a F

Japanese Mono rcph No.118

"yr"

cc

i~l~R i1

,i.

OPERATIONAL

HISTORY

OF NAVAL COMMUNIGATIONS
December 1941-August 1945

PREPARED BY MILITARY HISTORY SECTION HEADQUARTERS, ARMY FORCES FAR EAST

DISTRIBUTED BY OFFICE F THE CHIEF OF MILITARY HISTORY DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY

DEPARTYENT OF THE ARMC OFFTCE OF THE CHIEF OF ILITAhRY HISTORY Washington 25, D. C. CNH

SUBJECT :

Distribution of M~anuscript

: Addressee

The inclosed manuscript is forwarded for your use and retention. FOR THE CHEF CF

MILTAR.Y

HISTORY :

1 Incl
Ms

D. C, $WKGER CoLoel~, Artillery Executtive

FOREWORD

Due to the technical nature contained in this

of the subject matter

monograph, editing was limited to

grammatical changes.o

Th- translation of this text was performed by

individuals not versed in and therefore the field of communications,

technical terms used herein

are

not

purported to be absolutely correct but are theclosest interpretations of the Japanese characters.

26 May 1953

ii.

Preface Through Instructions No. 126 to the Japanese Government., 12 October 1945, subject: Institution for Wiar Records Investigation, steps were initiated to exploit military historical records and official reports of the Japanese War Ministry and Japanese General Staff. Upon dissolution of the War Ministry and the Japanese Peneral Staff, and the transfer of their former functions to the Demobilization Bureau, research and compilation continued and developed into a series of historical monographs. The paucity of original orders, plans and unit journals, which are normally essential in the preparation of this type of record, most of which were lost or destroyed during field operations or bombing raids rendered the task of compilation most difficult; particularly distressing has been the complete lack of official strength reports, normal in AG or G3 records. However, while many of the important orders, plans and estimates have been reconstructed fron memory and therefore are not textually identical with the originals,, they are believed to be generally accurate and reliable. Under the supervision of the Demobilization Bureau, the basic material contained in this monograph was compiled and written in Japanese by former officers, on duty in command and staff units within major units during the period of, operations. Translation was effected through the facilities of Military Intelligence Service Group, 02, Headquarters, AFFE. This Japanese Operational Monograph was prepared in English by the Japanese Research Division, Military History Section, Headquarters, Army Forces Far East and is based on the translation of the Japanese original.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chap~ter
I.

terPage

ORZAIIZAT ION AND DEVELOPMENT Central Agency Developmnt of Communications Facilities Policy for Control of Civil Communications Facilities International Communications Japanese-German Communications Agreement Combined Fleet Communications Regulations General Operational Communications Routine Communications Communications Inspection

1
1

4
31

33
34 36

37 37
142 42 42 46 51 55 56

1941 Naval

Wartime

Communications Plan

Revisions of the Communications Plan

II,

RESEARCH IN WAVE PROPAGATION Results of Research,- 1939-19140 Results of

Research,

1941

Results of Research, 19142-1913 Results of Research, 19145

57
58 63

III.

COI4AUN ICATIONS SECURTY Cryptographic Functions Code Printing Techniaues

63
614 66

Encoding of Call Signs

Communications Defense Countermeasure Committee Countermeasures for Equipment vii

68
70

Chapter Essential Points of the Revised Communications Procedure Unification of the Code Regulations Revision of Code Books Distribution System of Cryptographic Publications Enforcement of the Code Area System

71

75 76 77
81

The Exchange of Code Books with the Army

Security "Accidents" and Countermeasures

8h
85

List of Code Books

Disposal of Code Books After the End of the War

91 94
96
102

1V.

CO1'4UNICATIONS PREPARATIONS FOR WAR Wire Communications Facilities

Communications of Carrier Task Force Selection of Fleet Flagship Communications Equipment for Ships
Development of Radar Radar Research Radar Production V,

103 10h 105

109 109 112

NAVAL AI FORCE CO IUNICATIONS

231 131
138 1h4

Radio

Equipment for Aircraft

Base Air Force Communications Base Communications Equipment Communications of Air Squadrons General Situation Frequency System Radio Equipment

146
f16
172 177

viii

Chapter

Page
Co rainications Procedure 190 19h
194

Communicati ons Plan for Home~land Air Defense Operation Policy

Plan1e

Intelligence and Air Defen se Co nmand Centers Lookout Co nnications Net Tansmission of Air Defense

195

195

Intelligence

196_

Ground Control of Interceptor Fighters Su mat of Installation

Co,-n1-.cationis Between

199 200

Work
and

the-Arnmr

Navy Finder

201

Radio Navigation Utilization of tie Radio Direction Radio B~eacon

202

203
206
207 207

V.s

COZUINICAII01O S

IN ESCORT

OP

.ATI0NIS

General

Situation

The

Co

rmurieations Plan of the General Escort Cor ind

208. 217 218 221

222

Comunications of

the

General Escort Commrand

Ship Cor wnications

.eircraft
Radilo

Communications

Thte.H, ence

Office of the Resident N~aval Officer and .Coi~n-nications

224
226. 226

VII.

0PT .ATI&. AT C(11vITNICAT IO1,1S OF SUBMARINES Sunm ary of Communications Plan

Chapter Summiary of Subarine Communications Operations

Pa 229

Radio Direction Finder

Submarine Communications Bases

230
231

Development of Principal Equipment for

Submarines Transmitter 'eery-lon Frequency Wave Receiving Set 231 231 232

Ve-.-low Frequency Wave Transmitter

Radio Direction Finder Ver'y-log VIII. Frequency -ave Receiving Antenna

232
232 233 234 234 234 :23b

COLT MUNICAT IONS IN FIRST PHASE OPERATIONS Operational Plan Policy Communications Procedure

Communications Security Radio Intelligence

Armo-r avy Communications Agreement for Southern Operations easures Adopted for Southern Operations in in

243

244
244

Special

249

Communications Comunications IX. COi

Hawaiian Operation
the Indian Ocean Operation

250 254
255 255

2TJICATIONS

IN SECOND PHASE OPERATION

Commuications Plan for Midway Operation

Communications Plan for 1st Task Force Communications in tle Midway Operation

256 258

Operations of the 1st Combined Communications Unit

261

terPag
Northern Force Communications Plan. Communications Plan for 2d Task Force Communications in the Aleutians Operation Commnications in the Solomons Area Operation Communications Plan of .- bhe South Seas Force for Port Noresby Operation
Port
Moresby

262

264
268 272 27'h 275

Occupation Force

Communications

Plan

Communications P

of the Port Moresby Task Force and Air Force (29 April 1942)

277

Communications of the Tulagi Occupation Force Communications of the Port Moresby Occupation Operation (Battle of the Coral Sea) Communications Plan of the Eighth Fleet Communications Plan Communications in the Battle of Savo Island Communications in the Battle of Eastern Solomons Outline of Communications Plan Base Communications The Problem of Wave Propagation Air Combat Communications Communications Unit on Guadalcanal Island Communications in the Battle of Santa Cruz Policy Comunications Plan of the Support Force
S r

282
283 287 287 291 292 292 294 295 296 298 299 299 300 300 302

of Operations

A4craft Communications .

Chapter

Pale

Radio

Intelligence

304
304 30h4 35o 307

Communications in the Battle of Guadalcanal Advance Force Communications Plan Raiding Force Communications Plan Operations of the Raiding Force Operations of the Advance Force I. CO10 UNICAT INS IN TBIRD PHASE OPERATIONS Generai. Situation First Mobile

309
311

.311
Communications Plan 313 317 326 X42

Fleet

Summary of First Mobile Fleet Operational Communications Operational Communications Regulations of the 1st Mobile Base Air Force XI. COM UNICAT IONS PLAN FOR KESU--GO OPERATION Establishment of Communications Centers and Nets Establishment of Lookout Posts Establishment of Weather Communications Nets Communications Among the Principal Operational Command Centers Air Fleet Headquarters Broadcast Communications Nets
Air

3h5 3L8
349

349
355

Base Telecommunications

3ss
358
360 361

Communications Plan for Surface and Underwater Special Attack Units A-Type Communications Net B-Type Comemuications Net
C-Type Communications Net

361

xii.

C~ater
Lookout Communications Net Broadcast Communications Nets Special Attack Craft Communications External Communications Weather Communications Frequency System Cormmnications Equipment. for Secret Bases of Special Attack Planes Radio Equipment for t1E Unit Bases Surface Special Attack

Page
361 361 362

362

36h. 36h
368 369 370 375 376 376 381 381 382

Problem of Communications Personnel Communications Preparations Relative to the Mloving of Imperial General Headquarters Operational (Communications) Preparations of the Navy General Command Communications Plan MEaintenance of Command Posts

The

Technical Advisory Staff

Traning and Guidance General Communications Training Training of Apprentice Radiomen Survey of Reserve Equipment Communications Preparations of Fifth Air Fleet Communications Preparations of Third Communications Plan Situation of the Various Personnel Problems Communications Preparations of Tenth Air Fleet

Maneuver'

384

384
385 385 389 390,

Air

Fleet

-Air Fields
--

395 397 398

x~ii

Chtr
Conmiations Plan40

Pag

Situation of

the

Bases at the End of War

h.03

Wire Commnications,
Installation and Increase of Radars Transfer of the Command Post to the Yokosuka Naval District
Aircraft

405

h4o0
406
406

Communications Bquipmit
Facilities of Bases

Visual.

Communication

407
107

Reinforcement of Personnel

ziv

CHATS

No,
1. 2. 3.
40

age
Commnications Units Utilized for Interception Radio Diection Finding Stations' Table of Equipment (As of 1 Dec h4i4) T/E of Naval _Co imnucation Units Operational Comuncations Assignment Air 7 8
19 38

.5.

Commncation

Assign

ents (Incomplete)

40 h
82 97

6.
7.
8e
9, 100 1. 12.

Radio Communication Nets and Stationis Code Area System Prewar Preparations Plan for Communications Unit

Expansion of the Tokyo Communications Unit 19h2 Standard Table of Equipment

19hh 191'

98 99
101

for Communications Units,

,Mobile Commncations Equipment Production

Plan'
Vessels

Plan for Increasing Radio Equipennt on Nava

108 113

13.

Installation Standard

of

Radar for Ships, 19H2

Radar for Ships,

J14c.' Installation Standard of

l19.

1U4
Ls

15.
16.

Radar Production Schedule Types -of Lookout Posts

Search Radar Assignment

116

7.a

17
132

180 19.
20.

Aircraft Communications Equipment Production

Standard

Radio

Communications Equipment

in

Aircraft

135

Authorized Strength of Base Air Force Communications

Department

114)

2. .Standard
22,
Base

Communications Equipment for Mobile LandBased Air Force

Equiment

1hS 1hx,6

Communications i

Major Air Base Conmmnications Equipment Maintained ~3-23-01

1937

J7

No.
2h.. 25. 26. 27. Major Air Base Communications Equipment Maintained from 1938 to 19h.0 Major Air Base Communications Equipment Maintained from 19h1 to 19h3

149

Major

Air Base Communications Equipment Maintained in Japan at Termination of War Classification

362
i73
17Lh

Fz'equii

28.?rque11ay Assignment Standar'd 29.

.iation

of Communications Net 178 179 181 181.

30.
31

St

P.adio Equipment. for Various Types of Aircraft (Excluding Radar) Equipment in Actual Use at Start~ of

6 Communications
33Sit&~y

War

3~.

Expermental Communications Equipment at Start of War

of the 191.3 Experimental Equipment (Excluding Radar)
-

3h.

R~io Communications Equipment in Actual. Use (Jan

43.3

Oct hh)
55 *erimental Radio Equipment
36. ''Lookout Communications Nets

186

188
197 198199 200 209

57. Qoxmunications Nets

38.
Qwganization of Command Communications Nets Oomnmunications Net Escort Unit Communications Net

39.

ho4
L421

.Li. Monitoring by Surface Escort Unit or Ship

Air

Base Net and' Frequency for Escort Plan

213 2JJ4 231 235

hS

M ~onitoring by Aircraft

)44.
455.

Submarine Communications Bases Ship, Aircraft

and

Submarine Communications

Noe

No.o
Communications Unit (Base) Cori munications Communications Operations Time Chart Communications Relay

Par re

.46.
47. 48,

236 239 240 241 245

49, Broadcast Specifications

50. 51. 52.
Place Indication System Radio Intelligence Ship and Aircraft Communications Nets Communications Net for Nidway Operation Communications Assignment

247
251 257

530
54.

263
265

55. Communications Nets

56. 57. 58. Aircraft Communications Communications Nets Aircraft Communications Homing Procedure
Receiving of Communications

267
276

279

59.
60. 61.

2a

Communications Assignments Communications Plan Classification of the Use of Low Frequencies Land-Based Communications Unit Communications Net Communications Assignment Aircraft Communications Communications Assignment Aircraft Communications

28

62.. 63.

2h9 290

64.
65. 66. 67. 68. 69.

293
2

3c6 xvii

No.
70. 71. 72. Radio Communications Net Communications Assignment Target and Content Indication Signs Singapore Area Fixed Communications Net Radio Transmission and Receiving Standard for Each Unit (or Base) of the 1st Mobile Base Air Force

P
313

.314
335 320

73.
74.

33:
336

75. A-Type Base Radio Communications System and Assignments

76. B-Type Base Radio Communications System and Assignments Warning Nets
Aircraft Communications Plan and
A-Type

337
339

77.
78.

Aircraft Radio

Communications Frequency System of the 1st Mobile Base Air Force 79. 80. 81. 82. Communications Control Control Procedure Communications Centers and Nets
Frequencies of Flight-Weather Communication Net

340
330
332

31 6 350 356

83.

Operational Command Centers Emergency Central Communications Net Communications Centers Special Attack Craft Communications Special.Attack Squadron Frequency System (Incomplete) A Comparative Table of Authorized, Required and Available Communications Personnel (As of 1 March 19h5) Advance Graduation of Officers and Enlisted Trainees and Discontinuance of Enrollment Base Telephone Communications Special Attack Squadron Base Communications Yaaato Communications Net (HQ 3d Air Fleet) Tenth Air Fleet Headquarters Telephone System

8h.
85. 86.

359
.360 363 366
371

87.
88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93.

373
378 379 394

4oh

xviii

Q{APTER I Organization and Development

Centra. Agency
In the Navy General Staff of Imperial General Headquarters, the Communications Departanent, or what was also designated as the hth Bureau, was the responsible organ for the preparation of plans and policies pertinent to .all communications matters of the Navy. These plans and policies were implenented by the 1th Bureau after approval by the Navy General Staff. The Navy General Staff, in

turn, submitted requests to the Navy Ministry for any necessary funds, materials and manpower to support the operational plans and policies as set forth by the 14th Bureau. Within the
and Ulth).

4th

Bureau there were three sections (9th, 10th,

Details pertaining to communications plans, operational

control, international communications, communications training, equipment and installations,. control and censorship of conmunica-

tions and communications security were handled by the 9th Section.

The 10th Section was responsible for code plans, code training, compilation, maintenance and revision of code books and crytographic tables, encoding and. decoding and forwarding of radio messages

*The term tCentral Agency" actually does not refer to an es-

tablished office as such but is merely the closest interpretation of what the Japanese Navy officials referred to as the highest authorities concerned with communications in the Navy General, Staff and the Navy Ministry,

to and from the Navy General Staff and overall control of communications within the Navy. The 11th Section was responsible for

research, plans, training and execution of matters regarding radio intelligence. This section also supervised communications censor-

ship, control and security. With reference to the function of radio intelligence under the 11th Section,. its importance was greatly elevated from the time. of the outbreak of the China Incident (1937) which had international repercussions. Orient, With the subsequent focus of foreign powers on the

radic intelligence became an indispensable function, as demands for information poured into the 11th Section.

increasing
It

was not. until the end of 1940 that the function of radio

intelligence became a separate entity under the Communications Department, despite opposition voiced by the senior officers of the

4th Bureau.

Radio intelligence or the Special Duty Group, as it

was called, was established with the policy that it would chiefly be an enforcement agency with a status equivalent to the other bureaus of the Navy General Staff. A member of the 3d Bureau (Intel-

ligence) and a member of the 4th Bureau (Communications) were assigned to this' new group to assist in formulating plans by presenting the ideas of their respective bureaus in regard to intelligence and communications operations. The Special Duty Group was also respon-

sible for the preparation of plans pertaining to the distribution of radio intelligence reports and preparation of an annual radio

intelligence In directly

program. inistry, two bureaus and two departments were planning and policy, i.e.,

the Navy

concerned with communications

the Military Affairs Bureau, the Military Preparations Bureau, the Navy Ship and Ordnance ment. Department and the Navy Aeronautical Departsec-

Within each of these bureaus and departments there were

tions primarily concerned with the technical aspects of conmunications among other general functions such as plans, budgets, and personnel requirements. policies

The 1st Section of the Military Affairs.

Bureau and the 1st Section of the Military Preparations Bureau were concerned with communications requirements. The Navy Ship and Ordnance Department was concerned with the plans, budgets, policies and personnel

administration

of planring, research,

construction, testing, mainte-

nance and supply of equipment (excluding aircraft); design,

examina-

tion, construction, repair, research, testing and control of wire

communications equipment; design and examination of installations Navy construction and repair depots (excluding air Furthermore, it installations). inspectors, of

controlled through the Navy ordnance

technical depots, Navy yards and the Navy Construction and Repair Department. it Thus, in regard to the execution of war preparations, agency.

was the direct

supervisory

The Navy Aeronautical Department generally handled design,

maintenance and supply of air

equipment design and examination of

ground installations

pertaining to aviation and equipment

for ships

mobilization of plants and munitions essential repair of equipment and the training in

to construction and The

aviation technique.

2d

Naval Technical Depot and all

ity

Navy air depots came under its

author-

regarding aviation technical matters-

Development

of Communications Facilities operations in China, efforts

As a result

of Japanese

were made

toward improving the Navy communications by modernizing communica-

tions equipment, increasing communications installations and intensive training of personnel. Moreover, stringent radio control beoperational policy neces-

came necessary because of the change in

sitated by the rapid development- of aircraft radio- technique,

particularly in the field'

and the progress of

of radio direction finders

and radio intelligence techniques.

Close cooperation with land-

based air units-deployed over vast areas had to be maintained and

the improvement range was essential. of communications installations to cover a wider

It was realized then that such accomplishments

the establishment of a single system of naval However,

would necessitate

comat

munications centered around land communications units.

that time Japan's efforts ing naval sea units,
mert

ere

concentrated on improving and expandprogress was realized in the improv-

and little

of land-based communications units.

The entire Navy communications system was centered at the Tokyo

Communications Unit.

In 1937, additional construction was started The work consisted

and the project was completed in autumn of 1941.

of the installation of a Type-0 No 03 transmitter, a Type 97 No 01 high frequency transmitter, a Type-98 No 02 high frequency transmitter and a Type-99 No 2 high frequency transmitter.

Furthermore,

the umbrella-type antenna was discarded and an inverted It-type antenna was installed as well as a very-high frequency radio control
mechanism . ,

The so-called Owada Receiving Station, which specialized in broadcast interception, was established as a detachment of the Tokyo Communications Unit. Interception was used with successful results

during the China Incident, utilizing 23 large receivers, 200 small receivers and a total of 13 low, medium and high frequency radio direction finders. Subsequently, increasing demands for this service

necessitated the expansion of the Owada facility and steps were taken to increase personnel and equipment to' the extent where it could

function as the coordinating unit covering radio intelligence for the Navy General Staff. In obtaining intelligence data, it

was

most effective to set up

intercept organizations as near to the target of interception as possible. In particular, since radio waves from the European areas

pass the polar region,

locations in northern Japan proved more satisIn those

factory than Tokyo, insofar as reception was concerned.

areas where specialized interception stations could not be established,

owing to the lack of appropriations, re gular were utilized in

communications

units

interception work by assignment of additional per(Chart 1) idea of the value and use of a and the use of a radio direc-

sonnel and equipment.

Initially

the Navy had little

radio direction finding organization tion finder to obtain strategic However, with the development

information was not considered. of aircraft and radio intelligence

technique, the acquisition of strategic information was demanded. The technical progress of radio direction finders made the tion of such information possible and facilities expanded for that purpose. (Chart 2) the strategic value of the of research and frequent in this acquisi-

and personnel. were

With the development of aircraft, South Sea Islands increased. maneuvers, the establishment

As

a result

of communications installation

area was deemed necessary from the standpoint

of strategy and security.

Communications facilities

at advanced

bases such as Palau, Truk and

Also,

Kwajalein and the relay base on Saipan were to be improved. radio direction finding organizations were to be improved and increased in and stations in number.

these areas

The Fourth Naval Armament

for the improvement bases on Palau,

Replenishment Plan of

1939 provided at the air of radio com-

of radio navigation installattons and the improvement and Truk.

Truk and Ponape, on

munications facilities for the installation

Palau

The plan also provided

of radio direction'; finding stations at Ponape,

Chart 21 Commuications Units Utilized for Interception

Interception
Organization Takao Comm Unit (Sh-injo Det)

Interception

Targets of'u

an.pxnt
2 2 20 2.

High freq large receiver Low freq receiver High freq receiver United States5 Special receiver Britain Ocean Area eark 2 Telephone Indian Low freq RDF China Area High freq RD}F lfodel 2, me diumi freq RDF. High f'req trans 0.5 W;1 Special receiver

2 1 1

High freq RDF

(ICaihzuruj

9 2
2 ':W 1 21

Comm Unit

Soviet

Union

req DF High freq trans 1

LoBre Medium

High

freg trans 0.5 Ki

~ediUri ~aizuru Comm Unit Union Soviet (Shibata Det)

Special receiver7 High freq RDF freq RDlF Low freq RDF High freq. trans 1 KA. High freq trans 0.5 ICN Special receiver Mark -2 Telephone Special receiver Low freq RDF Medium freq R~DF High freq RDF High freq trans I T High freq trans 0.5 W

2
2 2. 1 1 26 1 17 2 2

Shumashu Comm Unit

UieStes

Aleutian-Alaska

Kaibun Comm Unit

Soviet Union

11 1

Special receiver
6th

12

(ixwwajalein)

Comm

Unit

United

States

Low freq

Hawaii Area

Medium freq RDF High freq RDF4 High freq trans 1 KV Hihfreq t rans 0.5 KV

RDF3

3
1 1

Note:

RDF

--

Radio Drection Finder

Chart 2-a Radio Direction Finding Stations' Table of' Equipment (As of' 1 Dec 44)

Communication Unit

Yokosuka

Owada

E it

Detachment

2 Hatsuse Shirakata Hachijo3 4

__

Type 87 wAi Type 93 Nol

3
_

______

____

3
1

SType
1.1j

89
21

Portable
__Type

5: 6 7 9 10

3
1 1
___

2 1 1 6 2 2

a. a

r Tp

3 Improved

__

Type 3 Improved pove

S High Freq
Q4

11

Portable
Light

Imp oved

12
13
14,

1
1 1

'Lprove

No 2 Telephone
ao

15

1 1

Type 92
Type 97 Type 92 99 17

,r
m

4.19
2 12
8
___

18
1

0Improved

~o ~ Type
co
a

Imp oved
No3

20 .21
22

20

4
____

Type 3

Type 92 No4 Type 95 No3

2 2

24 25 26
27 28 2.1 1 40KVAx1 50KI'T2 15Icxa Model 5x10 M'ode1
__ .1

0 A "N
E-H

Type 95 No 4
Type 95 No5
.~Type

1
1 1 1 1

91No 4

u,

Type 97 No 5

Monitor

High Frequency, 29 Improved)________ Low Frequency, .30

(Improved):____

1 1

. 15K'VAx1
_5Kx2

3
5V x 25KVAx1

Generator

31

15KVAx2

Direct Current
_____________7Gx1

32

7Kx2
20 K rh2

Ohr33

Yodel 1x12 oe
200

____x_ -____________ 6x4o

T/E of Radio Direction Finding Stations, as of 1 Dec 4~4 (coat q)

1

Chart 2-b

Chichi j imna
Ogiura I ojima Sekine
2_

Ominato Nemuro

Shimushu

2. 3 4

Rosaku.
1 1

Nosappu
_

3 5 3
1

1. 1

1, 1

1 1
2

7
S

1 1 4

1 2
.

1 1 2

9
10 11 12
13

.3

1
____

1
___

14 15 16 17 18 1

1 1

1 2 2 2 10 4 11 2 15

19
20 21 22
23
____ _________

4r

24 25 26 27 28

29
30

2 1 316KVAx2

1
1 15K-VAx2

3
2 6K 'x1
10OK':hcl

1
1 1 15 KV -x1

1
3 K74x1
5Kibx1

15 KVA4xJ

32

33

T/E of Radio Direction Finding

Stations, as of 1 Dec 44 (conit 4d)

Chart 2-c

Shimushu 2 sash iatu

Osaka msakinno

M~aizuru Shibata Nakaho jo

Kure Miyazaki

Sasebo Namba

2.
1

2
2

1
1 1

1 11
1 1 11

7
9

5
7

1
______

1 2 1

8
10
11

1
1 2 2 2.1

____

12
13
_ ________1 _ _ _

1
1
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

14

15

1.

