bodies, as they were forced to work in
the NBC uniform in the desert heat, as well as being able to set off dangerous military
escalations (Wallerstein 1998). Furthermore, the situation behind the front was disastrous,
with reserves and civilians barely trained in confronting the chemical and biological threat,
divided into more than one hundred dispersed bases with communication difficulties, where
notable quantities of materials and equipment were amassed outside, exposed to biological
and chemical enemy threat. Moreover, there also lacked a sufficient number of detection and
decontamination systems, etc (Mauroni 1998). Despite the deficiencies come across in the
Gulf War, the United States’ armed forces still today encounter numerous problems in the
field of NBC defence. For example, there lacks a sufficient amount of protective clothing,
there are inadequate detection systems, little attention on the part of commanders to the NBC
threat, the medical personnel is badly trained in confronting NBC emergencies, etc. (GAO
1996 e 1998). Recent exercises held in the United States’ national centre for training
confirmed the lack of attention on the part of the commanders in NBC training. Above all,
not “refreshing” the USA military’s preparation at regular intervals in the field of operations
in a contaminated environment makes all past didactic efforts in vain (Reeves 2000).
The British also encountered notable problems in assuring the perfect functioning of
their instruments for detecting NBC, they resulted often too complex to action, with out-of-
date equipment capable of producing a great number of false alarms, calibrated only to
reveal a limited number of chemical agents, etc. Furthermore, the NBC uniform adapted for
European operations was extremely heavy and uncomfortable in a desert environment. It was
forecast that in the case of a temperature greater than 30°, personnel with the NBC uniform
undertaking heavy work would have to work for a period of 5-10 minutes with 15-30 minute

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rests and, in these conditions, every soldier would need at least 15 litres of water a day: a real
challenge for the logistic apparatus.
The Royal Navy even boarded yellow canaries on two ships, memories of the experiences of
the First World War (moreover, an official analysis on NBC preparation in the Gulf drawn
up by the British forces, the canary experiment is taken so seriously as to criticise it, as in the
case of a natural death there could be episodes of panic…v. MoD 1999).

The Risk Represented by Chemical-Biological Armament

The risks posed to European security connected to the proliferation of mass-destruction
weapons are essentially: terrorist acts, incidents with NBC agents diffusing in the
atmosphere, instability on a regional or even world-wide level (with growing violations of
the international regulative structure) and, finally, attacks with toxic substances against
European military contingents in service abroad and/or against the European territory
(Cornish, van Ham e Krause 1996). The western military in “out-of-area” service should be
tranquillised by the fact that historically the chemical weapon has never been used against
adversaries who could express nuclear and/or chemical mass retaliation. Regarding this,
since the Gulf War a debate has arisen centred on how to respond to an attack with chemical
and biological weapons. In this specific case, most claim that Saddam Hussein did not use
toxic weapons mainly for fear of nuclear retaliation, others are of the opinion that Bush
would never have authorised an atomic retaliation (Utgoff 1997). According to a more
articulated but arguable interpretation the Iraqi leadership abstained from using NBC
weapons because of: 1) allied bombing (which would have heavily damaged the logistics,
NBC deposit and production centres, command, control and communication equipment; 2)
adverse meteorological conditions; 3) fear of losing international support; 4) inability to
assemble a chemical head on the Scud missiles; 5) the dispersion of enemy troops; 6) the
allied forces’ preparation to act in a contaminated environment and their readiness to “go
nuclear” (Dumoulin 1995, 45-46). But all these listed points are arguable: the allied
bombings never completely interrupted the C3 process (so much so that Saddam Hussein
was able to send orders for the whole duration of the conflict and also afterwards) and the
notable damages to the NBC logistics and plants did not have direct consequences on the
Iraqi troops as they were equipped with further well-supplied deposits, including chemical
weapons (GAO 1997; Eddington 1999). The meteorological conditions were not on the
whole favourable, but it should be considered that when force was used in the air and ground

