Succ Cases

1. Promise to deliver future property BLAS vs. SANTOS, Administratrix of the Estate of MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS G.R.
No. L-14070 March 29, 1961 FACTS: Simeon Blas contracted a first marriage with Marta Cruz sometime before 1898. They had three children, one of whom is Eulalio who has children and grandchildren who are the plaintiffs. Marta Cruz died in 1898, and the following year, Simeon Blas contracted a second marriage with Maxima Santos. At the time of this second marriage, no liquidation of the properties required by Simeon Blas and Marta Cruz was made. On December 26, 1936, a week before his death on January 9, 1937, Simeon Blas executed a last will and testament stating One-half of our properties, after the payment of my and our indebtedness, all these properties having been acquired during marriage (conjugal properties), constitutes the share of my wife Maxima Santos de Blas. Maxima Santos de Blas also executed a private document presented as Exhibit A where she promised that in making her will, she will give one-half () to the heirs and legatees or the beneficiaries named in the will of her husband. Exhibit A was presented as evidence by the plaintiffs arguing that the dispositions made were valid. The defendants contends that Exhibit "A" is a worthless piece of paper because it is not a will nor a donation mortis causa nor a contract. It is also contended that it deals with future inheritance. The trial court and appellate court rendered judgement in favour of the defendant so the case was elevated to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not Exhibit A constitute a contract of future inheritance which is prohibited to be the subject matter of a contract under Article 1271 of the Civil Code. DECISION: Exhibit "A" is not a contract on future inheritance. It is an obligation or promise made by the maker to transmit one-half of her share in the conjugal properties acquired with her husband, which properties are stated or declared to be conjugal properties in the will of the husband. The conjugal properties were in existence at the time of the execution of Exhibit "A" on December 26, 1936. As a matter of fact, Maxima Santos included these properties in her inventory of her husband's estate of June 2, 1937. The promise does not refer to any properties that the maker would inherit upon the death of her husband, because it is her share in the conjugal assets. That the kind of agreement or promise contained in Exhibit "A" is not void under Article 1271 of the old Civil Code Future inheritance is any property or right not in existence or capable of determination at the time of the contract, that a person may in the future acquire by succession. Certainly his wife's (Maxima Santos) share in the conjugal properties may not be considered as future inheritance because they were actually in existence at the time Exhibit "A" was executed. As this private document (Exhibit A) contains the express promise made by Maxima Santos to convey in her testament, upon her death, one-half of the conjugal properties she would receive as her share in the conjugal properties, the action to enforce the said promise did not arise until and after her death when it was found that she did not comply with her above-mentioned promise. (Art. 1969, old Civil Code.) The lower courts decisions were reversed and the defendant-appellee, administratrix of the estate of Maxima Santos, is ordered to convey and deliver one-half of the properties adjudicated to Maxima Santos as her share in the conjugal properties
2. Deed of Donation which is to take effect after death of decedent SICAD VS. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 125888 August 13, 1998 FACTS: Aurora Vitro DA. De Motinola of the City of Iloilo executed a deed entitled DEED OF DONATION INTER VIVOS naming her grandchildren as the donees. The property involved is a parcel of land located at Brgy. Pawa, Panay, Capiz, covered by TCT No.T16105 in the name of Montinola. Montinola's Secretary, Gloria Salvilla, afterwards presented the deed for recording in the Property Registry, and the Register of Deeds cancelled TCT No. T-16105 (the donor's title) and, in its place, issued TCT No. T-16622 in the names of the donees. Montinola however retained the owner's duplicate copy of the new title (No. T16622), as well as the property itself, until she transferred the same ten (10) years later, on July 10, 1990, to the spouses, Ernesto and Evelyn Sicad. Aurora Montinola drew up a deed of revocation of the donation, and caused it to be annotated as an adverse claim on TCT No. T-16622. Then, on August 24, 1990, she filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court in Roxas City for the cancellation of said TCT No. T16622 and the reinstatement of TCT No. T- 16105. Her petition was founded on the theory that the donation to her three (3) grandchildren was one mortis causa which thus had to comply with the formalities of a will; and since it had not, the donation was void and could not effectively serve as basis for the cancellation of TCT No. T-16105 and the issuance in its place of TCT No. T-16622. The Trial Court then rendered judgment on March 27, 1991, holding that the donation was indeed one inter vivos, and dismissing Aurora Montinola's petition for lack of merit. The matter of its revocation was not passed upon. Montinola elevated the case to the Court of Appeals. She however died on March 10, 1993, while the appeal was pending. Spouses Sicad together with the legal heirs of Montinola were substituted as appellants. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the trial court . ISSUE: Whether or not the donation was indeed one inter vivos or mortis causa. DECISION: The court considers first the intention of Aurora Aurora Montinola in executing the document entitled "Deed of Donation Inter Vivos," The evidence establishes when the deed of donation prepared by Montinola's lawyer (Atty. Treas) was read and explained by the latter to the parties, Montinola expressed her wish that the donation take effect only after ten (10) years from her death, and that the deed include a prohibition on the sale of the property for such period.
A donation which purports to be one inter vivos but withholds from the donee the right to dispose of the donated property during the donor's lifetime is in truth one mortis causa. In a donation mortis causa "the right of disposition is not transferred to the donee while the donor is still alive." In the instant case, nothing of any consequence was transferred by the deed of donation in question to Montinola's grandchildren. They did not get possession of the property donated. They did not acquire the right to the fruits thereof, or any other right of dominion over the property. More importantly, they did not acquire the right to dispose of the property. They were therefore simply "paper owners" of the donated property. All these circumstances, including, to repeat, the explicit provisions of the deed of donation ineluctably lead to the conclusion that the donation in question was a donation mortis causa, contemplating a transfer of ownership to the donees only after the donor's demise. The decision of the Court of appeals is set aside and the Deed of Donation Inter Vivos executed by Montinola in favor of her grandchildren is declared null and void.
3. Nenita de Vera SUROZA, complainant, vs. Judge Reynaldo P. HONRADO and Evangeline YUIPCO , respondents. A.M. No. 2026-CFI, December 19, 1981 FACTS: Mauro Suroza, a corporal in the 45 Infantry of the US Army (PhilippineScouts) married Marcelina Salvador but they were childless. However, theyreared a boy named Agapito who used the surname Suroza and who considredthem as parents as shown in his marriage contract with Nenita de Vera. WhenMauro died, Marcelina, as a veterans widow, became a pensioner of the FederalGovernment. Agapito and Nenita begot a child named Lilia and afterwards, Agapito also became a soldier. However, he was disabled and his wife wasappointed as his guardian when he was declared an incompetent. In connectionto this, a woman named Arsenia de la Cruz (apparently a girlfriend of Agapito)wanted also to be his guardian however the court confirmed Nenitasappointment as guardian of Agapito.The spouses Antonio Sy and Hermogena Talan begot a child named MarilynSy, who was delivered to Marcelina Salvador Suroza who brought her up as asupposed daughter of Agapito and as her granddaughter. Marilyn used thesurname Suroza and stayed with Marcelina but was not legally adopted by Agapito.Marcelina, being a veterans widow accumulated some cash in two banks.She executed a notarial will which is in English and was thumbmarked by her for she was illiterate. In that will, Marcelina bequeathed all her estate to Marilyn. After her death, Marina Paje (alleged to be a laundrywoman of Marcelina and theexecutrix in her will) filed a petition for probate of Marcelinas alleged will. Asthere was no opposition, Judge Honrado appointed Marina as administratix andsubsequently, issued two orders directing the two banks to allow Marina towithdraw from the savings of Marcelina and Marilyn Suroza and requiring thecustodian of the passbooks to deliver them to Marina. Upon motion of Marina,Judge Honrado issued another order instructing the sheriff to eject the occupantsof the testatrix house among whom was Nenita and to place Marina inpossession thereof. Nenita was then alerted to the existence of the testamentaryproceeding hence, she and other occupants filed a motion to set aside the order ejecting them, alleging that the decedents son Agapito was the sole heir of thedeceased; that he has a daughter named Lilia; that Nenita was Agapitosguardian; and that Marilyn was not Agapitos daughter nor the decedentsgranddaughter. Later, they questioned the probate courts jurisdiction to issue theejectment order. In spite of such fact, Judge Honrado issued on order probatingMarcelinas supposed will wherein Marilyn was the instituted heiress. Nenita filedin the testate case an omnibus petition to set aside proceedings, admitopposition with counter petition for administration and preliminary injunctionreiterating that Marilyn was a stranger to Marcelina; that the will was not dulyexecuted and attested; and that the thumbmarks of the testatrix were procuredby fraud or trick. Further, that the institution of Marilyn as heir is void because of the preterition of Agapito and that Marina was not qualified to act as executrix.Not contented with her motions, Nenita filed an opposition to the probate of thewill and a counter-petition which was however, dismissed. Instead of appealing,Nenita filed a case to annul the probate proceedings which was also dismissed.Hence, this complaint. ISSUE: Whether or not a disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judgefor having admitted a will, which on its face is void. RULING: Disciplinary action should be taken against respondent judge for his improper disposition of the testate case which might have resulted in a miscarriage of justice because the decedents legal heirs and not the instituted heiress in thevoid will should have inherited the decedents estate. Inefficiency impliesnegligence, incompetence, ignorance and carelessness. A judge would beinexcusably negligent if he failed in the performance of his duties that diligence,prudence and circumspection which the law requires in the rendition of any publicservice.In this case, respondent judge, on perusing the will and noting that it waswritten in English and was thumbmarked by an obviously illiterate testatrix, couldhave readily perceived that the will is void.