16
17 1Ei 19 20 21 22 24 1 6
.7

2 1 7 .4 2 .7 9 6

25
26
27
.1 ,

1
1

i
1
____ _ _ _

28
29 30 31 32 1 1 2 2 60KVAx2 5Kt'b 2 2 1

3
2 25KVAx1

3
2 25KVAx1

2 1

4 3
4OKVAx1 15KTix2 51x2 5.

6KVAi2

6KVAx1

3220K~c2

33

T/E of Radio Direction Finding Stations, as of 1 Dec 44 (cont rd)

Chart 2-d

Sasebo 2

Rashin Tanegashirna 1 1 Kaibun Eiko Ushi jia

Cliinhae

Hakata
1

Ee

Rakuto
2 2

41
5

2 2

1 1

1 1

6
8 9 10
1~11 13

1 1

____1

14 15 16 17 18
19
20

_126

4__

4__

5__

4_4_6

2 41
251 26___

~
-__-___
__

1~

__t

28
29 30 1 1 1 1 15 K TAx1 1 1 15 KVTAx2 2 1 25KVAx1 16K8&2 1 1 15 KVA xl 1 15 KVAx2 2 1 2 5KVAx2

31 15 KVAx1

32

33

T/E

of Radio

Direction

Finding

Stations, as of 1 Dec 44 (cont'd)

Chart 2-e

Chinhae 2 ekiShinjo 3
4

Takao aiForce

2d

4th Truk

8th 6th Kwajalein Rabaul 2d Gasmata

10th Singapore 2d Singapore

Main

13t 2d Nichiyoto Jaluit

____

3
3 2

5 7
8

3. 3

1
_

7-6___
2
1
_

2
_

12 14

1 1

l_______

15
16

1
____

17 18

19
20
21

1 4
____

19

10
________

fl

20

22
23
_________

24 25 26
27

1 1 1
_____

28. 29 30 1 1

3 3
4O KVAx1 15K,"x2 5 F x2

1 1 15 KV_4x1

3
1 15KVAx2
_______15OKVAx2

2 21 6KVAx2 15 KVAx1 25K'bc2 80K1h&2 Model 2x120

31 15J$VAx2
32

15 KV
_____

_______ _______

5Khcl2

33

T/E of' Radio Direction Finding

Station, as of 1 Dec 10th Singapore 2 Saipan
3

4+4 (cont'd)
12th Rangoon 21st Soerabaya 4th

Chart

2-f

24th Ainboina 2d Amboina Kuparig

3d

2d Rangoon
_____

2d 3d Andamnan Soera"
________

3d

4
5
____________

1
________________

6 7
8 9
10
11
____

2 2

2 2

2 2 2 2

12 13
14

1
1
1
__ _1

15
16 17 18
19

____

____

20 21 22 23
24

18

14
1

11 1

2
31
1 1 1 1

25

26
27

28
29 3 1 15KVAx2 32 32 2

1
.5 3 3 1 5KVAx2 1 1 3 1 15KVAx2

5
3 6OKVAx1 0Vx

30
31

6OKVAx2
7KWx2

6KVAx2

T/E of Radio Direction Finding Stations, as of 1 Dec 44 (cont 'd)

1 25th 31st 32d
Da v o a a'O a
_ _ _1

Chart 2-g

Base Force
Ko riku a o a
PDo j oAhi hr r sr

1M M ai n Fo r c e

M an2 la n lD i
_ _ _

1 1

1 1

5 6
7 1
_ _ _1_

S 9
10__

3 2 3
_

1
_ _ _ __ _

1
_ _ _

3.1
12
_ _ _ _2 _______

13______

14
15

1
1
_____

1
____ _

16 17

18 19
20 21
22______

2 10 15 25

18

23

______

24 25
26 27 28 29 1

2
1

1.1 1.1 15KVAx1

1 1 6TV x

2 1 25KVAjd.

1 1 3Kdx2.

30
31

3KVAx1

32
33

3K~ix1

TIE of Radio Direction Finding Stations,.as of 1 Dec 44 (conttd)

________ ________

Chart

2-h

Base Force

1 2
3 4 5
_ _

Bk

Hann ak Hinn Tokyo

_ _

10th
_______

Indochina
Saigon
_ _

11th2d 2d

Balika-n

Tetsusembi
3
_2

Miri Base
_ _ _ __1

________ _________________

__

__1

9
10
______

3
______

3
______

32

_1

15
16 17

18
19
_____ _____ _____________ _______

20
21
______

2
_____

5
_____________

7
_______

12

22
23
_____________

24 25 26 27
28

2 2 1 1
_______

29 30

1 1

2 2

(Ty'pe 99) 1 (Type 99)

11 1 6KVAx2 1 15KVAx1

31

3KVx3

6OKVAx2 5KWx2
x2.

6K VAx.

32 3230n
33
_________

Model 4x120

Yodel

6x125

T/E of Radio Direction Finding Stations, as of 1 Dec 44 (cont'd)

Base Force
1 Maka

Chart 2-i

'Garrison Units

-ssarMarcus

Is.

Wake Is.

2
3

1st Makassar
________

4
5
_ _ _ _

2
2

7
8 92 10
_ _ _ _

1 1 2

1__ 2_
______ _ _

12 13

__

______________

14

15 16 17 18
19
__ _ _

__

20
21
________

5
______

22

12

22
23
________ ______

24
25

2
4
_____

26 27 28 '29 1 (Type 1 .1-

2)
6

3
2

30 31 32

5
15KVAx2 60KV~x2 3OKWx2

15KVAx1

40KVAx2

7Wx

33

Model 4x120

Volea
vided
for

and Ulithi.

The

1940 Naval Armament Replenishment Plan of radio navigation installations the improvement

pro-

for additional improvement

the air

bases on Palau and Truk, at Jaluit

or radio conof the Truk

munications facilities

and the improvement In

Radio Direction Finding Station.

addition, the 1941 Thnergency

Supplementary Naval Armament Replenishment

overall improvement of communications

Plan

provided for the

installations at important before-

bases in the South Sea Islands. the outbreak of war,

By the end of 1941, just

important temporary comnmunications installaHowever, there

tions were improved considerably.

were

very few

bombproof installations and their

after

improvement had to be carried out

the outbreak of the war (See Chart 3 for T/E of naval comrinmuni-

eations units). To centralize control over the communications facilities, the

1st Combined Communications Unit was activated in

new organization

M.,ay 1941.

This

was

comprised_ of the Tokyo ard the

Owada Communi-

cations Units and was placed under the command of Captain Gonichiro To expedite the operations

Xakimoto,

of the newly established Combined of the' chief of the Navai1 General

Communications Unit, the authority Staff to instruct and the

authority of the in Administrative

,C

in

C, Combined Fleet

to direct were specified 1941, which read:

Secret Order No 515,

May

The commanders of the Combined Communications Unit, the Naval Communications Unit and other specially established communications units will be given instructions by the chief of the Navy General Staff in regards to communications necessary for tactics and operations. The commandants of the Naval Districts and Guard Districts will place the commanders of their suoordinate communications units, insofar as it does not interfere with their other duties, under the C in C, Combined Fleet, with regard to communications, utilization of radio intelligence and radio direction findings

of the Combined Fleet.

The communications units which had been newly organized Southwest Occupied Area after Operations did not cooperate especially in the completion of the First satisfactorily in the

Phase

with the Combined Fleet,

Therefore, and control the

the control of radio direction finding.

there 'was a strong desire for a central unit to direct effectively communications units in that area. In

August 1943,

3d Combined Communications Unit' was activated and assigned to the Southwest Area Fleet siderably improved. When Saipan fell of the 1st to the enemy in June 1944, the headquarters and communications in this area became con-

Combined

Communications Unit stationed there was annihiradio intelligence, deviating --

lated.
somewhat the in

This unit had been engaged in

from the original purpose for which it

was established

supervision and coordination of naval operational communications that area. It was realized that. if the unit were to be reestabwas originally intended,
and

lished and perform the duties for which it

it

would be necessary to find an energetic commander

staff

to

18j

T/E

of Naval Communication Units

'hr Chart

3ma

Equipment Key to Unit Name

Transmitter Eigh Frequxency

location of Communications

Type

50

Unit Tokok M~ain Body Tokok Comm Unt

C
ACE

DetaBc6men2t
Tatsukae

Det

7 3D

Kaigaya Kuet Main BodyAC Ykoura Comm Unit Det Hiazaki Det B D CDE 1

61
1

NKur

s AC B D D1
C__E

Main.Boy Daeam Comm Unit Detzak Dakta

Det

14 15 16 1 2

Eaio Det Saeo Comm Mb et Usg Snt Hiata Det Nakahoj1 Det

D D1 C DE D

158

216 23

T/E

(cont Id)

of Naval Communication Units

Chart

3--b

Transmitter High Frequency M~edium Frequency iLow Frequency 30 KWi 5 KVJ 2

IV

Key

to
___

500

250
Watt

Unit Watt 1. 2

TTele2 50 200 IWatt W"att

1 2

Watt
____

7 phone
,.'
att

1 Ci

500 Batt

1 1 2 1

3
4+ 5 6 7

4
6, 1 3 1 2 2 1

1 1

3 3
1

2 2

4
9
10. 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 16
_s

2
5 1

1, 2, 1 1 .2

1 1 1 1

3
3 1 1 1
1

1 1

1 1 1l

2:

20

12

2=2 23
2 I
_

2
1

2
1
1(

T/B of Naval

Communication Units

Chart 3-c

(cont'd)

rteceive: igFruey
___ _reqec ______

Others Frequenc
__ __ ___

Heqe.

Low

Badjo Direction

Finder
___

___

Audio Frequency mlif ier h req Hg

toHih aNe 1
2

untLarge Hig UntAl

rs,,ave 51

Freq

TTi~

~ ' ~ rl a1

Free

o-

~d

_e Freq

o Freq Lw

__

4 5 6

12
3 52 33
_ _

I_
3
__ _ _ _f

8
0

12
2
_2

10
11

21

2
_ _

___

12

7 ___j __2

_3~

13

16 22
2

14
15

21_ 2
1

16
17

3
_

122 1

1 '1
[

j
1

2 4 /

2 2

[2 2

T/E of~ Naval Communications Units (cont'd) Equ~iinentTransmitter Key Type Cmunictos
______Name

Chart 3-d

High Frequency

to Unit 1
K' IM K

Detkachmen

Onanato
Comm

Makubetsu4
Det__
___

Unit

SekineD Det Nemuro Det

DF

~akkanai
Det

A BOCD
D AC9 A B
D1
_

H-enashi Det Chinkai Main Body Jonan Chzinkai

101

Comm
Unit______

tRakutoD
Det

Gyuto
Det_____

D} D

12
_

Heikai Det TakaoAC Main Body Takao Comm

Unit

13

AC B B16"
B_16_

14
15 1 1 2
4_

Hozan Det

9
'

Shokozan
Det

Shinjo Det OsakaMain Body

17 1 19 20 2 213

AC B D CD C2 C2

Osaka
Comm
Unit

Moriguchi
Det

Shionomisaki Det OwadaA.CDE Main Body

Ohira

Owada

Comm
Unit

Det

1st Com uni cations Unit Determined by Comuni- Cin 2d Cmui binedCComnFleet cations Unit

AB

CD

23 24

_________

A B C D

T/E of' Naval Communications Units (cont'd)

Chart

3-e

Key
to Unt 500 High Frequency 250

Transmitter
Medium Frequency Low frequency

200

250 -Tf

Telephone 50

5
KW

1'

500 Watt

Name 1 2

tt 3.

Tat atWatt

atWatWt 2

K6'V

KW

1. .

3 3.
3.

3.

3
4 5 3. .

3.

6 7
8 3.

1
3

9
1.0

.1

.3 3.
)

).

3.2

33 3.4 35
1.6 5

3. 1

1.7 3.8
19 .20 21 22

3.

3.
2
*.

23 24 3. 3. 23

Chart (cont'd) Key toHihFrqenyLow UtH g

Nam

3-f'

Receiver

Others qency
Sall

~ Frequen y Lage igh

Freq

Radio Direction Finder 26

High

Small.
All

Nam 1 2'

Lage igh~11Lare 1

Lare
___

Wave

SallFreq
______

Med

Freq

Low

Freq

62 2 13

3
4 1

5
6 7
8

.9
10
TI

I5
94 J-__ 1 2 1 T6

1
2

3
3

21 4

T
10__

10

sh

2__

11
a ni

io

___
1

14
Co

29
l

15 16 17 18
19
av

6.

20

1.

25.
2
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _

20

'4

4
2

1 3

21..
22 23

23

62

T/E of Naval Communications Units (cont'd) " EqupmentKey to Location of Communications

Chart

ransmitter High Frequency 15 { 5 2

1

Type
AB C
____

Unit Name 1
__ ____

Koror, Palau
MainBody

3d

Comm Unit

Peleliu lst Det2 Ailai 2d Det Dublon, Truk

Main Body Chare*,

D2 B AC
____ __ ____

lst Det

Dublon

B D6 D6 A BC
B

4th

Comm Unit

Sunday 2dDet Ponape 3dflet

Umran

7 8
9 10 1 1 12 13
____

4th Det
Moen
__________

5th Det_________

B A B"CD

5th Comm Unit Rabaul

Main

Body

8th Comm Unit

___________

Rabaul ' 1st Det Vunak nau,

2d Det

AE ACB B D

Body
Shumushu.
Comm
Unit
__________

Ka oka A B C

142

Paramushiro

Det
Det_____

DB D16 A CE B B1 D" ACB

AC

1 1

Matsuwa
Det______

Chichijima Comm Unit

Chichijima Main Body Yoakeyama 1st Det

17

Ogiura

2d Det

19 2
2

Singapore Main. Body Singapore

lst Det___

B D2
D2
D2

21

10th Comm Unit

Singapore 2d Det
Sabang

3d Det
4th Det

D2 D
________

Penang
__________

24
_________

1J/E of Naval Communiiations''tiits

(cont 'a)

Chart

3-h

Key trequincy

Transmitter iediumi Frequ~encyLoFrqec 250

Wa8tt euny

UnitFrqec Nae 500 Wlatt 250 Watt 7 Telephone 150-Watt 50 All Wave Watt 5 KW

2 KEG

1. KVW

Watt

3 4 5
6

2.

2 2.

2.

2.

2.

7
8 1 2 2' 1. 2. 2. 2 2

9
1.0 11 22 2.3 2.4 2.5 16 2.7 2.8 19 20 21. 22 23
24___________

2.

2 *J 12.

2.

2 '2

2.

2. 1

2.

2.

2. 6

2 *2

2 2. 1

T/of Naval Communications Units (contrd) Transmitter tey Unit Name Freqency 500 Watt 250 wiatt Large
___Freg

Chart 3-i

Receiver High Frequency

_____ _____ _____________Finder

Others Fre Hg Small Freq Direction e

_____

Small High

o Fe

All ~' ave

36

Freq

1
2

'3

3
4

36

5 6
7
8~2 .

9
10 11 12 13 14 1 12

42

20 31

2 2

3
2. 2

15 16
17

6 .6 39 l

1 2

1 2

18
19 20 21 22
23

2 2 1 15
___

3*

44

24

T/E of' Naval Communications Units (cont' d)

Chart 3-j

Equipment

Key to

Tanmte High Frequency

Communications

Type

Unt25 Name
KM

15
NW

5
KN

2 NW

25th Comrunications Unit

______ _____

BCD Davao Davao AC

1 2

32d
Comm Unit

1st

Det

Davao 2d Det Davao 3d Det Davao

4th
Det

B4 B b D6 AC B

_________

Main Body 12th Comm

Unit

7
82
__ __

lst Det
___________

2d Det Soerabaja
Main. Body

9
ACB 1
__CE 10_________

Soerabaj a lst Det 21st Comm Unit Soerabaja 2dflet Malab ar

B D
Det ____13 ~B3d

11 12

4th Det
Ambon 24th Comm
Unit__

D AE B
D

14
1

Main Body

lst Det 2d Det M~anila Main Body

16
_

171 1

AE AE B1 B1 D ACE

31st Comm Unit

Manila

lst Det Manila 2d Det Rashin Main Body Rashin Meikodo Det
Kaibun

20

21
__

Rashin

B22
D
D2

Comm
Unit

Kaibun Det
Eiko

23

Eiko Det

D2

TIE of~ Naval Communications (cont 'd) Key to Unit ig Frequency 1. 500 250
T

Units
Transmitter eimFeunyLow MeimFuny~requency

Chart 3-k

250

7
w

Telephone 5-att gv ITt K7

2 KT

500 Watt

cW att

iatt

Watt

3
4 5

3
1 2

2
1,. 11

8 9 10

11 12 13
14

5
1

1
1 400 100

15 16 17 18 1 5 2 3

1
1

1
1

19
20 21 22 23 24

3
1

1 300
1 1

2.

29

T/E of Naval Communications Units (cont ta)

Key to Unit Name 32 3 Receiver High requency Others Radio Direction A.

-Chart '3.'~l

Key to TyeColunxi

________Finder

Small High Med ILow Large All Freq Freq Freq Wave

Taking command of Gamt :munications and hnandf3ing -radio transmissionl. and reception as stelephone control. Provided mainly with transmitting equipment:.
Provided

36

B. 3
C.

28
2

receiving equiprtent.

mainly

with

4
-5 6 7
8 9 21.0 *ll 212 13 14 15 216 17'
18 2

D.'
E.

Provided

radio direction finders. Radio direction finder control.

mainly

with

15

15 34
2

18

23
2 6 2 2

.49
2

19 20 21 22 23
24[ l

3
20 2

__

__

__

lead it.

At that

time,

there was a

scarcity of suitable personnel

and even the post of chief of 4th Bureau remained unfilled. As communications in the area supervised by the 3d Combined on the whole, satisfactory, the was felt

Communications Unit had become,

existence of this that as

to It

unit was not always necessary and it

long as some of the staff officers concerned were assigned

Southwest Area Fleet, the unit could be deactivated. to deactivate the 3d Combined Communica-

Headquarters,

was decided therefore,

tions Unit and appoint the commander of this unit, Captain Onishi, Keiichi, to
the post of chief of 4ath Bureau and concurrently commandTo effect

or of the reestablished 1st Combined Communications Unit. command liaison, it

was decided to have a membet of the 9th Section,

4th Bureau, serve as a staff mepmber of the new unit and orders effect-ing this change were issued on 20 August 1944.

Policy for Control of Civil Communications Facilities

Although no positive policy had been adopted for guidance of

communications facilities outside the naval service, the Navy had

contended that there should be a consistent policy to assume control

of shipping communications. The. majority of private ships were but only a few of the were equipped with high freon merchant

equipped with low frequency transmitters,

first-class ships subsidized

quency transmitters.

by the Navy

Most of the transmitters installed

vessels had such varied frequencies that

the Navy anticipated dif-

ficulty in escorting merchant vessels in wartime. With the enactment of the Antiaircraft Defense Law in 1937, ocean-going fishing boats were required to report information per-, taining to air defense. the Communications

With the support and guidance of the Navy,

(civil government agency) conducted

Ministry

training classes at fishing boat bases, but the fishing boat cornpanie s were not very enthused about the unification of communications facilities because of the expense involved. As such, a

centralized control facility to control this new communications net did not materialize. About 1940, .the Navy overcame some of the difficulties and made progress in the control of civil ship communications by prescribing the limit of permitted deviation of frequency and making gradual improvements in transmitters. The first-class vessels suibsidized

by the Navy were directed to install high frequency sets, a means by which to control these vessels, especially ocean-going vessels, during wartime. to the Navy, it

When control of shipping affairs was transferred

was decided that merchant ships would be equipped,

in accordance with its requirements, with radio sets to conduct simultaneous lovy and high frequency communications. Because of the necessity to direct communications in escort operations, the need for surface traffic security, reports of submarine. warnings and prevention of exposure of anticipated movements of important vessels, it was decided to dispatch Navy officers to

32:

principal coastal radio stations to direct communications.

In July

1942, Navy officers were dispatched to the coastal radio stations in Choshi, Tsunoshima, Shiomisaki, Nagasaki, Ochiishi and Keelung;

and subsequently,

officers were also dispatched to the four coastal and Naha (Okinawa). the event of

radio stations at Shanghai, Tsingtao, MVokpo (Korea)

In

order to provide long-range

communications in

war, the communications plans prepared annually provided for-the

wartime requisitioning outside Navy control.

of powerful transmitters owned by companies

However, 'concrete measures such as contracts

with those companies were not taken. By 1941,, with the domestic and foreign state of affairs dicative of imminent war, it was feared that unless concrete inpre-

parations were expedited, it

would become impossible. for the Navy

to requisition necessary equipment once theArmy started requisitioning.

Such being the case,

negotiations were conducted with the

Army and the Communications Board and an agreement was concluded regarding transmitters to be requisitioned by the Navy in wartime.

International Communications

Prior to the conclusion of the Japanese-German Military Alliance,

the Japanese Navy had limited its activities in the field of

inter-

national communications to support of the Communications

regards to technical matters and frequency assignments,

Ainistry in
and had

not adopted an international communications policy.

ith the con-

33

clusion of this alliance, the Navy was required to adopt a policy to .provide for direct communications between Tokyo and Berlin in
order to establish closer liaison and exchange information between the Japanese and German Navies. Initially, the attitude of the

Japanese Navy was that German authorities in Japan in communication with Germany and German vessels should use Japan's communications facilities and that direct communications would not be authorized. After further study, the Navy changed its attitude and a communications agreement was concluded which authorized the Japanese Embassy in Berlin and the German Embassy in Tokyo to communicate directly with their respective countries. Japanese-German Communications Agreement the Japanese Navy Ministry in 1. Direct communications ,between Tokyo and the German Navy Ministry in Berlin: a. The Japanese Navy will use the Funabashi Transmitting Station of the Tokyo Communications Unit and the German Navy will use the Norddeich Naval Transmitting Station. A transmitter with approximately 20 kilowatts power will be used exclusively. Continuous'liaison will be maintained and agreements will be made on frequencies in accordance with atmospheric and communications conditions.

b;

c. It will be made possible for the Japar.se Embassy in Berlin and the German Embassy in Japan to communicate
directly wyith their respective countries. 2. Transmittal of information to German vessels: a. The Japanese Navy will transmit information regarding enemy mines and submarines to German vessels and submarine s in Japanese waters.

b,

The Japanese Navy will transmit with the frequency used for Tokyo Broadcast No 2 in the same manner as shipping communications are being conducted.

3. Communications between German vessels and Japan through the Chosbi Coastal Radio Station and the Naval Communications Unit at Singapore will be commenced immediately and communications with the Naval Communications Unit at Jogjakarta will commence when communications facilities there are completed.
4. Communications between Japanese submarines and German Navy radio stations will be through either the German Norddeich Radio Station or the submarine base radio station. Necessary information will be transmitted in the same way German shipping communications are conducted.

5. The Japanese naval representative in German-occupied areas and German naval representatives in Tokyo, Singapore, Jogjakarta and Penang may communicate directly with their respective countries and receive shipping communications.
When the agreement was put into effect in 1942, the Japanese Navy communicated with German submarines in accordance with the agreement, and in early 1944 the scope of communications stipulated in the agreement was expanded. The transmitting of radio messages

by Japanese and German naval representatives in occupied areas through naval communications facilities was authorized; and as the German submarines began to use the Penang base in early 1944, the German radio station there was equipped with transmitters made at the Japanese Navy depot. German radio operations were authorized to comand it was agreed that the Frequencies for

municate freely with German submarines,

Japanese Navy retain ownership of the transmitters.

communications between Tokyo and Norddeich were carefully studied for it was almost impossible to communicate in the daytime. However,

communications hours.

were conducted satisfactorily

between 1800 and 0700

Although the Japanese-German the Italian Navy soon learned of it

comurnications agreement was secret, and demanded that it become a

party to the agreement.

suspicion, vessels in

As the motive of Italy was regarded with

Subsequently, however, Italian

her demand was rejected.

Japanese waters were authorized to In 1943, call

receive information signs and other comwithdrew from

on enemy mines and submarines.

munications data were completely revised when Italy the Axis Powers.

Combined

leet

Communt~?ications

Regulationst~~o~

All naval communications

with the communications

were to

be conducted in

accordance

plan of the Navy General Staff and the Naval mach

Communications Regulations prescribed by the Navy i' inistry. fleet efficient commander was to prescribe

detailed regulations necessary for However, the communica-

coem munications within his fleet.

tions regulations formulated by the Combined Fleet were regarded as the best example and therefore, of communications

regulations for operational forces

of the fleets not under

communications regulations

the command of the Combined Fleet wyere, the Combined Fleet Regulations. In preparing a communications plan,

as a rule,

patterned after

forces temporarily activated

normally used the plan of the Combined Fleet and simply modified the

details of the plan

in

accordance

with

the disposition of its

force.

Although the communications plans of the various fleets may have differed in some details, essentially all naval communications actually adhered to the Combined Fleet Radio Communications Regulations, which were as follows General Article 1. Radio communications within the Combined Fleet will be conducted in accordance with the .Naval Communications Regulations,, the army-Navy Communications Regulations and as specified in the following articles. Article _2. Each fleet commander will be authorized to prescribe the necessary regulations in regard to communications within his fleet and will immediately report or notify the quarters concerned of his regulations. Operational Communications
A.

