G.R. No.

176951

November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention. x-----------------------------x G.R. No. 177499 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x G.R. No. 178056 November 18, 2008

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, petitioners vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, petitioners-in-intervention. DECISION CARPIO, J.: The Case These are consolidated petitions for prohibition1 with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order filed by the League of Cities of the Philippines, City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas2 assailing the constitutionality of the subject Cityhood Laws and enjoining the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) and respondent municipalities from conducting plebiscites pursuant to the Cityhood Laws. The Facts During the 11th Congress,3 Congress enacted into law 33 bills converting 33 municipalities into cities. However, Congress did not act on bills converting 24 other municipalities into cities. During the 12th Congress,4 Congress enacted into law Republic Act No. 9009 (RA 9009),5 which took effect on 30 June 2001. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code by increasing the annual income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. The rationale for the amendment was to restrain, in the words of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, "the mad rush" of municipalities to convert into cities solely to secure a larger share in the Internal Revenue Allotment despite the fact that they are incapable of fiscal independence.6

After the effectivity of RA 9009, the House of Representatives of the 12th Congress7 adopted Joint Resolution No. 29,8 which sought to exempt from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not approved in the 11th Congress. However, the 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress,9 the House of Representatives re-adopted Joint Resolution No. 29 as Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarded it to the Senate for approval. However, the Senate again failed to approve the Joint Resolution. Following the advice of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 16 municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. The 16 cityhood bills contained a common provision exempting all the 16 municipalities from the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009. On 22 December 2006, the House of Representatives approved the cityhood bills. The Senate also approved the cityhood bills in February 2007, except that of Naga, Cebu which was passed on 7 June 2007. The cityhood bills lapsed into law (Cityhood Laws10) on various dates from March to July 2007 without the President's signature.11 The Cityhood Laws direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites to determine whether the voters in each respondent municipality approve of the conversion of their municipality into a city. Petitioners filed the present petitions to declare the Cityhood Laws unconstitutional for violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal protection clause.12 Petitioners also lament that the wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment because more cities will share the same amount of internal revenue set aside for all cities under Section 285 of the Local Government Code.13 The Issues The petitions raise the following fundamental issues: 1. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution; and 2. Whether the Cityhood Laws violate the equal protection clause. The Ruling of the Court We grant the petitions. The Cityhood Laws violate Sections 6 and 10, Article X of the Constitution, and are thus unconstitutional. First, applying the P100 million income requirement in RA 9009 to the present case is a prospective, not a retroactive application, because RA 9009 took effect in 2001 while the cityhood bills became law more than five years later. Second, the Constitution requires that Congress shall prescribe all the criteria for the creation of a city in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. Third, the Cityhood Laws violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution because they prevent a fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. Fourth, the criteria prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, for converting a municipality into a city are clear, plain and unambiguous, needing no resort to any statutory construction. Fifth, the intent of members of the 11th Congress to exempt certain municipalities from the coverage of RA 9009 remained an intent and was never written into Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Sixth, the deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are not extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. Seventh, even if the exemption in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, the exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. Preliminary Matters Prohibition is the proper action for testing the constitutionality of laws administered by the COMELEC,14 like the Cityhood Laws, which direct the COMELEC to hold plebiscites in implementation of the Cityhood Laws. Petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines has legal standing because Section 499 of the Local Government Code tasks the League with the "primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto."15 Petitioners-in-intervention,16 which are existing cities, have legal standing because their Internal Revenue Allotment will be reduced if the Cityhood Laws are declared constitutional. Mayor Jerry P. Treas has legal standing because as Mayor of Iloilo City and as a taxpayer he has sufficient interest to prevent the unlawful expenditure of public funds, like the release of more Internal Revenue Allotment to political units than what the law allows. Applying RA 9009 is a Prospective Application of the Law RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 during the 11th Congress. This law specifically amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code, which now provides:

Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One hundred million pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (i) a contiguous territory of at least one hundred (100) square kilometers, as certified by the Land Management Bureau; or (ii) a population of not less than one hundred fifty thousand (150,000) inhabitants, as certified by the National Statistics Office. The creation thereof shall not reduce the land area, population and income of the original unit or units at the time of said creation to less than the minimum requirements prescribed herein. (b) The territorial jurisdiction of a newly-created city shall be properly identified by metes and bounds. The requirement on land area shall not apply where the city proposed to be created is composed of one (1) or more islands. The territory need not be contiguous if it comprises two (2) or more islands. (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, RA 9009 increased the income requirement for conversion of a municipality into a city from P20 million to P100 million. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement. Prior to the enactment of RA 9009, a total of 57 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in Congress. Thirty-three cityhood bills became law before the enactment of RA 9009. Congress did not act on 24 cityhood bills during the 11th Congress. During the 12th Congress, the House of Representatives adopted Joint Resolution No. 29, exempting from the income requirement of P100 million in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose cityhood bills were not acted upon during the 11th Congress. This Resolution reached the Senate. However, the 12th Congress adjourned without the Senate approving Joint Resolution No. 29. During the 13th Congress, 16 of the 24 municipalities mentioned in the unapproved Joint Resolution No. 29 filed between November and December of 2006, through their respective sponsors in Congress, individual cityhood bills containing a common provision, as follows: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. - The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. This common provision exempted each of the 16 municipalities from the income requirement of P100 million prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. These cityhood bills lapsed into law on various dates from March to July 2007 after President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo failed to sign them. Indisputably, Congress passed the Cityhood Laws long after the effectivity of RA 9009. RA 9009 became effective on 30 June 2001 or during the 11th Congress. The 13th Congress passed in December 2006 the cityhood bills which became law only in 2007. Thus, respondent municipalities cannot invoke the principle of non-retroactivity of laws.17 This basic rule has no application because RA 9009, an earlier law to the Cityhood Laws, is not being applied retroactively but prospectively. Congress Must Prescribe in the Local Government Code All Criteria Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.18 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code govern exclusively the creation of a city. No other law, not even the charter of the city, can govern such creation. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, non-discriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws.

Cityhood Laws Violate Section 6, Article X of the Constitution Uniform and non-discriminatory criteria as prescribed in the Local Government Code are essential to implement a fair and equitable distribution of national taxes to all local government units. Section 6, Article X of the Constitution provides: Local government units shall have a just share, as determined by law, in the national taxes which shall be automatically released to them. (Emphasis supplied) If the criteria in creating local government units are not uniform and discriminatory, there can be no fair and just distribution of the national taxes to local government units. A city with an annual income of only P20 million, all other criteria being equal, should not receive the same share in national taxes as a city with an annual income of P100 million or more. The criteria of land area, population and income, as prescribed in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, must be strictly followed because such criteria, prescribed by law, are material in determining the "just share" of local government units in national taxes. Since the Cityhood Laws do not follow the income criterion in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, they prevent the fair and just distribution of the Internal Revenue Allotment in violation of Section 6, Article X of the Constitution. Section 450 of the Local Government Code is Clear, Plain and Unambiguous There can be no resort to extrinsic aids like deliberations of Congress if the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous. Courts determine the intent of the law from the literal language of the law, within the law's four corners.19 If the language of the law is plain, clear and unambiguous, courts simply apply the law according to its express terms. If a literal application of the law results in absurdity, impossibility or injustice, then courts may resort to extrinsic aids of statutory construction like the legislative history of the law.20 Congress, in enacting RA 9009 to amend Section 450 of the Local Government Code, did not provide any exemption from the increased income requirement, not even to respondent municipalities whose cityhood bills were then pending when Congress passed RA 9009. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contains no exemption whatsoever. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law in applying Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. The 11th Congress' Intent was not Written into the Local Government Code True, members of Congress discussed exempting respondent municipalities from RA 9009, as shown by the various deliberations on the matter during the 11th Congress. However, Congress did not write this intended exemption into law. Congress could have easily included such exemption in RA 9009 but Congress did not. This is fatal to the cause of respondent municipalities because such exemption must appear in RA 9009 as an amendment to Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The Constitution requires that the criteria for the conversion of a municipality into a city, including any exemption from such criteria, must all be written in the Local Government Code. Congress cannot prescribe such criteria or exemption from such criteria in any other law. In short, Congress cannot create a city through a law that does not comply with the criteria or exemption found in the Local Government Code. Section 10 of Article X is similar to Section 16, Article XII of the Constitution prohibiting Congress from creating private corporations except by a general law. Section 16 of Article XII provides: The Congress shall not, except by general law, provide for the formation, organization, or regulation of private corporations. Government-owned or controlled corporations may be created or established by special charters in the interest of the common good and subject to the test of economic viability. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, Congress must prescribe all the criteria for the "formation, organization, or regulation" of private corporations in a general law applicable to all without discrimination.21 Congress cannot create a private corporation through a special law or charter. Deliberations of the 11th Congress on Unapproved Bills Inapplicable Congress is not a continuing body.22 The unapproved cityhood bills filed during the 11th Congress became mere scraps of paper upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. All the hearings and deliberations conducted during the 11th Congress on unapproved bills also became worthless upon the adjournment of the 11th Congress. These hearings and deliberations cannot be used to interpret bills enacted into law in the 13th or subsequent Congresses. The members and officers of each Congress are different. All unapproved bills filed in one Congress become functus officio upon adjournment of that Congress and must be re-filed anew in order to be taken up in the next Congress. When their respective authors refiled the cityhood bills in 2006 during the 13th Congress, the bills had to start from square one again, going through the legislative mill just like bills taken up for the first time, from the filing to the approval. Section 123, Rule XLIV of the Rules of the Senate, on Unfinished Business, provides: Sec. 123. x x x All pending matters and proceedings shall terminate upon the expiration of one (1) Congress, but may be taken by the succeeding Congress as if presented for the first time. (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, Section 78 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, on Unfinished Business, states:

Section 78. Calendar of Business. The Calendar of Business shall consist of the following: a. Unfinished Business. This is business being considered by the House at the time of its last adjournment. Its consideration shall be resumed until it is disposed of. The Unfinished Business at the end of a session shall be resumed at the commencement of the next session as if no adjournment has taken place. At the end of the term of a Congress, all Unfinished Business are deemed terminated. (Emphasis supplied) Thus, the deliberations during the 11th Congress on the unapproved cityhood bills, as well as the deliberations during the 12th and 13th Congresses on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, have no legal significance. They do not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing laws passed by subsequent Congresses. Applicability of Equal Protection Clause If Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, contained an exemption to the P100 million annual income requirement, the criteria for such exemption could be scrutinized for possible violation of the equal protection clause. Thus, the criteria for the exemption, if found in the Local Government Code, could be assailed on the ground of absence of a valid classification. However, Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption. The exemption is contained in the Cityhood Laws, which are unconstitutional because such exemption must be prescribed in the Local Government Code as mandated in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Even if the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, such exemption would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. The exemption provision merely states, "Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009 The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." This one sentence exemption provision contains no classification standards or guidelines differentiating the exempted municipalities from those that are not exempted. Even if we take into account the deliberations in the 11th Congress that municipalities with pending cityhood bills should be exempt from the P100 million income requirement, there is still no valid classification to satisfy the equal protection clause. The exemption will be based solely on the fact that the 16 municipalities had cityhood bills pending in the 11th Congress when RA 9009 was enacted. This is not a valid classification between those entitled and those not entitled to exemption from the P100 million income requirement. To be valid, the classification in the present case must be based on substantial distinctions, rationally related to a legitimate government objective which is the purpose of the law,23 not limited to existing conditions only, and applicable to all similarly situated. Thus, this Court has ruled: The equal protection clause of the 1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: 1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; 2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law; 3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and 4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.24 There is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills were not informed that a pending cityhood bill in the 11th Congress would be a condition for exemption from the increased P100 million income requirement. Had they been informed, many municipalities would have caused the filing of their own cityhood bills. These municipalities, even if they have bigger annual income than the 16 respondent municipalities, cannot now convert into cities if their income is less than P100 million. The fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. This requirement is illustrated in Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck,25 where the challenged law allowed milk dealers engaged in business prior to a fixed date to sell at a price lower than that allowed to newcomers in the same business. In Mayflower, the U.S. Supreme Court held: We are referred to a host of decisions to the effect that a regulatory law may be prospective in operation and may except from its sweep those presently engaged in the calling or activity to which it is directed. Examples are statutes licensing physicians and dentists, which apply only to those entering the profession subsequent to the passage of the act and exempt those then in practice, or zoning laws which exempt existing buildings, or laws forbidding slaughterhouses within certain areas, but excepting existing establishments. The challenged provision is unlike such laws, since, on its face, it is not a regulation of a business or an activity in the interest of, or for the protection of, the public, but an attempt to give an economic advantage to those engaged in a given business at an arbitrary date as against all those who enter the industry after that date. The appellees do not intimate that the classification bears any relation to the public health or welfare generally; that the provision will discourage monopoly; or that it was aimed at any abuse, cognizable by law, in the milk business. In the absence of any such showing, we have no right to conjure up possible situations which

might justify the discrimination. The classification is arbitrary and unreasonable and denies the appellant the equal protection of the law. (Emphasis supplied) In the same vein, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress - as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. Furthermore, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petitions and declare UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. SO ORDERED. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

Footnotes
1

Under Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. As National President of the League of Cities of the Philippines, Mayor of Iloilo City, and taxpayer. June 1998 to June 2001. June 2001 to June 2004.

Entitled AN ACT AMENDING SECTION 450 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7160, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991, BY INCREASING THE AVERAGE ANNUAL INCOME REQUIREMENT FOR A MUNICIPALITY OR CLUSTER OF BARANGAYS TO BE CONVERTED INTO A COMPONENT CITY.
6

Sponsorship Speech of Senator Aquilino Pimentel, 5 October 2000. June 2004 to June 2007.

Entitled Joint Resolution to Exempt Certain Municipalities Embodied in Bills Filed in Congress before June 30, 2001 from the Coverage of Republic Act No. 9009.
9

June 2007 to June 2010. The sixteen (16) Cityhood Laws are the following:

10

Republic Act No. 9389, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Baybay in the Province of Leyte into a component city to be known as the City of Baybay." Lapsed into law on 15 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9390, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Bogo, Cebu Province into a component city to be known as the City of Bogo." Lapsed into law on 15 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9391, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Catbalogan in the Province of Samar into a component city to be known as the City of Catbalogan." Lapsed into law on 15 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9392, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Tandag in the Province of Surigao del Sur into a component city to be known as the City of Tandag." Lapsed into law on 15 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9394, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Borongan in the Province of Eastern Samar into a component city to be known as the City of Borongan." Lapsed into law on 16 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9398, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Tayabas in the Province of Quezon into a component city to be known as the City of Tayabas." Lapsed into law on 18 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9393, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Lamitan in the Province of Basilan into a component city to be known as the City of Lamitan." Lapsed into law on 15 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9404, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Tabuk into a component city of the Province of Kalinga to be known as the City of Tabuk." Lapsed into law on 23 March 2007;

Republic Act No. 9405, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Bayugan in the Province of Agusan del Sur into a component city to be known as the City of Bayugan." Lapsed into law on 23 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9407, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Batac in the Province of Ilocos Norte into a component city to be known as the City of Batac." Lapsed into law on 24 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9408, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Mati in the Province of Davao Oriental into a component city to be known as the City of Mati." Lapsed into law on 24 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9409, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Guihulngan in the Province of Negros Oriental into a component city to be known as the City of Guihulngan." Lapsed into law on 24 March 2007; Republic Act No. 9434, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Cabadbaran into a component city of the Province of Agusan Del Norte to be known as the City of Cabadbaran." Lapsed into law on 12 April 2007; Republic Act No. 9436, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Carcar in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as the City of Carcar." Lapsed into law on 15 April 2007; Republic Act No. 9435, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of El Salvador in the Province of Misamis Oriental into a component city to be known as the City of El Salvador." Lapsed into law on 12 April 2007; and Republic Act No. 9491, entitled "An Act converting the Municipality of Naga in the Province of Cebu into a component city to be known as the City of Naga." Lapsed into law on 15 July 2007.
11

Section 27 (1), Article VI of the Constitution. Section 1, Article III of the Constitution.

