RULE ON DNA EVIDENCE A.M. No. 06-11-5-SC TIJING vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No.

125901; March 8, 2001 Ponente: Quisumbing, J. FACTS: Petitioners have 6 children. The youngest is Edgardo Tijing, Jr. (born on April 27, 1989) Bienvenida served as the laundrywoman of private respondent. According to Bienvenida in August 1989, Angelita went to her house to fetch her for an urgent laundry job. Since Bienvenida was on her way to do some marketing, she asked Angelita to wait until she returned. She also left her four-month old son, Edgardo, Jr., under the care of Angelita as she usually let Angelita take care of the child while Bienvenida was doing laundry. When Bienvenida returned from the market, Angelita and Edgardo, Jr., were gone. Bienvenida proceeded to Angelitas house but did not find them there. Angelitas maid told Bienvenida that her employer went out for a stroll and told Bienvenida to come back later. She returned to Angelitas house after three days, only to discover that Angelita had moved to another place. Bienvenida then complained to her barangay chairman and also to the police who seemed unmoved by her pleas for assistance. Notwithstanding serious efforts, they saw no traces of his whereabouts. Four years later, Bienvenida read in a tabloid about the death of Tomas Lopez, the common-law husband of Angelita, and whose remains were lying in state in Bulacan. Bienvenida lost no time in going to Bulacan, where she allegedly saw her son Edgardo, Jr., for the first time after four years. She claims that the boy, who was pointed out to her by Benjamin Lopez, a brother of the late Tomas Lopez, was already named John Thomas Lopez. She avers that Angelita refused to return to her the boy despite her demand to do so. Bienvenida and Edgardo filed their petition for habeas corpus with the trial court to recover their son. Benjamin Lopez, as witness for the petitioners, declared that Tomas Lopez could not have possibly fathered John Thomas Lopez as the latter was sterile. He recalled that Tomas met an accident and bumped his private part against the edge of a banca causing him excruciating pain and eventual loss of his child-bearing capacity. Benjamin further declared that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son and that he and Angelita were not blessed with children. The trial court ruled that Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez are one and the same person who is the natural child of petitioners. CA reversed. ISSUE: Whether or not Edgardo Tijing, Jr., and John Thomas Lopez is one and the same person and is the son of petitioners.

HELD: Evidence presented by Bienvenida is sufficient to establish that John Thomas Lopez is actually her missing son, Edgardo Jr. first; there is evidence that Angelita could no longer bear children. She admitted that after the birth of her second child, she underwent ligation in 1970. Second, Benjamin Lopez declared in court that his brother, Tomas, was sterile because of the accident and that Tomas admitted to him that John Thomas Lopez was only an adopted son. Third, it is unusual that the birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez was filed by Tomas Lopez instead of the midwife four months after the alleged birth of the child. Fourth, the trial court observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had strong similarities in their faces, eyes, eyebrows and head shapes. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and material evidence to establish parentage. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress. Though it is not necessary in this case to resort to DNA testing, in future it would be useful to all concerned in the prompt resolution of parentage and identity issues. PEOPLE vs. VALLEJO G.R. No. 144656; May 9, 2002 Ponente: per curiam FACTS: Accused-appellant Gerrico Vallejo is charged with the crime of Rape with Homicide committed against a 9-year old child Daisy Diolola on July 10, 1999 in Rosario, Cavite. Daisys dead body was found tied to the root of an aroma tree by the river after the "compuerta". The body was brought to the barangay hall. Daisy was wearing her pink short pants with her sleeveless shirt tied around her neck. Accused-appellant was then invited by the policemen for questioning as he was the last person seen to be with the victim on the day the incident happened. During trial and based on the testimony of witnesses, the policemen went to the house of accusedappellant at about 4:00 o'clock in the afternoon of July 11, 1999 and recovered the white basketball shirt, with the name Samartino and

