Aristotle on Infinity

Kolloquium-Vorlesung Berlin, 13. Mai 2008 Pieter Sjoerd Hasper Faculty of Philosophy, University of Groningen P.S.Hasper@rug.nl

1. Introduction Aristotle does not detest infinity: actually, he gladly accepts quite a few infinities. He wants to do justice to the requirement of mathematics, and among its basic principles are, as he himself is quite aware, the infinite divisibility of magnitude, the existence of lines which are extendible to infinity, and the existence of an infinite series of numbers. And not only in mathematics we require infinities: Aristotle himself argues at length to establish the infinite divisibility of physical bodies and against there being physical atoms; Aristotles universe is eternal, being infinitely old and lasting for another infinite time and going through all kinds of everlasting cyclical processes, such as the revolutions of the heavenly bodies, the alternations of the seasons, the generations of men and other animals. At the same time Aristotle goes on record for denying that there is anything infinite in actuality and for claiming that even mathematicians do not use and require the infinite. Leaving aside the reasons Aristotle has for this denial, we need to find out how Aristotle meant to solve this apparent contradiction. Now Aristotle himself is quite aware of this contradiction and calls in Physics 3.6 for an arbiter to regulate in what sense there is infinity and in what sense there is not. It is then that he starts his theoretical discussion of infinity, in which he famously, or notoriously, introduces the notion of the potential infinite; in which he seems to define this potential infinite as that of which there is for those taking according to quantity always something beyond to take, that is, as something which will never be a whole; and in which he likes the infinite to matter without form. At the end of his discussion of infinity, at the end of Physics 3.8, he seems to be quite satisfied: Concerning the infinite it has now been stated in what sense it is and in what sense it is not as well as what it is he obviously refers to his denial of its actual existence and his affirmation of its potential existence, as well as his definition of the infinite as that of which there is always something beyond to take. So if we want to understand Aristotles satisfaction, we must be able to make sense of the potential infinite and of this definition of infinity. Now Aristotles account of infinity has received over the years quite a lot of attention and scrutiny and thus there are quite a few interpretations around. However, all interpretations seem to agree on one thing: Aristotles infinite is something which is always finite, but which may be extended indefinitely. Take for example the natural numbers: every number one takes is finite, but the series of numbers may be extended indefinitely, for there is always a next number; and there is not any number for which it is true that there is no further number beyond it. At the same time they have to accuse Aristotle of failing to meet his own standards even though not all interpreters pay attention to this consequence. For Aristotles past is infinite and in that past there has been an infinity of revolutions of the heavenly bodies and so on. Thus it is not true of the past that it is something which is always finite, even though it

2 may still be indefinitely extendible into the future. In fact this accusation goes back to Philoponus, who found fault with Aristotle for related reasons. My main purpose today is to convince you that the standard account of Aristotles remarks on infinity cannot be correct and must be replaced with an alternative account. My interpretation does not merely stem from the wish to be charitable to Aristotle and save him from such a rather obvious inconsistency. It is primarily based on considerations of textual evidence: the standard account cannot deal with part of that textual evidence. I hope to achieve that aim by doing discussing four issues: 1. What does Aristotles claim that the infinite does not exist in actuality, but does exist potentially, amount to? 2. How should we understand Aristotles definition of the infinite as that of which there is for those taking according to quantity always something outside to take? 3. How should we interpret Aristotles remarks that mathematicians do not need and do not use the infinite? 4. How does Aristotle arrive at likening the infinite to matter? (Though for reasons of time I shall just make one small point on this issue after I have discussed the second issue.) I propose to have a discussion after each section.

2. The potentiality of the infinite The most important passage we have to get to grips with is from the beginning of Physics 3.6, just after Aristotle has stated the need for arbitration: Well, being is used as, on the one hand, [being] potentially and, on the other hand, as [being] actually, and the infinite is by addition, but also by division. , . But of magnitude it has been stated that in actuality it is not infinite, though it is [infinite] by division. For it is not difficult to get rid of atomic lines. It remain, then, that the infinite is potentially. , , . But one should not take what is potentially [infinite] as something which will actually be also infinite, in the same way as in the case it is possible that this is a statue, in the sense that this will also be a statue. , , , 1 However, since being is used in many ways, just as a day and games are because there are all the time different and different things coming into being, so also the infinite is. For also in those cases [something] is both potentially and actually, for the Olympics are both because the games can be coming into being and because they are coming into being.