12

13

Section 285 of the Local Government Code provides: "Allocation to Local Government Units. The share of local government units in the internal revenue allotment shall be allocated in the following manner: (a) Provinces Twenty-three percent (23%); (b) Cities Twenty-three percent (23%); (c) Municipalities Thirty-four percent (34%); and (d) Barangays Twenty percent (20%) Provided, however, That the share of each province, city, and municipality shall be determined on the basis of the following formula: (a) Population Fifty percent (50%); (b) Land Area Twenty-five percent (25%); and (c) Equal sharing Twenty-five percent (25%) Provided, further, That the share of each barangay with a population of not less than one hundred (100) inhabitants shall not be less than Eighty thousand (P80,000.00) per annum chargeable against the twenty percent (20%) share of the barangay from the internal revenue allotment, and the balance to be allocated on the basis of the following formula: (a) On the first year of the effectivity of this Code: (1) Population Forty percent (40%); and (2) Equal Sharing Sixty percent (60%) (b) On the second year: (1) Population Fifty percent (50%); and (2) Equal Sharing Fifty percent (50%) (c) On the third year and thereafter: (1) Population Sixty percent (60%); and (2) Equal sharing Forty percent (40%).

Provided, finally, That the financial requirements of barangays created by local government units after the effectivity of this Code shall be the responsibility of the local government unit concerned."
14

Sema v. COMELEC, G.R. No. 177597, 16 July 2008; Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC, 409 Phil. 571, 592 (2001); Mutuc v. COMELEC, 146 Phil. 798 (1970).
15

Section 499 of the Local Government Code provides: "Purpose of Organization. There shall be an organization of all cities to be known as the League of Cities for the primary purpose of ventilating, articulating and crystallizing issues affecting city government administration, and securing, through proper and legal means, solutions thereto. The league may form chapters at the provincial level for the component cities of a province. Highly-urbanized cities may also form a chapter of the League. The National League shall be composed of the presidents of the league of highly-urbanized cities and the presidents of the provincial chapters of the league of component cities."
16

The Court granted the interventions of the following cities: Santiago City, Iriga City, Ligao City, Legazpi City, Tagaytay City, Surigao City, Bayawan City, Silay City, General Santos City, Zamboanga City, Gingoog City, Cauayan City, Pagadian City, San Carlos City, San Fernando City, Tacurong City, Tangub City, Oroquieta City, Urdaneta City, Victorias City, Calapan City, Himamaylan City, Batangas City, Bais City, Tarlac City, Cadiz City, and Tagum City.
17

Article 4 of the Civil Code provides: "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." Republic Act No. 7160, as amended.

18

19

Ramirez v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 93833, 28 September 1995, 248 SCRA 590, 596; Security Bank and Trust Company v. RTC of Makati, Br. 61, G.R. No. 113926, 23 October 1996, 263 SCRA 483, 488.
20

Republic v. Court of Appeals, 359 Phil. 530, 559 (1998); Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Solidbank Corp., 462 Phil. 96, 129-131 (2003).
21

The Corporation Code of the Philippines (Batas Pambansa Blg. 68) is the general law providing for the formation, organization and regulation of private corporations.
22

See Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations, G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77, 135-136.
23

The rational basis test is the minimum level of scrutiny that all government actions challenged under the equal protection clause must meet. The strict scrutiny test is used in discriminations based on race or those which result in violations of fundamental rights. Under the strict scrutiny test, to be valid the classification must promote a compelling state interest. The intermediate scrutiny test is used in discriminations based on gender or illegitimacy of children. Under the intermediate scrutiny test, the classification must be substantially related to an important government objective. Laws not subject to the strict or intermediate scrutiny test are evaluated under the rational basis test, which is the easiest test to satisfy since the classification must only show a rational relationship to a legitimate government purpose. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Constitutional Law, Principles and Policies, 2nd Edition, pp. 645-646.
24

De Guzman, Jr. v. COMELEC, 391 Phil. 70, 79 (2000); Tiu v. Court of Tax Appeals, 361 Phil. 229, 242 (1999). 297 U.S. 266 (1936). Republic of the Philippines SUPREME COURT Manila EN BANC

25

G.R. No. 176951

December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 177499 December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x G.R. No. 178056 December 21, 2009

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, vs. PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention. DECISION VELASCO, JR. J.: Ratio legis est anima. The spirit rather than the letter of the law. A statute must be read according to its spirit or intent,1 for what is within the spirit is within the statute although it is not within its letter, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute.2 Put a bit differently, that which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and that which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.3 Withal, courts ought not to interpret and should not accept an interpretation that would defeat the intent of the law and its legislators.4 So as it is exhorted to pass on a challenge against the validity of an act of Congress, a co-equal branch of government, it behooves the Court to have at once one principle in mind: the presumption of constitutionality of statutes.5 This presumption finds its roots in the tripartite system of government and the corollary separation of powers, which enjoins the three great departments of the government to accord a becoming courtesy for each others acts, and not to interfere inordinately with the exercise by one of its official functions. Towards this end, courts ought to reject assaults against the validity of statutes, barring of course their clear unconstitutionality. To doubt is to sustain, the theory in context being that the law is the product of earnest studies by Congress to ensure that no constitutional prescription or concept is infringed.6 Consequently, before a law duly challenged is nullified, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with, the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court.7 BACKGROUND The consolidated petitions for prohibition commenced by the League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), City of Iloilo, City of Calbayog, and Jerry P. Treas8 assail the constitutionality of the sixteen (16) laws,9 each converting the municipality covered thereby into a city (cityhood laws, hereinafter) and seek to enjoin the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) from conducting plebiscites pursuant to subject laws. By Decision10 dated November 18, 2008, the Court en banc, by a 6-5 vote, granted the petitions and nullified the sixteen (16) cityhood laws for being violative of the Constitution, specifically its Section 10, Article X and the equal protection clause. Subsequently, respondent local government units (LGUs) moved for reconsideration, raising, as one of the issues, the validity of the factual premises not contained in the pleadings of the parties, let alone established, which became the bases of the Decision subject of reconsideration.11 By Resolution of March 31, 2009, a divided Court denied the motion for reconsideration. A second motion for reconsideration followed in which respondent LGUs prayed as follows: WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that the Honorable Court reconsider its "Resolution" dated March 31, 2009, in so far as it denies for "lack of merit" respondents "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and in lieu thereof, considering that new and meritorious arguments are raised by respondents "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 to grant afore-mentioned "Motion for Reconsideration" dated December 9, 2008 and dismiss the "Petitions For Prohibition" in the instant case. Per Resolution dated April 28, 2009, the Court, voting 6-6, disposed of the motion as follows:

By a vote of 6-6, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 31 March 2009 is DENIED for lack of merit. The motion is denied since there is no majority that voted to overturn the Resolution of 31 March 2009. The Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision of 18 November 2008 is DENIED for being a prohibited pleading, and the Motion for Leave to Admit Attached Petition in Intervention x x x filed by counsel for Ludivina T. Mas, et al. are also DENIED. No further pleadings shall be entertained. Let entry of judgment be made in due course. x x x On May 14, 2009, respondent LGUs filed a Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents "Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009" and "Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon." Per its Resolution of June 2, 2009, the Court declared the May 14, 2009 motion adverted to as expunged in light of the entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009. Justice Leonardo-De Castro, however, taking common cause with Justice Bersamin to grant the motion for reconsideration of the April 28, 2009 Resolution and to recall the entry of judgment, stated the observation, and with reason, that the entry was effected "before the Court could act on the aforesaid motion which was filed within the 15-day period counted from receipt of the April 28, 2009 Resolution."12 Forthwith, respondent LGUs filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009 to which some of the petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention filed their respective comments. The Court will now rule on this incident. But first, we set and underscore some basic premises: (1) The initial motion to reconsider the November 18, 2008 Decision, as Justice Leonardo-De Castro noted, indeed raised new and substantial issues, inclusive of the matter of the correctness of the factual premises upon which the said decision was predicated. The 6-6 vote on the motion for reconsideration per the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues have already been passed upon" reflected a divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the basic issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision; (2) The aforesaid May 14, 2009 Motion to Amend Resolution of April 28, 2009 was precipitated by the tie vote which served as basis for the issuance of said resolution. This May 14, 2009 motionwhich mainly argued that a tie vote is inadequate to declare a law unconstitutional remains unresolved; and (3) Pursuant to Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be heard by the Court en banc and decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. The basic issue tendered in this motion for reconsideration of the June 2, 2009 Resolution boils down to whether or not the required vote set forth in the aforesaid Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII is limited only to the initial vote on the petition or also to the subsequent voting on the motion for reconsideration where the Court is called upon and actually votes on the constitutionality of a law or like issuances. Or, as applied to this case, would a minute resolution dismissing, on a tie vote, a motion for reconsideration on the sole stated groundthat the "basic issues have already been passed" suffice to hurdle the voting requirement required for a declaration of the unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws in question? The 6-6 vote on the motion to reconsider the Resolution of March 31, 2009, which denied the initial motion on the sole ground that "the basic issues had already been passed upon" betrayed an evenly divided Court on the issue of whether or not the underlying Decision of November 18, 2008 had indeed passed upon the issues raised in the motion for reconsideration of the said decision. But at the end of the day, the single issue that matters and the vote that really counts really turn on the constitutionality of the cityhood laws. And be it remembered that the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution was the last vote on the issue of whether or not the cityhood laws infringe the Constitution. Accordingly, the motions of the respondent LGUs, in light of the 6-6 vote, should be deliberated anew until the required concurrence on the issue of the validity or invalidity of the laws in question is, on the merits, secured. It ought to be clear that a deadlocked vote does not reflect the "majority of the Members" contemplated in Sec. 4 (2) of Art. VIII of the Constitution, which requires that: All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, x x x shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis added.) Webster defines "majority" as "a number greater than half of a total."13 In plain language, this means 50% plus one. In Lambino v. Commission on Elections, Justice, now Chief Justice, Puno, in a separate opinion, expressed the view that "a deadlocked vote of six (6) is not a majority and a non-majority cannot write a rule with precedential value."14 As may be noted, the aforequoted Sec. 4 of Art. VIII, as couched, exacts a majority vote in the determination of a case involving the constitutionality of a statute, without distinguishing whether such determination is made on the main petition or thereafter on a motion for reconsideration. This is as it should be, for, to borrow from the late Justice Ricardo J. Francisco: "x x x [E]ven assuming x x x that the constitutional requirement on the concurrence of the majority was initially reached in the x x x ponencia, the same is inconclusive as it was still open for review by way of a motion for reconsideration."15 To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the rule on a tie-vote situation, i.e., Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the complementary A.M. No. 99-1-09SC, respectively, providing that: SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied.

A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC x x x A motion for reconsideration of a decision or resolution of the Court En Banc or of a Division may be granted upon a vote of a majority of the En Banc or of a Division, as the case may be, who actually took part in the deliberation of the motion. If the voting results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. But since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, the aforequoted provisions ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases "shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." To repeat, the last vote on the issue of the constitutionality of the cityhood bills is that reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolutiona 6-6 deadlock. On the postulate then that first, the finality of the November 18, 2008 Decision has yet to set in, the issuance of the precipitate16 entry of judgment notwithstanding, and second, the deadlocked vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not definitely settle the constitutionality of the cityhood laws, the Court is inclined to take another hard look at the underlying decision. Without belaboring in their smallest details the arguments for and against the procedural dimension of this disposition, it bears to stress that the Court has the power to suspend its own rules when the ends of justice would be served thereby.17 In the performance of their duties, courts should not be shackled by stringent rules which would result in manifest injustice. Rules of procedure are only tools crafted to facilitate the attainment of justice. Their strict and rigid application must be eschewed, if they result in technicalities that tend to frustrate rather than promote substantial justice. Substantial rights must not be prejudiced by a rigid and technical application of the rules in the altar of expediency. When a case is impressed with public interest, a relaxation of the application of the rules is in order.18 Time and again, this Court has suspended its own rules or excepted a particular case from their operation whenever the higher interests of justice so require.19 While perhaps not on all fours with the case, because it involved a purely business transaction, what the Court said in Chuidian v. Sandiganbayan20 is most apropos: To reiterate what the Court has said in Ginete vs. Court of Appeals and other cases, the rules of procedure should be viewed as mere instruments designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. They are not to be applied with severity and rigidity when such application would clearly defeat the very rationale for their conception and existence. Even the Rules of Court reflects this principle. The power to suspend or even disregard rules, inclusive of the one-motion rule, can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court has already declared to be final. The peculiarities of this case impel us to do so now. The Court, by a vote of 6-4, grants the respondent LGUs motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009, as well as their May 14, 2009 motion to consider the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision unresolved, and also grants said second motion for reconsideration. This brings us to the substantive aspect of the case. The Undisputed Factual Antecedents in Brief During the 11th Congress,21 fifty-seven (57) cityhood bills were filed before the House of Representatives.22 Of the fifty-seven (57), thirty-three (33) eventually became laws. The twenty-four (24) other bills were not acted upon. Later developments saw the introduction in the Senate of Senate Bill (S. Bill) No. 215723 to amend Sec. 450 of Republic Act No. (RA) 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991. The proposed amendment sought to increase the income requirement to qualify for conversion into a city from PhP 20 million average annual income to PhP 100 million locally generated income. In March 2001, S. Bill No. 2157 was signed into law as RA 9009 to take effect on June 30, 2001. As thus amended by RA 9009, Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 now provides that "[a] municipality x x x may be converted into a component city if it has a [certified] locally generated average annual income x x x of at least [PhP 100 million] for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices." After the effectivity of RA 9009, the Lower House of the 12th Congress adopted in July 2001 House (H.) Joint Resolution No. 2924 which, as its title indicated, sought to exempt from the income requirement prescribed in RA 9009 the 24 municipalities whose conversions into cities were not acted upon during the previous Congress. The 12th Congress ended without the Senate approving H. Joint Resolution No. 29. Then came the 13th Congress (July 2004 to June 2007), which saw the House of Representatives re-adopting H. Joint Resolution No. 29 as H. Joint Resolution No. 1 and forwarding it to the Senate for approval. The Senate, however, again failed to approve the joint resolution. During the Senate session held on November 6, 2006, Senator Aquilino Pimentel, Jr. asserted that passing H. Resolution No. 1 would, in net effect, allow a wholesale exemption from the income requirement imposed under RA 9009 on the municipalities. For this reason, he suggested the filing by the House of Representatives of individual bills to pave the way for the municipalities to become cities and then forwarding them to the Senate for proper action.25 Heeding the advice, sixteen (16) municipalities filed, through their respective sponsors, individual cityhood bills. Common to all 16 measures was a provision exempting the municipality covered from the PhP 100 million income requirement. As of June 7, 2007, both Houses of Congress had approved the individual cityhood bills, all of which eventually lapsed into law on various dates. Each cityhood law directs the COMELEC, within thirty (30) days from its approval, to hold a plebiscite to determine whether the voters approve of the conversion. As earlier stated, the instant petitions seek to declare the cityhood laws unconstitutional for violation of Sec. 10, Art. X of the Constitution, as well as for violation of the equal-protection clause. The wholesale conversion of municipalities into cities, the petitioners