4. Testacy of Sixto Lopez, Jose S. LOPEZ, Petitioner-appellee, Vs. Agustin LIBORO, Oppositor-appellant.
FACTS: The will of Don Sixto Lopez was submitted for probate by Jose Lopez and Clemencia Lopez, the Dons sister. The probate was opposed by Agustin Liboro who contended that the will is not valid due to the following grounds:(1) That the deceased never executed the alleged will; 2) that his signature appearing in said will was a forgery; (3) that at the time of the execution of the will, he was wanting in testamentary as well as mental capacity due to advanced age; (4) that, if he did ever execute said will, it was not executed and attested as required by law, and one of the alleged instrumental witnesses was incapacitated to act as such; and it was procured by duress, influence of fear and threats and undue and improper pressure and influence on the part of the beneficiaries instituted therein, principally the testator's sister, Clemencia Lopez, and the herein proponent, Jose S. Lopez; and (5) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud or trick. Liboro pointed out that the first page of the will, which was contained in two pages in all, was not numbered in letters or Arabic numbers as what should have been required by law. It was also argued that the testator should have signed the will with his signature and not only with his thumb print if he indeed had the capacity to execute the will. Furthermore, the will did not expressly state that the language used is a language which the Don understood; in this case, it was in Spanish. ISSUE: Whether or not there was substantial compliance to qualify the will for probate. RULING: Yes, it was executed in all particulars as required by law. The purpose of the law in prescribing the paging of wills is guard against fraud, and to afford means of preventing the substitution or of defecting the loss of any of its pages. In the present case, the omission to put a page number on the first sheet, if that be necessary, is supplied by other forms of identification more trustworthy than the conventional numerical words or characters. The unnumbered page is clearly identified as the first page by the internal sense of its contents considered in relation to the contents of the second page. By their meaning and coherence, the first and second lines on the second page are undeniably a continuation of the last sentence of the testament, before the attestation clause, which starts at the bottom of the preceding page. Furthermore, the unnumbered page contains the caption "TESTAMENTO," the invocation of the Almighty, and a recital that the testator was in full use of his testamentary faculty, all of which, in the logical order of sequence, precede the direction for the disposition of the marker's property. Again, as page two contains only the two lines above mentioned, the attestation clause, the mark of the testator and the signatures of the witnesses, the other sheet cannot by any possibility be taken for other than page one. The testator affixed his thumbmark to the instrument instead of signing hisname. The reason for this was that the testator was suffering from "partialparalysis." While another in testator's place might have directed someone else tosign for him, as appellant contends should have been done, there is nothingcurious or suspicious in the fact that the testator chose the use of mark as themeans of authenticating his will. It was a matter of taste or preference. Both waysare good. A statute requiring a will to be "signed" is satisfied if the signature ismade by the testator's mark. As for the question on the language of the will, there is no statutoryrequirement that such knowledge be expressly stated in the will itself. It is amatter that may be established by proof aliunde. The will may therefore be submitted for probate.
Topic: 5. DEFECT IN ATTESTATION CLAUSE Rosario GARCIA vs Juliana LACUESTA, et al. G.R. No. L-4067, November 29, 1951 FACTS: A will was executed by Antero Mercado wherein it appears that it was signed by Atty. Florentino Javiwe who wrote the name of Antero. The testator was alleged to have written a cross immediately after his name. The Court of First Instance found that the will was valid but the Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision holding that the attestation clause failed: 1) to certify that the will was signed on all the left margins of the three pages and at the end of the will by Atty. Javier at the express request of the testator in the presence of the testator and each and every one of the witnesses; 2) to certify that after the signing of the name of the testator by Atty. Javier at the formers request said testator has written a cross at the end of his name and on the left margin of the three pages of which
the will consists and at the end thereof 3) to certify that the witnesses signed the will in all the pages thereon in the presence of the testator and of each other. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: Whether or not the attestation clause is valid. RULING: The attestation clause is fatally defective for failing to state that Antero Mercado caused Atty. Javier to write the testators name under his express direction, as required by section 168 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is not here pretended that the cross appearing on the will is the usual signature of Antero Mercado or even one of the ways by which he signed his name. After mature reflection, the SC is not prepared to liken the mere sign of the cross to a thumbmark and the reason is obvious. The cross cannot and does not have the trustworthiness of a thumbmark.
Topic: WHEN THE TESTATOR REQUIRES ANOTHER TO WRITE HIS NAME ON HIS BEHALF 6. Lucio BALONAN vs. Eusebia ABELLANA, et al. G.R. No. L-15153, August 31, 1960 FACTS: The last Will and Testament sought to be probated consists in two (2) typewritten pages. The first page is signed by Juan Bello and on the left margin appears the signatures of the three (3) instrumental witnesses. On the second page appears the signature of said witnesses, at the bottom of which appears the signature of the notary public and below said signature is his designation as notary public. On the left margin of the second page (last page of the will) appears the signature of Juan Bello under whose name appears handwritten the phrase, Por la Testadore Anacleta Abellana (For the Testate of Anacleta Abellana). The will is duly acknowledged before the notary public. ISSUE: Whether or not the signature of Juan Bello above the typewritten statement, Por la Testadora Anacleta Abellana comply with the requirements of law prescribing the manner in which a will shall be executed. RULING: Article 805 of the Civil Code provides: Every will, other than a holographic will, must be subscribed at the end there of by the testator himself or by the testators name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of one another. The law requires that the testator himself sign the will, or if he cannot do so, the testators name must be written by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. In this case, the name of the testatrix, Anacleta Abellana does not appear written under the will by said Abellana herself, or by Dr. Juan Bello. There is therefore, a failure to comply with the express requirement in the law that the testator must himself sign the will, or that his name be affixed thereto by some other person in his presence and by his express direction. Hence, the will of the deceased Anacleta Abellana must not be admitted to probate.
7. G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911
BEATRIZ NERA, ET AL., plaintiffs-appellees, vs. NARCISA RIMANDO, defendant-appellant. Facts: The only question raised by the evidence in this case as to the due execution of the instrument propounded as a will in the court below, is whether one of the subscribing witnesses was present in the small room where it was executed at the time when the testator and the other subscribing witnesses attached their signatures; or whether at that time he was outside, some eight or ten feet away, in a large room connecting with the smaller room by a doorway, across which was hung a curtain which made it impossible for one in the outside room to see the testator and the other subscribing witnesses in the act of attaching their signatures to the instrument. Ruling: The true test of presence of the testator and the witnesses in the execution of a will is not whether they actually saw each other sign, but whether they might have been seen each other sign, had they chosen to do so, considering their mental and physical condition and position with relation to each other at the moment of inscription of each signature. But it is especially to be noted that the position of the parties with relation to each other at the moment of the subscription of each signature, must be such that they may see each other sign if they choose to do so. This, of course, does not mean that the testator and the subscribing witnesses may be held to have executed the instrument in the presence of each other if it appears that they would not have been able to see each other sign at that moment, without changing their relative positions or existing conditions. The evidence in the case relied upon by the trial judge discloses that "at the moment when the witness Javellana signed the document he was actually and physically present and in such position with relation to Jaboneta that he could see everything that took place by merely casting his eyes in the proper direction and without any physical obstruction to prevent his doing so." And the decision merely laid down the doctrine that the question whether the testator and the subscribing witnesses to an alleged will sign the instrument in the presence of each other does not depend upon proof of the fact that their eyes were actually cast upon the paper at the moment of its subscription by each of them, but that at that moment existing conditions and their position with relation to each other were such that by merely casting the eyes in the proper direction they could have seen each other sign. To extend the doctrine further would open the door to the possibility of all manner of fraud, substitution, and the like, and would defeat the purpose for which this particular condition is prescribed in the code as one of the requisites in the execution of a will. 8. G.R. No. L-36033 November 5, 1982 IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE PROBATE OF THE WILL OF DOROTEA PEREZ, (deceased): APOLONIO TABOADA, petitioner, vs. HON. AVELINO S. ROSAL, as Judge of Court of First Instance of Southern Leyte, (Branch III, Maasin),respondent. Facts:
In the petition for probate filed with the respondent court, the petitioner attached the alleged last will and testament of the late Dorotea Perez. Written in the CebuanoVisayan dialect, the will consists of two pages. The first page contains the entire testamentary dispositions and is signed at the end or bottom of the page by the testatrix alone and at the left hand margin by the three (3) instrumental witnesses. The second page which contains the attestation clause and the acknowledgment is signed at the end of the attestation clause by the three (3) attesting witnesses and at the left hand margin by the testatrix. Ruling: Ruling as to how the law should be construed: The law is to be liberally construed, "the underlying and fundamental objective permeating the provisions on the law on wills in this project consists in the liberalization of the manner of their execution with the end in view of giving the testator more freedom in expressing his last wishes but with sufficient safeguards and restrictions to prevent the commission of fraud and the exercise of undue and improper pressure and influence upon the testator. This objective is in accord with the modern tendency in respect to the formalities in the execution of a will" (Report of the Code commission, p. 103). Parenthetically, Judge Ramon C. Pamatian stated in his questioned order that were not for the defect in the place of signatures of the witnesses, he would have found the testimony sufficient to establish the validity of the will. The objects of attestation and of subscription were fully met and satisfied in the present case when the instrumental witnesses signed at the left margin of the sole page which contains all the testamentary dispositions, especially so when the will was properly Identified by subscribing witness Vicente Timkang to be the same will executed by the testatrix. There was no question of fraud or substitution behind the questioned order. In Singson v. Florentino, et al. (92 Phil. 161, 164), this Court made the following observations with respect to the purpose of the requirement that the attestation clause must state the number of pages used: The law referred to is article 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, which requires that the attestation clause shall state the number of pages or sheets upon which the win is written, which requirement has been held to be mandatory as an effective safeguard against the possibility of interpolation or omission of some of the pages of the will to the prejudice of the heirs to whom the property is intended to be bequeathed (In re will of Andrada, 42 Phil., 180; Uy Coque vs. Navas L. Sioca, 43 Phil. 405; Gumban vs. Gorecho, 50 Phil. 30; Quinto vs. Morata, 54 Phil. 481; Echevarria vs. Sarmiento, 66 Phil. 611). The ratio decidendi of these cases seems to be that the attestation clause must contain a statement of the number of sheets or pages composing the will and that if this is missing or is omitted, it will have the effect of invalidating the will if the deficiency cannot be supplied, not by evidence aliunde, but by a consideration or examination of the will itself. But here the situation is different. While the attestation clause does not state the number of sheets or pages upon which the will is written, however, the last part of the body of
the will contains a statement that it is composed of eight pages, which circumstance in our opinion takes this case out of the rigid rule of construction and places it within the realm of similar cases where a broad and more liberal view has been adopted to prevent the will of the testator from being defeated by purely technical considerations.
9. WHEN WITNESSES DID NOT SEE THE ACTUAL SIGNING OF THE WILL BY THE TESTATOR Vda. De Ramos vs. CA, GR No. L-40804, Jan. 31, 1978 Facts: Petitioners and intervenors, as instituted heirs or devisees, prayed for the probate and/or allowance of the will and codicil purportedly executed by Testatrix Eugenia Danila because they too have rights and interests to protect. Respondents opposed the petition because the Testatrixs will and testament had already been probated and not revoked or annulled during her lifetime and was duly signed by her and the three (3) witnesses and acknowledged before a Notary Public in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law even if two (2) of the attesting witnesses did not see the Testatrix sign the will when they affixed their signatures therein. The lower court gave more weight and merit to the straight-forward and candid testimony of the lawyer notary public affirming that the Testatrix and the three (3) witnesses signed the will in the presence of each other. CA reversed the decision of the lower court on the ground that the evidence failed to establish that Testatrix Eugenia Danila signed her will in the presence of the instrumental witnesses in accordance with Art. 805 of the New Civil Code. Issue: WON the last testament and its accompanying codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities of the law after two (2) of the attesting witnesses testified that they did not see the Testatrix sign the will. Held: The will and codicil were executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. Each and every page of the will and codicil carry the authentic signatures of the testatrix and 3 attesting witnesses. Similarly, the attestation clauses were properly signed by the attesting witnesses. Both instruments were duly acknowledged before a notary public who was all the time present during the execution. The documents were prepared by a lawyer and the execution of the same was evidently supervised by another lawyer before whom the deeds were acknowledged. Once signed by the attesting witnesses, the attestation clause affirms that compliance with the indispensable legal formalities had been observed. In the attestation clause, the witnesses do not merely attest to the signature of the testatrix but also to the proper execution of the will, and their signatures following that of the testatrix show that they have in fact attested not only to the genuineness of the testatrix signature but also to the due execution of the will as embodied in the attestation clause.
