V I C TO R I A M AY E R

Crafting a New Conservative Consensus on Welfare Reform: Redening Citizenship, Social Provision, and the Public/Private Divide

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Abstract
This article traces the development of conservative welfare discourse in the United States, beginning in the 1970s when a new cohort of conservative intellectuals re-articulated previously competing social and economic projects in ways that allowed their proponents to support a common welfare reform agenda. I analyze how these writers used race and gender images associated with categories from American political tradition to re-imagine citizenship and to shift the public/private boundary. In conclusion, I note how this new conservative reform project displaced the liberal understanding of citizenship that had anchored the entitlement to public assistance and promoted the simultaneous communitization and marketization of public welfare institutions.

Summer 2008 Pages 154181 doi:10.1093/sp/jxn007 # The Author 2008. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oxfordjournals.org Advance Access publication May 2, 2008

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Introduction
When President Clinton signed the Personal Responsibility Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) in 1996, twenty years of expansionary changes in federal programs for poor families won by social liberals from the 1950s through the early 1970s were swept away and the door closed on efforts to make cash assistance a social right within the United States. By eliminating the entitlement to welfare benets and implementing a new federal block grant, federal policy-makers authorized state and local governments to require poor mothers to submit to new government regulation of their domestic lives and to work or engage in work-related activities in order to receive assistance. This legislation marked the culmination of over twenty years of political theorizing and strategizing by actors opposed to prior welfare expansions. In contrast to the mid-twentieth century when liberals dominated debates, the 1980s saw a renewed conservative movement that proved more adept at harnessing the discontent triggered by economic and social instability to effect welfare reform. Yet conservatives could play this role only by overcoming internal disagreements between free market proponents seeking to reduce the size of the welfare state and social conservatives eager to use the state to re-regulate race and gender relations destabilized by the new social movements. Historical studies have produced rich accounts of how free market liberals and proponents of historic race and gender hierarchies restricted the development of an American welfare state until the 1930s (Orloff 1988; Skowronek 1982). The way federal policymakers addressed social conservatives concerns by incorporating existing race and gender relations into the early welfare state programs has also been well documented (Amott 1990; Gordon 1994; Lieberman 1998, Quadagno 1994). When liberal policy-makers, pressed by the new social movements, moved to protect minority rights and expand access to social provision, they rekindled resistance to the welfare state among both groups of conservatives but were able to benet from a split among conservatives over the Nixon Administrations welfare reform plan. Prompted by free market advocates, Nixon proposed to replace AFDC with a modied negative income tax (the Family Assistance Plan [FAP]). This neoliberal program garnered support from social liberals and free-market proponents, but because it would have reduced local ofcials capacity to regulate race and gender relations, social conservatives in Congress opposed the plan. This division in

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conservative ranks, combined with some liberal skepticism, prevented the FAP from being passed. Detailed and nuanced treatments of this earlier period of US welfare politics have been produced by Amenta (1998), Lieberman (1998), and Poole (2006) among others. This article takes up the story from there, tracing how a new cohort of conservative intellectuals sought to bridge these competing economic and social projects. To make clear the political challenges and the strategies they deployed to surmount them, I rst situate them in the discursive and institutional context of the 1960s and early 1970s. Here I follow George Steinmetzs suggestion that Esping-Andersens concept of welfare regime be expanded to encompass social policies and accompanying intellectual and cultural elements (1993, 41) as well as Adams and Padamsee (2001) who stress the importance of signifying processes, subjects interpolated by such processes, strategies, and sanctions. Policy paradigms are potentially mobile templates that can in principle be transplanted, may coexist with other, partially conicting logics, and may be abandoned or transmuted into new paradigms of social regulation (2001, 6). I refer to these as policy logics to leave open the possibility that political actors may join conicting logics into a single policy regime. I identify three competing policy logics shaping the discourse surrounding the Nixon Administrations FAP: a social conservative logic of behavioral regulation, a neoliberal logic of market freedom, and a social liberal logic of entitlement. Each logic is tied to a distinctive set of rhetorical and normative categories in American political culture. I show how the legal scholar Charles Reich, on the left, and economists Fredrick Hayek and Milton Friedman, on the right, t into this model and why partisan positions did not then map neatly onto these separate logics. Although liberal policy experts also differed (OConnor 2001), I focus on the conservative actors, since they play a much larger role in shaping the recent welfare reform agenda. I then turn to the evolution of conservative reform discourse from the end of the 1970s to the late 1980s, analyzing how conservative intellectuals modied legacies of meaning to craft a new consensus justifying a shift away from social provision as a citizenship entitlement. These opponents of social programs found new ways to express resistance to racial integration in discourses of support for patriarchal family values and the Protestant work ethic. By conating class and racial identities and tying them to particular gender relations, these intellectuals broke the association between free market liberalism and social liberalism that had earlier divided conservatives. Re-dening the goal of social programs as preparing

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mothers for employment and citizenship by xing their moral deciencies, this discursive innovation permitted the reconciliation of free market and social conservative agendas, facilitating enlistment of public support. Although conservatives were thus able to re-align their oncedivided agendas, they still disagreed about the proper nature of the new poverty institutions. Free market proponents sought increased market coordination of social provision, whereas social conservatives envisioned increased community involvement. Ultimately they resolved these differences through a synthetic approach that promoted both marketizing and communitizing the network of state bureaucracies. Marketization here stands for the shift in social policy and institutional organization to conform to norms and practices that govern market contracts and labor markets, and communitization designates the transfer of state regulatory authority to community associations, with the concomitant re-organization of poverty policy according to the norms and practices of private charity. The New Consensus (Novak et al. 1987) marks a turning point after which both communitization and marketization were brought into poverty policy. By comparing the recommendations promoted by The New Consensus with the recommendations proposed in ve other taskforce reports submitted to Congress as part of the 198788 welfare reform debates, I identify the novel aspects of this conservative consensus and its distinctive echo in reform legislation passed in 1988 and 1996. While not claiming that the new consensus alone caused these policy entrepreneurs to succeed, I show that its formulations affected the direction of welfare reform.

