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Updated 9 March 2012
CONTENTS
Updates-1 March 2012 Operations Pages Rolling Stock Pages Signalling & Control Pages Blog Index Infopapers Index Design Electric Traction Pages Fare Collection Finance for Railways Glossary Pages Intermodal Q&A Stations
Contents
Background - Automatic Train Protection Systems - Warning and Train Stop Systems in Use in the UK Current UK Train Protection Systems - Warning and Train Stop Systems in Use in Continental Europe - Full Automatic Train Protection Systems in Use in Continental Europe - European Interoperable Railway Requirements - New Systems - Design, Delivery, Migration and Reliability - Future Strategy - A Business Case? - Bibliography More articles on this site about signalling are listed in the Signalling Index
Background
Railway signalling is the baseline safety system controlling the movements of trains. It is the safety critical part of the train control function of the railway. Once instructed by a signaller or an automatic system, it is responsible for setting up non-conflicting and safe routes for trains, for defining (safe) limits of movement and for transmitting instructions or commands to train drivers. Traditionally, signalling systems in Britain and in many other countries have relied on the train drivers reacting to indications displayed to them by line-side semaphore or colour light signals and controlling the trains speed in line with the instructions. During the 150 years of the use of railway signalling, drivers failures to respond to commands transmitted by signal aspects of any type can and have led to a number of accidents, some causing very large numbers of fatalities. In response to the continuing need to reduce risks created by train drivers failing to respond to signal instructions, various forms of driver warning devices and signal command enforcement systems have been developed. These have become known as Train Protection Systems. Those systems that continuously monitor actual train speed and enforce adherence to a commanded speed pattern are referred to as Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems.
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train stop systems include combinations of permanent magnets and electromagnets, inductive polaritychanging responders, coded beacons and simply coded track circuits. More recently, fully Automatic Train Protection (ATP) systems have been developed to enforce speed limits and movement authorities at the full range of restrictive signals, with and without line-side signals and including permanent and temporary line speed limits. Driving is still manual but speed limits are always enforced. Degraded modes though invariably include low speed driving on sight.
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(inductive or radio frequency) or short electrical loops positioned within the four-foot. These types of short-range devices are often referred to as "balises" (from the French word for marker). See Beacon Transmission for more information.Thecontinuous systems Passive a low Balise: frequency Track signal based and transponder that is woken up by
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To the Top of this Page.Home Page Site updated 9th March 2012Copyright Railway Technical Web Pages 1998 2011. For comments, questions or to submit articles, contact us.
use a permanently active data transmission and monitoring system, either through electrical inductive coupling by means of track loops or coded track circuits or by means of radio transmission of limit of movement authorities. Fully operational ATP systems were first introduced on metros in the late 1960s and are now common on such systems all over the world. Most metro applications use continuous systems in conjunction with automatic train operation. ATP was also introduced to the Japanese Shinkansen high speed route in 1964 and has since been introduced in various forms on a number of main line railways, often in conjunction with high speed train operation.
receives its energy from a passing train and then sends packets of information to the train. Active Balise: Track based
transponder that is powered from the signalling supply and that continuously sends packets of information to passing trains. Passive and active balises can transmit either fixed or variable information railways Simple or to both. use Many balises is prefer location
Principles
The basic defining principle of ATP is that train speed is monitored against the current permitted speed limit. The speed may be limited by line profile or signal indication, that is, the need to protect routes of other trains and track related constraints. If the allowable speed is exceeded, a brake application is invoked until the speed is brought within the required limit or the train is stopped.
powered-up by the passing trains. information almost invariably transmitted by means of passive balises.
Most ATP systems are based on conventional block signalling although these can be very short. Each block is described by a fixed dataset related to its location, length, gradient(s) and maximum (civil) speed limit (s). Each block will also have a variable data set derived from the signal aspects ahead and their effect on the resulting speed limit(s) for that block and the next block(s).