10. THE ACKNOWLEDGING OFFICER MANY INSTRUMENTAL WITNESS TO A WLL Cruz vs. Villasor, GR No. L-32213, Nov. 26, 1973 Facts:
NOT
BE
THE
THIRD
Petitioner Agapita Cruz, th surviving spouse of the decedent, Valente Z. Cruz opposed the allowance of the will because it was alleged to have been executed not in accordance with law particularly Articles 805 and 806, NCC which requires the following: a. At least 3 credible witnesses to attest and subscribe to the will; b. The Testator and the witnesses to acknowledge the will before a notary public. One of the three (3) instrumental witnesses was a notary public before whom the will was supposed to have been acknowledged. Petitioner therefore argued that only two (2) witnesses appeared before the notary public to acknowledge the will. Private respondent Manuel Lugay, the executor of the will maintains there was substantial compliance with the legal requirement of having at least three (3) attesting witnesses even if the notary public acted as one of them. Issue: WON an acknowledging officer can serve as a witness at the same time of a Last Will and Testament. Held: The notary public before whom the will was acknowledged cannot be considered as the third instrumental witness since he cannot acknowledge before himself his having signed the will. Consequently, if the third witness was the notary public himself, he would have to avow, assent or admit his having signed the will infront of himself. This cannot be done because he cannot split his personality into two, so that, one will appear before the other to acknowledge his participation in the making of the will. Such will be in contravention of the provisions of Arts. 805 and 806 of the NCC.
15. GAN, vs. YAP G.R. No. L-12190; August 30, 1858 Topic: Lost holographic will may not be probated.
FACTS: After the death of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, Fausto Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the former. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements of allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will. ISSUE: WON a lost holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator. HELD: No. If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills.
Unlike holographic wills, ordinary wills may be proved by testimonial evidence when lost or destroyed. In the first, the only guarantee of authenticity is the handwriting itself; in the second, the testimony of the subscribing or instrumental witnesses (and of the notary, now). The loss of the holographic will entails the loss of the only medium of proof; if the ordinary will is lost, the subscribing witnesses are available to authenticate.
In the case of a lost will, the three subscribing witnesses would be testifying to a fact which they saw, namely the act of the
testator of subscribing the will; whereas in the case of a lost holographic will, the witnesses would testify as to their opinion of the handwriting which they allegedly saw, an opinion which cannot be tested in court, nor directly contradicted by the oppositors, because the handwriting itself is not at hand.
16. ROXAS de Jesus vs. Andres R. de JESUS, Jr. G.R. No. L-38338, January 28, 1985
Topic: When the date in the holographic will appears as FEB./61 FACTS: After the death of spouses Andres and Bibiana de Jesus, a special proceeding was instituted by Simeon, brother of Bibiana. Simeon was then appointed administrator of the estate and consequently, he delivered to the lower court a document purporting to be the holographic will of Bibiana which was then set for a hearing. Luz Henson, one of the compulsory heirs filed an opposition to probate assailing the purported holographic Will of Bibiana was not executed in accordance with law. However, the lower court issued an order allowing the probate which was found to have been duly executed in accordance with law. A motion for reconsideration was then filed by Luz assailing that the alleged holographic will was not dated as required by Article 810 of the Civil Code and contending that the law requires that the Will should contain the day, month and year of its execution and that this should be strictly complied with. The court then reconsidered its earlier order and disallowed the probate of the holographic will on the ground that the word dated has generally been held to include the month, day, and year. ISSUE: Whether or not the date (FEB/61) appearing on the holographic will of the deceased Bibian Roxas de Jesus is a valid compliance with the Article 810 of the Civil Code. RULING:
ART. 810. A person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written, dated, and signed by the hand of the testator himself. It is subject to no other form, and may be made in or out of the Philippines, and need not be witnessed.
As a general rule, the date in a holographic will should include the day, month and year of its execution. However, when as in the case at bar, there is no appearance of fraud, bad faith, undue influence and pressure and the authenticity of the Will is established and the only issue is whether or not the date FEB/61 appearing on the holographic will is a valid compliance with Article 810 of the Civil Code, probate of the holographic Will should be allowed under the principle of substantial compliance.
FACTS: After the death of Felicidad Esguerra Alto-Yap, Fausto Gan filed a petition for the probate of a holographic will allegedly executed by the former. Opposing the petition, her surviving husband Ildefonso Yap asserted that the deceased had not left any will, nor executed any testament during her lifetime. The will itself was not presented. Gan tried to establish its contents and due execution by the statements of allegedly four (4) witnesses to the execution of the alleged will. ISSUE: WON a lost holographic will may be probated upon the testimony of witnesses who have allegedly seen it and who declare that it was in the handwriting of the testator.
HELD: No. If testimonial evidence of holographic wills be permitted, one more objectionable feature feasibility of forgery would be added to the several objections to this kind of wills.
19. GONZALES vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al. G.R. No. L-37453, May 25, 1979 Topic: Credibility of Instrumental Witnesses
FACTS: Lutgarda Santiago and Rizalina Gonzales are nieces of the late Isabel Andres Gabriel. Lutgarda filed a petition for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by the deceased and designated Lutgarda as the principal beneficiary and executrix. There is no dispute that Isabel died as a widow and without issue. The will submitted consists of five (5) pages and includes the pages whereon the attestation clause and the acknowledgment of the notary public were written. The signatures of the deceased Isabel Gabriel appear at the end of the will on page four and at the left margin of all the pages.
At the bottom thereof, under the heading "Pangalan", are written the signatures of Matilde D. Orobia, Celso D. Gimpaya and Maria R. Gimpaya, and opposite the same, under the heading "Tirahan", are their respective places of residence. The petition was opposed by Rizalina assailing
that the will is not genuine and was not executed and attested as required by law. The lower court
disallowed the probate of said will and as a consequence, Lutgarda appealed to Court of Appeals reversed the lower courts decision and allowed the probate of the will. Rizalina filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the will was executed and attested as required by law. RULING: No. Instrumental witnesses in order to be competent must be shown to have the
qualifications under Article 820 of the Civil Code and none of the disqualifications under Article 821 and for their testimony to be credible, that is worthy of belief and entitled to credence, it is not mandatory that evidence be first established on record that the witnesses have a good standing in the community or that they are honest and upright or reputed to be trustworthy and reliable, for a person is presumed to be such unless the contrary is established otherwise. In other words, the instrumental witnesses must be competent and their testimonies must be credible before the court allows the probate of the will they have attested.
In the case at bar, the finding that each and everyone of the three instrumental witnesses are competent and credible is satisfactorily supported by the evidence as found by the respondent Court of Appeals, which findings of fact this Tribunal is bound to accept and rely upon. Moreover, petitioner has not pointed to any disqualification of any of the said witnesses.
20. GAGO vs. MAMUYAC, et al. G.R. No. L-26317, January 29, 1927 Topic: Probate of a cancelled will cannot be allowed.
FACTS: Miguel Mamuyac executed a last will and testament on July 1918 and almost 4 years later, Francisco Gago presented a petition in the CFI for the probation of such will which was opposed by Cornelia Mamuyac et al. The petition was denied upon the ground that Mamuyac had executed a new will on April 1919. An action was filed to secure the probation of the said new will. The opponents alleged (a) that the said will is a copy of the second will executed by Miguel; (b) that the same had been cancelled and revoked during the lifetime of the testator; and (c) that the said will was not the last will and testament of Miguel Mamuyac. The petition was then again denied upon the ground that the will of 1919 had been the cancelled and revoked based on the evidence adduced by the trial court that the 1918 will is a mere carbon of its original which remained in the possession of the deceased, who revoked it before a witness, who typed the 1919 will of the testator, and before another person who witnessed the actual cancellation by the testator in 1920. Hence, this appeal. ISSUE: WON a cancelled will can be probated. RULING: No. The law does not require any evidence of the revocation or cancellation of a will to be preserved. Where a will which cannot be found is shown to have been in the possession of the testator, when last seen, the presumption is, in the absence of other competent evidence, that the same was cancelled or destroyed. The same presumption arises where it is shown that the testator had ready access to the will and it cannot be found after his death. It will not be presumed that such will has been destroyed by any other person without the knowledge or authority of the testator. In view of the fact that the original will of 1919 could not be found after the death of the testator and in view of the positive proof that the same had been cancelled, the conclusions of the lower court are in accordance with the weight of evidence. After a careful examination of the entire record, we are fully persuaded that the will presented for probate had been cancelled by the testator in 1920.
21. CASIANO et al. vs. COURT OF APPEALS et al. G.R. No. 76464, February 29, 1988 Topic: Revocation of a will
FACTS: Adriana Maloto died leaving as heirs Aldina, Constantcio, Panfilo and Felino who are her niece and nephews. Believing that the deceased did not leave behind a last will and testament, the 4 heirs commenced an intestate proceeding for the settlement of their aunts estate. However, while the case was still in progress, the heirs executed an agreement of extrajudicial settlement of Adrianas estate
which provides for the division of the estate into four equal parts among themselves. When presented before the court, said agreement was approved. However, three years later, Atty. Sulpicio Palma, a former associate of Adrianas counsel, discovered a document entitled KATAPUSAN NGA PAGBUBULAT-AN (Testamento) and purporting to be the last will and testament of Adriana. Panfilo and Felino are still named as heirs in the said will, Aldina and Constancio are bequeathed much bigger and more valuable shares in the estate than what they have received by virtue of the agreement of extrajudicial settlement. The will likewise gives devises and legacies to other parties, among them being the petitioners. Thus, Aldino and Constancio joined by other devisees and legatees filed a motion for reconsideration and annulment of the proceedings therein and for the allowance of the will. Upon denial of the trial court, the petitioners came before the Supreme Court by way or petition for certiorari and mandamus which were dismissed because they were not the proper remedies. The appellate court found out that the will was burned by the househelper of Adriana and was at the possession of the lawyer in because Adriana was seeking the services of the lawyer in order to have a new will drawn up. ISSUE: WON the will of Adriana Maloto had been efficiently revoked. RULING: No. It
is clear that the physical act of destruction of a will, like burning in this case, does not per se constitute an effective revocation, unless the destruction is coupled with animus revocandi on the part of the testator. It is not imperative that the physical destruction be done by the testator himself. It may be performed by another person but under the express direction and in the presence of the testator. Of course, it goes without saying that the document destroyed must be the will itself. In this case, while animus revocandi or the intention to revoke, may be conceded, for that is a state of mind, yet that requisite alone would not suffice. "Animus revocandi is only one of the necessary elements for the effective revocation of a last will and testament. The intention to revoke must be accompanied by the overt physical act of burning, tearing, obliterating, or cancelling the will carried out by the testator or by another person in his presence and under his express direction. There is paucity of evidence to show compliance with these requirements. For one, the document or papers burned by Adriana's maid, Guadalupe, was not satisfactorily established to be a will at all, much less the will of Adriana Maloto. For another, the burning was not proven to have been done under the express direction of Adriana. And then, the burning was not in her presence. Both witnesses, Guadalupe and Eladio, were one in stating that they were the only ones present at the place where the stove was located in which the papers proffered as a will were burned.
