March 2012

Paper Series
The Pacific Pivot and the West
by Stephen F. Szabo
The Pacific Pivot The past year witnessed a number of dramatic signs that the United States is shifting its strategic focus toward Asia. President Barack Obama, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, and Secretary of State Hilary Clinton have all made clear what Clinton has termed a pivot point in U.S. policy. In all their statements the pivotal alliance of the past 60 years, that between Europe and the United States, was either not discussed or only mentioned in passing. Both Panetta and Clinton tried to back track at the recent Munich International Security conference, with Clinton stating, Europe remains Americas partner of first resort, and Panetta describing Europe as the United States security partner of choice for military operations and diplomacy around the world. Nonetheless, a shift is clearly apparent. This shift, accompanied by a continued draw down of U.S. forces and diplomatic presence in Europe and a slight increase of a presence in Australia, is combined with U.S. concerns over the continued decline of European defense spending, accelerated by the serious debt crisis confronting Europe. It also reflects a U.S. preoccupation with China, which is linked not only to Chinas dynamism and more aggressive foreign policy, but also to an almost un-American degree of doubt about the United States own future. At the root of it all is a sense that the West may have had its day and that the United States should turn to the dynamic region of Asia for strategic and economic reasons. This is a major miscalculation and threatens to undermine the anchor of the global system. In Europe there are also signs of a Pacific pivot. Germany will export more to China by the end of this year than it does to France, and most of German growth has come from the China market. Those European countries most vulnerable to the debt crisis are hoping that China will come to their rescue. At the same time, China is seen by many Europeans as more a threat than a promise, and anti-Chinese sentiment seems to be replacing the anti-Americanism of the Bush era, although concerns about a U.S. decline are widespread. The West is facing a major turning point in terms of its sense of itself and of its role in a world that seems to be heading toward a postWestern disorder. This is clearly the time for the West to rediscover and revitalize itself by uniting rather than engaging in a race to the Eastern exits.

Summary: The past year witnessed a number of dramatic signs that the United States is shifting its strategic focus toward Asia. This shift, accompanied by a continued draw down of U.S. forces and diplomatic presence in Europe and a slight increase of a presence in Australia, is combined with U.S. concerns over the continued decline of European defense spending, accelerated by the serious debt crisis confronting Europe. It also reflects a U.S. preoccupation with China. In Europe there are also signs of a Pacific pivot. The West is facing a major turning point in terms of its sense of itself and of its role in a world that seems to be heading toward a post-Western disorder. This is clearly the time for the West to rediscover and revitalize itself by uniting rather than engaging in a race to the Eastern exits.

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Unlike the Atlanticism of the Cold War era, a new Atlanticism is emerging in a global context. It will not be limited to Europe, but will have to operate in a truly global system in which the West is a necessary but still insufficient player. Sanctions on Iran, for example, will not succeed if they are only Western ones, but at the same time, the Western core is an essential precondition and is having real effects on the Iranian economy. The Western sanction regime was the starting point for a more extensive international sanction regime, which is now being built upon it. The same holds for climate change, energy security, international standards on a series of natural resource issues and international financial reform. The West can and should form the core and build out to an expanding circle of nations. The emerging powers of the 21st century have little but their emergence in common. They will not be able to form a consistent core similar to that of the West. Brazil, Russia, India, China, and others (referred to as the BRICs) do not often share interests or values with each other as a bloc. The recent actions of China and Russia blocking the UN Security Council action on Syria should serve as a wake-up call to the West. Many of the emerging powers, most importantly China and Russia, do not seem to have the will to play a role in global governance, have limited soft power appeal, and lack natural allies. A unified West, rather than creating an incentive for a counter coalition of BRICs, will instead provide the core of the new global order. The alternative to no Western core is an apolar system and lack of direction, which will dampen hopes for global governance at a time when it is needed more than ever. The West Still Exists The contemporary concept of the West and of Atlanticism is a legacy of the Cold War era. The struggle with the Soviet Union was both geopolitical and ideological, and Atlanticism was born from this struggle. The United States rediscovered its European roots and overcame its aversion to being involved in the European balance of power during this period and came to regard itself as a European power for the first time in its history. While this reorientation of U.S. policy was based on a realistic assessment of national interest, it also had a strong cultural component. After the experience of fascism and communism, and the war fought to defeat the former, Americans came to realize that not only national security but an entire way of life was at stake. Europeans also overcame their aversion to U.S. culture and its economic and social experience and a deep seated sense of superiority based on a longer historical and cultural history, to come to accept the idea of an Atlantic