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Raced and Gendered Images in Citizenship Discourse

The concept of citizenship is employed as an organizing device to examine how race and gender politics inform the symbolic and material dimensions of social policy. I focus on two aspects of citizenship. First, citizenship as an institutional relationship between members of a community and the national collective as regulated by the state highlights how citizenship comprises rights and obligations. Some are legally institutionalized and others less formally regulated (Hall and Held 1989). Second, citizenship reects the discursive constitution of the political community and national identities. The revolutionary events that produced modern notions of democratic citizenship and autonomy also produced interdependent ideas about nationality and cultural integrity (Calhoun 1997; Gilroy 1993). Marshalls famous 1949 lecture (1964, 72) expressed this in his

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denition of social citizenship to mean the whole range from the right to a modicum of economic welfare and security to the right to share to the full in the social heritage and to live the life of a civilized being according to the standards prevailing in the society. The statement indicates both a right and a duty to engage in those practices associated with a presumed national cultural heritage. Contemporary feminist scholars have taken up Marshalls concept of social citizenship, but point out how citizenship identities are multiple, have both raced and gendered meaning and have been mobilized politically to expand and to circumscribe opportunities afforded to different social groups (Orloff 1993; Fraser 1989). In liberal democratic societies, tensions between citizenship as a set of normative identities and citizenship as a right to freedom are institutionalized in the boundary between public and private. Social movements that seek to produce or eliminate specic regulations draw on democratic principles to justify relocating their concern from one side of the boundary to the other. Within the private, there are further divisions among those features of social life coordinated by the market, by the community, or by the family, each associated with different norms of interaction. In the United States, government policy has often reinforced these norms despite their construction as private, buttressing unequal gender and race relations originating in the economy or the family (Glenn 2002; Kerber 1998; Orloff 1993). Struggles over race and gender relations have always shaped US political institutions. Colonial elites employed enlightenment concepts to craft mutually supporting theories of racial and national identity (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Smith 1997). Showing how white revolutionaries posed whites as the essence of will and rational action and blacks as the essence of anti-will, Williams argues that such partializing ideologies can endure in their effects beyond the particular historical institutions they initially supported (1991, 220 221). Thus local southern communities used vagrancy laws, justied by images of undisciplined blacks, to require black women to work for white landowners after emancipation (Kerber 1998). The trope of black anti-will also endures in public discussions of black womens reproductive lives (Roberts 1999). Gender and race identities were also forged in struggles for suffrage and for a living wage. White working-class men argued that their identity as male citizen-workers entitled them to the franchise, contrasting their position to black slaves and to white wives and children (Fraser and Gordon 1994; Shklar 1991). In the 1930s, white citizens demanding assistance from the state sought to tie the male-breadwinner/female housewife cultural model to whiteness,

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inscribing dominant race and gender relations in the social policies of the American welfare state (Gordon 1994; Kessler-Harris 2001; Nelson 1990). When framers of the Social Security Act of 1935 created a federal program to support poor mothers suffering the loss of a male breadwinner, conservative whites in the Congress required that the program be administered locally, allowing ofcials to exclude black mothers as unt mothers or employable members of the community.1 Blacks working as agricultural laborers and domestics were also prohibited from participating in new government insurance programs that provided unemployed white male industrial workers with government funds to support their families (Kessler-Harris 2001; Lieberman 1998). Thus, passage of New Deal legislation did not disrupt the prevailing ideological and practical relations of gender and race despite efforts by black activists to press for minority inclusion in the new programs (Brown 1999; Gordon 1994; Kessler-Harris 2001). In summary, these battles over American citizenship shaped dominant understandings of national identity and produced differences by race and by gender in institutional citizenship and in the regulation of the public/private boundary (Glenn 2002; Kerber 1998; Smith 1997). In turn, these discursive and institutional effects shaped campaigns by civil rights and feminist activists to extend access to the benets of citizenship in the second half of the twentieth century, and subsequent efforts by social conservatives and neoliberals to restrict citizenship.

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Research Methods
This study traces the political evolution of conservative welfare discourse from 1970 to the late 1980s. Following the defeat of the Nixon FAP, conservative think tanks turned their attention to constructing new proposals for welfare reform. I examined academic publications, articles published in new conservative journals, like The Public Interest, and reports published by publicly and privately funded research institutes to identify inuential texts in the development of a new conservative position.2 I selected Wealth and Poverty by George Gilder (1981), Losing Ground by Charles Murray (1984), Toward a Family Welfare Policy by Michael Novak (1984), Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship by Lawrence Mead (1986), and a collective report (Novak et al. 1987) published by the American Enterprise Institute entitled The New Consensus on Family and Welfare (henceforth The New Consensus) because they made signicant discursive advances in

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addressing the tensions between free market liberalism and social conservativism and because both politicians and policy scholars frequently cited them. Like their predecessors, the new generation of conservative writers justied their policy proposals using key categories associated with citizenship: autonomy, freedom, dependence and subjugation, community, equality, and responsibility. For each of the works selected, I coded sections of text referring to these key categories. I also look at the concepts of property and privacy, which actors used to tie the normative concepts of citizenship to particular institutional arrangements. I identify where the authors deployed existing meanings and where they sought to establish new meanings, and how these meanings were tied to historically gendered and raced images of citizenship. I examined how each author used these concepts to argue for a particular positioning of social provision with respect to the spheres of the market, the community and the state, distinguishing between arguments using a logic of exchange, a logic of charity, or a logic of entitlement. This discursive analysis of the conservative positions on welfare is the heart of my argument. First, however, I situate it in a review of the existing welfare discourses of the 1970s.