No. 13 printed at the back, and the violet basketball shorts, with the number 9 printed on it, worn by accused-appellant the day before. The shirt and shorts, which were bloodstained, were turned over to the NBI for laboratory examination. Pet Byron Buan, Forensic Biologist of the NBI, testified that on July 12, 1999, he took blood samples from accused-appellant in his office for laboratory examination to determine his blood type. Likewise, the basketball shorts and shirt worn by accused-appellant on the day the victim was missing and the victim's clothing were turned over to the Forensic Chemistry Division of the NBI for the purpose of determining the presence of human blood and its groups. The results of the examinations conducted by Pet Byron T. Buan showed accused-appellant to belong to Group "O". The following specimens: (1) one (1) white no. 13 athletic basketball shirt, with patches "Grizzlies" in front and "SAMARTINO" at the back; (2) one (1) violet no. 9 athletic basketball short pants; (3) one (1) white small "Hello Kitty" T-shirt with reddish brown stains; (4) one (1) "cut" pink short pants with reddish brown stains; (5) one (1) "cut" dirty white small panty with reddish brown stains, were all positive for the presence of human blood showing the reactions of Group "A". Pet Byron Buan also testified that before he took the blood samples, he had a conversation with accused-appellant during which the latter admitted that he had raped and later killed the victim by strangulation and stated that he was willing to accept the punishment that would be meted out on him because of the grievous offense he had committed. Mr. Buan observed that accused-appellant was remorseful and was crying when he made the confession in the presence of SPO1 Amoranto at the NBI laboratory. At the instance of City Prosecutor Agapito S. Lu of Cavite City, NBI Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan took buccal swabs and hair samples from accused-appellant, as well as buccal swabs and hair samples from the parents of the victim. The samples were submitted to the DNA Laboratory of the NBI for examination. Forensic Chemist of the NBI conducted DNA tests on the specimens collected and thereafter testified that the vaginal swabs of the victim taken during the autopsy contained the DNA profiles of accused-appellant and the victim. In his defense, accused-appellant argued that the extra-judicial confession he made was done under duress, fear and after he had been beaten and maltreated by the police officers to confess to the commission of the crime. Moreover he contented that the DNA samples obtained by the prosecutor are contaminated samples because they were taken from his soaked clothing. RTC found accused-appellant guilty, hence this petition. ISSUE: (1) Whether or not circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction.

(2) Whether or not the DNA analysis, although resulted to negative due to contamination of smirchy water, can still convict the accused. HELD: (1) YES. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort to circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is unreasonable. Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and (c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt. In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant: (a) during the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an aroma tree; (b) the clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained. The bloodstains on accused-appellant's clothes and on Daisy's clothes were found positive of human blood type "A."; (c) accused-appellant has blood type "O."; and (d) the vaginal swabs from Daisy's body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accused-appellant. (2) Accused-appellant contends that the bloodstains found on his garments were not proven to have been that of the victim as the victim's blood type was not determined. The contention has no merit. The examination conducted by Forensic Biologist Pet Byron Buan of both accused-appellant's and the victim's clothing yielded bloodstains of the same blood type "A". Even if there was no direct determination as to what blood type the victim had, it can reasonably be inferred that the victim was blood type "A" since she sustained contused abrasions all over her body which would necessarily produce the bloodstains on her clothing. That it was the victim's blood which predominantly registered in the examination. DNA is an organic substance found in a person's cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each person's DNA profile is distinct and unique. When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim's body for the suspect's DNA.

This is the evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim. The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample. The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results: 1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires no further analysis or discussion; 2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or 3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion). In such a case, the samples are found to be similar, the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the similarity. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests. In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA, because, as Ms. ViloriaMagsipoc explained: "PROSECUTOR LU: Q: I noticed that specimens 1 to 5 consisting of bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of the accused gave negative results for the presence of human DNA. Why is it so? What is the reason for this when there are still bloodstains on the clothing? A: After this Honorable Court issued an Order for DNA analysis, serological methods were already conducted on the said specimens. And upon inquiry from Mr. Buan and as far as he also knew of this case, and we also interviewed the mother who came over to the laboratory one time on how was the state of the specimens when they were found out. We found that these specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The state of the specimens prior to the DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there before. So when serological methods were done on these specimens, Mr.

Byron could have taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for serological method and were not enough for DNA analysis already. So negative results were found on the clothings that were submitted this was specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir. Q: I also noticed that specimen no. 6-B consisting of the smears taken from the victim also proved negative for human DNA, why is it so? A: Because when we received the vaginal smears submitted by Dr. Vertido, the smear on the slide was very, very dry and could have chipped off. I already informed Dr. Vertido about it and he confirmed the state of the specimen. And I told him that maybe it would be the swab that could help us in this case, Sir. And so upon examination, the smears geared negative results and the swabs gave positive results, Sir. Q: How about specimen no. 7, the hair and nails taken from the victim, why did they show negative results for DNA? A: The hair samples were cut hair. This means that the hair did not contain any root. So any hair that is above the skin or the epidermis of one's skin would give negative results as the hair shaft is negative for DNA. And then the nails did not contain any subcutaneous cells that would be amenable for DNA analysis also, Sir. Q: So it's the inadequacy of the specimens that were the reason for this negative result, not the inadequacy of the examination or the instruments used? A: Yes, Sir." Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated, which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant. PEOPLE vs. MARQUEZ G.R. No. 136736; April 11, 2002 Ponente: Mendoza, J. FACTS: Accused-appellant Jimmy Marquez, together with four John Does, was charged with Robbery with Homicide under Art. 294, par. 1. Accused-appellant was likewise charged with violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearm and Ammunition) under a separate information docketed as Criminal Case No. 10193-SP. The prosecution presented four witnesses: Rizza Cervantes and Jerwin Aclan, eyewitnesses; SPO2 Rolito Alinea, the investigating policeman; and Dr. Azucena I. Bandoy, Assistant City Health Officer of San Pablo City, who prepared the Necropsy Report.