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attacks, the allied forces remained within the Iraqi range of attack for more than six months.
The fear of losing international support does not hold when analysing the facts, given that
the coalition against Saddam Hussein was composed of more than 30 countries (some Arab)
with the external support of many more (what presumed international support did the
Baghdad dictator have to defend?). Also the technical difficulties connected to realising a
chemical head for the Scud missiles had already been overcome by Iraqi scientists, as proved
by United Nations Special Commission (SIPRI 1998). Finally, the allied troops were
dispersed, but there were however precious objectives, such as logistic centres, air bases, etc.
within the range of the Iraqi’s launch systems, and furthermore on the moment of attack the
main units were well grouped together. Just as it is improbable that the Iraqi information
organisms, in all probability present in the border areas and amongst the Arab armies, were
unaware of the real state of the allied divisions’ NBC preparations. To conclude, Saddam
Hussein, rather than because of the remote possibility of nuclear bombardments, probably
abstained from using toxic devices because he was dissuaded by the credible American
threat to remove him from power.
To resolve the problem of toxic weapons once and for all in the Middle Eastern area
we would need to begin a generalised disarmament. The main problem to overcome is
represented by Israel’s possessing nuclear weapons. In fact, the Arab countries in possession
of chemical and biological weapons affirm that these serve as a deterrent against Israel’s
atomic (but also chemical and biological) potential. On the other hand, in analysing the
probability of the Arabs using chemical and biological weapons against Israel, we must not
forget that the Palestinian population is dispersed amongst the Israelis and therefore would
suffer great losses. Further disincentives to the Arabs resorting to toxic weapons are the
certainty of an NBC retaliation (not a small threat) and the presence of advanced Israeli anti-
missile defence systems. An agreement among the Middle Eastern states for a demilitarised
area free of all mass-destruction weapons could lead to the disappearance of NBC arms from
the area but, given the perennial climate of tension and suspicion, it is unlikely that this will
materialise. In this context, chemical and biological weapons can also serve as “pawns” to
exchange during eventual diplomatic negotiations.
In general, the possession of chemical and biological weapons is seen by
Mediterranean and Balkan nationalist leaders as one more instrument of defence – and its
importance is born witness to by the level of secrecy which surrounds the subject and the
protection reserved to production and deposit sites. In my opinion, it is therefore an extreme

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resource that is more political than military, more defensive than offensive, a sort of
“kryptonite” which is able to increase possible challengers’ level of uncertainty or to launch
political warnings. For example, if the allied coalition had tightened the circle around
Baghdad, the possibility of the use of chemical and biological weapons by Saddam Hussein
would have been high and it is plausible that this scenario also made the United States’
political and military planners reflect for a long time. On the other hand, however, the
possession on the part of one state of chemical weapons and vehicles able to take them to
far-off objectives obviously increases their strategic influence and the ability to blackmail
the other actors in the area. This leads the latter, for example, the eastern states of the Persian
Gulf to ask protection (and maybe also expensive anti-missile systems) from the only power
able to supply them: the United States of America.

What is Italy Doing in the Field of NBC Defence?

Italian public opinion, which has always been distracted on defence problems, should know
that the Italian military sector of NBC defence is in a period of transition towards a new and
more efficient model, forecast to be in full operation by 2001. Thus they are trying to
improve the situation in a sector, NBC defence, which has been traditionally relegated to a
secondary role and subject to little attention during the Cold War. The head NBC official of
the Artillery Department, Carmine Lanzara, publicly complained about this in 1986, saying
that, “the lack of personnel and training problems on one hand, and the incomplete
assignment of material on the other, mean that the NBC defence structure is in many cases
imperfect and unsatisfying” (Valpolini 1986, 37).
In the area of re-evaluating the NBC component’s operations, the 7th “Cremona”
regiment is being formed, born from the transformation of the 7th heavy artillery regiment.
On the organic plan the 650-strong “Cremona” will be divided into a regiment command, a
command and service company and an NBC defence battalion. The latter is formed of one
command and four specialised NBC companies. The provision of modern portable
equipment for detecting chemicals is forecast, as well as new impermeable and permeable
protective clothing, NBC masks, personnel decontamination field stations, automatic
detection and alarm equipment for biological threats, field cassettes for taking biological
samples, products for decontamination, vehicles for detecting NBC elements, etc. (Stanglini
1999; PIDNBC 1999; Morgante e Corrao 2000).