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The Challenges Faced by Conservative Welfare Reformers

When President Johnson declared a War on Poverty in 1964, he set the stage for renewed conservative attacks on the welfare state. Five years after launching an array of programs to increase opportunity for the poor, the number of families claiming assistance was still rising and the public began to lose patience. In 1970, Republican President Richard Nixon promoted a dramatically new FAP to replace the increasingly unpopular AFDC program. The new plan became trapped, however, between two different conservative factions and social liberals pressing for nationalized benets and eligibility standards. These three different positions form the important discursive precedents and challenges for a new conservative consensus. Social Liberalism: the Logic of Entitlement In the early 1960s, economists working in the Kennedy Administration promoted a new structural explanation of poverty that underlay both the short-lived Community Action Programs and more long-term changes in legal doctrine (OConnor 2001). In 1964, Charles Reich argued that because contemporary poverty

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resulted from large impersonal forces beyond individual inuence, and because new forms of wealth controlled by the state created new capacities for public administrators to regulate the behavior of recipients through a system of rules and tribunals outside the ordinary structure of government, (Reich 1964, 770) state-provided benets required new institutional protections to serve, like property, as a means of preserving individual autonomy and a pluralist democratic society. Reich proposed procedural protections such as the right to due process, limiting administrative discretion, and prohibiting private organizations from controlling access to public largesse. He maintained that a positive right to subsistence was needed to prevent public ofcials from forcing individuals receiving public assistance to relinquish their constitutional rights. While earlier maternalist arguments for social provision allowed for state regulation of mothering on the grounds that mothers were serving as agents of the state in raising their children (Baker 1984; Gordon 1994; Koven and Michel 1993; Mink 1995; Skocpol 1992), Reichs formulation justied an entitlement to assistance in terms of claimants membership within a democratic society, public assistance being their rightful share in the commonwealth, serving to protect their freedom. When poor black women mobilized in the late 1960s to claim the citizenship rights exercised by many white women (Amott 1990; West 1981), they encountered a federal judiciary already sensitized by Reich and others to problems of class and racial disparity in the exercise of citizenship (Bussiere 1997). They brought court cases against welfare agents that denied them access to resources to raise their children and were rewarded in a series of decisions preventing states from imposing eligibility criteria beyond those set by Congress (King v. Smith 1968). The Supreme Court struck down rules regulating poor parents interstate travel and moral behavior and required agencies to allow claimants to contest decisions to terminate their benets in a pre-evidentiary hearing (Goldberg v. Kelly 1970). Although the Warren Court interpreted the Social Security Act of 1935 as conferring a statutory entitlement to public assistance, to be administered in accordance with due process standards, the Justices stopped short of interpreting the Fourteenth Amendment as conferring a substantive right to welfare (Farina 1998). Thus, when Nixon took ofce, the logic of social provision as an entitlement was supported by members of the federal judiciary and liberal members of Congress. Yet, never formerly inscribed as a substantive right guaranteed by the Constitution, the entitlement to assistance remained a target for social conservatives.

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Social Conservativism By authorizing states to administer the new ADC program, the Social Security Act of 1935 allowed communities to use federal resources to regulate participation of poor white and black parents in domestic and paid labor (Quadagno 1994). During the 1950s, when federal ofcials moved to expand eligibility for social insurance programs and to standardize application and enrollment procedures for AFDC, conservative state legislators enacted new behavioral restrictions to formalize limitations on access to welfare benets (Reese 2005). The specic character of these restrictive policies reveals how social conservatives sought to promote patriarchal family arrangements and to protect racially organized labor markets. State man in the house rules, for example, allowed agencies to stop assistance when a man was discovered in the family home and suitable home policies allowed conservatives to deny benets to children born to unwed women. Employable mother rules authorized local agencies to decide which mothers were employable and therefore ineligible for assistance. This allowed local ofcials to press poor single black mothers into employment when demand for their labor was high, while continuing to provide assistance to white mothers (Goodwin 1995). When minority movements demanded civil rights exercised by whites, and feminist organizations pressed for gender equity, social conservatives fought the changes. When federal court rulings, civil rights laws, and poverty programs threatened the ability of local elites to regulate access to public resources (Reese 2005), they shifted their focus from the state to the national political arena. Economic Liberalism Like social conservatives, free market proponents were disgruntled with the Great Society programs. Although free market discourse preceded the welfare state, contemporary economic liberalism dates back to 1944 when Hayek attacked the New Deal social programs, arguing that as forms of centralized state planning they threatened efciency and liberty. According to Hayek markets offer the only method by which our activities can be adjusted to each other without coercive or arbitrary intervention of authority (1994, 41242). Unheeded during the 1940s, Hayeks call for free market capitalism was furthered by economist Milton Friedman. Friedman anchored his arguments to a very thin denition of citizenship. Commenting on President Kennedys oft quoted exhortation to Ask not what your country can do for youask what you can do for

