The Chinese of Ho Chi Minh City: Enriching or Surviving?

Michel Dolinski

I. Introduction
The place of the Chinese diaspora in Vietnam as part of the greater Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora is quite unique. In Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and the Philippines, the Fujianese numerically dominate the other Chinese groups; in most continental Southeast Asian countries such as Thailand, Laos, and Cambodia, immigrants from Chaozhou are greater in number. Vietnam is the only place in the region where the Cantonese community outnumbers the others. In a previous paper, we have already considered the evolution of the Hoa population of H Chi Minh City (H.C.M.C.) between 1975 and 2000. This initial research concerned the changes to demography and identity that affected the social and economic daily life of the Hoa who decided to stay in Vietnam while most of their neighbors fled following the countrys reunification. For this study we focused on the process these families integration into their host society as well as on their social and cultural evolution, considering the historical heritage and environment in which their ethnic group is rooted. Our aim was to understand the long-term development of the ward as well as the survival strategies of its inhabitants in relation to the changes that took place after the fall of Saigon in 1975 and the subsequent taking of power by the communists. We also considered the future prospects of this group within the current local and international context. For the historical part of the research, we used original documents,1 books, and updated data. But the heart of our approach was based on the analysis of about two hundred formal and informal interviews that we conducted in Mandarin in the 11th ward of the 5th district of Cholon between
1

Most of them found in the Centre des Archives dOutre Mer (CAOM), Aix en Provence (http://www.archivesnationales.culture.gouv.fr/caom/fr/)

1995 and 2000. Among the nearly fifty families that were visited, half have been regularly solicited. Final field research, completed in 2005, has allowed us to update our data and to partly reevaluate our previous conclusions. In this paper, we will briefly review the initial results, then present our perception of the evolution of our target group between 2000 and 2005. 1. Brief Historical Background of the 5th District Before the arrival of the French in Vietnam, the installation of Chinese migrants in the center and lately in the South of the country was encouraged by the Nguyn, for economic as well as political reasons. During this period several communities settled in the territories that the Vietnamese had gradually acquired by matrimonial diplomacy or by force. The Nguyn continued their Southern progress and used these newcomers predominantly from Guangdong, Fujian, Zhejiang, and Hainanto acquire new tools and techniques, to swell the governments treasurey, and to let those industrious pioneers contribute to the clearing and development of the newly conquered regions. The Chinese became wealthy and powerful, and quite a few of them got involved in the political life of the South. In 1778, during the Tyson revolt (17711802), some of these communities suffered the resentment of the rebellious population. Several groups of Chinese, hoping to escape the slaughter, fled southward. Some of them settled in a small village not far from Saigon, where they laid the foundation of Di An,2 the future Cholonthe Chinese Bazaar, as the French would call it later. The city quickly became the commercial hub of the Southern delta as the Chinese organized large-scale business using the Mekong and its watery labyrinth to set up a wide commercial network reaching to Cambodia and Laos, and stretching along the main coastal cities of Vietnam up to China. In Cholon the five Chinese communities surrounded temples where they could worship their ancestors, gods, and goddess, and were they also built the congregation houses in which they held their meetings, deliberated, and
2

In 1778 they fonded one or several little villages named Di An (Tin-Gan, Tai Ngn in Cantonese)

ruled the communities. Different activities were grouped under ethnicrelated corporations, the hang , which progressively developed into ethnic wards or larger districts where the different corporations would gather .3 During the colonial period the Chinese communities gradually grew in number, especially in the south, increasing their privileges and consolidating their economic power. Following the reunification of the country, their communities were playing a crucial role in the economy of the South. In the past, the different waves of migrants had gradually mingled with Vietnamese society, especially in Cholon, forming a large population that political regimes before April 30, 1975 had barely been able to control. In the years that followed the communist victory, the authorities could not accept the economic hegemony that the Chinese still exerted. The political radicalization of the government as well as the worsening of the relationship between Vietnam and China provoked the exodus of the Hoa in great number.4 Those who remained underwent the reorientation of the society and had to adapt daily life to this new situation. 2. The 11th ward Prior to the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, many of the prosperous Chinese from the 11th ward had already left Saigon, understanding that there would be no future for them in a country ruled by the communists. In the years that followed, another group of craftsmen and merchants also decided to leave. In 1978, after private trade was banned, a great share of the Hoa was sent to the new economic zones (NEZ), while others fled the country, especially between 1979 and 1981. At the same time quite a few
3 4