bemoan, will reduce the share of existing cities in the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.26 Petitioners-in-intervention, LPC members themselves, would later seek leave and be allowed to intervene. Aside from their basic plea to strike down as unconstitutional the cityhood laws in question, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention collectively pray that an order issue enjoining the COMELEC from conducting plebiscites in the affected areas. An alternative prayer would urge the Court to restrain the poll body from proclaiming the plebiscite results. On July 24, 2007, the Court en banc resolved to consolidate the petitions and the petitions-in-intervention. On March 11, 2008, it heard the parties in oral arguments. The Issues In the main, the issues to which all others must yield pivot on whether or not the cityhood laws violate (1) Sec. 10. Art. X of the Constitution and (2) the equal protection clause. In the November 18, 2008 Decision granting the petitions, Justice Antonio T. Carpio, for the Court, resolved the twin posers in the affirmative and accordingly declared the cityhood laws unconstitutional, deviating as they do from the uniform and non-discriminatory income criterion prescribed by the LGC of 1991. In so doing, the ponencia veritably agreed with the petitioners that the Constitution, in clear and unambiguous language, requires that all the criteria for the creation of a city shall be embodied and written in the LGC, and not in any other law. After a circumspect reflection, the Court is disposed to reconsider. Petitioners threshold posture, characterized by a strained interpretation of the Constitution, if accorded cogency, would veritably curtail and cripple Congress valid exercise of its authority to create political subdivisions. By constitutional design27 and as a matter of long-established principle, the power to create political subdivisions or LGUs is essentially legislative in character.28 But even without any constitutional grant, Congress can, by law, create, divide, merge, or altogether abolish or alter the boundaries of a province, city, or municipality. We said as much in the fairly recent case, Sema v. CIMELEC.29 The 1987 Constitution, under its Art. X, Sec. 10, nonetheless provides for the creation of LGUs, thus: Section 10. No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied.) As may be noted, the afore-quoted provision specifically provides for the creation of political subdivisions "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code," subject to the approval of the voters in the unit concerned. The criteria referred to are the verifiable indicators of viability, i.e., area, population, and income, now set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. The petitioners would parlay the thesis that these indicators or criteria must be written only in the LGC and not in any other statute. Doubtless, the code they are referring to is the LGC of 1991. Pushing their point, they conclude that the cityhood laws that exempted the respondent LGUs from the income standard spelled out in the amendatory RA 9009 offend the Constitution. Petitioners posture does not persuade. The supposedly infringed Art. X, Sec. 10 is not a new constitutional provision. Save for the use of the term "barrio" in lieu of "barangay," "may be" instead of "shall," the change of the phrase "unit or units" to "political unit" and the addition of the modifier "directly" to the word "affected," the aforesaid provision is a substantial reproduction of Art. XI, Sec. 3 of the 1973 Constitution, which reads: Section 3. No province, city, municipality, or barrio may be created, divided, merged, abolished, or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the unit or units affected. (Emphasis supplied.) It bears notice, however, that the "code" similarly referred to in the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions is clearly but a law Congress enacted. This is consistent with the aforementioned plenary power of Congress to create political units. Necessarily, since Congress wields the vast poser of creating political subdivisions, surely it can exercise the lesser authority of requiring a set of criteria, standards, or ascertainable indicators of viability for their creation. Thus, the only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can impose the criteria. The eminent constitutionalist, Fr. Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., in his treatise on Constitutional Law, specifically on the subject provision, explains: Prior to 1965, there was a certain lack of clarity with regard to the power to create, divide, merge, dissolve, or change the boundaries of municipal corporations. The extent to which the executive may share in this power was obscured by Cardona v. Municipality of Binangonan.30 Pelaez v. Auditor General subsequently clarified the Cardona case when the Supreme Court said that "the authority to create municipal corporations is essentially legislative in nature."31 Pelaez, however, conceded that "the power to fix such common boundary, in order to avoid or settle conflicts of jurisdiction between adjoining municipalities, may partake of an administrative natureinvolving as it does, the adoption of means and ways to carry into effect the law creating said municipalities."32 Pelaez was silent about division, merger, and dissolution of municipal corporations. But since division in effect creates a new municipality, and both dissolution and merger in effect abolish a legal creation, it may fairly be inferred that these acts are also legislative in nature. Section 10 [Art. X of the 1987 Constitution], which is a legacy from the 1973 Constitution, goes further than the doctrine in the Pelaez case. It not only makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries of provinces, cities, municipalities x x

x subject to "criteria established in the local government code," thereby declaring these actions properly legislative, but it also makes creation, division, merger, abolition or substantial alteration of boundaries "subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected."33 x x x (Emphasis added.) It remains to be observed at this juncture that when the 1987 Constitution speaks of the LGC, the reference cannot be to any specific statute or codification of laws, let alone the LGC of 1991.34 Be it noted that at the time of the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, Batas Pambansa Blg. (BP) 337, the then LGC, was still in effect. Accordingly, had the framers of the 1987 Constitution intended to isolate the embodiment of the criteria only in the LGC, then they would have actually referred to BP 337. Also, they would then not have provided for the enactment by Congress of a new LGC, as they did in Art. X, Sec. 335 of the Constitution. Consistent with its plenary legislative power on the matter, Congress can, via either a consolidated set of laws or a much simpler, singlesubject enactment, impose the said verifiable criteria of viability. These criteria need not be embodied in the local government code, albeit this code is the ideal repository to ensure, as much as possible, the element of uniformity. Congress can even, after making a codification, enact an amendatory law, adding to the existing layers of indicators earlier codified, just as efficaciously as it may reduce the same. In this case, the amendatory RA 9009 upped the already codified income requirement from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million. At the end of the day, the passage of amendatory laws is no different from the enactment of laws, i.e., the cityhood laws specifically exempting a particular political subdivision from the criteria earlier mentioned. Congress, in enacting the exempting law/s, effectively decreased the already codified indicators. Petitioners theory that Congress must provide the criteria solely in the LGC and not in any other law strikes the Court as illogical. For if we pursue their contention to its logical conclusion, then RA 9009 embodying the new and increased income criterion would, in a way, also suffer the vice of unconstitutionality. It is startling, however, that petitioners do not question the constitutionality of RA 9009, as they in fact use said law as an argument for the alleged unconstitutionality of the cityhood laws. As it were, Congress, through the medium of the cityhood laws, validly decreased the income criterion vis--vis the respondent LGUs, but without necessarily being unreasonably discriminatory, as shall be discussed shortly, by reverting to the PhP 20 million threshold what it earlier raised to PhP 100 million. The legislative intent not to subject respondent LGUs to the more stringent requirements of RA 9009 finds expression in the following uniform provision of the cityhood laws: Exemption from Republic Act No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009. In any event, petitioners constitutional objection would still be untenable even if we were to assume purely ex hypothesi the correctness of their underlying thesis, viz: that the conversion of a municipality to a city shall be in accordance with, among other things, the income criterion set forth in the LGC of 1991, and in no other; otherwise, the conversion is invalid. We shall explain. Looking at the circumstances behind the enactment of the laws subject of contention, the Court finds that the LGC-amending RA 9009, no less, intended the LGUs covered by the cityhood laws to be exempt from the PhP 100 million income criterion. In other words, the cityhood laws, which merely carried out the intent of RA 9009, adhered, in the final analysis, to the "criteria established in the Local Government Code," pursuant to Sec. 10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution. We shall now proceed to discuss this exemption angle.36 Among the criteria established in the LGC pursuant to Sec.10, Art. X of the 1987 Constitution are those detailed in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 under the heading "Requisites for Creation." The section sets the minimum income qualifying bar before a municipality or a cluster of barangays may be considered for cityhood. Originally, Sec. 164 of BP 337 imposed an average regular annual income "of at least ten million pesos for the last three consecutive years" as a minimum income standard for a municipal-to-city conversion. The LGC that BP 337 established was superseded by the LGC of 1991 whose then Sec. 450 provided that "[a] municipality or cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has an average annual income, x x x of at least twenty million pesos (P20,000,000.00) for at least two (2) consecutive years based on 1991 constant prices x x x." RA 9009 in turn amended said Sec. 450 by further increasing the income requirement to PhP 100 million, thus: Section 450. Requisites for Creation. (a) A municipality or a cluster of barangays may be converted into a component city if it has a locally generated average annual income, as certified by the Department of Finance, of at least One Hundred Million Pesos (P100,000,000.00) for the last two (2) consecutive years based on 2000 constant prices, and if it has either of the following requisites: (c) The average annual income shall include the income accruing to the general fund, exclusive of special funds, transfers, and nonrecurring income. (Emphasis supplied.) The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis37 or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice.38 To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself,39 resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.40 It is in this respect that the history of the passage of RA 9009 and the logical inferences derivable therefrom assume relevancy in discovering legislative intent.41 The rationale behind the enactment of RA 9009 to amend Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 can reasonably be deduced from Senator Pimentels sponsorship speech on S. Bill No. 2157. Of particular significance is his statement regarding the basis for the proposed increase from PhP 20 million to PhP 100 million in the income requirement for municipalities wanting to be converted into cities, viz: Senator Pimentel. Mr. President, I would have wanted this bill to be included in the whole set of proposed amendments that we have introduced to precisely amend the [LGC]. However, it is a fact that there is a mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities. Whereas in 1991, when the [LGC] was approved, there were only 60 cities, today the number has increased to 85 cities, with 41 more municipalities applying for conversion x x x. At the rate we are going, I am apprehensive that before long this nation will be a nation of all cities and no municipalities.

It is for that reason, Mr. President, that we are proposing among other things, that the financial requirement, which, under the [LGC], is fixed at P20 million, be raised to P100 million to enable a municipality to have the right to be converted into a city, and the P100 million should be sourced from locally generated funds. Congress to be sure knew, when RA 9009 was being deliberated upon, of the pendency of several bills on cityhood, wherein the applying municipalities were qualified under the then obtaining PhP 20 million-income threshold. These included respondent LGUs. Thus, equally noteworthy is the ensuing excerpts from the floor exchange between then Senate President Franklin Drilon and Senator Pimentel, the latter stopping short of saying that the income threshold of PhP 100 million under S. Bill No. 2157 would not apply to municipalities that have pending cityhood bills, thus: THE PRESIDENT. The Chair would like to ask for some clarificatory point. x x x THE PRESIDENT. This is just on the point of the pending bills in the Senate which propose the conversion of a number of municipalities into cities and which qualify under the present standard. We would like to know the view of the sponsor: Assuming that this bill becomes a law, will the Chamber apply the standard as proposed in this bill to those bills which are pending for consideration? SENATOR PIMENTEL, Mr. President, it might not be fair to make this bill x x x [if] approved, retroact to the bills that are pending in the Senate for conversion from municipalities to cities. THE PRESIDENT. Will there be an appropriate language crafted to reflect that view? Or does it not become a policy of the Chamber, assuming that this bill becomes a law x x x that it will apply to those bills which are already approved by the House under the old version of the [LGC] and are now pending in the Senate? The Chair does not know if we can craft a language which will limit the application to those which are not yet in the Senate. Or is that a policy that the Chamber will adopt? SENATOR PIMENTEL. Mr. President, personally, I do not think it is necessary to put that provision because what we are saying here will form part of the interpretation of this bill. Besides, if there is no retroactivity clause, I do not think that the bill would have any retroactive effect. THE PRESIDENT. So the understanding is that those bills which are already pending in the Chamber will not be affected. SENATOR PIMENTEL. These will not be affected, Mr. President.42 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) What the foregoing Pimental-Drilon exchange eloquently indicates are the following complementary legislative intentions: (1) the then pending cityhood bills would be outside the pale of the minimum income requirement of PhP 100 million that S. Bill No. 2159 proposes; and (2) RA 9009 would not have any retroactive effect insofar as the cityhood bills are concerned. Given the foregoing perspective, it is not amiss to state that the basis for the inclusion of the exemption clause of the cityhood laws is the clear-cut intent of Congress of not according retroactive effect to RA 9009. Not only do the congressional records bear the legislative intent of exempting the cityhood laws from the income requirement of PhP 100 million. Congress has now made its intention to exempt express in the challenged cityhood laws. Legislative intent is part and parcel of the law, the controlling factor in interpreting a statute. In construing a statute, the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the Legislature and to adopt the sense that best harmonizes with the context and promotes in the fullest manner the policy and objects of the legislature.43 In fact, any interpretation that runs counter to the legislative intent is unacceptable and invalid.44 Torres v. Limjap could not have been more precise: The intent of a Statute is the Law. If a statute is valid, it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is x x x the essence of the law and the primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of the legislature x x x.45 (Emphasis supplied.) As emphasized at the outset, behind every law lies the presumption of constitutionality.46 Consequently, to him who would assert the unconstitutionality of a statute belongs the burden of proving otherwise. Laws will only be declared invalid if a conflict with the Constitution is beyond reasonable doubt.47 Unfortunately for petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention, they failed to discharge their heavy burden. It is contended that the deliberations on the cityhood bills and the covering joint resolution were undertaken in the 11th and/or the 12th Congress. Accordingly, so the argument goes, such deliberations, more particularly those on the unapproved resolution exempting from RA 9009 certain municipalities, are without significance and would not qualify as extrinsic aids in construing the cityhood laws that were passed during the 13th Congress, Congress not being a continuing body. The argument is specious and glosses over the reality that the cityhood billswhich were already being deliberated upon even perhaps before the conception of RA 9009were again being considered during the 13th Congress after being tossed around in the two previous Congresses. And specific reference to the cityhood bills was also made during the deliberations on RA 9009. At the end of the day, it is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing legislative body. What is important is that the debates, deliberations, and proceedings of Congress and the steps taken in the enactment of the law, in this case the cityhood laws in relation to RA 9009 or vice versa, were part of its legislative history and may be consulted, if appropriate, as aids in the interpretation of the law.48 And of course the earlier cited Drilon-Pimentel exchange on whether or not the 16 municipalities in question would be covered by RA 9009 is another vital link to the historical chain of the cityhood bills. This and other proceedings on the bills are spread in the Congressional journals, which cannot be