The parties stipulated, subject to the sound discretion of the Court, that the pieces of jewelry and the cash stolen from the victim were worth P2.5 million. Accused-appellant Jimmy Marquezs defense was alibi. After trial, judgment was rendered finding accused-appellant guilty of robbery with homicide in Criminal Case No. 10069-SP but acquitting him of the charge of violation of P.D. No. 1866 in Criminal Case No. 10193-SP. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. HELD: As a preliminary matter, accused-appellant says that the use of DNA testing would prove his innocence. The fact, however, is that there was no DNA test to prove accused-appellants innocence. On the other hand, the evidence on record fully supports the trial courts judgment of conviction. A conviction for robbery with homicide requires proof of the following elements: (a) the taking of personal property with violence or intimidation against persons or with force upon things; (b) the property taken belongs to another; (c) the taking be done with animus lucrandi (intent to gain); and (d) on the occasion of the robbery or by reason thereof, homicide in its generic sense was committed. The offense becomes the special complex crime of robbery with homicide under Art. 294 (1) of Revised Penal Code if the victim is killed on the occasion or by reason of the robbery. Accused-appellants claims are unconvincing. In challenging the finding of the trial court as to the credibility of the prosecutions witnesses, the burden is on the accused to show that the testimonies are untrustworthy. This Court has consistently ruled that in the absence of any fact or circumstance of weight and influence which has been overlooked or the significance of which has been misconstrued by the trial court, appellate courts will not set aside the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court considering that it has heard the witnesses and observed their deportment during the trial. In this case, there is no showing that the trial court overlooked substantial facts so as to justify this Court in setting aside the evaluation of the evidence made by the trial court. Indeed, prosecution witnesses positively and categorically identified accused-appellant as one of the five armed men who held them up on September 22, 1995 and killed the victim. There was no possibility of mistaken identification because accused-appellant and his companions were not wearing masks, and the prosecution witnesses and accused-appellant and his companions were face to face of each other, when the latter carried out their evil plan.

Accused-appellant claims that Rizza Cervantes, as employee of the victim, and Jerwin Aclan, as the victims son, were naturally biased against him and, therefore, their testimonies should not be given credence. The same argument, however, could be made against accused-appellants own brother, Arcadio Marquez, who testified to corroborate accused-appellants alibi. Yet accusedappellant does not say his brothers testimony should not be given weight. Indeed, the relationship per se of the prosecution witnesses to the victim does not give rise to a presumption of bias nor does it ipso facto impair their credibility. There is no legal provision which disqualifies relatives of the victim of a crime from testifying, if they are competent. On the contrary, a relative like Jerwin Aclan should be considered especially qualified because he has an interest in securing the conviction of those who are truly guilty. What will it profit him if the one convicted is innocent? Indeed, in the absence of proof that a witness is moved by improper motive, it is presumed that he was not so moved and, therefore, his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. That presumption has not been overcome in this case, thus Jerwins identification of accused-appellant as the killer of his father stands. It should also be stressed that the motive for the killing is not important when there is no doubt as to the identity of the perpetrators of the crime. Here, however, the motive is plain: the victim was killed to rob him of his jewelry and his money. PEOPLE vs. YATAR G.R. No. 150224; May 19, 2004 Ponente: per curiam FACTS:

IN RE: WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS FOR REYNALDO DE VILLA G.R. No. 158802; November 17, 2004 Ponente: Ynares-Santiago, J.

FACTS: On April 1994, Aileen Mendoza, a 12 year old minor, woke up in her familys rented room in Pasig finding Reynaldo De Villa on top of her. Petitioner De Villa was covering her mouth so she could not shout for help and proceeded to rape her. This incident caused Aileen to get pregnant which was noticed by her mother sometime in November 1994. Only then did Aileen tell her mother that petitioner raped her. Her parents then filed a complaint against De Villa. Dr. Cosidon examined Aileen and confirmed that she was 8 months pregnant and had in her hymen some healed lacerations. On December 1994, she gave birth to a baby girl, Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleged that, at the time of the alleged rape, he was already 67 years old. Old age and sickness had rendered him incapable of having an erection. He also claimed that Aileens family had been holding a grudge against him. Finally, he interposed the defense of alibi, claiming that at the time of the incident, he was in his hometown of San Luis, Batangas. The trial court found petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, and sentenced him to death, to indemnify the victim in the amount of P50,000.00 to pay the costs of the suit and to support the baby. On automatic review, the SC decided that the date of birth of the child is medically consistent with the time of rape and it was never alleged that the birth was not premature or was in full term. The trial court decision was affirmed. Three years after the promulgation of our decision, petitionerrelator, June de Villa, manifests to the court that during the trial of the case, he was unaware that there was a scientific test that could determine once and for all if Reynaldo was the father of the victims child. Petitioner-relator was only informed by the Free Legal Assistance Group (FLAG) during the pendency of the automatic review of petitioners case that DNA testing could resolve the issue of paternity. Thus, petitioner sought the conduct of a blood type test and DNA test in order to determine the paternity of the child. The motion was denied hence, the decision became final and executory. Despite the decision, petitioner-relator asked a certain Billy Joe De Villa, grandson of Reynaldo De Villa and classmate of Leahlyn Mendoza, to ask Leahlyn to spit into a sterile cup so they could get the DNA tested. Leahlyn did what was asked of her. After this, petitioner-relator gathered samples from four grandchildren of Reynaldo de Villa which samples were stored in a refrigerator prior to transport to the DNA Analysis Laboratory at the National Science Research Institute (NSRI). During transport, the containers containing the saliva samples were kept on ice. The NSRI conducted DNA testing on the samples including that given by Reynaldo de Villa himself. The identities of the donors of the samples, save for the sample given by Reynaldo de Villa, were not made known to the DNA Analysis