22. AUSTRIA vs. REYES G.R. No. L-23079, February 27, 1970 Topic: Adopted children as testate heirs
FACTS: Basilia Austria filed with the CFI of Rizal a petition for probate ante mortem of her last will and testament which was opposed by Ruben Austria and others who are nephews and nieces of Basilia. However, such opposition was dismissed and the probate was allowed after due hearing. The bulk of the estate was destined under the will to pass on the Perfecto Cruz and others whom had been assumed and declared by Basilia as her own legally adopted children. Subsequently, upon Basilias death, Perfecto was appointed executor in accordance with the provisions of the formers will. Ruben and the others filed in the same proceedings a petition in intervention for partition alleging that they are the nearest kin and Perfecto and others had not in fact been adopted by the testator in accordance with law, hence they should be rendered mere strangers and without any right to succeed as heirs.
ISSUE: WON institution of adopted children as testate heirs is valid.
Yes. Even if the adoption in question were spurious, Perfecto Cruz, et al., will nevertheless succeed not as compulsory heirs but as testamentary heirs instituted in
RULING:
Basilia's will. This ruling apparently finds support in article, 842 of the Civil Code which reads:
One who has no compulsory heirs may dispose of by will all his estate or any part of it in favor of any person having capacity to succeed. One who has compulsory heirs may dispose of his estate provided he does not contravene the provisions of this Code with regard to the legitime of said heirs.
The lower court must have assumed that since the petitioners nephews and niece are not compulsory heirs, they do not possess that interest which can be prejudiced by a free-wheeling testamentary disposition. The petitioners' interest is confined to properties, if any, that have not been disposed of in the will, for to that extent intestate succession can take place and the question of the veracity of the adoption acquires relevance. 23. Topic: a will cannot be made subject of annulment GALLANOSA et al. vs. ARCANGEL et al. G.R. No. L-29300 June 21, 1978 FACTS: Florentino Hitosis executed a will in the Bicol dialect on June 19, 1938 when he was eighty years old. He died on May 26, 1939 and survived by his brother, Leon Hitosis. A petition for the probate of his will was filed in the CFI of Sorsogon. In that will, Florentino bequeathed his one-half share in the conjugal estate to his second wife, Tecla Dollentas, and, should Tecla predeceased him, his one-half share would be assigned to the spouses Pedro Gallanosa and Corazon Grecia, the reason being that Pedro, Tecla's son by her first marriage, grew up under the care of Florentino; he had treated Pedro as his foster child, and Pedro has rendered services to Florentino and Tecla. Florentino likewise bequeathed his separate properties consisting of three parcels of abaca land and parcel of riceland to his protege, Adolfo Fortajada, a minor. Opposition to the probate of the will was filed by Leon, his surviving brother. After a hearing,the oppositors did not present any evidence in support of their opposition, Judge Pablo S. Rivera, in his decision of October 27, 1939, admitted the will to probate and appointed Gallanosa as executor. The Gallanosa spouses submitted a project of partition covering sixty-one parcels of land and several pieces of personal property were distributed in accordance with Florentino's will. The project of partition was approved by Judge Doroteo Amador in his order of March 13, 1943, thus confirming the heirs' possession of their respective shares. ISSUE: Whether or not a will is subject of annulment. RESOLUTION: No.Our procedural law does not sanction an action for the "annulment" of a will. In order that a will may take effect, it has to be probated, legalized or allowed in the proper testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will is mandatory. The 1939 decree of probate is conclusive as to the due execution or formal validity of the will that means that the testator was of sound trial disposing mind at the time when he executed the will and was not acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence; that the will was signed by him in the presence of the required number of witnesses, and that the will is genuine trial and not a forgery. Accordingly, these facts cannot again be questioned in a subsequent proceeding, not even in a criminal action for the forgery of the will. After the finality of the allowance of a will, the issue as to the voluntariness of its execution cannot be raised anymore. In Austria vs. Ventenilla, 21 Phil. 180, a "petition for annulment of a will" was not entertained after the decree of probate had become final. After the time allowed for an appeal has expired, when no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs cannot, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise questions relating to its due execution. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution trial as to the testamentary capacity of the testator
24. Topic: when an issue of ownership is intertwined maybe passed upon on a probate proceeding. Pastor et al. vs. CA et al. GR. No. L-56340, June 24, 1983 Facts: Pastor, Sr. died in 1966, survived by his wife Sofia Bossio, two legitimate children Pastor, Jr. and Sofia de Midgely, and an illegitimate child Lewellyn Barlito Quemada. He left a holographic will which contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of Quemada consisting of 30% of Pastor, Sr.s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims. Quemada was appointed as special administrator of the entire estate of Pastor, Sr., whether or not covered or affected by the holographic will. Pastor, Jr. and his sister Sofia opposed the petition for probate and the order appointing Quemada as special administrator. Quemada instituted against Pastor, Jr. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses Pastor, Jr. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. The action is docketed as Civil Case No. 274-R. The probate court issued an order allowing the will to probate which was affirmed by the CA. On appeal SC dismissed the petition and remanded the same to the probate court. Quemada kept asking for payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy which was opposed by Pastor, Jr. and Sofia on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the CFI. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the probate court. The probate court ordered ATLAS to submit a sworn statement of royalties paid to the Pastor Group from the death of Pastor, Sr. died to February 1980. It revealed that 60% of the mining claims being operated pertained to Pastor Group. Of the 60%, 42% belonged to Pastor, Sr. and only 33% belonged to Pastor, Jr. While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated, the probate court issued an Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to Quemada was not inofficious. Thus, it directed ATLAS to remit directly to Quemada the 42% royalties due decedent's estate, of which Quemada was authorized to retain 75% for himself as legatee and to deposit 25% with a reputable banking institution for payment of the estate taxes and other obligations of the estate. The 33% share of Pastor, Sr.and/or his assignees was ordered garnished to answer for the accumulated legacy of Quemada from the time of Pastor, Jr.'s death, which amounted to over two million pesos. Another order declared that the questions of intrinsic validity of the will and of ownership over the mining claims (not the royalties alone) had been finally adjudicated thereby rendering moot and academic the pending suit for reconveyance. Issue: Whether or not the probate court can resolve questions of ownership over the mining claims and was able to determine the intrinsic validity of the will. Resolution: No. On the Question of Ownership The question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. The said court may only provisionally pass upon titles of properties to be included in the inventory of the estate properties, subject to final decision in a separate action to resolve the question on ownership. The issue in the probate of a will is restricted to that kind of validity of the will which for example determines whether or not the testator was possessed of a sound
mind, whether or not he freely executed the will, and whether or not the will had been executed in accordance with legal formalities. Before the provisions of the holographic will can be implemented, the questions of ownership of the mining properties and the intrinsic validity of the holographic will must first be resolved with finality. In this case, the Probate Order did not resolve the two said issues. Therefore, the Probate Order could not have resolved and actually did not decide Quemada's entitlement to the legacy. This being so, the Orders for the payment of the legacy are unwarranted for lack of basis. On the Intrinsic Validity of the Will If the deceased was survived by his wife and his children, there is a need, aside from liquidating the conjugal partnership, to set apart the share of the surviving spouse in the conjugal property, preparatory to the administration and liquidation of the estate of the deceased. In the case at bar, there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership, there was no prior definitive determination of the assets and debts of the estate of Pastor, Sr. nor his estate tax been paid. The net assets of the estate not having been determined, the legitime of the forced heirs in concrete figures could not be ascertained. It was therefore not possible to determine whether the legacy of Quemada would produce an impairment of the legitime of the compulsory heirs. This case was then remanded to the appropriate RTC for proper proceedings, subject to the judgment to be rendered in Civil Case No. 274-R. 25. TOMAS JIMENEZ, VISITACION JIMENEZ, DIGNO JIMENEZ, ANTONIO JIMENEZ, AMADEO JIMENEZ, MODESTO JIMENEZ and VIRGINIA JIMENEZ, petitioners, vs. HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, HON. AMANDA VALERACABIGAO, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch XXXVII, Lingayen, Pangasinan, LEONARDO JIMENEZ, JR. and CORAZON JIMENEZ, respondents. G.R. No. 75773 April 17, 1990 Facts: Leonardo (Lino) Jimenez on his first marriage with Consolacion Ungson had four children, namely: Alberto, Leonardo, Sr., Alejandra and Angeles. During the existence of the marriage, Lino acquired five parcels of land. After Consolacion died, he married Genoveva Caolboy with whom he begot the seven petitioners herein. Lino and Genoveva died. Virginia Jimenez filed a petition before the Court of First Instance praying to be appointed as administratrix of the properties of the deceased spouses Lino and Genoveva. Leonardo Jimenez, Jr., filed a motion for the exclusion of his father's name and those of Alberto, Alejandra, and Angeles from the petition, inasmuch as they are children of the union of Lino Jimenez and Consolacion Ungson and not of Lino Jimenez and Genoveva Caolboy and because they have already received their inheritance consisting of five parcels of lands. Virginia, the appointed administrator, included the five parcels of land in the inventory of the estate of the spouses. Leonardo Jimenez, Jr. moved for the exclusion of these properties from the inventory on the ground that these had already been adjudicated to the children on Lino on his first marriage. The probate court ordered the exclusion of the five parcels of land from the inventory. A motion for reconsideration of said order was denied so Virginia went to the Court of Appeals on a petition for certiorari and prohibition seeking the annulment of the order excluding the five parcels of land from the inventory and the denial of her motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition. Petitioners filed an amended complaint after two years to recover possession/ownership of the subject five parcels of land as part of the estate of Lino and Genoveva and to order private respondents to render an accounting of the produce therefrom. Private respondents moved for the dismissal of the complaint on the grounds that the action was barred by prior judgment in a
former decision and by prescription and laches. The trial court resolved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of res judicata. Issue: Whether or not in a settlement proceeding (testate or intestate) the probate court has jurisdiction to settle questions of ownership. Held: No. It has also been held that in a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with finality. Since the probate court's findings are not conclusive being prima facie, a separate proceeding is necessary to establish the ownership of the five parcels of land. The patent reason is the probate court's limited jurisdiction and the principle that questions of title or ownership, which result in inclusion or exclusion from the inventory of the property, can only be settled in a separate action. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so.