conveniently reduced to pure rhetoric without meaning whatsoever, on the simplistic and non-sequitur pretext that Congress is not a continuing body and that unfinished business in either chamber is deemed terminated at the end of the term of Congress. This brings us to the challenge to the constitutionality of cityhood laws on equal protection grounds. To the petitioners, the cityhood laws, by granting special treatment to respondent municipalities/LGUs by way of exemption from the standard PhP 100 million minimum income requirement, violate Sec.1, Art. III of the Constitution, which in part provides that no person shall "be denied the equal protection of the laws." Petitioners challenge is not well taken. At its most basic, the equal protection clause proscribes undue favor as well as hostile discrimination. Hence, a law need not operate with equal force on all persons or things to be conformable with Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution. The equal protection guarantee is embraced in the broader and elastic concept of due process, every unfair discrimination being an offense against the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless come as a separate clause in Sec. 1, Art. III of the Constitution to provide for a more specific protection against any undue discrimination or antagonism from government. Arbitrariness in general may be assailed on the basis of the due process clause. But if a particular challenged act partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.49 This constitutional protection extends to all persons, natural or artificial, within the territorial jurisdiction. Artificial persons, as the respondent LGUs herein, are, however, entitled to protection only insofar as their property is concerned.50 In the proceedings at bar, petitioner LCP and the intervenors cannot plausibly invoke the equal protection clause, precisely because no deprivation of property results by virtue of the enactment of the cityhood laws. The LCPs claim that the IRA of its member-cities will be substantially reduced on account of the conversion into cities of the respondent LGUs would not suffice to bring it within the ambit of the constitutional guarantee. Indeed, it is presumptuous on the part of the LCP member-cities to already stake a claim on the IRA, as if it were their property, as the IRA is yet to be allocated. For the same reason, the municipalities that are not covered by the uniform exemption clause in the cityhood laws cannot validly invoke constitutional protection. For, at this point, the conversion of a municipality into a city will only affect its status as a political unit, but not its property as such. As a matter of settled legal principle, the fundamental right of equal protection does not require absolute equality. It is enough that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights or privileges conferred and responsibilities or obligations imposed. The equal protection clause does not preclude the state from recognizing and acting upon factual differences between individuals and classes. It recognizes that inherent in the right to legislate is the right to classify,51 necessarily implying that the equality guaranteed is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. Classification, to be reasonable, must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class.52 The Court finds that all these requisites have been met by the laws challenged as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause. As things stand, the favorable treatment accorded the sixteen (16) municipalities by the cityhood laws rests on substantial distinction. Indeed, respondent LGUs, which are subjected only to the erstwhile PhP 20 million income criterion instead of the stringent income requirement prescribed in RA 9009, are substantially different from other municipalities desirous to be cities. Looking back, we note that respondent LGUs had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009. There lies part of the tipping difference. And years before the enactment of the amendatory RA 9009, respondents LGUs had already met the income criterion exacted for cityhood under the LGC of 1991. Due to extraneous circumstances, however, the bills for their conversion remained unacted upon by Congress. As aptly observed by then Senator, now Manila Mayor, Alfredo Lim in his speech sponsoring H. Joint Resolution No. 1, or the cityhood bills, respondent LGUs saw themselves confronted with the "changing of the rules in the middle of the game." Some excerpts of Senator Lims sponsorship speech: x x x [D]uring the Eleventh Congress, fifty-seven (57) municipalities applied for city status, confident that each has met the requisites for conversion under Section 450 of the [LGC], particularly the income threshold of P20 million. Of the 57 that filed, thirty-two (32) were enacted into law; x x x while the rest twenty-four (24) in all failed to pass through Congress. Shortly before the long recess of Congress in February 2001, to give way to the May elections x x x, Senate Bill No. 2157, which eventually became [RA] 9009, was passed into law, effectively raising the income requirement for creation of cities to a whooping P100 million x x x. Much as the proponents of the 24 cityhood bills then pending struggled to beat the effectivity of the law on June 30, 2001, events that then unfolded were swift and overwhelming that Congress just did not have the time to act on the measures. Some of these intervening events were x x x the impeachment of President Estrada x x x and the May 2001 elections. The imposition of a much higher income requirement for the creation of a city x x x was unfair; like any sport changing the rules in the middle of the game. Undaunted, they came back during the [12th] Congress x x x. They filed House Joint Resolution No. 29 seeking exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. For the second time, [however], time ran out from them. For many of the municipalities whose Cityhood Bills are now under consideration, this year, at the closing days of the [13th] Congress, marks their ninth year appealing for fairness and justice. x x x I, for one, share their view that fairness dictates that they should be given a legal remedy by which they could be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status using the criteria set forth under the [LGC] prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Hence, when House Joint Resolution No. 1 reached the Senate x x x I immediately set the public hearing x x x. On July 25, 2006, I filed Committee Report No. 84 x x x. On September 6, I delivered the sponsorship x x x. x x x By November 14, the measure had reverted to the period of individual amendments. This was when the then acting majority leader, x x x informed the Body that Senator Pimentel and the proponents of House Joint Resolution No. 1 have agreed to the proposal of the Minority Leader for the House to first approve the individual Cityhood Bills of the qualified municipalities, along with the provision

exempting each of them from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. x x x This led to the certification issued by the proponents short-listing fourteen (14) municipalities deemed to be qualified for city-status. Acting on the suggestion of Senator Pimentel, the proponents lost no time in working for the approval by the House of Representatives of their individual Cityhood Bills, each containing a provision of exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. On the last session day of last year, December 21, the House transmitted to the Senate the Cityhood Bills of twelve out of the 14 pre-qualified municipalities. Your Committee immediately conducted the public hearing x x x. The whole process I enumerated [span] three Congresses x x x. In essence, the Cityhood Bills now under consideration will have the same effect as that of House Joint Resolution No. 1 because each of the 12 bills seeks exemption from the higher income requirement of RA 9009. The proponents are invoking the exemption on the basis of justice and fairness. Each of the 12 municipalities has all the requisites for conversion into a component city based on the old requirements set forth under Section 450 of the [LGC], prior to its amendment by RA 9009, namely: x x x53 (Emphasis supplied.) In hindsight, the peculiar conditions, as depicted in Senator Lims speech, which respondent LGUs found themselves in were unsettling. They were qualified cityhood applicants before the enactment of RA 009. Because of events they had absolutely nothing to do with, a spoiler in the form of RA 9009 supervened. Now, then, to impose on them the much higher income requirement after what they have gone through would appear to be indeed "unfair," to borrow from Senator Lim. Thus, the imperatives of fairness dictate that they should be given a legal remedy by which they would be allowed to prove that they have all the necessary qualifications for city status, using the criteria set forth under the LGC of 1991 prior to its amendment by RA 9009. Truly, the peculiar conditions of respondent LGUs, which are actual and real, provide sufficient grounds for legislative classification. To be sure, courts, regardless of doubts they might be entertaining, cannot question the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification.54 By the same token, they do not sit to determine the propriety or efficacy of the remedies Congress has specifically chosen to extend. That is its prerogative. The power of the Legislature to make distinctions and classifications among persons is, to reiterate, neither curtailed nor denied by the equal protection clause. A law can be violative of the constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. The classification is also germane to the purpose of the law. The exemption of respondent LGUs/municipalities from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality occasioned by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009. From another perspective, the exemption was unquestionably designed to insure that fairness and justice would be accorded respondent LGUs. Let it be noted that what were then the cityhood bills covering respondent LGUs were part and parcel of the original 57 conversion bills filed in the 11th Congress, 33 of those became laws before the adjournment of that Congress. The then bills of the challenged cityhood laws were not acted upon due, inter alia, to the impeachment of then President Estrada, the related jueteng scandal investigations conducted before, and the EDSA events that followed the aborted impeachment. While the equal protection guarantee frowns upon the creation of a privileged class without justification, inherent in the equality clause is the exhortation for the Legislature to pass laws promoting equality or reducing existing inequalities. The enactment of the cityhood laws was in a real sense an attempt on the part of Congress to address the inequity dealt the respondent LGUs. These laws positively promoted the equality and eliminated the inequality, doubtless unintended, between respondent municipalities and the thirty-three (33) other municipalities whose cityhood bills were enacted during the 11th Congress. Respondent municipalities and the 33 other municipalities, which had already been elevated to city status, were all found to be qualified under the old Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 during the 11th Congress. As such, both respondent LGUs and the 33 other former municipalities are under like circumstances and conditions. There is, thus, no rhyme or reason why an exemption from the PhP 100 million requirement cannot be given to respondent LGUs. Indeed, to deny respondent LGUs/municipalities the same rights and privileges accorded to the 33 other municipalities when, at the outset they were similarly situated, is tantamount to denying the former the protective mantle of the equal protection clause. In effect, petitioners and petitioners-in-intervention are creating an absurd situation in which an alleged violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution is remedied by another violation of the same clause. The irony is not lost to the Court. Then too the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 is not limited in application only to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended to apply for all time, as long as the contemplated conditions obtain. To be more precise, the legislative intent underlying the enactment of RA 9009 to exclude would-be-cities from the PhP 100 million criterion would hold sway, as long as the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for conversion into a city under the original version of Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991. Viewed in its proper light, the common exemption clause in the cityhood laws is an application of the non-retroactive effect of RA 9009 on the cityhood bills. It is not a declaration of certain rights, but a mere declaration of prior qualification and/or compliance with the nonretroactive effect of RA 9009. Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of RA 9009 and were compliant with then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, which prescribed an income requirement of PhP 20 million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities that cannot claim to belong to the same class as the 16 cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. The former have to comply with the PhP 100 million income requirement imposed by RA 9009. A final consideration. The existence of the cities consequent to the approval of the creating, but challenged, cityhood laws in the plebiscites held in the affected LGUs is now an operative fact. New cities appear to have been organized and are functioning accordingly, with new sets of officials and employees. Other resulting events need not be enumerated. The operative fact doctrine provides another reason for upholding the constitutionality of the cityhood laws in question.

In view of the foregoing discussion, the Court ought to abandon as it hereby abandons and sets aside the Decision of November 18, 2008 subject of reconsideration. And by way of summing up the main arguments in support of this disposition, the Court hereby declares the following: (1) Congress did not intend the increased income requirement in RA 9009 to apply to the cityhood bills which became the cityhood laws in question. In other words, Congress intended the subject cityhood laws to be exempted from the income requirement of PhP 100 million prescribed by RA 9009; (2) The cityhood laws merely carry out the intent of RA 9009, now Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, to exempt respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement; (3) The deliberations of the 11th or 12th Congress on unapproved bills or resolutions are extrinsic aids in interpreting a law passed in the 13th Congress. It is really immaterial if Congress is not a continuing body. The hearings and deliberations during the 11th and 12th Congress may still be used as extrinsic reference inasmuch as the same cityhood bills which were filed before the passage of RA 9009 were being considered during the 13th Congress. Courts may fall back on the history of a law, as here, as extrinsic aid of statutory construction if the literal application of the law results in absurdity or injustice. (4) The exemption accorded the 16 municipalities is based on the fact that each had pending cityhood bills long before the enactment of RA 9009 that substantially distinguish them from other municipalities aiming for cityhood. On top of this, each of the 16 also met the PhP 20 million income level exacted under the original Sec. 450 of the 1991 LGC. And to stress the obvious, the cityhood laws are presumed constitutional. As we see it, petitioners have not overturned the presumptive constitutionality of the laws in question. WHEREFORE, respondent LGUs Motion for Reconsideration dated June 2, 2009, their "Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 by Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File and to Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings," dated May 14, 2009, and their second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated November 18, 2008 are GRANTED. The June 2, 2009, the March 31, 2009, and April 31, 2009 Resolutions are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The entry of judgment made on May 21, 2009 must accordingly be RECALLED. The instant consolidated petitions and petitions-in-intervention are DISMISSED. The cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491 are declared VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL. SO ORDERED. PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. Associate Justice DISSENTING OPINION CARPIO, J.: "A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC (dated 26 January 1999): In the Matter of Clarifying the Rule in Resolving Motions for Reconsideration The Court Resolved as follows: A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION. IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED." (Emphasis supplied) [T]he reason for the rule (of immutability of final judgments) is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements. - Justice Lucas P. Bersamin, Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164195, 4 December 2009 The ponencia states that "since the instant cases fall under Sec. 4(2), Art. VIII of the Constitution, [Sec. 7, Rule 56 and the Resolution in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC] ought to be applied in conjunction with the prescription of the Constitution that the cases shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the instant cases and voted thereon." I dissent. I. The Rules on Tie-Vote

Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court expressly governs tie-votes in the en banc, thus: SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied) This provision contemplates three possible instances where the Supreme Court en banc may be equally divided in opinion or where the necessary majority1 in the votes cannot be had. First, in actions instituted originally in the Supreme Court, if there is a tie-vote, the Court en banc shall deliberate again. After such redeliberation and the Court remains equally divided, which means that no decision had been reached, the original action shall be dismissed. In such a case, the tie-vote results in the dismissal of the action without establishing any jurisprudential precedent. Significantly, a deadlock vote on an original action is not novel to the Court. In fact, the Court had experienced such a deadlock in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources,2 Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec,3 Antonio, Jr. v. Comelec,4 Agudo v. Comelec,5 and People v. Lopez.6 1. Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources In Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources, petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought a suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations. Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of the IPRA "on the ground that its provisions amount to an unlawful deprivation of the States ownership over lands of the public domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution." The Court, via a Per Curiam resolution, dismissed the petition because the Court was equally divided in opinion, to wit: After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371. Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is DISMISSED.7 (Emphasis supplied) On motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc, by virtue of Section 7, Rule 56, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration since the members of the Court en banc were equally divided on such motion. In a minute Resolution promulgated on 21 September 2001, the Court stated that "the members of the Court who took part in the original deliberations on the petition find no reason to modify or in any way alter their views on the questions raised by petitioners and reiterated in their motion for reconsideration and therefore maintain their votes as stated in the resolution of December 6, 2000." Justice Angelina Sandoval Gutierrez took no part on the ground that she did not participate in the deliberations on the petition. In short, the tie-vote on the main decision cannot invalidate the prior action of the Legislative and Executive branches in enacting RA 8371. Moreover, the tie-vote on the motion for reconsideration resulted in the denial of the motion for reconsideration. Thus, RA 8371 stands as valid. 2. Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec In Badoy, Jr. v. Comelec, petitioner Badoy, Jr. prayed that Section 12(F) of Republic Act No. 6132 or The 1971 Constitutional Convention Act be declared unconstitutional. The voting of the Supreme Court Justices standing at five (5) votes in favor of constitutionality and five (5) votes against, the constitutionality of the provision was deemed upheld in conformity with Section 10, Article VIII of the Constitution then in force. The petitions were, therefore, denied. 3. Antonio, Jr. v. Comelec In Antonio, Jr. v. Comelec, the Supreme Court Justices were evenly divided on the issue of whether the Comelec should have ordered, as it did, a recanvass and proclamation on the basis of the returns of certain precincts in Batanes. Five Justices believed that such a proclamation was a necessary precedent to a protest in the House Electoral Tribunal. Five other Justices dissented. The Court, pursuant to the Rules of Court, ordered a rehearing on the petition in G.R. No. L-31609 entitled Agudo v. Comelec.

