A.

LABOR STANDARDS CASES

1. Emirate Security and Maintenance Systems, Inc. and Roberto Yan vs. Glenda M. Menese, G.R. No. 182848. October 5, 2011 Facts: Menese alleged in the compulsory arbitration proceedings that on April 1, 1999, the agency engaged her services as payroll and billing clerk. She was assigned to the agency's security detachment at the Philippine General Hospital (PGH). She was given a monthly salary of P9,200.00 and an allowance of P2,500.00, for a total of P11,700.00 in compensation. Effective May 2001, her allowance was allegedly reduced to P1,500.00 without notice, and P100.00 was deducted from her salary every month as her contribution to a cash bond which lasted throughout her employment. She was required to work seven (7) days a week, from 8:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. She was also required to report for work on holidays, except on New Year's Day and Christmas. She claimed that she was never given overtime, holiday, rest day and premium pay. Issue: Whether or not Menese would be awarded of overtime pay. Held: While the labor arbiter declared that Menese's claim for overtime pay is unrebutted[44] and,

indeed, nowhere in the petitioners' position paper did they controvert Menese's claim, we hold that the claim must still be substantiated. InGlobal Incorporated v. Commissioner Atienza,[45] a claim for overtime pay will not be granted for want of factual and legal basis. In this respect, the records indicate that the labor arbiter granted Menese's claim for holiday pay, rest day and premium pay on the basis of payrolls.[46] There is no such proof in support of Menese's claim for overtime pay other than her contention that she worked from 8:00 a.m. up to 5:00 p.m. She presented no evidence to show that she was working during the entire one hour meal break. We thus find the NLRC's deletion of the overtime pay award in order. Also, the NLRC noted that the award of P2,600.00 for the refund of the cash bond deposit is overstated and should be adjusted to P600.00 only, as indicated by the payrolls. We likewise find the adjustment in order. All told, except for the above clarifications on the overtime pay award and the refund of the cash bond deposit, we reiterate and so declare the petition to be devoid of merit.

2. BPI Employees Union-Metro Manila, et al. vs. Bank of the Philippine Islands/Bank of the Philippine Islands vs. BPI Employees Union-Metro Manila, et al., G.R. Nos. 178699/178735. September 21, 2011. Facts: On December 14, 1995, Uys services as a bank teller in BPIs Escolta Branch was terminated on

grounds of gross disrespect/discourtesy towards an officer, insubordination and absence without leave. Uy, together with the Union, thus filed a case for illegal dismissal. On December 31, 1997, the Voluntary Arbitrator rendered a Decision finding Uy's dismissal as illegal and ordering BPI to immediately reinstate Uy and to pay her full back wages, including all her other benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) and attorneys fees. On October 28, 1998, the CA affirmed with modification the Decision of the Voluntary Arbitrator. Instead of reinstatement, the CA ordered BPI to pay Uy her separation pay. Further, instead of full back wages, the CA fixed Uy's back wages to three years.[8] The case eventually reached this Court when both parties separately filed petitions for review on certiorari. While BPIs petition which was docketed as G.R. No. 137856 was denied for failure to comply with the requirements of a valid certification of non-forum shopping,[9] Uys and the Unions petition which was docketed as G.R. No. 137863 was given due course. Issue: Whether or not Uy would be entitled for vacation and sick leave Held: BPI contends that at the time of Uys dismissal, she was no longer functioning as a teller

of the bank but as a low-counter staff and as such, Uy is not anymore entitled to the tellers functional allowance pursuant to company policy. BPI further argues that Uy is neither entitled to the monetary conversion of vacation and sick leaves for failure to prove that she is entitled to these benefits at the time of her dismissal. The Supreme Court ruled that Uy is entitled to the tellers functional allowance but not to the monetary conversion of vacation and sick leaves. Uys function as a teller at the time of her dismissal was factually established and was never impugned by the parties during the proceedings held in the main case. Besides, BPI did not present any evidence to substantiate its allegation that Uy was assigned as a low-counter staff at the time of her dismissal. It is a hornbook rule that he who alleges must prove. As to the vacation and sick leave cash conversion benefit, the Supreme Court held that entitlement to the same should be necessarily proved since this privilege is not statutory or mandatory in character but only voluntarily granted.