26. Testate Estate of CARLOS PALANCA TANGUINLAY. ROMAN OZAETA, petitioner and appellant, PHILIPPINE TRUST COMPANY (Special Administrator), movant and apellee, MARCIANA PALANCA, ANGEL PALANCA, and SEBASTIAN PALANCA, co-movants and appellants, MARIA CUARTERO VDA. DE PALANCA, ET AL., co-movants and appellants, vs. ROSA GONZALES VDA. DE PALANCA, ET AL., oppositors and appellants. GRN L-5585 September 16, 1954 Facts: Roman Ozaeta initiated a special proceeding for the probate of the will left by Carlos Palanca Tanguinlay. The will confirmed to all requirements needed, so the trial court approved its probate. A motion was filed with the probate court by the Philippine Trust Company, appointed as special administrator of the estate, asking that a Buick sedan car presumably a part of the estate of Palanca, and being kept by Rosa Gonzales, be delivered to said special administrator for purposes of administration. Rosa declined to give the car up saying that having been married to Palanca in 1945, as his widow, she had a right to keep the sedan. Maria Cuartero entered the scene and claimed that Rosa could not have validly been married to Palanca in 1945 for the reason that she had married him in 1929, and therefore, any marriage entered into by Rosa with Palanca thereafter must be bigamous and void. Therefore, she was the true widow and as such had a better claim to the car. Issue: Who is entitled to a portion of Palancas estate as the formers legal widow? Held: Rosa Gonzales is the legal widow of Palanca and is therefore entitled to a portion of his estate. Maria Cuartero and Rosa Gonzales both claimed that they were married to Carlos Palanca Taguinlay in 1929 and 1945, respectively. The marriage of Rosa to Carlos had been duly established by testimonial and documentary evidence. One of the pieces of evidence presented was the will executed by Carlos Palanca wherein he declared that he married Rosa Gonzales in which marriage they had eight children.
Palanca executed his will and he made the solemn declaration in said document that since 1923 and for some years thereafter he maintained amorous relations with Maria Cuartero and had by her six natural children whom, according to him, he had liberally fed and supported. He said nothing about having married Maria; on the contrary, he declared that for grave reasons he regarded her unworthy of being the guardian of the persons and property of his children by her and so appointed Felisa Joson de Fernandez and the Philippine National Bank as guardians of their persons, and property respectively. On the other hand, in the same will he spoke of his marriage to Rosa Gonzales and the eight children he had by her, which children according to him were legitimated by reason of their subsequent marriage. We are convinced and so find and hold that Palanca and Maria Cuartero were never married, and that there was not even a simulated marriage; that on April 12, 1945, Palanca was a widower and so was in a position to marry as in fact he validly married Rosa Gonzales.
28. Remedios NUGUID vs. Felix NUGUID and Paz Salonga NUGUID. G.R. No. L-23445, June 23, 1966
FACTS: Rosario Nuguid, testator in the holographic will, died single and without descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. Surviving her were her legitimate parents, Felix Nuguid and Paz Salonga Nuguid, and six brothers and sisters, namely: Alfredo, Federico, Remedios, Conrado, Lourdes and Alberto, all surnamed Nuguid. On May 18, 1963, Remedios Nuguid, sister of Rosario, filed in the Court of First Instance of Rizal a holographic will allegedly executed by Rosario Nuguid on November 17, 1951, some 11 years before her death. The will stated as follows: Nov. 17, 1951 I, ROSARIO NUGUID, being of sound and disposing mind and memory, having amassed a certain amount of property, do hereby give, devise, and bequeath all of the property which I may have when I die to my beloved sister Remedios Nuguid, age 34, residing with me at 38-B Iriga, Q.C. In witness whereof, I have signed my name this seventh day of November, nineteen hundred and fifty-one. (Sgd.) Illegible T/ ROSARIO NUGUID Remedios prayed that said will be admitted to probate and that letters of administration with the will annexed be issued to her. This was opposed by the parents of Rosario, Felix and Paz. The parents opposed on the ground of preterition. The CFI of Rizal decided in favor of the parents and declared that there was indeed preterition of compulsory heirs. Petitioner insists that the compulsory heirs were simply ineffectively disinherited and that they are entitled to receive their legitimes, but that the institution of heir "is not invalidated," although the inheritance of the heir so instituted is reduced to the extent of said legitimes. ISSUE: May a part of the will, when preterition has been declared, be considered to still be valid with respect to the free portion of the will? RULING: No, preterition has an effect of completely nullifying the will. Article 854 of the Civil Code states that (T)he preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious.
The deceased Rosario Nuguid left no descendants, legitimate or illegitimate. But she left forced heirs in the direct ascending line her parents. The will completely omits both of them. They thus received nothing by the testament; tacitly, they were deprived of their legitime; neither were they expressly disinherited. This is a clear case of preterition. It cannot be gleaned in the will that any specific legacies or bequests are therein provided for. It is in this posture that the Supreme Court held that the nullity is complete. Perforce, Rosario Nuguid died intestate. Remedios claim that the will should only be nullified as to the part of the legitime and that she should thus be considered a devisee or legatee is without merit. The law requires that the institution of devisees and legatees must be expressly stated in the will. Such was not present. Also, the omission of the parents in the will cannot be interpreted as a form of disinheritance as the law also requires that, for disinheritance to be proper, the disinheritance should be clearly and expressly stated in the will. Absent that, no inference of disinheritance may be had.
27. Pascual COSO, vs. Fermina Fernandez DEZA, et al., G.R. No.L- 16763,December 22, 1921 FACTS:
The testator, a married man, became acquainted with Rosario Lopez and had illicit relations with her for many years. They begot an illegitimate son. The testators will gives the tercio de libre disposicion to the illegitimate son and also provides for the payment of nineteen hundred Spanish duros to Rosario Lopez by way of reimbursement for expenses incurred by her in talking care of the testator when he is alleged to have suffered from severe illness. The will was set aside on the ground of undue influence alleged to have been exerted over the mind of the testator by Rosario Lopez. There is no doubt that Rosario exercised some influence over the testator. ISSUE: Whether or not the influence exercised was of such a character to vitiate the will. RULING: Mere general or reasonable influence over a testator is not sufficient to invalidate a will; to have that effect, the influence must be undue. The rule as to what constitutes undue influence has been variously stated, but the substance of the different statements is that, to be sufficient to avoid a will, the influence exerted must be of a kind that so overpowers and subjugates the mind of the testator as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Such influence must be actually exerted on the mind of the testator in regard to the execution of the will in question, either at the time of the execution of the will, or so near thereto as to be still operative, with the object of procuring a will in favor of particular parties, and it must result in the making of testamentary dispositions which the testator would not otherwise have made. And while the same amount of influence may become undue when exercise by one occupying an improper and adulterous relation to testator, the mere fact that some influence is exercised by a person sustaining that relation does not invalidate a will, unless it is further shown that the influence destroys the testators free agency. The burden is upon the parties challenging the will to show that undue influence existed at the time of its execution. While it is shown that the testator entertained strong affections for Rosario Lopez, it does not appear that her influence so overpowered and subjugated his mind as to destroy his free agency and make him express the will of another rather than his own. Mere affection, even if illegitimate, is not undue influence and does not invalidate a will. Influence gained by kindness and affection will not be regarded as undue, if no imposition or fraud be practiced, even though it induces the testator to make an unequal and unjust disposition of his property in favor of those who have contributed to his comfort and ministered to his wants, if such disposition is voluntarily made.
30. Acain vs. IAC FACTS: Constantitno filed for probate of the will of his decased brother Nemesio. The spouse and adopted child of the decedent opposed the probate of will because of preterition. RTC dismissed the petition of the wife. CA reversed and the probate thus was dismissed ISSUE: Whether or not there was preterition of compulsory heirs in the direct line thus their omission shall not annul the institution of heirs. RULING: Preterition consists in the omission of the forced heirs because they are not mentioned there in, or trough mentioned they are neither instituted as heirs nor are expressly disinherited. As for the widow there is no preterit ion because she is not in the direct line. However, the same cannot be said for the adopted child whose legal adoption has not been questioned by the petitioner. Adoption gives to the adopted person the same rights and duties as if he where a legitimate child of the adopter and makes the adopted person a legal heir hence, this is a clear case of preterition. The universal institution of petitioner together with his brothers and sisters to the entire inheritance of the testator results in totally abrogating the will because the nullification of such institution of universal heirs without any other testamentary disposition in the will amounts to a declaration that nothing was written. No legacies and devisees having been provided in the will, the whole property of the deceased has been left by universal title to petitioner and his brothers and sisters. An adopted child, if totally omitted in the inheritance, is preterited and can invoke its protection and consequences. Since an adopted child is given by law the same rights as a legitimate child, the adopted child can, in proper cases, invoke Article 854 in the same manner a legitimate child can. 29. Aznar vs. Duncan
FACTS: Edward E. Christensen, a citizen of California with domicile in the Philippines, died leaving a will executed on March 5, 1951. The will was admitted to probate by the Court of First Instance of Davao in its decision of February 28, 1954. In that same decision the court declared that Maria Helen Christensen Garcia (hereinafter referred to as Helen Garcia) was a natural child of the deceased. The declaration was appealed to this Court, and was affirmed in its decision of February 14, 1958 On October 29, 1964, the Court of First Instance of Davao issued an order approving the project of partition submitted by the executor, dated June 30, 1964, wherein the properties of the estate were divided equally between Maria Lucy Christensen Duncan (named in the will as Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, and hereinafter referred to as merely Lucy Duncan), whom the testator had expressly recognized in his will as his daughter (natural) and Helen Garcia, who had been judicially declared as such after his death. The said order was based on the proposition that since Helen Garcia had been preterited in the will the institution of Lucy Duncan as heir was annulled, and hence the properties passed to both of them as if the deceased had died intestate, saving only the legacies left in favor of certain other persons, which legacies have been duly approved by the lower court and distributed to the legatees.
ISSUE:
whether the estate, after deducting the legacies, should pertain to her and to Helen Garcia in equal shares, or whether the inheritance of Lucy Duncan as instituted heir should be merely reduced to the extent necessary to cover the legitime of Helen Garcia, equivalent to 1/4 of the entire estate. HELD: One point deserves to be here mentioned, although no reference to it has been made in the brief for oppositor-appellant. It is the institution of substitute heirs to the estate bequeathed to Lucy Duncan in the event she should die without living issue. This substitution results in effect from the fact that under paragraph 12 of the will she is entitled only to the income from said estate, unless prior to her decease she should have living issue, in which event she would inherit in full ownership; otherwise the property will go to the other relatives of the testator named in the will. Without deciding this, point, since it is not one of the issues raised before us, we might call attention to the limitations imposed by law upon this kind of substitution, particularly that which says that it can never burden the legitime (Art. 864 Civil Code), which means that the legitime must descend to the heir concerned in fee simple. Manresa defines preterition as the omission of the heir in the will, either by not naming him at all or, while mentioning him as father, son, etc., by not instituting him as heir without disinheriting him expressly, nor assigning to him some part of the properties. In a case where the testator left to one who was a forced heir a legacy worth less than the legitime, but without referring to the legatee as an heir or even as a relative, and willed the rest of the estate to other persons, it was held that Article 815 applied, and the heir could not ask that the institution of heirs be annulled entirely, but only that the legitimate be completed.
