Some Remarks on the Yogastra

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

Philosophy East and West, Volume 59, Number 3, July 2009, pp. 249-262 (Article)
Published by University of Hawai'i Press DOI: 10.1353/pew.0.0057

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/pew/summary/v059/59.3.ferraz.html

Access Provided by USP-Universidade de Sao Paulo at 06/13/11 9:01PM GMT

 SOME REMARKS ON THE YOGASU TRA

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

Philosophy Department, University of Sao Paulo

Introduction The recently released critical edition of the first chapter of the Patanjalayoga has con firmed that there is no manuscript evidence in favor of the autonomous existence of a Yogasutra (YS).1 Manuscripts present a whole text, the Yogasastra, later divided into two parts, YS and Yogabhasya (the latter traditionally attributed to Vyasa). The extrac tion of a YS from the Yogasastra is evidently possible, but it is not obvious whether the result is a coherent work that conveys a clear message. In the present article, we discuss some topics included in the YS in order to evaluate the logical consistency of the yoga system.2 Our leading thread in this task is provided in an article by T. S. Rukmani,3 who defends the claim that there are so many logical problems in the yoga school that yoga should be taken more as a discipline to be followed rather than to be understood intellectually.4 We present and analyze four problems raised by Rukmani: the first refers to a tension between the first degree of samadhi and the continuity of mental activities; the second is an interpretation of YS II.27; the third deals with the role of dharmamegha in the yoga system; and the fourth explores the living liberation. Before discussing the YS, some major translation options must be pointed out. Several Sanskrit technical terms can be rendered into English in different forms, and commentators have not reached a consensus on the issue. Our options are the following: we translate samadhi following Eliades suggestion, as enstasy, a word that expresses yogic self-realization as a perfect standing inside oneself, free from all phenomenal limitations.5 Citta is translated as mind, the aggregate of mental capacities and contents. Nirodha is translated as cessation and vrtti as mental modification, which includes both mental processes as inference or perception and their contents. Other choices are specified when required. The Goal of Yoga Before considering Rukmanis challenges to the theoretical basis of yoga, we must outline the goal of yoga as stated by the YS. In doing so, a general background is provided to the discussion of the supposed problems identified in the yoga system. Let us consider the sutras in I.24. YS I.2 defines yoga as the cessation of the mod ifications of the mind.6 YS I.3 describes the result of yoga: the permanence of the knower in its very nature.7 Finally, YS I.4 asserts the effect of the absence of yoga: the identification between mind and its modifications.8

Philosophy East & West Volume 59, Number 3 July 2009 249262 > 2009 by University of Hawaii Press

249

These sutras present yoga as a specific technique for reaching a special state, where all mental modifications cease. The fact that this state must be reached suggests two things. (1) There is a factual identification between mind and its modifications. Indeed, this identification can be called metaphysical ignorance (avidya) and is the source 9 In this state of identification, mind ascribes of all human afflictions (klesas) (see II.4). perpetuity to the transitory, purity to the impure, and pleasure to the painful, and suffers the bad consequences of these mistakes (see II.5).10 (2) There is an essential distinction between the knower and the mental processes whereby human beings are ordinarily inserted into the phenomenal world. In the yoga system, mind is not conscious by itself. Sutra IV.19 asserts that mind has not light in itself, since it belongs to the seeable.11 In other words, there is a pure principle or being (purusa) that must not be confused with any mental process. The state where the practitioner is completely free from this confusion and unveils her true nature is enstasy. The path from the practitioners identification with mental processes to her liberation is provided by yoga. All practices presented by the YS aim to stop the flow of ordinary experience, so as to disclose a state where the practitioner is free from her phenomenal mind and exists only as an unconditioned being (purusa). The YS classifies the mental modifications that must be transcended so that the practitioner can attain the full liberation of her purusa (YS I.6):12 knowledge (pramana), error (vipar yaya), creative thought (vikalpa), deep sleep (nidra), and memory (smrti).13 All nor mal psychic life (including all sound knowledge acquired by perception [pratyaksa], inference [anumana], or verbal cognition [agama] [see I.7]14) must be suppressed so that the purusa can be released from all phenomenal limitations. The accomplishment of this final goal, the samadhi, is not immediate. Enstasy supposes skillfulness in the eight techniques, designated as astangayoga, that are expounded in the second chapter of the YS. In addition to this, there are at least two degrees of enstasy, according to the first chapter of the YS. In sutra I.17, the first degree of samadhi is presented as enstasy with all intuitive knowledge (samprajna 15 This intuitive knowledge or insight (prajna) is not described by sutra I.7, which ta). presents the cognitive skills of common people. Indeed, prajna implies a direct ac cess to the nature of anything chosen as the object of contemplation, that is, a perfect fusion (samapatti) of the practitioners mind with her object or support. Prajna is not a cognitive resource commonly available; this intuitive knowledge arises from a special technique of yoga, samyama (control), which is composed of the final three members of astangayoga: dharana (mental concentration on an object [III.1]16), dhya na (the continuity of this concentration [III.2]17), and samadhi (the complete integra tion with the object [III.3]18). Thus, intuitive knowledge (prajna) presupposes that at least one level of enstasy has been achieved, precisely the one called samprajnata. Sutra I.17 affirms that samprajnata-samadhi is accompanied by four supportive factors: reasoning (vitarka), refined reflection (vicara), sublime happiness (ananda), and sense of egoity (asmita).19 These four factors do not play the same role. According to sutras I.4244, the first two (vitarka and vicara) designate cognitive