As such, the existence of this benefit as well as the employees entitlement thereto cannot be presumed but should be proved by the employee. In this case, however, the records failed to prove that Uy was receiving this benefit at the time of her dismissal on December 14, 1995. 3. SLL International Cables Specialist and Sonny L. Lagon v. NLRC, Roldan Lopez, et al., G.R. No. 172161, March 2, 2011 Facts: Sometime in 1996, and January 1997, private respondents Roldan Lopez and Danilo Caete, and Edgardo Zuiga, were hired by petitioner Lagon as apprentice or trainee cable/lineman. The three were paid the full minimum wage and other benefits but since they were only trainees, they did not report for work regularly but came in as substitutes to the regular workers or in undertakings that needed extra workers to expedite completion of work. After their training, Zuiga, Caete and Lopez were engaged as project employees by the petitioners in their Islacom project in Bohol. Private respondents started on March 15, 1997 until December 1997. Upon the completion of their project, their employment was also terminated. Private respondents received the amount of P145.00, the minimum prescribed daily wage for Region VII. In July 1997, the amount of P145 was increased toP150.00 by the Regional Wage Board (RWB) and in October of the same year, the latter was increased to P155.00. Sometime in March 1998, Zuiga and Caete were engaged again by Lagon as project employees for its PLDT Antipolo, Rizal project, which ended sometime in the late September 1998. As a consequence, Zuiga and Caetes employment was terminated. For this project, Zuiga and Caete received only the wage of P145.00 daily. The minimum prescribed wage for Rizal at that time was P160.00. On May 21, 1999, private respondents for the 4th time worked with Lagons project in Camarin, Caloocan City with Furukawa Corporation as the general contractor. Their contract would expire on February 28, 2000, the period of completion of the project. From May 21, 1997-December 1999, private respondents received the wage of P145.00. At this time, the minimum prescribed rate for Manila was P198.00. In January to February 28, the three received the wage ofP165.00. The existing rate at that time was P213.00. For reasons of delay on the delivery of imported materials from Furukawa Corporation, the Camarin project was not completed on the scheduled date of completion.

Faced with economic problems, Lagon was constrained to cut down the overtime work of its workers, including private respondents. Thus, when requested by private respondents on February 28, 2000 to work overtime, Lagon refused and told private respondents that if they insist, they would have to go home at their own expense and that they would not be given anymore time nor allowed to stay in the quarters. This prompted private respondents to leave their work and went home to Cebu. On March 3, 2000, private respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, non-payment of wages, holiday pay, 13th month pay for 1997 and 1998 and service incentive leave pay as well as damages and attorneys fees. In their answers, petitioners admit employment of private respondents but claimed that the latter were only project employees, for their services were merely engaged for a specific project or undertaking and the same were covered by contracts duly signed by private respondents. Petitioners further alleged that the food allowance of P63.00 per day as well as private respondents allowance for lodging house, transportation, electricity, water and snacks allowance should be added to their basic pay. With these, petitioners claimed that private respondents received higher wage rate than that prescribed in Rizal and Manila. Issue: Whether or not allowance for lodging house, transportation, electricity, water and snacks allowance should be added to their basic pay. Held: The Court makes a distinction between facilities and supplements. Supplements constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages. Facilities, on the other hand, are items of expense necessary for the laborers and his familys existence and subsistence so that by express provision of law, they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom, since if they are not so furnished, the laborer would spend and pay for them just the same. In short, the benefit or privilege given to the employee which constitutes an extra remuneration above and over his basic or ordinary earning or wage is supplement; and when said benefit or privilege is part of the laborers basic wages, it is a facility. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or item (food, lodging, bonus or sick leave) given, but in the purpose for which it is given. In the case at bench, the items provided were given freely by petitioner employer for the purpose of