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your country, Friedman argued that [n]either half of the statement expresses a relation between the citizen and his government that is worthy of the ideals of free men in a free society. The free man, according to Friedman, will ask neither what his country can do for him nor what he can do for his country. He will ask rather What can I and my compatriots do through government to help us discharge our individual responsibilities, to achieve our several goals and purposes, and above all to protect our freedom? (Friedman 1962, 12). Friedman argued that the nation was nothing more than a collection of individuals who share a preference for individual freedom and for efciency. He emphasized the responsibility of the free man for his own destiny, but unlike later conservative formulations, he argued that this responsibility was to oneself and not to society. Like the social liberals, Hayek and Friedman argued that the welfare state had expanded government control too far, hindering the efforts of citizens to pursue their individual preferences. Unlike Reich, who suggested it was necessary to entitle poor citizens to public assistance to protect democracy, Friedman saw public assistance as exogenous to the operation of democracy. If the majority should abandon a preference for supporting the poor, then an economic liberal theory would not justify continuing it. Yet as long as the majority chose to allocate resources to alleviate poverty, Friedman argued that benets should be distributed without conditioning their receipt on adherence to behavioral prescriptions that violated the right to self-determination. Friedman proposed replacing Johnsons Great Society programs, seen as inefcient and paternalistic, with a negative income tax. These goals were agnostic in the case of efciencyand antithetical in the case of self-determinationto social conservative aspirations of reforming social programs to reassert race and gender hierarchies destabilized by the War on Poverty and the new social movements. While distancing himself from the position that social provision should be an entitlement, by making access to public assistance conditional only on nancial eligibility and standardizing assistance levels nationally, Freidmans negative income tax proposal was compatible with social provision as an aspect of citizenship. Conict over Nixons FAP Differences among adherents to these three logics of social policy came to a head when the Nixon administration introduced its FAP. The plan was based on Friedmans negative income tax proposal, but it assumed new service provisions as it moved from the halls of academia to the White House (Moynihan 1973; Quadagno 1994).

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Unlike AFDC, the revised program would provide a guaranteed income to poor families with minor children, regardless of the presence of a male household head. Consistent with an entitlement notion of welfare, it would establish a national income oor and would be administered by the federal government. Benets would be determined solely on the basis of family size and nancial status, declining in amount as family members earned more income, but at a marginal tax rate that would still provide an incentive for increased participation in paid work (Aaron 1973; Steensland 2006). The program would provide training programs for unemployed recipients. Unlike the negative income tax proposed by Friedman, which was insensitive to family structure, the FAP was designed to promote family formation among poor urban blacks by providing training programs to black men. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, then assistant to the President, promoted these training measures to reverse the erosion of the patriarchal family in black communities and to reduce black mens participation in urban violence. According to Moynihan (1973), the program appealed to President Nixon because it would allow the administration to quell black unrest and win political support from disaffected southern, working-class whites, without alienating powerful capitalists who preferred federal assistance to raising the minimum wage. Promising new federal support to large numbers of poor southern families, the program was warmly received by the southern press (Moynihan 1973) and by the House of Representatives. AFDC benets, funded jointly by the federal and the state government, were so small in most southern states that AFDC would be entirely replaced by the FAP, in effect removing local regulation of access to poverty benets. This turned conservative southern and western members of the Senate Finance Committee against the program (Quadagno 1994). Their resistance, combined with opposition from a smaller number of liberal senators, sympathetic to the argument that the FAP would reduce benet levels in northern cities, prevented the bill from making it out of the Senate Finance Committee (Moynihan 1973; Quadagno 1994). Steensland (2006) has argued that social conservatives resisted the FAP because it transgressed the existing categorical distinction between the deserving and undeserving poor by providing benets to both breadwinners and unemployed adults through the same program. Yet by ignoring the racial and gender dimensions of these categories, institutionalized in both social programs and local labor markets, he misses the nature of the political challenge that subsequently faced conservatives seeking to reshape the welfare state.

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In 1973, Henry Aaron (71) noted that none of the several minorities seeking diverse and inconsistent changes in the present system ha[d] the power to impose its will on the others. Social liberals could not introduce national eligibility and benet standards, economic liberals failed to replace federal social service agencies with a bureaucratically smaller and less intrusive negative income tax program, and social conservatives were unable to enact an alternative block grant program that would tightly regulate the movement of poor mothers between domestic and paid labor. National welfare reform would wait until conservative intellectuals produced a new articulation of the relationship between democratic citizenship and capitalism that bridged the conservative dissensus.

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Aligning Social Conservatism and Economic Liberalism

Supported by a new network of conservative organizations, intellectuals experimented with ways of reconciling the competing Republican projects in the mid-1970s. Their reformulation of both welfare and citizenship re-aligned conservative forces around a common reform agenda. My analysis begins with a consideration of how George Gilder and Charles Murray re-articulated economic liberalism as in conict with social liberalism. Then I show how Michael Novak and Lawrence Mead dened poor parents as unprepared for citizenship, to make a case for paternalist social programs designed to regulate the behavior of the poor. Finally, I demonstrate how Murray, Novak, and Mead, along with other taskforce members, synthesized these discursive advances in a new conservative vision of the welfare state presented in the collectively authored The New Consensus on Family and Welfare (Novak et al. 1987). Re-articulating the Relationship Between Economic Liberalism and Welfare Policy George Gilders Wealth and Poverty (1981) presented a symbolic rapprochement between free market capitalism and social conservativism. Valuing capitalism, Gilder attacked the economic liberals assessment of capitalism and their libertarian values. Gilder assigned a moral dimension to capitalism, claiming that because economic growth requires disciplined, creative and essentially moral producers, (1981, xxii) capitalism evokes these characteristics within the population. As a corollary, he asserted that re-distributive state programs harm recipients because they break the psychological link between reward and effort (1981, 79). Moreover, the taxes required to support these programs are also harmful to middle-class families because they push mothers into paid employment and