I think I prefer reading here, with mss. J and I (cf. also F: ), against E, which is followed by Ross. The structure of the whole sentence is: ... , which constitutes a normal use of with double accusative, meaning: to take x as y, in casu: to take what is potentially [infinite] as something which will also be infinite. Perhaps this construction does not absolutely require , but it is certainly smoother with it.

3 , , It is clear that in the case of time and in the case of human beings the infinite is in a different way as in the case of the division of magnitudes. However, in general the infinite is in this way: by there all the time other and other things being taken, that is, [by] what is being taken all the time being finite, yet all the time different and different. , . , , , (Physica 3.6, 206a14-29) There are two difficult points in this passage. The first is that Aristotles argument in the second paragraph is rather puzzling. For ostensibly it only concerns magnitudes: he states that he has argued, in Physics 3.5, that there cannot be an infinite magnitude. As we still need the infinite, for example to account for the infinite divisibility of magnitude, Aristotle infers that the infinite is merely potentially. But this conclusion he does not qualify by limiting it to magnitudes, it seems. For though he does say that the infinite is in a different way in the case of time and human beings than in the case of the division of magnitudes we shall see later what he has in mind , he holds that the description of the infinite as being because all the time other and other things are being taken is perfectly general. And this description of the being of the infinite is linked to the point that the infinite is potentially. For Aristotle offers this description of the way of being of the infinite, because the normal way of being, as in the case of statues, would involve that the potential being of the infinite entails an actual being of the infinite. Thus Aristotle seems to base the general conclusion about the potential way of being solely on there not being an actual infinity in the case of magnitude. How is that possible? The second difficult point in this passage is how to understand this potential way of being of the infinite. It is this second point I shall deal with first after that I shall discuss the first difficulty. Normally being potentially F entails it being possible to be actually F. But if we apply this scheme to the potential being of the infinite, we get into the absurdity that there is something which is actually infinite. In order to escape from that absurdity Aristotle distinguishes between two ways of being, and thus also between two ways of being potentially/actually: the way of being of statues and the way of being of days and games. He draws the same distinction in a somewhat more general way in the following passage: Further, being is used in several ways, so that one should not take the infinite in the way of an individual, such as a human being or a house, but rather in the way a day and games are said [to be], which have being not in the way some substance has come to be, but [have being] all the time in [a process of] coming to be or passing away, finite, but all the time different and different. , , , , , , , (Physica 3.6, 206a29-33) Now there seem to be two ways of taking this distinction between the way of being of individual objects and the way of being which consist in being in a process, all the time being

4 different. The first way is the road universally taken: Aristotle draws this distinction to avail himself of a way of being potentially which does not entail the possibility of the infinite being actual and given Aristotles denial that the infinite can be actual it is a natural way of understanding it. Thus the import of the distinction would be that between things which are in the sense of being there completely, as a house is there completely, with all its components, here, now, in front of us and things which are in the sense of going on, but not yet complete, in the way a day is going on, with some of its components already having been realized, but not all. And the point of this distinction that the infinite will never be complete and will always have been realized incompletely, though it may go on and on. There are two kinds of objections against this interpretation. The first is the one I mentioned in the introduction: it creates a problem for Aristotle regarding the infinity of the past. For the past, growing as it is all the time, is never complete, but that is not enough for keeping it from being infinite. Of course our going back from the present into the past can be represented as a process which is always finite, yet all the time going on. But that does not prevent from the whole infinite past from having been realized. In order to resolve this problem Jonathan Lear has even proposed to ascribe to Aristotle an anti-realist view of the existence of the past, as being dependent on mind going through it. That seems very implausible. Another kind of objection is textual. There are two points made by Aristotle which are not consistent with this interpretation. A first point is that Aristotle explicitly says that there is a sense in which one can say that the infinite is in actuality. He already hints at this in the long passage quoted, when he says: Also in those cases, [that is, of a day and of games,] [something] is both potentially and actually, for the Olympics are both because the games can be coming into being and because they are coming into being. This would already be misleading if Aristotle does not really believe that the infinite can be in full actuality, be it the actuality of a process going on. He makes the same point explicitly a little further on: In this way the infinite is, potentially as well as by way of reduction, and it is also in actuality, in the way we say of a day and of games that they are. , , 2 , (Physica 3.6, 206b12-14) But surely we cannot interpret the actuality of the infinite in terms of being complete. A second point made by Aristotle which is inconsistent with the standard interpretation is the distinction he draws between two ways in which something is by all the time other and other things being taken: In magnitudes that [i.e. all the time other and other things being taken] occurs while what has been taken remains, whereas in the case of time and of human beings [that occurs] while they are passing away in such a way that they do not give out. , . (Physica 3.6, 206a33-b3)

