PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. FLORENCIO DORIA y BOLADO and VIOLETA GADDAO y CATAMA @ "NENETH," G.R. No.

125299 January 22, 1999 PUNO, J.: FACTS: In 1995, members of the PNP Narcotics Command (Narcom), received information from 2 civilian informants (CI) that one Jun was engaged in illegal drug activities in Mandaluyong City. The Narcom agents decided to entrap and arrest Jun in a buy-bust operation. The Narcom agents formed Team Alpha they designated PO3 Manlangit as the poseur-buyer. At 7:20 a.m., Jun appeared. PO3 Manlangit handed Jun the marked bills worth P1,600.00. The exchange of money for a marijuana was completed. Jun asked PO3 to wait for an hour while he will get the mariujuana from his associate. After a while, when Jun was about to give the marijuana, PO3 Manlangit forthwith arrested Jun. They frisked Jun but did not find the marked bills on him. Upon inquiry, Jun left the money to his associate Neneth. The team went to the house and they noticed a box under the dining table. Suspicion aroused, PO3 Manlangit entered Neneths house and took hold of the box. He peeked inside the box and found that it contained 10 bricks of what appeared to be dried marijuana leaves. Simultaneous with the boxs discovery, SPO1 Badua recovered the marked bills from Neneth. They arrested Neneth and Jun. They learned that Jun is Florencio Doria y Bolado while Neneth is Violeta Gaddao y Catama.Both of them were charged with violation of Section 4, in relation to Section 21 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The trial court found the existence of an organized/syndicated crime group and sentenced both to death and pay a fine of P500,000.00 each. Hence, the automatic review. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless arrests of Doria and Gaddao are legally permissible. HELD: DECISION REVERSED AND MODIFIED. 1. Florencio Doria y Bolado is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine 2. Violeta Gaddao y Catama is acquitted RATIO: It is recognized that in every arrest, there is a certain amount of entrapment used to outwit the persons violating or about to violate the law. The type of entrapment the law forbids is the inducing of another to violate the law, the seduction of an otherwise innocent person into a criminal career. Where the criminal intent originates in the mind of the entrapping person and the accused is lured into the commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him, there is entrapment and no conviction may be had. The law tolerates the use of decoys and other artifices to catch a criminal. The warrantless arrest of Doria is not unlawful. The following are the instances where warrantless arrests are allowed: A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it; and (c) When the person to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from a penal establishment or place where he is serving final judgment or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has escaped while being transferred from one confinement to another.

Herein, Doria was caught in the act of committing an offense. When an accused is apprehended in flagrante delicto as a result of a buy-bust operation, the police are not only authorized but duty-bound to arrest him even without a warrant. The warrantless arrest of Gaddao, the search of her person and residence, and the seizure of the box of marijuana and marked bills, however, are different matters. Our Constitution proscribes search and seizure without a judicial warrant and any evidence obtained without such warrant is inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. The rule is, however, not absolute. Instances where search and seizure may be made without a warrant and the evidence obtained therefrom may be admissible (1) search incident to a lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view; (5) when the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable searches and seizures. Personal knowledge of facts in arrests without warrant must be based upon probable cause which means an actual belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion. Gaddao was arrested solely on the basis of the alleged identification made by her co-accused, Doria. Save for Dorias word, the Narcom agents had no reasonable grounds to believe that she was engaged in drug pushing. Since the warrantless arrest of Gaddao was illegal, it follows that the search of her person and home and the subsequent seizure of the marked bills and marijuana cannot be deemed legal as an incident to her arrest. The "plain view" doctrine applies when the following requisites concur: (a) the law enforcement officer in search of the evidence has a prior justification for an intrusion or is in a position from which he can view a particular area; (b) the discovery of the evidence in plain view is inadvertent; (c) it is immediately apparent to the officer that the item he observes may be evidence of a crime, contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. The law enforcement officer must lawfully make an initial intrusion or properly be in a position from which he can particularly view the area. In the course of such lawful intrusion, he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The object must be open to eye and hand and its discovery inadvertent

EDGARDO A. GAANAN vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986 GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: FACTS: Remember the two parties here. 1. Atty. Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon 2. Atty. Eduardo Gaanan and his client Leonardo Laconico There is a complaint filed by Atty. Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon to Leonardo Laconico. It was a direct-assault case. Afterwards, Atty. Pintor and Montebon offered to withdraw the complaint they filed against Laconico after demanding P8,000 from him. This demand was heard by Atty. Eduardo Gaanan. It was through a telephone extension as requested by Laconico so as to personally hear the proposed conditions for the settlement. Atty. Pintor was subsequently arrested in an entrapment operation upon receipt of the money. Since Atty. Gaanan listened to the telephone conversation without complainant''s consent, complainant charged Gaanan and Laconico with violation of the Anti- Wiretapping Act (RA 4200). The lower found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty of violating Section 1 of Republic Act 4200. The Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court. Gaanan filed a petition for certiorari with the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether listening in an extension telephone renders one liable under the wire-tapping law. HELD: Petition is GRANTED. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act. RATIO: The telephone extension herein was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Further, our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA 4200 or others of similar nature. An extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements. Gaanan thus is acquitted of the crime of violation of RA 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