Laboratory. The DNA Laboratory rendered a preliminary report, which showed that Reynaldo de Villa could not have sired any of the children whose samples were tested, due to the absence of a match between the pertinent genetic markers in petitioners sample and those of any of the other samples, including Leahlyns. Hence, the instant petition for habeas corpus, and new trial. ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be released and acquitted based on the DNA evidence. HELD: Petitioner relies upon the DNA evidence gathered subsequent to the trial in order to re-litigate the factual issue of the paternity of the child Leahlyn Mendoza. Petitioner alleges that this issue is crucial since his paternity is now conclusively disproved, thus the 2001 conviction must be overturned. He invokes the remedy of the writ of habeas corpus to collaterally attack the 2001 Decision. The ancillary remedy of a motion for new trial is resorted to solely to allow the presentation of what is alleged to be newly-discovered evidence. The remedy of the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing. The most basic criterion for the issuance of the writ is that the individual seeking such relief be illegally deprived of his freedom of movement or placed under some form of illegal restraint. If an individuals liberty is restrained via some legal process, the writ of habeas corpus is unavailing, the writ cannot be used to directly assail a judgment rendered by a competent court which, having duly acquired jurisdiction, was not deprived or ousted of this jurisdiction through some anomaly in the conduct of the proceedings. In this case, petitioner invokes the writ of habeas corpus to assail a final judgment of conviction, without providing a legal ground on which to anchor his petition. In fine, petitioner alleges neither the deprivation of a constitutional right, the absence of jurisdiction of the court imposing the sentence, or that an excessive penalty has been imposed upon him. Also, petitioner invokes the remedy of habeas corpus in order to seek the review of findings of fact long passed upon with finality. For all intents and purposes, petitioner seeks a re-evaluation of the evidentiary basis for his conviction. He is asking the court to reexamine the weight and sufficiency of the evidence in this case in light of the new DNA evidence that the petitioner seeks to present to this Court. This relief is outside the scope of a habeas corpus petition. The petition for habeas corpus must, therefore, fail. The writ of habeas corpus cannot be distorted by extending the inquiry to mere errors of trial courts acting squarely within their jurisdiction With regard to the prayer for new trial, it is stressed that the issue of Leahlyn Mendozas paternity is not central to the issue of

petitioners guilt or innocence. The rape of the victim Aileen Mendoza is an entirely different question, separate and distinct from the question of the father of her child the fact or not of the victims pregnancy and resultant child birth are irrelevant in determining whether or not she was raped. Pregnancy is not an essential element of the crime of rape. Whether the child which the victim bore was fathered by the purported rapist, or by some unknown individual, is of no moment in determining an individuals guilt. Even if this issue of filiation be considered, it appears that the petitioner once more relies upon erroneous legal grounds in resorting to the remedy of a motion for new trial. A motion for new trial is available only for a limited period of time, and for very limited grounds, that is, within fifteen (15) days from its promulgation or notice and on the ground of FAME or newly discovered evidence. Upon finality of the judgment, therefore, a motion for new trial is no longer an available remedy. In this instance, although the DNA evidence was undoubtedly discovered after the trial, it is nonetheless found that it does not meet the criteria for newly-discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. Such evidence disproving paternity could have been discovered and produced at trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Petitioner-relators claim that he was unaware of the existence of DNA testing until the trial was concluded carries no weight with this Court. Lack of knowledge of the existence of DNA testing speaks of negligence. It is a settled rule that a party cannot blame his counsel for negligence when he himself was guilty of neglect. HERRERA vs. ALBA G.R. No. 148220; June 15, 2005 Ponente: Carpio, J. FACTS: Thirteen-year old Rosendo Alba, represented by mother Armi Alba, filed a petition for recognition, support and damages against the father, Rosendo Herrera. Herrera denied that he was the biological father of the child, and that he had physical contact with the mother. The court ordered Herrera to take DNA paternity testing. Herrera files a motion for reconsideration on the grounds that: 1) the test is inconclusive, and 2) the test is unconstitutional because it violates his rights against self-incrimination. Trial court denied the motion. The CA affirms the court a quo decision. ISSUE: Whether or not the admissibility of DNA testing is a valid proof of filiation.