32. Sienes et al. vs Esparcia et al. GR No. L-12957 March 24, 1961 Facts: Teresa Reales the first wife of Saturnino Yaeso to whom Lot 3368 originally belonged, he had four children named Agatona, Fernando, Paulina and Cipriana. With his second wifw Andrea Gutang, he had an only son named Francisco (prepositus). Upon Yaeso's death, said lot was left to Francisco and title was issued in his name, Because Francisco was then a minor, his m other administered the property for him and declared it in her name for taxation purposes. When Francisco died, without issue,his mother, Andrea Gutang (reservista), as sole heir, executed an extra judicial settlement and sale of the property in favor of spouses Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay, the vendee Andrea Gutang demanded from Paulina Yaeso and her husband Joe Esparcia the surrender of the original certificate of title which was in their possession. The latter refused. Cipriana and Paulina Yaeso (reservatorios, the surviving half-sister of Francisco as such, declared the property in their name for tax purposes and subsequently executed a deed of sale in favor the spouses Fidel Esparcia and paulina Sienes who in turn, declared it in their name. Constancio Sienes then filed an action asking for the nullification of the sale executed by paulina and Cipriana. The trial court declared the sale of Andrea Gutang to Constancio Sienes and Genoveva Silay was void and that the sale by Paulina and Cipriana Yaeso to the Spouses Esparcia Is also Void. The land in Question was Reservable property and therefore, the reservista Andrea Gutang was under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of the relatives with in the Third degree belonging to the line from which said property came. Held: The lot is reservable property. On Francisco's death, with out descendants, the property was inherited by his mother, Andrea Gutang, who was under obligation to reserve it for the benefit of
relatives within the third degree belonging to the line from which said property came, if any survived her. Being reservable property, the reserva creates two resolutory conditions, namely, 1 ). the death of the ascendant obliged to reserve 2 ). the survival at the time of his death, of relatives within the third degree belonging to the same line from which the property came. 33. Lacerna et al. vs Vda De corcino GR No. L-14603 April 29, 1961 Facts: Bonifacia Lacerna died in 1932 leaving 3 parcels of land to her only son, Juan macabebe, the lattr died single and intestate in 1943, An action was instituted by the plaintiff Juan Macabebe's cousin for the recovery of these three parcels of land from the defendant. Agatona Vda de Corcino, in her answer, Agatona alleged that she held the lands under a power of attorney executed by Juan Macabebe and that she is entitled to succeed him in the same manner as the plaintiff. Since she was Juan's aunt, and also with the court permission. Jacoba Macabebe filed an answer in intervention alleging that she is a half sister of the deceased, who died intestate, leaving neither ascendant or decendant, and that as his half sister she is entitled by succession to the properties in question, the court awarded the parcels of land to jacoba which is not subject to reserve troncal Held: The transmission of the lands by inheritance was therefore in accordance with the order prescribed for intestate succession, pursuant to which a sister, even if only a half sister, in the absence of other sisters or brothers or of children of sister's or brother's, exclude all other collateral relatives regardless of whether or not the property of the deceased came. Juan nearest heir was his half-sister Jacoba. thus the second transfer contemplated by the rules on the reserva never took place. Therefore, the property will pass to Jacoba under the rules of intestate succession.
35. BEATRIZ L. GONZALES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA (BRANCH V), ET., AL G.R. No. L-34395 May 19, 1981
AQUINO, J.: FACTS: Benito Legarda y De la Paz, the son of Benito Legarda y Tuason, died [Manila] on June 17, 1933. He was survived by his widow, Filomena Races, and their seven children: four daughters named Beatriz, Rosario, Teresa and Filomena and three sons named Benito, Alejandro and Jose. On July 12, 1939, the real properties left by Benito Legarda y Tuason were partitioned in three equal portions by his daughters, Consuelo and Rita, and the heirs of his deceased son Benito Legarda y De la Paz who were represented by Benito F. Legarda. Filomena Legarda y Races died intestate and without issue on March 19, 1943. Her sole heiress was her mother, Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda.
Mrs. Legarda on March 6, 1953 executed two handwritten Identical documents wherein she disposed of the properties, which she inherited from her daughter, in favor of the children of her sons, Benito, Alejandro and Jose (sixteen grandchildren in all). 1wph1.t In the testate proceeding, Beatriz Legarda Gonzales, a daughter of the testatrix, filed on May 20, 1968 a motion to exclude from the inventory of her mother's estate the properties which she inherited from her deceased daughter, Filomena, on the ground that said properties are reservable properties which should be inherited by Filomena Legarda's three sisters and three brothers and not by the children of Benito, Alejandro and Jose, all surnamed Legarda. That motion was opposed by the administrator, Benito F. Legarda. ISSUES: Whether or not the disputed properties are reservable properties under article 891 of the Civil Code, formerly article 811. Whether or not Filomena Races Vda. de Legarda could dispose of them in his will in favor of her grandchildren to the exclusion of her six children. HELD: No, Mrs. Legarda could not convey in her holographic will to her sixteen grandchildren the reservable properties which she had inherited from her daughter Filomena because the reservable properties did not form part of her estate. The reservor cannot make a disposition mortis causa of the reservable properties as long as the reservees survived the reservor. As repeatedly held in the Cano and Padura cases, the reservees inherit the reservable properties from theprepositus, not from the reservor. Article 891 clearly indicates that the reservable properties should be inherited by all the nearest relatives within the third degree from the prepositus who in this case are the six children of Mrs. Legarda. She could not select the reservees to whom the reservable property should be given and deprive the other reservees of their share therein.
36. PADURA vs. BALDOVINO G.R. No. L-11960, December 27, 1958
FACTS: In an order, the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Special Proceedings declared all the reservees, without distinction, co-owners pro indiviso in equal shares of the parcels of land subject matter of the suit. RULING: The appealed order was reversed and set aside. The reservatarios who are nephews of the full blood are declared entitled to a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood. Records are remanded to the court below for further proceedings.
37. Francisco Tioco De Papa, Manuel Tioco, Nicolas Tioco and Januario Papa, (Plaintiffs-Appellees) vs. Dalisay Tiongko Camacho, Primo Tiongko and Godofredo Camacho, (Defendants-Appellants), (G.R No. L- 28032, September 24 1986) Facts: Defendant Dalisay Tongko-Camacho and the plaintiffs, Francisco Tioco de Papa, Manuel Tioco and Nicolas Tioco, are legitimate relatives, Plaintiffs being said defendants grandaunt and granduncles. Plaintiffs and defendant Dalisay have as a common ancestor the late Balbino Tioco (who had a sister Romana Tioco), father of plaintiffs and great grandfather of the defendant. Roman Tioco during her lifetime gratuitously donated four (4) parcels of land to her niece Toribia Lioco (Legitimate sister of plaintiffs).
That Toribia Tioco died intestate in 1915, survived by her husband, Eustacio Dizon, and their two legitimate children, Faustino Dizon and Trinidad Dizon (mother of Dalisay) and leaving the aforementioned four (4) parcels of land as the inheritance of her said two children in equal pro-indiviso shares. That in 1928, Balbino Tioco died intestate, survived legitimate children by his wife Marciana Felix ( among them plaintiffs ) and legitimate grandchildren Faustino and Trinidad Dizon. In the partition of the estate, 3 parcels of land were adjudicated as the inheritance of the late Toribia Tioco, but as she had predeceased her father, Balbino Tioco, the said three parcels of land devolved upon her two legitimate children Faustino and Trinidad in equal pro-indiviso shares That in 1937, Faustino died intestate, single and without issue, leaving his one-half (1/2) pro indiviso share in the sever(7) parcels of land above-mentioned to his father, Eustacio Dizon, as his sole intestate heir, who received the said property subject to reserve troncal . That in 1939, Trinidad Dizon-Tiongko died intestate, and her rights and interests in the parcels of land were inherited by her only legitimate child Dalisay, subject to the usufructuary rights of her surviving husband Primo Tiongko. On June 14, 1965, Eustacio Dizon died intestate, survived his only legitimate descendant, Dalisay. Dalisay now owns one-half (1/2) of all the seven (7) parcels of land as her inheritance from her mother, Trinidad. CLAIMS OF THE PARTIES: Dalisay claims, upon legal advice, the other half of the said seven(7) parcels of land by virtue of the reserve troncal imposed thereon upon the death of Faustino Dizon and under the laws on intestate succession; But the plaintiffs; also upon legal advice, oppose her said claim because they claim three fourths(3/4) of the one-half pro-indiviso interest in said parcel of land, which interest was inherited by Eustacio Dizon from Faustino Dizon, on three-eights(3/8) of the said parcel of land, by virtue of their being also third degree relatives of Francisco Dizon. ISSUE: Whether defendant Dalisay is entitled to the whole of the seven (7) parcels of land in question on whether the plaintiffs, as third degree relatives of Faustino are reservations (together with said defendant) of the one-half pro-indiviso share therein which was inherited by Eustacio from his son Faustino, and entitled to of the said one-half-pro-indiviso share, on 3/8 of said 7 parcels of land. The trial court ruled in favor of the plaintiffs so the defendant appealed and raised that in a case of reserva troncal, where the only reservatarios(reservees) surviving the reservista, and belonging to the line of origin, are nephews of the descendants(prepositus), but some are nephews of the half blood and the others are nephews of the whole blood, should the reserved properties be apportioned among then equally, or should the nephews of the whole blood take a share twice as large as that of the nephews of the half-blood? HELD: Proximity of degree and rights of representation are basic principles of ordinary intestate succession; so is the rule that whole blood brothers and nephews are entitled to a share double that of brothers and nephews of half blood. If in determining the rights of the reservatarios inter se, proximity
of degree and the right of representation of nephews are made to apply, the rule of double share for immediate collaterals of the whole blood should be likewise operative. We, therefore, hold, and so rule, that under our laws of succession, a decedents uncles and aunts may not succeed at intestate so long as nephews and nieces of the decedent survived and are willing and qualified to succeed. Hits conclusion is fortified by the observation, also made in Padura, supra, that as to the reservable property, the reservatarios do not inherit from the reservist but from the descendant praepositus. It is likewise clear that the reservable property is no part of the state of the reservista, who may not dispose of it by will, as long as there are reservatarios existing (Arroyo vs. Gerona, 58 Phil. 237). The letter, therefore, do not inherit from the reservista, but from the descendant praepositus, of whom the reservatarios are the heirs mortis causa, subject to the condition that they must survive the reservista.
It is a consequence of these principles that upon the death of the reservista, the reservatarios nearest to the prepositus (appellee) becomes, automatically and by operation of law, the owner of the reservable property. Had the reversionary property passed directly from the praepositus, there is no doubt that the plaintiffs-appellees would have been excluded by the defendant-appellant under the rules of intestate succession. Upon the stipulated facts, and by virtue of the rulings already cited, the defendant-appellant Dalisay Tiongko-Camacho is entitled to the entirely of the reversionary property to the exclusion of the plaintiffs-appellees. Wherefore, the appealed judgment of the lower court is reversed and set aside and complaint is dismissed, with costs against the plaintiffs-appellants. So Ordered.