4. Agudo v. Comelec In Agudo v. Comelec, where the Court reheard G.R. No. L-31609, "the equal division (5 to 5) in the Justices opinions had persisted, thus calling for the application of Section 11, Rule 56 of the 1964 Revised Rules of Court."8 Accordingly, the Court ordered the dismissal of the petition. 5. People v. Lopez In People v. Lopez, then Solicitor General Lorenzo M. Taada, filed in the name of the People of the Philippines, a petition for prohibition to enjoin Associate Judge Eusebio M. Lopez from conducting further proceedings and from otherwise taking further cognizance of criminal cases for treason against Benigno S. Aquino (No. 3527) and against Antonio de las Alas, and other treason cases of similar nature. After the case was firstly heard, the Justices taking part were equally divided and no decision could be rendered; so the Court ordered a rehearing in accordance with Section 2 of Rule 56 in relation with Section 1 of Rule 58. The case was submitted again for deliberation and decision. The votes remained tied at 4-4. Thus, the petition was denied. The above-cited cases, involving actions originally commenced in the Supreme Court, clearly demonstrate that the Court has consistently applied the Rules on tie-vote. In accordance with such rules, the evenly divided Court directed the rehearing of those cases9 and when, after the rehearings, the tie-vote persisted, the Court ordered the dismissal or denial of the petitions. Second, in cases appealed to the Supreme Court, Section 7 of Rule 56 explicitly provides that if the Court en banc is still equally divided after re-deliberation, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed. A tie-vote in cases arising under the Courts appellate jurisdiction translates into a summary affirmance of the lower courts ruling.10 In short, the tie-vote in the en banc cannot amend or reverse a prior majority action of a lower court, whose decision stands affirmed. Third, on all incidental matters, which include motions for reconsideration, Section 7 of Rule 56 specifically states that if the Court en banc is evenly divided on such matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. To settle any doubt on how a tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration should be interpreted, the Court en banc issued a clarificatory Resolution on 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, as follows: A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION. IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied) The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts prior majority action on the main decision stands affirmed.11 This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc." In short, Section 4(2) requires a majority vote of the Court en banc not only in cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also in all other cases that are heard by the Court en banc. The principle that a multi-member judicial body such as the Supreme Court cannot, based on a tie-vote, overrule a prior action is consistently applied in legislative bodies as well.12 In the book The Standard Code of Parliamentary Procedure, the author Alice Sturgis writes: A tie vote on a motion means that the same number of members has voted in the affirmative as in the negative. Since a majority vote, or more than half of the legal votes case, is required to adopt a motion, an equal or tie vote means that the motion is lost because it has failed to receive a majority vote. A tie vote on a motion is not a deadlock vote that must be resolved; it is simply not a majority vote, and the motion is lost.13 (Emphasis supplied) Similarly, if the Philippine Supreme Court en banc is evenly split in its opinion on a motion for reconsideration, it is not a deadlock vote that must be resolved; it is simply not a majority vote, and the motion for reconsideration is defeated. More importantly, the tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration does not and cannot, in any instance and for any reason, supersede the prior majority vote on the main decision. II. The Tie-Vote on the Second Motion for Reconsideration Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution provides: (2) All cases involving the constitutionality of a treaty, international or executive agreement, or law which shall be heard by the Supreme Court en banc, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc, including those involving the constitutionality, application, or operation of presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations, shall be decided with the concurrence of majority of the members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon. (Emphasis supplied) Under Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, the requirement of a majority vote of the Supreme Court en banc applies not only to the constitutionality of a law, but also to the constitutionality of treaties, executive agreements, ordinances, regulations, and all other cases which under the Rules of Court shall be heard by the Court en banc. To repeat, any case which is heard by the Court en banc shall be decided by a majority vote of the Court en banc.

To insure equal protection of the law, all cases required to be heard by the Court en banc under Section 4(2), Article VII of the Constitution must be governed by the same rules on voting, whether on the main decision or on the motion for reconsideration. There can be no one rule for cases involving the constitutionality of a law and another rule for all other cases. The Constitution makes no such distinction in Section 4(2) of Article VIII. Undeniably, the Constitution does not require that motions for reconsideration in cases involving the constitutionality of a law shall be treated differently from motions for reconsideration in other cases heard by the Court en banc. There is no basis for such a different treatment, and such a different treatment would violate the equal protection of the law. Where the Constitution does not distinguish, this Court must not create a forced and baseless distinction. In the present cases, the voting on the main petitions was 6-5 to declare the sixteen Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. Clearly, there was compliance with Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution since a majority of the members of the Court en banc, who actually took part in the deliberations, voted to declare unconstitutional the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In the first motion for reconsideration, a majority of 7-5 voted to deny the motion for reconsideration. Again, there was a clear majority that denied the first motion for reconsideration. The majority of the Court en banc struck down the sixteen Cityhood Laws twice, first, during the deliberations on the main petitions, and second, during the deliberations on the first motion for reconsideration. Thereafter, by deliberating on the second motion for reconsideration filed by respondents, the Court in effect allowed the filing of a second motion for reconsideration, which is generally prohibited under the Rules of Court. The Court en banc, voting 6-6, denied the second motion for reconsideration in the Resolution of 28 April 2009. The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Certainly, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, and the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision. The Court en banc need not deliberate again because in case of a tie-vote on a second motion for reconsideration, which is an incidental matter, such motion is lost. The tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and the second motion for reconsideration must thus be denied. Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because there remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and Resolution of 31 March 2009 where majority of the Court en banc concurred in decreeing the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed.14 These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action. Applying Section 7, Rule 56 and the clarificatory Resolution in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC to the present cases does not in any manner contravene the mandate of Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. To repeat, the Court en banc deliberated on the petitions and, by a majority vote of 6-5, granted the petitions and declared the sixteen Cityhood Laws unconstitutional in the Decision of 18 November 2008. Again, by a clear majority vote of 7-5, the Court en banc voted to deny the first motion for reconsideration. Therefore, contrary to the ponencia, the present cases were decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc when it declared the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws, pursuant to Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc. Whether the case involves the constitutionality of a law, ordinance or regulation, or any civil, administrative or criminal case which under the Rules of Court must be heard en banc, the case must be decided by a majority vote of the Court en banc as expressly required by Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution. Any tie-vote in the motion for reconsideration results in the denial of the motion for reconsideration pursuant to A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, which governs all cases heard by the Court en banc. Further, to treat the second motion for reconsideration not as an incidental matter would certainly render inutile the distinction set forth in Section 7, Rule 56 among original actions commenced in this Court, appeals from the judgments of lower courts, and incidental matters, such as motions. III. Precedents Applying Section 7, Rule 56 In Santiago v. Comelec,15 involving the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 6735 (RA 6735), entitled "An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum and Appropriating Funds Therefor," the Court en banc, in an 8-5 vote, held that RA 6735 is "incomplete, inadequate, or wanting in essential terms and conditions insofar as initiative on amendments to the Constitution is concerned." While the Court en banc did not expressly declare RA 6735 unconstitutional, the majority of the Court en banc ruled that RA 6735, the law governing the implementation of the initiative system, was insufficient to amend the Constitution. The majority of the Court en banc concluded that "the COMELEC should be permanently enjoined from entertaining or taking cognizance of any petition for initiative on amendments on the Constitution until a sufficient law shall have been validly enacted to provide for the implementation of the system."16 On motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc voted 6-6-1,17 inevitably resulting in the denial of the motion for reconsideration and affirmance of the prior majority action on the main petition. In other words, the Court en bancs ruling in Santiago that RA 6735 was inadequate to amend the Constitution, obtained via an 8-5 vote, was deemed affirmed by a tie-vote on the motion for reconsideration. In fact, the Courts decision in Santiago spelled the sudden death of the so-called PIRMA initiative that triggered Santiago. The case of Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources also applies to the present cases. Petitioners in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources challenged the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA). There, the Court en banc was evenly divided not only on the main petition, but also on the motion for reconsideration. In a minute Resolution promulgated on 21 September 2001, the Court en banc, by virtue of Section 7, Rule 56, denied the petitioners motion for reconsideration since the members of the Court en banc were equally divided on such motion. As a result, the Per Curiam Resolution dismissing the petition stood affirmed and the constitutionality of RA 8371 was deemed upheld. Santiago and Cruz are squarely in point with the present cases because Santiago and Cruz, like the present cases, indisputably involve the constitutionality of a law and a tie-vote on the motion for reconsideration.

Applying Section 7, Rule 56, the Court en banc, instead of prolonging their disposition, outrightly denied the motions for reconsideration in Santiago and Cruz. No rehearings and no redeliberations were set and conducted to re-examine the motions for reconsideration. This is precisely because such proceedings are absolutely without any basis. For this reason alone, the second motion for reconsideration in these cases must suffer the same fate as the motions for reconsideration in Santiago and Cruz -- it must be summarily denied pursuant to Section 7, Rule 56. Following the ponencia, the cases of Santiago and Cruz would be deemed unresolved. Worse, the resolutions in Santiago and Cruz denying reconsideration due to a tie-vote would be deemed a blatant disregard of the mandate of Section 4(2), Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution. IV. The Finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision Respondents, in filing the Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 By Declaring Instead that Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of March 31, 2009 and Motion for Leave to File, and To Admit Attached Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision Dated November 18, 2008 Remain Unresolved and to Conduct Further Proceedings Thereon (Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009), mistakenly believe that "with the 6-6 vote on the second motion for reconsideration, the issue of whether the Cityhood Laws were unconstitutional remained unresolved." In the first place, the Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009 is a prohibited pleading. A prohibited pleading is a scrap of paper, and can never be placed "on an equal, if not a higher, standing than a motion for reconsideration." There is nothing left to be resolved precisely because the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration simply means that there was no majority vote to overturn the 18 November 2008 Decision, and the second motion for reconsideration is lost. The tie in the voting does not leave the case undecided. There is still the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution which must stand in view of the failure of the members of the Court en banc to muster the necessary vote for their reconsideration.18 No further proceedings, much less re-deliberations by the Court en banc, are required. Since the second motion for reconsideration was denied, pursuant to Section 7 of Rule 56, there is absolutely nothing which would preclude the 18 November 2008 Decision from becoming final after fifteen (15) days from receipt by the parties of the 28 April 2009 Resolution denying the second motion for reconsideration. The Court had explicitly directed the parties, in the 28 April 2009 Resolution, to refrain from filing further pleadings as it would no longer entertain the same. Yet, respondents opted to ignore and persistently defy such directive. Aside from filing the Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009, respondents filed three more pleadings, namely, (1) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of 2 June 2009, (2) Urgent Motion to Resolve Pending Incidents, and (3) Appeal to Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura to Participate in the Resolution of Respondents' Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009. All these pleadings, which were filed in direct contravention of the Courts directive in the 28 April 2009 Resolution, are prohibited and are mere scraps of paper, unworthy of the Courts attention. Furthermore, having in fact been filed without express leave - no such leave ever having been granted by the Court, these pleadings are mere surplusage that did not need to be acted on, and did not give rise to any pending matter which would effectively forestall the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision. Clearly, these various pleadings reflect respondents desperate attempts to further delay the execution of the final decision in these consolidated cases. As pointed out in petitioners' Comment Ad Cautelam,19 respondents, "by every possible guise and conceivable stratagem, have stubbornly and persistently sought to evade the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision." Notably, respondents craftily phrased and titled their motions based on the Court's last denial order or resolution, and deliberately avoided reference to the previous repeated denials by the Court." The Court cannot countenance such dilatory tactics. While it is perfectly fine for respondents to defend their cause with all the vigor and resources at their command, respondents may not be allowed to persist in presenting to the Court arguments which have already been pronounced by final judgment to be without merit and their motions for reconsideration of that judgment which have been denied.20 Litigations must end and terminate at some point. In the present cases, that point must be reckoned after the lapse of 15 days from the date of receipt by respondents' counsel of the 28 April 2009 Resolution denying the second motion for reconsideration or on 21 May 2009, as certified by the Deputy Clerk of Court and Chief of the Judicial Records Office. Whether respondents understood, or simply refuse to understand, the meaning of this statement, there is no other meaning than to consider G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499, and 178056 finally closed and terminated on 21 May 2009. Well-entrenched is the rule that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable,21 no longer subject to attack and cannot be modified directly or indirectly, and the court which rendered it, including this Court, had lost jurisdiction to modify it.22 The Court laid down this rule precisely "(1) to avoid delay in the administration of justice and thus procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of judicial business, and; (2) to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of occasional errors, which is why courts exist."23 As Justice Bersamin stated in Apo Fruits Corporation v. Court of Appeals:24 [T]he reason for the rule is that if, on the application of one party, the court could change its judgment to the prejudice of the other, it could thereafter, on application of the latter, again change the judgment and continue this practice indefinitely. The equity of a particular case must yield to the overmastering need of certainty and unalterability of judicial pronouncements. (Emphasis supplied) Hence, when the 18 November 2008 Decision became final on 21 May 2009, this Court can no longer entertain and consider further arguments or submissions from the parties respecting the correctness of the decision, and nothing more is left to be discussed, clarified or done in these cases.25

In fact, in recognition of the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision, the Commission on Elections issued Resolution No. 8670, while the Department of Budget and Management issued Local Budget Memorandum No. 61. COMELECs Resolution No. 8670 ordained that the voters in the 16 respondent municipalities shall vote not as cities, but as municipalities in the 10 May 2010 elections. On the other hand, the Department of Budget and Management's Local Budget Memorandum No. 61 set forth the Fiscal Year 2009 Final Internal Revenue Allotment Allocation of all the legally existing cities and municipalities in the whole country and the reversion of the 16 "newly-created cities" to municipalities. Moreover, House Bill No. 6303, introduced by Representatives Carmen L. Cari, Eduardo R. Gullas, Rodolfo G. Plaza, Philip A. Pichay, Thelma Z. Almario, Wilfrido Mark M. Enverga, Manuel S. Agyao, Sharee Ann T. Tan, Edelmiro A. Amante, Mujiv S. Hataman, Jocelyn Sy Limkaichong, Ferdinand R. Marcos, Teodulo M. Coquilla and Yevgeny Vincente B. Emano, sought to amend Republic Act No. 9009 by inserting the following paragraph: THE INCOME REQUIREMENT PRESCRIBED HEREIN SHALL NOT APPLY TO MUNICIPALITIES WHICH WERE SOUGHT TO BE CONVERTED INTO CITIES AS EMBODIED IN BILLS FILED BEFORE JUNE 30, 2001 AND WHOSE CHARTERS HAVE ALREADY BEEN APPROVED BY THE SENATE AND THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES. House Bill No. 6303, in proposing to amend Republic Act No. 9009 by exempting the 16 respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement under the Local Government Code, is undoubtedly an admission that the 18 November 2008 Decision had become final and the Cityhood Laws are indeed unconstitutional. House Bill No. 6303 is clearly but an "attempt to possibly rectify the conceded fatal defect in the Cityhood Laws." To repeat, the Court, by a majority vote, ruled that the 16 Cityhood Laws are unconstitutional in its 18 November 2008 Decision. The Court, by another majority vote, denied the first motion for reconsideration of the 18 November 2008 Decision. Then, the Court, by a split-vote, denied the second motion for reconsideration. Contrary to respondents' perception, there is nothing left unresolved by the Court. The 18 November 2008 Decision became final on 21 May 2009. As a consequence, it has become immutable and unalterable, no longer subject to attack and cannot be modified directly or indirectly by this Court, which had lost jurisdiction to alter it. V. Final Note Any ruling of this Court that a tie-vote on a motion for reconsideration reverses a prior majority vote on the main decision would wreak havoc on well-settled jurisprudence of this Court. Such an unprecedented ruling would resurrect contentious political issues long ago settled, such as the PIRMA initiative in Santiago and the people's initiative in Lambino. Countless other decisions of this Court would come back to haunt it, long after such decisions have become final and executory following the tie-votes on the motions for reconsideration which resulted in the denial of the motions. Such a ruling would destabilize not only this Court, but also the Executive and Legislative Branches of Government. Business transactions made pursuant to final decisions of this Court would also unravel for another round of litigation, dragging along innocent third parties who had relied on such prior final decisions of this Court. This Court cannot afford to unleash such a catastrophe on the nation. Accordingly, I vote to EXPUNGE from the records, for being prohibited pleadings, the (1) Motion to Amend the Resolution of April 28, 2009; (2) Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009; (3) Urgent Motion to Resolve Pending Incidents; and (4) Appeal to Honorable Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno and Associate Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura to Participate in the Resolution of Respondents Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution of June 2, 2009. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice

EN BANC

G.R. No. 176951

LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, - versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYBAY, PROVINCE OF LEYTE; MUNICIPALITY OF BOGO, PROVINCE OF CEBU; MUNICIPALITY OF CATBALOGAN, PROVINCE OF WESTERN SAMAR; MUNICIPALITY OF TANDAG, PROVINCE OF SURIGAO DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BORONGAN, PROVINCE OF EASTERN SAMAR; and MUNICIPALITY OF TAYABAS, PROVINCE OF QUEZON, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF

SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x G.R. No. 177499 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF CALBAYOG represented by MAYOR MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, and JERRY P. TREAS in his personal capacity as taxpayer, Petitioners, - versus COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; MUNICIPALITY OF LAMITAN, PROVINCE OF BASILAN; MUNICIPALITY OF TABUK, PROVINCE OF KALINGA; MUNICIPALITY OF BAYUGAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL SUR; MUNICIPALITY OF BATAC, PROVINCE OF ILOCOS NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF MATI, PROVINCE OF DAVAO ORIENTAL; and MUNICIPALITY OF GUIHULNGAN, PROVINCE OF NEGROS ORIENTAL, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention. x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - --x G.R. No. 178056 LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES (LCP) represented by LCP National President Present: JERRY P. TREAS, CITY OF ILOILO represented by CORONA, C.J., MAYOR JERRY P. TREAS, CARPIO, CITY OF CALBAYOG CARPIO MORALES, represented by MAYOR VELASCO, JR., MEL SENEN S. SARMIENTO, NACHURA, and JERRY P. TREAS in his LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, personal capacity as taxpayer, BRION, Petitioners, PERALTA, BERSAMIN, DEL CASTILLO, versus - ABAD, VILLARAMA, JR., PEREZ, MENDOZA, and COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS; SERENO, JJ. MUNICIPALITY OF CABADBARAN, PROVINCE OF AGUSAN DEL NORTE; MUNICIPALITY OF CARCAR, PROVINCE OF CEBU; and MUNICIPALITY OF EL SALVADOR, MISAMIS ORIENTAL, Respondents. CITY OF TARLAC, CITY OF SANTIAGO, CITY OF IRIGA, CITY OF LIGAO, CITY OF LEGAZPI, CITY OF TAGAYTAY, CITY OF SURIGAO, CITY OF BAYAWAN, CITY OF SILAY, CITY OF GENERAL SANTOS, CITY OF ZAMBOANGA, CITY OF GINGOOG, CITY OF CAUAYAN, CITY OF PAGADIAN, CITY OF SAN CARLOS, CITY OF SAN FERNANDO, CITY OF TACURONG, CITY OF TANGUB, CITY OF OROQUIETA, CITY OF URDANETA, CITY OF VICTORIAS, CITY OF CALAPAN, CITY OF HIMAMAYLAN, CITY OF BATANGAS, CITY OF BAIS, CITY OF CADIZ, and Promulgated: CITY OF TAGUM, Petitioners-In-Intervention. August 24, 2010 x--------------------------------------------------x RESOLUTION CARPIO, J.: For resolution are (1) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration and (2) motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009 filed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al. and (3) the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners-inintervention Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City, and Oroquieta City. On 18 November 2008, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a majority vote, struck down the subject 16 Cityhood Laws for violating Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution and the equal protection clause. On 31 March 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, again by a majority vote, denied the respondents first motion for reconsideration. On 28 April 2009, the Supreme Court En Banc, by a split vote, denied the respondents second motion for reconsideration. Accordingly, the 18 November 2008 Decision became final and executory and was recorded, in due course, in the Book of Entries of Judgments on 21 May 2009. However, after the finality of the 18 November 2008 Decision and without any exceptional and compelling reason, the Court En Banc unprecedentedly reversed the 18 November 2008 Decision by upholding the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in the Decision of 21 December 2009. Upon reexamination, the Court finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. A. Violation of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution Section 10, Article X of the 1987 Constitution provides: No province, city, municipality, or barangay shall be created, divided, merged, abolished or its boundary substantially altered, except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code and subject to approval by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the political units directly affected. (Emphasis supplied) The Constitution is clear. The creation of local government units must follow the criteria established in the Local Government Code and not in any other law. There is only one Local Government Code.1 The Constitution requires Congress to stipulate in the Local

Government Code all the criteria necessary for the creation of a city, including the conversion of a municipality into a city. Congress cannot write such criteria in any other law, like the Cityhood Laws. The clear intent of the Constitution is to insure that the creation of cities and other political units must follow the same uniform, nondiscriminatory criteria found solely in the Local Government Code. Any derogation or deviation from the criteria prescribed in the Local Government Code violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code to increase the income requirement from P20 million to P100 million for the creation of a city. This took effect on 30 June 2001. Hence, from that moment the Local Government Code required that any municipality desiring to become a city must satisfy the P100 million income requirement. Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009, does not contain any exemption from this income requirement. In enacting RA 9009, Congress did not grant any exemption to respondent municipalities, even though their cityhood bills were pending in Congress when Congress passed RA 9009. The Cityhood Laws, all enacted after the effectivity of RA 9009, explicitly exempt respondent municipalities from the increased income requirement in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Such exemption clearly violates Section 10, Article X of the Constitution and is thus patently unconstitutional. To be valid, such exemption must be written in the Local Government Code and not in any other law, including the Cityhood Laws. RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code. Section 1 of RA 9009 pertinently provides: "Section 450 of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991, is hereby amended to read as follows: x x x." RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. RA 9009, by amending Section 450 of the Local Government Code, embodies the new and prevailing Section 450 of the Local Government Code. Considering the Legislatures primary intent to curtail "the mad rush of municipalities wanting to be converted into cities," RA 9009 increased the income requirement for the creation of cities. To repeat, RA 9009 is not a law different from the Local Government Code, as it expressly amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code. The language of RA 9009 is plain, simple, and clear. Nothing is unintelligible or ambiguous; not a single word or phrase admits of two or more meanings. RA 9009 amended Section 450 of the Local Government Code of 1991 by increasing the income requirement for the creation of cities. There are no exemptions from this income requirement. Since the law is clear, plain and unambiguous that any municipality desiring to convert into a city must meet the increased income requirement, there is no reason to go beyond the letter of the law. Moreover, where the law does not make an exemption, the Court should not create one.2 B. Operative Fact Doctrine Under the operative fact doctrine, the law is recognized as unconstitutional but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In fact, the invocation of the operative fact doctrine is an admission that the law is unconstitutional. However, the minoritys novel theory, invoking the operative fact doctrine, is that the enactment of the Cityhood Laws and the functioning of the 16 municipalities as new cities with new sets of officials and employees operate to contitutionalize the unconstitutional Cityhood Laws. This novel theory misapplies the operative fact doctrine and sets a gravely dangerous precedent. Under the minoritys novel theory, an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality by the Court, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. This view will open the floodgates to the wanton enactment of unconstitutional laws and a mad rush for their immediate implementation before the Court can declare them unconstitutional. This view is an open invitation to serially violate the Constitution, and be quick about it, lest the violation be stopped by the Court. The operative fact doctrine is a rule of equity. As such, it must be applied as an exception to the general rule that an unconstitutional law produces no effects. It can never be invoked to validate as constitutional an unconstitutional act. In Planters Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation,3 the Court stated: The general rule is that an unconstitutional law is void. It produces no rights, imposes no duties and affords no protection. It has no legal effect. It is, in legal contemplation, inoperative as if it has not been passed. Being void, Fertiphil is not required to pay the levy. All levies paid should be refunded in accordance with the general civil code principle against unjust enrichment. The general rule is supported by Article 7 of the Civil Code, which provides: ART. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. When the courts declare a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void and the latter shall govern. The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional law by recognizing that the existence of a statute prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an operative fact and may have consequences which cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality will impose an undue burden on those who have relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a criminal case when a declaration of unconstitutionality would put the accused in double jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a municipality in reliance upon a law creating it. (Emphasis supplied) The operative fact doctrine never validates or constitutionalizes an unconstitutional law. Under the operative fact doctrine, the unconstitutional law remains unconstitutional, but the effects of the unconstitutional law, prior to its judicial declaration of nullity, may be left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play. In short, the operative fact doctrine affects or modifies only the effects of the unconstitutional law, not the unconstitutional law itself.

Thus, applying the operative fact doctrine to the present case, the Cityhood Laws remain unconstitutional because they violate Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. However, the effects of the implementation of the Cityhood Laws prior to the declaration of their nullity, such as the payment of salaries and supplies by the "new cities" or their issuance of licenses or execution of contracts, may be recognized as valid and effective. This does not mean that the Cityhood Laws are valid for they remain void. Only the effects of the implementation of these unconstitutional laws are left undisturbed as a matter of equity and fair play to innocent people who may have relied on the presumed validity of the Cityhood Laws prior to the Courts declaration of their unconstitutionality. C. Equal Protection Clause As the Court held in the 18 November 2008 Decision, there is no substantial distinction between municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress and municipalities that did not have pending bills. The mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not a material difference to distinguish one municipality from another for the purpose of the income requirement. The pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress does not affect or determine the level of income of a municipality. Municipalities with pending cityhood bills in the 11th Congress might even have lower annual income than municipalities that did not have pending cityhood bills. In short, the classification criterion mere pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress is not rationally related to the purpose of the law which is to prevent fiscally non-viable municipalities from converting into cities. Moreover, the fact of pendency of a cityhood bill in the 11th Congress limits the exemption to a specific condition existing at the time of passage of RA 9009. That specific condition will never happen again. This violates the requirement that a valid classification must not be limited to existing conditions only. In fact, the minority concedes that "the conditions (pendency of the cityhood bills) adverted to can no longer be repeated." Further, the exemption provision in the Cityhood Laws gives the 16 municipalities a unique advantage based on an arbitrary date the filing of their cityhood bills before the end of the 11th Congress as against all other municipalities that want to convert into cities after the effectivity of RA 9009. In addition, limiting the exemption only to the 16 municipalities violates the requirement that the classification must apply to all similarly situated. Municipalities with the same income as the 16 respondent municipalities cannot convert into cities, while the 16 respondent municipalities can. Clearly, as worded, the exemption provision found in the Cityhood Laws, even if it were written in Section 450 of the Local Government Code, would still be unconstitutional for violation of the equal protection clause. D. Tie-Vote on a Motion for Reconsideration Section 7, Rule 56 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 7. Procedure if opinion is equally divided. Where the court en banc is equally divided in opinion, or the necessary majority cannot be had, the case shall again be deliberated on, and if after such deliberation no decision is reached, the original action commenced in the court shall be dismissed; in appealed cases, the judgment or order appealed from shall stand affirmed; and on all incidental matters, the petition or motion shall be denied. (Emphasis supplied) The En Banc Resolution of 26 January 1999 in A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC, reads: A MOTION FOR THE CONSIDERATION OF A DECISION OR RESOLUTION OF THE COURT EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION MAY BE GRANTED UPON A VOTE OF A MAJORITY OF THE MEMBERS OF THE EN BANC OR OF A DIVISION, AS THE CASE MAY BE, WHO ACTUALLY TOOK PART IN THE DELIBERATION OF THE MOTION. IF THE VOTING RESULTS IN A TIE, THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS DEEMED DENIED. (Emphasis supplied) The clear and simple language of the clarificatory en banc Resolution requires no further explanation. If the voting of the Court en banc results in a tie, the motion for reconsideration is deemed denied. The Courts prior majority action on the main decision stands affirmed. 4 This clarificatory Resolution applies to all cases heard by the Court en banc, which includes not only cases involving the constitutionality of a law, but also, as expressly stated in Section 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, "all other cases which under the Rules of Court are required to be heard en banc." The 6-6 tie-vote by the Court en banc on the second motion for reconsideration necessarily resulted in the denial of the second motion for reconsideration. Since the Court was evenly divided, there could be no reversal of the 18 November 2008 Decision, for a tie-vote cannot result in any court order or directive.5 The judgment stands in full force.6 Undeniably, the 6-6 tie-vote did not overrule the prior majority en banc Decision of 18 November 2008, as well as the prior majority en banc Resolution of 31 March 2009 denying reconsideration. The tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration is not the same as a tie-vote on the main decision where there is no prior decision. Here, the tie-vote plainly signifies that there is no majority to overturn the prior 18 November 2008 Decision and 31 March 2009 Resolution, and thus the second motion for reconsideration must be denied. Further, the tie-vote on the second motion for reconsideration did not mean that the present cases were left undecided because there remain the Decision of 18 November 2008 and the Resolution of 31 March 2009 where a majority of the Court en banc concurred in declaring the unconstitutionality of the sixteen Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision and the 31 March 2009 Resolution, which were both reached with the concurrence of a majority of the Court en banc, are not reconsidered but stand affirmed. 7 These prior majority actions of the Court en banc can only be overruled by a new majority vote, not a tie-vote because a tie-vote cannot overrule a prior affirmative action. The denial, by a split vote, of the second motion for reconsideration inevitably rendered the 18 November 2008 Decision final. In fact, in its Resolution of 28 April 2009, denying the second motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc reiterated that no further pleadings shall be entertained and stated that entry of judgment be made in due course.

The dissenting opinion stated that "a deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value."8 Indeed, a tie-vote is a non-majority a non-majority which cannot overrule a prior affirmative action, that is the 18 November 2008 Decision striking down the Cityhood Laws. In short, the 18 November 2008 Decision stands affirmed. And assuming a non-majority lacks any precedential value, the 18 November 2008 Decision, which was unreversed as a result of the tie-vote on the respondents second motion for reconsideration, nevertheless remains binding on the parties.9 Conclusion Section 10, Article X of the Constitution expressly provides that "no x x x city shall be created x x x except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." This provision can only be interpreted in one way, that is, all the criteria for the creation of cities must be embodied exclusively in the Local Government Code. In this case, the Cityhood Laws, which are unmistakably laws other than the Local Government Code, provided an exemption from the increased income requirement for the creation of cities under Section 450 of the Local Government Code, as amended by RA 9009. Clearly, the Cityhood Laws contravene the letter and intent of Section 10, Article X of the Constitution. Adhering to the explicit prohibition in Section 10, Article X of the Constitution does not cripple Congress power to make laws. In fact, Congress is not prohibited from amending the Local Government Code itself, as what Congress did by enacting RA 9009. Indisputably, the act of amending laws comprises an integral part of the Legislatures law-making power. The unconstitutionality of the Cityhood Laws lies in the fact that Congress provided an exemption contrary to the express language of the Constitution that "[n]o x x x city x x x shall be created except in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code." In other words, Congress exceeded and abused its law-making power, rendering the challenged Cityhood Laws void for being violative of the Constitution. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the motions for reconsideration of the 21 December 2009 Decision and REINSTATE the 18 November 2008 Decision declaring UNCONSTITUTIONAL the Cityhood Laws, namely: Republic Act Nos. 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. We NOTE petitioners motion to annul the Decision of 21 December 2009. ANTONIO T. CARPIO Associate Justice Promulgated: August 24, 2010 x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x DISSENTINGOPINION VELASCO, JR., J.: As may be recalled, the Court, by Decision1 dated November 18, 2008, declared as unconstitutional the sixteen (16) cityhood laws, namely Republic Act Nos. (RA) 9389, 9390, 9391, 9392, 9393, 9394, 9398, 9404, 9405, 9407, 9408, 9409, 9434, 9435, 9436, and 9491. By Decision of December 21, 2009, however, the Court declared as valid and constitutional the same Cityhood Laws, reversing, in the process, the November 18, 2008 Decision and setting aside three of its subsequent incidental orders issued after November 18, 2008.2 In this recourse, main petitioners pray, without prejudice to the resolution of their motion to annul the December 21, 2009 Decision, that the Court reconsider the same decision and declare the aforementioned 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. As in their underlying petition for prohibition, they latched their case primarily on two grounds: First, the Cityhood Laws sought to create cities which do not meet one of the criteria, or, to be precise, the verifiable income norm stipulated in Section 450 of the Local Government Code (LGC) of 1991, as amended by RA 9009.3 Second, the said Cityhood Laws, by granting a different treatment to respondent local government units (LGUs), via an exemption from the standard PhP 100 million floor income requirement set under RA 9009, infringe the equal protection clause of the Constitution. As argued, the circumstance that the Cityhood Laws in question were filed and deliberated upon in the 11th and/or 12th Congress, or before the enactment of RA 9009 during the 12th Congress, does not constitute a substantive distinction exacted under the equal protection guarantee that would warrant a preferential treatment of respondent LGUs. In their motion to annul, petitioner League of Cities of the Philippines (LCP), et al. would urge the Court to declare as void its December 21, 2009 Decision on the argument that it had no jurisdiction to issue the same, the earlier November 18, 2008 decision being now immutable, having in the meanwhile become final and executory, as in fact an entry of judgment has been made thereon. For their part, intervening petitioners, in their separate, but similarly worded Manifestation with Supplemental Ad Cautelam Motion for Reconsideration, adopted in toto the arguments raised in main petitioners motion to annul and in the latters ad cautelam motion for consideration. All expressed dismay over the consequent reduction of their share in the internal revenue allotment (IRA), since more cities will partake of the internal revenue set aside for all cities under Sec. 285 of the LGC of 1991.4 In a bid to have the December 21, 2009 Decision declared as a nullity, petitioners argue, as a preliminary consideration, that the Court no longer has jurisdiction to modify, reconsider or set aside a final and executory, ergo unalterable judgment, like the November 18, 2008 Decision. The majority finds the motions for reconsideration meritorious and accordingly reinstates the Courts November 18, 2008 Decision declaring the 16 Cityhood Laws unconstitutional. I regret my inability to join the majority. Contrary to the majoritys posture, the subject November 18, 2008 Decision never really became final and executory, albeit it has been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgments on May 21, 2009. It is settled that the doctrine of immutability of judgments necessarily applies only to final and executory decisions. Before such finality, a court has plenary power to alter, modify or altogether set aside its own decision. In fact, the power of the Court to suspend or even disregard rules of procedure can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that it itself has already declared the judgment to be final.5 This critical issue of finalityinclusive of the application of Sec. 7,