Le Van Luu, Pagodes chinoises et annamites de Cholon, p. 10. The 1975 victory of communist North Vietnam adversely affected the status of the Chinese. All private trade within the country was banned in 1978. Many Hoa businessmen were sent to populate and cultivate land in areas known as New Economic Zones (NEZ). During 1978, the Chinese held several protests in Ho Chi Minh City against the relocations to the NEZs and also to press for Chinese citizenship. The 1979 China-Vietnam border war worsened relations between the Hoa and Kinh communities as some Chinese were viewed as supporting the PRC. Vietnamese propaganda emphasised this feeling for political reasons. Many Hoa were among the thousands of Vietnamese boat people to flee the economic and political reconstruction. More than 200,000 Chinese left Vietnam for Hong Kong and other Southeast Asian countries during 1979. By 1981, some 227,000 Chinese refugees had been accepted by the PRC alone. Hundreds of thousands of other Hoa and Kinh boat people were to reside in refugee camps in Hong Kong and other Southeast states for up to two decades after fleeing Vietnam in the late 1970s.

Vietnamese peasants abandoned their devastated countryside and moved to the city, while former Saigoners also came back to town. In Cholon some of the buildings deserted by or confiscated from their original residents were occupied by these newcomers. Former North Vietnamese soldiers and civilians working for the new administration, who were encouraged to settle down in the Chinese city, occupied empty or confiscated structures as well. The numbers of these new Vietnamese residents helped to alter the ethnic population ratio in the historical districts, especially in the 5th, 6th, 10th, and 11th.5 According to our information, between 1989 and 2000 the Hoa accounted for 39.6 percent of the total population of the 5th district. The population of Chinese shows a slow, relative decrease compared to the global population of H.C.M.C. In 1989, the Hoa numbered 433,551 and represented 14 percent of the population of the city; they were 524,000 in 1993 but represented only 13.3 percent of the entire population. In 1996 they were 550,000, representing 12 percent of the population of H.C.M.C., while in 2000, they were 620,000 and still represented 12 percent of the global population. In 2005 a high-ranking official confirmed this slow but steady erosion of the group. To partly explain this process, he emphasized that the expansion of greater H.C.M.C., for the last ten years, has resulted in the absorption of several neighboring villages, which naturally increases the proportion of Vietnamese residents. Concerning the 5th district, other specific factors seem to have emphasized this tendency. One of them is related to the urban projects6 intended to ease the increasing demographic pressure on the city. The main objectives include reducing road traffic, improving the precarious situation of the natural habitat, relocating polluting factories, rehabilitating rivers, and creating large green areas. In the 5th district, which is one of the most densely crowded in the city, many
5

According to Laurent Gedon, between 1979 and 1989, the Chinese population in the 5th district, the traditional and most populated center of Cholon, decreased by 13 percent. Ethnic Chinese made up 52.7 percent of the population in 1979, but only 39.2 percent in 1989. (Laurent Gdon, Les Hoa au Vietnam.) Officially, according to H Chi Minh, Cuc thong k, in 2000, the Chinese population of H Ch Minh City was of approximately 620,000 persons, representing 12 to 13 percent of the entire population of the city. Data: H Chi Minh, Cuc thong k TP. HCM, [Statistical Yearbook H Chi Minh City 2000], Statistical Office of H Chi Minh city, January 2001, 279. 6 Nguyen, Laurence Le renouvellement urbain au Viet-Nam, 1st Congress of Rseau Asie-Asia Network. September 24-25, 2003, Paris France (translated and adapted from)

programs are currently underway while others, initiated in the nineties, are near completion.7 At the boundary of the 11th ward, new residential constructions have popped up, some of which are popular urban blocks, others more luxurious apartments. As part of road-enlargement operations, many of the old houses from the colonial period are being replaced by narrow, contemporary-styled, multistory buildings erected a few meters back from the road. Most families interviewed complained that intense speculation in the ward has caused an uncontrolled boom of the real estate prices and rent, which were already very high because of the districts transformation into an active economic center. When their houses are razed to the ground, most expropriated residents receive from the contractor only a portion of the financial compensation to which they are legally entitled, often thanks to the complicity of corrupt officials from the local authority.8 Since this money usually is not enough for the impecunious families to reconstruct new homes, they have no choice but to move to sometimes-distant suburbs, condemning many to shuttle back and forth everyday to work downtown where their activity has been going on for years and generates a low but steady income. Between 1995 and 2005, some young couples have also departed from the crowded center for the sake of convenience. Most have settled down near the recently industrialized zones now located in the outskirts of the district or of the city. When asked why, they say simply that there they have more opportunities to find better jobs in Taiwanese or Singaporean factories. The inhabitants also emphasize the increasing number of mixed marriages to explain the slow dilution of the Hoa population in the ward.
7

