UNAMID

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
BACKGROUND GUIDE
United Nations/African Union

M i s s i o n i n D a r f u r
S p e c i a l i z e d A g e n c i e s
 2008-2009 International Model United Nations Association, Inc. Used and distributed under license.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
September 2008
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General
Boston University
Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

Director-General Welcome to NHSMUN 2009! I serve as the Undersecretary-General (USG) for Specialized
McGill University
Agencies, and this is my fifth NHSMUN and third on staff. I served as the Director and
Nancy Henry Assistant Director for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during my first two years on
Conference Director staff, and as a delegate I was on the ICJ and Security Council, so Specials has been near and
Tufts University dear to my heart for a very long time now. I have always thought that the intimacy and
personality of our committees give our delegates a substantive experience that cannot be
Michelle Shevin
rivaled, and I am unbelievably excited to serve as the USG of Specials.
Chief of Staff
Barnard College
I’m usually a junior at Dartmouth College studying Economics and Classical Archaeology, but
Cristina Rade I’m taking the fall off to work an internship with the Naval Postgraduate School in sunny
Chief of External Relations Monterey, CA. My academic interests include international trade policy, the pottery of the
Adelphi University
Athenian empire, and the role of the UN in the modern world. In my spare time, I love
Ryan Burke arbitrarily changing the order of my Netflix queue and travel.
Director of Security
University of South Carolina My summer was spent working with your Directors to create the best background guides
possible. I can attest to the amount of thought, research, and analysis that went into making
Matthew Low Specials this year, and I can also guarantee that your conference experience will be the best
Under-Secretary-General
University of California,
possible. However, we fully expect you to put in a commensurate level of effort! Your research
Berkeley and analysis will be critical to make your committees a success.
Daniel Nowicki My only regret since I’ve become USG-Specials is that I’ll have far less interaction with
Under-Secretary-General delegates than I used to. So if you see me at any point during the conference, feel free to stop
Georgetown University
and ask me about archaeology, NHSMUN, college, or anything you want to chat about. I look
Deanna Maxfield forward to seeing you all in March, and good luck with your research!
University of Southern Sincerely,
California Jerry Guo
Emily Robertson
jerry.guo@gmail.com
Under-Secretary-General 860.420.7788
Duke University
Lisa Cuesta
University of Pennsylvania
Jerry Guo
Dartmouth College
NHSMUN is a project of the

International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General September 2008
Boston University
Rosa Akbari Dear NHSMUN delegates,

Director-General
McGill University
Hello and welcome to NHSMUN’s very first simulation of the African Union/United Nations Hybrid
Nancy Henry operation in Darfur, or UNAMID as we can call it from now on. My name is Chris Talamo, and I’ll be
Conference Director your Director this year. In case you haven’t been informed already, this committee will quite unique.
Tufts University Not only will you be deliberating over the UNAMID mandate, arguably the most important
peacekeeping operation in the world today, but you will also be dealing with fast-paced crises that
Michelle Shevin
emerge from the conflict. Your creativity will be tested and you will have to rely on the full extent of
Chief of Staff
Barnard College your delegating prowess, but this committee will reward with a fun and enriching hands-on experience
that most conferences simply don’t offer. I’ve led and participated in over a dozen crisis simulations,
Cristina Rade and already I’m more excited for this committee than I have ever been.
Chief of External Relations
Adelphi University
Let me put business aside and introduce myself a little bit. I am an Astronomy and Physics double
Ryan Burke major at Dartmouth College, where I am currently a sophomore. My primary interest is in cosmology,
Director of Security particularly the particle dynamics of the Big Bang, where the physics of the large meets the physics of
University of South Carolina the small. When I’m not doing physics or MUN, I can be found pursuing one of my far-flung, diverse
interests. I enjoy listening to music from the Romantic Era of the nineteenth century, particularly that
Matthew Low of Tchaikovsky, Sibelius, and Dvorak. When I’m not listening, sometimes I’ll try my own hand at
University of California,
composition, too. I’m also very well read in the Greek and Roman classics, and I have this beautiful
Berkeley dream where half of my future home is library space filled with books.
Daniel Nowicki This is actually my very first year with NHSMUN, but I staffed my high school’s conference for four
Under-Secretary-General years and am currently the Secretary General of Dartmouth’s annual high school conference.
Georgetown University
Throughout all of my years, I’ve had a special penchant for crisis committees, especially when they are
Deanna Maxfield coupled with peacekeeping operations. I feel that this tangible style of committee is too often
Under-Secretary-General underrepresented at MUN conferences, and as a result, delegates usually only experience the “New
University of Southern York” side of the UN. Every single delegate’s opinion will be of immeasurable importance to the
California success of this committee, so it’s important to be aware of the situation. At the same time, dealing with
Emily Robertson
the crises will almost assuredly be an exciting experience for everyone. Ultimately, the point of this
Under-Secretary-General simulation is to enhance your knowledge of international affairs, not save the world.
Duke University
The only advice I would impart to you before you embark on your research is ask questions.
Lisa Cuesta Everything about this committee, from its topics to the procedural rules that govern it, will be home-
Under-Secretary-General grown, and I would honestly be shocked if you didn’t have any questions before March. Once you
University of Pennsylvania
come up with them, feel free to e-mail me at nhsmun.unamid@gmail.com. I’m really looking forward
Jerry Guo to this committee and meeting all of you over these next few months!
Dartmouth College Best regards,
Chris Talamo
cjtalamo@gmail.com
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United 0015 Hinman
Nations Association, Incorporated Hanover, NH, 03755
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
The 2009 National High School Model United Nations
United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur
A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations
2009 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in
your committee; these papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. They
will not give you a complete description of the topic areas and they will not contain the most up-to-date
information, particularly in regards to rapidly evolving issues. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully
explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared
to intelligently utilize their newly acquired knowledge and apply it to their own countries’ policy. You will
find that your nation has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted for or with the opinions
of another nation.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide
contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in
committee sessions. (Note: some position papers have unique guidelines that are detailed within respective
committees’ Background Guides.) The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and
resources available to you and where they can be found. A brief history of the United Nations and the
NHSMUN conference are also included. The annotated rules of procedure complete the Delegate
Preparation Guide.
An essential part of representing a nation in an international body is the ability to articulate that nation’s views
in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to
write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to
be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research
and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper
must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2009 and
should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-
spaced. The papers will be read by the Director of each committee and returned at the start of the
conference with brief comments and constructive advice.
You are responsible for sending a copy of your paper to the Director of your committee. Additionally, your
delegation is responsible for bringing a bound copy of all of the position papers—one for each committee to
which your school has been assigned—to the conference (to be submitted during registration). Specific
requirements of the bound copy have been sent to the faculty advisor/club president. In addition to position
papers, each delegation must prepare one brief summary statement on the basic economic, political, and
social structures of its country, as well as on its foreign policy. Please mail country summary statements to the
Director-General of NHSMUN 2009 at the address below. All copies should be postmarked no later than
February 16th and mailed to:
Rosa Akbari, Director-General Chris Talamo