Rule 56 of the Rules of Court6 and A.M. No. 99-1-09-SC7 on deadlock voting, read in conjunction with the constitutional voting requirement needed for a declaration of unconstitutionality of laws8has been discussed in some detail in the December 21, 2009 Decision. I need not delve at length on the same issue again. Suffice it to hark back on some highlights of that disposition: Before the December 21, 2009 Decision, the inconclusive 6-6 tie vote reflected in the April 28, 2009 Resolution9 of the Courtresolving the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decisionwas the last vote on the issue of the validity or invalidity of cityhood laws.10 Significantly, while the April 28, 2009 Resolution denied, for being a "prohibited pleading," the second motion for reconsideration covered thereby, for which reason an entry of judgment for the November 18, 2008 Decision was ordered made, the Court, in its Resolution of June 2, 2009,11 reconsidered the April 28, 2009 Resolution.12 In net effect, the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 Decision was no longer considered a prohibitive pleading. Several motions and pleadings followed. In all, then, the issuance of the entry of judgment for the November 18, 2008 Decision was precipitate not only because several incidents were pending before the Court when the entry was made on May 21, 2009, but in view of the 6-6 tie vote on the second motion for reconsideration of the November 18, 2008 ruling. That voting result obviously does not reflect the "[decision] x x x of a majority of the Members of the [Court en banc] who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues of the case and voted thereon," contemplated in Sec. 4 (2), Art. VIII of the Constitution.13 A deadlocked vote of six is not a majority and a non-majority does not constitute a rule with precedential value.14 For sure, the issuance of an entry of judgment, by itself, does not, as the majority suggests, bar the Court, under any and all instances, from considering further submissions and from altering, if it must to avoid grave injustice, a decision covered thereby. For, the recall of entries of judgment for the purpose of reevaluating a case, albeit rare, is hardly a novelty. The Court has in the past bent backwards and recalled entries of judgment in the interest of justice. 15 For it is in relaxing the rules that the Court oftentimes serves the ends of justice and equity based on substantial and meritorious grounds. Albeit not touched upon in the Resolution subject of this Dissent, petitioners have brought up the question of the appropriateness of the participation of certain members of the Court, particularly with respect to the Decision subject of the motion to annul. This Dissent will endeavor to address and perchance write finis to this issue. To petitioners, the votes cast by Justices Diosdado M. Peralta, Lucas P. Bersamin, Roberto A. Abad and Martin S. Villarama, Jr., for or against the December 21, 2009 Decision, should be excluded. For as argued, under Sec. 4(2), Article VIII of the Constitution, all cases involving the constitutionality of law shall be heard by the Court en banc and "shall be decided with the concurrence of a majority of the Members who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues in the case and voted thereon." Following what to the Court is petitioners thesis, applying the aforecited Section 4(2), those who may participate and vote on the December 21, 2009 Decision shall be limited to those who actually took part in the deliberations on the issues on the case and voted thereon,16 the reference being to the members of the Court who actually took part in the November 18, 2008 Decision and voted thereon.17 And the four (4) aforementioned members of the Court did not participate in the deliberations of the issues leading to the issuance of the November 18, 2008 Decision simply because they were not yet members of the Court.18 Petitioners above posture is flawed by the logic and premises holding it together. For, it assumes that the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws and the arguments for and against the proposition were not put in issue, discussed, resolved and voted upon in the December 21, 2009 Decision. The sheer absurdity of this assumption needs no belaboring. But the bottom line is that said decision, for reasons articulated therein, expressly declared the Cityhood Laws to be valid and constitutional. As a matter of record,19 eleven (11) members of the Court actually took part in the deliberation on the issues presented in G.R. Nos. 176951, 177499 and 178056 and voted on the November 18, 2008 Decision.20 Three (3) members took no part,21 while one (1) was on official leave.22 As of December 21, 2009, only six (6)23 of the original eleven (11) participating and voting members remained with the Court, the five (5) others24 having meanwhile retired. If the participants in the December 21, 2009 Decision were to be limited to the members of the Court who actually took part in the deliberations of the November 18, 2008 Decision, as petitioners in all seriousness now contend, then only the six (6) members referred to above could have had validly participated and voted on the Decision of December 21, 2009. That would not even constitute a quorum of the en banc Court, as aptly pointed out by respondents.25 And for sure, the same six (6) members could not even pass upon the main and intervening petitioners motion for reconsideration, if their position were to be pursued to its logical conclusion. Now to the substantive merits of the case. The majority would insist that a city, as prescribed by Art. X, Sec. 1026 of the Constitution, may be created only in accordance with the criteria established in the LGC. In specific terms, this means that any cityhood law must meet all criteria, such as the income criterion, presently set forth in Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991, as amended by RA 9009. Congress cannot, so the majority claims, write such criteria in any other law.27 I disagree. If only to emphasize the point, the word "code" in the cited constitutional provision refers to a law Congress enacts in line with its plenary power to create local political subdivisions. As was said in the December 21, 2009 Decisionbut without going presently into the qualificatory details therein spelled outthe only conceivable reason why the Constitution employs the clause "in accordance with the criteria established in the local government code" is to lay stress that it is Congress alone, and no other, which can define, prescribe and impose the criteria. The imposition may be effected either in a consolidated set of laws or a single-subject enactment, like RA 9009. And provided the imperatives of the equal protection clause are not transgressed, an exemption from the imposition may be allowed, just like the cityhood laws each of which contained the following provision: "Exemption from [RA] No. 9009. The City of x x x shall be exempted from the income requirement prescribed under Republic Act No. 9009." I find it rather startling, therefore, that the majority opinion, without so much as taking stock of the legislative history of the 16 Cityhood Laws in relation to RA 9009, at least to determine the intent of the law, would conclude that Congress "exceeded and abused its law-making power"28 when it enacted the said cityhood laws as an exception to RA 9009. It cannot be emphasized enough that if Congress has the plenary power to create political units, it surely can exercise the lesser power of requiring a menu of criteria and standards for their creation. As it is, the amendatory RA 9009 increasing the codified income requirement from Php 20 million to Php 100 million is really no different from the enactment of any of the Cityhood Law exempting the unit covered thereby from the codified standards. The majoritys contentionthat the exemption from the income requirement accorded by the Cityhood Laws to respondent cities is unconstitutional, being violative of the equal protection clausedoes not commend itself for concurrence. As articulated in the December 21, 2009 Decision, the equal protection clause is not violated by an enactment based on reasonable classification, the reasonableness factor being met when the classification: (1) rests on substantial distinctions; (2) is germane to the purpose of the law; (3)

is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) applies equally to all members of the same class.29 As then amply explained in the said Decision, all these requisites have been met by the laws assailed in this proceeding as arbitrary and discriminatory under the equal protection clause. And I presently reiterate my submission that the exemption of respondent LGUs from the PhP 100 million income requirement was meant to reduce the inequality brought about by the passage of the amendatory RA 9009, which, from the records, appears to have been enacted after the affected LGUs, with pending cityhood bills, had qualified under the original PhP 20 million income norm. It is maintained that the distinguishing characteristic setting respondent cities apart from other LGUs desirous to be cities, i.e., mere pendency of the cityhood bills in the 11th Congress, would not avail respondent cities any. The differential treatment of respondent LGUs based on that characteristic does not, per the majority, constitute a valid classification because the classification applies only to the conditions prevailing during the 11th Congress, a phenomenon that will not happen again. It may readily be conceded that the conditions adverted to can no longer be repeated. But the scenario thus depicted by the majority would not render the legislative classification unconstitutionally arbitrary. As long as the classifying law is not limited in its application to conditions prevailing as of the time of its enactment, but is intended to apply for all times as long as the contemplated conditions exist, then there is no sufficient ground for invalidation. This is what Congress precisely did, as it in fact applied the classification for as long as the conditions were obtaining. These conditions to repeat are: the corresponding cityhood bill has been filed before the effectivity of RA 9009 and the concerned municipality qualifies for cityhood status under the original version of the 1991 LGC. The allegation that Congress made, under the premises, an unreasonable classification in favor of a few privileged LGUs cannot be accepted. As respondents aptly observed, the classification was enforced, not on a single instance, but on sixteen (16) instances which spanned several months involving erstwhile municipalities spread across the archipelago, from the municipality of Batac in the North to the municipality of Lamitan, Basilan in Southern Mindanao. The ensuing excerpts from the December 21, 2009 Decision aptly capture the situation on the ground and should address the majoritys equal protection of the law concern: Lastly and in connection with the third requisite, the uniform exemption clause would apply to municipalities that had pending cityhood bills before the passage of R.A. No. 9009 and were compliant with the then Sec. 450 of the LGC of 1991 that prescribed an income requirement of P20 Million. It is hard to imagine, however, if there are still municipalities out there belonging in context to the same class as the sixteen (16) respondent LGUs. Municipalities which cannot claim as belonging to the same class as the sixteen cannot seek refuge in the cityhood laws. As to them, they have to comply with the P100 Million income requirement imposed by R.A. 9009. The issue voiced by the intervening movant-petitioners about the eventual reduction of their IRA share resulting from the creation of the sixteen (16) respondent cities is a matter worth looking into, but not by the Court, absent proof that the cityhood laws created an arbitrary classification. Under our system of government, it is Congress that for the most part is possessed with authority to balance clashing interests of different local political subdivisions and thereafter draw the line and set policy directions and choices responsive to their fiscal demands and needs. And to borrow from Quinto v. Comelec, "the constitutionality of the law must be sustained even if the reasonableness of the classification is fairly debatable. As long as the bounds of reasonable choice are not exceeded, courts must defer to the legislative judgment."30 This is as it should be for courts ought not to be delving into the wisdom of the congressional classification, if reasonable, or the motivation underpinning the classification.31 Yet, wittingly or unwittingly, this seems to be what the majority opinion intends to accomplish in this case. This should not be allowed. The majority resolution has made much of the invocation in the December 21, 2009 of the operative fact doctrine, stating the observation that the minority has adopted a theory that an unconstitutional law, if already implemented prior to its declaration, can no longer be revoked and its implementation must be continued despite being unconstitutional. In context, the assailed invocation was no more than a recognition that the creation of cities, or at least some of them, pursuant to the Cityhood Laws, has been approved by a majority of the votes cast in the plebiscite in the units affected. And as a result of such approval, official transactions with long term implementability may have been entered into which cannot be easily undone without legal and financial complications. Thus, the advisability on practical consideration, on top of strictly legal grounds consideration, of positing the constitutionality of the Cityhood Laws in question. What the majority deems as a minority did not say that a law otherwise invalid, cannot be invalidated by operation of the operative fact doctrine. Accordingly, I vote to deny the ad cautelam motion for consideration and the motion to annul the Decision of the Court dated December 21, 2009 interposed by petitioners League of Cities of the Philippines, et al., and the ad cautelam motion for reconsideration of the same decision separately filed by the intervening-petitioners Batangas City, Santiago City, Legazpi City, Iriga City, Cadiz City and Oroquieta City.

rio vs. COMELEC G.R. No. 105120 FACTS: Grio and his LDP political party filed a certiorari case against COMELEC in relation to the May 11, 1992 election. Grio is a candidate for Governor of Iloilo where the sub-province of Guimaras is located. LGC of 1991 took effect requiring the conversion of existing sub-provinces into regular provinces, and Guimaras is one such sub-provinces, upon approval by majority of votes cast in a plebiscite. The plebiscite favored the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province but petitioner questioned the COMELEC that ballots should have contained spaces to allow voting for Gov, Vice Gov and members of the Sanggunian of Iloilo. September 2, 1992

ISSUE: Whether or not there was a complete failure of election in Guimaras. HELD: The court held that COMELEC was under mistaken presumption that under the LGC of 1991, whether or not the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province is ratified by the people in plebiscite, the President will appoint provincial officials. However, the voters favored for the conversion of Guimaras into a regular province so there was need to undo what COMELEC has done in plebiscite. There ballots in Guimaras should have contained spaces for Gov and Vice Gov. etc. but SC has now considered the case moot and academic since majority voted in the affirmative for the conversion of Guimaras. THIRD DIVISION [G.R. No. 147767. January 14, 2004] MANUEL E. ZAMORA, petitioner, vs. GOVERNOR JOSE R. CABALLERO, ANESIO M. RANARIO, in his capacity as Provincial Administrator, MARIANO KINTANAR, in his capacity as Provincial Auditor, CARMEN R. RASUL, in his capacity as Provincial Treasurer, ROLANDO L. OSORIO, BELINDA G. APAWAN, ARMANDO L. SERAS, RUWEL PETER S. GONZAGA, ARMANDO C. CODILLA, RAUL B. BASAES, GRACIANO C. ARAFOL, JR., respondents. DECISION CARPIO-MORALES, J.: Petitioner Manuel Zamora, a member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley (the Sanggunian), seeks to invalidate all acts executed and resolutions issued by the Sanggunian during its sessions held on February 8 and 26, 2001 for lack of quorum. It appears that on February 6, 2001, Vice-Governor Reynaldo Navarro sent a written notice of a special session on February 7, 2001. [1] Upon the request of Governor Jose R. Caballero, however, the scheduled special session was reset to February 8, 2001 without the benefit of a written notice.
1

[2]

On February 8, 2001, the Sanggunian thus held a special session to, among other things, allow the Governor to deliver his State of the Province Address. As only seven members of the fourteenmember Sanggunian were present, [3] no resolution was considered.
3