maintaining the efficiency and health of its workers while they were working at their respective projects. Thus, the Court is of the view that the food and lodging, or the electricity and water allegedly consumed by respondents in this case were not facilities but supplements which should not be included in the computation of wages received by respondent employees. 4. RAMY GALLEGO v. BAYER PHILIPPINES INC., et al. 594 SCRA 730 (2009), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered, each case to be determined by its own facts, and all the features of the relationship assessed. Facts: Petitioner Ramy Gallego was contracted by Bayer Philippines Inc. (BAYER) as crop protection technician. When Gallegos employment came to a halt, BAYER reemployed Gallego through Product Image and Marketing Services, Inc. (PRODUCT IMAGE) performing the same tasks as that of a crop protection technician. After a few years, Gallego claims that he was directed to submit a resignation latter, but he refused. He was later on transferred to Luzon; moreover, his co-workers allegedly spread rumors there that he was not anymore connected with BAYER. Believing himself to be illegally dismissed, he filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) claiming he is entitled for reinstatement, backwages, and etc. BAYER denied that existence of an employer-employee relationship between BAYER and Gallego since Gallego was actually under the control and supervision of PRODUCT IMAGE, an independent contractor. The Labor Arbiter found BAYER, et al. guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered the reinstatement of Gallego. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Gallego then appealed to the Court of Appeals via Certiorar , which was dismissed. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether or not PRODUCT IMAGE is a labor-only contractor and BAYER should be deemed Gallegos principal employer. Held: Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job, work, or

service within a definite or predetermined period, regardless of whether such job, work or, service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. Under this arrangement, the following conditions must be met: (a) the contractor carries on a distinct and independent business and undertakes the contract work on his account under his own responsibility according to his own manner and method, free from the control and direction of his employer or principal in all matters connected with the performance of his work except as to the results thereof; (b) the contractor has substantial capital or investment; and (c) the agreement between the principal and contractor or subcontractor assures the contractual employees entitlement to all labor and occupational safety and health standards, free exercise of the right to self-organization, security of tenure, and social welfare benefits. In distinguishing between permissible job contracting and prohibited labor-only contracting, the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case are to be considered, each case to be determined by its own facts, and all the features of the relationship assessed. In the case at bar, the Court finds substantial evidence to support the finding of the NLRC that PRODUCTIMAGE is a legitimate job contractor. The Court notes that PRODUCT IMAGE was issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Certificate of Registration Numbered NCR-8-0602-176. The DOLE certificate having been issued by a public officer, it carries with it the presumption that it was issued in the regular performance of official duty. Gallegos bare assertions fail to rebut this presumption. Further, since the DOLE is the agency primarily responsible for regulating the business of independent job contractors, the Court can presume, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, that it had thoroughly evaluated the requirements submitted by PRODUCT IMAGE before issuing the Certificate of Registration. Independently of the DOLEs Certification, among the circumstances that establish the status of PRODUCT IMAGE as a legitimate job contractor are: ( 1 ) PRODUCT IMAGE had, during the period in question, a contract with BAYER for the promotion and marketing of BAYER products; (2) PRODUCTIMAGE has an independent business and provides services nationwide to big companies such as Ajinomoto Philippines and Procter and Gamble Corporation; and (3) PRODUCT IMAGEs total assets from 1998 to 2000 amounted to P405,639, P559,897, and P644,728, respectively. PRODUCT IMAGE also posted a bondin the amount of P100,000 to answer for any claim of its employees for unpaid wages and other benefits thatmay arise out of the implementation of its contract with BAYER.PRODUCT IMAGE cannot thus be considered a labor-only contractor