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undermine the capacity of fathers to be male breadwinners. Therefore, Gilder argued, welfare benets should be diminished to reduce both taxes and the moral hazards associated with public assistance. Gilder also claimed that integration posed risks for white middleclass families that threatened to undermine the cultural traits that had enabled their success. He represented white resistance to court-ordered desegregation as an issue of class, not race, defending the freedom of white families to regulate the moral inuences their children were exposed to. His argument rested on assigning different behavioral traits to whites and blacks, asserting that white middleclass families were economically successful because they exhibit appropriate attitudes and behaviors; they work hard, delay gratication, and live in patriarchal nuclear families. This recast mandatory integration as an attack on the cultural freedom of middle-class white communities. With this re-articulation, Gilder both obscured the racial dynamics of segregationist politics and negated structural features of class dynamics by locating the causes of black poverty in the moral character of the poor. Three years later, Charles Murray provided an alternative synthesis of economic liberalism and social conservativism in Losing Ground (1984). Building on Gilder, he claimed that by promoting structural explanations for poverty, elites had steered social policy off course, causing the state to distribute economic opportunities and rewards outside the salubrious action of the market. He encouraged discontent among working-class whites by suggesting that the Great Society programs generated benets for blacks at the expense of white families. Drawing on social conservative views of the minority poor as cultural outsiders who avoided work and had children out of wedlock, he argued that public transfer programs undermined the freedom of middle-class Americans to choose not to subsidize a life style that deviates from their own (Murray 1984, 19). For Murray, this new interpretation of economic liberalism justied re-incorporating discretion into social provisioning. Instead of campaigning to remove legal notions of entitlement and due process standards, Murray suggested replacing state assistance with private social provision. In the conclusion of Losing Ground, he proposed eliminating all government programs for the needy and leave the working-age person with no recourse whatever except the job market, family members, friends, and public or private locally funded services (1984, 2272228). A complete shift in social assistance from government programs to charity would have little effect on most citizens, while requiring poor individuals who might be tempted to use public resources to shirk responsibility, to engage in

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practices valued by middle-class Americans in order to secure assistance. By re-articulating their resistance to welfare in behavioral rather than essentialized race-based terms, these authors opened the door to collaboration on welfare reform between racial conservatives and blacks and whites who were concerned about the increased incidence of single-parent families among inner city black communities. Furthermore, by arguing that the current welfare program violated the rights of middle- class taxpayers to refrain from supporting behaviors they disapproved of, Murray, in contrast to Freidman, re-articulated economic liberalism as being in tension with social provision as an entitlement. Bridging Paternalist State Poverty Programs and Economic Liberalism These early discursive interventions were endorsed by the Reagan administration but they did not eliminate support for public provision. Other conservative writers disagreed with Murrays proposal to move to private assistance presumably limited to morally acceptable families. In Toward a Family Welfare Policy, Novak (1984) suggested that undesirable behavior may not be a choice, as Murray assumed, but rather a result of poor mental health or a lack of skills and attitudes. Novaks argument relied on an historic understanding of dependency as reecting personal insufciency; however, unlike the whites who deployed this interpretation to justify black slavery, Novak recast the moral virtues associated with self-reliance as a problem of human potential. According to Novak, [m]any of the poor, especially among the young, need[ed] help in learning skills and attitudes: how to read, how to apply for and hold a job, how to govern themselves and conduct themselves. He wrote, self-reliance is a virtue of many parts, which can be taught (Novak 1984, 54255). According to Novak, reducing poverty required the intervention of traditional institutions, like the church, that were paternalist and possessed moral expertise. Lawrence Mead presented the conceptual basis for aligning economic liberalism and social conservativism in their current form. In Beyond Entitlement (1986), Mead described a new articulation between citizenship as identity and as institutionalized relationship to the state that treated self-reliance as not just a moral good but a prerequisite for citizenship. He re-introduced the concept of social obligations, drawing on historic racialized images of citizenship to justify state enforcement of the new obligations. In the introduction to Beyond Entitlement, Mead noted that Americans regard

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minimal social competences like work or getting through school as obligatory even if they are not legally enforced. He argued that although, [t]hese social obligations may not be governmental . . . they are public in that they fall within the collective expectation that structures an orderly society (1986, 12). Meads discussion of social obligations bears some resemblance to Marshalls denition of social citizenship; however, unlike Marshall who equated social duties with other duties, like voting, that were expected but not enforced, Mead and the other authors of The New Consensus argued that outside intervention was needed to ensure that the poor assume these responsibilities: This new thing, which we have called behavioral dependency, is more like an inability to cope. Many of the poor need order in their surroundings and in their lives . . . . Low income is comparatively easy to remedy; to overcome behavioral dependency requires a much more human, complex, and difcult engagement. (The New Consensus, Novak et al. 1987, 5) The contrast between this description of the new poor and the selfreliant citizen resembles the will/anti-will dichotomy that Williams noted in slave law. But unlike Murray and Gilder, who suggested eliminating state programs in order to restore the salutatory disciplinary effects of market competition and private charity, Mead argued that the state, and not the economy or the community, was responsible for disciplining poor parents. In his view, the welfare problem emerges as one of authority rather than freedom. According to Mead, The best hope for solving it is, not mainly to shift the boundary between society and government, but to require recipients to function where they already are, as dependents (1986, 4). Meads re-conceptualization of social obligations was central to the reportThe New ConsensusNovak et al. submitted to Congress in 1987. Inverting the logic of entitlement, which asserts that only by removing non-nancial conditions on the receipt of welfare can poor citizens retain their autonomy, Novak et al. (1987, 5) argued that the government must supervise the behavior of welfare recipients in order to help them to live as full and independent citizens. Fraser and Gordon (1994) suggest that prior racialized and gendered images associated with key words like dependency shape public debate without being stated; however, the writers of The New Consensus explicitly invoked race. In contrast to essentialized racial categories used by social conservatives in pre-World War II political discourse, the conservative reformers linked race to dependency, through a new category, the urban underclass, applied to poor

