Japan Dump Space is incredibly expensive.

Logan 10 - Former Chief of Medical Operations, NASA (James, Turning Dust to Gold: Building a Future on the Moon and Mars, 2010, 265. Space is too expensive. NASA was supposed to solve the 'cheap, reliable, robust' access to space problem. It failed miserably and continues to fail. The Shuttle is almost three times as expensive on a cost-per-pound basis to LEO as was the Saturn V ($4166 per pound vs. the Shuttle's $12,500 per pound in real dollars). Everything the Shuttle has ever launched into space is worth more than twice its weight in gold -- and that's just the transportation costs!

Japan is in a state of national insecurity Korea is on the verge of attack; stabilization is key for prevention Gleis 3-18-11, Joshua, political analyst for Huffington Post Japan May Have Another Nuclear Crisis to Worry About in North Korea Huffington Post http://www.huffingtonpost.com/joshua-gleis/japanmay-have-another-nu_b_837801.html NH)
The world is witnessing an unprecedented series of catastrophes taking place in Japan. A massive earthquake and powerful aftershocks, followed by waves of tsunamis and subsequent nuclear calamities have left the entire world in a state of shock. Japan was arguably the best prepared country in the world for such events, yet even it is wholly overwhelmed at the moment. The United States has been the leading country assisting its ally, using naval assets and other military forces from nearby US bases.

Tertrais 1 (Bruno, Lecturer in World Politics at the Institute dEtudes Politiques in Paris, works as Special Assistant to the Director of Strategic Affairs at the French Ministry of Defense, US MISSILE DEFENCE Strategically sound, politically questionable, April, http://www.cer.org.uk/pdf/cerwp11.pdf) A regional power (for example, North Korea) would be more likely than a major power to actually fire its ballistic missiles. As two US experts point out, rogue states with small arsenals would be far more vulnerable to a disarming US pre-emptive strike, giving them a more sensitive

trigger finger than Russia or China. 4 Regional powers are much more vulnerable to the classic use them or lose them dilemma. Also, a country that faces the risk of being totally destroyed a real possibility if it became embroiled in a major war with the US might have nothing to lose by launching one or several missiles on US territory. Therefore, the risk of such a country deciding to fire its missiles, once conflict has erupted, is real

China Shift Relations high nowconsultations prove Xinhua 10/11China, U.S. hold consultation on Asia-Pacific affairs, Embassy of the Peoples Republic of China in the United States of America, http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/gdxw/t866433.htm BEIJING, Oct. 11 (Xinhua) -- China and the United States ... affairs in Hawaii in June.
EIJING, Oct. 11 (Xinhua) -- China and the United States on Tuesday held their second consultation on Asia-Pacific affairs, during which both sides agreed to jointly maintain regional stability and cooperation.A press release issued after the closed-door consultation said the two countries shoulder common responsibilities and share common interests in maintaining regional stability, promoting economic development, dealing with security challenges and promoting regional cooperation..The Chinese side conveyed its concern regarding several issues that may affect bilateral ties with the United States.The Chinese side said that maintaining the sound and stable development of China-U.S. ties is an important requirement for dialogues and cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region, according to the release.The Chinese side spoke highly of the progress of bilateral relations since President Hu Jintao's U.S. visit in January.However, it also voiced strong dissatisfaction and firm opposition to the U.S.'s "interference in China's domestic affairs and infringement upon China's interests," referring to issues surrounding Taiwan, Tibet and the valuation of China's currency, the press release said.China values its cooperative partnership with the United States, which was settled by the leaders of both countries during Hu's visit, the press release said.China hopes the United States will respect China's core interests and concerns and cooperate with the Chinese side to promote the sound and stable development of bilateral ties, the press release said.The U.S. side said it attaches high importance to its relationship with China and is committed to its sound and stable

development, the press release said.The U.S. side also expressed welcome and support for the peaceful development of crossStrait relations. It will handle its relationship with China from a strategic point of view and strengthen cooperation with China to properly handle disputes, according to the press release.China also reiterated its stance regarding the South China Sea issue during the consultation.The two countries held their first consultation on Asia-Pacific affairs in Hawaii in June.