5. Kaisahan at Kapatiran ng mga Manggagawa at Kawani sa MWC-East Zone Union and Eduardo Borela, etc. vs. Manila Water Company, Inc., G.R. No. 174179. November 16, 2011. Facts: The Union is the duly-recognized bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of the respondent Manila Water Company, Inc. (Company) while Borela is the Union President. On February 21, 1997, the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) entered into a Concession Agreement (Agreement) with the Company to privatize the operations of the MWSS. Article 6.1.3 of the Agreement provides that the Concessionaire shall grant [its] employees benefits no less favorable than those granted to MWSS employees at the time of [their] separation from MWSS. Among the benefits enjoyed by the employees of the MWSS were the amelioration allowance (AA) and the cost-of-living allowance (COLA) granted in August 1979, pursuant to Letter of Implementation No. 97 issued by the Office of the President. The payment of the AA and the COLA was discontinued pursuant to Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law, which integrated the allowances into the standardized salary. Nonetheless, in 2001, the Union demanded from the Company the payment of the AA and the COLA during the renegotiation of the parties Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). Thereafter, the Company integrated the AA into the monthly payroll of all its employees beginning August 1, 2002, payment of the AA and the COLA after an appropriation was made and approved by the MWSS Board of Trustees. The Company, however, did not subsequently include the COLA since the Commission on Audit disapproved its payment because the Company had no funds to cover this benefit. As a result, the Union and Borela filed on April 15, 2003 a complaint against the Company for payment of the AA, COLA, moral and exemplary damages, legal interest, and attorneys fees before the National Labor Relations Commission Issue: Whether or not attorneys fees would be awarded in the instant case Held: There are two commonly accepted concepts of attorneys fees the ordinary and extraordinary. In its ordinary concept, an attorneys fee is the reasonable compensation paid to a lawyer by his client for the legal services the former renders; compensation is paid for the cost

and/or results of legal services per agreement or as may be assessed. In its extraordinary concept, attorneys fees are deemed indemnity for damages ordered by the court to be paid by the losing party to the winning party. This is payable not to the lawyer but to the client, unless the client and his lawyer have agreed that the award shall accrue to the lawyer as additional or part of his compensation. Article 111 of the Labor Code, as amended, contemplates the extraordinary concept of attorneys fees. Although an express finding of facts and law is still necessary to prove the merit of the award, there need not be any showing that the employer acted maliciously or in bad faith when it withheld the wages. Thus the SC concluded that the CA erred in ruling that a finding of the employers malice or bad faith in withholding wages must precede an award of attorneys fees under Article 111 of the Labor Code. To reiterate, a plain showing that the lawful wages were not paid without justification is sufficient. One of the issues of this case involved the effect of the Memorandum of Agreement provision that attorneys fees shall be deducted from the amelioration allowance (AA) and CBA receivables. In this regard, the CA held that the additional grant of 10% attorneys fees by the NLRC violates Article 111 of the Labor Code, considering that the MOA between the parties already ensured the payment of 10% attorneys fees deductible from the AA and CBA receivables of the Unions members. In the present case, the Union bound itself to pay 10% attorneys fees to its counsel under the MOA and also gave up the attorneys fees awarded to the Unions members in favor of their counsel. The award by the NLRC cannot be taken to mean an additional grant of attorneys fees, in violation of the ten percent (10%) limit under Article 111 of the Labor Code since it rests on an entirely different legal obligation than the one contracted under the MOA. Simply stated, the attorneys fees contracted under the MOA do not refer to the amount of attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC; the MOA provision on attorneys fees does not have any bearing at all to the attorneys fees awarded by the NLRC under Article 111 of the Labor Code. Based on these considerations, it is clear that the CA erred in ruling that the LAs award of attorneys fees violated the maximum limit of ten percent (10%) fixed by Article 111 of the Labor Code

B. LABOR RELATIONS CASES

1. E.G. & I. Construction Corporation and Edsel Galeos v. Ananias P. Sato, et al., G.R. No. 182070, February 16, 2011. Facts: Nilo Berdin was hired by petitioners in March 1991 as a steelman/laborer; Anecito S. Parantar, Sr. was hired in February 1997 as a steelman; and Romeo M. Lacida, Jr. was hired in March 2001 as a laborer.At the start of their employment, they were required by petitioners to sign several documents purporting to be employment contracts. They immediately signed the documents without verifying their contents for fear of forfeiting their employment.