3631 av. Henri-Julien Dartmouth College
Montréal, Québec H2X 3H4 0015 Hinman
Canada Hanover, NH 03755
(Country Summaries) (Individual Position Papers)
Delegations are required to mail hard copies of papers to the Director-General and Directors.
NHSMUN Staff will not consider e-mail submissions as an adequate substitution.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to Directors or Summary Statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.
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COMMITTEE INTRODUCTION
The United Nations/African Union Mission in Darfur (UNAMID) is easily one of the most ambitious
peacekeeping missions pursued today. It employs almost ten thousand uniformed personnel from over fifty
countries and has over US$1.5 billion at its disposal (A/C.5/62/30). Its purpose is to maintain the security of
Darfur, a region of Sudan approximately the size of metropolitan France, where ongoing conflict since 2003
has killed over 200 thousand natives and displaced two million more (“UNAMID”). These figures only begin
to hint at the scope of this rapidly developing conflict and the importance of this mission to the United
Nations and African Union.
UNAMID was created after pressure was applied on the African Union (AU) to replace its ailing African
Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS). AMIS was first deployed in 2004, only one year after the UN first started to
draw attention to the conflict in Darfur. At its inception, it was widely hailed as the long sought “African
solution to an African problem,” as the mandate of AMIS largely allowed the AU to act independently of the
UN and the international community. However, the execution of the mission proved to be too cumbersome
due to a high turnover rate of commanders, poorly defined rules of engagement, and an overall lack of
logistical planning (O’Neill 35-36). Many countries and organizations, including major donors to AMIS, such
as the United States and European Union, began to criticize the failings of the mission and press the need for
direct UN involvement. Despite its detractors, AMIS’s mandate was extended and the mission continued to
be lauded by public figures at all levels of international government, including former Secretary-General Kofi
Annan, until the mission’s integration into UNAMID (SG/SM/10653).
It was not until the unanimous approval of S/RES/1769 on 31 July 2007 that the UN personally stepped in,
after AMIS’s mandate expired with little improvement to show once again. UNAMID’s mandate has proven
to be much more comprehensive and better equipped to respond to the rapid developments that take place in
Darfur. However, the UNAMID mandate has gone beyond expectations in that it also successfully provides
substantial consideration not only for the internally displaced persons (IDPs) in Sudan, but also for the
refugees in Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR). As states bordering the region of Darfur, Chad
and CAR have been forced to welcome hundreds of thousands of refugees and provide them with food and
water. These two nation-states have repeatedly complained to Sudan and the international community that
supporting the refugees is a substantial economic burden as well as a security threat (“Chad” 7). These
international considerations were largely ignored by the AMIS mandate and only reiterate the notion that the
conflict is not confined to one territory. UNAMID is also unique for being a mission whose mandate goes
beyond the enforcement of an existing peace agreement or ceasefire. The mission is equipped to handle
investigations of such violations, but also is responsible for the security, humanitarian oversight, and even the
socioeconomic reconstruction of the region (“UNAMID”). This makes the mission as much a rebuilding
operation as it is a peacekeeping mission, using the experimental technique of finding peace through
economic development.
Though the conflict is quite as complicated as it is dynamic, there is one key humanitarian concern that
towers above the rest, and that is the question of genocide. There are powerful opinions and arguments on
both sides from major players on the international stage, but no conclusion has been reached thus far. While
influential countries like the United States and international activist groups have used the term genocide to
describe the situation, other important organizations such as the UN and Amnesty International recognize
the humanitarian abuses taking place without using such a definitive term. In the executive summary of the
final report published by International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, it reads “killing and forcibly
displacing members of some tribes does not evince a specific intent to annihilate, in whole or in part, a group
distinguished on racial, ethnic, national or religious grounds” (“Report”). This is the opinion that presently
guides the actions taken by the UN Secretary-General and UNAMID. It should be noted, however, that the
report was not entirely forgiving towards the combatants, as it strongly recommends to the Security Council
that it refer the situation to the International Criminal Court (ICC) for further investigation surrounding the
human rights violations.
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This committee will not replicate any present UNAMID body in existence today. It is instead a special,
executive assembly of UN, AU, and UNAMID officials whose collective task is to make recommendations to
the Security Council on how best to revise the UNAMID mandate before it expires in July 2009. By the end
of the conference, the committee will be expected to have a written report compiling all of its
recommendations to be released to the international community. This special task requires a number of
important modifications that will distinguish this simulation from all the rest. Delegates will be filling roles
instead of representing nations, with responsibilities ranging from the economic considerations of the World
Bank Representative to the national interests of representatives from CAR, Chad, and Sudan. The Director
and the Assistant Director will be representing the Joint AU-UN Representative (Rodolphe Adada) and the
Deputy Joint AU-UN Representative (Henry Anyidoho), and the delegates will fill the remaining 17 positions.
The procedural function of the committee will also be modified to facilitate the fast-paced debate that will
take place considering the multitude of topics that must be addressed. (The specifics of the UNAMID
simulation are thoroughly detailed in the next section.)
The most substantial and obvious difference in this simulation will be the use of crises during committee.
While delegates’ primary task will be to revise the existing mandate, the people delegates represent are
ultimately responsible for the execution of the current mandate as well. Throughout committee sessions,
delegates will be confronted with urgent developments in Darfur that must be addressed in a timely fashion.
These developments will interrupt the committee’s deliberations on the mandate, so delegates should be
prepared to rapidly change gears from mandate deliberations to crisis management lest the ground
developments get out of hand. Field updates will take a number of forms, including newspaper articles,
formal reports from ground forces (police and military alike), and tips from people and organizations
operating in the area; as such, delegates should be familiar with all aspects of the conflict. Because this crisis
format is new to NHSMUN, we will be holding a simulation crisis via e-mail during the weeks leading up to
the conference. Delegates are encouraged to contact the dais at nhsmun.unamid@gmail.com as soon as
possible in order to receive the updates surrounding this crisis.
With the plethora of updates and the heavy burden of revising the UNAMID mandate, this committee will
require a great deal of preparation and research with special requirements for the position paper, which will
be discussed later in this guide. The intention of this committee is to give delegates a sense of how UN-
related politics takes place outside of UN Headquarters in New York. Delegates will hopefully realize that
peacekeeping and security maintenance have radically different needs and requirements than resolution
writing, but both are integral to the function of the United Nations. A good way to characterize this is the
difference between field work and laboratory work. Laboratory work is likely what the delegates are used to:
they are put in a safe, sheltered room to discuss political theory on broad, through important issues facing the
international community today. This committee will be exercising fieldwork, where the pace of life will be too
fast for concerns about theories and desires. The dais will recognize the practical success of delegates’ actions
rather than their predicted utility. It should be noted, however, that the same NHSMUN philosophies apply
to this committee. Education, as well as compromise, will be very important to the dais. Ultimately, even a
failure to maintain the security of Darfur will be acceptable as long as the delegates walk away with a sense of
how peacekeepers do their jobs, a side of international relations long neglected by MUN conferences.
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SIMULATION
This simulation has a slew of special needs separate from any other committee, and so many of the
procedural rules that delegates may be used to are changed to accommodate for those needs. This committee
is unique in that it is a crisis-driven committee with executive responsibilities for maintaining an ongoing
peacekeeping operation. However, it is also unique as a committee not driven towards a resolution, but rather
the revision of the mandate of this peacekeeping mission. These two obligations will be impressed upon the
delegates at all times. While the delegates are expected to produce a revised mandate by the end of the
simulation, they must remember their responsibilities to the existing one, and they must be willing to drop
discussion of the mandate to confront any major difficulties that may arise. These different responsibilities
require different procedural mechanisms, so the rules that the delegates may be used to will be heavily
modified during both the mandate review and crisis management portions of the simulation. In fact, it is fair
to say that the rules we use in this committee will barely resemble standard parliamentary procedure.
Therefore, delegates are encouraged to read through these new procedures closely.
Prior to any discussion of how debate will function during the mandate and crisis phases of the committee,
delegates should be aware of the extent of their executive powers. In order to complete their obligation to
fulfill the objectives of the current mandate, the members of the committee will be directly responsible for
the integrity of the ceasefire. Along with this responsibility come a number of powers available to the
delegates.
First, it should be noted that everyone in the simulation will be playing a particular, unique role. These roles
are very specialized and delegates filling each role will be responsible for fulfilling their specific duties. For
example, although the force commander should be knowledgeable of all aspects of the current situation
(including diplomatic matters), he or she should be especially knowledgeable of the status and deployment of
the peacekeepers deployed in the region and will be considered the committee’s expert concerning such
matters.
In the same vein, each role will also have its own individualized executive powers. Continuing with the
example of the force commander, no redeployment of the peacekeepers can be executed without the positive
vote of the force commander, effectively giving him or her veto power concerning military affairs. Each role
has its own departmental duties and privileges, which will come into play throughout the simulation. (For a
more detailed account of the roles and their duties and function, see the Roles section.) When all of the roles
are combined, the committee essentially has full executive power over the UNAMID mission. Delegates may
negotiate for, request, or reapportion from the existing budget more funding for IDPs, reapportion new
funds for new civil or economic programs, ask the World Bank for more investments in the region, or
anything else at their immediate disposal. If you can think it, it is likely you can do it.
There are important limits, however, to this power. Obviously, the committee cannot perform an action that
is under the express purview of another body. For example, the committee cannot approve an international
economic sanction against Sudan because that is solely the Security Council’s responsibility. Delegates must
be constantly aware of where they fit in the UN bureaucracy, including who is responsible to them and who
they are responsible to, if they wish to be effective on the international stage. If they do not have the
authority to take an action but know of the body that can, it is certainly possible for the delegates to place
pressure on the responsible organizations. For example, the committee can request more peacekeepers from
the UN and the AU, but it cannot assume that it has those troops at its disposal before both bodies confirm
so, nor can it assume that the two organizations will agree to their request. These may seem like obvious
comments, but this balance between the committee’s executive power and the power they actually have to
make requests for must be constantly and vigilantly observed.
Another obvious limit to the committee’s power, though arguably the most important one of all, is the
sovereignty of the countries involved. Sudan, Chad, and CAR are all states recognized by the United Nations
and must be respected as such. Not only that, but each of the three countries have their own vested interests
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in the conflict, including political, economic, and humanitarian considerations. Additionally, the UNAMID
mission is operating domestically with the permission of Sudan; taking any actions that places that permission
at risk also places the entire mission at risk. Chad and the CAR are also independent, sovereign states with
national interests at stake in this dispute that also must also be respected.
Committee Debate
The committee’s procedural function will be broken up into the crisis and mandate segments discussed
earlier, with each having its own special rules. The discussion of the mandate of UNAMID will more closely
resemble the debate style used in most other committees. When the committee begins at the first session, it
will utilize formal debate and speaker’s list. As committee proceeds, it is expected that delegates will utilize an
indefinite moderated caucus for substantive discussion. Because moderated caucuses encourage delegates to
present many ideas at once, it will become prudent from time to time for the committee to either make a
speakers list or enter a round-robin of speeches so that each delegate have an extended period of time to
present to the committee which proposal they support and explain the reasons why. Delegates will be able to
request these through motions, and the dais may call them at any time. Alternatively, delegates may also elect
to enter unmoderated caucuses as needed.
Document Production
The primary goal of the discussion surrounding the mandate will be to create a series of recommendations to
the Security Council concerning how the mandate should be amended. This will be accomplished by creating
a detailed report addressed to the Security Council. This report will not be formatted like a normal resolution.
Instead of operative and perambulatory clauses, the report will be written in paragraph format broken down
into subtopics. Full, English sentences will be required, and the report should use headers to distinguish the
various topics it aims to address. The committee may choose to report on as many or as few topics as it
deems are pertinent to the current situation. In some respects, the procedure will be similar to that of the
Security Council: each proposal will require at least five sponsors and/or signatories to be considered, and
all proposals will require a 2/3 majority vote from all attending members to pass. However, there are a
number of important changes. Only one report will be allowed to pass, although dissenting opinions may be
written as addendums to the report. This means that if there is more than one proposal being voted upon on
the floor and the first one passes, all subsequent proposals will automatically fail. All work on the report
should be done in committee at the conference. No prewritten work, whether it is an entire report or a
section of one, will be accepted.
Crisis Debate
The crisis-reaction portion of the committee will be much more heavily modified. Because the debate during
these segments of debate will need to be much faster in order to appropriately react to the situations that
arise, the dais will encourage the committee to enter a moderated roundtable format. This new type of debate
will be similar to an unmoderated caucus in that delegates may speak freely without being called upon by the
dais. However, not all of the rules will be suspended and minimal restrictions will be placed on the delegates.
It is expected that all delegates participate in this debate, regardless of the topic. Delegates should use this
time to release, debate, and agree upon ideas at an accelerated pace, not to divide into caucus groups and
debate individual proposals. Should the committee have multiple documents to write quickly or otherwise
desire to break up into specialized groups, the committee may make a motion to enter an unmoderated
caucus. As with discussions surrounding the mandate, the delegates will also be expected to break into rounds
of speeches throughout the deliberation of the crisis in order to clear the air and to present the full reasoning
behind various proposals. All motions to accomplish any of these tasks may be done in the same way as in
debate over the mandate.
The vagaries between the two segments will be discussed at a special rules briefing prior to the first
committee session. Although this not mandatory, it is very strongly encouraged that delegates attend this session,
as the Director and Assistant Director will explain how the committee will function in much greater detail.
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Various Documents
The resolution output for the crisis portions will also be heavily modified; in fact, because of the rapid nature
of the updates, there will not be any resolutions at all. There will instead be three types of documents that the
committee can pass during this time: (1) press releases, (2) communiqués, and (3) plans of action.
Press releases and communiqués are similar documents, but with significantly different uses. Press releases
are exactly that —announcements to the press. Reuters International is the official news agency of the United
Nations and will be the one to receive and distribute all press releases produced by the committee. These
documents are particularly useful for addressing the international community as a whole or for influencing
public opinion. It should be noted that any press released the committee makes must reflect the face of the
entire UNAMID mission. Therefore, the supporting organizations (including important donors) cannot
support statements that violate the current UNAMID mandate and could put the entire operation in
jeopardy. Therefore, the words of any press release must be chosen with the utmost care.
Communiqués are addressed to particular recipients. Anyone who can get to a newspaper can read a press
release, but communiqués are sent via secure channels to the intended recipients, whether they are countries,
organizations, or individual people. Depending on the circumstances, a delegate may wish to delay presenting
privileged information to the entire committee. Bear in mind, however, that information travels quickly
through diplomatic circuits so delegates should not expect to be able to keep information privileged for too
long. Communiqués can be written to anyone who will receive them, whether they are individuals,
governments, or organizations.
Action plans are of an entirely different nature. Action plans will be to this committee as resolutions are to
others: they will be the delegates’ primary and most important tool for changing the situation in Darfur on
the ground. Action plans exercise the invested executive powers of the committee in any way that it sees fit.
Moving troops, redirecting aid, distributing pamphlets or contraceptives, or anything else the delegates can
think of that does not involve diplomatic communication falls under the purview of this document. Standard
resolutions take far too long to write and are ineffective for reacting to crises in a timely manner, which is
why committee will not be using resolutions for crises. The action plan instead strips all of the formalities
surrounding a resolution, such as preambulatory clauses, which makes the plan easier to write quickly. The
action plan is simply comprised of sponsors and operatives. (An example of an action plan is included in
Appendix.) Even this format is flexible, though. As long as both parts of the action plan are on paper and
legible, the dais will be satisfied.
Communiqués and Press Releases:

Here, we should also make a note of voting procedures, as that will determine which documents actually go
into effect. Communiqués that are sent from individuals concerning private matters (e.g. the EU Representative
contacting the EU, UNDP contacting Attaché from Sudan, etc.) do not need to come before a public vote;
they simply may be handed to the dais, which will then pass it through the appropriate channels. Joint-
communiqués from UNAMID as a whole, press releases, and action plans, however, require committee approval.
Each of these documents must first have two members as sponsors (there are no signatories for these
documents) before they can be entertained. Once a specific document has proper support, the dais will take
the document and formally recognize it by making it available for the committee to read.
Of course, the individual delegate is not expected to be sheltered from their home committees or
associations. It would be unreasonable for the Force Commander not to be apprised of the situation with the
troops on the ground, or for the World Bank Representative not to be kept up to date with the investments
the organization is willing to make in the region. Because of this, delegates should also expect to receive
communiqués from their offices and departments, which will be managed through the dais. These letters are
written exclusively to the delegates to whom they are addressed, and are not shared with the remainder of the
committee. A delegate who receives a private communiqué may choose to either distribute the information or
keep it secret, depending on his or her motives in the committee. The delegates may also, in turn, write back
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to their offices or even initiate the conversation if they have a specific question to ask of them, but delegates
should keep in mind that these communiqués take time to send and the offices take time to construct
responses, so speed is not included in these requests. In order to send a communiqué, a delegate need only
write up what he or she desires to say, and then pass the note to the dais. These documents are meant to
enhance the personal aspect of the committee, giving each delegate his or her special role and purpose that is
a distinguishing mark from the other delegates.
Action Plans:
To begin the voting procedure on action plans, the committee must approve a motion to move into voting
procedure, which requires a simple majority to pass. Once voting begins, the committee must vote on all
proposals recognized by the dais. Proposals that pass are sent out to begin going into effect; proposals that
fail are returned to one of the sponsors and are no longer recognized by the dais as-is. That said, the failed
document may be revised and resubmitted in the same process. All proposals require a two-thirds majority
as well as the approval of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to pass.
Field Updates:
The delegates will also be receiving documents from the world around them, which will have their own erratic
formats. Some of the reports will come from Reuters International, but others will come from less formal
sources. Delegates should expect official reports to come from the ground forces present in Darfur and the
investigative teams that regularly look into allegations that the ceasefire has been broken. These are reports
that are released directly to the management of UNAMID and are not public knowledge unless the
committee chooses to make a specific report into a press release. Finally, delegates should also expect to
receive very informal reports from other forces on the ground, including teams sent by NGOs and
humanitarian organizations. These reports will not be easily confirmed given their source and informal nature,
but are still a valuable asset to the overall operations of the mission.
Timeframe
All correspondence given to the committee will be accompanied with a month and day and delegates will be
closely apprised of any jumps in time that take place. Of course, delegates may also ask the dais what the date
is whenever they are in doubt. This system is designed to ensure that the committee always has something on
the floor to discuss, while preventing long waits for larger, more time-consuming proposals to go into effect.
Clearly, this committee is functionally and procedurally unique, and these many pages of modifications to
standard MUN rules may seem daunting at first. As long as the delegates come into the committee having
read this document and possessing at least a rudimentary understanding of how the committee will function,
however, all will be well. Delegates will learn the most about the committee just simply by being in it. Of
course, if there are any questions or concerns, please send them to nhsmun.unamid@gmail.com. We will
respond as quickly and thoroughly as possible.
In summary, here is a table outlining the differences between the two debate styles:
DEBATE DIFFERENCES
Mandate Debate Crisis Debate
Preferred Debate Style Moderated Caucus Roundtable
Action Plans, Communiqués, Press
Document Output Mandate Revisions
Releases
Voting Requirements 2/3 Majority 2/3 Majority
-9-
POSITION PAPER GUIDELINES