Communications within the fleet

Article 3. ,Communications within the fleet will be ordinarily conducted directly and freely by designated frequencies. Article 4. The operational communications assignment will be as shown in Chart 4, and the frequency system will be as shown in Chart (omitted in original). Article 5. Transmission with the simultaneous use. of day and night frequencies will be the standard procedure. However, -vessels with small communications capacity may choose one frequency which will definitely be received by the addressee. Article 6.. When the enemy is within 60 miles, the tactical communications assignment will be effected in lieu of the strategical communications assignment (specific order for the change will not be issued). Ships leaving the combat area will revert to the strategical communications assignment. Article 7. Then the fleet is cruising or is at anchor in a group, each ship will continue monitoring its designated frequency. However, ships with small communications capacity will be authorized to conduct joint monitoring.

Chart

4.

00 0 v0 0,0 -0 t 0)0 00r4 E 0 0 P

H-

010

~0 0
43 0) H Q) 0 a-F r1
0

co

00

71, 0
0 0 0 10

0re

0r

v -p-) to

to00 0)5

0 $40$ l 0 0
U

0 0O -P 0 H 0 0 $4

0 0 C.4

0S O O O.00
(v-I 0

-c

$4

42 o0 o) a) 0

C) 0 0

,ro -2-1 r-4 -r

N
U

N N

-N

4)

F
o

0
H0 co
-o

N~ N

UO.

00

Wi---Z
to 0 4. oH

N NPr ,a N N
- r-

~.,-iNQ N0
r

4 4

ZZtk
iC .

N4 U
4W

No S6 Ni H

N N

Nm

to ~
0.r-

N]

Z N

Article 8. As the ships of a fleet enter port, the ships having entered the port are authorized to dispense with the low frequency wave after the arrival of the flagship of the division to

which it

belongs.

Article 9. When a ship dispenses with the low frequency wave of the fleet, it will monitor the medium frequency wave during the last quarter of every hour frcm 0600 to 2200 hours every day. Article 10. own division will Replies to calls from ships other than from its be made by the division flagship.

digits

Article 11. The standard speed of transmission will be 85 code per minute.

Article 12.

A ship

within visual

communications range is

au-

thorized to withdraw its division commander.

communications watch after

notifying its

Article 13.

The air

communications assignment will be shown in

Chart 5. (Incomplete)
Article 1. As a standard procedure, aircraft communications

will be relayed by its

carrier.

When necessary, direct communica-

tions may be conducted by preparing necessary frequency.

Articl4 15.

The

submarine communications

assignment will be as

shown in Chart (not entered in original test). Article 16. As a standard procedure, submarine communications will be relayed by its flagship. When' necessary, direct communications may be conducted by utilizing the necessary frequency. B. Communications Outside of .the fleet

Articld 17. Each fleet flagship (or ship representing the fleet) will join the nearest local 'communications net.
Article 18. When a ship cruises independently, it will be authorized to join the local communications net and conduct communications.

Article
C.

19.

Communications outside of the fleet

will

be con-

ducted through the flagship. Communications security

Chart 5

4-1

o
b.0

TS-

U )r

4,

1 C7
'ri

U))

U) 0

3 coc

)-.v
o

H.3 ('3
U)

1 C

4o

Article 20. Plain language communications will be authorized only when there is no alternative. Article 21. The radio silence standard will be as follows:

(1) Very Strict Radio Silence (TT-S7-$A) will be conducted When utmost control is necessary. All radio transmission will be prohibited except emergency messages absolutely necessary for operations. The local supreme commander will control radio transmission. (2) Strict Radio Silence (TE-K-KA) will be conducted when strict control is necessary. All radio transmission will be prohibited except messages absolutely essential for operations. Commanders of all levels will control radio transmission of their unit.

(3)

Radio Silence (TE-TST-

KA) will be conducted when ordi-

nary strict control is necessary. All radio transmission will be prohibited except messages important for operations, safety precaution and rescue. Commanders of all levels may entrust control of 'radio transmission to the communications officers.

D.

Radio jamming Commanders of all levels

will be authorized to

Article 22.

conduct radio jamming when deemed

effective.

Article 23. Joint jamming will be conducted in accordance with frequency assignments.

Article 24. When it is detected that the friendly communications are being jammed by the enemy, measures will be taken as folloves: Method 1. Communications will be continued witth the same frequency utilizing the intervals of the enemy jamming. This method will be used in general except in those cases covered by special orders.

Method 2.) Method

) (Contents omitted in original) 8.)

Routine

Communications

Article 25. The routine communications of the fleet will be conducted in accordance with the operational communications assignment. Article 26. The use of radio communications will not be authorized for reporting results of gun and torpedo practice firing.

Article 27.

Without requiring specific orders, medium frequenwill be monitored in the following cases:

cy of the fleet
(1) (2) (3) (4)

When passing through narrow channels

When When

leaving or entering ports conducting fleet maneuvers poor

When visual communications are impossible due to

visibility

Article 2S. When the main part of the fleet is anchored at places other than a naval port or naval station, a .comrnunication. liaison with the shore facilities will be established. Special orders will be issued each time in assigning the ship responsible for the establishment of a land' communications post. Communications Inspection inspect flagship (or delegated ship) will The fleet Article 29. communications and prepare necessary records. Important matters will be reported immediately and other matters will be reported at the beginning of each month.

194 Naaa

l artime Communications Plan

In 194.1, instructions were issued converting existing peacetime communications plans to a wartime footing. The main object of without

this revision to wartime

conditions called for converting,

undue change, existing communications facilities

operational communications. The communications

and practices into

capacity of the main

advance operational bases were to be increased to the degree sary for them to become operational communications centers.

necesThe

Tokyo Communications Unit. was to be the communications center for the entire area, while the auxiliary stations at Takao, Truk and Sasebo were to Ominato, sub-

be -respectively, the communications

centers for the southwest, northeast, are as. As the center of communications, Tokyo Communications

southeast and Asiatic mainland

the range and capacity of the order to lighten

Unit was to be increased in

the load on :the auxiliary communications. was to be the area of the long-range range of the auxliary

The range of this station 2,ne,

communications

while the comniunic4-

stations was to be the short-range

tions zone.

Vessels within the range of one of the auxiliary sta-

tions were to enter the local short-range

conduct its

communications. net and

communications through the local auxiliary stations, communications net were Center

Vessels outside the range of any short-range to conduct communications (Chart 6).

through the Tokyo Communications

The Central Broadcast Net was to be used by the Tokyo

Communications Unit to communicate

with naval officers abroad and The Primary

with unitsn

as well as outside the naval service.

Radio Net was to be

used for communications between secondary ship

and land-based radio stations through the Tokyo Communications Unit.

The Secondary Radio

Net

was to be used for communications between

ship and land-based auxiliary radio stations through the secondary

CHART RADiO COMMUNICATION NETS AND STATIONS

WAKKANAI

SHUMUSHU

CHI N HAE

CHIOHWIMA

SHANGHAI

TAKAO

IAINAN

MAKO

ROt

- I'-- --

---

-I-

-RADIO NET

- -~----

- RADIO STATION

PRIMARY

C
''

PRIMARY

SECONDARY

RADIO NET

SECONDARY

COMMUNICATIONS

SHIP

OR

STATION

AUXILIARY

RADIO

NET

6
NET

AUXILIARY SHIP

COMMUNICATIONS STATION
OR

CENTRAL

BROADCAST

VESSEL

- -

~ -~----~--

I-

- I-

--

radio stations.

The Auxiliary Radio Net was to be used for communi-

cations between ship and radio stations through the auxiliary radio station.

The Force Radio Net was to be used for communications with-

in the fleets or between ships and land stations or within Naval

District and Naval Guard District units.

Each communications unit was the communications center of the

area concerned and, as a rule , ships and stations assigned to each communications net (except those specially designated), communicated unit of the

with proper parties through the central communications assigned communications net.

All ship and land radio stations were the fleet

attached to the Central Broadcast Net and when necessary,

flagship or other ship or land radio station was to be attached to the Primary Radio Net to communicate directly with the Tokyo Com-

munications

Unit.

In

addition,

ship and land radio stations were

required to SOS on 500 KG frequency and for urgent dispatch on 215

KC frequency.

In

the event of an urgent dispatch, a

ship or land

radio station was authorized to call

the desired station.on the after contact had been

urgent dispatch frequency but was required, made, to transmit on its proper frequency.

The use of the urgent

dispatch frequency was to be strictly controlled in order to maintain communications security against the enemy. Special attention

was to be given to the utilization of wire communications to maintain traffic communications on Primary security and to lighten the burden of radio

'and

Secondary Radio Nets.

Transmissions by the

communications unit nearest to the fleet anchorage were to be remotely controlled by wire or else conducted by low-powered transmitters from flagships. Communications with the Army were to be conducted in accordance
with

the Landing Operations Manixal and the

Army-Navy

Radio Communi-

cations Agreement.

Details regarding frequency and procedure were

to be decided through consultation with all forces engaged in the

operations to avoid radio interference.

Radio intelligence instructions designated

Great

Britain and

the United States as the primary targets for radio intelligence while the secondary targets were the Soviet Union and-China. The

radio intelligence teams gathered information which was forwarded

to the Central Radio Intelligence Group for decoding.

Based on

information received from these teams and through their own facilities, the Central Intelligence Group

was

responsible

for the prepa-

ration and dissemination of the estimate of the situation. The main target for radio direction finding the enemy forces located in

was

designated

as

the Pacific operational waters,

and the

secondary target as those in the Japan Sea, the China Sea and on the
Asiatic mainland.

Revisions of the Communications Plan

When

the theater of operation expanded considerably with the

occupation of territories in the Southern

Area

and the increase of

forces in this area, there developed a great increase in comunications traffic which taxed to the limit the capacity of the Tokyo Communications Unit. The sit uat on reached the stage where it was

impossible to conduct smooth and prompt communications through the existing method. In June 1943 therefore, revisions were made in

the Navy Communications Regulations to strengthen wire communications and to strengthen radio control.

As the existing communications regulations

concerned only radio

communications and in view of the importance of wire communications,. matters concerning wire communications were added to the regulations. Radio and wire communications were more closely coordinated to lighten the load on radio facilities as well as to increase efficiency. Communications between units having both wire and radio facilities were, as a rule, to be conducted by wire.

The existing long-range and short-range communications zones

sere abolished and transmission communications "zones were established. They were classified into the central broadcast communications zone (entire area) and the local broadcast communications zone, and the frequency of all stations was fixed so that the transmission of any one station could cover the entire theater of nzeration. This

called for the strengthening of the central broadcast communications net and the establishment of the local broadcast communications net.

Pder

the revised regulations, ships and stations assigned to

each communications net could communicate with other units only

through the central communications

tions net.. As a rule, all

unit

of their assigned cornmunica-

radio ships and stations were

to

be

attached to the central 'broadcast net in

broadcast net. city Howvever,

addition to their local

radio stations with small receiving capa-

were not required to be attached to both communications nets

but were assigned to only one communications net.

A fixed communicazones

tions
and air

net was established between units.

Air

communications

communications nets were determined in

order to unify the

air transportation communications and maintain security of communica-

tions.

In addition, a wire telegraph communications

net

and wire
system

telephone

communications net were established, as well as a

for sending telegrams by telephone ble between ship and station, unclassified -or low classification it

When wire telephony was possi-'

was used as much as possible for messages.

As the war approached closer to the Homeland and air raids became intensified, centered the main operational strength of the Navy was the land-based air forces. Along with the increase in

on

forces and the acceleration

of war preparations,

the burden placed

on communications increased heavily.

Communications could not be

conducted Smoothly because of additional time required to handle more efficient complicated codes and because of communications incapable personnel. As in-

greatly affected operations,

it became

necessary to effect other fundamental changes in plan. Therefore in December 1944, the ft

the communications

damental policy was revised

.48

and the preparation of facilities to cope with the changing war situation was also taken into consideration. tion was unfavorable, practice before it Because the war situa-

was decided to gradually put the plan into The essentials

the completion of all preparations.

of this revised policy were as follows :

1.

The communications net will be separated into two nets -the purely operational communications net and the administrative communications net. operation centers will be communications cenThe main air ters corresponding in size and capacity t.o the communications units. In order to strengthen and increase the communications operacapacity of the communications units and main air will ba further tion centers, broadcast communications strengthened, and as much of the regular fixed communications system as possible will be converted into the broadcast system. Communications nets will be divided into the land communications net and ship communication net in order to facilitate the use of the ships and to strengthen cooperation of the communications unit with forces afloat. the revision

2.

3.

4.

Also included in weather net.

was the plan for establishing a

The weather reports had been conducted mainly by wire However, with the intenbattle on

under control' of the Communications Board. sification of enemy air

raids and the expected decisive

the Homeland, it

became necessary to convert

wire

communications bases. plan to cope

into radio communications nets centered around the air The necessity for the immediate execution of this with the

war

situation was recognized, but its

materialization.was

delayed due to enemy disruption of communications and the delay in

thea preparation:,of crystals. ypubt into oeratioz Iia .~

The
te

plan9, therefrore s al~though gradualcompleted

when

the war ended.

CH E:

-- ,

Re search in

Wave Propagation.

from about 1930, Ito, Yoji,

Vice Admiral Minohara,

Tsutomt.

and Gaptain

both members of the Naval Technical Research Laboratory,

at the time,,

were

engaged in

research work. in; wave prpgati were made by the ' t inte

on

and.

ionized layer.

'xperiments

rence method' In. view o'.

which had originally been conducted by Dr.

Appleton.

the fact that Dr. Appletonts experiment was conducted in is worthy of mention that.

1926,it

the - research by the 'Japanese NIavy began

only four years later. Although, the early experiments were conducted by- the "interby the
"im-

ference method," subsequent experiments were conducted

pulse method".
the Pacific War..

This was the basis of radio communications used in By this method 9 a transmitting station transmitted of about 104 second

radio waves modulated by a very short impulse

so.Mthat by

the approximate height of an ionized layer can be estimated

measuringthe time difference between radio waves transmitted

along ground surface and those reflected by air ionized layers in

the upper -arbmosphere e A transmitter of this type was installed at the Pieguro Naval

Technical Research Laboratory (Tokyo)

and receivers were set up at

Tachibana Mura Receiving Station and at Hiratsuka Receiving Station

established in

the compound

of the Naval Powder Depot in

Kanagawa

Prefecture.

The results of experiments rare recorded simultaneously

Experiments

at both receiving stations. quencies

were conducted with fre-

anging from 2,000 to 2,999 kilocycles.

Continuous measure-

ments at fixed frequencies were conducted chiefly at 4,000 to 4,999 kilocycles. As a result, it was discovered that the ionized layer

existed at heights of 90 to 110 kilometers in the daytime and about 200 kilometers at night. Subsequently, photographic strip records It

were made of the ionized layer at a fixed frequency (4,000 K).

has been revealed. by Dr. Appleton that the layers existing at heights of 90 to 110 kilometers in the daytime and at 200 kilometers at night were different. He called the former E-layer and the latter F-layer.

The measurement of the height of the ionized layer by the

Navy

was conducted by continuous observation of the various heights of the layers by fixed frequency. In November 1932, the relation of At the time of the solar

the layers with meteors was investigated.

eclipse on Losap Island in the South Sea Islands on 14 February 1934, research personnel were sent to investigate and to clarify the .,conditions of the ionized layer- in the southern area. At the Kiratsutka the strength

Laboratory of the Naval Technical Research Laboratory,

of actuial radio waves from every part of the world was

measured

and

studies were made of the variations of wave strength during a day and the four seasons. The 'measurement of the ionized layer up to that time had been limited to that of the height of the layers. In some cases, in-

vestigation

of

variations

in

radio

waves

was conducted density

occasionally of the

by changing the frequencies. electrons

possible

The measurement of

(or penetration frequency) which determines the highest

frequency, important for communications, was not made at

all.

On the other hand,

in

1932, 'Mir.

Namba,

Shogo of the

Electricity
(simi-

Research Laboratory of the Communications

inistry

determined

lar to method by Eckersley) the alternation coefficient for radio

waves passing quency field a result through the intensity ionized

layer.
records

He utilized which were

the high freavailable as

measurement

of cooperation between

Great Britain

and the United States

and .which were made public by Burrows. ionosphere

Mr. Namba estimated the

and announced the method as to how to calculate the high intensity for long distance
of the

frequency field

communications.
.s well as

The measurement

of the height

ionized layer

the penetration frequency was started in by this

which

1934.

It

was discovered radio

this'

experiment that when frequency is

are originally reflected by E-layer

increased,
penetrate

waves
and

layer

are reflected by F-layer. quency is

It

was also discovered that as

the fre-

increased, the radio waves penetrate In

F-layer and pass be-

yond the ibnosphere. tration

1934, experiments for measuring the penechiefly

frequency and the height of the ionized layer were

conducted by the
the highest

Naval. Technical

Research Laboratory.
comunications

As a result,

practicable

frequency in

with Tokyo as a

center was determinable

for any hour of the day or season of the year.

The lowest

practicable

frequency according to the output of the

transmitter was

determined,

as experimented by

Eckersley,

by the

degree of attenuation of radio -waves when they penetrate or are reflected by the E-layer. However, this question of attenuation pre-

sented

many difficulties.

From a theoretieal point of

view,

there

are different

opinions even tcday in

that numerous unknown coeffi-

cients are found in

attenuation.

Therefore,

radio

waves with
to

various

frequencies in actual communications the field intensity according

should be utilized

measure

'to

various ranges and seasons of the intensity.

year and that attenuation factor be induced from the field However, such an experiment requires a large

number of field intensity

measuring sets and many years of observation and careful arrangemen t of data.
It was discovered that for making a communications the highest practicable plan) frequency (basis

can be determined by measuring the and that

ionized layer, regardless the lowest practicable

of the output of transmitters,

frequency can be calculated

by the measurement

of field

intensity

and by close observation It was made clear that

of the ionized layer, the basis for the selec-

especially E-layer.

tion of communications frequency lies in measuring the ionized layer

*xd field intensity.

The ionized layer measuring equipment was gradually improved ,

largely tbrough the efforts (Technical) Yamamoto.

of Technician.

Shinkawa and Lieutenant

For the observation of the solar eclipse in

Hokkaido on 19 June 1936, record

automatic equipment had been devised to

by photograph the penetration frequency by connecting a

and by
layer,

transmitter and a receiver to the layer measuring equipment changing frequencies.

Thus, through research in the ionized

for the communications elan. frequency for

the necessary data was available was after could be clear 19314 that penetration

It

the ionized layer

measured.

From 1934 to 1937, the following facts were made

I. -in the variations during a day and a year, the density of the electrons in ,- layer varies with the sun's altitude and is approximately in proportion to Js x wherein x This coincides with represents the altitude of the sun. the theory advanced by Chapman.
2. Besides regular tions reflections, there are irregular reflec-

called sporadic reflections

in s-layer.

3.

In the daytime , F-layer is divided into Fl-laye and F2In winter, hovever, Fl-layer does not appear. layer. The diurnal and annual P2-layer appears only at night.
variations in Fl-layer are more irregular than l>-laer,

but are subject to variations approximately in proportion Ho 'aver the day-night variation in F2-layer co to 's theory. In other disagrees considerably with Chapman words, the day-night variation is not symmetrical with noon Penetration frequency becomes rapidas the dividing line.. sunset it gradually ly higher with the sunrise, and after insummer) becomes lower; it reaches the lowest (espciall Moreover, the day-night variation is consiat daybreak. In the amounting from 10 to 20 per cent. rgreat, lhb1y seasonal variation, the lowvest penetration frequency is observed twice--once in winter between December and January The highest penetration frequency occurs and again in June.
in spring exist theory Results and fall. on this 1939-1940 Considerable point.a discrepancies with Ohapmants

of Research,

In

September 1939, an observatory was e3tablished on Falau

Island to conduct the observation of the ionized layer in the South

Sea
for

Islands area.

By this observation, valuable data was obtained in the equatorial area. The short and medium

communications

range high frequency propagation charts were prepared based on attenuation calculations in accordance with observation and measurement of field intensity and they were published December 1939 in

Tokyo.

This chart contained frequency, time and correlation of field

intensity in every month of the year for ranges of 300, 500, 700,

1,9000,-1500,

2,000 and 2,500 kilometers, and served as a guide to

communications in medium latitudes and during the period of maximum sunspots.

the South The short and medium frequency wave propagation chart for

Sea

Islands area, based upon a one-year observation on

Palau

Island, was published and distributed by the Naval Technical

Research Laboratory in September 1940.

Results of Research, 1941

As a result of research, data on penetration frequency (density

of they electrons), the height of the ionized layer and field intensity was obtained. Research was made for day-night and seasonal variaThe relationship of the as follows:

tions. and their relation with sunspots.

density of the electorns with the sunspots is i. 2.

Marked correlation between the day-night variation of the electrons and that of the sunspots cannot be observed.
There is a marked positive correlation between the mean monthly value of density of the ejectrons and that of thr sunspots, ana both make corresponding changes.

Therer cycle. In

patical

radio frequency varies

ith

the sunspot

other words , high freqauency can be used during the maxiof sunspots. Because high frequency is subject to less Too high a frequency

mum

value

attenuation, cannot be

it makes communications easier.

used for communications during the minimum value of sunlow because it will penetrate communications be-

spots when penetration frequency is the ionized layer.

It was also- discovered that

come difficult on account of attenuation in

The government organization

this period.

of the

Radio Physics Research ComCom-

mittee,
mittee

which had beeni advocated by the Electronics Research

of the Scientific Research Council, was promulgated committee was, at to the status jointly of the

in April Radio by

1941.

The elevation of the

physics Research Institute

the time,

supported

the Army,

Navy and the Communications

'Ministry

with the aim of re-

search in wave propagation and the ionized layer. Results of Research, 1942
-

1943 1942 by

A wave

propagation chart book was distributed in July

the Naval Technical

Research Laboratory.
equatorial it

In addition to the wave

areas

propagation charts for the

and the medium latitude contained

which had been published previously,

a wave propagation

chart based on the data obtained at Shikuka, pagation chart.

and a long-rang e

pro-,

Since these charts were based upon the data for were found in the ac-

maximum value of sunspots, many discrepancies tual

communications during the minimum value of sunspots.

High frequency in because tration

the equatorial area was reported inadequate of sunspots, sudden decrease and great attenuation in in pene-

of the minimum value

frequency at daybreak area. Therefore, there

the equato-

rial

arose an urgent need to use medium

frequency at night and daybreak and for short distance communications. Such being the case, observations in the southern occupied

areas became necessary. at Singapore, Bandoeng,

The Army planned to establish observatories

Manila and Rangoon;

and the Navy at ParaIt was decided

mushiro, K~wajalein,

Makassar, Sabang and Rabaul.

that the nucleus of these observatory staffs

would consist of per-

sonnel from the Radio Physics Research Institute. The Army began to establish its observatories from January 1943
while the Navy

in

the

order Singapore,

Bandoeng,

Rangoon and

Manila,
Makassar,

commenced in July on Kwajalein, Paramushiro, Penang.

A

Rabaul. and at sea.

The observation party for Rabaul was lost in

enroute

members of the Kwajalein party were killed after arrival.

action while precostly sacri-

paring for observations fices

They were all

for wave propagation research.

The observatories at Paraand

unshiro, Makassar and Penang were established without difficulty

furnished valuable information. Results

of Research 9 , 1l95 each area became

As the conditions of the ionized layer in clearer through data obtained from the nical

southern area, the Naval Tech-

Research Laboratory distributed to the Navy a monthly bulletin

containing wave propagation information together with the forecast for the. f ollowing month for use in communications. With the progress of the war, aircraft became research in wave propagation for

an urgent necessity.

Only one frequency was used However, it was re-

during one flight regardless of day or night.

vealed that since the range of ground waves could be increased more in the

case

of aircraft

owring to its

high flying altitude than in the

the case of ground communications, the radio waves used in

range. This information,

ground

waves occupied. half

transmitting from fighters operating at short

the result of calculating the ratio between

the flying altitude

was imparted to air

and the range of ground waves on land and sea,

units through the Yokosuka Air Group. Moreover',

in

consideration of the sky and ground waves with ranges up to 500

a disc-type to aviation each air unit wave propagation chart was devised

kilometers, and distributed

through the Yokosuka Air Group. chart was distributed of the as Wartime

practical

high frequency

Research No 12, with Yokoyama, Eitaro

Radio Physics Research

Institute

in

charge.

With time and range

as the axds,

and frequency chart for

waves of

as the parameter,
beginners.

this was a convenient and easy ref3renc

there were gross errors pertaining to

However,

2,

3 and 4-megacycles,

particularly

in

the attenuation in

the day-

time.

Since the use of medium frequency on aircraft

was stressed the books.

were

for operational radio waves at night and at daybreak,

were distributed among the units concerned after

corrections

made.

The following is

summation of research on radio ways trans-

mission directly connected

with

organization of the radio system: 193L.

1.

Observatory in
mini irzuar

Tokyo,

Condition:

SuunsDots at

Th Tokyo,

the vertical

enetration frequency at F2-layer at and 5.5 to 6

noon was 6 to 6.3

megacycles in
in tions

megacycles in the spring and fall,

sumnmer and winer.