China views space as zero-sum; this increases the likelihood of a space war. Yali and Blair 06 (Blair, Bruce and Chen Yali. "The Space Security Dilemma." China Security. Vol. 1, No. 2 (2006): 2-15. Blair is the president of the World Security Institute, and Yali is the editor-in-chief of Washington Observer Weekly.)
A zero-sum mindset toward space is hardening in China as a result of this apprehension, as amply illustrated in the public media. Space is eyed in China as an area of resources and possibilities to be acquired before its too late. Shu Xing, whose book is reviewed later in this journal, likens the grabbing of satellite orbits to the Enclosure Movement in late 18 th Century England in which the more capability one has, the more resources one can seize. Another reviewed author argued that countries scramble into space to fight for the tremendous resources found there and once this fight for resources causes irreconcilable conflicts, it may lead to radical space confrontations. A space war seems to many Chinese to be another form of resource war. Such urgency in seeking control over resources is not unique to space, but also applies to energy and other areas. Given Chinas population and rapid economic growth, controlling resources is understandably a paramount concern. Regarding space, however, a zero-sum (win-lose) attitude is narrow-minded and misguided. If feverish competition for resources in space causes Sino-American relations to deteriorate or leads to the outbreak of war between them, then both

parties

lose

Increased pressure causes China to reciprocate conventionally- undermines diplomacy and provokes miscalculation Twomey 09--, National Security Affairs Dept. Assistant Professor, Contemporary Conflict Center Co-Director, Chris, Feb, "Chinese-U.S. Strategic Affairs: Dangerous Dynamism," http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2009_0102/china_us_dangerous_dynamism, access 9/6/10 EL China and the United States... stability in an intense crisis.
Further, the dangers of inadvertent escalation have been exacerbated by some of these moves. Chinese SSBN deployment will stress an untested command-and-control system. Similar dangers in the Cold War were mitigated, although not entirely overcome, over a period of decades of development of personnel and technical solutions. China appears to have few such controls in place today. U.S. deployment of highly accurate nuclear warheads is consistent with a first-strike doctrine and seems sized for threats larger than "rogue" nations. These too would undermine stability in an intense crisis.

Taiwan is the biggest impact most likely scenario for global nuclear escalation Ikegami 8 (Dr. Masako, Professor of Sociology and Peace & Conflict Studies and Director of the Center for Pacific Asia Studies Stockholm University Time for Conflict Prevention Across the Taiwan Strait, China Brief, 8(7), 3-28, http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=48 22)
Indeed, a cross-Strait conflict is potentially one of the most dangerous conflicts involving two major nuclear powers, in which the risk of escalation, in the worst case, cannot exclude strategic nuclear exchange. Thus, it is understandable that many countries make such a statement of neutrality or remain bystanders. The location of Taiwan, however, in the midst of the vital sea lines of communications (SLOCs), any level of armed conflict will inevitably envelop an international affair with global consequences, economically, politically and militarily. By nature, a cross-Strait conflict cannot be a limited theatre of war. Therefore, it would greatly improve conflict prevention if NATO could at a minimum maintain its own version of strategic ambiguity to make Beijings calculation of using force more difficult, less optimistic, and thereby more prudent [9]. The recent large-scale naval exercise conducted by the United States, Japanese, Australian, Indian and Singaporean navies in September 2007 might have aimed at such a signaling effect toward China. It will also be constructive if Europe, together with other Western countries, were to make Beijing understand that any armed attack on Taiwan would lead to worldwide criticism and boycotts of Chinese products.

DoD Tradeoff The next generation bomber is currently funded, however defense spending has been frozen meaning any new spending would have to trade off CFR 2/13 Council on Foreign Relations, (2/13/12, A Defense Budget at the Crossroads, http://www.cfr.org/us-strategy-andpolitics/defense-budget-crossroads/p27318)JCP
Budgeting broadly reflects a new focus on the Asia-Pacific region and the Pentagon's growing embrace of the adaptable, expeditionary strengths of the Navy and Air Force. The Navy is set to maintain its current fleet of eleven aircraft carriers and ten air wings, and receive enhancements in the cruise missile capacity of its submarines. Funding will be sustained for the Air Force's nextgeneration long-range bomber as well as sixty-five drone patrols, with a capacity to expand to eighty-five. Financing is protected for ongoing counterterrorism efforts, including special operations forces (CNN), which have nearly doubled since 2001, and new unmanned ISR systems (intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance). Mounting concerns over the security of the Pentagon's

digital networks made cyber operations one of the few areas where funding actually increased. The so-called nuclear triad--strategic bombers, ballistic missile submarines, and intercontinental missiles--are also preserved. The transition away from troop-intensive counterinsurgencies in Iraq and Afghanistan will come with commensurate reductions in the Army and Marine Corps. Two army heavy brigades are slated to be withdrawn from Europe as part of the planned elimination of no less than eight brigade combat teams. The total active army will shrink from a peak of roughly 570,000 in 2010 to 490,000 by 2017. Meanwhile, Marine Corps numbers are expected to recede from 202,000 to 182,000, shedding at least one of nine infantry regiments. Procurement of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter will face delays--the previously scheduled purchase of forty-two aircraft for 2013 will be cut to just twenty-nine. Military pay and benefits, which account for about a third of the defense budget, will also face reductions. The Pentagon may also try to carve out some additional savings through another round of base closures (BostonHerald), but the proposal is likely to face significant opposition in Congress.