Almost all districts have developed programs to replace the old and unsanitary dwellings by constructing new residential areas. Each district is supposed to relocate its inhabitants inside its own limits whenever possible, but some districts negotiate with others located at the periphery. The residents are supposed to finance 30 percent of the cost of their relocation, with the administration providing 70 percent. But the contribution of the population can rise to as high as 50 percent. The 5th has transformed some of its unsanitary areas into residential zones by constructing popular buildings. The 5th district has also created an industrial zone where most polluting factories have moved and where new companies are now investing. A residential area has also been created nearby. However, according to officials the poorest inhabitants of the district do not wish to leave the center, where they have jobs in the informal sector and where they have a higher standard of living. Sometimes the residents prefer land, where they can build low-cost houses, to living in an apartment located in the center. 8 This has been confirmed by an anonymous high-ranking official.

This situation, which is considered a natural and inevitable result of the proximity of both communities, is particularly visible among the 25-to-30year-old generation. The last point worth noticing, even if it seems marginal, concerns the growingif still limitedtide of soft migration made possible through arranged marriages with foreigners or by sending children abroad to study. Between 2000 and 2005 this situation has been amplified, as we will see in the next section. II. A Traditional Ward with an Integrated Dynamism The urban social and economic architecture of the 11th ward is deeply related to its distinctive location at the heart of the 5th district, the center of Cholon. The site used to be a sojourn place for the arriving Chinese immigrants. Since its origins the geographical situation of the ward has justified the construction of hostels and lodges along the former Hai Hop and Testard wharves, at the crossroad of present-day Chau Van Liem and Nguyn Trai streets. Gradually, the place and its vicinity have become a hotel area. The nearby Chinese congregation houses and temples have also widely shaped the urban space and economic environment,9 resulting in the establishing of administrations such as the income-tax office, the central police station, many private and public schools, banks, sports arenas, etc. Furthermore, most of the commercial trade and industrial activities that though the years have spread around these centers of prayer and decisionmaking are in fact closely interwoven with this heritage. 1. General Evolution of the Situation Since the Beginning of the

Eighties After the beginning of the Doi Moi, the creation of industrial zones as well as export processing zones (EPZ) attracted many international companies to H.C.M.C. and its larger area, giving the population new working opportunities. In the early stages of the process, the Hoa clearly
9

Shen,Yehshing. 2001.

took advantage of their cultural origin to find jobs in the Taiwanese, Singaporean, or Hong Kong-managed plants. During that period there appeared in the ward a wave of expatriated Chinese who thought the time was ripe to go back and invest in Vietnam, as well as some business adventurers and small entrepreneurs from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore who perceived Vietnam as a new Eldorado. These pioneers, who were often between 35 and 50 years old, helped rejuvenate the economy of the streets as they opened shops, restaurants, workshops, and offices. Some of them quickly mingled with the population, learned Vietnamese, married, or, often for practical reasons, took a second local spouse. Theses micro-companies would only hire a few people, often Hoa, who where used as go-betweens because they understood the local culture, could speak Mandarin, Cantonese, Vietnamese, and, for the more aged ones, Minnanese, one of the dialects used widely in Fujian and Taiwan. In 1995 to 1996, at least one member in each Chinese family interviewed worked for Taiwanese businessmen or in a Taiwanese plant. For the bigger companies, things were slightly different. Although in the beginning, many of them hired people of Chinese origin as workers or staff members, they quickly encountered problems because many Hoa lacked technical skills due to their low (if not non-existent) level of training, or because of their insufficient Mandarin or Vietnamese ability. These problems resulted from the educational situation following the postreunification period as well as from the traditional attitude of most Hoa toward higher education. This often resulted in poor or inadequate translations of orders or technical specifications. Other problems would result when Vietnamese workers would refuse to obey a Hoa manager because of his social status was considered to be lower. Consequently, as well as for economic reasons, many Taiwanese companies increasingly hired highly qualified staff imported from Taiwan as well as low-paid and hard-working technicians and staff members recruited in Mainland China. If many international firms remained in Vietnam between 1997 and 2000 despite the crisis, a significant number the small-scale entrepreneurs left the country, temporarily or for good. In the 11th ward, some of these