38. Gertrudes De Los Santos (Plaintiff-appellee) versus Maximo De La Cruz (Defendant-Appellant) (G-R No. L-29192, February 22, 1971) FACTS: The parties admit that the owner of the estate which was the subject matter of the extrajudicial partition agreement, was Pelagia de la Cruz, who died intestate on October 16, 1962; that defendantappellant is a nephew of the said decedent; that plaintiff-appellee is a grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz; her mother, Marciana de la Cruz, being a niece of said Pelagia died on September 22, 1935, thus predeceasing Pelagia de la Cruz; and the purpose of the extrajudicial partition agreement was to divide and distribute the estate among the heirs of Pelagia de la Cruz. ISSUE: Whether, in premises, plaintiff-appellee is an heir of the decedent, and has the right to participate in the partition by representing her mother Marciana? HELD: Plaintiff-appellee being a mere grandniece of Pelagia de la Cruz could not inherit from the latter by right of representation. Article 972: the right of representation takes place in the direct descending line, but never in the ascending.
In the collateral line, it takes place only in favor of the children or brothers or sisters, whether they be of the full of half-blood. Much less could plaintiff-appellee inherit in her own right? Article 962: In every inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant ones, saving the right of representation when it properly takes place. As reiterated in the case of Linart Y Pavia vs. Ugarte Y Iturralde (5 Phil. 176), the Supreme Court said, In an intestate succession a grandniece of the deceased and not participate with a niece in the inheritance, because the latter being a nearer relative, the more distant grandniece is excluded. In the collateral line the right representation does not obtain beyond sons and daughters of the brothers and sisters. In the present case, the relatives nearest in degree to Pelagia de la Cruz are her nephews and nieces, one of whom is defendant-appellant. Necessarily, plaintiff-appellee, a grandniece is excluded by law from the inheritance. It is quite apparent that in executing the partition agreement, the parties thereto were laboring under the erroneous belief that plaintiff was one of the legal heirs of Pelagia. Plaintiff not being such an heir, the partition is void with respect to her, pursuant to article 1105 of the Civil Code, which reads:
Article 1105 In partition which includes a person believed to be an heir, but who is not, shall be void only with respect to such person. In view of the Foregoing Considerations, appellee is hereby sentenced to restore or reconvey to him his corresponding share of property she has received under the extrajudicial partition. CASE No. 39 Topic: An aunt does not concur with the nephews and nieces as intestate heirs. Filomena ABELLANA DE BACAYO, , -versusGaudencia FERRARIS, et al., G.R. No. L-19382, August 31, 1965
FACTS: Melodia Ferraris left properties in Cebu City consisting of 1/3 share in the estate of her aunt Rosa Ferraris. Ten years have elapsed since the last time she was known to be alive, she was declared presumptively dead for purposes of opening her estate to succession and distribute her it among her heirs. Hence, a petition for the summary settlement of her estate was filed. Melodia left no surviving descendant, ascendant or spouse, but was survived only by collateral relatives, namely: 1) Petitioner Filomena, an aunt and half-sister of her father; and 2) her nieces and nephews who were children of her only brother of full blood who predeceased her. In the settlement proceeding, Filomena was excluded as an heir pursuant to a resolution issued by the lower court. A motion for reconsideration was denied hence this action. ISSUE: Does the aunt concur with the nephews and nieces of the decedent as intestate heirs if they are the only surviving heirs of the decedent?
RULING: As an aunt of the deceased she is as far distant as the nephews and nieces from the decedent (to the third degree of consanguinity) since in the collateral line to which both kinds of relatives belong, degrees are counted by first ascending to the common ancestor and descending to the heir (Art. 966, Civil Code). Petitioner is likewise right in her contention that nephews and nieces alone do not inherit by right of representation unless concurring with brothers or sisters of the deceased, as provided expressly by Art. 975. Nevertheless, the trial court was correct when it held that, in case of intestacy, nephews and nieces exclude all other collaterals (aunts and uncles, first cousins, etc.) from the succession. This is readily apparent from articles 1001, 1004, 1005, and 1009 of the Civil Code that provided as follows: ART. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other half. ART. 1004. Should the only survivors be brothers and sisters of the full blood, they shall inherit in equal shares. ART. 1005. Should brothers and sisters survive together with nephews and nieces, who are the children of the decedent's brothers and sisters of the full blood, the former shall inherit per capita, and the latter per stripes. ART. 1009. Should there be neither brothers nor sister nor children of brothers or sisters, the other collateral relatives shall succeed to the estate. The latter shall succeed without distinction of lines or preference among them by reason of relationship by the whole blood.
CASE No. 40 Topic: Brother is excluded by legitimate child of the decedent. Eugenio C. DEL PRADO, -versusAurea S. SANTOS, legal guardian of the minor Jesus Santos del Prado, G.R. No. L-20946, September 23, 1966
FACTS: Eugenio del Prado is a legitimate brother of Anastacio del Prado, who died single and intestate. Anastacio cohabited with Aurea Santos (who was legally married) without the benefit of matrimony and they begot a son named Jesus del Prado whom Anastacio admitted as his son in Jesus birth certificate. At the time of Anastacios death, a parcel of land in his name was adjudicated to Jesus del Prado. Eugenio then filed a complaint before CFI to annul the deed executed by Aurea adjudicating to her son a parcel of land left by Anastacio alleging that he (Eugenio) was deprived of his rightful share in the estate of his brother. The lower court dismissed the petition, and upon appeal to CA, the appellate court certified the case to Supreme Court that such involved purely legal questions. ISSUE: Who has the better right to the parcel of land? Is it the minor left by Anastacio or the latters brother? RULING: Since Anastacio del Prado died in 1958, the new Civil Code applies (Article 2263). Illegitimate children other than natural are entitled to successional rights (Article 287). Where, as in this case, the deceased died intestate, without legitimate descendants or ascendants, then his illegitimate child shall succeed to his entire estate (Article 988), to the exclusion of his brother who is only a collateral relative.
41. WENCESLA CACHO, petitioner-appellee, vs. JOHN G. UDAN, and RUSTICO G. UDAN, oppositors-appellants. G.R. No. L-19996 April 30, 1965
FACTS: On December 13, 1959 one Silvina G. Udan, single, and a resident of San Marcelino, Zambales, died leaving a purported will naming her son, Francisco G. Udan, and one Wencesla Cacho, as her sole heirs, share and share alike. Wencesla Cacho, filed a petition to probate said Will in the Court of First Instance of Zambales on January 14, 1960. On February 15, 1960 Rustico G. Udan, legitimate brother of the testatrix, filed an opposition to the probate. On February 16, 1960 Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., filed his Appearance and Urgent Motion for Postponement for and in behalf of his client Francisco G. Udan, the appointed heir in the Will. On June 9, 1960 Francisco G. Udan, through counsel, filed his opposition to the probate of this will. Promptly, oppositor Rustico G. Udan, through counsel, verbally moved to withdraw his opposition, due to the appearance of Francisco G. Udan, the named heir in the will and said opposition was ordered withdrawn. After one witness, the Notary Public who made and notarize the will, had testified in court, oppositor Francisco G. Udan died on June 1961 in San Marcelino, Zambales, Philippines. After the death of Francisco G. Udan, John G. Udan and Rustico G. Udan, both legitimate brothers of the testatrix Silvina G. Udan, filed their respective oppositions on the ground that the will was not attested and executed as required by law, that the testatrix was incapacitated to execute it; and that it was procured by fraud or undue influence. ISSUE: Whether the oppositor brothers, John and Rustico Udan, may claim to be heirs intestate of their legitimate sister, the late Silvina Udan. DECISION: No, the Supreme Court found that the lower court was correct in holding that the oppositor brothers of the testatrix were not, for at the time of her death Silvina's illegitimate son, Francisco Udan, was her heir intestate, to the exclusion of her brothers. This is clear from Articles 988 and 1003 of the governing Civil Code of the Philippines, in force at the time of the death of the testatrix: ART. 988. In the absence of legitimate descendants or ascendants, the illegitimate children shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. ART. 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following articles. These legal provisions decree that collateral relatives of one who died intestate inherit only in the absence of descendants, ascendants, and illegitimate children. Albeit the brothers and sisters can concur with the widow or widower under Article 1101, they do, not concur, but are excluded by the surviving children, legitimate or illegitimate (Art. 1003). The death of Francisco two years after his mother's demise does not improve the situation of appellants. The rights acquired by the former are only transmitted by his death to his own heirs at law not to the appellants, who are legitimate brothers of his mother, for the reason that, as correctly decided by the court below, the legitimate relatives of the mother cannot succeed her illegitimate child. This is clear from Article 992 of the Civil Code. ART. 992. An illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.
42. EUFRACIA VDA. DE CRISOLOGO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS, HON. ANDRES, respondents. G.R. No. L-44051 June 27, 1985 FACTS:
The petitioners filed an action against the private respondent for ownership, annulment of sale, and delivery of possession of various properties, with writ of preliminary injunction and damages. Claiming to be legal heirs of the vendor, they sought the annulment of four deeds of sale covering seventeen (17) parcels of land and a residential house executed by Lutgarda Capiao in favor of respondent Mallillin. The latter filed a motion to dismiss which was however denied and another complaint then was made. The substance of the original complaint embraces in quintessence the following: That Julia Capiao who maintained extra-marital relations with one Victoriano Taccad, begot with him one child and/or forced heir, named Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao who was married to Raymundo Zipagan both of whom died at Cauayan, Isabela in 1970 and 1964, respectively, without any children and/or immediate forced heirs' ;That Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao having died on November 11, 1970 at Cauayan, Isabela, without any will intestate succession took place and the herein plaintiffs, as relatives within the fifth civil degree to her (Lutgarda [Leogarda] Capiao were consequently instituted as Lutgarda's legal heirs and were legally entitled to inherit all the properties which were hers by virtue of the extrajudicial partition. ISSUE: Can the relatives of Julia Capiao, namely: the plaintiffs in this case inherit from Lutgarda Capiao, the original owner of the properties in question? DECISION: No, they cannot because the source of these properties in question, deceased Lutgarda (Leogarda) Capiao is undoubtedly an illegitimate child. Article 992 of the Civil Code provides: Art. 992. Illegitimate child has no right to inherit ab intestate from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child.' Putting in black and white the family tree of the parties graphically showing their relationship with the late Lutgarda Capiao the source of the properties in question and their relationship with one another, clearly, they can not because the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao cannot inherit from an illegitimate child of the latter, because that is the clear and unmistakable provision of Article 992 of the New Civil Code. Neither can Lutgarda Capiao inherit from the legitimate relatives of Julia Capiao who are the plaintiffs in the instant case. 44. HILARION, JR. and ENRICO ORENDAIN, represented by FE D. ORENDAIN, petitioners, vs. TRUSTEESHIP OF THE ESTATE OF DOA MARGARITA RODRIGUEZ, respondent. G.R. No. 168660 June 30, 2009 Facts: Doa Margarita Rodriguez died and left no compulsory or forced heirs. Her will was admitted to probate by virtue of the order of the CFI Manila. Her testamentary dispositions contemplated the creation of a trust to manage the income from her properties for distribution to beneficiaries specified in her will. Specifically, the testatrix directed that all the twenty five (25) pieces of property listed in the tenth clause of her will should be placed under the trusteeship and should be perpetually administered by the trustees and a certain percentage of the income from the trust estate should be deposited in a bank and should be devoted for purposes specifically indicated in her will. Some of the beneficiaries of Doa Margarita questioned the validity of the latters testamentary disposition concerning the trust. They claim that it violates Art. 870 of the Civil Code which prohibits a testamentary disposition declaring all or part of the testators estate inalienable for more than twenty years. The SC declared that what is void is the testamentary disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period and since such period has not lapsed, the will of the testator must be given effect.