Community. NATO became an alliance of both interests and values. At the end of the Cold War, many realists in both the United States and Europe began to argue that the two sides would begin to separate since the security threat they faced from the Soviet Union had disappeared. They are now arguing for the Pacific Pivot, as they view China as the equivalent of the old Soviet threat in a region that has no political or alliance structures similar to those in Europe. While there is a good deal of truth to this assessment, it overlooks what international relations scholars refer to as a pluralistic security community. As Jeffrey Kopstein of the University of Toronto has put it, The idea of a security community can be said to exist when a group of people believe that social problems can be resolved through peaceful changeAmericans and Europeans not only needed to be friends but also wanted to be friends. 1 If the Atlantic Alliance is a security community rather than simply a traditional security alliance, the prospects for its survival beyond the weakening of security interests are strong. In any case, it is important to look both at the interest and value dimensions of the relationship in the context of the emerging new global order. The West as a Community of Values Despite the continuing manifestations of anti-Americanism in Europe and anti-Europeanism in the United States, there is also a good deal of data indicating a continuing and robust transatlantic value community. Polling by Gallup in the summer of 2010 found that 47 percent of Europeans surveyed believed that global challenges would strengthen transatlantic relations while only 16 percent thought they would weaken the relationship.2 The German Marshall Funds 2010 edition of its annual survey, Transatlantic Trends, found that 77 percent of Americans and 67 percent of Europeans polled felt that the United States and the EU have common values.3 When looking at China, only about 30 percent of Europeans polled believed that Europe and China have enough common values to be able to cooperate on international affairs, while 63 percent did not. In contrast, 55 percent of Americans held the more positive view on common values with China while 45 percent did not. The 2011 Transatlantic Trends found that only 47 percent of Europeans and 42 percent of Americans had a favorable
1 Jeffrey S. Kopstein, Anti-Americanism and the Transatlantic Relationship, Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 7/No. 2 (June 2009):367. 2 http://eu.gallup.com/brussels/145046/europeans-say-global-security-issuesfuture-transatlantic-relations.aspx 3

http://trends.gmfus.org.php5-23.dfw1-2.websitetestlink.com/?page_id=3175

view of China.4 However, while 52 percent of Europeans thought the United States was the most important region to them (37 percent chose Asia), in the United States, 51 percent picked Asia compared to only 38 percent picking the EU. More significantly, the younger the American, the more likely they were to pick Asia. There is clearly a danger of a generational transatlantic divide developing. Americans seem to take Europe for granted while regarding Asia as the big new thing. These U.S. perceptions do not reflect the full economic picture. The transatlantic economy generates over $5 trillion in sales, employs over 5 million workers, and remains the most integrated market in the world, comprising 54 percent of world GDP. While global trends are shifting, the transatlantic economy remains the dominant one today. The U.S. investment stake in Europe is four times that of its stake in Asia. The U.S. trade balance with Europe contrasts with the imbalance with China, and the growth in exports is with Europe. The trade imbalance and reliance on Chinese credit to finance the U.S. deficit has become a major political issue. The current Republican presidential primaries have already produced a new tone on China as an economic threat. This tendency will grow as what Gideon Rachman has labeled the Zero Sum Future and the downsides of globalization become more apparent in the West.5 The West, which was initially a winner in the early stages of globalization, is now clearly on the losing end. Neither part of the West can effectively separately cope with the threat posed by cheap labor and increasing productivity in a mercantilist China and elsewhere. Both sides of the Atlantic are beginning to see the need to protect their markets against the unequal conditions and terms of trade, investment, ownership, and intellectual property rights. When U.S. and European business and government leaders travel to China, they leave their electronic devices at home for fear of hacking and industrial espionage. New efforts to create not only a new transatlantic economic space but to widen it to include the south Atlantic are signs of this return to a new Atlanticism as a response to a failing global model. The relentless and well-thought-out strategy of China, Russia, and others for using and acquiring natural resources to enhance national power with little regard for human rights and democratic practices has only strengthened a sense of a value community in the transatlantic world as it tries to
4 5