Enforcement
The speed limit on the approach to a restrictive signal forms a gradually reducing curve that follows the braking profile required to reach the target speed at the signal. If the signal shows a stop aspect, the target speed will be zero. The on-board monitoring equipment will continuously compare the train speed with the curve required to achieve the target speed and will initiate a warning usually both audio and visual. If action is not taken, the system will cause a brake application. In some implementations, a braking curve infringement calls for a full service brake initiation, in others for emergency brake. There are also differences in the brake release function. Some systems allow the driver to release the brake once the train speed has returned within the prescribed curve. In others, the brake command is irrevocable and the train must be brought to a stand before the driver can release the brake. There are also railway undertaking specific rules about the consequences when the ATP system has intervened.
Train Data
On the train, data comprising train weight, length, braking capability and maximum technically permitted speed are necessary to ensure compliance with speed limits set by the ATP system. Usually, the train consist data must be input by the driver before the trains starts its journey. Ways of validating this may be considered necessary.
Monitoring
In most cases, the performance of the equipment is monitored and recorded for further analysis in case of infringements or failures of the system. These systems are variously known as On Train Monitoring Systems (OTMS), On Train Data Recorders (OTDRs) or On Train Monitoring Recorders (OTMRs).
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signal showing a green aspect. The driver must acknowledge the restrictive signal warning within 3s or the train brakes will apply automatically. AWS is provided on 98% of the UK main line railway network. The use of AWS was extended to protect certain permanent speed restrictions after an accident at Morpeth in 1969, which was caused by a driver failing to reduce the train speed for a speed restriction. AWS was installed at speed restriction locations where the train approach speed is over 60 mph or the reduction in speed required is more than one third of the approach speed. This is mandated in a railway group standard. After an accident at Nuneaton in 1975, the use of AWS was extended further to include temporary speed restrictions. It is now also used for emergency speed restrictions. Although AWS has been partially effective in reducing train movement accidents, it has not eliminated SPAD or over-speed errors entirely. By design, it is only intended to provide an alert and a reminder of a restrictive signal aspect or speed restriction. As long as the alert is acknowledged, the driver may continue to drive the train at any speed. A number of accidents occurred where drivers forgot the restrictive aspect warning despite the visual reminder in the shape of the so-called sunflower device. AWS may be considered to a limited extent as a fail-to-safety system since the main trigger element is a permanent magnet. Failure of the electro magnet results in a warning indication to the driver. However, removal of the permanent magnet from the track is not detected.
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a TPWS failure, the signal would display a red aspect. This addition to the original specification significantly increased costs. TPWS does not replace the existing AWS system. AWS is retained, so that drivers still receive the warnings advising of adverse signal indications. The TPWS equipment was designed to interface with the existing onboard AWS equipment on trains or to replace it so that it could be fitted quickly.
transmitter/receiver with a unique identity. At the start of the single line, the driver stops and calls the control centre for authority to enter the section. If the line is clear, the signalman in the control centre transmits a coded "electronic token" data message which is received by the train and then shows the authority for that section on a cab display. The driver will then call for confirmation that he can enter the section. Once in the single line section, he will advise the control centre that he has cleared the loop track. A clearance marker board is specially provided to help him. When he has reached the end of the single line section, the driver calls the control centre again and offers to give up the token. After a "handshake" procedure by the control centre, he sends the token back by radio data transmission to release the section. The signaller is provided with a computer system that allocates the coded tokens to each section and prevents more than one token being issued for an occupied section. It also receives the tokens sent back by each train as it reaches the end of the single line section. At the exits of the single line sections, the points are permanently set in the direction of normal running and are "trailable" for trains entering the section, i.e. they allow a train to pass through at reduced speed using the wheel flanges to move the point (switch) blades aside reset to the normal position. A "Distant Board" complete with AWS ramp, warns the driver that he must slow down for the movement over the points leaving the single line. The Points Indicator shows the position of the points. A "Stop Board" at the end of the passing loop warns the driver to stop and ask for permission to enter the next single line section. Stop board locations are provided with TPWS loops that are linked by radio to the signal controller. A "Loop Clear" board indicates to the driver when the rear of the train is clear of the points.