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 The current worldwide geo-political situation poses challenges and risks to the
European political and military apparatus in general and the Italian one in particular.
Looking to the future, as Europe will increase its collective commitment in the defence
sector, equipping itself with integral armed forces beyond NATO co-operation, increasing
commitment can be hypothesised in assuring security for the countries which will slowly,
directly or indirectly, enter the economic area of the Euro. In line with this strategic direction
we must set the decision taken at the Helsinki summit to constitute a rapid reaction corps of
approximately 50-60,000 men entirely made up of the European military. This rising
architecture of European security brings about two important consequences for the Italian
military apparatus: quality and quantity of the armed forces to meet European standards and
the rapid employment units being able to work together perfectly. In the field of NBC
defence one could think of making the means and procedures of employing the Italian
regiment the same as those in the similar units of the other allied countries. An European
NBC unit could also be drawn up, an “empty box” to be filled when necessary with the
pawns made available by different states and capable of being projected outside the area. In
this way, as well as the obvious savings from standardising the means, doctrine and training,
a precious resource would be created which would assure the necessary flow of information
towards the respective national authorities on the sensitive topic of the risk/threat of toxic
contamination.
However, Italy, given the lack of instruments (also conventional) and probably
political will to carry out mass retaliation, must entrust themselves to the abilities of the
allies (in primis the United States) to dissuade against the use of mass-destruction arms by
state organisations against the military in service abroad. What I have just said however
makes it indispensable to continue the operation of improving the Italian military’s passive
NBC defence (distant detection systems, masks, overalls, gloves, etc.) so as to discourage a
possible adversary and increase the trust and morale of the troops outside the national
borders. In fact, despite the possibility of toxic attack against the Italian contingents
remaining remote, the specific nature of chemical and biological offence means that episodes
of panic are possible, expecially when faced with attackers who use stratagems, for example,
like flooding the positions held by the national divisions with coloured smoke. Finally,
effective countermeasures should be adopted especially regarding mind-altering agents,
which, despite not being lethal, can negatively influence the conduct and morale of the
military who are hit.