companies were sold, often to another Taiwanese, while others survived, left to the care of their Vietnamese wives10 until better days. In 2005, only a limited number of the original investors were back in the ward, but an interesting new situation had occurred. 2. Contrasted Situation Economically, the families we studied can be divided into three subgroups. First, the wealthy ones, in which we include small entrepreneurs, successful shop owners, or people working for the government, some of them highly ranked in the administration. After 1975 to 1978, they found a new place in society thanks to their commercial dynamism, their political involvement, or opportunism. They can be considered as belonging to a kind of middle class having developed its own specificity related to local history and society. As in other Asian countries,11 they are eager to appropriate traditional high-class cultural forms and use them as status markers. A second category of families includes small businessmen, shopkeepers, and craftsmen who have managed to reconstitute their assets. Some of them also work for local or foreign companies in business or service fields. The last part of our population, numerically the most important, is composed of small unsuccessful shopkeepers, factory workers, shop employees, peddlers, etc. The 1997 Asian crisis temporarily affected the economic activity of the Hoa population of the ward. That year, an important portion of our witnessesthe richest as well as the poorest oneswondered whether to stay in Vietnam or try to find a way to flee the country. In 2000 the situation of the Hoa improved slightly, following the general trend of the economy. For some businessmen, the increase in economic activity held encouraging prospects, but its pace was still slow. The middle-class retailers where surviving, but had adopted a stand-by position. In the streets of our study, many shopkeepers changed products or tried to find innovative solutions.
10 11

Dolinski, 2000.

See also Hagen Koo: Globalisation and the Asian Middle Classes: A Tentative Research Agenda, Asia Pacific Forum n22, Dec. 2003.

Old shops closed as their owners decided to retire. Many people also speculated on how to leave the country. The poorest families on our panel felt depressed and most of them could just manage to survive. In 2005 the results of the economic boom were clearly visible among all the families, but this prosperity was distributed unevenly. The wealthiest families of the group had obviously taken advantage of new opportunities and their attitude had radically changed. They no longer worried about their future in the country and most of them even looked forward to modern and more profitable investments in computers, Internet cafs, or else. We also found a great deal of new small-scale businesses co-owned by a Hoa, sometimes very young, and a Taiwanese, also sometimes very young. Many new Chinese small entrepreneurs from Hong Kong and Singapore (and even from Mainland China in one case) are also looking for opportunities in the booming Vietnamese market and have invested in the district. Furthermore, while during a previous visit a Taiwanese businessman declared that he hesitated to hire Hoa people as staff members, in 2005 he explained to us how much this situation had changed and insisted on the emergence of these potential reliable partners. Indeed, between 2000 and 2005 a wave of young Hoa had appeared in the job market. Unlike their parents, who didnt have the chance to pursue their education in Mandarin after the 1975-1978 upheaval, many of the younger generation have received technical, managerial, or commercial training in Vietnam, or abroad in the case of the wealthiest ones. They often belong to the richest, or at least upper-middleclass, families of the group and speak Mandarin fluently. Quite a few sons and daughters on our panel have become agents or representatives, or have gone into partnership with companies from Hong Kong, Singapore, or Taiwan. Some of them, especially the children of political executives, also occupy valuable positions in public or private sectors such as service and banking, or have responsibilities in Vietnamese or foreignWestern or Chinesecompanies. The educational investment of their parents seems therefore to have been fruitful. The families belonging to the second group of our panel concede that after 2000 they also started to perceive the benefits of the global dynamic