Induktives Sicherungssystem (Indusi, Tyne and Wear Metro, Germany and Austria)
Indusi is a German designed main line railway warning and supervision system used on the Tyne & Wear Metro. It is also standard in Germany and Austria. A track-mounted inductive transponder is used to transmit signal warning and speed limit codes to the train. The transponder is mounted on the sleeper ends just outside the four-foot, unlike most other systems where the transmitter is mounted between the rails. The approach to a danger signal is protected by a transponder that indicates a maximum speed and causes emergency braking if a preset level is exceeded. On the main line version, an adverse distant signal indication must be acknowledged by the driver to prevent an emergency brake application. The system is used in Germany for lines with a maximum speed up to 160 km/h and in Austria for line speeds up to 120 km/h. In the more recent electronic version, it includes speed supervision to a braking curve. It is not fully designed to vital standards.
Degraded Operation
None of the systems mentioned is used for continuous speed supervision and all of them can be isolated in the cab and the train can be driven at normal speeds regardless of signal aspects. Most of the systems require a positive action to issue a warning or restrictive data. However, TASS displays some of the behaviour of a true ATP system in that it can detect missing balises. As mentioned before, in the case of TPWS, the transmitters at a location are linked to the signal in rear so that this signal will show a red aspect in the event of TPWS failure at the next signal. This is because passing trains cannot detect failures of the track-mounted equipment.
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Whilst the described systems above all provide some protection against collisions and over-speed derailments, none provide the full and vital protection that is available from modern Automatic Train Protection systems.
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forming train position validators. Effectively, the system provides pseudo moving block capability thanks to very short virtual blocks. Train detection and inductive data transmission between track and train are effected by means of the cable. A fixed block back-up system uses axle counters for train detection. Trains are operated fully automatically without driver intervention but a train captain is provided on every train and can operate the train at reduced speed in an emergency. A Vehicle On Board Computer (VOBC), linked to the transmission system, controls the on-board vital and driving functions. All trains are controlled by Vehicle Control Computers (VCCs) from a central control facility. The system has a good safety record but it requires continuous track cables and uses a back-up axle counter train detection system. It is therefore relatively expensive to install and maintain. As with any system requiring extensive track-mounted cabling, there is the risk of damage to the cables during track maintenance activities. This type of system can only be considered for a metro-type operation with a high service frequency.
ASFA (Spain)
ASFA is a cab-signalling and train protection system widely used in Spain. Intermittent track-to-train communication is based on magnetically coupled resonant circuits in such a way that nine different sets of data can be transmitted. A resonant circuit trackside is tuned to a frequency representing the signal aspect. The system is not fail safe, but reminds the driver of the signalling conditions and requires him to acknowledge restrictive aspects within 3s. Lamp and bell warnings are provided for the driver. Three different train types can be selected on-board to give continuous speed supervision of line speed and after passing a restrictive signal (160 km/h or 180 km/h). A speed check can be carried out (60 km/h, 50 km/h or 35 km/h, depending on train type) after passing a transponder 300m before reaching a stop signal and a train trip is provided at signals at danger. There is an irrevocable emergency brake upon violation.
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ATB EG is installed on the vast majority of lines of ProRail (the new Dutch infrastructure authority) and is a fail-safe system using coded track circuits of conventional design and two versions of on-board equipment, ACEC (computerised) or GRS (electronic). The transmission between coded track circuits and on-board equipment is via vehicle-mounted induction pickup coils suspended above the rails. There are six speed codes (40, 60, 80, 130 or 140 km/h) that are picked up by the train and displayed to the driver. There is a gong warning at a code change and a bell if the system requests a brake application. The emergency brake is invoked on over-speed or if the driver does not react to an acoustic warning. The system does not distinguish between the 40km/h limit and stop. This allows driving on sight in the event of an equipment failure.