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blacks and Latinos living in urban areas. Under the subheading The Urban Underclass, the authors of The New Consensus wrote: This concentrated population is increasingly black and Hispanic . . . . Since this concentrated urban population seems unusually resistant to economic growth, and since it runs against the grain of a traditional American sense of opportunity, upward mobility, and classlessness, both popular writers and social scientists have felt driven to describe it in the new and deliberately shocking term underclass. (Novak et al. 1987, 3536) Relying on this characterization of the minority poor as anticitizens lacking in will and resistant to growth, Mead and the other writers sought to harmonize social conservative desires to regulate behavior and economic liberals libertarian goals by mapping them onto two different categories of people. Welfare is conceptualized as disciplining the poor to prepare them for incorporation within the polity, while the non-poor are considered to have mastered the skills now considered prerequisite for citizenship, and can be free to pursue their desires through the market. Unlike racial discourses associated with slavery and Jim Crow, this model distinguishes among poor and non-poor minorities and considers that poor blacks and Latinos under public tutelage can develop the traits required for self-reliance. According to Novak et al. (1987), welfare caseloads will drop as the new paternalist state programs succeed in schooling welfare-dependent underclass women to become citizen-working mothers. In contrast to racialized images of citizenship, which facilitated the new alignment between social conservative and economic liberal projects, gender politics proved more problematic for the new conservatives. As the full title, The New Consensus on Family and Welfare implied, they sought to initiate changes in both work and domestic relations. The authors emphasized families from the outset, identifying the family as the matrix within which the citizen is well formed or misshapen and decrying the increasing number of female-headed families among the poor (Novak et al. 1987, 16). The New Consensus suggested that single-parent family poverty required a change in social behavior and parental assumption of responsibility (72), but now dened parental responsibility for both mothers and fathers in terms of a male-breadwinner model, which prioritized work outside the home in order to support the family. The authors also argued that requiring mothers on assistance to work would eliminate the incentive to bear children outside of

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marriage, which they associated with AFDC because it allowed single mothers to stay home with their children. Unlike the ill-fated FAP that promised to eliminate the nancial incentive for family dissolution by extending benets to poor families with working fathers, The New Consensus proposed eliminating the incentive to remain single by requiring poor single parents receiving benets to work. This strategy is inconsistent with the prior assertion that AFDC claiming results from an inability to cope, but it also conicts with the social conservative aspiration to re-establish the patriarchal nuclear family model as hegemonic. Labor market demand for low-wage service workers and family needs for care-giving labor posed a problem for welfare reformers who were trying to satisfy both free market liberals and social conservatives. In the past, southern lawmakers resolved this conict by requiring black mothers to work when service or agricultural workers were needed, but now civil rights legislation and principles of non-discrimination demanded a new strategy. Unable to resolve their dilemma by explicit racial differentiation, The New Consensus proposed redening citizen-motherhood as encompassing both paid work and unpaid carework. Unlike the earlier defenders of the family who lobbied for a family wage, these reformers simply noted that two parents working at the minimum wage were needed to keep working-class families above the poverty line. This shift away from the older image of the care-giving-citizenmother to one of the working-mother-citizen elicited a harsh response from George Gilder. He saw this as dangerous for poor families and for all traditional family structures. Gilder thought work requirements would send a message to all mothers to [p]ut your job rst, children second (1987, 21) and would hurt malebreadwinner families by re-distributing resources away from them to subsidize public child care. Unable to foster agreement among conservatives on how poor citizens should balance the demands of the market and domestic work, the authors refrained from addressing the issue in The New Consensus. Their silence shifted the problem of resources for family care to state-level policy-makers, welfare case managers, and the welfare claimants who would have to nd ways to address the needs of families, within a policy regime demanding participation in paid work from all adults. Repositioning Social Provision with Respect to the State, the Market, and the Community In contrast to the challenges of organizing care, conservative reformers were explicit on how to foster economic self-reliance. The task, according to Mead, was to build a new welfare system that

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would create for recipients inside the welfare state the same balance of support and expectation that other Americans face outside it (1986, 4). Yet re-organizing the state to function according to the principles of market and community coordination breaches liberal democratic boundaries that divide public from private institutions. It was just this kind of threat to private life that had motivated Reich to call for institutionalizing property-like protections for recipients of government aid. Because this re-positioning of social provision is central to both the new conservative consensus and the institutional changes conservative reformers promoted, I review the sequence of shifts in the articulation of the public/ private boundary, from the debates over the FAP through the writing of The New Consensus, including the specic policy recommendations it presented. Despite their differences, in the 1970s, social liberals, social conservatives, and economic liberals shared a classical liberal conception of the public/private dichotomy. This conceptualization separates social interaction into a public sphere of action, uniformly regulated by the state, and a private sphere in which individual citizens are free to exercise moral and political autonomy. Positioning the boundary between public and private was central to the arguments of each group. Reich argued for extending private property-like protections to public aid in order to protect the moral autonomy of recipients, while social conservatives resisted federal busing mandates by arguing that school choice was private, and economic liberals argued for a reduction in state regulation of the economy and community life. When Murray suggested re-introducing discretion into eligibility decisions, he proposed shifting social provision from the public to the private sphere in order to accomplish this. An important turning point came when Novak and Mead asserted that, rather than eliminate government social provision, the country should re-organize public poverty programs to reproduce the regulation imposed by private institutions. Mead and Novak had different visions of what the new welfare institutions should look like, however. Mead preferred to re-organize the public sphere and the state to conform to the norms and practices associated with market coordination, whereas Novak pushed for sharing state regulatory authority with private associations, and a concomitant re-organization of poverty policy according to the norms and practices of discretionary private charitable giving. In the nal section of The New Consensus, Mead, Novak, and the other authors recommended a synthetic approach that promoted both marketization and communitization of government bureaucracies interacting with the poor. They re-classied work and

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domestic responsibilities as obligations of citizenship, re-fashioning them like an employment relationship by conditioning receipt of public assistance on the completion of work or work-preparation activities, while also recommending new forms of caseworker discretion in determining eligibility for assistance and compliance. The authors also recommended granting new regulatory authority to non-governmental organizations to supplement the governmental sector which was unable by its nature to engage the problems of the underclass at the necessary moral depth (Novak et al. 108). In making their case, they associated both government agencies and voluntary associations with the category public, ignoring recognized boundaries between these different types of institutions. They compounded this issue when they included businesses along with religious and philanthropic organizations in the list of voluntary associations they called upon to address the problems of the dependent poor. This importation of previously distinct institutional norms and practices from both the market and the world of voluntary associations into the public sphere obscured the different logics historically associated with each, incorporating tensions that later emerged when policy-makers, state ofcials, and non-governmental organizations institutionalized the recommendations from The New Consensus in the new poverty programs.