This is the text as read by ms. E, as well as Simplicius in his commentary (despite Ross report on Simplicius).

5 And this distinction is very important to Aristotle, as appears from the fact that he refers to it in the closing words of his account of the infinite: Time and motion are infinite, as well as thought, while what is being taken does not remain. Magnitude, on the other hand, is neither by reduction nor by increase in thought infinite. . . (Physica 3.8, 208a20-22) The point of the distinction is quite clear: in the case of time, the generations of human beings, motion and thought there may be a succession of things occurring one after the other, but as soon as one goes over to the next one, the previous period of time, generation, part of motion, or thought disappears. In the case of magnitude, however, this does not happen: after one has taken the first part and then goes on to take the next part, the first part taken remains. Now for this distinction there is no conceptual room if Aristotle were to think of the being of the infinite generally in terms of it having been partly realized, without it being ever completely realized, while being always extendible. For that is precisely the picture in the case of magnitude, where what has been taken does remain. Therefore we should go the other road, the one not taken. For it is not mandatory to interpret the way of being of a day and of games, all the time other and other things being taken, as of something which is partly realized, but never completely. One could also interpret Aristotle as thinking of things of which only one part is really going on and in that sense being, while earlier and later parts are not actually going on, but have been actual or will be actual events like days or games are the perfect example of such things. This interpretation also makes better sense of Aristotles emphatic all the time different and different. For it is really every time something completely different which is actual. It also fits the present infinitives and better, for they focus on what is going on now, rather than on what has been achieved so far. Finally, in this sense the infinite can even be actual, for a day or games can also be actually going on by one stage of them going on. The upshot of this is that something being potentially infinite means that there are infinitely many ways in which it can manifest itself, but each actual manifestation of it is finite and there cannot be an infinite number of actual manifestation at the same time. Its infinity can also be actual, but this only involves the actuality of one of its infinitely many manifestations. The division of a magnitude, for example, is infinite because there are infinitely many divisions possible, but each actual division involves only finitely many points of division and a magnitude cannot be actually divided at an infinite number of places. The infinity of division can also be actual merely by one of the infinitely many divisions being actual. The generations of human beings are infinite, but each generation itself is finite; their infinity is actual by one generation being actual. Of course, it is not the actuality of one of the infinitely many possible manifestations which alone is responsible for the actuality of the infinity, for then the mere actuality of a finite number of possibilities would be enough to have an infinity rather, it is such an actuality together with the fact that there are infinitely many alternative possibilities which may have been realized in the past or may be realized in the future. The very same idea we encounter in the only other passage in which Aristotle elucidates the conception of potentiality involved in infinity:

6 However, both the infinite and the void, that is, things which are such, are said [to be] potentially and in actuality in a way different than for many of the things which there are, such as from what is seeing, what is walking and what is seen. For whereas these things can also at some time be true without qualification (for the one thing is seen because it is seen, the other because it is possible to be seen, the infinite is not potentially in such a way that it will in actuality be separable, but by knowledge. For it is by division not giving out that one explains that actuality being potentially, not by being separated. , , <> , . ( , ) , . 3 , 4 . (Metaphysica .6, 1048b9-17) In fact there is very little which is new in this passage. Just as in Physics 3.6, Aristotle first contrasts the potentiality of the infinite with the potentiality of normal cases. In normal cases, he says, Fs being potentially is understood by reference to the relevant actuality of F actually being Aristotle uses the phrases being true without qualification, being in actuality separable and being separated, where in Physics 3.6 he uses the example of being a statue and the vocabulary of being as an individual and as some substance has come to be, separability being the hallmark of their being. By contrast, in the case of the infinite, the void and such things, Fs being potentially is not to be understood by reference to such an actuality, but in some other way. Where in Physics 3.6 this actuality which explains the potentiality is all the time other and other things being taken, here the actuality explaining the potentiality is division not giving out. The only new element in Aristotles account of Metaphysics .6 is the clause but by knowledge how are we to understand it? As its function is to cite an alternative ground for the potentiality of being, alternative to the normal separated actuality, that is, it must refer to the knowledge that division is not giving out. That fact Aristotle has established by way of his argument in Physics 6.1 that no continuum can consist of points or indivisibles. This is a fact about division which never manifests itself in full actuality, that is, as a whole, but with each division it is partly actualized just as Aristotle says that the day is actual because part of it is actual. Similarly, time can only be said, epistemologically speaking, to be infinite because one knows that there is no beginning of time and no end of time; likewise for the generations of human beings. On an ontological level, of course, it is because matter is infinitely divisible and time without beginning or end that it can be realized in ever different manifestations.

3. Different kinds of infinity

See the following note. Where both Ross and Jaeger read ... ..., in the first case following ms. Ab and Alexander, in the second case Alexander, I follow mss. E and J and in the second case Ab as well. My main reason is that the two clauses / and / are clearly meant to be parallel, citing competing grounds for . The most economical way of achieving that on the basis of the manuscripts is by reading twice. The idea behind the text as established by Ross and Jaeger seems to be that needs a subject, but why not insert a subject with one?
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7 Let me start with a possible objection against the account of the potential infinite I have been ascribing to Aristotle. In the introduction I mentioned that Aristotle at a certain moment defines: Infinite is that of which there is for those taking according to quantity always something beyond to take. . (Physica 3.6, 207a7-8) This definition does not really seem to apply to the account of the potential infinite as an infinite pool of possibilities which may manifest themselves one by one, but not all at the same time. For it suggests a progressive realization, there already having been something taken and there still being more beyond. So how should we understand this definition of the infinite? The underlying problem is in fact the same as the first problem we encountered in our attempts to understand Aristotles argument introducing the potential infinite. This problem was that for Aristotle there not being an actually infinite magnitude seems to be enough to conclude that it remains, then, that the infinite is potentially, even though he seems to apply this account of the potential infinite generally, not only to magnitudes. The reason why the underlying problem is the same is that they can be solved together. To see how, we first have to draw a distinction between two kinds of infinity. That there is such a distinction appeared already earlier, when I quoted passages distinguishing between infinity in the case of magnitude, where what is taken remains, and infinity in the case of time, motion and thought, where what is taken does not remain. Now the same distinction is also behind the argument employed by Aristotle elsewhere: In the case of magnitudes ... there is no infinite in the direction of larger. For as large as [a magnitude] can potentially be, so large it can also be in actuality. Hence, since no perceptible magnitude is infinite, there cannot be an exceeding of every definite magnitude. For there would then be something larger than the heavens. ... .. . , . , . (Physica 3.7, 207b15-21, with omissions) This is a curious argument, especially in the light of Aristotles theory of the potential infinite. The core of that theory is, to repeat, that something being potentially infinite does not involve the actuality of it being infinite, but rather that there are infinitely many possible manifestations of it, each of them finite. Applied to magnitude this principle would entail that if magnitude is potentially infinite, there are infinitely many magnitudes of different lengths possible, each of them finite. Here, however, Aristotle argues as if magnitude being potentially infinite does entail the possibility of there being an actually infinite magnitude. Moreover, the clause of there being an exceeding of every definite magnitude is Aristotles standard phrase for there being an infinite series of magnitudes, all of them being finite. So if he writes that there cannot be such a series, he denies that magnitude is potentially infinite, in the sense appropriate to his own theory of the potential infinite, on the grounds that there is no actually infinite body. (Let me add that the same difficulty arises if one were to adopt the standard interpretation.) The same line of reasoning can be detected in an earlier passage:

8 Exceeding everything according to addition cannot even be there potentially, unless, that is, there is something accidentally actually infinite, in the way the physicists claim the body outside the universe, whose substance is air or something of that sort, to be infinite. But if it is not possible that there is an actually infinite perceptible body in this way, it is clear that it could not even be potentially [infinite] according to addition. ... , , , , , . , , ... (Physica 3.6, 206b20-26) For these arguments to be valid, Aristotle must assume that if there is to be a magnitude of a certain length, the material for this magnitude must already be there. It is as if the actualisation of a certain possible magnitude consists in its being marked off in one way or another from a pre-existent magnitude. Now the very same idea also explains why in the case of magnitude what has been taken remains, while that does not happen in the case of time, motion, the generations of human being and thought. Time, motion, the generations and thoughts are spread out in time, and with the next period of time, the next part of motion, the next generation and the next thought, the previous one is not present any more Aristotle is certainly not a detenser. With magnitude, on the other hand, we also take first one part and then the next, but as the parts are marked out from a larger whole, the parts remain in existence, for example in our counting procedure or our measurement by addition, but also in division procedures. With this idea in mind we can understand why Aristotle only focuses on magnitude in his argument introducing the potential infinite: it is only with magnitude that there is going to be an immediate problem. Only in the case of magnitude there is the issue whether there is something infinite in actuality, for all the other infinities are spread out over time and therefore not actual anyway. But there is still some kind of infinity in the case of magnitude, namely the infinite divisibility of matter. That is the real problem Aristotle wants to solve with his account of the potential infinite. That within the same framework he can also accommodate the more fleeting kind of infinities, is perhaps neat, but also something to be expected, given that with them there is no problem of there being an infinity all at once. In a similar vein we can make sense of the definition of the infinite as that of which there is for those taking according to quantity always something beyond to take, especially the impression of progressive realization. For if we look at the context, it appears that it is the introduction to Aristotles account of the infinite as the matter of a finite whole which applies primarily to perceptible objects: Infinite, then, is that of which there is for those taking according to quantity always something beyond to take. On the other hand, that beyond which there is nothing, is complete and whole. For thus we define a whole, as that of which there is nothing absent, e.g. a whole human being or box. ... . , , , . ... For the infinite does not fit seamlessly onto the whole ... for the infinite is the matter of the completeness of the magnitude and is what is potentially whole, but not in actuality, and it is divisible to reduction and the converse addition, and whole and finite not for itself, but with regard to something else. And it does not contain, but is contained, insofar as it is infinite.

9 , ... , , , , . (Physica 3.6, 207a7-10, 17-18, 21-25) Within each whole there is an aspect which escapes in a sense from the whole in that it could have been individuated not as this whole, but as a plurality of wholes and the possibilities it harbours are infinite. This aspect appears if we subject it to an infinite procedure of division.

4. Infinity and mathematics The distinction I drew between the infinity of magnitude and the infinity of phenomena whose realization is spread out in time was related to there being, in Aristotles view, a largest magnitude. However, are there not proofs in mathematics which require real infinities? For example, the parallel axiom says that two non-coinciding parallel lines do not meet each other, even if the lines are extended indefinitely. It has been argued that this is a real problem for Aristotle. Moreover, it is a problem which he acknowledges, so the claim goes, in the following passage: The account does not rob the mathematicians of their study either, by getting rid of the point that there is an infinite in such a way that it is in actuality untraversable in the direction of growth. , For as it is, they do not even need the infinite, for they do not use it; rather, they merely require there to a finite [line] which is as long as they like. ( ), And it is possible that another magnitude of whatever length has been cut in the same ratio as the largest magnitude. . Hence with regard to proving it will in this way not make any difference, but being among the magnitudes which there are will be possible. 5 , .6 (Physica 3.7, 207b27-34) A common interpretation of the penultimate line is the following. Aristotle recognizes that lines extendible indefinitely do play a part in geometry. So just one line which is as long as one wants, but still finite, is not enough. But Aristotle cannot accept an infinite set of ever longer lines, and he wants there to be a longest line anyway. Therefore he would suggest a procedure of scaling down: though the proof is accompanied by a diagram, what this diagram stands for can be made arbitrarily small, so that relatively speaking one line can become arbitrarily long as long as the other ratios, that is, the other relative sizes, remain the same.