250

Philosophy East & West

processes that provide four sublevels of enstasy. The last two, as we will try to show, describe the objects whereby these processes operate.20 Let us consider the four sublevels of the first two forms of samprajnata-samadhi. First, the YS describes a samadhi with reasoning, a kind of enstasy based on infer ence (see I.42).21 Here, prajna does not arise from a special mental capacity but from the special use of a cognitive resource available to normal people (reasoning), which must be employed as vehicle for a perfect fusion with an objective support. Second, YS presents the next sublevel of enstasy, samadhi without reasoning (see I.43). One may here ask what mental capacity is the vehicle for this second enstasy. Indeed, there is none. This second sublevel of enstasy is intended to reach the same outcome as the first, but without the mental resource used for it. Indeed, reasoning is required to achieve samadhi for the first time. When this state is reached in a sound way, the practitioner can attain the resulting enstasy without the cognitive skill that was used as a leading thread before. The YS points out that the cognitive constituents of reasoning (including memory) must be purified so that enstasy without reasoning can take place.22 This purification means that the practitioner gains autonomy with regard to these cognitive constituents and achieves prajna without their help. The third and fourth sublevels of samprajnata-samadhi repeat the structure of the first two, although the mental capacity at stake in these last levels is no mere reasoning but refined reflection. Accordingly, the YS describes two more enstasies from whence prajna arises: with refined reflection and without refined reflection (see I.4423). Here, refined reflection (vicara) designates a more subtle cognitive skill than reasoning. In the third sublevel, a fusion of this reflection with its object is intended, and in the fourth the same outcome is to be achieved without this mental skill. The two last supportive factors of samprajnata-samadhi (ananda and asmita) are not mental capacities but two kinds of object on which at least vicara operates. This idea can be inferred from sutra I.41, which describes what the supports used in samprajnata-samadhi are. One of these supports is grahya, that is, an object that can be grasped by the normal processes of human cognition, as reasoning. In this sense, grahya can designate the object upon which samadhi with and without rea soning is attained. Moreover, sutra I.41 tells us that the instruments of human cogni tion (grahana) and the very knower (grahtr) are also supports of enstasy.24 These supports are subtler than objects of reasoning and require a subtler cognitive process in order to be grasped. We suggest that this cognitive process is vicara and that the objects on which the enstasies with and without refined reflection are attained are exactly grahana and grahtr. If one accepts that ananda is an instrument of cognition and that asmita is a subtle part of the knower, then one clarifies that the two last forms of samprajnata-samadhi are not cognitive processes but the objects to which mental concentration is applied.25 The main differences among the supportive factors of samprajnata-samadhi can be summarized in the diagram in figure 1. According to this diagram, the two first forms of samprajnata-samadhi (vitarka and vicara) are mental processes, divided into four sublevels that are organized in an order of increasing subtleness (from a to d ). The last two of these sublevels use as support the other two forms of samadhi.

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

251

Fig. 1.