At

midnight, in

it

was 2.3 megacycles

Cominunica-

December. and January, in

and 4.8 megacycles

summer.

high frequency became so difficult

and the high frequency

band
to

so narrow t'nat the following

of communications:

freouencies were

adopted according

the distance

Day frequency ................ Night

5 to 13 megacycles
made a sharp increase which indicated

frequency.............2 to 6 megacycles
of sunspots

The number

that the sun entered the period of int3nse solar effect. tration frequency at F2m-ayer at noon was 12 to and 7 to 8.7 megacycles

The

eane-

13.7 megacycles in winter.

became

spring and fall,

in

summer and

The easier.

frequency band was

greatly

expanded and communications

Frequencies adopted:
Day frequency Spring and fall

...........
.........

9 to 25 megacycl es

Summer and winter

ight frequency

7 to 18 mnegacycles
3 to

Winter

,...........

S megacycles

....... 5 to 11 Summer........... No inconvenience was exoerienced

megacycles

in

communications by the

high frequency band of more than about 4 megacycles. the need for using medium frequency.

This precluded

The output of more than one

There-

kilowatt increased the range of communications considerably.

fore, in some cases, it was possible to use only cne frequency

through the day and night when the right frequency was selected. 2. Observatories at Tokyo, Palau and Shikua Sunspots gradually entered a period of decrease in number, with 1938 as the period of maximum frequency.

Penetration frequency
In Tokyo at noon,
and winter, and 7

at the ionized layer also became greatly lowevred.

it dropped to

to 10 megacycles in spring, fall At midnight, it

megacycles in summer.
and 6 megacycles in cycles in

was 3 megacycles in winter was 9 to 10 megasummer and

summer.

In Palau at noon, it

spring and fall, was

and.S to 9 megacycles in

winter.

At midnight it megacycles in

to 9 megacycles in

spring and fall, , it

and 6 to 7

summer and winter; but at daybro In Sakhalin :at noon, it

showed a sharp

decline to 3 megacycles.

was 7 to 8.5 mega-

cycles in spring, fall and winter, 5.5 to 7 megacycles in summer, while at midnight it was 3 megacycles in winter and 5.5 .egacycles in summer. The conditions of communication became gradually worse
the number of sunspots from about 1937. For

with the decrease in

night frequency, a frequency of about 3 megacycles became necessary

for short distance communications.

In the southern area, the density

of electrons did not show much decrease from daytime until midnight, whereas it showed a sharp decrease at daybreak which made it very

61

difficult

to choose
adopted:

an operational

frequency at davn.

Frequencies

mdium frequency

7 to 16 megacycles.......in 5 to 13 megacycles 3. Observatories Sin a yore,

Period: Since communications

medium and lowv latitudes

.....

in PaaToe

high latitudes

at Tokyo,

oheara i anila, i'iak

aramushirc, z-ar and PenanE.

=pan oon

Bandoeng

1942 to 1945
sunspots were were at the minimum value It in 1943' and 1944, that at day-

very difficult.

often happened

break in
1.5

the southern- area,

frequency had to be lowered

as far as

megacycles. *Therefore the use' of mnedium frequency of 2 to 4

A close investi-

megacycles became necessary at night and daybreak. gation had to be conducted to

into the time for change of day frequency A very high frequency could not The range

night

frequency and vice versa.

be used for day use as there was too much attenuation. of communications
for cornunications

by one frequency was diminished and the planning

nets became extremely difficult.

Frequencies

adopted:
...........

Day frequency

5 to 13 megacycles
2 to 6 megacycles

Night frequency ..........

6a.

CHAPTBR

III

Communications Security

Cryptographic Functions
As was briefly described in Chapter I, cryptography was ad-

ministered by the 9th and' 10th Sections of the Communications

De-

partment (4th Bureau,

Navy General Staff).

The 9th Section had one

staff officer in charge who decided the general, policy to be integrated in any communications plan of the Navy. code planning, training, tables,
equipment, compilation,

The details
code books,

for
code

encoding and decoding and other implementing functions were of the 10th Section.

the responsibilities

Until 1943, the post of chief of the 10th Section was concurrently held by Navy Ministry.

the chief of the Radio Communications Section of the

In September 1943, a

full-time section chief vas

assigned to the 10th Section and the chief of the Radio Communications Section was delegated the concurrent role of commander of the

Tokyo Communications Unit.

ing and decoding

With this

change,

the function

of encod-

was

transferred to the Tokyo Comm.nications Unit as The duties Which were retained by

were most of the code personnel.

he Radio Communications Section consisted of receiving and filling

outgoing messages to and from the Navy Ministry, Staff the Navy General

and other Navy offices ih Tokyo, making copies and distributsecurity of messages and other matters concern-

ing incoming messages,

ing handling

of.

r-ed utters.

In

the naval districts and guard districts, crytographic mate-

rials were handled by the local cofrnmunications unit stationed in

that district. In
officer

the units,
or by a

they were handled by the assistant

code officer independently assigned, additional corn-

communications but as the

humber of ciphered

messages increased,

missioned and
The printing

arrant officers were assigned.

of cryptographic materials was carried out by the

Printing Bureau of the Cabinet, but later

when the the

Naval Code Book

A and other publications were contemplated, taken by the printing office in

increases tions to in the various types

printing was under-

the Navy Mlinistry.

and copies services

With subsequent
publica-

of cryptographic

be made,

the printing

of the Naval Torpedo

schodl

and the task.

.Naval

Communications School were called upon to perform the

During the Pacific

top secret matters

Wf ar,

most of the printing except military

by the Bunjudo Printing Office in

was initiated

Yokohama

(Navy-controlled

publishing company).

In

1944

the

10th

Section of the Navy General Staff

was

moved to that concern and code

books of all

description were

printed there.

Code Printing

Techniques

Combat experiences had shown that it to dispose of code books immediately in methods were sought to print code books

was

extremely difficult Thus various

emergencies.

which,

when sunk, would be

obliterated in wrater such as: (a) tents of

Chemicals which dissolve the con(b) water-soluble ink

a book

when soaked in sea water,

which fades away when exposed to sea water, and (c) water-soluble paper. Of these three methods, the chemicals mentioned in (a) had

long been under study, but by this method alone,

it was impossible Therefore,

to chemically treat all those which were being used. careful study was made of (b) and (c).

The research for water-

soluble ink was made at the Technical* Research Laboratory (by Senior
Technician i'isa as the person in charge) but the study reached a

stalemate because of the following problems: 1.

IfP solvent action was too sensitive, there was danger

of the writing fading from raine-water, splashes of

-sea-

water or perspiration when the printed matter is carried or used, and, if vs 2.

being

the action Was too weak, there

danger of the writings failing to become invisible.

The chemical for treating printed or written matter had to be absolute so that it would be impossible for the

enemy to use scientific means to cause reappearance

thereof.

3.

There was the difficulty of eliminating traces of print.

type

The German water-soluble

ink served as the incentive and water-

soluble ink reportedly superior to the German counterpart was concocted. With the use of this ink and starch-coated paper, it was

planned that all.

the regulations

for its

use should be printed first

of

After confirming its

practicality,

other matters such as the

additive tables and the code books were to be printed. The

printing

method merely entailed cleaning the type ink.

with

benzine& and then applying the water-soluble ing machine

No special printthe

was used and the matter to be printed was run off in hen the printed matter was thoroughly soaked as a parts took sevoral

usual manner.

book, the permeation of sea-water through all hours.

Whether

the traces of the printing types remained depended

largely upon the printing technique and there

which disappearance

wer

some cases in

was not complete.

Encoding of Call Signs

For the utmost security, it was necessary to encode it call signs

and names of senders and addressees, particularly since that movements and locations secrecy. However,

was vital strict

of the naval forces be kept in

naval authorities felt

hesitant about further the believed

complicating the encoding system as they were apprehensive costly delays to- communications. that On the other hand, it

was

well-trained radiomen would be capable

and the aduthorities Ac-

started on the compilation of code books for utmost security. tually, there was little hope of establishing an_ intricate

system in view

of encoding call

signs and names of senders and addressees

of the marked deterioration of radiomen's

skill during the war.

A program to encode the call signs and the names of senders and addressees with the improved
was

1MIG'MAA" transcription machine* persons equal' to the In the Hawaiian opera-

planned, but got no further since clerical

number of radiomen to dictate were required. tions, special code phrases were used by the special measures

Combined Fleet and no

However, in

had been taken by the Central Agency.

anticipation of commencement of
when the First

operational
Saeld,

action in November the "'New Code Book

1941 for

Air Fleet anchored in Vol II"

Air Communications,
Operation (Part B)"

and the 01New Code Book for TDactical to

were distributed to each ship of the Fleet

be used in

the forthcoming operation,

case! of security mac-

The code was changed. periodically but in cidents" to code books in the, nterim,

top secret communications

were handled by the application of the emergency regulations and use of other code books, Revision of code books was made by imnprouse. In case of '1accidents'1

vising on the code books currently in

to the master code books, the emergency regulations were to be

ap-

plied

as a temporary expedient and. new code books were distributed the old ones,
In case of "accident' to other than the

to replace

master code books, means of other

the emergency regulations were

depending upon

telegraphed by

code books,

the urgency and the extent

**The "3IGMA1' was originally a German code machine which the

Japanse improved. and adapted to the 'a AZA" (Japanese alphabet). encoded from dictation. This maciine transcribed, i.e.,

of

distribution. regulations

Units not accessible through liaison

by telegraph by the nearest

were informed senior commanding

of the

officer,
later to

and. the code books,

replace the old

after

being revised, were distributed

ones.

Communications Defense Countermeasure Committee'

With the progress of communications progress technique, communications

intelligence also made rapid

through the expansion and

strengthening ,of its

communications, on items requiring

agencies.

As a result
often

of the study of enemy

respective revision

agencies of security

submitted recommendations of friendly communications,

At the time of the northern French Indo-China operations January 1941,

the 2d Carrier Division (the Sorv, to southern rsu

in

and 23d
Formosa.

Destroyer Division) It sailed

was ordered to advance silence but

southward under radio in the vicinity

due to an unforeseen a considerable

incident

of Agincourt,

Formosa,

number of messages were transmitted. learned of the

The British

Navy at Hongkong

Japanese movement apparently through interception

This was confirmed through Japanese interception
UThe 2d Carrier Division is
an aircraft carrier believed

of these messages. of their

sailing

communication which read;

south and it is certain that

to be the Sor.
since then,

reached northern Formosa,

rest of the force great

but nothing is
to Takaon security

known

and the

proceeded impetus to

This incident

served as a

counter-

measures for were considerable

communications. defects in

The results of the current call

studies signs

showed there and. that moni-

toring revealed the characteristic

of each ship from its

traas-

mitting frequencies

It was therefore certain that the enemy,

through monitoring, radio

direction finding and call

signs,

was

makng an intensive study of Japanese communications, Therefore,

in-order

to establish countermeasures,

a Communi ca-

tions Dfense

Countermeasure Committee was formed in December 1943.

The members were as follows: Chairman: 4th Bureau chief, Navy General Staff

Commit tee members:

9th Section chief (concurrently 10th Section chief) Members of the 9th.and 10th Sections

Naval Communications School instructors Naval Technical Department members

Naval Air

headquarters members

Yokosuka Air Group instructors Members of

Naval Afairs

Bureau

Technical Research Laboratory members The committee studied broad and in 1. problems concerning communications, the gist of which follows:

September 1943 submitted a report,

Revision of Communications Procedure:

With broadcast communications being the predominant and adhered

means, the transmittal forms will be revised

to:
in

strengthening of security,
simplification in communications,

speed and reliability

and. discipline

of

handling,

administration

2.

The following a. b,

code countermeasures are planned: of code revision,

Rationalization

Strengthening and increasing handling speed by

mechanization,

c,

Prevention

of

'accidents"

dturing transportation,

d.,
3,

Planning measures for localizing damage in of Uaccident s.0l

for equipment:

case

Countermeasures

a.

Investigation of
direction finding,

transmitters incapable of radio

of radiation

b,

Elimination waves.

of the characteristics

4.

Induce more security measures in

cations schools, efficient inspection

basic training at comimuni-

5.

Establish

agencies into effect

for at

communications. once. Then re-

These countermeasures

were

put

vision of the communications rules was taken up, with the Communica-

tions

School and the Yakosuka Air Group taking the initiative.

a draft decision was prepared but until further discussions was ready for and

In
studies

August 1944, prolonged final

1945 when it

printing.

However,

there was no opportunity for its time.

enforcement

due to the

adverse war situation at this

Countermeasures for 1. Euimnt

Development of a

transmitter which could. avoid detection

by radio

direction

finders:

A device ]nown

as SIB"

(mediun

frequen-

cy communications method which eludes radio direction finders to a great eztent) had been completed at the end of 1944, January 1945.
of the characteristics of radio waves,

and was instal-

led on flagships in
2. Elimination

a.

Tone-changing device: In order to offset the characteristic of the tone of transmitters, a device was added by which the tone was varied intermittently. Monitoring to determine correctness
In particular,

b.

of signal was conrepairs were

ducted on main warships.

made on devices which transmitted notably peculiar radio waves.

The monitoring of friendly carried out by higher to headquarters research communications of had heretofore unit been with-

each communications body. The necessity

out resorting

any special

thereof

had been keenly felt, difficulty in providing

but it
suitable

did not materialize as there was great

installations and personnel.

Essenti

Points of the Revised Communications Procedure

The Navy Communications

Rules

had been revised

in

1937,

and

subsequent to that year,

entered., There still

many revisions and additions had. been

a need for security in tactical com-

existed

munications,

particularly

aircraft

communications.

The problem

rested on the need for establishing a suitable

messages Outline and the need for of the revised communications discipline.

transmittal form for

Navy Communications Rules.

1.

The name was changed to Navy Communications

Regulations.

Radio, wire communications and radiotelephone were included therein, 2. Because of the peculiarities inherent in aircraft communi-

cations and the training of personnel,

craft communications were extracted

only matters concerning airthe "Extracts

and compiled in

from the Navy Communications Regulations

3. basic, aircraft The five strategical types of message into (air-basic, transmittal general

(Aircraft

Communications).1

forms were as follows: and security), tactical and

(divided

cozmunications

air-N~o 1 and air-No 2)

emergency. a.' The basic transmittal form

This was a transmission form used for direct commnications or broadcast communications between bases
and for short distances
long- distance communications, b. Strategic general transmittal form This was used mainly for broadcast communications It or stations in strategic moments. form which had greater communications. Common signs were used mainly. were omitted; items, with the to in (2) the exception 'EK0O number security for and strategic general communications and could be used transmittal)

(generelly* 200 miles to avoid

in the. routine and strategic

between ships was a transmittal routine for

Calling: Beading:

(I) All prefixes handling of all of those referred Manual or

Code Indicator

those having a broadcast

or those in numerical or letter code, were

somewhat simplified,
Ending: The heading was errors in broadcast to be repeated call signs to prevent

c.

Strategic security transmittal form

quired than in

This was appied in case greater security tas rethe strategic general transmittal form. (1)

Heading:

Frefixes

were the same as in

(b);

(2)

addressee,

for distribution list

addressees,

part or all of the conventional message text were made into code form and. inserted at the

end of the text (Call si

code signs).

d.

Tactical transmittal

form

nous,

This transmission form was to be used. when volumiprompt and smooth handling was required.. The main form of communications was broad.castir and direct communications could be effected. when necessary, Heading: (1)
(2)

Only necessary matters were to be entered;

Senders (these were not inserted special mention wvas omitted address and distribution list in the required)

addressees text, unless were usually

Ending:
e, Aircraft

Same as the basic transmittal

communications transmittal form

form

Because munications,
simplified for

of the characteristics of aircraft comthe tactical transmittal form was further

sole use in aircraft communications and

in. facilit ating :t rin ~Ing Tihe main forim of: mi~-nications was broadcasting, and. direct communications could be effected when necessary. In order to strengthen the
security of call signs -of aircraft, ship and station communications, a different call and ending was used for this transmittal form, c ssifying' them as ? r-basic
transmission,
-ur~
f.

air-I
tt~

or air-2
.LU-1
formI

transmission.

-----Fixlergen

q
t ransu

ta,.l

the most simplified transmittal form used and the ending (station callsims were omitted), and. was adopted in case of great
to transmit only the text urgency. g, In case acknowledgement was required and. direct com-

This was

munications were. to be effected in various transmittal

forms, at the

Conclusion ofthe ending switch-over from broadcasting

the

acI~owle

:ement

req~uest

sign was transmitted indicate the

4.

in case

the indication of freq.uency in communications was

required,

abbreviated freqluency code was used. for security puarpose.

5. he~t o relay methods were the ordinary relay method. (usual relay method)j and emergency reley netho

(a_ method of r'ela bro^.d-

cast in which u essages received were rel

in

a,

as they

were received.
the r e c eivii

order to

mini ize

delay)

Relay

instructions

wsere prescribed for

such instances wherein there

was vagueness

or doubt in

oi' messages.

6,
7,
under

When

jaming was perceived,

'

s irs ion was r eauired

to

be

susoended at once. Radiation of radio wa ve was so arranged that

it could

not,
the

any

circumstances; be urndertaken

without

the

-permission of

communications officer.
of

At the same time,

for the prompt handling

communications

in case radio control was not i.force' Fin strata-

aic and other areas) for the radiatI on of radio wave, tor (radiotelephone operator) would obtain
following matters

the

comm n.>

permission

only on the

prescribe'.

by the communications officer:;

a,. Correction of mistakes

b.

in transmission; to radio transmission (voice tre nsmi ssi on); c. Reply message in testing and. transmitting call signs.

Reply

h 8, Te

service

rmessage

was

di.vidd

into

the reply

to trans-

mission and service message.

The reply to transmission was limited case

to an extremely small. number (in

of aircraft transmission,

it

was generally

the same

as

that

used

in

the past),

the use of which

was left

to

the operators,

depending upon

the situation,

E cet
necessary,

for the above, the

Navy

when the communications officer deemed it

communications

code books (the numerical and sign books, than the currently used procedure
were to be used for general

the security of which was better

signals, and which were

easy to use)

communications. the abbreviation

importances

Eowever,

in

the case of aircraft

communications,

' 1 RI-YA-QTSJT

was prescribed for those of special

9,

The operations

liaison (liaison

absolutely necessary for

operations and security), radio sets),

testing (used exclusively for testing liaison (call and relay) were as new:ly

and call-reply

prescribed and placed under the

1 single heading O'liaison 1

Unification

of the Code Re Ulations

The

ode books

had their respective regulations concerning their There-

use but the fore,

contents of these regulations were much the same,

unified regulations was made,

the. suggestion for

code was

[ut as multiof securi-

formity of

rather advantageous

from the viewpoint However,

ty,

the suggestion was not carried

out.

it

was decided

that

a unified code book should be provided for both the numerical code
and letter code including the headings. and indexes of the code method

to be referred to.
The compilation of the code book

URO(A,

which was to replace

the code

book

I"D", was

started in

the latter part of June

1942

and

completed in
the

the latter part

TIOTS{Jt

of July.

This code book, together with

valid

code book

which

was still

was,

immediately distri-

buted to all

the units of the Combined Fleet.

The distribution and aircra'ft was to and enforcement Since then,

within the Corbined Fleet by means of destroyers

completd

by early Septembe.

The distribution

by the China Area Fleet took an additional month or two.

new code books were prepared successively and everything proceeded smoothly by the end of
In view of the fact

1942.
that the distribution of code books had

taken one and Fleet,

a half months even with the assistance of the Combined

stiudy of measures re-.

there arose the demand for the urgent

garding further distribution due to the revision of code books..

Revision ith air fleets the failure of

of Code Books the as some main body of aircraft the

the Midway operation, as well

was completely destroyed

car-.

riers. code all

As a result

of this

situation,

it

was

feared that some of the changing

Hoe

books lost were seized by the enemy and necessitated the code books (except those used for information).

ver ,

the staff

of

the Combined Fleet was of the opinion that if

they would not held the cause an immediate

there were
The taken books as

any code books lost, Central was to

danger.

Agency also

same opinion and the

only action

apply the emergency regulations

(using the old code

the master code) as a temporary expedient.

Subsequently, their importance. all the code books were revised in the order of was

The additive method

(numerical code system) and the titles

adopted to a greater extent than before were revised to disguise

of code books The

any suggestion of their

contents.

existing

code books were named by their system (use in

contents and catalogued by calendar signs). were added to the

the "JIKKA!"

of the ten Japanese number, Roman letters

When

code books increased

titles.
Code books had hitherto been revised every several years, the regulations for their use as and

well as the additive- tables were in view of.the increase in

revised every 6 to 12 months.

However,

communications, more frequent revisions were made according to the following standard:

i.

Strategic code book and its

regulations for use:

Every six months or one year.

2.

Additive table and its

Every one to use.

key table:

six months according to the frequency of

3.
4.

Tactical code book:

Once a month.

Call signs.
was changed once a month; the change by The original a modification table was made every day or once a week.

Distribution System of Cryptogaphic Publications The Navy Library and the Naval District Libraries respectively,
served as the cryptographic publications distributing organs for

the Central Agency and for each naval district. The Navy Library was attached to the Secretariat of the Navy Minister and its chief librarian

was

charged

with

the custody and

distribution of Navy publications.

A chief librarian-was assigned

to each Naval District Library v ith the concurrent position of assistant to the staff officer in charge of the custody and .preparation of publications. Since there was no direct connection of command and supervision between the Navy Library and the Naval District Libraries, distribution could not be carried out smoothly, and the increase in the number ofcopies .and frequent renewal of cryptographic publications necessitated a drastic reform of the distributibn system. In March 1942, the Navy Library became the 5th Section of the Naval Ship and Ordnance Department and the chief librarian of the Navy Library was concurrently assigned to the Naval Ship and Ordnance Department to be in a better position to command and control distribution. Although this reform of the system greatly facilitated the transportation of cryptographic publications, the marked decline in the general appreciation for the maintenance of secrecy and the importance of publications. the code and cipher caused the frequent loss of these In addition, the whereabouts of many cryptographic Much time was taken

publications became unknown during transit.

for investigation to determine whether there were any cryptographic

publications carried by transport short,

ships when they were sank.

In

the merits and demerits of this

system were about the same who appreciatpositive

and only the Naval Ship and Ordnance Department staff

ed the importance of the cryptographic efforts in making effective

publications made

use of the new system.

The results were satisfactory in

part, but the conspicuous

drawbacks of the new system were that the personnel became lax in
safeguarding secrets and that cryptographic to be missing for long periods of time. Taking into consideration and Naval District the capacities of the Navy Library were publications were found

Libraries, the cryptographic publications

distributed to each department and the code book contents scheduled to be revised were made known to each department half a year before the revision. tion, this However, in consideration of the scope 1940 and orders perse of distribuissued by

system was changed in

radiotelegraph because the old system involved complicated procedures due to frequent changes in schedules. It was decided to in

notify

en

bloc the schedule and change of schedules

monthly reports by-the

Telegraph Section. In order to -minimize security IaccideQtst

had been put into use , it was decided after the to code books Which

M'Aidway operation that

only the current code book and that

for the next phase of operations be kept in the libraries. successively the

should be distributed and that the rest

Accordingly, in

view of the necessity to distribute

frequently revised code books in time for use, it was decided to issue detailed instructions concerning the distribution twice a

month

in addition to scheduled cancellation notices and other reThese instructi ons were

marks in the Navy Official ieport Appendix.

to be given exclusively to the headquarters and local distribution

offices, and other departments were to be notified by their respctive commande:cs.

with reference to the monthly report, a

was instituted in

distribution division

the Telegraph Section to make

a detailed

investi-

gation of the actual distribution of code books in compilation of the report in in

addition to the

an effort to achieve maximum efficiency The code books,.-

handling code books and safeguarding secrecy:

upon completion, were transferred to the Navy library directly from. the printing office undier the supervision of the

Bureau-of

Naval.

Affairs which immediately transferred them to each Naval District Library. Transmission was effected under the escort of librarians.

The local distribution offices

conducted

mass transportation under

the escort of their staff members, but as for distribution to minor offices, the recipients were summoned or the code books were forwarded by registered mail.
The .return of code books from various units was made in the Homeland as soon as orders for cancellation were issued; seas areas, they ere returned when ships were available; books in from

over-

and code

custody of ships were returned when the ships docked in

Homeland ports.

Later

however, shortage

due to frequent of transports,

"accidents"

during charge

transportation and the

the officer in

of code. books was to burn them and then notify the writing to that effect.

Navy MIinister in

Enforcement of the Code Area System

As the war situation turned unfavorable,

many forces vere isothe distribution nan drastic

lated

at 'widely remote places.

Accordingly,

of
measures

cryptographic publications became very difficult were necessary for this distribution. Thus, it

was decided to adopt

the code area system (Chart 7). The entire theater of operations was divided into 11 code areas,

and of these, nine were grouped into three categories

in Chart 7)

(,

Y and

when unification was required from the , operational viewas -the code book used other

point.