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The Fruits of The New Consensus

Passage of the Family Support Act The New Consensus was one of the six reports prepared in response to President Reagans 1986 call to reform AFDC. Other reports included: Up From Dependency: A New National Public Assistance Strategy Report prepared by the Presidents Domestic Policy Council Low Income Working Group (1986); Investing in Poor Families and Their Children: A Matter of Commitment (Heintz 1986), produced by the American Public Welfare Association and the National Council of State Human Service Administrators; Ladders Out of Poverty: A Report of the Project on the Welfare of Families (Meyer, Babbitt, and Flemming 1986); A New Social Contract: Rethinking the Nature and Purpose of Public Assistance, a report of the Task Force on Poverty and Welfare (1986) submitted to Governor Mario Cuomo; and Making America Work: Productive People, Productive Policies (Clinton 1987) produced by the National Governors Association chaired by Governor Bill Clinton. Here these six reports, including The New Consensus, are compared

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with reform legislation passed in 1988 and 1996 to assess their congruence with changes in national welfare policy and discourse. In 1987, national actors hoping to end the fteen year dearth of reform legislation heralded a new consensus among policy-makers and experts (Naples 1997). Points of similarity across the reports indicate how the central themes of the debates and the set of imaginable alternatives had shifted since the early 1970s. Using a language of mutual responsibility and contract, all six reports recommended changing welfare programs to focus on preparing and moving mothers into employment, conrming the claims of consensus. Furthermore, all the reports voiced concerns about the increasing number of never married mothers who claimed public assistance and called for strengthening child support enforcement programs. These similarities indicate that elite welfare discourse on both the right and the left had shifted in ways consistent with the arguments promoted by the new conservative intellectuals. However, despite their shared use of the contract metaphor to signify mothers obligation to participate in work or workpreparation programs, the panels recommended different government obligations. In contrast to the report prepared by the Presidents Low Income Working Group and the conservative New Consensus, which proposed freezing or reducing government spending, the other reports recommended expanding government benets, including raising and standardizing welfare benets for families receiving cash assistance and offering affordable health insurance, child care, and a new federal income subsidy to working parents. The reports also discussed changes in program administration, recommending increasing local level discretion, but only The New Consensus suggested that the Congress consider revoking due process protections. In contrast, the report prepared for Governor Cuomo specically stated that the new work programs must be administered in such a way as to ensure the due process rights of recipients. These disagreements map neatly onto different policy logics. In promoting due process protections, nationally standardized benet levels, and supplements to low-wage work, the four reports prepared under the direction of state politicians and welfare administrators adhered to an entitlement logic of social provision that ensures participants right to self-determination within the new programs. In contrast, the changes in public assistance programs proposed by the presidents Low Income Working Group and The New Consensus are consistent with the new paternalist approach promoted by conservatives, which presumes that recipients of public assistance require new forms of state regulation exercised outside of the

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criminal justice system to prepare them for assuming the prerogatives associated with citizenship. Appearing numerous times in the public hearings leading up to the enactment of the Family Support Act (Naples 1997), the writers of The New Consensus contrasted their new normative interpretation of the self-reliant citizen with the dependent underclass mother. By shifting the locus of the problem from poverty to the behavior of poor parents, the proponents of the new conservative consensus were able to drive the notion of entitlement to the margins of debate, focusing attention on how to change the reproductive behavior and labor market participation of poor men and women (Naples 1997; Oliker 1994; Weaver 2000). Passed in 1988, the Family Support Act required all states to create new institutions for administering work requirements without enacting new measures to ensure that the returns to work were sufcient to support a family. According to the new legislation, mothers with children as young as three, or younger at state option, were required to participate in work, education, or short-term training if child care could be guaranteed by the state. Unlike the FAP, the Family Support Act authorized state discretion in the implementation of the new work programs, including the authority to contract with community based organizations for service provision. In contrast to the four reports calling for a federal commitment to raising and standardizing assistance, benet levels were unchanged and the Congress did not pursue raising the minimum wage or subsidizing returns to low-wage work. Contrary to the recommendations outlined in The New Consensus, however, Congress did not require poor parents to take jobs that worsened their nancial condition, and did not eliminate poor citizens right to due process and other protections the Supreme Court associated with the Social Security Act of 1935, at least not yet. These nal steps were to wait for the enactment of PRWORA in 1996. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act The new institutions authorized by the Family Support Act were intended to move poor parents from the welfare rolls into paid employment, but progress was slow in most states, owing in part to a weak economy. Primed by the conservative campaign for welfare reform, public impatience with rising numbers of claimants made welfare a popular object of campaign rhetoric (Weaver 2000). This time welfare reform discourse was mobilized by a Democratic presidential contender, Clinton, who promised to end welfare as we know it (cited in Weaver 2000, 171). Clintons selection as the