A next generation bomber is vital to preventing the collapse of nuclear deterrence Sirak, 9 senior editor of Air Force Magazine (Michael, Like SAC Air Force Magazine, June, http://www.airforcemagazine.com/MagazineArchive/Pages/2009/June%202009/0609SA C.aspx)
The Air Force has done a good job in upgrading its B-2 and B-52 fleets, Elder said, but gradual losses in capability will degrade the bomber legs deterrent as time goes on. ... The Air Forces reliable but lumbering B-52s are already limited to low-threat environments, while the stealthy B-2s, of which only 20 airframes exist, are considered a nighttime-only system in high-threat environments..

Maintaining credible nuclear deterrence prevents the collapse of civilization Schneider, 8 - Senior Analyst with the National Institute for Public Policy, Ph.D in history at the University of Southern California and JD from George Washington University, former senior officer in the DoD in positions relating to arms control and nuclear weapons policy. (Mark, The Future of the U.S. Nuclear Deterrent, Comparative

The United States must maintain an effective nuclear deterrent because, without it, the U.S. could be destroyed as an industrial civilization, and our conventional forces could be defeated by a state with grossly inferior conventional capability but powerful weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Both Russia and China have the nuclear potential to destroy the U.S. (and our allies) and are modernizing their forces with the objective of targeting the U.S. missile defenses and conventional strike capabilities, while critically important elements of deterrence and national power simply cannot substitute for nuclear deterrence. In light of the emerging strategic partnership between Russia and China and their emphasis on nuclear weapons, it would be foolish indeed to size U.S. strategic nuclear forces as if the only threat we face is that of rogue states and discard the requirement that the U.S. nuclear deterrent be second to none.

START European missile defense puts Russias participation in the START treaty on the brink RIA Novasti 12/8 (Russian Newspaper, Medvedev's missile shield remarks may be election rhetoric - NATO chief, December 8, 2011, http://en.ria.ru/world/20111208/169468939.html ACS)
In his address to the nation on November 23, Medvedev said that if Moscow's participation in the European missile defense project fails, Russia would deploy Iskander tactical missiles in the Kaliningrad Region and halt its disarmament and arms control efforts, including participation in the new strategic arms reduction treaty with the United States.

The NATO secretary general said...treaty with the United States.

SBMD will cause Russia to withdraw from START Friedman 11 Research Intern for the Project on Nuclear Issues (Jonah, May 25, Why Numbers Matter, http://csis.org/blog/whynumbers-matter ACS)

Last week Russian General Andrei...may need to be reconsidered.

Last week Russian General Andrei Tretyak, head of the Armed Forces General Staff Main Operations Directorate, made about the threat posed to Russia by U.S. missile defense plans. In it, he claimed that the real danger to Russias nuclear deterrent would come after 2015, when the United States deploys its new version of the SM-3 missile, as well as 40 ships thus equipped bringing the total number of interceptors to 400. These figures mirror those given by the director of the Missile Defense Agency in congressional testimony last year. Although it seems highly unlikely that the U.S. would station the entirety of its BMD-capable ships in Europe, it could potentially send them there in the event of a crisis. So what? some would argue. Under the terms of the New START treaty Russia can maintain 1,550 deployed warheads, so why should they care about 400 interceptors (especially given that 400 interceptors does not necessarily entail 400 hits, something which both sides know)? For one thing, it seems as though what the Russians really fear is not U.S. capabilities today (or even in 2015), but U.S. capabilities further in the future. They figure that if the United States can field 400 interceptors by 2015, what is to stop it from deploying 800 by 2020 or 1,200 by 2025? Such an expansion would certainly start to undermine Russias nuclear deterrent. Another reason why 400 interceptors might be cause for concern in Moscow is also related to future U.S. capabilities. According to the MDA website The MDA plans to develop and test several new technologies designed to intercept and destroy ballistic missiles during the ascent phase of flight, providing increased flexibility and targeting opportunitiesBy leveraging Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and space assets for pervasive over-the-horizon sensor netting, the engagement zone of current Standard Missile-3 interceptors can be extended to the pre-apogee portion of a missiles trajectory. At current, U.S. missile defenses are geared towards targeting missiles in the mid-course or terminal phases of their trajectory, after warhead(s) separation. This means that if a conflict were to erupt between Russia and the U.S./NATO today, some 1,500 warheads would have to be met by 400 interceptors. Add countermeasures to the equation and it becomes difficult to see how the interceptors could prevail. However, even 400 interceptors could cause serious crisis instability, since the Russians would be facing a worst-case scenario of losing about a quarter of their warheads. Moreover, if the United States were to develop the capability to effectively target missiles prior to warhead separation, it would only need to contend with the 700 deployed launchers allowed by the New START treaty. Although some of those 700 launchers would include bombers and SLBMs, the threat that 400 interceptors (or more in the future) could pose to Russias silo-based ICBMs could start to undermine Russias deterrent. For its part, Russia has been loudly warning lately that if no agreement can be found on missile defense, it will resort to augmenting its nuclear strike capabilities, and may even withdraw from the New START treaty. Although abrogation of the treaty seems unlikely, and modernization of Russias nuclear forces may still suffer funding setbacks (partly due to corruption), these are not threats which can be totally ignored. It is important for the United States to consider the impact its missile defense policies will have on the strategic calculations of other nuclear powers such as Russia. BMD systems which target missiles in their mid-course or terminal phases would be less worrying to Moscow, yet still capable of defending against limited and unsophisticated attacks from Iran or North Korea. If the pursuit of certain missile defense capabilities serves to increase tensions in the U.S.-Russia relationship, that pursuit may need to be reconsidered.