of the economy. If their financial capacity did not give them the ability to invest in extensive commercial projects, most of them have nevertheless found economic stability. In 2005 quite a few had also invested in small but vigorous, and often modern, operations, or had just kept their business going on. Their sons and daughters had also often found good positions in local or foreign companies, created their own small business, or helped their parents to run the family shop. On the other hand, the poorest households of our panel seem to remain in the gloomy mood that already characterized them during the first years of our study. Furthermore, we have noticed a slow but clear process of impoverishment. Between 1997 and 2000, the disappearance of many Chinese-owned companies from the ward or the district, and the general slump in business, particularly affected the daily life of this group, with some families finding themselves in extremely difficult situations. As they usually wished to preserve their independence, these people would often carry on various activities outside of their normal job,12 combined with extra jobs at home such as folding up cardboard boxes, crushing seeds, etc. Children often join in these activities to help their parents. In 2005, even if they report gaining a modest profit from the economic boom, most of them still assert that their situation hasnt really changed or improved. Some even concede that, more than before, they rely on financial help sent by their relatives living abroad. III. Identity One of our initial propositions was that the erosion of the Chinese community and the loss of face resulting from the inversion of social positions have produced a group trauma that still exists. Indeed, after the new government began to apply its political program, the Chinese of Cholon like everyone in Southern Vietnamhave been deprived of their property and wealth. But as ethnic Chinese they also lost the privileges that their
12

In The Role of Private Entrepreneurship in the Peoples Republic of China and Vietnam for Social and Political Change, Southeast Asian Studies Working Paper n7 Bonn, 1999, p.15, Thomas Heberer underlines the fact that, not only in Vietnam, but in almost any developing country, one of the only economic alternatives for people with a low educational background is this kind of self employment.

10

communities had provided for years. They became losers among the losers, social outcasts who switched from being an economically dominant group that felt culturally superior, to a dominated one. This inversion reinforced their frustration and sense of injustice. Added to this is the fact that, for ideological reasons, some Chinese secretly fought with the Vietcong forces during the war.13 After the victory these collaborators naturally cooperated with the communist authorities. This rupture with the other part of the population, often considered ethnic treason, also contributed to the destabilization of the group. To regain a satisfactory image in its own eyes, the community has reinterpreted the past in order to create a satisfactory explanation of the events. Our previous analysis has shown that the structure of most interviews contained a strong opposition between past and present. The term jiefang (liberation) symbolizes the dramatic rupture between the highly idealized beforedescribed as a golden ageand the economically and socially difficult after. If this opposition underlies the speech of most adults, we can still distinguish two different attitudes, generally associated with the socio-cultural status of the interviewed families. Those who are content with the current situation are those who are successful, as their status allows them to easily accept the social transformations. Concerning their childrens education, they insist on the advantage of keeping a double cultural identity, and urge their children to master Mandarin in order to preserve their roots and fulfill their Chineseness. But they also emphasize the necessity of speaking and writing fluent Vietnamese, for both social and economic reasons. When interviewed, they consider the Vietnamese higher education system a useful means to study modern techniques, but they also categorically criticize it for its deficiencies. Members of this group are also inclined to have their children learn English in the best schoolsAmerican if possiblefor business purposes most of the time, in order to find a job in a foreign company, or to emigrate. Indeed, between 2000 and 2005, quite a few of these prosperous or just well-to-do families had sent or tried to send at least one of their
13

See for example The Chinese in Vietnam, Divided Loyalties? anonymous, The Asia Magazine, September 14, 1969. This point has also often been made in our interviews.

11

children abroad to study in American or Canadian Universities or in the Philippines. Their children are usually welcomed and supported by relatives who emigrated after 1978. While some parents hope that their childrens foreign educations will allow them to continue or develop a family business upon their return, others simply wish that they will establish themselves in their new adopted countries. These families seem to project a positive future. Because of their resources, most of them have opportunities to travel abroad. They therefore dont consider migration a necessity, and often prefer to look for new commercial opportunities locally. They also often use their relatives or friends living abroad as partners for fruitful business associations. They dont appear to be afraid of intermarrying with Vietnamese or seeing their ethnic group dissolved into society. Indeed, their status allows them to mingle without fear of forgetting their roots. They find advantages in this bicultural condition, which serves them and is sometimes considered as a form of superiority, symbolizing a kind of re-conquest of the groups former social position. We can say that their economic or social achievement also give them the feeling that they control their destiny once again. Opposite that are those who can hardly bear the current situation. They can be small unsuccessful shopkeepers, factory workers, peddlers, moto-taxi drivers, etc. They belong to the lower social category of our population sample but represent a substantial proportion of it. They often express regret not to have left the country, feel frustrated because they havent reached a satisfactory social or economical level, and generally associate their current condition with the 1975 upheaval and its subsequent effects on the group. Most of the time their level of education is basic. Their speech reveals a very strong opposition between past and present. To counterbalance their resentment they find some solace in traditional Chinese values and from this position condemn the social or economic problems of Vietnamese society. They encourage their children to study some Vietnamese in order to fit into society, and some Chinese in order to preserve their identity and values, and because it can be helpful to find a

12

job for a Chinese boss. Between 1995 and 2005, the speech of this category of people hadnt changed much.