The code books were differentiated

exclusively for communications w+ithin the area (non-related to areas),

and the code book used for comnunications between the headJapan Proper, the

quarters of the area and the Central Agency.

greater part of China and Formosa were excluded from the code areas and the old code system was observed. The code book for the exclusive use

ithin

a code area was for

called Code System "HA" , and Code Book "HA" , the Regulations Code "HA", and Key Table been compiled in "HA" were used.

As Code Book "HA" had not

time, Code Book .t"Tt

Iwas

used instead.

The code

Code Area System

[ea

Chart 7

Theater
South China Hainan Island Maaya

Control Center 2d China Expeditionary

Fleet

1 "R

"{Ai =
No 7

Hainan Chiard fist

Hq 10th Area Fleet.

J~

umaraHg

(10th Comm Unit) let Southern Ex~spediNorthtionary Fleet Borneo

(10th
Comm Unit)

No

o 13

No

ThailandoCi

French Indo-China

11th Base Force

No

No

Java S and E coasts of Borneo Celebes

Lesser Sunda Islands

Ha 2d Southern Expeditionary Fleet .(21st Comm Unit.)

No

No

Covering J, areas

L and S

Hq 10th Area Fleet (10th Comm. Unit) Hq 10th Airea Fleet

(10th Comm Unit)

No 13

Covering
areas

K, N

and S

No 14

Burma

Hq 13th Base Force

(12th Comm Unit)

No 11

No 11

Philippines Area north of Australia Bonin Islands Iwojima 'MarcusIsland

Hg Southwest Area
Fleet

No 10
___1_

No 10

Hq 25th Base Force. (24th Comm Unit)

No

~-ake

Island

Hq Chichijima Base Force (Chichijima Comm Unit)

Eq 27th Air Flotila:

No

N o 15

Pagan

Southeast area East Carolinelarshall area

Hg Southeast Area Fleet (8th'Comm Unit) Hq 4th Fleet (4th Comm

Unit)

No 12
No

No 12

Covering N, 0 and P

areas

Hg Southeast Area Fleet

(8th Comm Unit)

No

Iest

Crlie

q 30th BaseUnit) (3d Comm Force Hq Takao Guard Dist (Takao Comm Unit)

0o 9
No 8

No
Ao

gg

Formosa Remarks: 1. 2.

3.

"I"codes were for use between the center of a code area and the Central Agency or C in C Combined Fleet. 1 "RB0 special codes, were for use between the following important sections: Central Agency; C in C Combined Fleet; commanders of various fleets; commander of 27th.Air Flotilla; commanders of important base forces (those at Kurile Islands, Chichijima, Okinawa, Fort Arthur, ?ashin, Yangtze River, Amoy, Hongkong, Tshingtao and Mako); 9th, 10th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 15th, 21st, 22d, 23d, 25th, 30th, 32d, 33d Base Forces. "HA" codes were for use between various sections within a code area.

book was common to

all the code areas but the regulations for code

and the key.table were different. The code book for use within the code area was distributed to every communications organ in the area and arrangements were made so

that only the Central Agency and the Combined Fleet headquarters

could communicate directly with the areas.

tributed also to the naval districts

The code book was di'in Japan

and guard districts

Proper and Korea to be used for interception. the numerical code by the additive panel.

The code method was

The code book used for communications between each communica. tions center was called Code System "I", Regulations for The Code Book tI Code "I"
, Key Table

utilizing

Code Book "I",

"I" 'and Additive Strip "I".

time so that Code Book

had not been compiled in

"RO"

was used instead.

In the beginning, it was planned that all the code books and Actually they were

tables should be different for

each

code area.

made different except the code book, which was used in

there was no code for use in the group areas,

common, but
The Central

WY and Z.

Agency and the Combined Fleet headquarters

harnk

possessed all

the code

s ,il the naval

districts and guard districts in Japan Proper The code method

and Korea possessed only the decoding books. approximately the same additive as Code

was

"HO,

but to strengthen security, the

t strips"' which were attached to the additive panel were

frequently changed.

When the distribution

impossible, lished for Area F that area used the before

of code publications to District

special the tROn code hich

F became

had been estabcode area system

enforcement

of the

as well as the code regulations and additive table* specially designated for that area.

The code area system was gradually carried out by areas where
the revision of the codes 'IROU and nTENit was not feasible in case

of security taccidentl, almost all this

and in

LMay 1945, the system was In

in

force in the use of

the code areas

(excluding Area F). Area B

Area F,

system was not possible.

Was dissolved because the

Burma area was lost

before the distribution.

Area

T (Formosa)

was

established after the enemy landing at Okinawa.

The Exchange of Code Books By the end of 1944,

to facilitate operations

with the Army

order
first

it

became

necessary to unify codes in

and as the

of the

Army and the Navy,

step,

it

was decided to interchange

Navy and the Army had were a Army for different

the currently used code books

The varieties difficult the to code of use.

between the
books of the these books

mutual utilization. code form, and the

so numerous that the

Navy found it

Moreover,

administration became

complicated because

notification

table consisted *The additive .a .code group composed of five -letters 0 to 9 each. The use of this code

of

an irregular

arrangement

of

with numbers ranging from

was limited to once for a unit.

on their

usages was apt to be delayed; them.

therefore, the Navy could

hardly ut?lie

On the other hand, the Army utilized naval intercepting information for Army air transportation to the Southern Area communications mainly to

code books very effectively in intelligence. was disrupted however, as air

and there was only the air

the northern ksiatic

was used in

continent, the code book for air transportation

of the Japan Air Transportation Com-

the communications

pany.
Security "Accidents" hMajcr security "accidents" and Coiintermeasures

concerning code and cipher and their rar were as follows:

countermeasures
Submarine

in the Pacific

I-1 at Guadalcanal Island:

While transporting provisions to Guadalcanal Island,

submarine

the

was stranded on the coast of Kamimbo during combat

with an enemy motor torpedo boat.

of its hull above the water.

It

listed and exposed part

persons evacuat-

The responsible

ed some of the military top secret documents from the craft and buried them in the coastal sands of enemy territory where there

was every fear of their

being dug out plus the fact that

water-

soluble ink had been used for only a few of these documents The loss comprised many code books for future use in to those in current use, totalling addition This

about 200,000 copies. the "accident"

fact was reported about a month after

when the

crew involved returned to Rabaul,

Although the Submarine Squad-

ron

Corn and issued orders to dig them out and destroy them one or two of the numerous places where the docunot be located.
code books left T oreo-er, in the

immediately,

ments were buried could

a considerable number of

as there were
aerial

submarine,

bombardment and torpedoing by submarines was complete destruction was not confirmed.

carried out, but

Countermeasures:
1.
Emergency measures were used.

taken and new code books vsere

2.

The additive table of the wartime code book vas immediately revised and the encoding procedure ras altered. The original of the strategic code book was not changed.

3.

"Accident"

during in

trap

port to

Tsingtao ;ere being trans-

1943,

when crytographic publications

ported from Kure Naval Ship and Ordnance

Base Force, the box containing

Department to Tsingtao
opened 6

them was inadvertently

This-was
failure to

charged have a

to the Naval Ship and Ordnance Department's

responsible officer cognizant of the import-

ance of cryptographic publications.

Countermeasure,.,
1. Emergency measures were taken.

"Accident'

on Bia'k Island: hern the enemy assaulted

Biak

Island. in

May 1944, the

garrison unit, anticipating danger, had the radio crew carry the code books to another communications room. The radio crew

encountered enemy soldiers on the way and the code books were lost in the fighting. This "accident" was reported to the Cen-

tral Agency about three weeks later because the responsible officer of the shore combat unit was negligent in reporting it earlier. Emergency measures were taken immediately. Since the

A-GO Operation was just in the planning stage, overall emergency measures were taken. gation,: it As a result of prompt and thorough investi-

was

found that only one or two codes were actually How-

missing and nothing had happened to the important codes.

ever, as emergency measures were taken for many codes on the basis of the careless report, communications were slowed down considerably. In addition, as this "accident" happened immedia-

tely before the A-GO Operation, progress on this operation, was seriously affected.

Countermeasures:
1. Overall emergency measures were taken. 2. The encoding procedure was partially altered. The original of the strategic code book was changed.

3.

Jettisoning of code books from transport plane of the Fourth Fleet: A transport plane of the Fourth Fleet flying from Truk to Rabaul in 1943 cast its cargo into the sea during flight because

of motor trcuble. some

It beLame kncN

that

the

cargo comprised

code books and there vwas fear that they

might be adrift.

For fear that the

code book:s. being tightly packed, would remain

adrift

for a long period and as the place of "accident" countermeasures

was

somewhat near the coast,

Countern' asure::

were taken immediately.

1.

Emergency measures were taken.

"Accident" A

of code books washed from transport

submarine: air at during debarkation

submarine was attacked

for a

from the

of cargo destined
The craft

unit stationed and the

Salamaua, New Guinea. on deck

suddenly submerged

cargo which was

was washed away.

Among the cargo were

some cryptographic

publi-

cations.
Countermeasure:
1.

Emergency measures were taken to some extent.

Freight-car door "accident": W{hen cryptographic publicaticns train from the Yokosuka Naval District were transported by freight Library to the
in 1943, to it

Ominato

Naval Ship and Ordnance

at the destination that

Department

was discovered
the freight-car

the lock fastened

door had been lost

in

transit.

Whether it had fallen off or

the door had been purposely opened could not be ascertained.

Nothing was amiss with the packing.

Countermeasure:

1.

No measures were taken.

Loss ' during railway transportations

When cryptographic publications were sent under escort

fron] the Chinhae Communications Unit to its they were lost detachment in 1944,.

due to negligence during transportation and were

not recovered despite thorough search. Countermeasure: -1--Emer..gency measures were taken by distributing code book. of lost duplicates

Besides these seven major code "accident"

cases during the two

years from 1 January 1943 to the end of 1944, there were a number of minor cases. Approximately 2,000,000 copies of cryptographic publi-

cations for current and future use were discarded due to these seven

"accidents".

For the safeguarding of military secrets, measures to

minimize losses due to "accidents" were so earnestly desired that the

"strip additive panel" device cal use in ly studied.

-came

to be. adopted and put into practiresults were thorough-

part, though the war ended before its

Apart from the measures taken due to the "accidents" mentioned above, the "additive strip" was used together with the additive table

as a measure to further increase security of code from the middle of

1944.

In

enforcing this

system, the revision of the strategic code

book was effected by advancing the date

for the regular revision.

The Japanese Navy could not obtain any actual proof whether the code was broken by the enemy, the lost although it was presumed that Therefore, some of the con-

code books had fallen into enemy hands.

jecture was that,

although secret communications might have been inthe important code books in by the enemy. However, current use could

tercepted by the enemy, not be directly tors utilized

the following fac-

were taken into considerations

1.

Since

the Navy revised its

important it

codes (at least was quite

the

additive table)

about every month,

certain

that the codes were not broken by the enemy inasmuch as numerous codes were used at not too frequent intervals. 2. It was presumed that if any messages were broken by the code book

enemy, it in

was because cutpost units used the old

re-transmitting radio messages

when the new code book

had not been distributed to them.

3.

As the Army revised the letter

substitution table

for send-

ing telegrams, the enemy could have broken the code by

ob-

taining cross-checking data concerning matters identical

both in the Army and the Navy. reliance was not placed in the diplomatic rela-

4.

Ccmplete

tions code. At any rate,

the Americans reported that the disaster to Ad-

miral Yamamoto at Buin,

Bougainville,

was due to cryptanalysis.

However, this was impossible as his movement was never dispatched in the

Navy

code.

Furthermore, from the success in the Kiska withdrawal

operations and others, it -was concluded that the main code book had not been broken. List of Code Books I.* For strategic and administrative use: a. Naval Code Book (KO): Exclusively used for communications between important communication organs. b.; Naval Code Book (SHIN): Used' for coimunications concerning logistics but rarely used because the code personnel were accustomed to the use of Naval Code Book (D). c.' Naval Code Book

(D):

A numeral
2. For tactical use. a.

code book which was widely nd proficiently used for most communications.

Naval Code Book (OTSU): Used for tactical communications of stfrface forces; revised once or twice a year.

b.

Naval Code Book (BO): Used for local actions.

c.

Naval Code Book (F): Used for air communications; revised every two

months.
d. Naval Code Book (C): Used for air communications and other miscellaneous

purposes.

e.

Naval Code Book (H): Used for air communications in the China area; simple letter transcription method code which could be readily revised at any time.

f.

Naval Code Book (EI).

Used for land. combat in

the China area.

Widely

used during the China Incident, but sparingly used after the outbreak of W orld War II. There was a tendency to use the Naval Code Book (OTSU) in place of this code book. g.

Code Book for the Its

Army-Navy

joint operation:

use was suspended due to a security "accident"

by the Army. h. The Combined Fleet Special Code A collection of cede (A).

phrases. reports.

3.

For communications

of intelligence

a.

Overseas Secret Telegraph Code Book:

Kept in reserve but was to be used for ccraunica-

tions between attache's and the Central Agency. b. Naval Code Book (J):

Used for communications between attache's stationed in Europe and America and the Central Agency.

c.

Naval Code Book (iMI):

Used for intelligence communications in the China

area.
d. "IC": Used by intelligence agents. "I C-A" : This was distributed to officers stationed

in

Great Britain, France, Italy, Spain,

Portugal, Turkey and Soviet Russia.

"I C-B":

Distributed to the headquarters of the Second China Expeditionary Fleet, the officers stationed in Canton, and the headquarters of the Canton Base Force; headquarters of Mako Naval Guard District, headquarters of Takao Naval Guard District and headquarters of Hainan Naval Guard District. Distributed to the officers stationed in North Korea, Khabarovsk, Manchuria and Eorea; headquarters of Chinhae Naval Guard District. Distributed to the officers stationed in America, Canada, Mexico, Brazil, Argentina

"I

C-C":

"I

C-D t:

and Chile.
"I C-L": Distributed to

Burma..
e. "The New
0

the officers stationed in

ode Book":

Distributed to the" officers stationed on the ern coast of America.,

4.

west-

Code books commonly used for communications with service branches outside the naval service. a. Shipping Secret Communications Regulations:

Used in communications with merchant ships. These regulations provided for encoding call signs and

names of the senders and addressees;

and for the'

text the code from "Naval Code Book (S)" was applied. b. Naval Code Book (B): This book was distributed to merchant ships of more than 1,000 tons. c-. Code. Book for Fishing Boats: This was distributed to all vessels.

d.

Naval Code Book (W):

Used for reporting all ships (foreign) entering and clearing ports. This book was distributed to
principal naval headquarters and above, local

resident officers, custom houses and Naval Harbor Master's Offices. e. Standard Code Book for the Three Ministries:

Used by the Navy, Army and Foreign

It

was distributed to

Ministries. the diplomatic officials

stationed in East Asia and principal Navy and Army headquarters.

5.

For miscellaneous uses. a. Naval Communications Abbreviations:

Abbreviations for ranks and positions, the names of agencies and communications phrases. b. Primary Signal Book: This was also used in c, Special Abbreviations visual signals.

for the Combined Fleet:

The abbreviations used for tactical communications, for' communications with temporarily established radio stations and for communications inspection.

d.

Naval Call-Sign Table: This was distributed to all communications agencies.

e.'

Special Call Sign Table for the Combined Fleet: Used for tactical Fleet. communications of the Combined

Disposal of Code Books In by fire the latter all

After the End of the War

an order was issued to destroy

part of August,

the cryptographic Code Book "ROa

publications except the following: their regulations for use

(3) and (4),

and

additive tables; Code Book

"TEN"

No 1, its its

regulations

for

use and additive table; Code Book and its

and its

"HA",

regulations for use regulations for use

signals in use.

key table; the Code Book "I", its

key table; call

signs and abbreviation

It

was

planned to keep various kinds of code books at the

offices of the Central Agency for some time but they were all des-

troyed due to

an error by an officer of the -Navy General Staff, and

this created temporarily confusion in communications. day of August,

On the last

all documents were destroyed except Code Book hT"EN"

and related books and tables,

signals.

and the call signs and abbreviation

CHAPTER

IV

Communications

Preparations for War

before the

Te-

.communications

preparations

outbreak

of

war

were

to have been planned according to the annual War

were made program was Charts 9 for

obilization
due to the the

Program but since no preparations budgetary reasons, fall no full-scale (See

equipment

undertaken

until of

of 1941 (Chart B)

and 10 for

expansion

Tokyo Communications Unit

and.

standard TO/E for other cornnunica-

tions units);
The establishment for fleets, ground and the forces of the central and air communications bases necessary in installations offensive of prepa-

operations the

completion

of the wire in

communications nets the communications

Homeland were the

main objectives

rations at
of the naval

the

outbreak of war.
in the

Since the communications

combat area there had generally

facilities
been pro-

vessels

forward

completed

(though not entirely considered. 1942, during offensive

adequate),

were no special

blems to be After the the central

operations, of the

the air

consolidation bases and units

of in of

communications

facilities

occupied territory was emphasized.

However, the

production

fixed radio sets did not increase,.so the operations were carried out
mainly by means of mobile radio equipment (Chart 11). land corm-

Throughout World

ar.II, the maintenance

of overseas

Chp~rt
-xewaar

Prei_:,,ations
Stranry of

Mla

for C orrunac

it

CoinmaUcti Ui t

Preparations
Effect

Objective
arrntem;e

L1 Strenthen c ormunications capac ity. Co mmnic Lions

Tinit l
V

TO To

the unjt to

2,

Est blish
ceiving

reserve sending and. re-

stat ion s.

erve as the central comn mication .unit of the entire, d1avy.

t for

Ta ao ComnTnnicat ions

Unit

.Strengthen coram pications capacity

To serve

communications unit in the Southern Operations,

as

the central

Q:.ir.to Comrication's TUnit

Strengthen comnunications cap city

To serve as. the. central comnunications wait in the ?Lortherxi Operations..

5th (T r 2) Comm-Iunications

Strengrthen coimunications capacity

Unit

To serve as. the central comnnuications unit in the Pacific Operations.

1st Communications Unit

?ro~.d ed with: 15 mobile high frecuency transmitters 15 receivers

To. serve

as the mobile. communications unit dousing the French IndoChina anid Malay Operat ions,

2CL Com nications

Unit

Provided wi the 20 mobile hi~ frequency transmitters

To serve as the mabil1e comunications unit during ,the Philippines and Datch T-ast, Indies Operations.

Chart 9 Expansion of the Tokyo Cmnunications Unit 1942-1944

_ L

Project

Completed

Installed underground receiving facilities with the compound for antiaircraft defense. Equipped with 40 receivers Receiving Facilities Installed reserve receiving sta-

Spring of 1943

tions at the Naval War College. Equipped with 40 receivers

Middle of 1942

Reinforced receiving stations:

Constructed two strongly built receiving station rooms. Equipped with 40 receivers
; --~

iddle

of 1943

Installed Totsuka Transmitting Station No 2: Constructed 3

bombproof transmitting station rooms and installed 16 15-kilt

watt transmitters. Reinforced the Transmitting rooms of the Fanabashi Transmitting Station: Constructed 2 strongly

Spring of 1944

built transmitting station rooms

Transmitting and installed transmitters. 4 2 kilowatt

Spring of 1944

Facilities
Installed control line between the Koyama Transmitting Station and the Tokyo Communications Unit; enabled use of 2 transmitters

Autumn of 1942

Installed control line between the Usami Transmitting Station and the Tokyo Communications Unit; enabled use: of the 100-

Autumn of 1942.

kilowatt, ultra2ong-wave transmitter

hat10

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Chart 11
Mobile Co rnications squi nt Produ~ction clan

Planned Co~auricati onis

:otuy ?roducti on

tqui-iiznt

07anuary
1912

From

From
July

From
January

From July
1943

From
Januairy

1942

1943

1914

High Frequency I obile Radio set

30

50

100

150,

20C

Air Base
o.5

?adio Set

20

50

100

200

30

Portable

r~adio

Set

100

200

300

400

50J

Portable Viery ThiEh

Fregsency Radio Set

l150 00

200

250

3C0

Telephone Set

100

200

300

400

300

101

munications facilities was so poor that operations carried out with the facilities
Te main reasons for this beings

sere ali'ays

in an unsatisfactory condition.
(1)

impossibility

of mass pro-

duction of communications eouirment ties due to American submarine

(2)

transportation difficulinefficient as wrell as

attacks--(3)

lack of maintenance personnel.

ire

Communications

Facilities nets was accelerated for

The establishment of wire com'r unicatins in 1941 as a measure in the preparations

w-r, and

the Navy plan-

ned to obtain exclusive munications inistry.

use of the wire nets controlled by the ComIn the beginning of the war, the first of the telegrap and telephone and guard districts con-

sideration was
circuits in Japan. In

the installation

connecting Tokyo, the naval districts

anticipation

of greater production of radios

after

19.43,

plans were made to complete the air defense lookout communications and wire communications extensive Every effort telegraphs between air bases in the

Homeland

and make inistry.

use of the wire

nets

owned by the Comm.nunications

was

made to complete the installation but due to a shortage

of

portable

and telephones,

of materials and about 1945. importance

other factors,

the work was not completed until

As for wire facilities in was particularly attached to

occupied overseas areas,

installations at base air groups.

102

However, due to transportation difficulties and shortage

of mate-

rials, no progress was made,.

Vhen installation raids,

was completed,

it

was immediately destroyed by air

thus the work remained unThe base air groups which

finished when the. war came to an end.

wetre specially designated in Chitose,

the installation plan

were: ,Kanoya,

Bibai, Paramushiro, Takao, Clark (Philippines), Davao,

Kendari, Singapore, Guam and Rabaul.

Communications of Carrier Task Force In lute any operation, secrecy of fleet

movement had
groups,

been

of abso-

necessity.

Fleets usually maneuvered in

but when disas a rule,

persed for

operations,

the distance between each group,

did not exceed 100

miles.

Thus, communications within a fleet were

chiefly 'conducted by the visual method.

communications

However,

radiotelephone

by short-distance transmitting frequency was the usual On the other hand, as total reliance

means for radio communications.

could 'not be placed upon the radiotelephone, telephone system was

a double or a triple

generally

adopted

and the radiotelegrap hsystem

by, low and high frequencies was also used as alternate and reserve communications means. As task forces also had to maintain. secrecy of movement in their operations, over-all coordination of land-based communications A coordinated system be-

units in

the operating area was required.

tween the task forces

and land-based communication units

was gene-

rally estalshed beroie the otbreak f

war,

Moreove,the fl

103

ship of a fleet
units) required

(or the
transmitters

ship in

charge of corn
wo ld

unications

with outside
by enemy

which
klthough

not be detected

radio direction finders. in early 1944, they

such trnsmitters

were completed

were not put to practical use until spring of

operations.

194

when task forces actually engaged in

Selection of Fleet Flagship There were both advantages and disadvantages craft carrier in using an airNavy

as the flagship of a task force, but the Japanese carriers

of as a possible standpoint a

used aircraft
From the use pacity

as task force flagships throughout

communications, flagship
because

the war.
to ca-

standpoint

it of

was more its

advantageous protective

a battleship against

strong

impairment to of directing

communications facilitiesb the operation, the use that of

However, an aircraft

from the

carrier as

flagship was highly advantageous in over air squadrons, the main striking

it

enabled direct control

strength of the force,

and also the cbmrnanding officer could of reconnaissance

direct-

ly

control

the of the

commander

planes and gain firsthand

when Japan had flying

knowledge

enemy situation.

Therefore,

squadrons

equal or superior in of war,

fighting power and skill an aircraft

to that

of the enemy at the start

carrier had many

ad-

vantages as. a flagship.

With the progress of the war, the fightng power and skill of
the Japanese air
carriers

squadrons decreased steadily.

As such, aircraft
caused the

became vulnerable to

damages which frequently

failture of command funct ion at critical

moments.

Nevertheless,

the fact remains that the aircraft carrier was used as a flagship to the very end of the war as the expedient means mand..

for combat

corgi

Other means could have been easily taken had the radiotele-

phone within a task force been developed and improved to the same extent as the wiretelephone.

Commnications
The number of vessels in the outbreak of the China Incident

uipm~ent

for

Ship

Japanese

Navy at the time of the

was

approximately 330 (1,250,000

tons),

the main strength of ships, 10 marines,

which

consisted of the following: 10 battle80 subs

aircraft

carriers, 35 cruisers., 136 destroyers,

13 gunboats, 10 torpedo boats and 10 special duty ships.

Vessels under construction were based upon the First Plan (four-year plan beginning in l93L.), the Second Plan (five-year plan beginning

in 1937) and the Third Plan (six-year plan beginning in 1939).

(See Monographs 145, 149, 160, 169, 172 and 174),.

Although there was some delay in ships, the construction .of these new

due mainly to the slow production of engines,

no difficulty However,

was encountered in the installation of radio

equipment.

from about 1940 when military preparedness began to be accelerated,

the production of special radio equipment such

as high frequency

transmitters for submarines

and other large-tye high frequency

transmitters tended to lag behind schedule.