With mss. J, F and I and Philoponus, against mss. E and V, which read , and are followed by Ross. This is the exact text as read by mss. J and I and by Simplicius, while ms. F and Philoponus merely deviate in reading rather than . Mss. E and V have . Ross brackets and strikes , without any support in any manuscript.
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10 For the proof that does not matter, but this procedure does ensure that the line is among the existing magnitudes. I very much doubt that this is what Aristotle is saying it definitely looks like an overinterpretation. Moreover, it seems to me that the two premisses of the argument: Aristotle cannot accept infinite sets, and mathematics must respect the fact that there is a largest magnitude, are incorrect. As I argued, the point of Aristotles account of the potential infinite is not that there cannot be an infinity in some abstract, timeless domain, but that there cannot be an infinity of things in this world at the same time. Thus Aristotle would have nothing against talk about there being an infinite number of points on a line or there being an infinite number of lines for the mathematician to refer to, as long as he does not have to conceive of all of them separately at the same time. With regard to the second premiss, that mathematics must respect the fact there is a largest magnitude, namely the size of the universe, there are remarks in Aristotles discussion of infinity which suggest otherwise. In Physics 3.4 he lists a number of arguments in favour of there being an infinity. One of them is the argument from thought: It is because it does not give out in thought that number seems to be infinite, as well as the mathematical magnitudes and what is beyond the heavens and with what is beyond being infinite, also body seems to be infinite, as well as the universes. .. . , (Physica 3.4, 203b23-26) In response to this argument Aristotle says at the end of his discussion of infinity: It is absurd to rely on thought, for the excess and the falling short [do] not [occur] in the object, but in thought. For one could think of each of us as a multiple of ourselves, letting us increase to infinity. But it is not on that ground that someone is beyond the town or beyond the particular magnitude we have, because one thinks it, but because he is; and that is accidental [i.e. to the mere thought]. Time and motion are infinite, as well as thought, while what is being taken does not remain. Magnitude, on the other hand, is neither by reduction nor by increase in thought infinite. , . , , . . . (Physica 3.8, 208a14-22) Aristotle makes here two points. First he allows for indefinite extendibility in thought, but denies that this has any ontological consequences. And in the final line he adds that even extendibility in thought does not lead to any infinity. Together they suggest that we should distinguish between the limitations in the case of real, that is, perceptible magnitude and the limitations in the case of magnitude as it appears merely in thought. Aristotles repeated emphasis that there being a largest magnitude concerns perceptible magnitude confirms this picture. And there is also an explanation of this difference: in the case of perceptible magnitude the matter first has to be available if we want to start a procedure of division or addition, but in the case of magnitudes which appear merely in thought, we have a free ride thought does not remain, as Aristotle points out once again.

11 But what about this line in the passage which suggest this scaling down? I do not think that it suggests anything like that. Rather, what it states is the principle that all magnitudes should be measurable in terms of each other, in the sense that for any two magnitudes the smaller, when multiplied, may exceed the larger. This is Euclids homogeneity requirement for magnitudes (in a different sense of homogeneity); it was first formulated by Eudoxus, a contemporary of Aristotles and is crucial for Eudoxus general proportion theory. It states this principle in the following way. Suppose there to be an infinite line which is divided at a certain point. Now if we want to divide any arbitrary line, say a finite line, in the same ratio as that infinite line, then we are stuck, for we would have to divide it at its end-point. Thus if it is to be possible that another magnitude of whatever length has been cut in the same ratio as the largest magnitude, then on each occasion the largest magnitude should be finite. Thus Aristotle offers in fact an extra argument why we cannot have an infinite magnitude, not even in thought such a magnitude does not obey one crucial mathematical constraint. And that is what Aristotle also seems to be referring to in the final sentence: not having infinite magnitudes in mathematics does not matter for proofs, and only thus magnitudes can belong to the class of existing magnitudes.