IV. Permanence of the Soft Emigration Movement During our earlier field research we noticed an uninterrupted tendency of soft expatriation, which mainlybut not exclusivelyconcerned women of marriageable age. This soft emigration was often made possible by arranged marriages between families; matchmaking by relatives or former neighbors, especially in the case of Chinese-Vietnamese living in America, Canada, or Australia; encounters between a Vietnamese-Chinese now living abroad and one visiting the country; or introductions by relatives or friends, as most often happens for Taiwanese-Hoa marriages. We also have a few cases in which the Vietnamese-Chinese worked with or for a Taiwanese future spouse, as well as some who fell in love with men they met during marital trips organized by Taiwanese companies.14 These womens main destinations were Taiwan, Canada, Australia, and the United States. Among our sample group, we have observed that poorer families often have at least one daughter married to either a Taiwanese or the son of relatives who left the country during the migratory wave of the seventies and eighties. In 2005 this situation hadnt much changed for the lowerincome part of the group. But as we noted above, soft migration still occurs, though less frequently, among richer families and through different channels.

V. Conclusion When we initiated this research in 1995 we focused on a small ward where about a hundred families lived and worked. Between 1995 and 2005, half of them were the object of our constant attention through formal or
14

See Michel Dolinski, Cholon, Destination maritale pour clibataires taiwanais, Taiwan enqute sur une identit, Chaigne C., Paix C., Zheng C. ds., Paris, Ed. Karthala, 2000, Pg. 293-307.

13

informal interviews. Such a small sample of the population can certainly not be considered representative of the whole Hoa population of H Chi Minh City. However, we believe that the key tendencies and recurrent problems that appeared throughout our research and analysis of more than a hundred recordings, or resulting from our observations in the field, closely reflect the evolutionary trends of this community. If today Mainland China attracts most of the investment that pours into Asia, Vietnam remains an important potential market for Western multinational groups as well as for companies based in Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Today, the Chinese communities play a strategic role in the economy and their presence in the country is still a crucial decision-making element for the potential investors. The government therefore cannot neglect this dynamic group. Our study shows that between 1995 and 2005, the Hoa population of Cholon slowly adapted to new local, regional, and international trends, and has fully integrated the Chinese Southeast Asian entrepreneurial and financial network. Besides the major Asian or Western companies who invest heavily and built big plants in the country, a new wave of Chinese foreign entrepreneurs, some of them very young, is also eager to explore this market. The field data also suggests without doubt that the Hoa community follows the tempo of Vietnamese society and continues its progressive integration. But our last survey, conducted in July, 2005, points to the acceleration of a polarization process taking place in Hoa society. A part of this community has found economic stability and is eager to continue its integration in the global dynamic of the country. Between 2000 and 2005 this group diversified its investments in modern commercial activities. A significant number of its young members are increasingly connected with the Southeast Asian economic network or cooperating with newcomers. The group also clearly accepts the assimilation process as a natural one but insists on its specific and locally rooted double identity. As with many overseas Chinese communities nowadays, the Hoa keep in with the general course of re-Sinicization and, without forgetting the necessity of a general Vietnamese education, valorize Chinese education. In fact their Chineseness

14

is perceived as an economic and cultural advantage, to be preserved for its values and because it allows them to easily mingle in society. On the other hand, a large part of our panel has not found economic stability, having been largely passed over by the economic boom. Many families have even slowly pauperized. Even if the post-78 trauma seems to gradually disappear, these peoples morale often hasnt recovered from the loss of face that the community suffered. This part of the group also insists on the preservation of its Chineseness and emphasizes the need for Chinese education, but for a very different reason than the upper class: because this identity is used as a refuge. This difference is rather important. We have also observed a dispersion among the young population to the peripheral zones, and a growing ethnic blending between Vietnamese and Chinese in the ward. Since the opening up of the country, the possibility for the wealthiest to send their children abroad to study and the steady flow of soft migration through arranged marriages with foreigners augments the slow but continuous trend of migration. In the near future, it will be interesting to closely observe the evolution of this community now living in a non-hostile environment. We will also see how this dynamic group will adapt to the new challenges of Vietnamese society at the beginning of the twenty-first century. We believe they will do as well as the Chinese pioneers did in previous centuries.

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