BACC (Italy)
BACC is installed on most of the infrastructure of RFI (Rete Ferroviaria Italiana) in two versions, both of which operate in a similar way. Conventional coded track circuits operate at one of two carrier frequencies to deal with two train classes those operating either above or below 180 km/h. The transmission between coded track circuits and on-board equipment is via induction pickup coils suspended above the rails. For the <180 km/h trains a 50Hz carrier frequency is used for 5 amplitude modulated (AM) speed codes. A 178 Hz carrier frequency with 10 AM speed codes is used for higher speed trains. In the cab the driver sees the speed corresponding to the code and the signal aspect. The emergency brake is applied upon overspeed but can be released when the speed is reduced to the approved level. The version of BACC used on the Rome to Florence high-speed line is effectively an automatic train protection system with full speed supervision.
KVB (France)
This is the standard ATP system used in France and is technically similar to Ebicab, although the information provided on the drivers display is more limited. The system is installed on the conventional railway network, in particular on the routes where high speed trains (trains grande vitesse or TGV) approach major termini. Some sections of the high-speed lines (ligne grande vitesse or LGV) use the system in place of or together with TVM for certain spot transmissions and for the supervision of temporary speed
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restrictions where appropriate speed levels are not available from TVM codes. Spot transmissions include such items as door release authority, overhead line section switches and radio channel changes. The system is overlaid on the conventional signalling system. The data is transmitted inductively between passive balises (between two and nine may be required per signal) and the on-board antenna which activates (powers up) the balise as it passes. The data transmission capacity is limited, hence the need for many additional balises. The driver must input train data unless the train is a modern, fixed formation unit, where data is automatically programmed into the on-board supervision computer. In the event of any over-speed, the driver will receive a warning and then an irrevocable emergency brake will apply. The brake cannot be released until the train is at a stand. This system is provided on Eurostar trains and it is proposed to use it on certain limited sections of the CTRL, most notably on the approach to St. Pancras station.
TBL 2 (Belgium)
TBL 2 is used on all lines in Belgium where the permitted line speed is greater than 160 km/h. TBL 2 is a cab signal system and is similar to the UK GWML ATP system (see under Britain) which uses a powered balise in the form of a steel loop with additional, long infill cable loops provided to give early warning of signal indication changes. TBL 2 is direction sensitive. This capability is provided by having the balises mounted between the rails with a small offset from the centre. The driver is shown the maximum allowed speed (from a braking curve), the target speed, the target distance and the train speed. Audio-visual warnings of violations are provided with an emergency brake in the event of no acknowledgement.
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The European Rail Traffic Management System (ERTMS) is a fundamental building block for the implementation of interoperability on the TEN. The European Train Control System (ETCS) covers the physical signalling and train control part of ERTMS.
ETCS
The ETCS specification has three substantially different ATP operating levels allowing a stepped transition from conventional line-side signalling to a full moving block concept, with some incremental additions. The levels provide full speed supervision and varying amounts of in-cab information, throughout a trains journey, and may be summarised as follows: Level 1 No Infill (System A) The Level 1 system is overlaid on existing visual signalling systems. It is based on Eurobalises providing ATP supervision and protection. It can have an adverse effect on route capacity, in a range of 5-15%, generally, because of trains having to reduce the speed as demanded by the supervision curve before receiving new information at the next signal position. Level 1 With Infill (System B) This level uses infill signal indication updates between the main balises, either by means of additional balises, using so-called EuroLoop or by radio. The driver thus receives updated information on the status of the next signal(s) before reaching the main balises. This option reduces the adverse effect on route capacity, but is more expensive to install and operate, as additional line-side equipment is required. Level 2 Level 2 uses conventional, fixed block train detection (with track circuits or axle counters) but the driver receives all train movement authority information via bi-directional GSM-R radio. It has full continuous ATP supervision and protection with in-cab signalling displays. It can improve route capacity and line-side signals can be removed. With signals retained it is referred to as System C and with signals removed as System D. Level 3 Fixed blocks are not required for Level 3. This level uses balises and tachometry to detect train position. All conventional signalling is removed and all data communication is via GSM-R radio. It can improve route capacity but, although technically feasible, it has not been proven on an existing main line railway and, in our view, it currently represents a significant risk in terms of operability and reliability. These issues have yet to be resolved.