Respondents were required to work from 7:00 a.m. until 5:00 p.m. While in the employ of petitioners, they devoted their time exclusively in the service of petitioners and were assigned to various construction projects of petitioners. On July 24, 2004, the project engineer of respondents Berdin, Parantar, and Lacida instructed them to affix their signatures on various documents. They refused to sign the documents because they were written in English, a language that they did not understand. Irked by their disobedience, the project engineer terminated their employment. On the same date, they were given their weekly wages. However, the wages that were paid to them were short of three (3) days worth of wages, as penalty for their refusal to sign the documents. The following day, they were not allowed to enter the work premises. On July 26, 2004, respondents filed their respective complaints with the Regional Arbitration Branch of Cebu City for illegal dismissal, underpayment of wages (wage differentials), holiday pay, thirteenth (13th) month pay, and service incentive leave pay. Petitioners, on the other hand, admitted that respondents were employed by them and were assigned in their various construction projects. However, they denied that they illegally terminated respondents employment. According to petitioners, respondents abandoned their work when they failed to report for work starting on July 22, 2004. Petitioner corporation sent letters advising respondents to report for work, but they refused. Petitioner corporation maintained that respondents are still welcome, if they desire to work. Issue: Whether or not there was abandonment on the part of the respondent. Held: The Court held that for abandonment to exist, it is essential (a) that the employee must have failed to report for work or must have been absent without valid or justifiable reason; and (b) that there must have been a clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship manifested by some overt acts. The employer has the burden of proof to show the employees deliberate and unjustified refusal to resume his employment without any intention of returning. Mere absence is not sufficient. There must be an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue his employment. Based on the evidence presented, the reason why respondents failed to report for work was because petitioner-corporation barred them from entering its construction sites. It is a settled rule that failure to report for work after a notice to return to work has been served does not

necessarily constitute abandonment. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. Petitioner-corporation failed to show overt acts committed by respondents from which it may be deduced that they had no more intention to work. Respondents filing of the case for illegal dismissal barely four (4) days from their alleged abandonment is totally inconsistent with the known concept of what constitutes abandonment.

2. Atlanta Industries, Inc. and/or Robert Chan vs. Aprilito R. Sebolino, et al., G.R. No. 187320, January 26, 2011. Facts: In the months of February and March 2005, complainants Aprilito R. Sebolino, Khim V. Costales, Alvin V. Almoite, Joseph S. Sagun, Agosto D. Zao, Domingo S. Alegria, Jr., Ronie Ramos, Edgar Villagomez, Melvin Pedregoza, Teofanes B. Chiong, Jr., Leonardo L. dela Cruz, Arnold A. Magalang, and Saturnino M. Mabanag filed several complaints for illegal dismissal, regularization, underpayment, nonpayment of wages and other money claims, as well as claims for moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees against the petitioners Atlanta Industries, Inc. (Atlanta) and its President and Chief Operating Officer Robert Chan. Atlanta is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel pipes. The complaints were consolidated and were raffled to Labor Arbiter Daniel Cajilig, but were later transferred to Labor Arbiter Dominador B. Medroso, Jr. The complainants alleged that they had attained regular status as they were allowed to work with Atlanta for more than six (6) months from the start of a purported apprenticeship agreement between them and the company. They claimed that they were illegally dismissed when the apprenticeship agreement expired. In defense, Atlanta and Chan argued that the workers were not entitled to regularization and to their money claims because they were engaged as apprentices under a government-approved apprenticeship program. The company offered to hire them as regular employees in the event vacancies for regular positions occur in the section of the plant where they had trained. They also claimed that their names did not appear in the list of employees (Master List)[5] prior to their engagement as apprentices.