Instead of the standard position paper, we will be simulating actual reports that a delegate to this body may
write. The paper will be broken up into two parts: personal background and solutions.
The personal background is anything but a recap of the history of the Darfur conflict. Each delegate should
write a background on his/her role’s specific facet of the conflict. For example, the Sudanese attaché should
write a detailed background on Sudan’s participation and influence on the development of the situation.
Other delegates, such as the UNDP representative, should not only chronicle the Programme’s impact on the
region, but should also investigate relative development efforts in general. If you are in doubt about how far
you should research, the most advisable course of action is to either nhsmun.unamid@gmail.com, or do
more. Delegates are encouraged to research all related aspects of the Darfur conflict, as no one role in
committee is completely autonomous from the rest; topics not directly related to a delegate’s assigned role,
however, should not make up the most significant parts of the paper.
In the solution portion of the position paper, each delegate will have a chance to demonstrate his/her
creative capabilities, an important aspect of solving the crises as they will be presented. As with the
background portion, delegates should focus on solutions that fall under their area of expertise. Delegates
should make sure, however, to address every facet of the conflict at some point. (The subtopics listed in the
Current Status should serve as a sufficient outline for topics to be discussed.) This does not mean that the
topics presented in this guide should all receive simple courtesy remarks; every topic should have a well
thought out solution backed by facts (which are very important to any solution). The topics corresponding to
the delegate’s role should have particularly detailed solutions. Ultimately, this section is crucial as delegates’
ideas are a better indicator of the delegates’ thinking and strategies than their ability to recant background
information. Overall, both sections of the guide should be written as though they were being addressed to the
director of their department, government, or organization.
While the e-mail account for this committee is always open for delegates so that they may use the dais’s
expertise as a resource, there are some questions that I can answer. A mention of an expected page count is
purposely omitted. Delegates should end their paper when they feel that they have addressed everything that
they want to no matter how long that is. That said, if your paper is reaching upwards of 13 pages or more, it
may be beneficial to to review and edit. The purpose of this paper is not to emulate professional-level
expertise and prose, but rather gain a strong familiarity with the topic and its myriad nuances. Remember,
NHSMUN is intended to be a learning experience –not a homework assignment. The Director will read and
closely examine all delegates’ submission and return each with various constructive comments.
In the interests of the crisis, all questions pertaining to their logistics will be happily answered. Any
information regarding what topics are more important than others, however, will not be disclosed. The crises
that the delegates will deal with will be comprehensive in nature and will require the input and expertise of
every delegate in the room. Any questions concerning where to find information on a specific topic will be
immediately forwarded to the bibliography at the end of this guide.
All papers must also have an accompanying bibliography in MLA format. In-text citations should also be
provided in MLA format whenever necessary.
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HISTORY
INTRODUCTION TO DARFUR
While the modern Darfur conflict has much more recent origins, an examination of the history of Darfur is
necessary to understand how the conflict came to be. Looking even beyond the arrival of the Europeans
during the Age of Imperialism will enhance delegates’ understanding of the true state of the region. Though it
was never popular in the presses of European and American newspapers, the land we know as Darfur was
instrumental in the development of modern East Africa.
In the language of the Fur, a tribe that
principally inhabits Darfur, Darfur
literally means “the land of the Fur,” a
misnomer in light of the local
demographics. Darfur has a rich
history including a plethora of nomadic
tribes fighting for the right to their
lands, with Fur tribes making up only
one segment of the population. Note
that “tribe” and “ethnicity” are not
synonymous; multiple tribes can find a
common ethnic heritage while being
independent entities. This may seem
odd in light of the modern concept of
a nation-state, which defines a political
entity as a collection of people with a
common culture and heritage. It may
be helpful to consider ethnicity as a
force connecting certain tribes with
tribes as discrete political entities.
Though there are fewer tribes that
would describe themselves as “Arab,”
people identifying as Arabs have been
long present in Darfur. They originally
came as traders and scholars to Africa
from the Middle East in a nomadic
fashion, integrating into the various
societies of Darfur via marriage.
Despite their mingling with Darfurian
cultures, the Arab culture remained
very prominent in the region, which is,
in part, due to the fact that identifying
as an Arab helped protect against being
sold into slavery (Flint 8).
Figure I: Tribal Lands in Modern Darfur It is difficult to find accurate

(Source: Institute for Security Studies)
measurements of local demographics
to put all of these ethnicities into perspective. There has been no official census since 1956, which was
conducted by Sudan just before declaring independence from the United Kingdom (Daly 12). Prior to that,
other attempts were made by the UK to achieve a demographic measurement of Darfur’s total population,
but each investigation yielded unnaturally fluctuating numbers that would jump by over 75% in both
directions during spans of less than a decade (Daly 11). Information on tribes other than the Fur is even more
difficult to come across due to the number of smaller tribes and their minority status. Even though there have
been advances made in communications technology, demographic information like this has not permeated to
- - 11 -
the outside world. This is especially important given that the current conflict changes demographics on a daily
basis.
The history that follows is not meant to be a comprehensive guide to the entire history of Darfur. Instead,
key topics that delegates may normally overlook are targeted. Some topics are just briefly covered (or even
omitted) as it is assumed delegates can research these issues on their own. That said, all delegates are
encouraged to research all of the topics discussed here and go beyond the text. If the committee is to address
the problems afflicting this region, it will require the resourcefulness and ingenuity of all delegates present,
which will only be possible if each person comes to NHSMUN well researched.
PRE-COLONIAL DARFUR: SHATTERING A FRACTURED NATION
The Fur came to prominence in the region in the early 17th century in the aftermath of the collapse of the
Tanjur Empire; the Keira, a Fur tribe, rose to prominence and established the Sultanate of Darfur. At this
point, Darfur was a notable crossroads region along an African pilgrimage route to Mecca, and it also served
as a hub for slave trade in the region. Darfur regularly shipped most of its exports through Egypt via the
Forty Days Road. People who were not Egyptian traders, however, had little knowledge of Darfur because of
the geographic barriers that the Nile’s cataracts and the Sahara Desert presented (Daly 29); the Sultanate
remained relatively unknown throughout most of its history, which began in 1596. Over time and multiple
rulers, the Sultanate consolidated its grip over Darfur and the neighboring region of Kordofan. Sultan Ahmed
Bahr, who ruled over the widest extent of the Darfur Sultanate from 1682-1722, took his armies to the Nile
River before being assassinated (Global 5).
Despite consolidation, all was not harmonious in Darfur. For one, the nomadic lifestyle that persisted among
most of the tribes made taxation and military mobilization difficult. This was especially problematic in the
Sultanate’s southern reaches where the Baqqara people, a nomadic Muslim Bedouin group, proved
particularly resistant to foreign rule. They maintained their own economy and trade practices and even bought
their own weapons from foreign powers (Daly 36). In addition to this, the sheltered geography that allowed
the Darfur Sultanate to grow as long as it did also prevented it from attaining technological advancements.
The Sultanate made an effort to provide their military with proper weapons only after the Baqqara has already
increased their own arms. Perhaps more telling, the succession of the Sultanate was not legally defined in any
way. Sultans would normally father many sons among their multitude of wives and concubines, each of which
had an equal opportunity at the throne. Even before the Sultan passed away, conflict among the princes,
often resulting in murder and exile, became the way a prince established himself as the rightful heir to the
throne (Daly 22). This produced years of dangerous political instability as claimants to the throne gradually
assembled in enemy lands to conspire against the Sultanate they hoped to someday lead.
Egypt was also undergoing significant changes at this time, which had dramatic impact on the evolution of
Darfur. In the early nineteenth century, Egypt was recovering from a disastrous French invasion led by
Napoleon. In addition, Albanian mercenaries brought to the country refused to acknowledge a new leader.
Thus, Muhammad Ali, the deputy commander of the Albanians, was placed in command (McGregor 54).
After some time, Muhammad Ali then not only took control as Wāli [governor], but also as the Khedive
[prince] of Egypt, setting himself far above other provincial rulers in the Ottoman Empire (which Egypt was
a part of despite its near-rebellious autonomy). In Sudan, Muhammad Ali saw a significant source of wealth,
trade, and manpower, and an opportunity to further exemplify himself as an autonomous provincial
governor. The end for the Darfur Sultanate came when the Egyptians rode into Kordofan. Ali launched an
invasion of Darfur via Kordofan in 1821, becoming derailed by revolts before finally being able to take
Darfur (Daly 35). Egypt continued to claim Darfur even though they had not occupied the territory, but the
Sultanate persisted in a prostrated state.
- - 12 -
The end of Egyptian dominance over