The designation of both mental skills and objective supports as samadhi seems prob lematic at first, since one may think that the same concept is applied concurrently to some capacities of human subjectivity and to the objects on which these capacities operate. However, one must acknowledge that the objects designated as supportive factors of samprajnata-samadhi are subjective capacities and not any external content grasped by them. In this way, the YS suggests a kind of gradual ascent toward the inner constituents of mind. The first two sublevels of enstasy (with and without reasoning) imply the minds absorption (the accomplishment of samyama, as revealed above) in an objective content. After that, both the enstasies with and without refined reflection imply the minds absorption in itself, in its very constituents. This ascent is not arbitrary, but a preliminary task with regard to the second and ultimate degree of samadhi (asamprajnata), which aims at the absorption of the practitioners mind in purusa, the conscious principle that gives rise to mental activities. The Problem of Samprajnata-samadhi The exposition of the first degree of samadhi in the last section provides us with the indispensable background for understanding Rukmanis criticism of the yoga system. Rukmani has pointed out an internal tension in the definition of samadhi.26 On the one hand, samadhi is defined by the YS as the accomplishment of yoga, that is, as the cessation of mental modifications. However, on the other hand, the first degree of enstasy (samprajnata-samadhi) cannot be understood as the full cessation of men tal modifications, since mental processes are still at work in it. A dilemma arises from these claims: either samprajnata-samadhi is not a true accomplishment of yoga but, in this case, one cannot understand why it is designated as samadhior the ac complishment of yoga does not really imply the cessation of all mental modifications, and, hence, one cannot accept the definition of yoga as stated in YS I.2. This problem does not arise from the fact that the sublevels of samprajnata samadhi are based on cognitive skills (reasoning and refined reflection). Indeed, one could answer to this supposed problem by remarking that the second and fourth sublevels of samprajnata (without reasoning and without refined reflection)

252

Philosophy East & West

occur without any cognitive skill, and that the first and the third sublevels are simply preliminary practices of the enstasies purified of all cognitive capacity. In truth, Rukmani refers to the fact that, according to the YS, all sublevels of samprajnata samadhi produce latent impressions (samskaras), which are effects arising from any type of mental activity (even those enstasies without reasoning or refined reflection). Generally speaking, these latent impressions crystallize habit patterns (vasanas), which are potential causes of new mental modifications. That is why these latent impressions are also called bja (seeds): they give rise to the future patterns of mental reactions based on past experiences. The latent impressions of samprajnata-samadhi are special since they destroy the banal latent impressions (see III.927) and, consequently, the old mental patterns derived from their crystallization. Moreover, these special samskaras produce the mental tendency for seeking the accomplishment of yoga. However, like all other latent impressions, the samskaras arising from the first degree of enstasy are mental impressions, so that Rukmani is correct in pointing out a tension between this first degree of samadhi and the achievement of the yoga process. We have said above that a dilemma arises from this tension. Ian Whicher, choosing the second horn of this dilemma, defends the claim that nirodha (the intended cessation or dissolution of vrttis) does not imply a true suppression of all mental flux. According to Whicher, in Yoga philosophy, dissolution means that the karmically binding effects (and affects) of the vrttis dissolves, not the existence of vrtti, i.e., of all vrttis in total.28 He takes the classical theory of gunas (which, in fact, exceeds the scope of the YS) as his point of departure. The gunas are said to be the elements that compose all phenomena, including mental vrttis. There are three gunas: rajas, tamas, and sattva. Only this last is said to produce beneficial and sub lime vrttis. For Whicher, yoga practices both dissolve the harmful effects of rajasic or tamasic mental modifications and produce the beneficial vrttis, based on sattva, the luminous element of mind. Accordingly, yoga would aim to dissolve only the rajasic or tamasic vrttis, with which the mind is usually identified. As Whicher states, in the accomplishment of yoga, it is a specific state of consciousness or cognitive error evidenced in the mind and not the mind itself which is at issue.29 The description of samprajnata-samadhi in the YS gives at least partial support to Whichers position. As we have seen above, in this degree of enstasy, mental processes still occur, so that mind does not really cease in samprajnata.30 However, suppose that Whichers position is correct. When we presented the dilemma arising from samprajnata-samadhi, we stated that a troublesome consequence would ensue from the alternative defended by Whicher: if the accomplishment of yoga does not imply the cessation of all mental modifications, then the definition given by YS I.2 (yoga is the cessation of mental modifications) is incorrect. This consequence would reveal the YS as an incoherent text. Whicher formulates a complex argument to deny this problem, beginning with a modus tollens: if the YS intended to define yoga as the cessation of mental modifications in general, then sutra I.2 would use the plural form of vrtti, which would clearly comprehend the totality of mental processes. However, this plural form is not used, and, thus, yoga cannot be defined as the ces-