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 Better Italian preparation in the sector of NBC defence would be in line with the
indications which emerged from the NATO study groups dedicated to the threat of banned
weapons: the SGP (Senior Politico-Military Group on Proliferation) which identified the
political and economic instruments to prevent or respond to the phenomenon of proliferation,
and the DGP (Senior Defence Group on Proliferation) which indicated the military
capacities necessary to discourage proliferation and deter the eventual use of NBC arms
against the population and the NATO armed forces (NATO 1997). In practise, the SGP
advises giving maximum support to international regulatory initiatives aimed at contrasting
proliferation, warning potential proliferants of the serious consequences of their efforts and
finally creating a better climate of security in those regional areas, Asia and the
Mediterranean in particular, most at risk of proliferation. The DGP, after having stressed the
dangers connected to NBC and missile proliferation, took into consideration the destructive
impact of the use of NBC arms (even only the threat) on maintaining cohesion within NATO
and the possibility of using the allies’ military forces. Furthermore, the DGP revealed that
the skills of NATO’s military units to lead operations in a contaminated environment are not
standardised and, therefore, the enemy could profit from the existing differences. In
concluding its analysis, the DGP indicated the need for robust conventional military forces
completed by atomic weapons systems to raise the costs of potential aggressors, as well as
underlining, among other things, the need for a vast information network (satellite
recognition, systems for detecting chemical and biological agents at a distance, etc.), a
widened air defence with anti-missile tactical systems and protective equipment for the
military found in the operative zones (Joseph 1996). The final suggestions from the DGP are
certainly (and intentionally) generic in their contents and must be taken as politico-military
guidelines2. Furthermore, the DGP indications, if on one hand forecasting measures
2
“1) Ensure Alliance cohesion through continued widespread participation in Allied Defence
preparations for operations in the NBC proliferation risk environment; 2) maintain freedom of
action and demonstrate to any potential adversary that the Alliance will not be coerced by the threat
or use of NBC weapons; 3) reassure both Allies and coalition partners of the Alliance’s ability
effectively to respond to, or protect against, NBC threats or attacks; 4) ensure responsive and
effective consultation procedures to resolve crises which have a potential NBC dimension at the
earliest possible stage; 5) complement non-proliferation efforts with a mix of military capabilities
that devalue NBC weapons, by reducing the incentives for, and raising the costs of, acquisition; 6)
complement nuclear deterrence with a mix of defensive and responsive conventional capabilities,
coupled with effective intelligence and surveillance means, that together would reinforce the
Alliance’s overall deterrence posture against the threats posed by proliferation by increasing the
options available to Alliance decision-makers during crises and conflicts; 7) balance a mix of
capabilities including nuclear forces and conventional response capabilities to devalue a

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effectively correlated to the NBC threat (for example, relating to the soldiers’ individual
protection), on the other hand it is obvious that for example the improvement of the satellite
surveillance network does not only serve to control the NBC arsenals of the countries at risk,
just as the increase in the mobility of arms systems does not only serve to avoid an attack
with toxic substances. Therefore, the final document is certainly to be looked at from the
point of view of the recent development in the Allies’ strategic concept: strongly protected
and highly mobile military divisions able to intervene rapidly in the so-called “arch of crisis”
which goes approximately from Russia to North Africa, passing through the Middle East.
In conclusion, from this rapid panorama dedicated to the biological and chemical
risk/threat the reasons for the Italian public opinion to be interested should be clear: in fact, it
is wrong not to be interested in the chemical and biological disarmament process, just as it is
to believe that an international agreement is enough to resolve the thorny question of
poisonous weapons. Furthermore, as Nixon would say, “for every complicated problem there
is always a simple answer, and usually it is wrong”. Obviously, the heavy veil of secrecy
surrounding the entire “chemical and biological weapons” question certainly does not help in
achieving a solution to the problem.

REFERENCES
CIA (Central Intelligence Agency), 1989, “Trends and Developments in Warsav Pact
Theater Forces and Doctrine Through the 1990s”, NIE 11-14-89, Washington DC, Central
Intelligence Agency.
Cornish Paul, Peter van Ham and Joachim Krause, 1996, “Europe and the challenge of
proliferation”, Chaillot Paper, no. 24, Paris, Institute for Security Studies, West European
Union (http://www.weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai24e.html).

proliferant’s NBC weapons by denying the military advantages they would confer and through the
prospect of an overwhelming response to their use; 8) prioritize needed capabilities in terms of their
contribution to Alliance objectives; 9) conflict control, including the tempo and direction of military
operations, and the ability to prevail in all phases of any conflict; 10) evolve capabilities as the
threat evolves while focusing on existing conditions and expected near term trends, with their
regional emphases, and maintaining options for deploying more capable systems if necessary in the
future; 11) emphasise system mobility, given that NBC proliferation risks are expected to be
primarily regional in character and that NATO forces may be called upon to operate beyond
NATO’s borders; 12) integrate NBC-related concepts into the Alliance’s defence planning and
standardization processes” (Carter and Omand 1996, 13).

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Orton Robert D. e Robert C. Neumann, 1993, “The Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction
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