105

Military preparations had been strongly stepped up from about

1940, and merchant ships and fishing boats were requisitioned one
after another and converted into naval auxiliary vessels. carriers Large-

type merchant ships were converted to aircraft and small fishing boats to The installation_ minesweepers,

and cruisers,

subehasers aiid picket boats. on these con-

of complete radio equipment difficulty

verted vessels presented considerable on these vessels was often inferior the Navy. yond initial great difficulty

as such equipment

to the standards designated by

Replacements with new radio equipment were necessary beestimates, and,moreoer,

when they

were

installed,

was experienced in

the problem of enlarging a radio source which varied accord-

room and of the adaptation of the power ing to each ship. From the beginning of were rapidly completed,

1941,

a large number of converted vessels with either additional

and these were fitted

equipment or the old equipment replaced altogether. tion and Repair Depots undertook the task,

The Construc-

which was done as rapidly When the war was in

as
full

possible to minimize the docking period. swing, a new naval construction program

was

planned

(Fourth bat-

Plan),

which took into consideration the experiences

gained in

tie

and emphasized the preparation of small vessels. Through appropriations from the M unitions Preparation Expen-

diture,

the preparation of transmitters and tubes for the expedi-

tionary forces was completed.

Hoever, the types and amount of

equipment to be furnished were decided in accordance

ith the amount

of stockpiled equipment and. probable future developments.

From the beginning of 1940, TM-type high frequency portable radio sets had been ordered on a long-term basis for the monthly
output of approximately 35 sets, industry. At the outbreak the

peak production in civilian

of the Pacific War, tubes valued at

60,000,000 yen had been purchased.

After commencement of hostilities,

research

was

continued for

ways and means to imprcve communications, a few of the objectives being: 1. To strengthen the radio room under the armored deck to

maintain radio communications.

2. 3. To make medium frequency communications
'To

possible.

improve, very-high frequency communications for greater

security.
4. To mprove the capacity tions. for intercepting enemy communica-

To attain thess

objectives, the amount of .radio equipment was

increased according to a plan (Chart

12).

The

situation of communications equipment for submarines from

the fall of 1941 was as follovws 1. Only the high frequency transmitter was used and the low frequency radio tumbler mast was discarded. The 17

2.

water
3.

KG very--low frequency receiving set (for underradio reception) was installed.

but ended in

of medium frequency transmitters was planned the experim ental stage since the antenna array Was not completed.
The installing

107

chart 12

Plan

or nr ea

in2' ?dio i uiret

on

' aval Vessels

rye of

hip

Details

radio rooms to 'be provided in four places and the receiving and transmitting rooms under the radio rooms. armored deck to be made the, gian Receivers for the interception of enemy coinr xiications to be increased: six receivers for the fleet flagship and four- receivers for the division. flagship. i:edium fre uency trans itters to be increased: tree for the fleet flagship, t;o for the division flagship and one for other vessels. Installation of 25 ~1ver-high frequency telephones : three for the fleet 'flashin taro for the division flagship and one for other vessels.

Capital 7arshi4

Destroy er

To be equ~ip ed. with an a~dMitiu~al medium frequency transmitter.

Def ens e Thip

To

frequency

be equipped with an additional medium

telephone .

108

(For further details, see Chapter cations of Submarines). In the latter part of

VII:

Operational Communi-

1942, combat operations became very accome in from about the

tive and reports on damaged vessels began to middle of May.

Attention was focused on measures to minimize such

damages and at the same time, serious consideration was given to

a plan for improving communications on ships and

simplifying equip-

ment

in

order

to minimize

the amount of labor and materials required.

various measures were taken into

As a result

of combat experiences

consideration such as-redesigning the antenna to minimize obstruction and damage by gun fire or bombs, the change of location of

radio rooms froni the main deck and upper deck as a

against damage and the dispersion and care ment.v Other measures instigated from the

precaution

of communications equip-

Munitions Preparation

Ex-

penditure, the simplification of command and communications facilities, the abolishment or curtailment of secondary radio batteries

and the readjustment of other small equipment.

Radar Research then information was received that radar was being used in
European theater by both Great Britain and Germany,

the

Japan became

cognizant of the necessity of radar from the tactical standpoint.

Thereafter every effort was made to advance radar research for

mili-

tary purposes.

109

In the initial stage of the war, technical research on radar and communications equipment pertaining to aviation was the responsibility of the Naval Air Technical Depot, while radar and communications equipment for ships and ground installations were handled by the Naval Technical Research Laboratory.

However, chiefly be-

cause of the poor staff of radar research technicians available in the Naval Air Technical Depot, the research on aircraft radar equip ment made little progress, despite the fact the Naval Technical Research Laboratory assisted in the research. In view of the great effect radar had on operations, research on this type of equipment was accelerated by all departments concerned from the outbreak of the war. duction were studied and Navy Various measures' to improve proAdmiral Shimada, presuming

Minister

that the reason for the slow progress

in

the production and per-

formance of radar equipment lay in the administrative systems of the Navy Ship and Ordnance Department and the Navy Aeronautical Department, decided to establish the Electronics Development Depart-

ment

as the central administrative agency, despite strong opposition. The Lilitary

Affairs

Bureau, the Navy General Staff, the Navy

Aeronautical Department and the Navy Ship and Ordnance Department

strongly opposed the establishment reasons:

of

the agency for the following

1. The establishment of an. administrative agency would only

complicate matters and would not expedite the development The slow progress in radar.equipment of radar equipment. was attributable primarily to lack of research facilities.

110

2.

Research and experimental manufacture of radar equipment and production would be impossible without the positive aid and the cooperation of the Navy yards and air. depots. Furthermore, under the prevailing shoftage of materials, it would be actually impossible for the Electronics Development Department, as an independent agency, to obtain the

necessary materials.
Despite all the opposition, the Navy Minister ordered the

es1944.

tablishment

of the Electronics Development Department in March

The new department took of radar,

over 'matters

concerning research and testing

communications and sonic equipment which hitherto were

as-

signed to the Navy Ship and Ordnance- Department and the Navy Aeronautical Department. The department, organized into two bureaus was responsible for research and

(General Affairs and Technical),

testing of radar, communications and sonic equipment.

Although the creation of this

tralized the administrative and facilities,

administrative organization

cen-

control over the research and testing of the decentralized research facili-

radar equipment

ties

remained the bottleneck.

In

November 194,

a committee studied

the problem and. a new system was established whereby would be concerned: with research, testing,

one,

organization

production and supply of The

materials for communications equipment.

Navy

Electronics

Develop-

ment

was dissolved and the 2d Navy Technical Depot

was

established

on 15 February

1945, through the merger of

communications facilities the Naval Air Technical

attached to the Central Agency concerned, Depot, Naval Technical Researci

Laboratory and Yokosuka Navy Yardo

agency for

The 2d Navy Technical Depot then became the responsible

m11

the research, testing production and materials for communications

equipment.
Radar Production

From

the commencement of hostilities until the spring of 1942,

the promotion of construction and installation of radio equipment on vessels was the main task. It

was

in mid-May that radar No 1

Type 2 was installed on the battleship Ise for aircraft detection, and radar No 2 Type 2 was installed on the battleship surface craft detection.

Hyuga

for

As a result of these first two experimental

ventures which were relatively successful, the radar

No

2 Type 1 In

was installed on aircraft carriers, cruisers and battleships. March 1943,

radar

No 2 Type 2 was installed on Subchaser No 43 for

surface craft detection, and on Submarine year for submarine use (Chart 13). for Ships, 1944, see Chart

1-158

in April of the same

(Installation Standard of Radar

14.)
placed a tremendous

Subsequently the demand for rada 'equipment burden upon production.

The emphasis on the transition to produc-

tion of radar and the materials and labor facilities which had

hitherto been laid upon general radio equipment required a largescale study to be made. The Navy General Staff studied the poten-

tialities of various industries to manufacture radar equipment and issued a general production schedule (Chart 15). The, production of radar for lookout posts commenced in the middle of 1942 and installation was carried out under the following plan: (Chart 16)

Chart 13 Tnstallation Standard of Padar for Ships, 194~2

~pe of 1Radar and Quiantity

Order 'Thpe of Vessel

of
Installation
________

N~o 2Type 1

N'o

2Type 2

Battfleshp3 Cruisor Aircraft Carrier Submarine tender Destroyer

(TSUJT - cla ss

2 2

-21

2 1

2
2 2 1

1
1 1

Destroyer
Submarine Chaser

Submarine

2123

Chart 14
Installation Standard of radar for

Ships,

1944

Tpe
Type

of' radar and Quantity ITol Type

0o3

~~Order
lati on

of________

To2

Type 1

Type 2

a Tntercepter

Battleship Cruiser Xircraf t Carrier "ircraft (vi11

3
2 1 2
2

1. 1

2 -2

2
2

2 2 2 2

4
2 1

Submarine tender ~Destroyer

t TSU If

11
1 1 1

c-cass' 2

Destroyer
S ~~ine
Flagshrip

CIE- ser111
submharine 1111
2. 11 1 1
1

'rrsnort suc marire S St ^barine

Transport

114

Chart 15

Radar Production Schedule

Ju1-Dec ape

Jan-Jin 1943

Ju1-Dec

Jan-Jun
194_

7u1-Dec Jan Jun

1944'
1945

1942

1943

Radar for 1 okotit ;ost

20

4C

50

50
100.

50

50

Pox'table

50

Radar No 1
Type

150

150

3
20 30 50 50 50 50

ar for ship L1Se

__

ati-vyessel Radar for shuin use Badar ( .ir

no 6) for aircraft

20

30

50

1:00

150

150

300

500

800

1000

1000

1000

Rad.ar for

20

20

20

20

firing Radar for sear cl i~ght

direceting

40

40
____

40

Radar
intercept 1.00 300

300

300

aevice

From July 1942 Type of Lookout Post of Instal- ] Radars at lation One Place Rate 10 2

From July 1943

Remarks

Monthly

'4Number

Monthly
Installation Rate 15

Number of1 Radars at One Place 2 1

I
Antiaircraftloo

;EClass
F Glass

otstation
stattion

10
Chart 16

Anti-.vessel lookout

From 1944, a great increase of radar lookout posts

was

planned

due to the intensification of enemy air raids and the shrinking battlefront. The object of the plan was to perfect a warning system

by radar nets throughout the Homeland, Formosa, the Philippines, Malaya, Java and the coast of Central and South China (Chart 17).

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CHAFT R V

Naval Air Force Communications

Radio Equipment for Aircraft

In

the preparations for war, radio equipment as well as other

war materiel depended solely on production by the civilian industries. In 1940, the Navy took further measures to increase pro-

duction by establishing the Numazu Ordnance Depot (specializing in

manufacture

of communications equipment).

By 1941, large-scale

equipping of aircraft was planned and the production of necessary radio equipment was set forth according to a production schedule

issued by the Nfavy General Staff' (Chart la).:

At the outbreak of war, the installation aspect of aircraft communications equipment vias limited to installing equipment in any available space. The installation was carried out without

careful consideration of the requirements in battle or the duties of the radio crew during flight. equipment

Therefore, efficiency of radio

-could

not be fully manifested.

In the installation of equipment on aircraft, the fitting of the radio was found to be most defective, operate it under very adverse conditions. and the radio crew had to Receiving was difficult

or impossible because of the noise from the defective telegraph set or buzzers , and as a result , some of the important telegraph messages failed to be received. Moreover, it

was extremely difficult

131

wbart 18

Aircraft

Com. nicat ions

oaui rent Pro action

Planned Monthly ?roduct ion

Tyie

Fomn
Jan
19)42

From
Jul

From
Jan 19)43

From
Jul
19)43

-From

19)42

Jan

1941

A.tircraf.t adio et I_. 1

)QQ

500

1,000

1, 500

2,000

Set No. 2

AicatB~o300

500

700

1,000

1,500

Aircraft Riadio Set I o. 3.

200

300

500

600

1,000

Aircraft PRadio
Set

iNo.4

100

100

150,

150

150

Very Ei h Freauency Badtio Telephone for co lrnifications

100

100

150

150

150

Writhin

the Unit

Horning

direction

500

.jinn.er

1i000

1,500

2,0X00

2,500

132:

to operate the telegraph set in

a plane at a high altitude because

of the sets could

the apparatus was poorly located and adjustment

not be made. The installation work by aircraft manufacturing companies was

also very unsatisfactory. poor testing In

particular,

careless supervision and high-

frequently resulted in

wrong wiring and defective

voltage ground contact or bonding.

In after many instances of defective in wiring, the sets did not function and considerable time was

they were installed

the plane,

required for repairs and maintenance.

number of aircraft to repair.

There was also a considerable

on which the equipment was absolutely impossible

Another defect was the noise, caused by improper insillaignition system; moreover in the installation

t+;n and bonding of the there were frequent

cases in which the mounting bases were of different

size necessitating adjustments tobe made. There

were

various factors for the consistently defective inOne factor which was quite flagrant

stallation of

equipment.

was

that the equipment itself stallation technique. the

was considered more important than the inActually there were no research personnel of equipment until 1944. Those who the vol-

specializing in engaged in

installation

the planning and research in

radio did not engage in

actual equipping of aircraft.

They only considered the weight,

ume and capacity of any equipment and were not familiar with the actual circumstances of those who operated it during flight.

133

Another factor was that the electrical engineers of aircraft manufacturing companies who engaged in the planning and experimental manufacture of airframes knew very little much less its operatiobs. about radio equipment,

They merely did the work of a carpenter

fitting something of a certain size into a certain size into a certain space, and had no idea as to how the equipment could be used effectively. As for the companies themselves, they were forced to rush production of communications equipment and as a result, they deliberately scamped their work. Factory superintendents were so occupied with

procuring materials that the testing of completed aircraft, their primary duty, was neglected. Thus, as mentioned in the foregoing, there were many reasons for unsatisfactory equipment but the must fundamental one was that the installation work was neglected and that the personnel concerned were indifferent as to its effects upon the fighting power. The standard radio equipment installed in various types of aircraft in December 1941 and August 1945 is shown in Chart 19.

A general classification of radio equipment for the land-based attack planes

was

as follows:

1.. No 3 aircraft radio.

2. Fixed antenna for No 3 aircraft radio. 3. Trailing antenna for No 3 aircraft radio (75 m). 4. Radiotelephone for inter-unit communications. 5. Controller of radiotelephone for inter-unit communications. 6. Antenna of radiotelephone for inter-unit communications. 7. Loop antenna for radio direction finder.

134

Char 19-a
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33

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Auxiliary antenna for radio direction finder.

Radar.
Side antenna for radar. Front antenna for radar. Radar intercept receiver. Antenna for radar intercept receiver.

U.
12.

13.

The radio equipment for other types of aircraft was generally

the same as the above. The radiotelephone was

necessary for fighter planes to carry

out effective aerial combat and interception operations, but because of its limited range, the fullest extent. pilot's the pilots .became disinclined to use it to

This tendency was probably attributable to the radio and partly to imperfection of the

indifference toward

equipment itself, but the basic reason for the poor fighter plane communications

was

that there were very few officers enthusiastic

enough to overcome the drawback and make the best use of existing equipment. With the appearance of Type 3, No 1 aircraft radio. set, radiotelephone capacity increased as it maintenance thereof was neglected.. was simpler to manipulate, but Moreover, most of the units had

poor communications due to the lack of attention to the screening of electromagnetic elements. There was originally in existence the Type 96, No 4 aircraft radio set which could be operated by remote control and it stalled in large and medium planes. was in-

Then the Type 2, No 4 radio

set was experimentally manufactured for remote control purpose but its mass production was shelved because it was deemed impracticable.

137

However, since the Type 96, No 4 aircraft radio set

operated on medium frequency, the Type 2, No 3 aircraft radio. set was installed in land-based attack planes. This necessitated the

radio operator's seat to be placed far behind the pilot, m!aking intercommunications difficult. In small planes, too, with the increase in the amount of equipment carried such as radar and other equipment, the space for radio sets became smaller, thereby increasing even more the-necessity for remote control. Remote control for the radiotelephone of fighter

planes was adapted for the Type 3, No 1 aircraft radiotelephone with good results,_and the application of remote control to radiotelegraph was finally revived in the last Type No' 3 experimental aircraft radio set, modified in 1944. This however, was not put into practical

use by the operational forces. Base Air Force Communications At the beginning of the war, the base air force was organized as a unit of the Combined Fleet; consequently, each unit with its own independent communications system was included in the communications system of the Combined Fleet. operations, Later, with the progress of

the base. air force became the main striking strength

of naval operations, and to cope with this situation, communications facilities of the base

air

force were gradually increased.

However,

the capacity of the cooperating land-based communications units was far too limited to satisfy the requirements of the

-air forces

from

1.8

the standpoint of both personnel and equipment (See Chart 20 for authorized strength of the base air force communications department). The base air force's independent communications system encompassed two communication nets, namely, the air .force communications which was considered an operational communications net, and the ad-

ministrative communications
interrupted communications

net.

At the time, it

was felt that un-

.could have

been maintained through maxi-

mum utilization of communications units if the following measures had been taken: boost the capacity of communications units, thereby strengthening biroadcasting communications of communications units; adopt mechanical control for regular unit-to-unit ;communications;

and increase their capacity in handling communications.

Operational air communications centers which were projected to be strengthened were Kisarazu, Yamato, Kanoya, Shokozan (Takao), Clark. Field , Tinian, Truk, Rabaul and 'Se letar (Singapore).. With the

progress

of the war, those in Formosa and Japan were enlarged and

became flexible. organizations with auxiliary centers as reserve installations. As enemy air activity grew in intensity, dispersal in

depth of groups of bases and the dispersal of installations in each base was required, and at the same time, a new arrangement of radiotelephone networks to connect dispersed installations. became neces-sary. However, there was no equipment available to meet the foregoing requirement, and moreover, at this stage of the war, the war

1.39

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industry of Japan was so overburdened that there was no means time to manufacture new equipment.

or

There was no alternative but

for the air bases to use low-power sets which were originally to be installed on ships. Base Communications Equipment The standard for communications equipment supply to occupied bases and mobile land-based air forces was determined after the outbreak of hostilities (Chart 21). The base constructioh policy had undergone great changes since the start of the Inner South Seas Operations. The changes meant that

bases were maintained as a group of bases and that base installations were dispersed and converted into bombproof installations. As a

result, all communications equipment was moved into the bombproof installations. The standard for communications equipment supply was

reestablished in consideration of the speedy execution of this type of large scale conversion work and of the need for increasing mediumfrequency transmissions. .Standard for Naval Air Base Communications Installations and Equipment (established in September 1944) entailed dividing the air base installations into the following four categories: (Chart 22).

JJ44

c rt 22
Standard Coinmunicat ions Eouiin't for Mtiobile l~and:-ased Air Force
Per, n'~ent Base

Comlmicationas aai rent

Mobile >se

Freciaency
Transmitter_________

High Fecuencar

Receiver

P2dio Direction einder

1_.

Mobile Hi -ecqency2L (or 'AG S tyTe) 60 Kilovrolt km ere s igh Frecenc y 40 x 60

Power Source

ilovolt Aimere sigFecuency 3x 1

Description

base corirznication This standaard s hows equipment srnply ; - ctuf.ly , from haf t o co:rnseveral times the zL2nber of per . nication e-~u rment liste& herein. here spa. ied in proportion to the stren:th and mission of

-er

gale

the

base force,

L45

Classification

1
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TrasmiterReceiver
i

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(Ai

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frequency transmission) 5 (some with mediumfrequency transmission)

(C)
bir
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Gp

at large

(later chang1 d to 9)

Air Gp at small
base

(D)

3 (some with mediumfrequency transmission)

Chart 22 1. Major Air Base Communications Equipment Maintained in 1937

(Chart 23).

2. Major Air Base Communications Equipment Maintained from

1938 to -1940 (Chart 24).

3.

Major Air Base Communications Equipment Maintained from

1941 to 1943 (Chart 25). 4. Major Air Base Communications Equipment Maintained in Japan

at Termination of War (Chart 26). Communications of Air Squadrons General Situation The concept of the air squadron communications system and its application, taking into consideration the battle experiences of the

146

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China Incident, the Pacific War. equipment after

was more or less

stabilized before the outbreak of aircraft

There was no noticeable improvement in

the outbreak of war, but instead there was a definite

trend in

which the quality as well as quantity dropped as the supply

scarce. Moreover, the skill of flight

of materials became dropped in ly, the air

radiomen

proportion to

the increase in system had to

casualties and consequentbe simplified according to

communications

the capabilities of the available personnel. Intensive training in telegraphic communications with fighter The use

planes had been carried out prior to of the radiotelephone in

the outbreak of war.

communications

with

fighters was the most

advantageous and suitable

method.

However, since ;it was necessary

for the fighters to coordinate reasons, there

with the attack unit and for security

telegraphic com-

was

no alternative but to utilize

munications to cover the 200-mile range.

burden upon the flight

This placed a considerable

operations,

personnel of fighter planes in

but they successfully overcame these difficulties factory skill in of the war. operational actions, at least

and showed satisduring the early pase

Frequency System Frequencies used by the forces committed' to

classified usages into three types, that (Chart 27) is, A, B and C, an operation were according to the

(See Charts 28 and 29 for Frequency Assignment

Standard and Organization of Communications Net respectively).

172

Cart 27

Frequlency Classification

Classification

U~se es

T~jpe-A air co n ~cations frecwency

T i s will be ased for corn . nice t ions of m-onortant operational matters and matters concerning the entire fleet.

1.

Operation.

Tzmeairthe coy =uicationsthabvintrgh) 2. Con th

communications concen ing flotilla (or unit corresponding to

b uencyn in case each flotilla n~ications v

zz nnhfre

attacks a different target.

Tpe-C air comm xi at ions f recu 121cy

1. 2.

Communications between air flotillas an~d the base or aircraft carriers.. Co mmunication s f or secuiring

homing

1736

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Radio Equipment

1.
is

The standard radio equipment -for various types of aircraft Chart 30, and spare equipment equivalent to 30 per cent

shown in

of each item

was supplied to each air squadron. radio equipment

2.

Changes in
a.

First Phase Operations The types of aircraft radio equipment in late 1941 were

as shown in

Chart 31.

Every item of equipment was produced in rapid

succession and every type of aircraft was,, in general, properly

equipped.

The breakdown of equipment was quite rare and flight

enough to repair and maintain the equipment. of various' areas in the early phase of

radiomen were skillful Consequently, in

the battles

the war, there were rarely any occurrences of poor liaison or dif-ficulty of communications due to breakdowns of equipment to hinder man was assigned

combat efficiency.

Moreover, one radio maintenance

to each -air squadron and he successfully discharged duties in

tion with the flight radiomen* Meanwhile,

coopera-

the Central Agency decided (Chart 32) to

to carry out manufacture improve,. quality and to of equipment in order to

of experimental new equipment effect standardization

and mass production

meet the growing demands of the performance.

expanded

operational zone and improved aircraft b. Second Phase operations The First factorily

Phase operations had progressed very satis-

and the operations zone was greatly expanded.

In parti-

177

Chart 30

Standard

Bdio Eouiment for Varioyus Tyr-es of Aircraft

(xcluding

Radar)

Type of

Aircraft

For Coi iinications the Air Force

with Units Oat side

For

Com=unication

Foi'ce

.i thin the Air

Radio i rect ion Finder

lerge-size
planes

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2 set s

U,-p e

2. set

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1-type

1 }2

(R3,

set

L'

-type

1 set

Sin le-.seater1se1
igohter'

remarks

Gi ie _ a e of f i Ater -o1aeunmit had an addition1 11ti-t,, e set.

178

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180

Chart 32

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181

cular, when the Solomons area became the main theater of operations,
radio frequency unexpectedly became an important problem as data was lacking on the frequency range in this area. In night communi-

cations, high frequency was ineffective operations. Although it was knowvn that

and this

greatly hindered

high frequency is less effec-

tive at night than daytime, this importance areas in in Japan. However,

was not considered a matter of great for air operations in the southern the frequen-

'which night flying was frequently conducted,

cies of 5,000-10,000 kilocycles ordinarily used in

the past turned

out to be exitremely ineffective.

In many cases, a search plane'a to reach its destination Therefore,

report on the sighting of the enemy failed and frequently hindered the execution

of operations.

research and experiments, were started immediately on the utilization of the medium frequency band. Towards the end of 1942, the medium frequency band (2,500-5,000 radio set and sent planes). As a tem-

KC) was first

added to the Type-96 No 3 aircraft operations (excluding fighter

to the forces in porary measure,

part of the trailing

antenna for low frequency _was

used for this modified set.

quency attachment was more quency and as its performance in handling

As the adjustment of this medium frecomplicated than that of

the

high frethe peak

was

not thoroughly understood,

medium frequency was not realized.

With the Guadalcanal campaign as a turning point, the Japanese realized that war production was too slow to meet the counteroffen-

182-

sives of the enemy.

Therefore, standardization of the materials and

products and simplification of design was attempted in order to facilitate mass production. Principal improvements realized from the manufacture of experimental equipment were as follows: 1. Experimental manufacture of the Type-43 experimental equip-

ment (equipment experimentally manufactured in the fiscal year 1943) for various types of aircraft. 2. Elimination of covers to various radio sets for protection

from dust and water.

3.
4.

Decrease in number of relays in various radio sets. Restricting the use of neon tubes by using Argon tubes.

5.

Use of iron and wood as substitutes for aluminiam and copper.