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

253

sation of all mental modifications. Next, Whicher takes this conclusion as a premise and adds to it two other claims: yoga is defined by the cessation of what cittavrtti means, and cittavrtti designates only a certain kind of mental modification, which 31 From these premises, he reaches the following conresults from rajas and tamas. clusion: yoga is the cessation of rajasic and tamasic mental modifications, but not of the sattivic ones. In our view, Whichers argument is valid, but at least two of his premises are not true. The first one is the conditional statement of the modus tollens. It is not clear that in order to refer to all mental modifications YS should have used vrttis and not cittavrttis. In fact, vrttis can refer to several kinds of modifications and not only to the mental ones. The YS provides us with at least two examples of the wide scope of vrtti: in II.50 vrtti describes the modifications of the prana, and in III.42 the same word designates a kind of phenomenal modification that can be controlled by the yoga practices. Accordingly, if sutra I.2 had used the plural form of vrtti, as Whicher suggests, the sutra would have referred not just to all mental modifications but to any modification at all, be it bodily or even worldly. To restrict the scope of vrtti to the modifications at stake in the definition of yoga, the YS uses cittavrtti. Thus, cittavrtti delimits the kind of modifications aimed at yoga, which are exactly the ones related to the mind. As a consequence, neither is cittavrtti insufficient to refer to all mental modifications nor is vrttis (plural) capable of making such refer ence with exactitude. The second troublesome premise in Whichers argument is the one that defines cittavrtti as referring only to rajasic and tamasic mental modifications. The only clas sification of mental modifications into their general components is stated in I.5, where vrttis are divided into afflicted and non-afflicted.32 Probably, one would think, following Whicher, that the rajasic and tamasic modifications are the afflicted ones. However, this would not exhaust the range of what cittavrtti refers to since the text clearly includes the non-afflicted modifications as contents of cittavrtti. As a consequence, the YS includes all kinds of mental modifications (be they caused by rajas, tamas, or sattva) in the sphere of what must cease so that yoga can be accomplished. If our criticisms of Whichers premises are correct, then his argument does not provide support for the intended conclusion that yoga does not imply the cessation of all mental modifications. Consequently, Whichers position in regard to the dilemma that has arisen from samprajnata-samadhi prompts him to an incoherent out come: according to him, samprajnata-samadhi is to be considered an accomplish ment of yoga, although this degree of enstasy still produces mental modifications. This thesis needs to be consistent with the general definition of yoga provided in YS I.2, which states that yoga implies the cessation of all mental modifications. However, as we have seen, Whicher fails to provide a sound argument in favor of such consistency. The horn of the dilemma chosen by Whicher prompts us to consider daunting philosophical problems, which seem to confirm Rukmanis general impression that yoga must be a practical discipline rather than a theoretical one. However, we can

254

Philosophy East & West

escape from these problems if we accept the other horn of the dilemma, that is, if we defend the claim that samprajnata-samadhi is not a true and complete accomplish ment of yoga. In fact, this claim seems the simplest and most reasonable interpretation of the sutras concerning samprajnata-samadhi. After all, samprajnata-samadhi produces latent impressions, which clearly imply that at this degree of samadhi not all mental modifications have ceased. Samprajnata-samadhi is an enstasy based on supportive factors that gives rise to samskaras. Accordingly, how should we deal with the consequence of the dilemma at issue? As we have stated above, if we accept the first dilemma, then we must explain why samprajnata-samadhi is called samadhi, that is, the final accomplishment of yoga, where no mental modification is supposed to exist. We defend the claim that samprajnata-samadhi is included in samadhi because the final goal of yoga is a complex state, composed of several degrees. Indeed, samprajnata-samadhi describes an important level of enstasy, where most, although not all, mental modifications have already ceased. This level is an indispensable stage in the full attainment of yoga since practitioners should learn how to reach enstasy with supportive factors in order to repeat the process without any support, as we will see in the next section. Thus, one is correct in asserting that the final goal of yoga (samadhi) requires the cessation (nirodha) of all mental modifications. However, this full cessation is not an instantaneous achievement, and even in the sphere of samadhi there are levels of enstasy where this final goal is not fully attained. The Final Degree of Enstasy In the previous section, we tried to solve a problem raised by Rukmani concerning samprajnata-samadhi. Consequently, we intended to show that the role of samprajnata-samadhi in the yoga system is understandable and that this topic does not confirm Rukmanis appraisal of yoga as more of a practical discipline than a coherent theory. In this section, we deal with two problems raised by Rukmani concerning the last degree of samadhi. The YS designates this last enstasy as asamprajnata-samadhi, that is, enstasy be yond all intuitive knowledge. At this level, the practitioner searches for a perfect fusion, not with any kind of support, as she is supposed to have reached in samprajnata-samadhi, but with the pure conscious principle, which must be isolated from all its phenomenal applications by the usual mental processes.33 Accordingly, the yoga process is achieved; that is, the unconditioned being of mind (purusa) is released from all phenomenal aspects, even from those subtle components of mind as ananda and asmita, which serve as supports for the first degree of enstasy, as we have seen above. When the final enstasy is reached, the samskaras of samprajnata samadhi (which is considered exterior to this last degreesee III.834) are suppressed. Consequently, there is no vrtti or latent impression at all; the enstasy is perfect, with out seeds, and the practitioner reveals herself as a pure conscious power. One problem raised by Rukmani concerning this last enstasy arises from sutra II.27, which asserts that the intuitive knowledge of the practitioner that accomplishes