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resignalling on main lines. In the intervening period, project preparation, surveys, scheme plans and so on could be formulated for the first major route to be equipped. The objective is to fit the UK network with ETCS Level 2 or 3 wherever a business case can be made. In a number of areas this could involve conventional lines, community railways, including those requiring operating subsidy. It should be noted that there is scope within the regulations for derogations to the requirement for fitting of ETCS compliant ATP, particularly where it would not be economically viable. In view of the fact that Britain has TPWS, making an economic case for ETCS is going to be a struggle.
NEW SYSTEMS
Communications Based Train Control
Much of the development effort in the area of new signalling systems is concentrated on removing reliance on track-based equipment. Generically, this type of technology is referred to as Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) and is broadly similar to ETCS Levels 2 or even 3 in as much as conventional track circuits are not necessarily required for train detection. Where trains do not report their own location using tachometers, Doppler radar and balises, detection can be provided additionally by combinations of track circuits, or by means of Global Positioning by Satellite (GPS) or Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS) as they are now called. Some systems reduce or eliminate the need for fixed track based systems like track circuits and axle counters and rely instead on a combination of train borne speed and location data together with balises and GNSS. Some CBTC systems use radio-based data bearers to transmit train locations to the central control computers. These are now being used on some metros and people-mover systems like the Las Vegas Monorail. However, some track-based data is still usually considered essential in locations where track separation for parallel tracks and turnout (point) locking is required. In the US, a system using GNSS is operating over part of the route between Chicago and Detroit but it retains the existing line-side signalling for use by non-equipped trains. Another GNSS-PTC (Positive Train Control) system is due to enter service this year between Mazonia and Springfield, Illinois. A new feature is that it uses on-board sensors to detect a trains route through junctions (point-work).
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The Alaska Railroad has placed an order with Union Switch & Signal for a complete PTC system using vital GNSS equipment without balises. Similar systems are being developed for use in Australia and Brazil. In Europe, a number of trials are taking place to test the use of GNSS. It should be noted that some of the systems using satellite links for train separation were designed in the first instance for areas of "dark territory" where line-side signals are not provided and trains are controlled by train orders and track warrants. The CBTC systems are used to increase throughput and crossing point efficiency whilst not reducing safety. There is value in considering such systems for use in the UK, particularly where remote routes with low train frequency might have to be closed without a reduction in infrastructure replacement and maintenance costs. GNSS based systems can also be used for passenger information both on trains and at stations. A further possibility for the use of GNSS is to trigger the warning on the approach to a level crossing with a constant-time lapse regardless of the speed of the train. In a similar way, track workers could be alerted to the approach of a train within a known fixed time.
Approvals
Using lessons learned from previous introductions of new train protection systems, both in the UK and continental Europe, there is an opportunity for the approvals process required for new ATP systems to be implemented smoothly and such systems to be deployed rapidly. Operators, owners, suppliers and installers should be encouraged to interface with the regulatory authorities as early as possible. In looking towards future developments, there is a risk that accepted standards in place today will reduce the drive to improve and develop new systems because of changes required to existing standards. The process of changing and getting approval for compliance with new standards could act as a deterrent to improvements unless standards are carefully written to allow improvements.
Line Capacity
It is a widely held view in the industry that the introduction of ATP will reduce line capacity. This is not necessarily the case in all areas and there are positive benefits from the use of ETCS Level 2/3 in terms of train throughput. In simple terms, a trains speed on the approach to the block will have to conform to the safe braking distance profile. However, there is no reason why ECTS Level 2 should not be capable of supporting the
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existing capacity and, indeed, improving on it using shorter fixed blocks. As it does not require fixed blocks, Level 3 will improve capacity in most areas.