Darfur came with the curious incident
of the Sudanese Mahdist rebellion in
1881.1 Hailing from Dongola, a small
village along the Nile, Muhammad
Ahmad Abdallah ignited a spiritual and
political rebellion when he declared
himself to be the Mahdi, a movement
that spread throughout Egyptian Sudan
and manifested itself as a new nation.
In a number of key battles throughout
Sudan, the Egyptians were
continuously routed, weakening the
political clout of the Khedivate and
forcing it to turn to European aid; the
UK was the power that answered the
pleas for help. They poured more men
and resources into diplomatically
courting Egypt, but these appointees
actually encouraged Egypt to abandon
Sudan and use diplomacy to encourage
tribal rebellions (Daly 69). The
Mahdists continued their expansion
into Darfur and even into portions of
Abyssinia, though they had decidedly
less success in the latter region. The
Mahdist state, which established its
capital in the town of Omdurman,
immediately ordered tribal leaders to
swear fealty to them once they were
conquered, an act resented by many of Figure II: Extent of Mahdist Control in Sudan
the tribes. One significant rebellion was (Source: Institute for Security Studies)
led by Yusuf Ibrahim, a member of the Keira family with a claim to the former sultanate. Initially allying
himself with the Mahdist state, he soon decided to decline their order to swear allegiance and attempted to
break Darfur away as his own demesne. He was quickly put down by Mahdist forces, but his powerful
uprising was a movement with immense popular support and signaled where the loyalties of the Darfurian
tribes remained (Daly 72-73).
At this point, over thirty years of mobilization, defeat, conquest, and constantly changing governments had
tired the region and its people. The royal family that had unified the region for so many years was trapped in
hiding and was as divided as the people of Darfur. With every new invasion and administration, new divisive
opinions would creep into Darfurian society, further dividing the inhabitants and placing pressure upon the
tribes’ nomadic lifestyle. This pressure was transmitted to every aspect of Darfurian life, as alliances fell apart,
customs were abandoned, and nomadic dar were constricted. In some unfortunate cases, tribes were entirely
expelled from Darfur. However, this was only the beginning of the demolition of Darfur, for during the
period of British rule, Darfur would once again find itself as a crossroad empire and attracting unwanted
attention from jealous powers.
1
 In the Sunni Islamic faith, it is foretold that a man known as the Mahdi will bring justice to all Muslims and signal the
end of the world, bringing salvation to all of the faithful (Daly 61). Many Mahdis have risen in the past, though few have
had as significant impact as the Sudanese Mahdi of the nineteenth century.  
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COLONIAL DARFUR: RESURGENCE AND REMISSION
The onset of heavy British influence after the Anglo-Egyptian invasion of Sudan marks the decline of
Darfur’s importance to Sudanese politics. After the establishment of the Mahdist state, African territories
became rare due to the notorious “Scramble for Africa.” With fewer places to turn, the UK soon turned its
eyes on Egypt and Sudan. Egypt was already requesting vast amounts of aid and assistance and, in the eyes of
the international community, was decidedly in the British sphere of influence despite the fact that it was a de
jure Ottoman province.
Turning away from its noninterventionist policy in the past, the UK soon came to see the Mahdist nation as a
threat after its following proliferated throughout most of modern Sudan. The preparations for the Anglo-
Egyptian in Sudan war involved cooperation and contribution from both the British and the Egyptians. The
British were to provide the command structure and the military manpower for the invasion and the Egyptians
were to bear the financial costs of the war that was, in theory, for reunification with their territory (Daly 88).
The war, which lasted from 1896-1899, was a definitive success for the Anglo-Egyptian force, which quickly
established itself in the region. What evolved in the remains of the Mahdist nation is known as the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium that held power from 1899-1956, named so because the local government was nominally
Egyptian, but the important posts were manned by British men who carefully oversaw the management of
Britain’s ally. Khartoum was reestablished as the capital of Sudan at this time.
With the fall of the Mahdist governor in November 1899, a power vacuum evolved that tempted all for a mad
dash towards the throne. A man by the name of Ali Dinar emerged from the chaos and established himself as
the Sultan of Darfur, a post that was previously held empty for nearly thirty years (Daly 90); the Anglo-
Egyptian Condominium was satisfied with Dinar as the new sultanate. Indeed, as long as he complied with
the Condominium’s wishes and remained a dependency, the British command in Cairo saw no problem with
Darfur’s independence. Darfur had few resources for an industrialized country and the recent decades of war
had torn the region apart. For many years, Sultan Ali Dinar remained independent from direct British rule,
enjoying a period of benign neglect. During this period, Darfur was successful in most aspects of life and
began to heal after many years of turmoil. Of course, tribal infighting remained, especially from tribes that
remained loyal to the Mahdi. Such tribes continually launched small insurgencies against the Sultanate, but
were never strong enough to destabilize the government (Daly 102).
During Dinar’s rule, the French were expanding their Saharan Empire into modern Chad, and quickly
defeated the Wadai in 1912, a non-Muslim kingdom that broke away from Darfur in the 17th century and
resisted reintegration, with alarming ease. Benign neglect was no longer satisfactory for Sultan Dinar, evident
as he proceeded to intensely lobby Britain for support against the French. France was actually in support of
an agreement with the UK, however, to formally declare a border between Anglo-Egyptian Sudan and the
French protectorate of Chad. This would require the UK to occupy Darfur to enforce the border, a task the
British saw no merit in pursuing. To France and the UK, Darfur was a pawn in a large colonial chess game,
and to the UK, imposing a border was a liability almost not worth the time. The actual needs of the Darfur
Sultanate and Dinar were ignored completely, as were the dynamic nature of the nomadic tribal lands –
ultimately, this artificial border would cage the wandering tribes of Darfur and greatly affect their lifestyles
and economies.
In 1899 Sir Reginald Wingate, a staunch long-time opponent of Darfurian independence, was awarded
command of Sudan, quickly pursuing a campaign to take down the Sultanate. This was only made easier by
the United Kingdom’s 1915 declaration of Egypt as a British protectorate, further undermining the existing
Anglo-Egyptian Condominium. With the declaration, Sudan became, for all intents and purposes, an
independent British colony. Wingate took steps to arm and mobilize the nomads of northern Kordofan in an
effort to bring down Dinar. With the help of other tribes, the British successfully invaded in 1916 and quickly
routed Dinar’s armies; Dinar was killed later that year. Wingate completely reorganized the government of
Darfur into a model more amenable to the UK. The British’s indirect style of colonial rule established a
governmental chain of command that exploited the loyalties of existing tribal leaders.
- - 14 -
What is notable about this period is the fact that there were no social foundations established during British
rule. Because everything was left in the hands of local rulers and considering that Darfur had little to offer in
terms of trade or exports, the British found little reason to invest in the region. In 1928, revenue brought to
Khartoum by Darfur totaled 57,575 British pounds, while the total income stood at about £6 million (Daly
139). In the Khartoum national archives, the file labeled “Economic Development, Darfur Province” has
only five files within it between the dates of 1917 and 1950 (Flint 12). Schools, roads, health clinics, and other
public services were completely absent from the entire province, even as the British government was trying to
encourage the nomadic tribes to settle. This was not the case, however, throughout Sudan. At the Gordon
Memorial College in Khartoum, there were no students in Darfur enrolled in 1929 and only one in 1934,
while students even from similarly impoverished regions in South Sudan were represented in fair quantity
(Daly 135). These concerns and rising complaints from the people of Darfur would continue through British
and into Sudanese rule. The great depression of the 1930s and the Second World War of the 1940s only
accelerated Darfur’s decline.
Darfur finally had an opportunity for a turning point after the UK announced that it was opening an inquiry
into Sudanese independence, which was granted in 1949 after a protracted withdrawal of British troops.
Almost immediately, Egyptian nationalism spilled over into Sudan and calls for unification with Egypt spread
across the protectorate (Daly 156). Darfurians in el-Fasher staged a protest against such unification in 1948,
but little political change came of it. Instead, throughout the years leading to the pivotal 1953 national
parliamentary election, a number of political parties formed in Darfur. Some were divided along tribal
boundaries, some geographical, and one was even nurtured by the British as supporting rural provinces.
When time for the elections came, however, the parties themselves were still divided and often in a state of
confusion. Some candidates proved to be ineligible due to illiteracy or just did not campaign at all (Daly 174).
The resulting parties were heavily divided, and Darfur sent an impotent delegation to Khartoum. During this
colonial period, Darfur fell further behind the other Sudanese provinces. Infrastructure was kept at a
minimum, social services were all but unheard of, and disease and famine were rampant. Worse yet, Darfur
was both economically and politically powerless and unable to prevent the strife that would seize their new
nation over the next fifty years.
SUDANESE DARFUR: THE FORGOTTEN CONFLICT
During Sudanese rule, Darfur continued to stagnate economically, prompting various political changes. From
the perspective of Khartoum, Darfur was a large, sparsely populated, and financially limited province in the
west. It continued to become less important in the eyes of the new rulers, as pressing issues like the still
raging civil war in South Sudan. In the meantime, Darfur managed to survived three coups (1958, 1964,
1969), but never experienced any considerable growth. More importantly, the only major change that came
with independence was the absence of a foreign presence. The newly independent Sudan just continued
British policy of settling Darfur using highly centralized government. These are the foundations for the
complaints that Darfurian rebels would raise in the present decade.
The People’s Local Government Act of 1971 created a federal structure of administration for the provinces, with
executive councils overlooking each of the ten provinces of Sudan (Metz 15). This worked to enhance
Khartoum’s presence in the rural provinces, accelerating Darfur’s rate of assimilation into Sudanese culture
while effectively destroying the nomadic dar system in one fell swoop. In 1973, a droughts hit Darfur,
prompting a great famine that forced many tribes to attempt to migrate elsewhere. The strict regional
government made transit difficult, however, and in the resulting confusion, many tribes began to lose their
identities in favor of local affiliations. A great cultural amalgamation took place as tribes found themselves
settling with other tribes. The Regional Government Act of 1980 furthered this goal by placing a centralized
regional government in charge of Darfur (while South Sudan became a self-governing province).
Subsequently, Khartoum had much more direct rule over Darfur and saw to it that people assimilated quickly.
- - 15 -
Though famine-causing droughts continued, it