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

255

asamprajnata-samadhi and surpasses the identification between purusa (the pure conscious principle) and prakrti (the phenomenal or material principle) has seven levels.35 This enigmatic sutra seems to indicate that the passage from samprajnata samadhi (which is already composed of different sublevels, as we have seen above) to asamprajnata-samadhi is gradual. However, the YS does not explain what the seven levels are. Rukmani considers the text of the so-called Yogabhasya on this issue.36 Let us remember, as we stated in our first paragraph, that, in the manuscripts, the YS and Yogabhasya are not divided, so that it is quite reasonable to use the whole text to formulate an acceptable interpretation of some topics. According to Rukmani, the Yogabhasya creates more problems than it solves. The third level of asamprajnata, for example, is presented by this text as the end of the identification between purusa and prakrti, but the end of this misidentification is expected to be the last level of enstasy. Moreover, Rukmani considers the Yogabhasyas explanation of the fifth, sixth, and seventh levels of asamprajnata to be but a presentation in differ ent ways of the state of kaivalya (liberation), defined in the fourth chapter of the YS.37 Rukmanis exposition of the incoherencies of the Yogasastra (the YS plus the Yogabhasya) in sutra II.27 are convincing. However, we would like to hypothesize that maybe these incoherencies follow from the incapacity of researchers to understand clearly the doctrine of the YS. J. Bronkhorst suggests that the Yogasastra was composed by the author of the so-called Yogabhasya. This person compiled the so called YS and added his own comments. For Bronkhorst, this person committed some mistakes in the organization of the sutras.38 Moreover, Y. Grinshpon defends the claim that in several passages the Yogabhasya provides excessively conservative interpretations of the sutras.39 Analogously, the incoherencies found by Rukmani in sutra II.27 could be derived either from incorrect comments from the author of the Yogabhasya or even from a bad compilation of the sutras. More research on this pos required before concluding that sutra II.27 is incoherent with other passibility is sages of the YS. The last problem raised by Rukmani that we will deal with here is the place in the yoga system of the enstasy called dharmamegha (cloud of virtue), which is introduced only in the fourth chapter of the YS.40 According to YS IV.29, dharmamegha arises from the full revelation of viveka, a special capacity for discriminating that enables the practitioner to distinguish between her true nature and the phenomenal world. Sutras IV.30 and 32 state the consequences of dharmamegha: according to IV.30, this enstasy implies the cessation of all afflictions and all actions or deeds (karma).41 In IV.32, it is stated that in dharmamegha the phenomenal modifications have also ceased.42 To the extent that mental vrttis are phenomenal modifications, one can infer that they also cease when dharmamegha is achieved. Consequently, this stage of enstasy is beyond the sublevels of samprajnata, which still produces sam skara (which is clearly a mental modification). We defend the claim that dharma megha is only a different description of asamprajnata-samadhi. Although the phrase asamprajnata-samadhi is not mentioned in the fourth chapter of the YS, the con sequences of this last level of enstasy are expounded when dharmamegha is presented. The word dharmamegha simply emphasizes that the practitioner who