The impact is accidental nuclear war via nuclear reductions and cooperative relationsSTART is key

Rojansky and Collins 10 (Matthew and James, executive director of the Partnership for a Secure America + director of the Russia and Eurasia program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, "START is key to reducing the nuclear threat," http://thehill.com/opinion/op-ed/81321-start-is-key-to-reducing-thenuclear-threat?tmpl=component&print=1&page=)

both hawks and doves have missed an urgent point: that without a new treaty, Washington will be unable to manage the risks associated with Russias vast nuclear arsenal, which still poses the single greatest existential threat to the United States.

With around 4,000 deployed nuclear warheads, a staggering 1,000 tons of weapons-grade nuclear material, hundreds of deployed ballistic missiles and thousands of experts with the knowledge to construct such systems from scratch, Russia is still potentially the worlds nuclear supermarket. Agreements governing these arsenals are essential to preventing the many national security nightmares of nuclear proliferation to rogue states and terrorist groups from becoming realities. To protect America, we must agree to, and verify, limits on what the Russians have, know how they are using it, and take adequate steps to ensure that devastating weapons and dangerous materials remain safe from terrorist theft. As of Dec. 5, 2009, when the 1991 START agreement expired, we lack any enforceable, verifiable treaty to provide that level of information. We need a new treaty in force not only to plug holes left gaping by the old treatys expiration, but also to increase our security by imposing further limits on what new nuclear weapons the Russians can develop and deploy. A successor to START would likely lower the maximum number of deployed strategic nuclear warheads allowed to between 1,500 and 1,675 on each side still enough to destroy the world many times over, but far below the 6,000 allowed under the old treaty. Strategic delivery vehicles missiles, bombers and nuclear missile submarines will be further cut from 1,600 to around 800. Reducing Russias nuclear arsenal and taking missile launchers in both countries off alert reduces the likelihood of accidental nuclear war, keeping Americans safer. Verified and permanent reductions in the Russian nuclear arsenal will dramatically reduce the number of targets for potential theft or diversion of nuclear technology to terrorists. Over the past two decades, the U.S. has invested at least $10 billion to ensure security for Russian and former Soviet nuclear material, technologies, facilities, and individual experts under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction and other bilateral and multilateral programs. These programs have helped to deactivate over 7,500 former Soviet nuclear warheads, destroy over 2,000 missiles, and eliminate over 1,100 missile launchers. But without a comprehensive U.S.-Russian arms control agreement in place, steps like these could be totally nullified by production of new nuclear materials, weapons and launchers without any U.S. or international monitoring. Even after a new treaty enters into force, the U.S. and Russia will possess the worlds largest nuclear arsenals by a wide margin. And as long as nuclear weapons exist, leaders across the political spectrum

concur, the U.S. must maintain the worlds strongest, safest and most reliable arsenal. Yet in addition to reducing the size of the threat itself, a new agreement would be beneficial for increasing regular engagement between the U.S. and Russia on strategic issues, which will help build mutual understanding, and avert needless suspicion and conflict. Two decades after the end of the Cold War, Americans and Russians are increasingly intertwined in global financial and energy markets, and we share immediate and vital national security interests in preventing terrorism, state failure and drug trafficking throughout the Eurasian region. Yet our communication on security issues has been in dangerous decline for the past decade. In a sense, this should come as no surprise, since the most recent comprehensive U.S.-Russian security treaty was actually signed by the United States and the Soviet Union, which no longer exists. Any reset that puts U.S.-Russian relations on a more productive footing will depend first and foremost on forging a durable bilateral agreement to replace START. Arms control is not in itself a solution to U.S.Russian tensions, or a guarantee of security from the nuclear terror threat, but if history is any guide, it is where we must begin.