HELD: DNA is the fundamental building block of a persons entire genetic make-up. DNA is found in all human cells and is the same in every cell of the same person. Genetic identity is unique. Hence, a persons DNA profile can determine his identity. DNA testing does not violate the constitutional right against self-incrimination. The right applies only to forced communication/testimony obtained by using physical or moral compulsion. A complete match between the DNA profile of the child and the putative father does not necessarily establish paternity. Trial courts require at least 99.9% as minimum value of the probability of paternity. If the value is less than 99.9%, the result is merely a corroborative evidence; and if the value is 99.9% or higher, there is a presumption of paternity, but still subject to being refuted. Philippine courts should follow the Vallejo standard in assessing the probative value of DNA testing as evidence (i.e. In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among other things, the following data: how the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.) Filiation proceedings are usually filed not just to adjudicate paternity but also to secure a legal right associated with paternity, such as citizenship, support (as in the present case), or inheritance. The burden of proving paternity is on the person who alleges that the putative father is the biological father of the child. There are four significant procedural aspects of a traditional paternity action which parties have to face: a prima facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and child. A prima facie case exists if a woman declares that she had sexual relations with the putative father. In our jurisdiction, corroborative proof is required to carry the burden forward and shift it to the putative father. There are two affirmative defenses available to the putative father. The putative father may show incapability of sexual relations with the mother, because of either physical absence or impotency. The putative father may also show that the mother had sexual relations with other men at the time of conception. A child born to a husband and wife during a valid marriage is presumed legitimate. The childs legitimacy may be impugned only under the strict standards provided by law. Finally, physical resemblance between the putative father and child may be offered as part of evidence of paternity. Resemblance is a trial technique unique to a paternity proceeding. However, although

likeness is a function of heredity, there is no mathematical formula that could quantify how much a child must or must not look like his biological father. This kind of evidence appeals to the emotions of the trier of fact. In the present case, the trial court encountered three of the four aspects. Armi Alba, respondents mother, put forward a prima facie case when she asserted that petitioner is respondents biological father. Aware that her assertion is not enough to convince the trial court, she offered corroborative proof in the form of letters and pictures. Petitioner, on the other hand, denied Armi Albas assertion. He denied ever having sexual relations with Armi Alba and stated that respondent is Armi Albas child with another man. Armi Alba countered petitioners denial by submitting pictures of respondent and petitioner side by side, to show how much they resemble each other. Paternity and filiation disputes can easily become credibility contests. TECSON vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 161434; March 3, 2004 Ponente: Vitug, J. FACTS: Ronald Allan Kelly Poe, also known as Fernando Poe, Jr, (FPJ), who was born on August 20, 1939 in Manila, filed a certificate of candidacy for President in the 2004 Election. The petitioners herein alleged that FPJ made a material misrepresentation when he claims that he is natural-born Filipino citizen when his mother, Bessie Kelley Poe, was an American and his father, Allan F. Poe, a Spanish national. It also contended that if Allan F. Poe was a Filipino, FPJ was still disqualified because FPJ was illegitimate child by reason of preexisting marriage of his father with Paulita Gomez when his father married her mother. Petitioners further contend that there is no proof of filiation or paternity between FPJ and Allan F. Poe; hence FPJ must follow the citizenship of his mother, an American citizen. Petitioners herein filed a petition to cancel FPJ certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC, but the latter dismissed the petition. Hence, this petition. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not FPJ was a natural born Filipino citizen. (2) Whether or not DNA Evidence is needed to prove the filiation or paternity of FPJ with Allan F. Poe. HELD: (1) YES. In ascertaining whether grave abuse of discretion has been committed by the COMELEC, it is necessary to take on the matter of whether or not respondent FPJ is a natural-born citizen, which, in turn, depended on whether or not the father of respondent, Allan F. Poe, would have himself been a Filipino citizen and, in the