Skills Shortages
Any railway signalling developments proposed for the next 10 years will depend on the availability of suitable engineering and installation skills. A large proportion of the relevant UK skills base will be absorbed by the London Underground PPP contracts that cover the re-signalling of over 300 route-km of London Underground lines in the period 2006 to 2017. The equipment to be supplied is novel, ATP based throughout, with complex performance requirements and is still in development. Existing skills shortages in the UK are forcing the contracting companies to source part of the project staff from overseas. Modernisation of the UK main line signalling infrastructure with ETCS based equipment will require similar skills. Shortages, if not addressed immediately, are likely to slow down all replacement programmes.
Operating Rules
Adapted and new operating rules will need to be written for the new train protection systems introduced to the UK network. Amongst other issues, these rules will have to cover: Normal operations, e.g., driving with or without line-side signals under ETCS Levels 2 and 3; Failure modes and required actions, e.g., loss of radio contact, failure of on-board equipment; Protection of disabled trains; Possessions of the track by the maintainer; Starting and stabling of trains; Movement of trains within station limits; Shunting. Many of these processes will have to change significantly compared with existing practices and will, during the migration periods, have to be run in parallel with them. These circumstances could cause serious delays to train operations or present significant safety risks and should be included in any assessments carried out to determine the methods for introducing ATP. In particular, the man-machine interface must not be forgotten. The success and acceptance of ATP systems will depend to a substantial extent on drivers ability to understand and act upon the normal operational modes and failure modes possible with complex ETCS and similar ATP systems. Areas for further exploration concern the man-machine interface, the requirements for revoking authority (replacing signals to danger) and driver supervised movements.
Migration
A range of complex technical and operational issues will need to be considered as part of the development of migration plans for each area to be upgraded to ATP. These will include: Technical interfaces; Operational changes (see rules above); Electro-magnetic compatibility; Integration with existing systems;
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Retrofitting to existing rolling stock. Looking at the existing installations of signalling equipment, both at the line side and on rolling stock, it is likely that new ETCS equipment will have to operate alongside existing systems for at least 30 years.
Degraded Adhesion
All ATP systems fitted to trains operating over open areas of railway infrastructure will be subject to the effects of degraded adhesion from time to time. This is a particular problem in the temperate UK climate and has led to a number of attempts to mitigate the effects on train braking. A number of strategies have been adopted, ranging from reliance on techniques such as "defensive driving", to sanding and to operating in protected manual mode on ATO metro lines. The Ebicab system allows drivers to input a "poor adhesion" rate when setting up the train for initialisation prior to entering service. Swiss railways use a special code of ETCS to achieve the same objective [Watson, 2003]. This issue must be addressed in respect of both technology and operating rules when introducing ATP.
Back-up Systems
The use of GSM-R radio for vital data transmission is still regarded throughout the railway industry as either "not fully proven" or "insufficiently reliable" for permanent, full-time operation. Railway administrations, both national and commercial, presently regard the use of radio transmission without a fixed block, visual line side signal back-up system as unacceptable from a reliability perspective. The questions raised about the reliability of GSM-R or GNSS technology and its availability might be answered by the use of two-tier systems or independent, parallel systems being used. One of the main advantages of ETCS Levels 2/3 is that line-side signals can be removed and that a considerable rationalisation of line-side equipment can be achieved. This is expected to reduce installation and maintenance costs and to improve the life cycle costs. If back-up systems are retained, most of these benefits will be lost and costs will probably rise. This is likely to lead to failure to secure a business case for the viability of ETCS Levels 2/3 installations under existing cost/benefit analysis conditions. To overcome this problem, the reliability of the radio system must be improved and the methods for recovery from failures must be designed carefully to minimise loss of capacity. In the meantime, experience with the Swiss trial of ETCS Level 2 shows that back-up line-side signalling system should be retained at least during the implementation and stabilisation phases of a project.