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democratic presidential nominee in 1992 reected the new hegemony of the workfare approach to social provision within the Democratic Party. Like Mead, candidate Clinton promoted a paternalist welfare program that took its cues from market institutions (Weaver 2000). He took the agenda one step further than the Family Support Act by championing the idea of time limits. Unlike future Republican proposals, however, the Clinton administration proposed limiting the time that parents could receive assistance before being moved into a public job, not the time that they could receive cash payments (Weaver 2000). Eager to reclaim political credit for reforming welfare, a group of US House Republicans included welfare reform in their 1994 Contract with America. Like The New Consensus, the Contract with America valorized an end of government that is too big, too intrusive, and too easy with the publics money, and a government that respects the values and shares the faith of the American family (1994, 7). During the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, new pressure from increasingly powerful conservative Christian coalitions (Weaver 2000) threatened to destabilize the new consensus among social conservatives and economic liberals. New entrants into the welfare debates, these religious coalitions pushed conservative politicians to use public policy to punish childbearing outside of marriage. Unlike The New Consensus, which promoted regulatory practices to prepare young (under eighteen) single mothers for citizenship, the program proposed in the Contract with America would prevent them from claiming public assistance unless they married the biological father of their children or another man willing to adopt their children. Some conservative intellectuals who had supported the New Consensus began to promote these new provisions. William Kristol, for example, urged politicians to use the law to support marriage and the family at those points where libertarian goals and conservative family models came into conict (1995).3 The initiative risked alienating the more socially moderate economic liberals and anti-abortion advocates, a weakness exploited by the Clinton administration (Weaver 2000). Attacked by the Democrats, House Republicans sought an alternative solution that would allow them to preserve the prior consensus without jeopardizing support from the new conservative Christian coalitions. Eventually, they devised a compromise bill: in yet another move away from national standardization, they eliminated the age restriction from the federal bill but allowed states to adopt a family cap or a teen mother exclusion and added a new market-like performance bonus for decreasing unmarried teen fertility without raising abortion rates.

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The house-authored bill was eventually passed in a modied form in 1996. Program devolution went much further than granting states authority over who could enroll in the new public assistance programs. PRWORA granted eligible states federal block grants to be administered at their discretion. These changes produced a dramatic reduction in the citizenship rights of poor women. New state freedom to discriminate on the basis of claimants age and marital status was made possible by eliminating the federal entitlement to public assistance associated with the Social Security Act of 1935. Other authors have identied how these measures produced a privatization of care, forcing poor mothers to rely on family networks for support (Brush 2000; Mink 1999; Oliker 1995). But the PRWORA also advanced the marketization and communitization of welfare agencies along the lines proposed by The New Consensus. Government agencies were re-organized to function both like market actors and like private charity organizations. Reforming welfare ofces to make them more like entrepreneurially oriented employment and training centers (Weaver 2000, 127), politicians eliminated bureaucratic rules and practices. They authorized states to contract with both religious organizations and for-prot rms to administer the new welfare programs. Like the welfare reform discourse promoted by The New Consensus, the PRWORA negated the boundaries between the institutions of the state, the market, and the community, requiring claimants, state ofcials, and local welfare workers to negotiate the tensions among their different logics.

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Conclusion
In a recent review of welfare state scholarship, Orloff (2005) emphasizes that social programs are both regulatory and distributive. Yet understanding the political signicance of this dual character within the contemporary period requires a cultural analysis of welfare state politics. Before conservatives could effect reform in the mid-1980s and 1990s, they had to overcome the split between social conservatives and economic liberals which surfaced in the political struggles over the Nixon Administrations FAP. They bridged this division by re-articulating the two policy logics to produce a new hybrid policy regime. To succeed in a post-civil rights era, conservative reformers also had to develop a complex re-articulation of race and citizenship that incorporated class distinctions among blacks and recoded class in behavioral rather than economic or structural terms. By narrowing the object of poverty policy to this new behaviorally dened underclass, they succeeded in discrediting structural explanations of poverty and the entitlement logic of social

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provision which had anchored the earlier welfare expansions. Furthermore, by characterizing members of the new underclass as lacking in the the skills now considered prerequisite for citizenship, Mead and the other writers of The New Consensus were able to harmonize social conservative desires to regulate behavior and economic liberals libertarian goals by mapping them onto different groups. According to the new policy regime, individuals who were economically self-sufcient would be free to pursue their desires through the market, while those who sought assistance from the state would be required to work or participate in work-related activities to claim cash benets. By revoking entitlement and re-introducing state and local agency discretion, they also allowed ofcials to adopt new measures to regulate the reproductive and family care decisions of poor parents. Now stripped of essentializing racial categories, the new discursive synthesis was also able to attract support from black social conservatives who were concerned about the rise in single-parent households among the minority poor. Despite their success in re-aligning these two policy logics, some tensions remained and became incorporated in the new policy regime. Economic liberals and their business supporters wanted to move poor mothers into market employment, but this weakened the possibility of re-establishing the hegemony of the patriarchal nuclear family model desired by social conservatives. Noting the dramatic expansion in the number of mothers entering the labor market, the writers of The New Consensus and federal policy-makers bowed to the increasing demand for womens labor and promoted a change in the normative identity of the citizen mother from caregiver to provider. They were unable, however, to resolve how the new working-mother-citizen should balance the demands of the market and domestic work, remaining silent on this issue. Conservative reformers resolved their differences about the character of the new welfare institutions by taking a synthetic approach promoting both marketization and communitization of state bureaucracies interacting with the poor. By importing previously distinct institutional norms and practices from both the market and the world of voluntary associations, they incorporated new tensions in the network of governance institutions that would come to plague both ofcials and parents seeking assistance.

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NOTES
Victoria Mayer is an Assistant Professor at Colby College. She holds a Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Wisconsin-Madison. Her

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dissertation is entitled Contracting Citizenship: Shifting Public/Private Boundaries in the Context of Welfare Reform. She can be contacted at the Department of Sociology. Colby College, 4716 Mayower Hill, Waterville, ME 04901-8840, USA. Email: vlmayer@colby.edu 1. See Mink (1995) and Roberts (1999) on the imbrication of racial and reproductive politics in US social policy. 2. I reviewed reports published by the Institute for Research on Poverty at the University of Wisconsin-Madison, the Brookings Institute, the Ethics and Public Policy Center, and the American Enterprise Institute. 3. See also Murray (1993) The Coming White Underclass.

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