affirmative, whether or not the alleged illegitimacy of respondent prevents him from taking after the Filipino citizenship of his putative father. Any conclusion on the Filipino citizenship of Lorenzo Pou could only be drawn from the presumption that having died in 1954 at 84 years old, Lorenzo would have been born sometime in the year 1870, when the Philippines was under Spanish rule, and that San Carlos, Pangasinan, his place of residence upon his death in 1954, in the absence of any other evidence, could have well been his place of residence before death, such that Lorenzo Pou would have benefited from the "en masse Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in 1902. That citizenship (of Lorenzo Pou), if acquired, would thereby extend to his son, Allan F. Poe, father of respondent FPJ. The 1935 Constitution, during which regime respondent FPJ has seen first light, confers citizenship to all persons whose fathers are Filipino citizens regardless of whether such children are legitimate or illegitimate. (2) NO. The proof of filiation or paternity for purposes of determining his citizenship status should thus be deemed independent from and not inextricably tied up with that prescribed for civil law purposes. The Civil Code or Family Code provisions on proof of filiation or paternity, although good law, do not have preclusive effects on matters alien to personal and family relations. The ordinary rules on evidence could well and should govern. For instance, the matter about pedigree is not necessarily precluded from being applicable by the Civil Code or Family Code provisions. Section 39, Rule 130, of the Rules of Court provides "Act or Declaration about pedigree. The act or declaration of a person deceased, or unable to testify, in respect to the pedigree of another person related to him by birth or marriage, may be received in evidence where it occurred before the controversy, and the relationship between the two persons is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. The word `pedigree includes relationship, family genealogy, birth, marriage, death, the dates when and the places where these facts occurred, and the names of the relatives. It embraces also facts of family history intimately connected with pedigree." For the above rule to apply, it would be necessary that (a) the declarant is already dead or unable to testify, (b) the pedigree of a person must be at issue, (c) the declarant must be a relative of the person whose pedigree is in question, (d) declaration must be made before the controversy has occurred, and (e) the relationship between the declarant and the person whose pedigree is in question must be shown by evidence other than such act or declaration. Thus, the duly notarized declaration made by Ruby Kelley Mangahas, sister of Bessie Kelley Poe submitted as Exhibit 20 before the COMELEC, might be accepted to prove the acts of Allan F. Poe, recognizing his own paternal relationship with FPJ, i.e., living together with Bessie Kelley and his children (including respondent FPJ) in one house, and as one family.

In case proof of filiation or paternity would be unlikely to satisfactorily establish or would be difficult to obtain, DNA testing, which examines genetic codes obtained from body cells of the illegitimate child and any physical residue of the long dead parent could be resorted to. A positive match would clear up filiation or paternity. In Tijing vs. Court of Appeals this Court has acknowledged the strong weight of DNA testing "Parentage will still be resolved using conventional methods unless we adopt the modern and scientific ways available. Fortunately, we have now the facility and expertise in using DNA test for identification and parentage testing. The University of the Philippines Natural Science Research Institute (UP-NSRI) DNA Analysis Laboratory has now the capability to conduct DNA typing using short tandem repeat (STR) analysis. The analysis is based on the fact that the DNA of a child/person has two (2) copies, one copy from the mother and the other from the father. The DNA from the mother, the alleged father and the child are analyzed to establish parentage. Of course, being a novel scientific technique, the use of DNA test as evidence is still open to challenge. Eventually, as the appropriate case comes, courts should not hesitate to rule on the admissibility of DNA evidence. For it was said, that courts should apply the results of science when competently obtained in aid of situations presented, since to reject said result is to deny progress." PEOPLE vs. RUFINO UMANITO G.R. No. 172607; April 16, 2009 Ponente: Tinga, J. FACTS:

NOVER BRYAN SALVADOR Y DE LEON vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 164266; July 23, 2008 Ponente: Nachura, J. FACTS: Petitioner was the husband of Mary Ann Zuiga, one of the 3 children of spouses Ernesto and Margarita Zuiga. On September 27, 1997, the spouses and daughter Marianne went to Bulacan to attend a wake. Those who were left at home were Mary Ann and Arlene. Petitioner at that asked permission to attend a birthday party. Petitioner returned home with his friend Eduardo Palomares around 9:00 pm to get some karaoke tapes to be used at the party. They thereafter went back to the party and stayed there until 12 midnight before heading back home.