The above were tested and successively put into practice after 1943 (Chart 33). c.
1943
-

The beginning of the Third Phase operations (February

October 1944). As a result of the widespread war covering the entire

Pacific Ocean, the greater part of the highly-trained, skilled flight personnel as_ lost and they were replaced by those who had undergone mass-training in a shortened period. Therefore, interior communica-'

tions technique as well as poor handling and maintenance of equipment became apparent. Furthermore, carelessly manufactured equipment was Consequently,

supplied to the front line forces without being tested.

183.

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184

every unit was plagued with frequent breakdowns of equipment and complaints were received from a number of units that the failure of messages reaching the destination and improper functioning of communications equipment hindered the execution of operations. The

practical and experimental equipment manufactured in this period is shown in Chart 34. d. The latter period of the Third Phase operations (November 1944 - August 1945).
In order to meet the rapidly mounting enemy counter-

offensives,: the role of operational communications became ingly important.

increas-

The most urgent problems were the need for strict

supervision over the increasing output of carelessly manufactured equipment and the need for immediate use of experimental equipment., By March 1945, such equipment had undergone some improvement and was ,ready for practical use (Chart 35). When enemy air attacks by B-29 s increased in intensity, the plants manufacturing vacuum tubes and other various parts of equip ment were successively destroyed. In addition, due to the drop in

productive capacity resulting from the dispersal of plants, the manufacture of equipment was insufficient to meet the requirements of front line forces. Later, in anticipation of the

Homeland

opera-

tion in which all-out suicide attacks were to be carried out, the need for simplified communications equipment for special attack

planes was envisaged and efforts

yoere

directed to the experimental

185

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188

manufacture- of smal l-type radio sets for these planes. The improvemxrent and experimental manufacture of principal equip-

ment was carried out during the period just prior to the end of war.
On the other hand, manufacture be suspended due to. lack of vital of much of the other equipment had to parts: of Type-96,

1.
set,

Suspension of manufacture

No 2,

aircraft

radio

improved model No 2. 2. Suspension of manufacture of Type-96, No 3, aircraft radio

set,

improved model No I.

3.
set,

Suspension of manufacture
TNo

of Type-2,

No 3,

aircraft

radio

improved mccdel 4.

1.

Improvement of Type-96, No 4,

aircraft radio set, improved

models No. 1 and No 2 (adding low and high frequency bands to the equipment turned in for replacement). and test of the

5.

Suspension of experimental- manufacture

No 10, experimental aircraft its

radio transmitter, modified 1944 (biecause

practical value was questionable). 6. Experimental manufacture of No 1 experimental aircraft modified 1944 (improvenent radiotelephone and modification of Type-

radiotelephone,

3, No 1,
7. craft

aircraft

for mass production).

Acceleration

of mass production of No 3 experimental air-

radio set,

modified

1944.
of radio set for special weight). attack

8.

Experirmental manufacture

planes (small-sie

sets less than 20 kg in

189

9.

Experimental manufacture

and test

of the receivers exclu-

sively for the Shusui (interceptor plane). 10. Experimental manufacture and test of experimental radio-

telephone for inter-unit taken to increase

comimunications, modified 1945 (measures power of inter-unit telephone commmunications). on experimental aircraft radio

the

11.

Acceleration of experiments

homing. direction finder, modified 1944.

Communications Procedure Since the establishment Regulations in 1937, all of the Naval Radio Communications were carried out these regulacom-

the naval communications

in
tions

e: cordance

with these regulations. satisfactory in

At that time-,

were considered and were

carrying out the general units to effect

munications

disseminated to all

uninter-

rupted communicaticns. - The contents of these regulations wvere divided into two claeso--general procedures. The general communications procedure entailed communications communications and special communications

between two or more ships or stations under ordinary conditions. Such communications
vere

considered complete after receiving ac-

knowledgment from the ship or station at the other end.

The special (1) communications procedure that entailed the following: was not' required

Unilateral broadcasting in

acknowledgment (2)

from the radio receiving ship or station;

indirect communications

190

by intercepting telegraph messages from a third party instead of directly from the receiving ship or station; (3) collation messages received; (4)

of
transmis-

ship or station controlled communications

instead of permitting free and direct communications; (5)

sion on a certain frequency or that designated by the radio ship or station can be either curtailed or changed; (6) transmission of
.emergency.signal in case of distress;

(7) time synchronization;

(8) and a means "to .calibrate to standard frequency. These communications regulations were also applied to aircraft communications. use by ships However, as they

were

originally e-stablished for

and

local radio stations, they caused some barriers

when strictly applied to aircraft communications and steps were taken

to permit,
a more flexible

application

of

the

regulations.

Aircraft communications were different from other general ship or land communications on various points, particularly in regards to the following factors:

1. There were many instances requiring emergency communications

2.
Large numiber of aircraft used one common frequency.

This

was

in contrast to ship-to-ship or ship-to-station communications. 3. Radio equipment used in aircraft was not as reliable as that

used for ground communications.

4.
5.

Compared with general communications, there were more

tactical communications

which

required simple procedures.

The range of communications changed suddenly and greatly in

191

a short period. 6.
-7.

There were rarely any relay communications to be conducted. here there were no skilled radio operators, communicaequipnent was functioning.

tions had to be conducted to verify if

This had to be' done even at crucial periods 'when strict radio silence was mandatory.

8.

Codes used in headings were required to be brief as possible

or omitted.
mhen

special communications procedures were initially formulatedthey were not standardized

as required for aircraft communications,

by the Central Agency and their implementaticn was left up to each unit as it were: 1. Special communications procedures could not be applied to the communications other than that of the -unit concerned. 2. saw fit. Some of the disadvantages whicha became apparent

'Whenever a unit operated in concert 'ith other units, pre-

arrangement was. necessary. 3. When the communications of other units were intercepted,

the headings of the monitored messages could not be identified in many/ cases.
4.
It was necessary for aircraft radiomen and ground radiomen

to learn quickly the special communications procedures of the new unit whenever they were transferred. From about the end of 1943, heavy demands were placed on the Central Agency to establish a standard communications regulations

192

suited to the actual circumstances required in aircraft communica-tions. Consequently the establishinent of the new communications

regulations for aircraft became the responsibility of the Communications Counter-Planning Committee which was comprised of authorities from the 9th Section of the Naval General. Staff, the Naval Communications School and the Yokosuka Naval Air Group. The new communications procedures were centered on the broadcast communications system. There were actually five classifications

of communications procedures and one of these was for aircraft communications. The principal changes effected in the new communications

regulations for_ aircraft communications' were completed in January 1945 and were as follows: 1. The aircraft communications were simplified by distributing an extract of the communications regulations to aircraft communications personnel. By this means, they were fully able to conduct communi-

cations in spite of their unfamiliarity with other complicated ground communications procedures. 2. A standard reply signal was designated for plane units. 3. uniform. 4. The merits of the special communications procedures of various Communications dispatch forms were standardized Call signals for communications control stations were made

units were adopted. to facilitate usage.

193

Communications Plan for Homeland Air Defense' Operation The air

defense of the Homeland was undertaken by the Army, and defense of the

the Navy 'was in

charge of the air

Naval

districts

and

naval guard districts. district functioned as a

Consequently,

each naval district

or guard

central organ for the air

defense operations, along this

and. the .communications line in accordance

structure was planned and maintained defense

with the air

program of each naval district.

and guard district. As the war progressed and the Homeland 'was subjected to incessant bombings by B-.29's, a partial structure, change was made of the air defense

but no change was made in

general principles.

The Army

expressed earnest desire to effect Army-Navy unification of intel-

ligence
However,

agencies,

especially

the, unified command of search radars. the Army proposal because

<and

the Navy was opposed to

of the

difficulty in unification of communications

setback to

for fear of serious

communications capacity.

By compromise, an agreement was was

made to merely maintain closer contact with each other and this
observed until the war ended

The communications plan for the Homeland air defense operation

was as follows:

1.

The establishment of the new communications system will

defense the objectives of the Homeland antiaircraft Judging from the' disposition of the main enemy air operations. conform to

bases in the south (Iwo Jima and

Marianas),p

and in

the light of

the'enemy air raid' tactics upon the Homeland in the past, a rough estimate can be made as to the directions from which the enemy will attack. 2. The air raid. information a.nd warning system will be newly established to cope with the potential directions of the enemy air attacks in order to locate their approach and' spread the warning to the necessary organs as early as possible. The command communications system should also be adequately equipped to expedite communications .with the interceptor planes. for interception operations.
Plan

1. An, air defense intelligence center will be placed in each naval district and guard district, and auxliary centers will be established ,within the command center of the interceptor fighters according to the area of the assigned defense sector and the disposition of the- interceptor fighter units. 2. The intelligence center will be combined. 3. fullest center and the interception

comma d

radio broadcasting in

Both wire and radio communications will be used, and plain language will be carried out to the extent..

4. Telephone communications 'will be established between adjacent radar stations for mutual use of intelligence gathered by the Army and the Navy. 5. The intelligence report procedures of the Army and the Navy lookout posts will be unified , while the information notification procedure will be revised to facilitate use of information reports by the various quarters.

Intelligence and Air Defense Command Centers The, principal centers will be:
Maizuru, Kure, Sasebo and Kanoya.

Ominatc,

Yokosuka,

Yarnato,

The auxiliary centers will be:

Osaka (for intelligence only),

Chitose,

Kisarazu,

leiji,

M at suyama and Oita.

Lookout Communications Net Policy: In establishing a communications system for lookout -posts,

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cohs in-1

District.h

can A.,ii prnia by placing under izs coto approximate l2O-:3- r'aac'.f

oranz

on Zl

neli.
Ai3
0

.~e

C_ systs witbltttt
be sepr a-

jNJrationa i.le, the ope Asa ru

ccumniaton

net wI ne.Tmteor

t-te

fcmm

n".zc-L.omiicti the administraive

liyba co~-

2~ed~

,. r"xm;te

s ..

iir

th' e

..

w. h.~Q$V adjaetarb
sa geea rle ie ommnctos ntrt J~e wt .a.t th oo .... to connec lookoui edan with adaetarbss onde
-

wil beetbla
#ich they

belon.gae.

The trasmissio=n of informatIon ta oru L ?7r le jhone br"JoaGdca stingm end wlmaepossil th. ietueo

chie of thJ the these inraio e

a:

will be

effecte

by, radi n de-ft^ re ts.

196

Obait Lookou~t Comunications 1Yet s

C ommunications
?'et 1. retails The commnications of rntual stations i ideal, bat due to the lack of commuications facilities and personnel and the difficulty of assigin frequiencies in the center, two or three se~.rate lookout stations w

a~rroxi mat ely

the

Comnninicat ions
vet

Report

center will be included in the same f reoaency as a standard, and each organization will establish three or faur different report nets, 2. This communications net will be used exclusively for reports from. lookout stations. in
which the

same

distance. from the

%ithin

broadcast

method will be used.

3.

In case of lack of facilities, thiis co.incations net will be used for daily ad finistr tive commuicat ions, depending on' the situ--t ion. This net will be subdivided into two or. three communications nets according to the specified areas. (anticipated directions
of enemy invasion).

Communicat ions 1let f or Controlling

iookout

2.

Activities

As a riile, tele hone broadcasting will be carried oat,, .bat the report co=municat ions net will be employed toy control remote stations whi c] are difficult to reach by telephone broadca st ing.

3.This
4.

net will be used exclusively for controll ing lookout activities.

The sinn; taneoas command issuing arpparatus >'7Till be attached to wire commnications. As a rule,, all lookout agencies stationed in the district under administrative assignent will be included in one comunications net, but, especially, .in case a different f recuency is required because of the distance, tw o com u:n-ications nets will be provided.

1.

Admrinistrative Co~mmunications Let

2.

As a. rule, this will be provided .independwill be emplorec. as the report net, depending on the situation. 197

ently of other comunications nets, but it

The- method of indicating the target is prescribed as follows: The target will, be indicated by the bearing and distance from the principal center. (i xarnple): Target number, bearing: and distance (in degrees and kilometers); altitude,

course.s

Iedium frequency will be employed in telephone broadcasting in order to permit radio receiving sets to be repaired or completed for use. To supplement the lack of cotmnunicat ions capacity z'esuiting from the above measure, the auxiliary center and the low frequency telegraph broadcasting will also be used.

Comnunications nets:

Communications
Net

Details

1.

Medium f2requency radiotelephone will be carried out.

broadcasting }

elephone net
for broadcastng air defense intelligence
2. The air defense center ill monitor the intelligence broadcasts of adjacent sectors and include the necessary data in its own broadcasts.

net for

Communications

1.

The existing .communications

defense intelligence broadcast will be used 2

net for the air

broadcasting
intelligence j

air defense

2. Frequencies of adjacent sectors will differ to facilitate the mutual intercepotion of

information broadcasting.
_

I_
Chart 37

198

Organization of command comminuications

- nOtet

iCommunications

Net

Details

Tshi

w ill

be us -ued

exclusively

for

the

trans-~

et

for

ications om command2.

operational orders to the inter.. missiof ceptor fighter units.

irng air d9efenise.

operations Broadcating method will be used generally,
but ordinary communications procedure will, also be adopted depending on the situation,

vwsa
communications

ire communications net, only a

;adopted and ued :chiefl, but

netnt~ is

telephone it .willb'8s

also be used for wire telegraphy, : depending the situation.

,on

1 a ,This' net will be used exclusively for ;the

Telephone .net
for
air

for ommading commsanding:

transmission .of operational orders to

the

interceptor fighter units.

ally

airrdefense

defense

2.- One-way telephone communications -ill gener.talk

be carried out , but -the exchangeof is possible, depending on the ,ituations

Chart 3Ground Control of Interceptor Figters

A new communications net for intelligence broadcasting will the actions of a . small be established with the view to facilitate
The intelligence center of each number of interceptor fighters. sector will broadcast. the information necessary_ for interception operations and the fighter planes operating in the 'sector will maneuver in accordance with the information monitored.

A special command-communications net other than the one me.-; tioned in the preceding paragraph will be established for command with unit and for ground control of interceptor fighter planes.

199

Communications nee: Communications

fDtal
tTi 3s

I
komnctosbe fr broad-t. ~etf aign e l

mission

intelligence to fighter flight or waiting i eadinss, bu

viJ

of

Fue:'e .yv si L used xcluhsively for the tr , pla

can also

e~

":'

situation.

used for ground contr ol ,depending on te Cmuiain -

i2. As

a rule , te le phone br oadcas ti r-k by niggenfrequency will be adopted.

viond to that of the disposition of unite and the assigned districs

I3.

Classification of requ.e ;ci

will corres-

kteleaphone
'Commend

net

1. This net will be used exclusively for ground I control of the figshter pane anis and for _p intra-unit commi~and by thse fighter dane
cmmrnander." 2.

it

Type-B and C high

Chart 39

frequencies

will be adopted

Sunary:

of

Instillation

Work

In November 1944, when large-scale enemy air attacs Homeland became imminent, it was decided to

pon the

imnizlame

the eln for

completing the communications system for the Homeland Air Defense

Operation.

The preparations were

started irnmediately

afe

the

formulation of the plan, and, by .'ay

19415,

the

work was

nearl~y co -

pleted.

20CC

Later as air attacks by B-29 t s grew in

intensity

and attacks

were launched from higher altitude (above clouds), there was a

pressing need for hastening the establishment of a radar net and

fighter homing device. earanhile, warning was used at air bases,

because there was practically no reserve of the new equipment and partly because the air defense of the Homeland was originally assigned to the Army.

Communications Between the Army and Nv From the outbreak of war, joint operations of the Army and Navy Air Groups were frequently carried out, but communications were always conducted by prearrangement and were never qperated by direct mutual communications between plane units because of the different systems used. The

Army

used mainly the numerical code for aircraft comiunicaTherefore, despite

tions and the. Navy used Japanese characters.

the fact that direct communications between the service"s would have been vary expedient, nothing was done about standardizing the systems. The. Arm and the Navy established communications regulations

for joint operations after consultations in Tokyo (in 1943), but as

these

regulations

were- found to be inapplicable to the actual conThen the war

ditions of operational forces, they were not enforced.

situation became adverse, direct joint operations between the Army and the Navy became vitally necessary. This was

particularly

evident

201

when elements of the Army Air Force Regiment) Air Group) were

(98th Air R"

gent

an . ~7t (762d tV.

ir
!.aal

placed under the command of a naval force torpedo bombing.

Th}r r2ftr2

for training in Regulations

N~taval

Communications

were taught to the Army per

n ';,

and in

about four months they reached the point where operations could be carried out somewhat satisfactorily. direct Thereafter, the necessity for

corrmmunications between the Army and the Navy became even but the war situation worsened day by day and.precluded any towards establishing standard regulations.

greater, efforts

Radio Navigation In and accordance with the, demands from the standpoint of security

'operations,

research and improvement of the radio directicn finder oute.ven .before the outbrek

and the guide appara.tus- had been carried of war.

After the outbreak of war, the United States invented many

effective navigational devices such as the radar, the high frequency directional navigation. gation, beam transmitting set and the long-range radio aid to These contributed much to their capability in air

navi-

whereas Japan made little

its

progress from the time

of the

outbreak of war until

termination.

As far as Japan's capability in radio navigation was concerned,

the planes could. not fly through even slightly inclement

weather.
been,

Wnen on a mission, they missed. the enemy which shouldhave sighted, or lost a tactical

opportunity for attack and allowed the

202

enemy to take the initiative.

From about the end of 1943, forced

landings became very frequent because they could not return to their carriers or bases due to the incapability of the navigator. if Actually,

the radio equipment which was supplied at that time had been fully

utilized, a number of the forced landings would have been generally avoided. However, with the low caliber of flight and communications

personnel, nothing could be done to prevent losses as radio navigation was hardly comprehensible. itself

Moreover,

since the equipment in

was

very inferior as compared to American equipment, the

Japanese operational forces had no confidence in the equipment. Utilization of the Radio Direction Finder
The utilization of the high frequency radio direction finder on

ships was impossible owing to the, polarization and turbulence phenomena. Thus, high frequency radio direction finders were established

only as fixed e uipment at land bases, and ships were equipped exelusively with low frequency direction finders. Some of the ground

high frequency radio direction finders were used mainly for the interception of enemy radio communications, but very few were utilized for navigation. Low frequency radio direction finders were actually These

used only by carriers and naval vessels carrying seaplanes.

Ships ,reported only the direction of a plane, and although the reparting of a plotted position-by cross-bearing method was specified in various communications regulations, it was not actually carried

out because the cross-bearing coordination by radio direction finder

203

stations was difficult to execute.

Generally,

the base air forces

did not use direction finders for the following reasons: 1. The flight personnel preferred simple ground navigation and avoided use of radio aid navigation because it was not necessary when the visibility was good. 2. Low frequency radiation was much too complicated to be conducted on aircraft.

3.

Communications authorities were generally indifferent toward this problem.

The carrier forces often conducted training in radio navigation by direction finding from ships and utilized it in actual battles. This method was deemed particularly necessary for aircraft in returning to the carrier. The drawback was that it was necessary to

trail the antenna about 70 meters from the plane in order to radiate low frequency, and this slowed down the plane considerably. Moreover, with the improvement of aircraft and the increase of air-

craft speed, a trailing antenna often broke during high speed. Therefore, the use of high frequency equipment for ordinary communications as direction finding from ships was advocated, and this was first installed on the task force aircraft carrier Taiho in March 1944. The results were very favorable as this equipment kept the

mean margin of error within five degrees, although compared with the automatic radio direction finder, it was still, unsatisfactory.

At the outbreak of war almost all combat aircraft had radio

20.

direction finders, the

miles for large aircraft

range

of which was approximately 150 to 200

50 to 100 miles for the

and approximately

small aircraft
With the huge expansion of air strength, the number of aircraft

rhiaich were to be equipped with radio direction finders increased

greatly
at

However, since this equipment required precise adjustments

and vacuum tubes of excellent quality,

the time of manufacture

production could not meet the demand.

Mloreover,

as production was

boosted, defective equipment was supplied successively to the operational forces due to failur'e to inspect the finished products.

Consequently,
particular,

confidence in

the equipment was gradually lost. of small land-based aircraft felt

In
that

since the pilots

radio direction finders were useless and only increased the weight of aircraftp the radio
houseso The carrier end because task force had radio direction finders to the very horing, but there were many

direction finders were stored away in ware-

of the necessity for aircraft

radio direction finders which could not be used because tional

of poor func-

capacity 9
There was a gradual increase in accidents in which planes were

listed missing due to poor navigation. encouraged the use of the honing device,

The Central Agency,

therefore,

and at the same time es-

tablished a ,plan to facilitate navigation by installing powerful low

frequency transmitters at well known capes and bases to radiate

205

induction waves regularly as necessary. Radio Beacon Before the war, there had been a considerable number of radio beacon stations under the jurisdiction of the Transportation and Communications Ministry, and they were utilized for civil aviation and by some of the military aircraft. However, after the outbreak

of the war, nearly all the radio beacon radiating devices were removed and these stations were used merely as short wave radio stations. From the time. the decisive battle on the mainland was advocated due to the critical war situation,' the importance of the beacon was emphasized again in order to prevent navigation, accidents which would occur because of the deterioration in skill of flight personnel. The

officials of the Navy, the Army and the Transportation and Communications Ministry met and advocated the restoration and utilization of existing equipment, but because of the protracted disuse, its restoration could not be effected as anticipated. Also, experiments proved

were carried out on a portable medium frequency beacon but it impractical. Thus the beacon was not used during the war.

206

CHA R VI
Communications in

Escort

Operations

General Situation The communications in the operations for protecting. surface

traffic varied

with the change of system for escort operations.

the ' conduct of communications cane be divided
naval

For

purpose of analysis,

into two periods: the period in which each the operations for protecting traffic and the period in
traffic

district executed

at the outbreak of the war;

which unified operations for protecting surface

was executed by the establishment of the General Escort Com-

mand (15 Nov

43).
the naval districts and guard dis-

At

the beginning of the war,

tricts took charge of the protecticn of surface respective sea areas.

ation of Consequently,

traffic

within their

the communications for the oper-

protecting a convoy or an individual ship which sailed

through two or more sea areas necessitated the use of as many communications nets. After .the establishment of the GeneraliEscort Command, this
situation was improved. Later however, with the increase in shipping

losses due to enemy submarines, groups were the aircraft

coordinated operations of the air

carried out and a great improvement resulted chiefly in communications. system. Moreover, as the mine laying additional lookout and

operation by the enemy B-29's became intensified,

posts were newly established to watch for the laying of mines,

207

this added a new burden to the General Escort Command's communica-

tions.

The Communications Plan of the General Escort Command The communications of forces under the General Escort Command were conducted in accordance with the Naval Communication Regulations, Combined Fleet Communications Regulations, the communications regulations of the General Escort Command, the communications regulations of various escort units, shipping communications regulations and the Convoy Movement and Communications Regulations. The. foregoing re-

gulations were supplemented with the following instructions: The communications of the surface escort units and traffic protecting organs which are located in the same sector will be executed jointly, except under unavoidable circumstances.

1. Ship communications
a. The communications net will be divided into three categories: escort unit communications net, broadcast net, and the specially established communications net in ,the Japan Sea area (Chart 40).

b. Monitoring by units and ships will be prescribed as shovin in Chart 41. c. The ship or station which is the central communications
unit in each communications net will- promptly brcadcast

necessary communications to the escort unit by the broadcast net (Consecutive numbers will be given to each message). The above comunications ship or station will also monitor the wave of the broadcast net of the neighboring unit and endeavor to transmit immediately the messages concerned.

d.

Escort units and transport vessels will always exercise radio silence during their movement except when special

208

Escort Unit Communications Net

Cat4-

Chart 40-a

cations

Comn

Central
Stato

Stations of
C~omnunications

Frequency Used
_____________

Net

Net

low
fre

Med
_ r 41

High
-

Very-

e q , Higeh F

Ominato Escort Unit Communi-

Ominato Commiunications
-Unit

gOmnat o Surface Escort Unit Wakkanai Communications Unit

cations
Net

Group

903d Air
Hq.

(rE-TAl)
1st Escort Unit

41,350

l.st Escort Unit Coininuications Net

Maizuru Communications Unit

901st Air Group Hq. Force Eq.

Rashin

Base

Fet -Escort

SeventhSeventh Seventh Fleet

Fleet Escort Unit

Unit Eq. Comui(MoJi)

Chinhae

Communications Unit

Net

209

Chart 40-b Surface Escort

Unit

Broadcast Communications Net

Broadcasting
Station

Commnications
Net

-Abbre-

viation

Broadcast
Time

-Frequency
_____

Ominato Surface Escort Unit Broadcasting Net 1st Surface Escort Unit Broadcasting Net

Ominato C ommunications Unit Maizuru Commnunications Unit

Regular

Regular

Seventh Fleet Escort Unit Broadcasting

Net

Fleet Hq. (Mio ji)

Seventh

Regular

Remarks

Broadcasting stations or ships will always monitor commrunications of the broadcasting net of adjacent

sea

areas.

Japan Sea Area Special Communications Net

Coimunications
Net

Central
Station

.Stations of
Communications.. Net Tokyo Commtii ctiosUnt akknaio, inao

-Frequency

Japan Sea Area

Special
Net

Maizuru

nitOm Comuniatins Commnicaions UnitNiigata,

Communications

Chinhae, IMoji.