Issue: Whether or not the complainants are already regular employees Held: The apprenticeship agreements did not indicate the trade or occupation in which the apprentice would be trained; neither was the apprenticeship program approved by the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA). These were defective as they were executed in violation of the law and the rules. Moreover, with the expiration of the first agreement and the retention of the employees, the employer, to all intents and purposes, recognized the completion of their training and their acquisition of a regular employee status. To foist upon them the second apprenticeship agreement for a second skill which was not even mentioned in the agreement itself, is a violation of the Labor Codes implementing rules and is an act manifestly unfair to the employees. 3. Jose Mel Bernante vs. Philippine Basketball Association, et al., G.R. No. 192084. September 14, 2011. Facts: Complainants (Jose Mel Bernarte and Renato Guevarra) aver that they were invited to join

the PBA as referees. During the leadership of Commissioner Emilio Bernardino, they were made to sign contracts on a year-to-year basis. During the term of Commissioner Eala, however, changes were made on the terms of their employment. Complainant Bernarte, for instance, was not made to sign a contract during the first conference of the All-Filipino Cup which was from February 23, 2003 to June 2003. It was only during the second conference when he was made to sign a one and a half month contract for the period July 1 to August 5, 2003. On January 15, 2004, Bernarte received a letter from the Office of the Commissioner advising him that his contract would not be renewed citing his unsatisfactory performance on and off the court. It was a total shock for Bernarte who was awarded Referee of the year in 2003. He felt that the dismissal was caused by his refusal to fix a game upon order of Ernie De Leon. On the other hand, complainant Guevarra alleges that he was invited to join the PBA pool of referees in February 2001. On March 1, 2001, he signed a contract as trainee. Beginning 2002, he signed a yearly contract as Regular Class C referee. On May 6, 2003, respondent Martinez issued a memorandum to Guevarra expressing dissatisfaction over his questioning on the

assignment of referees officiating out-of-town games. Beginning February 2004, he was no longer made to sign a contract. Respondents aver, on the other hand, that complainants entered into two contracts of retainer with the PBA in the year 2003. The first contract was for the period January 1, 2003 to July 15, 2003; and the second was for September 1 to December 2003. After the lapse of the latter period, PBA decided not to renew their contracts. Complainants were not illegally dismissed because they were not employees of the PBA. Their respective contracts of retainer were simply not renewed. PBA had the prerogative of whether or not to renew their contracts, which they knew were fixed. In her 31 March 2005 Decision, the Labor Arbiter declared petitioner an employee whose dismissal by respondents was illegal. Accordingly, the Labor Arbiter ordered the reinstatement of petitioner and the payment of backwages, moral and exemplary damages and attorneys fees In its 28 January 2008 Decision, the NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiters judgment. Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, which overturned the decisions of the NLRC and Labor Arbiter. Issue: Whether or not there is employer- employee relationship. Held: To determine the existence of an employer-employee relationship, case law has consistently applied the four-fold test. Respondents argue that the element of control is lacking in this case, making petitioner-referee an independent contractor and not an employee of respondents. The Supreme Court agreed as it found that there was no control over the means and methods by which petitioner performs his work as a referee officiating a PBA basketball game. The contractual stipulations in the retainer contracts do not pertain to, much less dictate, how and when petitioner will blow the whistle and make calls. On the contrary, they merely serve as rules of conduct or guidelines in order to maintain the integrity of the professional basketball league. Moreover, the following circumstances indicate that petitioner is an independent contractor: (1) the referees are required to report for work only when PBA games are scheduled, which is three times a week spread over an average of only 105 playing days a year, and they officiate games at an average of two hours per game; and (2) the only deductions from the fees received by the referees are withholding taxes. There are no deductions for contributions to the Social Security System,

Philhealth or Pag-Ibig, which are the usual deductions from employees salaries. These undisputed circumstances buttress the fact that petitioner is an independent contractor, and not an employee of respondents. WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals.SO ORDERED.