At 4:30 in the morning the following day, the Zuiga spouses and Marianne arrived home. They opened the main door which was then locked. After preparing for sleep, Marianne proceeded to the room which she was sharing with Arlene. There she saw Arlene, who suffered stab wounds, already dead. After seeing Arlenes body, the Zuiga spouses rushed to the room of Mary Ann and the petitioner. While Mary Ann proceeded to Arlenes room, petitioner stayed at the sala and cried. He was later seen embracing Mary Ann and telling her that he was innocent. The police found no forcible entry into the house; no valuables were missing; and no bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlenes room. They likewise discovered, on top of the kitchen table, petitioners underwear, gray t-shirt and short pants. They further found hair strands on Arlenes bed. These pieces of evidence were brought to the laboratory for examination. The underwear and shirt were positive of type O human blood, Arlenes blood type. NBI Forensics conducted a DNA Analysis which yielded positive results of the presence of human DNA in petitioners gray shirt, the strand of hair found on Arlenes bed and the buccal swab of petitioner. Hence, a case was filed against petitioner for homicide. Ill motive established when it was made known to the court that petitioner was peeping through the bathroom and Arlenes room on two occasions while she was taking a bath and while she was inside the room with Marianne. Judgment convicted accused which was affirmed in CA. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not CA committed grave reversible error when it ruled that the most convincing evidence of the prosecution is the result of the DNA Analysis conducted by the NBI Forensic Chemist. HELD: NO. The DNA evidence considered as circumstantial evidence was sufficient to convict petitioner. The rules of evidence allow a trial court to rely on circumstantial evidence to support its conclusion of guilt. Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be established by inference. Conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld, provided that the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion that points to the accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person. In the present case, both the trial and appellate courts considered these pieces of evidence in finding petitioners guilt: 1) the non-employment of force in entering the scene of the crime; 2) no missing personal belongings; 3) the absence of bloodstains in other parts of the house except Arlenes room; 4) petitioners ownership of a balisong, the same weapon used in stabbing the victim; 5) the presence of type "O" human blood on petitioners T-shirt and briefs;

6) the positive result of the DNA analysis using the bloodstains found in petitioners shirt and briefs; and 7) petitioners unusual behavior after the discovery of the victims lifeless body. The DNA analysis made by the NBI expert placed the petitioner at the scene of the crime. Such evidence was considered, together with the other circumstances. The individual pieces of evidence may not be sufficient to point to the accused as the author of the crime. However, when taken together, they are more than enough to establish beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner committed the crime of homicide. We would like to emphasize at this point that the peculiarity of circumstantial evidence is that the guilt of the accused cannot be deduced from scrutinizing just one particular piece of evidence. It is more like a puzzle which, when put together, reveals a remarkable picture pointing towards the conclusion that the accused is the author of the crime.

RULES ON ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE A.M. No. 01-7-01-SC NATIONAL POWER CORP. vs. JUDGE CODILLA G.R. No. 170491; April 4, 2007 Ponente: Chico-Nazario, J. FACTS: M/V Dibena Win, a vessel of foreign registry, was owned and operated by Bangpai Shipping, Co., allegedly bumped and damaged the Power Barge 209 of NPC. For this reason, NPC filed before the Cebu RTC a complaint for damages against Bangpai Shipping Co. for the alleged damages caused on NPCs power barges. NPC filed an Amended Complaint impleading therein Wallem Shipping, Inc., as additional defendant, contending that the latter is a ship agent of Bangpai Shipping Co. Wallem Shipping, Inc. and Bangpai Shipping Co. filed a Motion to Dismiss which was subsequently denied. NPC, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the lower court consisting of Exhibits A to V together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Bangpai Shipping Co. and Wallem Shipping, Inc. filed their respective objections to NPCs formal offer of evidence. RTC denied the admission and excluding from the records NPCs Exhibits A, C, D, E, H and its sub-markings, I, J and its sub-markings, K, L, M and its sub-markings, N and its sub-markings, O, P and its submarkings, Q and its sub-markings, R and S and its submarkings on the ground that NPC never produced the originals. NPC justified the admission of the photocopies the photocopies offered are equivalent to the original of the document on the basis of the Electronic Evidence. RTC held that the Xerox copies do not constitute the electronic evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on

Electronic Evidence. The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically and not authenticated. The RTC also held that the required Affidavit to prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence was not executed, much less presented in evidence. Finally, RTC denied an exhibit for lack of proper identification since the witness who brought these pictures expressly admitted that he was not present when the photos were taken and had not knowledge when the same where taken. NPC filed a Motion for Reconsideration but it was denied. Hence, NPC filed a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 before CA but it was dismissed on the ground that the documentary evidence presented by NPC was not properly identified as the witness did not have personal knowledge of and participation in the preparation and making of the pieces of documentary evidence. CA affirmed the denial of admission of the exhibits as they mere photocopies and not the original documents. CA held that the photocopies could not be considered as original as defined in the Rules of Electronic Evidence. Finally, CA held that NPC had not properly established by affidavit pursuant to Rule 9 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence the admissibility and evidentiary weight of said documentary evidence. Hence, this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the photocopies of documentary evidence presented by NPC are the functional equivalent of their original based on its interpretation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. HELD: No. An electronic document refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression, described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed, which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. The rules use the word information to define an electronic document received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. This would suggest that an electronic document is relevant only in terms of the information contained therein, similar to any other document which is presented in evidence as proof of its contents. However, what differentiates an electronic document from a paper-based document is the manner by which the information is processed; clearly, the information contained in an electronic document is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically.