256

Philosophy East & West

attains the last degree of enstasy is free from all debts due to past actions and can reap the benefits of true virtue.43 The Problem of Living Liberation Until now, we have discussed some passages in the YS that, according to Rukmani, may contain serious problems concerning the theoretical basis of the yoga system. We intend to show that this theoretical basis cannot, based on these passages, be labeled as incoherent or even illogical. However, we do not defend the claim that such a basis is perfect, either. There is at least one problem in the YS, concisely pointed out by Rukmani,44 with which we agree. We refer to living liberation, that is, the claim that the practitioner can both completely liberate purusa and continue to live. In this final section, we will present and discuss this problem. We have seen above that in asamprajnata-samadhi no mental change occurs. To reach this state, the effects of past mental modifications must be extinguished. When these effects are fully nullified, the pure conscious power is liberated from any phenomenal constraint, and to the extent that in asamprajnata-samadhi no new vrtti is expected to be produced, the attainment of such enstasy implies that the practitioner has no more mental modifications. This is not a tentative state of mind, as samprajnata samadhi is described, for instance, in sutra IV.27, which asserts that samprajnata is incomplete and temporary.45 Indeed, in this lower degree of enstasy, one still returns to ordinary consciousness, where different mental processes take place.46 Nevertheless, when asamprajnata is attained, the practitioner no longer has either mental vrtti or karma (as described in YS IV.30). To understand what is at stake in asamprajnata, we must make explicit what is encompassed by the range of karma. All deeds, be they physical or mental, are karma. According to the classical doctrine of karma and rebirth, these deeds have a crucial role in the fate of human beings during their numerous lives. Bronkhorst addresses this point by saying that deeds constitute the decisive factor that cause rebirth to take place and that determine what the new life will be like.47 In other words, all mental and corporal modifications produce effects that hold human beings in a cycle of infinite rebirths. According to Bronkhorst, different meditation schools developed in ancient India to discover ways to escape this tragic fate. One of these schools supports the claim that deeds are performed by a phenomenal self, which is not the true invariable self. When this unconditioned self is revealed, one is liberated from the karmic effects of deeds.48 A second school claims that one must perfectly immobilize mind and body, so that no deed is created and the effects of past deeds are purged by the time of death, when complete liberation is achieved.49 In our view, yoga contains elements of these two traditional schools of meditation. On the one hand, yoga asserts that the phenomenal mind (citta) is not the true self and that one can disclose the true self and attain full liberation in life. On the other hand, yoga practices are intended to cause all bodily and mental modifications to cease so that the true self (purusa) is liberated; moreover, no deed is supposed to be performed after the full attainment of asamprajnata-samadhi. Thus, yoga at the

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

257

same time defends the claim that living liberation is possible and that when this liberation occurs no further physical or mental deed is performed. This last claim is difficult to accept since our ordinary notion of life is so entangled with that of deeds and mental modifications. Whicher expresses the incredulity arising from the consequences of asamprajnata-samadhi thus: if all the great Yoga masters of the past had obliterated or so thoroughly suppressed their minds in order to attain spiritual liberation, how did they speak, teach, reason, remember, empathize, or even use the word I?50 To avoid such problems, Whicher proposes, as we have seen above, that only the afflicted vrttis are suppressed and not the whole phenomenal mind. Against this interpretation, we have tried to show in the last section that the YS asserts that the practitioner who has attained asamprajnata samadhi has no mental modifications and produces no karma. However, to the extent that life implies karma and phenomenal modifications (at least from physical metabolism), how is it possible that a liberated practitioner can be alive without producing any karma? The fourth chapter of the YS tries to conciliate living liberation and deeds. Sutras 4, 5, and 6 describe how the liberated practitioner can create auxiliary minds based on her mastery over the sense of egoity (asmita). Sutras III.1654 assert that the practitioner establishes control (samyama) over any support used to attain samadhi. We have seen above that in samprajnata-samadhi one of the supports used to reach enstasy is asmita. Consequently, the practitioner establishes control over asmita, a control that includes even the ability to reproduce it by creating one or several doubles of oneself. These doubles are said to be used by the liberated practitioner to perform any deed, such as teaching disciples. As the duplicated minds do not produce latent impressions (see IV.6),51 they do not imprison the liberated purusa in the phe nomenal world. This doctrine of the creation of auxiliary minds is intended to reconcile the living liberation and the immutability of the released self: all deeds would be performed by created beings and not by purusa itself. However, several problems arise from such a doctrine: even if we accept that the creation of such doubles is possible and that they produce no karma, how should we understand the act that creates the duplicated minds? Is this not a mental modification? Does not such an act cause karmic effects? Moreover, we understand the doctrine of created minds as an attempt to explain how a liberated practitioner could perform volitional acts. Nevertheless, this kind of act does not exhaust the range of karmic effects since involuntary acts, such as those necessary to keep the body alive (breathing, digestion, and excretion, at the very least), still should, according to the classical doctrine, be taken as karma. Should not this organic or involuntary karma hinder the liberation of purusa? If the answer is no, it should not, then one implies that the process of yoga is limited to the mental dimension of human being, which is to be distinct from the physical sphere. This answer is problematic, since the YS defends no substantial dualism concerning body and mind. The ontological distinction presented by the yoga system is that between phenomenal or material entities (including the physical world and citta, the ordinary human mind) and a nonmanifested conscious principle (purusa).52 Thus, when