was during this time that tangible (yet limited)
international aid began to reach Darfur. In
addition to the Second Sudanese Civil War
distracting domestic and international attention
away from Darfur, aid was also limited because of
the region’s general inaccessibility (Daly 232).
After droughts and poor harvests of 1983 and
Table III: Deaths during the 1985 famine (de Waal “Famine” 12)
1984, a particularly severe famine struck Darfur
again in 1985 with what little aid resources available split between Darfur and Chadian refugees. In terms of
mortality rates, this famine was one of the worse that Darfur had experienced (see Table I).
Aside from basic neglect, many other factors contributed to the general disarray in the region. Libya’s
longstanding conflict with Chad over borders and influence was beginning to spill over into Darfur.
Mercenaries sponsored by Libya’s leader, Muammar al-Ghaddafi from northern Chad were resettling in
North Darfur to be retrained and rearmed. Consequently, some of the native Zaghawa tribes became
accessories to the conflict. At the same time, the struggling Chadian government in Ndjamena beseeched
some Darfurian tribes for help (Daly 218-219); a sizeable number answered the call. What is truly relevant,
however, are the implications of the Chadian War on the development of groups involved in the modern
conflict in Darfur.
Pro-Libyan tribes found themselves heavily armed after the conflict. Years of Libyan propaganda that Arabs
were being oppressed by the “African” governments in Darfur and Chad made these dangerous tribes quite
resentful (Daly 243). Many blame this combination of variables for the emergence of the Janjaweed militias that
emerged in the mid 1990s. Some also attribute tribes’ associations with the Chadian government during the
1980s as paving the foundation of the modern group, the Justice and Equality Movement (Jem).
(Coincidently, the group shares the same Zaghawa tribal heritage as Chadian President Idriss Deby.) War
between these groups of Darfurian tribes broke out with astonishing frequency, consistently pitting Arabs
against Africans (and vice versa). Despite these violent tensions, however, the government in Khartoum and
the international community found little interest in Darfur.
If one was to even consider Sudan at this time, the revitalization of the Second Sudanese Civil War in the
south always too precedence –the humanitarian and ethnic conflicts sprouting in Darfur seemed like mere
afterthoughts in comparison.
COUP D’ÉTAT AND THE RISE OF MODERN SUDAN
On 30 June 1989, modern Sudan was born. A group of army officers led by Omar Hasan al-Bashir launched a
successful coup that ousted elected Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdri from office; the operation was supported
by Hassan al-Turabi and the National Islamic Front (NIF), an “urban-based Islamic party” shadowing
Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (“National Islamic Front”); the organization always had clear aims to transform
Sudan into an Islamic state ruled by shari’a law. The NIF’s ideologue, Hassan al-Turabi ultimately named al-
Bashir as president –the post he holds to this day. Various other cabinet positions were given to NIF
members, including posts for the Minister of Finance, vice-president.
The timing of this coup was notable for the fact that it interrupted the largely successful 1988 Addis Ababa
peace negotiation between PM Mahdri and the secular Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). The
NIF, rejected many stipulations in the then-unsigned peace agreement, and war broke out anew. Needless to
say, the SPLM found the change to a non-secular regime particularly threatening.
Darfur remained a region of violence and mobilization throughout the 1990s. Although a tentative peace
agreement was signed between warring tribes in South Sudan, enforcement of the treaty was minimal and
resentment continued to percolate through groups. The now deceased Sheikh Hilal Abdalla, a prominent (and
somewhat controversial) figure among Islamists, claims that Arab nomads are frequently barred from their
- - 16 -
usual migratory routes by African tribes, notably the Fur (Flint 34). At the same time, Arab refugees from
Chad began fleeing to Darfur, not only disrupting regional traditions and pushing natives out of ancestral
grazing lands, but also absorbing food aid that many native Darfurians considered their own. Back in
Khartoum, Bashir worked to consolidate power, dissolving the Revolutionary Command Council for
National Salvation (RCC) in 1993. Although the RCC was essentially an extension of authority to fellow
military officers, Bashir’s dissolution of Sudan’s acting legislative branch was seen by Africans as both an
aggressive and foreboding move. From that point on, the NIF became known as the “National Congress
Party” (“National Islamic Front”).
In 1994, Darfur was partitioned into the three segments it remains in today: Shamal Darfur (North Darfur),
Janub Darfur (South Darfur), and Gharb Darfur (West Darfur). The Zaghawa tribe concentrated in the North,
the Masseleit in West Darfur, and the Fur remained around the Jebel Marra mountains in Northeastern
Darfur. Some speculate that the division was carefully manufactured to ensure that African tribes remained
the minority in each state. In 1995, tensions mounted inside a region located in West Darfur along the border
with Chad. The region had long been a strong base for the Umma Party, a secular Islamist political group
loosely related to the Mahdists and party of former PM Mahdri; the party enjoyed relative political stability
and self-rule throughout most of its history. Party faithful in the region, however, became concerned that they
might become disenfranchised by the African Masseleit and complained to President Bashir (Flint 57). Given
the Umma Party’s Islamist leanings, Bashir had no issue sponsoring a reorganization of the region by dividing
“traditional Masseleit lands into 13 emirates” with some subsequently headed by Arab groups (“Unifying
Darfur’s Rebels”). This set off an explosive conflict between the native African Masseleit and the Arab tribes,
with raids and murder becoming commonplace among both sides.
The conflict is also often noted as the beginnings of the Janjaweed within Sudan. These Arab militias
systematically raid African villages and despite their small numbers, consistent access to horses, camels, and
automatic weapons makes them no match for the civilians they attack.
SPARK OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR: FEBRUARY 2003
The first confirmed attack in Darfur took place on 26 February, 2003 on the town of Golo by the Darfur
Liberation Front (DLF). By March 2003, the DLF regrouped and renamed itself the Sudanese Liberation Army
(SLA), with Mini Arkoi Minawi as its leader. Although the SLA did not fully come into fruition until 2003,
military training began when a group of African Zaghawa, including a young Minna Arkoi Minawi, agreed to
train a few Fur men on Jabal Marra, a culturally significant extinct volcano located around the crux of the
three Darfur states (Daly 296). Quickly, the SLA caught the attention of the Sudanese People Liberation
Movement, which was still occasionally engaged against the Sudanese military in South Sudan. A SLA
delegation was sent to meet Chairman John Garang of the SPLM in Nairobi, Kenya; Garang made an offer
for the SLA to join his organization. After a polite refusal, Garang encouraged them to formulate a political
platform and manifesto, which prompted the 16 March declaration of the Sudanese Liberation Movement
(SLM) and its political doctrine (Flint 89). The organization was an alliance primarily among the Zaghawa,
Fur, and Masalit tribes, each filling up one position at the top of the SLM/A leadership; Minawi headed the
SLM/A’s political wing while Abdul Waheed Mohamed Nur led its armed faction.
Somewhat concurrently, another rebel organization was gaining a foothold in the region. In May 2000, a book
entitled The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan was distributed all across Khartoum and
Darfur. Its pages contained a scathing critique of the Khartoum government, citing many statistics that
almost all of its services went only to the northern tribes that held power (Flint 16-17). The book’s message
was highly Islamist, preaching not against the rule of shari’a law, but rather its implementation and the select
people who benefitted from it. This strongly differed strongly with the opinions of many other Darfur-based
rebel groups, notably the SLM/A, which had a definitively secularist policy (Daly 281).
Although The Black Book was penned by a group calling itself “Seekers of Truth and Justice,” it is generally
agreed that at least some of its authors would give rise to the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) in 2001 (Daly
277). Its first and current chairman, Khalil Ibrahim, is a member of the Zaghawa tribe, although it should be
noted that the JEM is not a tribal movement. The JEM is very much an Islamist movement, which seeks
- - 17 -
constitutional reform and a distribution of economic investment, with ultimate hopes to continue to enforce
shari’a law upon the Muslim regions. In their five-point manifesto, the JEM wrote that they are tolerant of
other religions in Sudan with the stipulation that “the believers of the other faiths must not oppose Muslims’
attempts to apply the laws of their religion for themselves” (Flint 105).
Because of this strong reliance on Islamic rhetoric, the JEM has been dogged by a number of suspicious
throughout its years. Ibrahim, for one, used to be a public servant for Khartoum until 1998 and so is
suspected of having ties with many controversial figures in the NIF (Flint 106). Perhaps the most prominent
of these is Hassan Turabi, the prominent Sudanese political and religious figure who was exiled from the
Sudanese government after a divisive break in the NIF in 1999. Many in Darfur, see Turabi as a major source
for the abhorrent violence that was part of Khartoum’s enforcement of Islamic law. While the JEM agrees
with Turabi’s politics on many points, their distaste with his practices and execution is the entire point of
their movement (Flint 107).
Figure III: Death rates during the first two years of conflict (“Excess”)
Fractioning Among Rebels
Almost immediately, the leadership of both the SLM/A and JEM found that communication was a looming
problem. The SLM/A had no centralized military command that could organize the militant groups sent by
the various tribes in the alliance (Daly 300). Oftentimes, this led to detachments being sent into large
government encampments or being abandoned when aid was needed. In one particular instance, a group of
4,000 Fur were assigned by the Zaghawa military commander, Abdullah Abakir, to capture all of Jebel Marra
from the government’s forces. At one point in the ensuing battle, the Fur were heavily outgunned and forced
to retreat up the mountain, but eventually came out with a narrow victory and heavy losses. Later it was
discovered that Minawi had taken the regiment’s telephones away, preventing them from getting in contact
with the high command for additional orders or reinforcements (Flint 97). These were the foundations of an
internal intertribal conflict that would later tear the SLM/A apart.
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The SLM/A and the JEM produced radically different platforms, but were forced to work together during
the early years of the modern Darfur conflict, particularly because the JEM’s military wing was not well
developed. During 2003, the rebels’ first coordinated attacks were often largely successful, catching
government military forces off guard, as most prominent commanders were busy dealing with confclit in
South Sudan. One such attack took place on 25 April 2003, when SLA and JEM militants attacked the airport
in El-Fasher –seven air force planes were destroyed in the attack and rebels looted all sorts of weaponry and
vehicles from the military base stationed there (Flint 120-121). These sporadic attacks in 2003 were
instrumental to the opening months of the conflict, as it allowed the rebels to stock up on much needed
weapons and ammunition before the coordinated arrival of government forces and the Janjaweed.
Soon after the attacks started, reports came into Khartoum that the rebels were also targeting Arab civilians in
addition to military targets. The government’s response lay with Ahmad Mohamad Haroun, Sudan’s current
Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs and alleged war criminal wanted by the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Haroun was asked to raise an independent militia to combat the rebels (Flint 123). The Arab
tribes were already gearing up to launch a counterinsurgency so Haroun’s job became relatively easy.
Publically, Khartoum declared that it was trying to resist an open rebellion, but evidence indicates that
Haroun may have had other motives and intentions. In his indictment to the judges at The Hague, ICC Chief
Prosecutor Luis Moren-Ocampo writes “Haroun stated that since the ‘children of the Fur’ had become
rebels, ‘all the Fur’ had become ‘booty’ for the Militia/Janjaweed. The Militia/Janjaweed who had heard the
speech commenced a looting spree as soon as Ahmad Harun departed” (International 6). Farms, livestock,
and food stores were primary targets, often with buildings burned down and resistors murdered. Witnesses
also claimed that helicopters attacked their villages and aircraft, which many believe implicates the
Government of Sudan (GoS) in the conflict (Flint 131). As long-time Darfur activist Professor Eric Reeves
states, the Janjaweed “typically begin very early in the morning, often after an Antinov [a fighter helicopter]
will push out bombs…as civilians flee from their huts, the [rebels] sweeps in” and essentially destroy
everything in site (“Frontline: On Our Watch”).
This open militia warfare continued until December 2003 when the government launched a large military
offensive against the rebels in Darfur. Many regiments of the JEM and SLA quickly evaporated in the face of
the Sudanese Army’s heavy equipment, with many of the remaining forces seeking retreat as the only possible
option. On 9 February 2004, President Bashir announced the end of the rebellion, stating that the military
was in “full control” of Darfur, yet the insurgency continued in a far more guerilla fashion (Flint 141-142).
The military, too bulky to keep up, watched as Janjaweed, SLA, and JEM forces fought all throughout the
countryside.
As conflict wore on, however, the various rebel groups began to fracture. By the summer of 2004, the JEM
had become highly volatile and was producing child rebel groups such as the National Movement for Reform
and Development (NMRD) (Daly 299). The SLM/A was also chafing under the rule of Minna Minawi. Many
criticized his early actions for keeping his regiment of SLA in the northern Zaghawa regions where they were
often not needed instead of sending them to conflict zones in the south. Even then, many accused him of
inciting violence among some of the Arab tribes, notably the Zayadiya, whose villages and farmlands were
reportedly devastated by Minawi’s SLM/A (Flint 136). After his ascendancy within the movement later that
year, infighting grew to the point that the SLM/A lost its coherence as an organization. The group split along
tribal lines into a number of factions, though Minawi retained control of the largest remnant (as well as the
only one recognized by most international agencies) (Flint 163). Furthermore, infighting between the JEM
and SLM/SLA grew considerably as well, with their differences in structure and policy proving impossible to
reconcile. In the end, Minawi’s SLA fought and routed the weak militants of the JEM (Flint 163-164).
SOUTH SUDAN: THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA)
In January 2005, the conflict in South Sudan reached breaking point. After over twenty years of fighting, the
Government of Sudan and SLPM/A met in series negotiations held at “Karen, Mchakos, Nairobi, Nakuru,
Nanyuki and Naivasha, Kenya, under the auspices of the Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
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(IGAD) Peace Process” to discuss the specific terms of what became the Comprehensive Peace Agreement
(CPA) (“ReliefWeb: CPA”). The CPA discussed security arrangements, wealth-sharing, power-sharing, and
protocols on the resoulution of conflict in various regions. The CPA also detailed the various terms of a
permanent cease-fire arrangement, arguably the most important aspect of any peace accord.
Figure IV shows the various political regions of Sudan as stipulated by the CPA, including Darfur and South
Sudan. Among these stipulations, Sudan agreed to allow South Sudan to hold an open referendum to vote on
independence, also giving the Nuba Mountains, Blue
Nile, and Abyei regions to opportunity to vote on
whether or not to join South Sudan. The majority of
terms reinforced divisions between Khartoum (the
“North”) and SPLA/M-controlled South –separate
armed forces, a 50:50-split of oil wealth between the
Khartoum Government and the SPLA, as well as the
use of separate currencies (“Sudan CPA Provisions”).
SPLM officials were also invited to joint a unity
government with Bashir in Khartoum, with SLPM
leader, Salva Klir instated as vice-president. To follow
the January agreement, Security Council Resolution 1590
established the United Nations Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) on 24 March 2005 with the well-outlined
mission “to support implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement” (S/RES/1590).
While the CPA was drafted in response to festering

conflict in South Sudan, the implications of the
agreement undoubtedly affected Darfur in the North.
Many were angered by Bashir’s concessions during CPA
negotiations, further fueling the existing rivalry between
Arabs and non-Arab populations in south Sudan. In Figure IV: Political Regions of Sudan (“Political”)
practice, a majority of these concessions’ deadlines were Blue: South Sudan Orange: North Sudan
disregarded, resulting in continued rivalry between the Pink: Nuba Mountains and Blue Nile
parties. Despite all these criticisms, however, the CPA Purple: Eastern Front Green: Darfur
and call for the development of UNMIS was viewed by
most countries as a diplomatic success. This opinion was perhaps more relative to Darfur as many noted that
CPA negotiations could serve as a model for dealing with the Darfurian crisis in the North.
DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT (DPA)
Although as early as 2004, many warned that a “north-south peace would be held hostage to an intractable
conflict in Darfur,” the international community the did not engage the Government of Sudan (GoS) about
the issue until talks with the SPLM and signing of the CPA concluded (de Waal “Sudan: The DPA and its
National Context”). In addition to the aforementioned implications of the CPA, smaller rebel groups,
including the SLA/M and JEM were quite displeased with the SPLM’s monopoly over rebel negotiations
during the drafting of the CPA.
Shortly after the division of the SLM/A in November 2005, Minawi began to take a conciliatory stance
toward Khartoum. The May 2006 Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA), was signed in Abuja by only one rebel
group—Minawi’s sect of the SLM/A—and the Government of Sudan. The DPA shared many of the
administrative considerations that the CPA first pioneered, including proposals for governmental and even
constitutional change (de Waal “Sudan: The DPA and its National Context”). Also somewhat akin to the
CPA, Minawi, the leader of the rebel signatories, was granted the fourth highest position in government:
Senior Assistant to the President and Chairperson.
- - 20 -
The mandate also made the important stipulation that the Janjaweed are to stand down at the same rate and
demonstrate “verifiable disarmament” by October 2006 (de Waal “Sudan: The DPA and its National
Context”). Many critics claim that because the Darfur Arabs that make up the Janjaweed were not invited to
the talks, and because there was no set definition for what the Janjaweed are, there is no way to judge what
“verifiable disarmament” meant and whether or not Sudan met that condition (Flint 214).
Responsibility 2 Protect (R2P)
At the Sixtieth Session of the UN General Assembly in September 2005, then Canadian Prime Minister Paul
Martin lambasted the Security Council’s lack of initiative regarding Darfur: “Too often Permanent Members
the veto—real or threatened—to prevent effective action. Too often, [the international community] has
debated the finer points of language while innocent people continue to die. Darfur is only the latest example”
(“Statement by the Right Honourable Paul Martin…”).
It was at this meeting the PM Martin introduced the “Responsibility to Protect (R2P)” guideline. Internalizing
lessons learned from the UN Chapter VI peacekeeping mission stationed in Rwanda and headed by Canadian
Romeo Dallaire, Martin stressed the importance of international intervention in situations of humanitarian
crisis. The 1994 Rwandan genocide and July 1995 mass killings in Srebrenica, Bosnia-Herzegovina finally
prompted a shift in traditional peacekeeping methods. Instead of calling for the creation of Chapter VI
peacekeeping mandates (which limit peacekeepers’ right to use force only in situations of self-defense), the
UN began to commission Chapter VII mandates, giving peacekeepers the authority to use force as a means
of humanitarian intervention as well. This new paradigm in peacekeeping laid the foundations for revising
UN initiatives in Darfur, ultimately leading to the Security Council’s 31 July 2007 authorization of the
creation of a Chapter VII joint African Union/United Nations Hybrid operation in Darfur.
CREATION OF UNAMID
As mentioned in the Committee Introduction and Vision section, 26,000 peacekeeping troops were requested
for deployment; as of 23 October 2008, the arrival of a Bangladeshi Multi-role Logistics Unit brought total
troop deployment just under 9,000 (“Bangladeshi Logisticts Unit…”); UNAMID’s original intent was to have
the majority of troops on the ground by the end of 2008. Seeing as this goal is far from complete, relatively
slow progress regarding international action has also discredited original terms drafted in the 2006 DPA.
Minawi’s SLA faction was thus prompted to remove itself from the his post in Bashir’s government in
October 2007 and instead threaten to “take up arms once more” and push any progress in the region to the
wayside (“Darfur Rebel Group Abandons Ceasefire”). In addition to diverging political aims among all parties
involved, many fear that the UNAMID intervention is destined for inevitable failure due to Khartoum’s
unwillingness to properly cooperate with external actors. Leading researcher on Darfur, Alex de Waal warns
that the approach to R2P used in Kosovo is thus incompatible with the situation in Darfur; political and rebel
allegiances are constantly changing while Chad has now become involved on both sides of the conflict (de
Waal “Why Darfur Intervention is Bad”). As he states, Khartoum views any kind of outside intervention as
the “camel’s nose poking into the tent” with “the rest of the beast intend[ing] to follow” (de Waal “Why
Darfur Intervention is Bad”). Even still, many cynics claim that R2P is a mere stop-gap and that
“humanitarian relief is an exercise in making a disaster just about tolerable” (de Waal “Why Darfur
Intervention is Bad”).
Aside from concerns regarding practical implementation, the dire humanitarian situation speaks for itself.
Claims of ethnic cleansing are continually tossed around by UN officials and various Member States while
Bashir has now been indicted by the ICC as a war criminal. As the only multi-dimensional short and long-
term aid program operating in the region, all efforts must be made to fulfill the UNAMID mandate and bring
a semblance of stability back to the region and its populations.
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CURRENT STATUS
Before reading this section, it is encouraged that all delegates read the UNAMID mandate (see Appendix) to
gain an understanding of what the Security Council has assigned to the mission. This will allow delegates to
frame the following discussion (which will not exclusively concern UNAMID actions) around their mission.
In addition to the mandate, delegates should keep themselves up-to-date with Darfur Humanitarian Profile
releases (found in the Library subsection of www.unsudanig.org).
The goal of the following section is to have delegates fully aware of the situations they must tackle over the
weekend both in the crises and in their mandate considerations. The issues here were not chosen to be
comprehensive of the issue as a whole. You will not find proposed solutions to each of problems. Instead,
delegates are encouraged to research past initiatives and contrast them with potential solutions that fall in line
with the policies of the particular party or organization they are representing.
It should also be noted that the best way to keep informed on the topics discussed below is to substantiate
the accuracy of published facts and statistics by checking multiple sources –even those presented by the
United Nations and its various agencies
operating in the region.
BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND

HUMANITARIAN NEEDS
In the immediate, humanitarian

concerns in Darfur are of utmost
concern. In its latest Humanitarian
Profile released October 2008, the UN
Office for the Coordination of
Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) states
the “crisis in Darfur reached a new
depth” with the number of Internally
Displaced Persons (IDPs) reaching
nearly 2.7 million, an increase of
approximately 200,000 since July 2008
(“Darfur Humanitarian Profile No.
33”). With the total number of affected
persons climbing towards 5 million,
humanitarian access to these
populations lack of access is quite
worrisome. In the figures below, the
OCHA portray the increased limitation
on aid transportation.
Resolving increasingly limited access to

already scarce resources should be
included in any immediate discussions
regarding Darfur and provide the
region with the basic needs for survival
(i.e. food, shelter, and water). Often,
humanitarian crises caused by conflict
suffer from donor fatigue, occurring
when aid agencies’ ongoing efforts in
one region are refocused to a new crisis
Source: OCHA
- - 22 -
“hotspot” so to speak, such as post-natural disaster relief effort. With that in mind, delegates are reminded of
their responsibilities to UNAMID and its mandate, ensuring that dutiful consideration is given to all aspects
of the humanitarian situation.
Food and W ater Security
Since 2003, both Darfurian rebels and the Janjaweed have been extensively burning viable farmland during
their raids on villages and tribes, leaving the people of Darfur at high risk of widespread famine. Despite the
international community’s efforts to provide humanitarian aid, however, the conflict has severely limited the
accessibility of many key humanitarian sites. The World Food Programme (WFP) reports that for its troubles,
43 of its drivers have been killed or remain missing and 83 trucks have been hijacked since 2003. The
Programme has a grim outlook for the future: “In 2008 there was little expectation of livelihood recovery or
sustainable returns of the displaced population” (WFP “Where we work – Sudan” 4). Theft outstanding, the
WFP at full force found that it could not supply all of the refugees it needed to. At maximum capacity, it
would transport eight thousand tons of food per month, which would only feed 500,000 people (Prunier
135). As the chart below indicates, 2007 saw some of the lowest rates of access to aid since the beginning of
conflict in spite of great increases in the presence of aid workers and humanitarian agencies.
PERCENT OF AFFECTED POPULATION ACCESSIBLE TO UN HUMANITARIAN AID SINCE APRIL 2004
Source: UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile, 1 July 2008.
Another key hindrance to transportation comes every year with the onset of the rainy season. Darfur has very
few paved roads that are regularly maintained, and the rainfall makes many roads and passageways
inaccessible (Daly 232). Increasing limits on transportation has been noted throughout the development of
the conflict. Some allege that assuming Sudanese cooperation with the Janjaweed and passive resistance to
humanitarian assistance is simply genocide by attrition. Without access to food aid, the Janjaweed have near
limitless access to Darfurian villages, raiding their stores and leaving them to starve cut off from the outside
world.
- - 23 -
The theft and destruction of livestock is also a significant problem for the people of Darfur, creating an
economic crisis as well as a famine. The animals themselves are not typically used as food, but are rather
beasts of burden that assist in farming and cultivation; grain is the most significant part of most tribes’ diets.
Oftentimes, tribe members cite that the number of animals that one owns is more important than the amount
of currency a person may possess (Daly 149). This, in particular, has made it difficult to repatriate refugees
back into Darfur: without new animals, sustenance farming is near impossible, even ignoring other problems
like drought.
With rainfall diminishing every year, water has become an increasingly prized commodity among the tribes.
Though placed in the middle of the Saharan Desert, Darfur does have a major watershed –Jebel Marra. The
mountain has historically been a source of water for many tribes, but the ongoing conflict and increased
difficulty in migrating there has robbed many tribes of the important resource. Unlike some other issues,
water scarcity has been targeted extensively in the past, as it has been viewed by many politicians as the sole
reason for Darfur’s retarded growth. For example, in 1966 the Umma Party won a considerable number of
seats in the Sudanese Parliament and embarked on a campaign to expand boring projects in search of
underground waterbeds (Daly 190). As this program evolved, however, it became bait for the Sudanese
government to attract foreign investment, often ignoring what areas needed it most or which areas would be
most productive (Daly 213). Of course, water aid is limited by the same transportation restrictions as food aid
–wells and other water sources are major targets for Janjaweed raids as the Arab nomads are just as
dependent on stationary water reserves as the African tribes.
Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps
IDPs are defined as persons forced to flee their homes due to extenuating circumstances, yet still remain
within their home country. As such, Darfurian IDPs are host to a number of special considerations separate
from Darfurian refugees residing in Chad and CAR. IDP camps, though naturally impoverished, are
sometimes subject to Janjaweed raids who either steal the aid they have received or, occasionally, destroy the
camp altogether. For this reason, getting the IDPs to receive aid is sometimes a difficulty in and of itself, as
they fear attracting the Janjaweed more than they fear famine (Prunier 113). The government is also
frequently accused of attacking Sudanese IDP camps. One particularly famous instance in October 2004,
Sudanese forces entered the IDP camp at El-Jeer using tear gas and bulldozed many of the buildings (Prunier
121). Oftentimes, the usual response from the government is that they are relocating the refugees to a safer
area. In 2004, for example, Interior Minister Abd-er-Rahim Mohamed Hussein proposed to regroup the
scattered IDP camps into eighteen locations, citing camp safety as a concern (Prunier 118).
One particular aspect of IDP camps that makes them so difficult to administer is their impermanent nature
relative to extraterritorial refugee camps. The traffic in and out of the camp is always highly variable with
IDPs either seeking to resettle on new land or flee to full refugee camps. In fact, many proponents of
genocide in Darfur claim that the Janjaweed attacks on IDP camps are actually coordinated with the goal of
driving the African tribes out of Darfur and into Chad. IDPs also tend to flee during the wet season when aid
cannot reach the camp and resources wear thin. Of course, the traffic makes it very difficult to get estimates
on how many IDPs reside in any one camp so planning the distribution of aid resources is an incredibly
difficult task.
- - 24 -
CONCENTRATIONS OF IDPS AS OF AUGUST 2008

Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- - 25 -
Refugees
Refugees are people who have fled from the conflict and are now in another country (in this case, Chad or
the Central African Republic). Though, in most conflict, the flight of refugees is primarily one-way, the Darfu
dispute has taken on a number of international facets that have created problems in Chad, Sudan, and CAR
to a lesser extent. Since the outbreak of the Darfurian conflict in 2003, an insurgency, the Union of Forces
for Democracy and Development (UFDD) against the military government of Chadian President Idris Déby
Itno has also developed; Chad claims the insurgency is supported by the Government of Sudan. Although
Khartoum “repeatedly denie[s] backing the rebels,” there is an overwhelming amount of evidence which
indicates otherwise (“Q&A: Chad Rebellion”). BBC correspondent, Stephanie Hancock, goes on to claim that
Sudan is “backing the Chadian rebels to counter the threat that it faces from its own” in Darfur by (“Q&A:
Chad Rebellion”). As with many borders in Africa, the border between Chad and Sudan was created
artificially, dividing many tribes of the same ethnicity. As such, many JEM and SLA combatants are Zagawa,
sharing the same ethnicity as President Déby. These rebels are said to “enjoy free reign in Chad, and are so
close to President Déby that it is not uncommon for them to fight alongside the Chadian Army when it needs
help” (“Q&A: Chad Rebellion”).
Current estimates of the number of refugees residing in Chad tend to hover around 250,000, a very large
number relative to other refugee situations around the world (“Darfur Conflict Zones Map”). This forces
provisions to be spread very thin among the refugees and Chadian natives, often prompting violence between
groups. Food, water, and firewood are the commodities needed most to sustain the people of the region.
Unlike with IDP camps, access is not a major problem as Chad is much more accessible by vehicles. Limited
resources, however, remain a problem, as well as Chad’s growing dissatisfaction with progress in the crisis.
President Déby has made repeated threats and pleas to the international community to either stop the conflict
from spilling over or to relocate the refugees elsewhere, particularly in the wake of two separate attacks on
Chad’s capital, N’djamena, in 2006 and 2008 (IRIN “CHAD” 3). Africans are also no longer the only
refugees that have been forced into Chad. The Darfur region is now seeing Arab tribes fight amongst
themselves for the land, often turning them against each other and driving them away into Chad (Gettleman
2). This further compounds the problems currently facing the refugee camps in Chad, increasing the threat of
fighting amongst the tribes there.
The Chadian conflict has sent its own group of refugees fleeing into Darfur (see figure below). Recent reports
indicate that about 40,000 refugees have fled to Darfur (Aly). Though the mandate of this committee should
focus on Darfurian refugees living in Chad, the Chadian refugees in Darfur must also be kept in consideration
and their welfare protected. The committee may want to consider cooperating with the United Nations
Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) when dealing with Chadian refugees.
- - 26 -
CHADIAN REFUGEE CAMPS