FUTURE STRATEGY
High Speed Line Requirements
The difficulty of preventing driver perception overload has resulted in a situation in Britain where line-side signals are no longer acceptable for trains running at speeds greater than 125 mile/h. In order to provide an increase in operating speeds to 140mph and above, full ATP with cab signalling will be essential and the use of ETCS compliant equipment is the logical way to provide this. The existing systems will have to be retained for conventional trains and may also be required for fall-back purposes at least during the early years of operation of any stand-alone ETCS Level 2/3 system, until reliability and operational experience allow removal of line-side signals.
Conventional Railways
It will be a logical progression for conventional railways to incorporate ATP using ETCS standards when signalling renewals become unavoidable. It is likely that this will be shown as a cost effective solution for renewals once the GSM-R network has been developed and the removal of full line-side signalling has been accepted as viable.
European Mandates
With the mandates issued by the European Community for the introduction of common train control systems on high-speed railways already being enshrined in national law and the forthcoming extension of this requirement to conventional railways, it will be necessary for UK main line railways to consider full ATP
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installation and, if it is decided to proceed, this will have to comply with the Technical Specifications for Interoperability (TSIs) issued by the European Community. It is the authors view that the future strategy for train protection in the UK should be based on the continued use of AWS/TPWS until replaced by ATP in conformity with the ETCS requirements. The replacement will have to be carried out on a route upgrade basis. It may be possible to consider other, low cost systems such as CBTC, as long as these are acceptable for lightly used community railways in remote areas with relatively low frequency services and a dedicated rolling stock fleet. However, it may be found that standardisation of ETCS across the whole network is more cost effective.
A BUSINESS CASE?
Making the case
In any strategic decision making process, the viability of the proposals from a cost/benefit perspective must be taken into account. In the case of the installation of full ATP on the UK railway network, there should be a review of the benefits and how much it will cost to achieve and maintain those benefits. Looking at these issues in depth and developing a strong business and safety rationale for implementation will lead to wider acceptance by railway companies and government agencies alike. As an example, in examining the UK main line rail system, it can be seen that some 12% of the network has a line speed of 35mph or less and a further 55% has line speeds between 40 and 75mph. These lines are fully protected by TPWS. On the other hand, high-speed routes (only 17 per cent of the UK network) contribute 49 per cent of the ATP safety benefit and high-density passenger routes with line speeds of between 60 mph and 100 mph (22 per cent of the network) contribute 33 per cent of the ATP safety benefit. In conjunction with renewal requirements, it could be shown where the most benefit will be obtained from the introduction of ETCS compliant ATP. With the completion of TPWS and TPWS+ over the UK network, the benefits of installing a fully ETCS compliant ATP system will be difficult to sustain in many areas. A case for ETCS fitment might be augmented by operational advantages or the need for interoperability with the ETCS fitted network. It is possible that a detailed examination will show that a financial case for ETCS installation could be supported by the elimination of line-side visual signals and by improvements in line capacity. However, this will only be achieved when the technical reliability of the systems is universally accepted. The question is further complicated when maintenance is considered. The goal of infrastructure managers is to reduce line-side or track-based hardware that requires regular maintenance. However, the balance must be found between the cost of supplying sophisticated technology and maintaining the software with highly qualified technicians on the one hand and the ground-based hardware requiring regular but cheaper maintenance on the other. With modern safe working practice requirements and the expansion of electronic signalling systems and its associated expertise, this balance will most likely favour ETCS systems. In the case of new trains, however, the position over the provision of ETCS capability is clearer - all new stock is being provided with at least the physical capability of accommodating ETCS. It should also be a requirement that the future design of rolling stock should allow for the needs and sensitivities of the new generation of electronic control and protection systems.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AEA Technology Rail (for RSSB), Baseline ERTMS Parameters - Recommendations For National Values, Derby, 2004. Bailey, C. (Ed.), European Railway Signalling, A & C Black, London, 1995. Emmerson, A. (Ed.), Railway Telecommunications, IRSE, London, 2004.
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