Almost four decades later, Hilarion, Jr. and Enrico Orendain, heirs of Hilarion Orendain, Sr. who were mentioned in Clause 24 of the decedents will, moved to dissolve the trust on the decedents estate. They argued that it had been in existence for more than twenty years, in violation of Articles 867 and 870 of the Civil Code, and inconsistent with the former ruling of the SC. The RTC held that the testamentary disposition of Doa Margarita is indeed void after the lapse of the twenty year period but it denied the dissolution of the trusteeship of the estate of Doa Margarita. It reasoned out that the nullity of the testatrixs disposition prohibiting alienation after the twenty-year period does not mean that the trust created by the former will also become void upon expiration of the twenty year period. It further held that the trustees may dispose of the properties left by the testatrix in order to carry out the latters testamentary disposition. Hence, this petition. Issue: 1. Whether or not the trusteeship over the properties left by Doa Margarita can be dissolved after the lapse of the twenty year period. 2. Whether or not the trustees may dispose of the properties under trusteeship in order to carry out the testatrixs testamentary disposition. Held: 1. Yes. In this case, the testatrix specifically prohibited the alienation or mortgage of her properties. The herein testatrixs large landholdings cannot be subjected indefinitely to a trust because the ownership thereof would then effectively remain with her even in the afterlife. 2. No. Apparent from the decedents last will and testament is the creation of a trust on a specific set of properties and the income accruing therefrom. Nowhere in the will can it be ascertained that the decedent intended any of the trusts designated beneficiaries to inherit these properties. The decedents will did not institute any heir thereto. As regards these properties, intestacy should apply as the decedent did not institute an heir therefor. Article 960 of the Civil Code provides legal or intestate succession takes place when the will does not institute an heir to, or dispose of all the property belonging to the testator. In such case, legal succession shall take place only with respect to the property of which the testator has not disposed. In light of the foregoing, therefore, the trust on the testatrixs properties must be dissolved and this case remanded to the lower court to determine the following: 1. The properties listed in Clause 10 of the will, constituting the perpetual trust, which are still within reach and have not been disposed of as yet; and 2. The intestate heirs of the decedent, with the nearest relative of the deceased entitled to inherit the remaining properties. To obviate confusion, we clarify that the petitioners, although correct in moving for the dissolution of the trust after the twenty-year period, are not necessarily declared as intestate heirs of the decedent. Our remand of the case to the RTC means that the probate court should now make a determination of the heirship of the intestate heirs of the decedent where petitioners, and all others claiming to be heirs of the decedent, should establish their status.
47. In the Matter of the Intestate Estates of the Deceased Josefa Delgado and Guillermo Delgado,Heirs of Luis DELGADO,petitioners vs.Heirs of Marciana RUSTIA,respondents. G.R. No. 155733. January 27, 2006
FACTS:
Guillermo Rustia and Josef a Delgado died without a will. The claimants of the irestates maybe divided into two groups: (1) the alleged heirs of Josefa Delgado, consisting of her half- and full-blood siblings, nephews and nieces, and grandnephews and grandnieces, and (2) the alleged heirs of Guillermo Rustia, particularly, his sisters, his nephews and nieces, his illegitimate child,and the defacto adopted child (ampun-ampunan)of the decedents. The Alleged Heirs of Josefa Delgado The deceased Josefa Delgado was the daughter of Felisa Delgado b y one Lucio Campo. Aside from Josefa, five other children were born to the couple, namely, Nazario, Edilberta, Jose,Jacoba, and Gorgonio, allsurnamed Delgado. Felisa Delgado was never married to LucioCampo, hence, Josefa and her full-blood siblings were all natural children of Felisa Delgado. However, Lucio Campo was not the first and only man in Felisa Delgados life. Before him wasRamon Osorio with whom Felisa had a son, Luis Delgado. The Marriage of Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado Guillermo Rustia proposed marriage to Josefa Delgado but whether a marriage infact tookplace is disputed. Several circumstances give rise to the presumption that a valid marriage existed between Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado. Their cohabitation of more than 50 years cannot be doubted. The Alleged Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillermo Rustia and Josefa Delgado never had any children but they took into their home the young sisters Guillermina Rustia Rustia and Nanie Rustia. These children, never legally adopted by the couple, were what was known in the local dialect as ampun-ampunan. During his life with Josefa, however, Guillermo Rustia did manage to father an illegitimate child, the intervenor-respondent Guillerma Rustia, with one Amparo Sagarbarria.
ISSUES: 1. Who are the lawful heirs of Josefa Delgado? 2. Whether or not the grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado can inherit by right of representation? 3. Who are the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia? RULING: The Lawful Heirs Of Josefa Delgado SC ruled that these factors sufficiently overcame the rebuttable presumption of marriage. Felisa Delgado and Ramon Osorio were never married. Hence, all the children born to Felisa Delgado out of her relations with Ramon Osorio and Lucio Campo, namely, Luis and his half-blood siblings Nazario, Edilberta, Jose, Jacoba, Gorgonio and the decedent Josefa, all surnamed Delgado,51 were her natural children. owever, that the petitioners before us are already the nephews, nieces, grandnephews and grandnieces of Josefa Delgado. Under Article 972 of the new Civil Code, the right of representation in the collateral line takes place only in favor of the children of brothers and sisters (nephews and nieces). Consequently, it cannot be exercised by grandnephews and grandnieces.54 Therefore, the only collateral relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to partake of her intestate estate are her brothers and sisters, or their children who were still alive at the time of her death on September 8, 1972. They have a vested right to participate in the inheritance.55 The records not being clear on this matter, it is now for the trial court to determine who were the surviving brothers and sisters (or their children) of Josefa
Delgado at the time of her death. Together with Guillermo Rustia,56 they are entitled to inherit from Josefa Delgado in accordance with Article 1001 of the new Civil Code:57 Art. 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter shall be entitled to one-half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other one-half. The Lawful Heirs of Guillermo Rustia Guillerma Rustia is an illegitimate child58 of Guillermo Rustia. As such, she may be entitled to successional rights only upon proof of an admission or recognition of paternity.SC ruled that two of the claimants to the estate of Guillermo Rustia, namely, intervenor Guillerma Rustia and the ampunampunan Guillermina Rustia Rustia, are not lawful heirs of the decedent. Under Article 1002 of the new Civil Code, if there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or surviving spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased. Therefore, the lawful heirs of Guillermo Rustia are the remaining claimants, consisting of his sisters,69 nieces and nephews. Therefore, the intestate estate of Guillermo Rustia shall inherit half of the intestate estate of Josefa Delgado. The remaining half shall pertain to (a) the full and half-siblings of Josefa Delgado who survived her and (b)the children of any of Josefa Delgados full-or half-siblings who may have predecease d her, also surviving at the time of her death. Josefa Delgados grandnephews and grandnieces are excluded from her estate. The trial court is hereby ordered to determine the identities of the relatives of Josefa Delgado who are entitled to share in her estate.
48. Effect of declaration of nullity of marriage of the parents on the status of a child born prior to such declaration
48. FEDIRICO SUNTAY vs. ISABEL SUNTAY G.R. No. 132524 December 29, 1998
FACTS : On July 9, 1958, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay (son of petitioner Federico Suntay) and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay were married in the Portuguese Colony of Macao. Out of this marriage, three children were born namely: Margarita Guadalupe, Isabel Aguinaldo and Emilio Aguinaldo all surnamed Cojuangco Suntay. Later, the marriage was declared null and void by the trial court on October 3, 1967. On June 1, 1979, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay predeceased his mother, Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay who died on June 4, 1990. Five years later, respondent Isabel (daughter of Emilio) file a petition for issuance in her favor of Letters of Administration of the Intestate Estate of her late grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay. Petitioner Fedirico, spouse of Cristina opposed the petition by filing a motion to dismiss contending that Isabel should not be appointed as administratrix of the decedents estate. He also cited Article 992 of the Civil Code which states that an illegitimate child has no right to succeed by right of representation the legitimate relatives of her father or mother. Petitioner contends that as a consequence of the declaration by the then CFI of Rizal that the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is "null and void," the latter is an illegitimate child, and has no right nor interest in the estate of her paternal grandmother . The trial court issued an order denying petitioner's Motion to Dismiss. ISSUE:
Whether or not Isabel is an illegitimate child that bars her from becoming the administratrix of Cristinas estate. DECISION: Isabel is a legitimate child. Though a conflict between the conflict between the body of the decision and the dispositive portion thereof which created the ambiguity or uncertainty in the decision of the CFI of Rizal is reconcilable. The legal basis for setting aside the marriage of respondent Isabel's parents is clear under paragraph 3, Article 85 of the New Civil Code, the law in force prior to the enactment of the Family Code. The fundamental distinction between void and voidable marriages is that a void marriage is deemed never to have taken place at all. Children born of such marriages who are called natural children by legal fiction have the same status, rights and obligations as acknowledged natural children irrespective of whether or not the parties to the void marriage are in good faith or in bad faith. On the other hand, a voidable marriage, is considered valid and produces all its civil effects, until it is set aside by final judgment of a competent court in an action for annulment. The status of children born in voidable marriages is legitimate. The children of Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay and Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay who were conceived and born prior to the decree of the trial court setting aside their marriage on October 3, 1967 are considered legitimate. For purposes of seeking appointment as estate administratrix, the legitimate grandchildren, including respondent Isabel, may invoke their successional right of representation the estate of their grandmother Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay after their father, Emilio Aguinaldo Suntay, had predeceased their grandmother. This is, however, without prejudice to a determination by the courts of whether the Letters of Administration may be granted to her.
The court found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court and the instant petition is dismissed.

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1. Promise to deliver future property BLAS vs. SANTOS, Administratrix of the Estate of MAXIMA SANTOS VDA. DE BLAS G.R.

7. G.R. No. L-5971 February 27, 1911

ISSUE: WON institution of adopted children as testate heirs is valid.

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