A perusal of the information contained in the photocopies submitted by petitioner will reveal that not all of the contents therein, such as the signatures of the persons who purportedly signed the documents, may be recorded or produced electronically. A persons signature affixed manually cannot be considered as information electronically received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced. The argument of NPC that since these paper printouts were produced through an electronic process, then the photocopies were electronic documents as defined in the Rules on Electronic Evidence was obviously an erroneous interpretation of the law. As the photocopies were not tantamount to electronic documents, it was consequential that the same may not be considered as the functional equivalent of their original as decreed in the law. The trial court was correct in rejecting these photocopies as they violate the best evidence rule and are therefore of no probative value being incompetent pieces of evidence. The best evidence rule was designed to guard against incomplete or fraudulent proof and the introduction of altered copies and the withholding of the originals. But the justification for the rule has expanded from the prevention of fraud to a recognition that writings occupy a central position in the law. The importance of the precise terms of writings in the world of legal relations, the fallibility of the human memory as reliable evidence of the terms, and the hazards of inaccurate or incomplete duplicate are the concerns addressed by the best evidence rule. Moreover Section 2, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court mandates that original writing must be produced. When the original document has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in the order stated. The offeror of secondary evidence is burdened to prove the predicates thereof: (a) the loss or destruction of the original without bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror which can be shown by circumstantial evidence of routine practices of destruction of documents; (b) the proponent must prove by a fair preponderance of evidence as to raise a reasonable inference of the loss or destruction of the original copy; and (c) it must be shown that a diligent and bona fide but unsuccessful search has been made for the document in the proper place or places. However, in the case at bar, though petitioner insisted in offering the photocopies as documentary evidence, it failed to establish that such offer was made in accordance with the exceptions as enumerated under the above quoted rule.

MCC vs. SSANGYONG CORPORATION G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007 Ponente: Nachura, J. FACTS: MCC is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax. Ssangyong forwarded to MCC Pro Forma Invoice containing the terms and conditions of the transaction. MCC sent back by fax to Ssangyong the invoice bearing the conformity signature of Gregory Chan, the MCC Manager. As stated in the pro forma invoice, payment for the ordered steel products would be made through an irrevocable letter of credit (L/C) at sight in favor of Ssangyong. Later, Ssangyong issued and sent via fax to MCC two Pro Forma Invoices and MCC, after several requests from Ssangyong, finally opened L/C. MCC then faxed to Ssangyong a letter requesting for a price adjustment of the order stated in Pro Forma Invoice but Ssangyong rejected the same and sent a demand letter to Chan for the opening of the second and last L/C since the whole amount involved was not fully covered by the first L/C with a warning that, if the said L/C was not opened by MCC on August 26, 2000, Ssangyong would be constrained to cancel the contract and hold MCC liable for US$64,066.99 and other damages. Chan failed to respond on the demand. Ssangyong then filed civil action for damages alleging that MCC breached the contract when it refused to open the L/C under Pro Forma Invoices. MCC filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. The trial court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary evidence presented had already been admitted and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000 and then rendered a decision in favor of Ssangyong. CA ruled, among others, that Pro Forma Invoices were admissible in evidence, although they were mere facsimile printouts of MCC's steel orders. ISSUE: Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such. HELD:

Although the parties did not raise the question whether the original facsimile transmissions are "electronic data messages" or "electronic documents" within the context of the Electronic Commerce Act (RA 8792), the Court deems it appropriate to determine first whether the said fax transmissions are indeed within the coverage of RA 8792 before ruling on whether the photocopies thereof are covered by the law. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately. When Congress formulated the term "electronic data message," it intended the same meaning as the term "electronic record". This construction of the term "electronic data message," which excludes telexes or faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law's focus on "paperless" communications and the "functional equivalent approach" that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense, "paperless," but verily are paperbased. Accordingly, in an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals. It must also be noted that the phrase "but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy" in the IRR of RA 8792s definition of "electronic data message" is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions RA 8792 were taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 8792 went beyond the parameters of the law when it adopted verbatim the UNCITRAL Model Law's definition of "data message," without considering the intention of Congress when the latter deleted the said phrase. Had the Legislature really wanted ordinary fax transmissions to be covered by the mantle of the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, it could have easily lifted without a bit of tatter the entire wordings of the UNCITRAL Model Law. It is therefore concluded that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission.

Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence. Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoices which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals are not electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts, Ssangyong, failed to explain why the originals of these documents were not presented. Because these documents are mere photocopies, they are simply secondary evidence, admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section 5. Ssangyong likewise did not sufficiently prove the loss or destruction of the originals. Nevertheless, despite the pro forma invoices not being electronic evidence, this Court finds that respondent has proven by preponderance of evidence the existence of a perfected contract of sale. With our finding that there is a valid contract, it is crystal-clear that when petitioner did not open the L/C for the first half of the transaction, despite numerous demands from respondent Ssangyong, petitioner breached its contractual obligation. It is a well-entrenched rule that the failure of a buyer to furnish an agreed letter of credit is a breach of the contract between buyer and seller.