Source: UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
- - 27 -
Health
In 2004, the Médecins Sans Frontièrs (MSF) conducted an alarming survey of mortality rates among four
Darfur IDP camps that sheltered about 215,400 people (Prunier 149). They found that during the refugees’
flight to the camp, the Crude Mortality Rate (CMR), a figure which includes violent deaths and those caused
by disease, malnutrition, and similar causes, was as high as 7.56 per 10,000 per day (one per 10,000 per day is
cause for calling the situation an “emergency”) (Prunier 150). Once they were in the camps, nonviolent deaths
still kept the figure as high as 2.35 per 10,000 per day (Prunier 150). This signifies a major crisis in the health
of refugees, which, thanks to international aid, has been slightly abated since the 2004 study.
While NGOs have been able to assist the growing health problem in Darfur, the impermanence of the IDP
camps and the sheer number of refugees (2.5 million as estimated by the UNHCR) have made it difficult to
administer aid for all (UNHCR. “Chad-Darfur” 5). The most significant threats are curable diseases such as
malaria or cholera; malaria currently claims approximately 4,000 live every month according to Sudanese
Health Minister Ahmed Bilal Osman (“Malaria kills…”). Maintaining proper sanitary conditions is difficult in
refugee and IDP camps considering their overpopulation and strained resources. It is no wonder that such
preventable diseases still affect such large populations.
Even still, Darfur has always been subject to poor health care. Even at Sudanese independence in 1956,
Darfur only had 0.57 hospital beds per 1,000 people with little growth taking place ever since (Flint 12). This
is an obvious side effect from a lack of infrastructure in Darfur and the nomadic society it operates in.
Stationary hospitals simply are not conducive to migratory people unless they are well distributed and all well
stocked. Progress in health standards, however, is possible. Julie Flint and Alex de Waal write “during 2005,
mortality rates in Darfur came down to levels comparable to those before the war” (Flint 173). While the
resurgence of the conflict in 2006 has disrupted that figure, it does prove that deaths related to disease and
malnutrition can be lowered. If short-term health initiatives are implemented with the intent to develop long-
term infrastructure, one can hope to eventually eliminate the risk of preventable disease within Darfur and
Sudan as a whole.
SECURITY SECTOR REFORM
Disarming the M ilitias
Disarming the Janjaweed has always been a focus of the international community, beginning most notably
with the passage of Security Council Resolution 1556. Operative six of that resolution:
Demands that the Government of Sudan fulfill its commitments to disarm the Janjaweed militias
and apprehend and bring to justice Janjaweed leaders and their associates who have incited and
carried out human rights and international humanitarian law violations and other atrocities;
further requests the Secretary-General to report in 30 days, and monthly thereafter, to the Council
on the progress or lack thereof by the GoS on this matter; and expresses its intention to
consider further actions, including measures as provided for in Article 41 of the Charter of the
United Nations on the Government of Sudan, in the event of non-compliance” (S/RES/1556).
Although the Sudanese government was not able to hold to this deadline (which they blame on the
unnaturally short time line provided by the text), this resolution is only the first in a number of steps to curb
the Janjaweed’s presence in Darfur.
The difficulty in enforcing this goal is that unlike the rebel groups, the Janjaweed have no central command
structure. The militias are usually assemblies of local Arab tribes fighting against the African tribes for one
reason or anotherand even among proponents of the theory that the Sudanese government is supporting the
Janjaweed, it is generally acknowledged that they do so on a group-to-group basis. Therefore, disarming the
Janjaweed is tantamount to disarming the citizens of Darfur. This also makes holding the Janjaweed
accountable for their defiance of the international community a very difficult task because their fractured
nature prevents them from being meaningfully represented in any peace negotiations. In response to this
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difficulty, the DPA took an interesting approach: in the timetable created for the disarmament of the SLA
(Minawi) and the Janjaweed, targets for the Janjaweed were to be met before those of the rebels rather than
being concurrent. In reality, however, all rebels—Arab and African alike—remain heavily armed and highly
disaffected.
The disarmament of nonstate actors is an extremely difficult task that has just recently become a common
obstacle in peacebuilding operations. Delegates are highly encouraged to look to recent lessons learned from
the situation in Iraq as the majority of issues (i.e. sectoral violence, lawlessness, corruption, etc.) currently
plaguing the country are a direct result of a very poorly planned (and nearly nonexistent) disarmament,
demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) campaign. The fragility of the situation in Darfur only fortifies the
possibility for the region to follow a similar spiral of chaos.
Reintegration of Forces
The Sudanese government’s primary solution to the problem of disarming the Janjaweed is by attempting to
reintegrate them into the armed forces and civilian-police (Civ-Pol) forces of the Sudanese state (Prunier 117).
Many question the motives of such integration, but above those complaints, it has become increasingly clear
that the Janjaweed are defying Khartoum more and more. The militias have not only begun to fight amongst
themselves, but have also started to fracture into smaller, more uncontrollable groups of bandits (Prunier
122-123). The DPA took specific steps to address the threat that the Janjaweed might continue to raid post-
integration into the Sudanese military. It required all paramilitary forces outside of Khartoum’s chain of
command be disarmed. In practice, the carefully chosen wording of the DPA allowed the GoS to evade
defining what the Janjaweed actually comprise while simultaneously legitimized the aggressive “disarmament”
of SLA and JEM rebels.
How best to reintegrate the various rebel groups of Darfur back into Sudanese society has been a matter of
some debate. While Khartoum would see them resume their lifestyles in Darfur and settle peacefully, other
countries, the United States in particular, have an interest in integrating armed SLA and JEM rebels into the
Sudanese military as Khartoum has done with the Janjaweed. At the Abuja peace talks that produced the
DPA, the United States allied with Minawi, the SLA/M leader, to spearhead the charge on this concern. The
GoS resisted, but by the end of negotiations, both parties agreed that 5,000 SLA militants would be integrated
into the Sudanese Army, with 3,000 receiving nonmilitary training (Flint 220).
That said the permanent development of an armed force as well as civilian-police force is a distant hope. Any
efforts in this realm should be viewed as particularly important by the committee as leaving the large military
stockpiles that the SLA possesses in the hands of reintegrated civilians could prove disastrous for Darfur’s
future, ultimately leading to raids by disaffected African tribesmen after peace is established.
LONG-TERM DEVELOPMENT
Agricultural Development
In order for the refugees of this conflict to be fully repatriated in the long-term, the agriculture and economy
of the region must be restored. As noted earlier, the raids by the rebels and the Janjaweed have targeted
livestock and farmland with particular voracity; simply replacing the refugees on that land will no longer do.
Desertification is increasing around Darfur and the entire Saharan region while systematic burning of the
existing farmlands is doing little to stem this process. Overgrazing is also a serious concern among most
environmentalists and politicians alike. While northern grazing is accelerating the rate of desertification,
politicians and the individual tribes have to deal with general southward migration that is forcing the tribes to
live in closer proximity.
Another aspect of the agrarian lifestyle of Darfur that the committee must consider is how fencing and claims
to land have affected the nomadic lifestyle. Northern nomads, who have found their traditional grazing routes
increasingly blocked by fencing, have started to call the enclosures zaraib al-hawa, meaning “enclosures of air”
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(Prunier 57). While property rights can help Darfur become a populated province with equal rights, delegates
must also consider the impact that permanent farmland will have upon the nomads. Ultimately, the concern
that must be addressed is whether there is a proper balance of encouraged development in Darfur if it comes
at the expense of the livelihoods of many nomadic tribes seeking the food and water they need to survive.
Investments in Infrastructure
One of the founding reasons for this conflict was the lack of development and attention paid to Darfur, and
in order to ensure a lasting peace, UNAMID must find a way to guarantee such development in the future.
The investments must also be used well, as the Umma Party’s 1960’s venture in water exploration proved
disastrous in terms of planning (see Food and Water Security). The development of schools and hospitals should
be considered particularly important by the committee seeing as Darfur has long had a severe lack of such
facilities relative to even Khartoum and South Sudan.
Another aspect of infrastructure development that the committee should consider is industrialization. While it
may seem at first glance that the nomadic lifestyle of the Darfurian tribes is not conducive to such
development, a number of large settlements (such as El Fasher) have been made with an expansive, agrarian
workforce. In the past, similar ventures have been made. Yugoslavia offered to finance a tannery in Darfur
(which was eventually moved to Khartoum) and the Soviet Union, in an effort to bring Sudan to their side of
the Cold War, built a dairy production factory in Darfur that almost immediately went under (Daly 190).
Bringing industrial infrastructure to Darfur would help provide a permanent source of income for many
Darfurians (as crops are subject to highly variable prices), and would also help provide Darfur with a viable
export even to other Sudanese provinces. Obvious drawbacks, however, are the poor access and high
transportation costs of shipments, so important modifications to such a program would have to be made.
Delegates are encouraged to look to the industrialization of other nomadic populations in the region, such as
the pastoralist Tuareg people of North Africa, for ideas on ways to reconcile nomadic culture with economic
assimilation. Also, exploring the history of foreign direct investment in Sudan will not only uncover proper
investment plans, but also help delegates understand the underlying reasoning behind certain countries’
policies towards the Darfurian conflict. Ultimately, whatever initiatives are implemented must be culturally
sustainable while economically profitable for all parties involved; this includes an effort to decrease expected
investment risk I the region.
Political Parity
Another principle reason for the 2003 is the political underrepresentation of Darfur under the Bashir’s
regime. While an important step has been taking in placing Minawi in the spot fourth in line to the
presidency, parliamentary parity has yet to be achieved. The SLA still preserves its highly secularist stance on
politics, drawing a stark contrast to the majority NIF’s desire to implement Islamic shari’a law within Sudan.
Many of those who oppose this move, especially populations in the rural provinces, feel disenfranchised by
the political monopoly that the NIF has achieved. Parliamentary reform plans have been included in both the
CPA and DPA and their implementation is still under way, but it remains to be seen whether or not those
plans will be successful. Otherwise, the discussion of political equality has long been glossed over in favor of
military and humanitarian affairs, but should still be a task that the committee considers in its goal to revise
the UNAMID mandate.
It is highly suggested for delegates to explore past actions of the UN Department of Political Affairs as well
as various power-sharing agreements included in previous peacekeeping mandates to gain perspective on the
development of good governance within Sudan. In addition, delegates must understand relations between all
parties involved in order to be able to formulate an agreement that pleases all involved.
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ROLES
The roles of each delegate and how they fulfill them will be of paramount importance to the overall success
of the committee. Every delegate must be the most knowledgeable on their respective subjects and must
share that information with the committee when necessary to facilitate the development of rapid solutions. In
this section you will find an outline of each representative’s basic job responsibilities, veto powers, and
information contacts. This information is not meant to be exhaustive in any way and delegates are strongly
encouraged to further research the day-to-day responsibilities of each position entails on their own.
A few notes should be made about each role’s powers, and how they should be used. While every delegate
will have some measure of de jure veto power over the rest of the committee, this power is to be used
sparingly at best. It should be noted that veto power in the context of this committee does not translate into
the veto power found in traditional committees such as the Security Council. In UNAMID, a delegate’s mere
verbal indication that he/she is weary of a certain aspect of a proposal will indicate to the dais that the
committee must continue working rather than putting an inevitably failing proposal to vote; the latter course
just wastes time that could be instead used to strike proper compromise within the original proposal.
Remember that external contacts do not answer questions regarding general research delegates should have
done beforehand, such as “What does ‘SLM’ stand for?” or “Which countries border Darfur?” Personal
communiqués are instead intended to provide research that could not have possibly been done prior to the
conference, such as “Would the European Commission be amenable to a plan to exchange US$1 billion in
investments in Northern Darfur if the territory was handed over to the EU?” The dais will also be
documenting communiqués in order to ensure representatives are asking proper questions pertaining to their
role.
Finally, at the end of each section, a few research points that the delegates should focus on are presented.
These should not be interpreted as an exhaustive list of preparatory responsibilities. All delegates should be
familiar with every aspect of the conflict at hand and should research their individual areas of expertise as
they relate to the current situation in Darfur.
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FORCE COMMANDER
The force commander’s job responsibilities only include the military personnel that are part of the mission,
not the police forces (see Police Commissioner). These personnel are entrusted with the maintenance of the
security of the Darfur region, moving to counteract threats from rebel groups, Janjaweed, and Sudanese
officials alike.
Delegates should remember that UNAMID’s military presence is not an invasion force, nor is it particularly
well-equipped, so it cannot be relied upon for aggressive or sustained combat. In committee, the force
commander will be able to veto any action plan that involves the redeployment or use of the military
personnel. He/she may not, however, directly message the international community concerning troops. Such
communications must instead be filtered through the dais to then present to the committee as a whole. They
will also be able to get in contact with their chain of command located throughout the region to receive
updates or to send orders when it becomes important to do so. The delegate representing this position should
be very familiar with the makeup of the UNAMID military force, paying particular attention to mechanized
units and transports (e.g. number and type of helicopters), main bases of operation, as well as the efficiency
and speed at which troops can be deployed (estimated from recent engagements).
POLICE COMMISSIONER
The Police Commissioner’s role in the overall UNAMID mission is to bring domestic day-to-day stability
back to the people of Darfur. The officers serving under the Commissioner perform various security tasks in
their daily work, such as investigating reports of domestic troubles or petty crimes, assisting in humanitarian
efforts taking place, and providing escort for important shipments and convoys. Gender-based violence has
been a particularly significant concern to UNAMID officers; the goal of minimizing the instances of such
crimes is an explicitly stated goal in the UNAMID Mandate. Also included among the Police Commissioner’s
job responsibilities are confidence building missions, intended to reassure all parties involved, including