4. Miguel Dela Pena Barairo vs. Office of the President and MST Marine Services (Phils.) Inc., G.R. No. 189314. June 15, 2011. Facts: Miguel Barairo was hired on June 29, 2004 by respondent MST Marine Services (Phils.)

Inc., (MST) for its principal, TSM International, Ltd., as Chief Mate of the vessel Maritina, for a contract period of six months. He boarded the vessel and discharged his duties on July 23, 2004, but was relieved on August 28, 2004 ostensibly for transfer to another vessel, Solar. Petitioner thus disembarked in Manila on August 29, 2004. Petitioner was later to claim that he was not paid the promised stand-by fee in lieu of salary that he was to receive while awaiting transfer to another vessel as in fact the transfer never materialized. On October 20, 2004, petitioner signed a new Contract of Employment for a six-month deployment as Chief Mate in a newly-built Japanese vessel, M/THaruna. He was paid a onemonth standby fee in connection with the Maritina contract. Petitioner boarded the M/T Haruna on October 31, 2004 but he disembarked a week later as MST claimed that his boarding of M/T Haruna was a sea trial which, MST maintains, was priorly made known to him on a stand-by fee. MST soon informed petitioner that he would be redeployed to the M/T Haruna on November 30, 2004, but petitioner refused, prompting MST to file a complaint for breach of contract against him before the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Petitioner claimed, however, that he was placed on forced vacation when he was made to disembark from the M/T Haruna, and that not wanting to experience a repetition of the previous termination of his employment aboard the Maritina, he refused to be redeployed to the M/T Haruna.

By Order of April 5, 2006, then POEA Administrator Rosalinda D. Baldoz penalized petitioner with one year suspension from overseas deployment upon a finding that his refusal to complete his contract aboard the M/T Haruna constituted a breach thereof. On appeal by petitioner, the Secretary of Labor, by Order of September 22, 2006, noting that it was petitioners first offense, modified the POEA Order by shortening the period of suspension from one year to six months. The Office of the President (OP), by Decision of November 26, 2007, dismissed petitioners appeal for lack of jurisdiction Issue: Whether or not the appeal made by the petitioner to the office of the president is valid Held: The Supreme Court ruled that petitioners appeal was erroneous. The proper remedy to

question the decisions or orders of the Secretary of Labor is via Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65. Appeals to the OP in labor cases have been eliminated, except those involving national interest over which the President may assume jurisdiction. The present case does not affect national interest. Hence, petitioners appeal to the OP did not toll the running of the period and the assailed decision of the Secretary of Labor is deemed to have attained finality.
5. James Ben L. Jerusalem v. Keppel Monte Bank, et al., G.R. No. 169564. April 6, 2011.

Facts: James Ben L. Jerusalem (James) was employed by Keppel Monte Bank (Keppel) on May 25, 1998 as Assistant Vice-President. On June 1, 1998, he was assigned as Head of the newly created VISA Credit Card Department. His employment was terminated on the ground of willful breach of trust and confidence for endorsing VISA card applicants who later turned out to be impostors resulting in financial losses to respondent bank. Issue: Whether or not James Ben L. Jerusalem was illegally dismissed. Held: The court held that petitioner was illegally dismissed. As provided in Article 282 of the

Labor Code, an employer may terminate an employees employment for fraud or willful breach of trust reposed in him. However, in order to constitute a just cause for dismissal, the act complained of must be work-related such as would show the employee concerned to be unfit to continue working for the employer. The act of betrayal of trust, if any, must have been committed by the

employee in connection with the performance of his function or position. The court found that the element of work-connection was not present in this case since petitioner was assigned under the Jewelry department, and therefore had nothing to do with the approval of VISA Cards, which was under a different department altogether.