On February 26, 2001, the Sanggunian held its 4th regular session during which it issued Resolution No. 05 [4] declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and Resolution No. 07 [5] authorizing the Governor to, on behalf of the province, enter into a construction contract (Contract) with Allado Construction Company, Inc. (the Allado Company) for the completion of Phase II of the construction of the capitol building. During the same session, the Sanggunian accepted the letter of irrevocable resignation submitted by Board Member Gemma Theresa M. Sotto. [6]
4 5 6

1 2 3 4 5 6

While only eight members of the Sanggunian were present at the commencement of the session on February 26, 2001, the Journal of the Proceedings (Journal) and Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 showed that a total of thirteen members attended it. [7]
7

Petitioner thus filed a petition [8] before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley against the Governor, et al., challenging the validity of the acts of the Sanggunian on February 26, 2001, alleging that while the Journal and Resolutions indicated the presence of 13 members, the Sanggunian nonetheless conducted official business without a quorum [9] as only seven of its fourteen members were actually present when the irrevocable letter of resignation of Board Member Sotto was noted, [10] and the motions to declare the entire province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity [11] and to authorize the Governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado Company [12] were approved. [13]
8 9 10 11 12 13

Petitioner additionally alleged that when the vote respecting Resolution No. 05 was taken, only the remaining six members voted for the adoption thereof, the then presiding officer Board Member Rolando Osorio not having cast his vote; [14] that when Resolution No. 07 was taken up, however, then presiding officer Osorio, [15] relinquished his seat to Board Member Graciano Arafol after the six members present unanimously voted on the said resolution in the affirmative, following which Osorio cast his vote as a member also in the affirmative, thereby authorizing the Governor to enter into the Contract with Allado Company; and that Board Member Arafol thereafter relinquished his seat as presiding officer to Board Member Osorio who once again assumed the duties of a presiding officer. [16]
14 15 16

Petitioner furthermore challenged the validity of the special session of February 8, 2001 for lack of quorum, there being only seven members of the Sanggunian in attendance, and for lack of written notice sent to all members at least 24 hours before the holding of the special session in accordance with Section 52 (d) [17] of the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC). [18]
17 18

Respondents, on the other hand, contended that since Board Member Sotto was in the United States [19] at the time the questioned acts were executed and resolutions adopted, the actual number of Board Members then in the country was thirteen which should be the basis of the determination of a quorum.
19

Branch 3 of the RTC of Nabunturan, at Compostela Valley, by Order dismissed the petition upon the following ratiocination:
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20

20

[20]

of April 24, 2001,

. . . Gemma Theresa M. Sotto should not be counted as member for the purpose of determining the number to constitute a quorum because she is in the United States of America. However, subparagraph (b) [of section 53 of the Local Government Code] states and provides for compulsion of any member absent without any justifiable cause. This is interpreted by the Supreme Court in the case of Jose Avelino, petitioner vs. Mariano J. Cuenco, respondent, G.R. No. L-2821, March 4, 1949. Gemma Theresa M. Sotto is beyond the reach of the legal processes of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and could not be arrested to compel her to attend its session. Quorum should be determined on the basis of the actual number of members of the body concerned rather than upon its full membership which is fourteen (14). Therefore, in this case, with seven (7) members of the thirteen (13) members present in constitutive of a quorum. x x x Moreover, Presidential Decree 1818 [21] prohibits the issuance of a restraining order or injunction in any case involving government infrastructure projects. [22] (Emphases omitted)
21 22

Hence, the present petition for Certiorari under Rule 45, faulting the trial court for erroneously (1) applying the case of Avelino v. Cuenco [23] to a controversy involving a local government unit; (2) taking judicial notice of Board Member Sottos being in the United States without proof thereof; and (3) ruling that to grant a Temporary Restraining Order would be in violation of P.D. 1818. [24]
23 24

Respondents question the authority of the Court to look beyond the Journal and Resolutions of the Sanggunian [25] and assert that the construction of the capitol building [26] cannot be enjoined. And they too assert that the presence of thirteen members at the February 26, 2001 session should be conclusive on the strength of Arroyo v. De Venecia [27] and U.S. v. Pons. [28] Citation of these cases is misplaced, however.
25 26 27 28

In Arroyo v. De Venecia, this Court refused to inquire into allegations that the House of Representatives failed to comply with the rules of procedures which the House itself promulgated absent any showing that there was a violation of a constitutional provision or of the rights of private individuals. In U.S. v. Pons, this Court did not go beyond the legislative journals which it found clear and explicit, it holding that to disprove the entries in the journals, evidence must be adduced based merely upon the memory or recollection of witnesses in contrast to journals which are the acts of the Government or sovereign itself. [29]
29

In the instant case, this Court is not called upon to inquire into the Sanggunians compliance with its own rules. Rather, it is called upon to determine whether the Sanggunian complied with the LGC, a law enacted by Congress, and its Implementing Rules. Moreover, the Journal of the Sanggunian is far from clear and explicit as to the presence of a quorum when the questioned acts were taken. It does not indicate how many members were
21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29

actually present when the body voted on the motions leading to the adoption of Resolution Nos. 05 and 07. While the Journal and the Resolutions show that 13 members attended the session, [30] the Journal shows that only six members were called by the presiding officer to vote on the motions. [31] Six members whose names appear in attendance, namely: Vice Governor Navarro and Board Members Zamora, Yanong, Castillo, Andres and Gentugaya, were not called and, save for the absent Vice Governor, [32] no explanation was given therefor.
30 31 32

Coincidentally, in Resolutions 05 and 07, the names of the Board Members who were not called upon to vote, including petitioner as he had in the meantime left, are followed by two asterisks (**). Additionally, it was clearly noted by petitioner, when he asked permission to leave the session, that only seven members were left: SP Member ZAMORA SP Member ARAFOL : Mr. President, I move to adjourn, Mr. President. : Objection Mr. President.

SP Member ZAMORA : Mr. President, before the objection, before objection Mr. President, I would like to invite everybody to go at my service I have a patient nga gi-pagawas na sa hospital nga i-uli na sa Awao, its been there for one hour so I really have to go I have to carry that patient to Awao Mr. President. SP Member OSORIO SP Member ZAMORA SP Member ARAFOL : You are excused Honorable : Okay, then remember that youre only seven Mr. President. : No problem.

SP Member ZAMORA : Okay so its alright for you to decide. The seven of you. I would like to manifest in the record that before further discussion that SP Member GONZAGA : Mr. President he is already excused Mr. President.

SP Member ZAMORA : Yes but I would like to make statement first for the record, for the record. That I do not want Mr. President that the incident of the of the State of the Province Address will be repeated Mr. President, wherein there are only seven members present and the quorum was declared Mr. President. x x x SP Member GONZAGA : Thats only your opinion . . .
33

[33]

(Underscoring supplied)

Respondents themselves admit that there were only seven members present when the motions were voted upon: 26. Nevertheless, even if that remark constituted a proper question on quorum, it is a matter of fact that there were still seven (7) members present. x x x [T]here is a quorum since seven is a majority of thirteen (13). x x x [34] (Emphasis supplied.)
34

Clearly, this Court is constrained to look into the proceedings of the Sanggunian as recorded in the Journal and not just rely on Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 to determine who and how many participated in the consideration thereof. The placing of the asterisks after the names of five
30 31 32 33 34

members in the Resolutions is highly irregular and suspicious especially since both resolutions indicate that petitioner, whose name is also followed by asterisks, was present even if it is clear from the Journal that he had already left the session before the Sanggunian took note of the resignation of Board Member Sotto and voted on the motions. Respondents other contention that the construction of the capitol building cannot be enjoined in light of Malaga v. Penachos, Jr. [35] fails to convince. In Malaga, this Court declared that although Presidential Decree No. 1818 prohibits any court from issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, the prohibition extends only to the issuance of injunctions or restraining orders against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of discretion in technical cases. On issues clearly outside this dimension and involving questions of law, this Court declared that courts could not be prevented from exercising their power to restrain or prohibit administrative acts. [36]
35 36

Respondents maintain that the exception in Malaga as indicated above should not be applied in the instant case because there was therein a defect in the compliance with procedural rules on bidding. In contrast, respondents stress, the bidding for the construction of the capitol building in which the winner was the Allado Company was not defective, they adding that Resolution 07 simply authorized the Governor to formalize the Contract necessary for the full implementation of the project. [37]
37

This Court fails to see the essential difference between Malaga and the instant case. In both cases, the defect in the Contract relates to the non-compliance with the mandate of a law respecting requirements before validly entering into a contract. In Malaga, the defect pertained to bidding. In the present case, the alleged defect pertains to the required number of votes necessary to authorize the Governor to enter into a construction contract. Clearly then, what is at issue in this case is not the propriety or the wisdom of entering into the Contract for the construction of the capitol building, which is beyond the power of this Court to enjoin, but the Sanggunians compliance with the requirements prescribed under the LGC before it may grant the Governor authority to enter into the Contract, which issue falls under the exception to the proscription against injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects, as held in Malaga. On the applicability of Avelino [38] to the present case: The issue in said case was whether there was a quorum in a meeting attended by only 12 of 24 senators, one having been in the hospital while another was out of the country. This Court held that although the total membership of the Senate was 24, the presence of 12 members already constituted a quorum since the 24th member was outside the country and beyond the coercive power of the Senate. [39]
38 39

In the instant case, there is nothing on record, save for respondents allegation, to show that Board Member Sotto was out of the country and to thereby conclude that she was outside the coercive power of the Sanggunian when the February 8 and 26, 2001 sessions were held. In fact it is undisputed that the leave form filed by said Board Member before the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) did not mention that she was going out of the country. [40] Petitioners contention that the trial court cannot take judicial notice of Board Member Sottos whereabouts is thus well taken. On this score, the instant case is outside the application of the doctrine in Avelino.
40

35 36 37 38 39 40

A court may take judicial notice of matters of public knowledge, or those which are capable of unquestionable determination or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial functions. [41] With respect to disputed facts, however, the court must receive evidence thereof, with notice to the parties. [42]
41 42

Also, in Avelino, the legislative body involved was the Senate and the applicable rule on quorum was that embodied in Article VI, Section 10 of the 1935 Constitution which reads: Section 10. (2) xxx A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such manner and under such penalties as such House may provide. [43] (Emphasis supplied)
43

The present case, however, involves a local legislative body, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley Province, and the applicable rule respecting quorum is found in Section 53(a) of the LGC which provides: Section 53. Quorum.(a) A majority of all members of the sanggunian who have been elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum to transact official business. Should a question of quorum be raised during a session, the presiding officer shall immediately proceed to call the roll of the members and thereafter announce the results. (Emphasis supplied) Quorum is defined as that number of members of a body which, when legally assembled in their proper places, will enable the body to transact its proper business or that number which makes a lawful body and gives it power to pass upon a law or ordinance or do any valid act. [44] Majority, when required to constitute a quorum, means the number greater than half or more than half of any total. [45] In fine, the entire membership must be taken into account in computing the quorum of the sangguniang panlalawigan, for while the constitution merely states that majority of each House shall constitute a quorum, Section 53 of the LGC is more exacting as it requires that the majority of all members of the sanggunian . . . elected and qualified shall constitute a quorum.
44 45

The difference in the wordings of the Constitution and the LGC is not merely a matter of style and writing as respondents would argue, but is actually a matter of meaning and intention. [46] The qualification in the LGC that the majority be based on those elected and qualified was meant to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed. [47] And, while the intent of the legislature in qualifying the quorum requirement was to allow sanggunians to function even when not all members thereof have been proclaimed and have assumed office, the provision necessarily applies when, after all the members of the sanggunian have assumed office, one or some of its members file for leave. What should be important then is the concurrence of election to and qualification for the office. And election to, and qualification as member of, a local legislative body are not altered by the simple expedient of filing a leave of absence.
46 47

41 42 43 44 45 46 47

The trial court should thus have based its determination of the existence of a quorum on the total number of members of the Sanggunian without regard to the filing of a leave of absence by Board Member Sotto. The fear that a majority may, for reasons of political affiliation, file leaves of absence in order to cripple the functioning of the sanggunian is already addressed by the grant of coercive power to a mere majority of sanggunian members present when there is no quorum. [48]
48

A sanggunian is a collegial body. Legislation, which is the principal function and duty of the sanggunian, requires the participation of all its members so that they may not only represent the interests of their respective constituents but also help in the making of decisions by voting upon every question put upon the body. The acts of only a part of the Sanggunian done outside the parameters of the legal provisions aforementioned are legally infirm, highly questionable and are, more importantly, null and void. And all such acts cannot be given binding force and effect for they are considered unofficial acts done during an unauthorized session. Board Member Sotto is then deemed not resigned because there was no quorum when her letter of irrevocable resignation was noted by the Sanggunian. For the same reason, Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 are of no legal effect. Even assuming arguendo that there were indeed thirteen members present during the questioned February 26, 2001 session, Resolution No. 05 declaring the entire province of Compostela Valley under state of calamity is still null and void because the motion for its approval was approved by only six members. [49] When there are thirteen members present at a session, the vote of only six members can not, at any instance, be deemed to be in compliance with Section 107(g) [50] of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the LGC which requires the concurrence of the approval by the majority of the members present and the existence of a quorum in order to validly enact a resolution.
49 50

The motion to grant the Governor authority to enter into the construction contract is also deemed not approved in accordance with the law even if it received seven affirmative votes, which is already the majority of thirteen, due to the defect in the seventh vote. For as priorly stated, as the Journal confirms, after all six members voted in the affirmative, Board Member Osorio, as acting presiding officer, relinquished his seat to Board Member Arafol and thereafter cast his vote as a member in favor of granting authority to the Governor. [51]
51

This Court is faced with an act clearly intended to circumvent an express prohibition under the law a situation that will not be condoned. [52] The LGC clearly limits the power of presiding officers to vote only in case of a tie, to wit:
52

Section 49. Presiding Officer. (a) The vice-governor shall be the presiding officer of the sangguniang panlalawigan x x x. The presiding officer shall vote only to break a tie. (b) In the event of inability of the regular presiding officer to preside at a sanggunian session, the members present and constituting a quorum shall elect from among themselves a temporary presiding officer. x x x (Italics in the original. Emphasis supplied.) While acting as presiding officer, Board Member Osorio may not, at the same time, be allowed to exercise the rights of a regular board member including that of voting even when there is no tie to break. A temporary presiding officer who merely steps into the shoes of the presiding officer could not have greater power than that possessed by the latter [53] who can vote only in case of a tie.
53

48 49 50 51 52 53

Lastly, for a resolution authorizing the governor to enter into a construction contract to be valid, the vote of the majority of all members of the Sanggunian, and not only of those present during the session, is required in accordance with Section 468 [54] of the LGC in relation to Article 107 [55] of its Implementing Rules.
54 55

Even including the vote of Board Member Osorio, who was then the Acting Presiding Officer, Resolution No. 07 is still invalid. Applying Section 468 of the LGC and Article 107 of its Implementing Rules, there being fourteen members in the Sanggunian, the approval of eight members is required to authorize the governor to enter into the Contract with the Allado Company since it involves the creation of liability for payment on the part of the local government unit. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed Order of the Regional Trial Court of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley dated April 24, 2001 is hereby reversed and set aside. Resolution Nos. 05 and 07 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Compostela Valley approved on February 26, 2001 declaring the entire Province of Compostela Valley under a state of calamity and granting authority to the Provincial Governor to enter into a general construction agreement, respectively, are hereby declared null and void. SO ORDERED.

54 55