258

Philosophy East & West

asamprajnata-samadhi is achieved, the cessation both of karma (as described in YS IV.30) and of phenomenal modifications (as described in YS IV.32) are supposed to be valid not only in the practitioners mind but also in her whole phenomenal being, which includes her body. If the answer to our question above is yes, it should, then we foresee two options: (a) there is no perfect liberation of purusa so long as the body of the practi tioner lives, which contradicts the exposition of asamprajnata-samadhi; and (b) the organic karma of the body is also suppressed as well as the mental modifications when asamprajnata-samadhi is achieved. This claim (b) seems the coherent conse quence of the exposition of asamprajnata-samadhi. However, we hardly understand, then, how the liberated practitioner can be alive, if all the involuntary processes of her body, insofar as they are karma, should be extinguished as well as all mental modifications. Moreover, the YS does not clarify how far the body itself should be suppressed. This last problem arises because the techniques of yoga are intended to surpass the phenomenal constraints on purusa both by absorbing the manifested effects of phenomenal processes in their subtle causes (see II.1053) and by suppressing any effect that potential causes could bring about (see II.1654). Consequently, we can ask if the body itself, as a set of phenomenal processes, is not supposed to be reabsorbed in its causes. The expected answer, be it positive or negative, would simply repeat the problems arising from our former question (about the role of organic karma in regard to the liberation of purusa). The topic of living liberation in the yoga system requires another journal article. We have sketched the problem here to show that the YS is far from being an indisputable exposition of an unambiguous doctrine. However, we also reject the claim that the YS is not a logically consistent text, as Rukmani suggests. In the first sections, we intended to provide an interpretation of certain specific passages in the YS so that three serious problems raised by Rukmani could at least be minimized. Our general conclusion is that much more exegetical work should be performed on the YS before any definitive verdict on its logical consistency can be asserted.

Notes 1 See P. Maas, Samadhipada: Das erste Kapitel des Patanjalayogasastra zum ersten Mal kritisch ediert (Aachen: Shaker, 2006). 2 We restrict ourselves to the textual interpretation of the YS and rarely refer to other schools of ancient India. Accordingly, we will not deal with the Buddhist influence on the YS, an important approach that could clarify some aspects of the yogic system. The close analysis of some concepts of the YS will be enough for our purposes here. 3 See T. S. Rukmani, Tension between Vyuthana and Nirodha in the Yoga sutras, Journal of Indian Philosophy 25 (6) (1997): 613628. 4 Ibid., p. 623.

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

259

5 See Mircea Eliade, Yoga, Immortality and Freedom (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1969). 6 YS I.2: yogascittavrttinirodhah. We use the following edition: Bangai Baba, Yogasutra of Patanjali with the commentary of Vyasa (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas, 1976). 7 YS I.3: tada drastuh svarupe vasthanam. 8 YS I.4: vrttisarupyamitaratra. 9 YS II.4: avidya ksetramuttaresam prasuptatanuvicchinnodaranam. 10 YS II.5: anityasuciduhkaanatmasu nityasucisukhatmakhyatiravidya. 11 YS IV.19: na tatsvabhasam drsyatvat. 12 YS I.6: pramanaviparyayavikalpanidrasmrtayah. 13 The concept of vikalpa is not restricted to the active production of mental images, since it also includes linguistic creations to which no real object corresponds (e.g., such logical absurdities as a round square). 14 YS I.7: pratyaksanumananagamah pramanani. 15 YS I.17: vitarkavicaranandasmitarupanugamatsamprajnatah. 16 YS III.1: desabandhascittasya dharana. 17 YS III.2: tatra pratyayaikatanata dhyanan. 18 YS III.3: tadevarthamatranirbhasam svarupasunyamiva samadhih. 19 The YS also defines asmita as a klesa (affliction) that must be suppressed in order to reach the goal of yoga, which is samadhi (see YS II.3). This apparent paradox is explained in note 23 below. 20 We follow the interpretation of Baba; see Baba, Yogasutra of Patanjali with the commentary of Vyasa, pp. 2425 n. 3. 21 YS I.42: tatra sabdarthajnanavikalpaih sankrna savitarka samapattih. 22 YS I.43: smrtiparisuddhau svarupasunyevarthamatranirbhasa nirvitarka. 23 YS I.44: etayaiva savicara nirvicara ca suksmavisaya vyakhyata. 24 YS I.41: ksinavrtterabhijatasyeva manergrahtrgrahanagrahiesu. 25 Asmita is a component of the knower and, because of this, a support on which the samadhi with and without refined reflection should be reached. Thus, asmita gives rise to enstasy and can be called a form of samadhi. However, asmita is a phenomenal aspect of citta and makes use of the pure conscious principle in order to exist (see YS.II.6). That is why asmita is also a klesa, that is, a limitation that must be surpassed so that yoga can be fully attained.