expand standards on transparency and human rights in the raw materials sectors. In the realm of political culture, the West is beginning to realize that China, Russia, and other emerging powers do not share its commitment to open societies or to a responsible global order. The idea that China will become a responsible shareholder in the global system, to use Robert Zoellicks phrase, has taken a beating since the Copenhagen Climate summit in late 2009. Assumptions that modernization and globalization will produce more democratic polities have also been shaken by the Chinese and Singaporean experiences. While optimism about the state of democracy in the West has been shaken by the economic and financial crisis and the rise of extreme right wing populism, the West still sees itself as a collection of pluralistic and open societies. Western leaders and their publics also continue to believe that democracies are more likely to follow peaceful foreign policies than are nondemocratic systems. Prospects for a New Atlanticism In remarks to the German Marshall Funds Brussels Forum on March 26, 2010, European Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso called for a new transatlantic partnership.6 He confronted the challenge of the new global system, stating: Some argue that with the rise of new powers, the transatlantic relationship has become less important and should just be one normal partnership among many. Calling this the multipolarist argument, he cogently refuted this on the basis of both common values and interests, arguing that: Values are also influential in defining our interests. Some people separate, if not oppose, values and interests. That is a mistake. Interests are not defined in a normative vacuum. On the contrary, the formulation of political interests is infused by our values, whether we are aware of it or not. In spite of many ups and downs, Barroso is right that the multipolarist argument is wrong if it implies a diminution of the transatlantic relationship. The prospects for a new global Atlanticism are realistic and should be actively pursued on both sides. Why? The interest dimension remains important. The new vulnerabilities of the West will continue to act as a centripetal force. While the old security relationship based on Europe and NATO will continue to fade, the need to protect both U.S. and European homelands from new threats is growing and the two sides have responded
6

http://trends.gmfus.org/transatlantic-trends/key-findings/

Gideon Rachman, Zero Sum Future: American Power in an Age of Anxiety (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2011)

http://brussels.gmfus.org/archives/2010-2/transcripts/

with closer cooperation on a host of counter-terrorism measures. This form of cooperation goes far beyond the traditional military relationship to include police, intelligence, finance ministries, civil aviation, health, and a host of other issues and institutions. Energy security and climate policy will demand closer cooperation, as well as Russia, China, and other powers pursuing an aggressive policy to secure natural resources in a mercantilist strategy aimed at the West. The EU and the United States are united on sanctions against Iran and are working together on the Middle East more broadly. As Commission President Barroso stated, the interest-value nexus remains on a global as opposed to a regional setting. NATO, in the wake of the Afghanistan experience, will have to return to being a regional alliance, a mission that is both politically sustainable in Europe and will not overstretch its limited military capabilities. The China challenge threatens to divide the West, but only if the United States overreacts and misreads the strategic response. A soft containment policy based on off-shore, largely naval, balancing will reassure countries in the region, but the United States is unlikely to substantially raise its military presence in the region or risk a confrontation with China. In fact, an overly aggressive policy will weaken the Atlantic alliance. China is not the Soviet Union. It is a successful market-based authoritarian country with major economic ties to countries around the world. A confrontational policy will therefore not work because it would be based on the false assumption that the China challenge is primarily a military one. It will also overstrain an already overcommitted U.S. defense budget. Instead, the fundamental China challenge is on the economic and global order levels and is fundamentally a challenge to the West as a whole. A unified West is essential to Western revitalization. As the Transatlantic Academys report, Global Shift: How the West Should Respond to the Rise of China concluded, the real challenge to the transatlantic community is internal Getting our own house in order is the number one priority as we respond to the global shift.7 The Obama Administrations pivot away from the transatlantic relationship undermines confidence in both Europe and North America that we can master our problems and avoid decline. The Obama team has correctly understood that the transatlantic relationship must be based on new global terms and must be based more on shared responsibility than it was during the Cold War,
7 http://www.transatlanticacademy.org/sites/default/files/publications/ GlobalShift%20TA%202011%20Collaborative%20Report.pdf

but it has a narrowly realist view of the relationship. Its rhetoric and policies have sent signals to Europe that it views the Atlantic alliance as yesterdays story and has downgraded it from a community to a partnership. The Republican presidential candidates, in turn, have denigrated Europe in their primary campaign and have run against a distorted version of the European anti-model. It is up to the West to shape a new global system that will expand the one it has created over the past 60 years. The new institutions and networks will have to reflect the new power balances of this century, yet Washington must rediscover the importance of an alliance it too often takes for granted and execute a new Atlantic pivot to provide balance to its Pacific one.

About the Author

Dr. Stephen F. Szabo is the executive director of the Transatlantic Academy. Prior to joining GMF, Dr. Szabo served as academic and interim dean as well as professor of European studies with the Johns Hopkins University School of Advanced International Studies, professor of national security affairs at the National Defense University, and chairman of West European Studies at the Foreign Service Institute, U.S. Department of State.

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