MARIO FL. CRESPO vs. HON. LEODEGARIO L. MOGUL, Presiding Judge, CIRCUIT CRIMINAL COURT OF LUCENA CITY, 9th Judicial Dist., THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the SOLICITOR GENERAL, RICARDO BAUTISTA, ET AL. G.R. No. L-53373 June 30, 1987 GANCAYCO, J.: FACTS: On April 18, 1977 the Provincial Fiscal filed an information for estafa against Mario Fl. Crespo. When the case was set for arraignment the accused filed a motion to defer arraignment on the ground that there was a pending petition for review filed with the Secretary of Justice. In an order, the presiding judge, Leodegario L. Mogul, denied the motion. A petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a preliminary writ of injunction was filed by the accused in the CA which was eventually granted while perpetually restraining the judge from enforcing his threat to compel the arraignment of the accused in the case until the Department of Justice shall have finally resolved the petition for review. The Undersecretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and directed the fiscal to move for immediate dismissal of the information filed against the accused. But the respondent judge denied the motion. ISSUE: Whether the trial court acting on a motion to dismiss a criminal case filed by the Provincial Fiscal upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice to whom the case was elevated for review, may refuse to grant the motion and insist on the arraignment and trial on the merits. HELD: Petition DISMISSED RATIO: It is a cardinal principle that an criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. And it is through the conduct of a preliminary investigation that the fiscal determines the existence of a prima facie case that would warrant the prosecution of a case. The Courts cannot interfere with the fiscal's discretion and control of the criminal prosecution. Whether the accused had been arraigned or not and whether it was due to a reinvestigation by the fiscal or a review by the Secretary of Justice, the Court in the exercise of its discretion may grant the motion or deny it and require that the trial on the merits proceed for the proper determination of the case. The role of the fiscal or prosecutor as we all know is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused before the Courts. It is the duty of the fiscal to proceed with the presentation of evidence of the prosecution to the Court to enable the Court to arrive at its own independent judgment as to whether the accused should be convicted or acquitted. The fiscal should not shirk from the responsibility of appearing for the People of the Philippines even under such circumstances much less should he abandon the prosecution of the case leaving it to the hands of a private prosecutor for then the entire proceedings will be null and void.

The least that the fiscal should do is to continue to appear for the prosecution although he may turn over the presentation of the evidence to the private prosecutor but still under his direction and control. The rule therefore in this jurisdiction is that once a complaint or information is filed in Court any disposition of the case as its dismissal or the conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court. The Court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. The determination of the case is within its exclusive jurisdiction and competence. A motion to dismiss the case filed by the fiscal should be addressed to the Court who has the option to grant or deny the same. It does not matter if this is done before or after the arraignment of the accused or that the motion was filed after a reinvestigation or upon instructions of the Secretary of Justice who reviewed the records of the investigation.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MARI MUSA y HANTATALU G.R. No. 96177 January 27, 1993 The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee. Pablo L. Murillo for accused-appellant. ROMERO, J.: FACTS: There is an information that this Mari Musa was engaged in selling marijuana in Zamboanga City. So the Narcotics team of PNP executed a buy-bust operation with Sgt. Ani as the poseur-buyer. Ani gave Musa the P20.00 marked money. Musa returned to his house and gave Ani 2 newspaper wrappers containing dried marijuana. The signal to apprehend Musa was given. NARCOM officer (Sgt. Belarga) frisked Musa but did not find the marked money. The money was given to Musas wife who was able to slip away. Later, Belarga found a plastic bag containing dried marijuana inside it somewhere in the kitchen. Musa was placed under arrest and was brought to the NARCOM office. On the other hand, Mari Musa alleged that the NARCOM agents, got inside his house without any search warrant, neither his permission to enter the house.The NARCOM agents searched the house and allegedly found a red plastic bag whose contents, Mari Musa said, he did not know. Musa claimed that he was subjected to torture when he refused to sign the document containing details of the investigation. After trial,the RTC found him guilty of selling marijuana in violation of Article II, Section 4 of RA 6425. Musa appealed to the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether the contents of the red plastic bag found in the kitchen may be admitted as evidence acquired incidental to a lawful arrest HELD: The appeal is DISMISSED and the judgment of the Regional Trial Court AFFIRMED RATIO: Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest authorizes the arresting officer to make a search upon the person of the person arrested. An officer making an arrest may take from the person arrested and money or property found upon his person which was used in the commission of the crime or was the fruit of the crime or which might furnish the prisoner with the means of committing violence or of escaping, or which may be used as evidence in the trial of the cause. Hence, in a buy-bust operation conducted to entrap a drug-pusher, the law enforcement agents may seize the marked money found on the person of the pusher immediately after the arrest even without arrest and search warrants. The warrantless search and seizure, as an incident to a suspects lawful arrest, may extend beyond the person of the one arrested to include the premises or surroundings under his immediate control. Objects in the plain view of an officer who has the right to be in the position to have that view are subject to seizure and may be presented as evidence.

When the discovery of the evidence did not constitute a search, but where the officer merely saw what was placed before him in full view, the warrantless seizure of the object was legal on the basis of the plain view doctrine and upheld the admissibility of said evidence. The plain view doctrine, however, may not be used to launch unbridled searches and indiscriminate seizures nor to extend a general exploratory search made solely to find evidence of defendants guilt. The plain view doctrine is usually applied where a police officer is not searching for evidence against the accused, but nonetheless inadvertently comes across an incriminating object. What the plain view cases have in common is that the police officer in each of them had a prior justification for an intrusion in the course of which he came inadvertently across a piece of evidence incriminating the accused. The plain view doctrine may not be used to extend a general exploratory search from one object to another until something incriminating at last emerges. Thus, the exclusion of the plastic bag containing marijuana does not diminish, in any way, the damaging effect of the other pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that the appellant sold marijuana, in violation of Article II, Section 4 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. By virtue of the testimonies of Sgt. Ani and T/Sgt. Belarga and the two wrappings of marijuana sold by Musa to Sgt. Ani, among other pieces of evidence, the guilt of Musa of the crime charged has been proved beyond reasonable doubt.