260

Philosophy East & West

26 See Rukmani, Tension between Vyuthana and Nirodha in the Yoga-sutras, pp. 614615. 27 YS III.9: vyutthananirodhasamskarayorabhibhavapradurbhavau nirodhaksana cittanvayo nirodhaparinamah. 28 Ian Whicher, Nirodha, Yoga Praxis and the Transformation of the Mind, Journal of Indian Philosophy 25 (1) (1997): 6. 29 Ibid., p. 11. 30 It is not clear if these processes are only sattivic, as Whichers position holds. 31 As he asserts, it is the cittavrtti as our confused and mistaken identity of au thentic selfhood (purusa), not our vrttis, thoughts and experiences in total state of definitive cessation (Whicher, Nirodha, Yoga which must come to a Praxis and the Transformation of the Mind, p. 20). 32 YS I.5: vrttayah pancatayyah klistaklistah. 33 We agree with Max Muller, who affirmed that yoga is not an activity that joins physical and psychic aspects of existence, as is usually understood, but a technique to put under the yoke of the pure conscious power all the phenomenal aspects of the experience. See Muller, The Six Systems of Indian Philosophy (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1912), p. 309. 34 YS III.8: tadapi bahirangam purvebhyah. 35 YS II.27: tasya saptadha prantabhumih prajna. 36 See Rukmani, Tension between Vyuthana and Nirodha in the Yoga-sutras, p. 618. 37 See Ibid., pp. 618619. 38 See J. Bronkhorst, Patanjali and the Yoga Sutras, Studien zur Indologie und Iranistik 10 (1984): 209. 39 See Y. Grinshpon, Yogic Revolution and Tokens of Conservatism in Vyasa yoga, Journal of Indian Philosophy 25 (2) (1997): 129138. 40 See Rukmani, Tension between Vyuthana and Nirodha in the Yoga-sutras, pp. 619621. 41 YS IV.29: prasamkhyane pyakusdasya sarvatha vivekakhyaterdharmameghah samadhih. 42 YS IV.32: tatah krtarthanam parinamakramasamaptirgunanam. 43 The word dharmamegha expresses this state in a metaphorical way, as if the liberated practitioner would enter into a different atmosphere or would even feel a blissful rain from the special cloud of virtue.

Marcus Sacrini A. Ferraz

261

44 Rukmani, Tension between Vyuthana and Nirodha in the Yoga-sutras, pp. 621622. 45 YS IV.27: tacchidresu pratyayantarani samskarebhyah. 46 Many of these processes use the latent impressions of the experience of enstasy, impressions that besides destroying the normal samskaras also stimu late the practitioner to repeat the enstasy in a more enduring way, since there are supposed to be fewer and fewer latent impressions that hinder the liberation of purusa. 47 Bronkhorst, Self and Meditation in Indian Buddhism (Paper presented at the International Conference on Korean Son Buddhism, Seoul, 1998; electronic version, retrieved January 3, 2007, from http://kr.buddhism.org/zen/koan/ y_bronkhorst.htm). 48 See ibid. 49 See ibid. 50 Whicher, Nirodha, Yoga Praxis and the Transformation of the Mind, p. 10. 51 YS IV.6: tatra dhyanajamanasayam. 52 In his article Mind/Consciousness Dualism in Sankya-Yoga Philosophy, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (4) (1993): 845859, Paul Schweizer extracts consequences from this ontology for contemporary philosophy. 53 YS II.10: te pratiprasavaheyah suksmah. 54 YS II.16: heyam duhkhamanagatam.

262

Philosophy East & West