Rashin,

210

Monitoring by Suirface Escort Unit or Ship

Fleet-level

Chart 41

Diiin Divisiones
lvel

Single Si

omFasi Single esl

Escort

Office of
esident Naval
Officer

he

Ummnc-or tions Unit)

Net Comnuni~

hip
Unit

Flagship
X Y

Vessl, or

Frequency

Escort Unit

X
X.

X Y

X Y

Z
y

Escort Unit Broadcasting Net Tokyo Broadcasting Net No I Arc raft FrequencyZ

Y
____

Air Base

Comm NetZ Japan Sea

Special

Net

CommxZ
Y Y Y

&xbmari.ne
Informtion,
(Weather) 500____

Y
_____

YXXY Adjacent Broadcasting Net Key

SXXKilocycles

Zoo
Y.G.. Z.

Exchange

of communications

Monitoring a Monitoring, dependin on the situation

213.

orders are issued. e. The communications of a convoy with the units outside the convoy will be the responsibility of the ship carrying the commanding officer, except as noted in paragraph f. All the ships in the convoy will normally monitor. through the 500 kilocycles net and will broadcast to the proper party by the same channel and by the frequency disignated by the escort unit when it positively sights the enemy or when attacked by enemy submarines. use the frequency prescribed by the Convoy Movement and Communications Regulations and also the 41,350 kilocycles band unless special orders are issued. While antisubmarine patrol planes are escorting in the air, special precaution must be takn regarding this frequency.

f.

g. For communications within the convoy, each vessel will

h.

Communications between escort vessels and transports within a convoy will be conducted by the visual communications method. Such communications will be completed by sundown except in unavoidable cases. Night ccmmunications will be avoided.
As for

i.

the direct radiation of waves by vessels will be avoided except under special orders, and the ships will diepatch communications through the nearest land-basal: communication unit or by wire. 2.

communications

of ships

at anchor in

the harbor,

Air comunications
a.

The communications net will be classified as the air base co: -unications net and the aircraft communications net, and will be designated as in Chart 42. Monitoring by the groups. will be designated as in Chart 4.3.

b.
c.

Then

an aircraft

sights the enemy, it

will broadcast the

sighting immediately, and the central air base will broadcast this report by the same frequency and also on the frequency of the surface escort unit.
d.

While an aircraft is in flight, it

will maintain strict

212

Air Base Net

Cat442
Chart

Communications
Net

Abbre-

Central

viation

Base

Bases of Afir Base

Net

901st Air Group 1st Base Net

Maizuru

Air Base

Noshiro, Nanao, Komatsu, Mineyaina, Miho, Tamatsukuri, Chinhae Air Group, 903d Air Group

901s AiNeoPthna 2dBseNtAir

901s AirGrou

Chihae
B~ase

Rashin,

Genz an, Our a, Hakata, Pusan, Yosu

903d Air

Base Net

Group

Ominato Air Group

Akeshi,

Otaru,

Noshiro,
;

Bihoro, Chitose, Odoiari'

akkanai,

Frequency for Escort Plan

Frequency ._______

ArGop

Ai Gou 901st
Air

Abbre-

viation

Low

High

Very-high

Group

9034 Air Group 958th

Group

41,350

(ETA

1)

Air

23

Monitoring by Aircraft

Chart

43

Communications Net Air Ease Communications Net

A -ase

(KO)

B - Base

(OTsu)

C - Base

(HEI)

Aircraft Frequency Tokyo Broadcasting Net No 1 Escort Unit Broadcasting Net

Excort Unit Frequency

500 Kilocycles

Submarine Information, (Weather) Air Defense Communications Note:

-I. A-Ease
3.

(where the C in C is located)

2. B-Base (where a base commander is located) C-Base (where a squadron commander is located on a mission) Exchange of communications. Monitoring. Monitoring, depending on the situation.

Key:

X ... Y
...

...

21

radio silence, except for the transmission of enemy contact reports, emergency dispatches and other important information. Special precautions must be taken regarding the radiation of waves.

e.

When an aircraft engaged in antisubmarine patrol sights a friendly convoy, the plane will report the name,
position, course, speed and the time the convoy is

sighted to the base. The base will relay the message to the adjacent air base scheduled to take over the

patrol and at
escort unit ,

the same time report to the local surface In this inst ance, wave radiation above the

convoy must be avoided as much as possible.

f While an aircraft is patrolling above a convoy, it will monitor on 41,350 kilocycles (radiotelephone frequency which is used within the convoy), and will try to maintaro close contact with the convoy. If the aircraft locates an enemy submarine, it will immediately report to -the convoy by the abbreviations specially prescribed

in the communications regulations of the General .;scort Command, and by the signals prescribed in the Convoy Movement Regulations and Comunicatios Regulations.

3.

Communications of ship protecting facilities

a.

Communications between a naval district or a guard district and the. office of the Resident Naval Officer will be carried out by wire, but the radio communications net prescribed by the commandant of the naval district will be used additionally in an or the guard district effort to report accurately and quickly. of the Resident Naval Besides the above, the officer antisubmarine Officer will endeavor to receive directly information, weather reports and monitor the broadcast net for the sea area under the charge of the local .naval district or guard district.

be

c,

The Resident Naval Officer will closely analyze air defense information, establish close contact with the
air defense intelligence headquarters and harbor guard area, and endeavor unit stationed in his jurisdictional thereby to obtain promptly reports on enemy air raids He will send such reports immediately and minelaying.

to the ships at anchor in the harbor under his juris-

diction.

a.15

e.

The commandants of naval districts, guard districts and the C in C of the Seventh Fleet will establish anti-mine lookout commaunications nets in their respective sea areas. communications

4.

Intelligence a,

The General Escort Cormmand will broadcast ant isubmarine information prescribed in the shipping communications regulations. The General Escort Commnnd will broadcast battle situation reports (serially numered) to the forces under the General 3scort Command whenever antisubmarine reports are broadcast. The reports will also be broadcast to ships which are directly concerned, using the call sign directed to all ships (including the forces under the

b.

General Escort Command).

c. The comn dants of naval districts, guard districts and the C in C of the Seventh Fleet will broadcast ant-minor reports for their respective sea areas. Also, the General Escort Command will broadcast a comprehensive anti-mine report (basd on the above anti--mine reports), to all vessels (including the forces under the General Escort Command) whenever the anti-mine reports are broadcast. The force under the General Escort Command will always pay attention to air defense information and endeavor

d.

to receive it directly in order to be on the alert

against enemy air attack.

5.

Interception of enemy communications

a.

The General Escort Command will maintain close contact w ith the Special Duty Section (radio intelligence) of
the Navy Genaeral Staff and other organs concerned and promptly notify the necessary quarters the battle situation reports or warnings.

b.

All naval districts, guard districts and the First Escort Fleet headquarters will order the intercepting and radio direction finder organs under their command to concentrate on enemy communications to de trmine enemy locations and movements and promptly notify the authorities concerned

of any enemy activity.

c. The comumandants of all naval districts, guard districts

216

and.C; in

C , First Escort Fleet may conduct jamming and

if neces-

radio deception against enemy communications

sarym
d

In accordance with the order of the commanding officer,

the enemy communications interception section attached to each escort convoy will endeavor to intercept on the

frequency of enemy submarines and enemy patrol planes maneuvering in the vicinity.

6.

Code books and cipher tables

a. Besides the present code books and cipher tables, the abbreviations and signals prescribed in the comrnunications regulations of the General Escort Co.mand will be used, For communications from surface escort units to transports, special attention must be paid to the code books and call sign list in possession of the other party 0

b.

Communications of the General Escort Command Before the General E scort Command was established, the Japanese

Navy was without a standard system for its submarine operations. Instead,

surface escort and anti-

these operations

were

carried

out

under separate systems by the commander of each unit responsible for

escort. This made it difficult

to

maintain mutual liaison and the respective sea areas under as these

convoy escort forces operating in their such conditions experienced great difficulty.

Moreover,

escort forces were

organized

with various types of escort craft

assem-

bled each time for each convoy trip,

no unified conception of the, The equipment used by these

communications system existed among them,

vessels was generally worn out and the communications personnel were

217

of low caliber.

Under such conditions, it was impossible to carry skillfully and rapidly.

out operational communications smoothly,

after the General Escort Command was established, the grad.'ual

unification of the system and reorganization of the facilities personnel were planned. However, and

the importance of safeguarding

transport routes by surface escort was not generally recognized

by the time its necessity was realized, it was too late to

and

take any

effective measures. Ship Communications Since communications between the various escort units wijere not

carried out smoothly at the time the General Escort Command was established, convoy escort proved weak at the bcundary of sea areas where escort transfers took place limits. of a designated for 'the next area). wherever possible unified.

(an

escort unit operated up to

the over

sea area only, whereby another unit

took

Therefore,. the through-escort and the communications

system was adopted

systens were revised and over the routes from unifiad with for

The frequencies for the communications

Yokosuka to Ominato, Osaka and Saipan respectively were those of the Yokosuka Surface Escort Force,

and the frequenciles

the route between the Kyushu area and Formosa were unified with those of the Surface Escort Force of the Sasebo Naval District. Communications units in the South China Sea monitored the frescheduled com-

quency of the 1st Surface Escort Unit and conducted

munications.

as for the communications

of the 1st Surface Escort

Unit (with its center at the Takao Communications Unit) which was in charge of the through-escort on the special route between Majo and Singapore, the following communications, to the escort forces in order

units

rendered

assistance. of
the

to

offset the limited capacity

escort Unit (by monitoring on the frequency of the lst Surface Escort, Unit and conducting scheduled communications): Unit, 11th Communications Unit (Saigon), Sasebo Communications

30th Communications Unit

(Manila) and 10th Communications Unit (Singapore). After the A.merican forces landed at Lingayen Gulf in the Thilip pines in early January 1945, the special route between

Moji

and

Singapore, fore which the First Escort Fleet (1st Surface -Escort Unit was deactivated 10 December 1944) activity and traffic ficult over the transport route in the South China Sea.

became

dif-P -

Therefore

in February 1945, the First Escort Fleet headquarters moved

to

M4oji

where it became the communications relay point for the transport routes to. north and central China areas. As escort ships were often required to use low and high frequencies simultaneously, it was repeatedly requested that each escort

ship be equipped with one tansmitter solely for low ::fequency and
another one for high frequency instead of one transmitter then in use for both low and high frequency. frequency capacity to Requests were also made for the high

be

increased to that of high frequency No 4

transmitter to meet the needs of the expanded operating sea areas. However, none of these requests were ever brought to realization.

1i9

The communications

personnel were also few in in

number.

Each

coast defense ship engaged

extensive operations under the 1st

Surface Esccrt headquarters had only six radiomen (including main-

tenance) and one code clerk, mile

the old-type destroyers each had Since it was

only four radiomen for every five receiving sets,

extremely difficult to carry out extensive escort communications

under these conditions, a request was made to increase the person-

nel at least to the extent where three receiving sets could be in operatioLL continuously. As a result, a temporary increase of the

radio crew by two persons and the code personnel by one was author-

ized for each coast defense ship and destroyer.

Up to autumn of 1944, escort vessels had not been organized into The escort units had

the escort divisions and destroyer divisions.

been comprised of various types of vessels which had but few opportunities for training and had no
difficult
tions

unified

plan

or system.

As

it

was

for such escort units to carry out inter-unit (ith

communica-

telephones such as Type-90 very-high frequency telehones it was decided to use the handy crystal-

and Igo ;2telephones), controlled aircraft the unit. verted aircraft Thus, all

radiotelephones designed for communications w-ithin vessels except for a very limited number of conand contact with (4,350 KO) to

vessels were equipped with these telephones

was improved by standardizing the frequencies

for communications within the escort forces so as to be applicable

220

both surface craft and aircraft.

With

a view to equipping ships in

important convoys with telephones of this type,

telephone crews was started.

the

training of

This plan .did not materialize

since,

the American forces had launched the Okinawa operations and disrupted transport routes from the southern areas. In early 1945, many of

Japan's

shipping lanes were, in enemy

hands and after May, only the Japan Sea was poses.

:safe

for transport pur'a

Therefore, efforts were made to strengthen the -communications

facilities

in the

Japan Sea area with Ma zru

as the relay base and

Niigata as the centraa Aircraft

port of discharge.

Communications
19, a part of the Army Air

' From May

Force -began to

cooperate

in the antisubmarine operations. However, the differences i communications systems, code books and techniques rances to communicaticnq.

the

were

great hind-

Contact by wire communications adequate.

was

at-

tempted but this also proved

As an expedient measure, a a code book common to both

communications system with call signs

and

parties was established and an emergency frequency (7045

KC)was

pfor important communications such as selected and used from July reports of the sighting of enemy forces -However, even this did not, prove satisfactory because of the complicated nature of the and therefore was rescinded. The various frequencies used for communications .within the air forces under the General Escort Command were unified at 4,350 KG,

method

221

Moreover,

with

the aim to maintain close contact between convoy

escort planes and escort ships, the frequencies for telephone communications

within

air

forces under the General Escort Command were

also unified at .41,350 KO.

In February 1945, the air forces under the General Escort Com-

mand were reorganized into four air groups:

and 951st Air Groups;

The 901st, 903d,

936th

and the base communications

net was divided

into the East and ~Vtest Base Communicaticns Nets with continuous contact maintained between them.

With the invasion of Okinaa by the

American forces, destroyed, tuallylimited

however, part of the air communications nets were communications were vir-

and until the end of the war, air to

the small sea areas of the Okhotsk Sea and the

Japan Sea with only the 901st land the 903d Air Groups in operation. Radio Inteligence
Enemy

communications intercepting organs along the routes for

which the surface escort forces were responsible were Tokyo, Yokosuka,
Sasebo, the 30th Communications Unit (Manila) (Singapore). However, and the 10th Communica-

tions Unit utilization

these organs were not adequate for In particular, the 30th

by the surface escort forces.

and 10th Communications Units, .with their main objectives directed

toward the. east, left the areas of the South China Sea and the Formosa

Strait in a very uncertain state.

In view of this situation, it

was

urgently necessary to strengthen the organs in

the South China Sea

which provided an important route for the transport of vital corn-

222

modities from the

southern

arease

Therefore, a demand was -made for finding net composed of

the establishment of a new radio direction

Samah (reactivated), the 11th (Saigon) and 10th (Singapore) Comm. ications Units with their relay point at Takao.

The 1st Surface utilization

Escort Unit headquarters (Takao) was authorized the full

of the net.

Up until 194, the , foreign commnications 'interception organs

.on

the Japan Sea coast-were directed at the Soviet Union and had Thereafter,

personnel for .intercepting Soviet communications only.

when it became difficult to. prevent American submarines , from entering the Japan Sea,

additional

-personnel were assigned to the foreign

communications intercepting organs - for intercepting American and British communicati ons. From March 1944, foreign communications interception teams, each consisting of one petty officer and three seamen, were assigned to
flagships in important convoys and also to escort aircraft carriers

for the purpose of avoiding enemy submarines and detecting enemy patrol plane s. Moreover, the lst Surface Escort Unit headquarters Maiuru)
These

-was reinforced with six teams and each naval district .(except
and each guard district with two to six teams respectively.

teams achieved considerable results but the commanders could not utilize them to the fullest exent because the ships lacked h1i quency radio direction finders. When it became apparent that the enemy would increase air raids frec

over Formosa and the Homeland, foreign communications interception teams were assigned to major air groups in an effort to predict enemy air raids and detect patrol activities of enemy planes over transport routes. The General Escort Command, in close liaison with the Special
Duty Group of the

Navy

General Staff, issued intelligence reports

and warnings at appropriate times concerning enemy movents,

and

at the same time, issued the Submarine Intelligence Report every ten days. The distribution of the latter report, however, was

discontinued as enemy submarines roamed throughout the, home waters in 1945. Thereafter, the General Escort Command radioed its esti-

mates of attacks by enemy task forces, made forec'asts of any largescale air attacks on the Homeland and issued warnings for the retirement of convoys and the dispersal of ships.

Office of the Resident Naval Officer and Communications To prevent confusion in communications likely to be created by the activities of enemy submarines swarming in home waters and by the intensification of air raids over the Homeland, the communications capacity of the Office of the Resident Naval.Officer was strengthened as. follows:
/

1.

The wire communications net between each naval district or

,Resident

guard district headquarters and the Office the

Naval Officer,

which .had been left almost in total disuse was restored as much as

224

possible 2.
provided

Each Office of the Resident Naval Officer was

additionally

with

one or two portable high frequncy radio sets ,9

one to three receiving sets, together with the personnel requi~red

to operate them

to effect communications by radio as

well as

by

3.

Each Office

of

the Resident Naval Officer was provided

with

intelligence receiving sets of Type-2 and

special

Type-2:-A.

These

were used in connection with directing the dispersal ed retirement of ships at anchor

in

case of an air raid.

Z25

CHA'T R VII Operational Communications of Submarines Irrespective of the mission, whether it be destruction of ships

or cooperation in fleet operations, a submarine frequently undertook independent missions covering

,along

distance,

Such being

the case, it had to facilitate its operational movement by speedy receipt of orders as well as be informed of the numerous intelligence reports on the area concerned. In expediting submarine warfare from

the communications point of view, the formulation of the communications plan had to be based on the following characteristics inherent in submarine operations:
1.

Submarines cover

extensive areas and thus require longdistance communications. In particular, great longitudinal distances adversely, affe ct communications.

2.

As submarines cruise underwater a great part of the time, suitable communications measures must be conducted to assure liaison.
Movements and dispositions of submarines must be under

3. 4.

constant secrecy.

Limited space in submarines restricted number of radio

personnel.

Summary of Communications Plan With reference to communications over long distances and of great longitudinal distances, it was necessary to assign suitable

day and night frequencies according to propagation characteristics of wave frequencies. However, with the limited radio personnel,

226

this

was

not easily

undertaken; furthermore

it

was definitey re-

stricted with respect to the number of radio waves

as well as to the
-

wave frequency itself due to the ' antenna

problem 0

The time of change-over between day and night frequencies was

set at sunset

in approximately the central area of a submarine's

In the

operating area. time,

period a few hours before the change-over

dual employment of day and night frequencies was. prescrib d, A. suitable frequency was, selected
according to the nature of which a submaine was

the ocean and the latitude

of the area in

located. more

In the frequency band,

a relatively lower. frequency was

-suital--for both day and night frequencies in the Pacific.

while a higher frequency was suitable in the Indian Ocean.

Ocean,

In :order to insure the transmittal of messages to a

in

submarine

submerged cruising, the following 'were taken into consideration. 1. Scheduled communications were conducted in order to regulate

the time for a submarine to raise the high frequency wave antenn

or attain the very-low frequency reception depth.

The communications, and, for security

time ,was selected at every even or odd-numbered hour;

purposes, communications were to start, not at the beginning of the designated hour, but

at

the same numbered minutes past the desiate

hour, or a few minutes added to those minutes.

2.- Messages were broadcast twice

at night),

(once during the day and once

and messages which were broadcast during the day

were

broadcast collectively at night.,

As to the time of collective broad-

227

casting, the usual starting time was at about two hours after
sunset on the longitudinal line on the western extremity of the submarine t operating area. to check any

3.

Broadcast messages were numbered serially

messages not received by a submarine.

4. As for dispatches from a submarine, a central communications

unit repeated messages received from a

submarine for acknowledgement

as well as for collation.

5.

Except in

special cases, submarines did not communicate

mutually but depended upon relay broadcasts by the central commzunications unit.
In order to afford greater protection to the secrecy of sub-

marines, the following matters were taken into consideration: 1. In daytime, the time

was held to

a minimum for very-low

frequency wave reception while completely submnerged as well as the

time for reception with the high frequency wave 2.

antenna up.

.In transmitting from a submarine, the time was minimized

by making the messages concise and the transmitting power was ad-

justed so as to minimize the communications range.

3.
The submarine special communications procedure (radiating was

radio waves for about five seconds at suitable time intervals) used to avoid' detection 4.
by enemy radio direction finders.

Through employment of several combinations of day and night

228

frequencies shifted irregularly at about one hour intervals, efforts

were

made

to avoid enemy interception and radio direction fin er

In order to maintain secrecy of the position of a

the folloving were considered

submarine,

in conducting

comunicationss9

1.

A submarine had to prepare all

outgoing dispatches and another position

shs

transmit them after surfacing and having moved to at night. On completion

of

the transmission, the submarine

permitted to return to its

2.

former position

A submarine was required to move to a new position after

completing transmittal from its fozger position. 3.

'iTen a submarine started. for, or withdrew from

an

opera-

tional sea area,

it was permitted to transmit messages from a position

nich

'would not betray its movement.

Summary of Submarine Communications Opraions As high frequency and very-low frequency waves were used jointly

for broadcasting to submarines, there was no particular concern over broadcasts failing to reach their destination during the war. Per -

cent age of broadcast reception by submarines with the .high frequency wave antenna up or the very-low frequency wave reception vwhile

com-

pletely submerged was about 30.percent in the daytime ,

and generally a

90 to 100 percent at night; and as collective broadcasting of messages was conducted was ensured. at night,

the receiving of most broadcasts

Z229

The high frequency radio range with the hi a. frequency

wave

antenna during submerged cruising in the daytime was 800 to 1,000 miles (transmitting range"), while in reception it was about equal

in comparison with that of other antennae; and while surfaced, day

or
night,

no great difference was observed either in

transmission

or in reception as compared to other antennae. As to a submarine's suibmerged cruising depth capable of reception in

the Thcific Ocean, it was l;

to 17

meters

in the

Hawaiian

area, while off the

west

coast of the United States it was about one

meter
Radio
L

less than in the above-mentioned area. Direction Finder submarine was capable of utilizing medium frequency as well1 and this capability was

as high frequency radio direction finders,

an effective asset for antiaircraft warning against enemy targets at the beginning of war in the Indian Ocean as Australian area; but after a submarine (from 1943),

well

as in the

was

equipped with radar

opportunities for the use of the direction finder Radio direction finders were utilized with

gradually decreased.

particularly effective results by the 2d Submarine Squadron in intercepting and attacking the US aircraft carrier Lexington.

20

Submarine Communications Bases

Communications bases used for submarine operations from the
outbreak of the war were as follows

(Chart, 44):
Indian Ocean Area (8th Submarine Squadron) Period Outbreak
to capture of

Pacific Ocean Area

(Sixth

Fleet)

Period

ato

Location
Squ-

Outbreakof wa Kwajalein: (6th o ACommunications

to
Ahugust

of-war Submarine
adron

19 1.2

Unit and CL Katori)

_ _

Singapore

adron Flagshipg Flaghip

Augus

August 1942 to ay 1944

1944munications
to

Truk:

(4th CoreUnit

and CL Katori) Saipan: (5th Cornmunications

Capture of Sin- .Singapore: gapore to April (10th Communi1942 cations Unit)

June 1944 July 1944

Unit)

April 1942 to end of war

Penag

July 1944 to end of war

Kure: (Kure Cornrunications Unit and Tsukushi Mlaru)

Chart

44

Development

of Princi al E ui ment for

Submarines

Transmitter The Type-99 Special No 3 (4) transmitter, 'which was capable of shifting three low frequency waves and three high frequency waves in a single motion, was completed in 1940 and installed in the new submarines. Old submarines were gradually equipped ith this transmitter.

2.31

Very-low Fre uency

'Wave

Receiving Set

Very-low

frequency wave reception was made possible by means

of an amplifier attached to the Type-92 special receiving set remodelled after the all-wave receiving set in German submarines and the test for reception while completely submerged was completed several months before the outbrea~k of war. The receiving radio wave

by this amplifier (with which all submarines were equipped immediately before the outbreak of the war) was of a fixed frequency in most cases, but later in 1944, a very-low, frequency wave receiving set which was capable of changing the receiving frequency was manufactured and installed in the new submarines. Very-low Frequency iave Transmitter As very-low frequency wave reception became possible by a submarine completely submerged, the 17.44 1W,-850 1iW transitter (installed at the International Communications Company, Machi in Aichi Prefecture,

Ltd,

Isami

and which had been in use for communi-

cations to Europe in winter time) was used in broadcasting to submarines by remote control from Tokyo. Radio Direction Finder Besides low frequency radio direction finding, a submarine was capable of medium and high frequency radio direction findings which were quite impossible by any other type of naval vessel. A Type-92 (From Kfure after July 1944).

special receiving set connected through an interstage transformer

with a Type T No

4 radio direction finder was used for this purpose.

a:32

Standard medium and high frequency radio direction finders were

developed about 1944, and several of the large submarines were equip-

ped with them, but they were not put to practical ended.

use before the war

Very-low Frecquency

Wave

Receiving Antenna
of' using the Type-T No 4 radio direction

The, effectiveness

finder's loop antenna as

was recognized, shaft camne to

very-low frequency rave receiving antenna

antenna an iron-

but as the same radio direction finder's used as the

be

antiaircraft

radar antenna,

dust core antenna fixed on

the bridge canopy came into use as a

As

very-low frequency wave receiving antenna from the end of 1944. to the sumarne's with this antenna, submergible depth capable

of all-wave .reception radio

no markied difference was observed when the

direction finder's loop

antenna

was used.

233