Sudan, Chad, CAR, and the Darfur people, that the mission is on track and showing signs of success.
As with all intrastate conflicts, the development of a sound civilian-police force is an integral aspect of the
entire mission’s overall success. The Commissioner will be able to veto any actions that involve the
redeployment or use of his police force, but like the Force Commander, cannot make direct requests to the
international community concerning his force. The Commissioner may also contact his/her chain of
command, including battalion leaders serving in specific sites, for updates on their actions or progress. The
delegate filling this position should be acquainted with the capabilities of his police force, including standard
issue weapons and their bases of operation, as well as how investigations are performed and how frequently
they occur.
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ATTACHÉ FROM SUDAN
The Sudanese attaché’s role is to represent the interests of the Government of Sudan (GoS) during
UNAMID’s daily operations, advising at all levels of the operation. As a representative of the GoS, the
attaché is also assumed to have strong allegiances to Bashir’s policies, and subsequently, with most Arab
populations across Sudan. Within the committee, this delegate will likely resist any revisions to the mandate
that extends the jurisdiction of UNAMID further into Sudanese territory. He/she may even attempt to
reduce its existing local presence, all the while balancing Sudan’s role as a cooperative ally in the UNAMID
mission. If the attaché has questions concerning policy or desires information from their government, they
may contact the Sudanese government via written communiqué. The delegate representing Sudan should be
very familiar with Sudan’s history with AMIS and UNAMID, as well as their opinions on the mission. They
should also be familiar with the assistance that Sudan is providing the UNAMID and how much flexibility is
available within that capacity.
ATTACHÉ OF THE JUSTICE & EQUALITY MOVEMENT (JEM)
This attaché’s role in the committee will be to represent the interests of Khalil Ibrahim’s sect of the JEM,
attempting to further the complex Islamist agenda while defending its actions to the international community.
This may be more difficult than it sounds, given the rebels’ notorious reputation for raiding humanitarian aid
convoys. In general, the JEM will support an expansion of the mandate as long as it results in pushing Sudan
out of the region without hindering JEM operations or ideologies. Increased security against the constant
threat of the GoS’s infiltration and incursion into Darfur will also be a strong lobbying point for this attaché;
the JEM was not party to the DPA for this very reason, refusing to sign the Agreement unless UNAMID
troops were already in place. The JEM attaché will be able to resist any action plan that requires the
cooperation of the JEM, but not if it is already included in the UNAMID mandate. He/she also will be able
to contact the administration of the JEM for updates or information if he/she so desires. The delegate
representing this rebel group should be very familiar with the history of JEM, its ideologies, as well as the sort
of operations that they engage in. The delegate should also make an effort to be familiar with their major
strongholds in Darfur and the extent of their zones of control.
ATTACHÉ OF THE SLM/A
This delegate’s role will be to represent Minna Minawi and his sect of the SLM’s interests in Darfur, which
are significantly different from the JEM’s. He should be more conciliatory with the Sudanese government
than the attaché from the JEM, as Mr. Minawi has served as a direct adviser to President al-Bashir, but still
should take a hard line on the issues that the SLM stands for. Just like the JEM attaché, this delegate will be
able to veto any action plan that requires the cooperation of the SLM, but not if it is clearly included in the
UNAMID mandate. Similar to the JEM delegate, the history, ideologies, standard equipment, and recent
actions of the SLM should be a top priority when researching the duties of this attaché, as well as major zones
of control.
ATTACHÉ FROM THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)
Throughout the Darfur conflict, CAR has frequently lobbied for the peaceful and just repatriation of all
Darfurians. Many in the prefects that host these refugees share a common ethnic heritage or are even family
members, and thus feel a sense of duty to protect their brethren. Hosting these refugees, however, has serious
political, economic, and humanitarian consequences. For example, persistent allegations exist that Khartoum
funded and supported the Union of Democratic Forces for Unity (UDFU), a rebel group in the northwest of
the CAR. This has strained relations between the two countries, which has made care for Darfurian refugees
in CAR no easier. It should be noted, however, that the government of the CAR has repeatedly expressed its
dedication to non-refoulment by pledging to provide the safe return of all Darfurians residing in their country
(IRIN “CENTRAL” 3). In committee, the attaché must carefully balance the pledges and responsibilities to
care for existing refugees alongside citizens’ frequent complaints that resources are becoming scarcer in CAR.
They will be able to veto any action plan that requires the cooperation of the CAR, but, again, only if it is not
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explicitly included in the UNAMID mandate. The delegate should be very familiar with the resources
available to the CAR, as well as the logistics behind providing for the refugees. Governmental relations
between the CAR and the other parties involved in this conflict, including rebel groups, should also be well
researched.
ATTACHÉ FROM CHAD
The Chadian attaché’s job at these deliberations will be to balance a plethora of strong pressures upon
his/her government in N’Djamena. On the one hand, the Chadian people feel a sense of obligation to assist
the Darfurian people for they share a common heritage with them, even more so than the Central Africans.
Ongoing conflict in Chad coupled with the additional strain caused by refugee populations is quickly
depleting all resources. Water and food supplies are exhausted and the Chadian people are finding themselves
equally in need as their Darfurian guests. The attaché should certainly try to encourage extra consideration
and resource allocation for the refugees as well as his/her country in any new proposals
Sacrificing the refugees, however, is something that Chad will not do. An alternative solution that Chad has
implored the international community to consider is relocating the refugees to another country, as chronic
allegations traded between Chad and Sudan that the other is funding insurgent rebels are straining relations.
The attaché will have the ability to block any action plans that require the cooperation of Chad, but not if the
task is explicitly in the UNAMID mandate that Chad has already approved of. The delegate filling this
position should be very familiar with the resources that Chad is currently providing to refugees and how long
they can sustain these donatives. The delegate should also be familiar with the allegations levied by Sudan that
they are harboring and funding the JEM and should be prepared to respond to further accusations.
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ATTACHÉ FROM CHINA
The Chinese attaché should emulate the relatively staunch policy that continues to emanate from Beijing
concerning the Darfur conflict. He/She should be first to defend Sudan’s right to independently handle its
internal affairs, encouraging no further expansion of the UNAMID mission, but rather push for further
cooperation between Sudan and the rebel groups to find a Sudanese solution to a Sudanese problem. This
attaché must also keep a close eye on how the international community continues to respond to the Darfur
conflict, however, and how Sudan’s (and by extension, China’s) reputation is affected by new developments.
Should Sudan err in their handling of the crisis, the Chinese should be present to warn their Sudanese
counterparts. This careful balance between promoting Sudan’s integral nature to the solution and overseeing
their proper execution of such a solution will be this delegate’s main concern.
Because China is a major participant in the UNAMID mission in terms of economic, political, and military
clout, the Chinese attaché’s veto powers will be more complicated than those of other delegates. In any
instance where a reapportion of UNAMID funds and/or an additional deployment peacekeeping troops is
being considered, it is paramount for the committee to garner Chinese support. Although China is notorious
for vetoing many international initiatives concerning Sudan, this attaché will not be able to veto any political
actions taken by the committee. The attaché’s role is instead strictly limited to the extent of the UNAMID
mandate as his/her foreign offices will handle all other issues (especially those regarding Chinese economic
investments and policies in Sudan). The Chinese attaché may communicate with his/her superiors, however,
for advice or to make recommendations regarding foreign policy and investment. The delegate filling this role
should be the committee’s expert on the relations between Sudan and China. He/She should also be very
familiar with the economic relations of China and Sudan, particularly focusing on Chinese oil and defense
investments in Sudan and the trade that takes place.
ATTACHÉ FROM THE UNITED STATES
The US is another major donor to UNAMID, contributing both financial assets and military personnel. The
general policy of the United States is much more aggressive against the Sudanese government than the other
nations represented in this committee, particularly over the sensitive issue of genocide. The United States’
attaché will likely push for the international community to concur with their assessment of genocide,
simultaneously demanding that the UNAMID mandate be stricter in terms of external oversight over the
Sudanese actions. Another key concern that the US has shown a particular tenacity for is accountability within
Sudan. The US has continually stated that bringing Sudanese leaders before the International Criminal Court
(ICC) to be tried for crimes against humanity (again, pushing charges of genocide) as an important step in the
peace building process; the US wants to see UNAMID take on a larger role in apprehending suspects. The
attaché will have to represent these views in the committee while facing fierce opposition from Sudan’s allies
and even the United States’ more forgiving allies.
Like the Chinese attaché, any considerations regarding budgetary reapportions and/or additional should have
US backing. This delegate must also respect his/her place within in the international system; he/she will have
no definitive veto on broader issues such as sanctions or embargos. The attaché will have the United States
Foreign Service constantly at their disposal for contact, though, and may turn to them for advice or
information. The delegate representing the United States should be very familiar with the history of the US’s
actions in Darfur, paying particular attention to their role in the creation and execution of AMIS and
UNAMID. Another topic that this delegate should keep an eye on is the potential for a significant policy
change after the 2008 election cycle. Both major parties’ candidates have taken a hard strong stance against
the Sudanese government; subsequently, the US may see significant policy changes in the months following
the November election (Sanders 3-5).
ATTACHÉ FROM THE EU
Unlike the attachés from the United States and China, the EU attaché must represent a number of diverse
opinions on the matter. Consequently, this attaché does not often take as definitive a stance in political
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affairs. Instead, the EU’s primary interests are a peaceful resolution to the conflict and the responsible use of
the funding that they are providing. The attaché should be fully driven by these neutral objectives, supporting
only measures that will make the mission more successful. The collected European countries also constitute a
major donor of military troops and police as well as supplies, and so have a strong interest in their use. The
EU attaché will have to represent his/her organization’s interest in maintaining the UNAMID force as a
reconstruction and security force, not as a strong arm to forcibly wrest control away from the rebels and
Sudan. The EU representative will have the same veto powers as the US and Chinese attachés: they can deny
budget reapportions and movements of peacekeepers outside of Darfur.
This delegate’s external contacts are unique as the EU “Foreign Service” is not as easily defined as the foreign
service of a specific country. Instead, the attaché can contact the Directorate-General for External Relations,
a division of the European Commission. All responses from this office will be EU policy, not the policy of a
specific nation. The delegate filling this position should be well acquainted with the history of the EU’s
involvement of UNAMID and its predecessors, as well as the extent to which the EU is providing aid to the
mission. The delegate should also take the time to review the independent opinions of the EU member
nations on the conflict as combined they comprise the official EU foreign policy the delegate is representing
in committee.
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REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO)
The DPKO can be considered the overall administrator for all UN peacekeeping operations. Their mission is
“to plan, prepare, manage and direct UN peacekeeping operations, so that they can effectively fulfill their
mandates” (DPKO 1). To do so, this Department oversees peacekeeping troop training missions, offers
logistical support and guidance, and coordinates implementation with external organizations (DPKO 2). The
representative will be present during deliberations to offer expertise to other delegates as they consider the
most effective ways to change the UNAMID mandate. Unlike the other roles, there is no set policy for this
position, save that the delegate representing the DPKO should do whatever they feel would make the project
more successful and efficient.
The DPKO representative, as the administrator directly responsible for the functions of UNAMID, can
reject any action plans that create new implementation methods within the UNAMID mandate. Methods do
not refer to the stated mandates of UNAMID, but rather how the committee plans to execute them. For
example, an action plan to raid known Janjaweed and SLM/JEM camps and confiscate their armaments
would be privy to veto because UNAMID has never before conducted such an operation.
The delegate filling this role should posses a very detailed knowledge of the type of support that the DPKO
usually provides for all peacekeeping missions, not just UNAMID. This includes serving as committee expert
on all issues regarding disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR). He/She should work alongside
the Force Commander, Police Commissioner, as well as the UNDP to ensure that proper and sustainable
security sector reform (SSR) occurs. He/she should also be familiar with the logistics surrounding UNAMID,
as logistical support an explicit part of their organization’s mission statement.
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (DPA)
The DPA is to political strategy and planning as the DPKO is to mission execution. They are the leading UN
experts on analyzing conflicts, making peace, and finding sustainable ways to protect it. In fact, their role in
the UN bureaucracy is so important, an Under-Secretary-General directs this department. One unique aspect
of the DPA is that they not only analyze specific situations around the world, but also perform analysis on
political theory and policy issues. This representative traditionally takes on the mediating role in multi-party
negotiaitnos that involve governments and rebel factions alike; he/she ensures that all parties’ concerns are
both voiced and addressed to some capacity.
The DPA does not have a very detailed policy on the Darfur conflict, save that they are “assisting in the
diplomatic push for a lasting peace settlement” (DPA 2), and this policy should be the one that guides the
DPA’s representative. The representative will have heavy influence during any diplomatic negotiations that
regard short and long-term political issues; this includes the structuring of any power-sharing agreements and
discussions regarding the establishment of good governance and rule of law. This representative may contact
his/her Department at any point for policy guidance and/or confirmation to engage parties in negotiations.
The delegate representing the DPA should be very familiar with their office, taking care to look over the
various policy issues that they have written about. It would also behoove the delegate to research the various
ways in which the DPA has helped other missions. A strong sense of the nature of the relations between all
parties involved in the dispute will also be critical to the effectiveness of this delegate.
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) &

UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (UNCHR)
This delegate’s role in the committee is twofold: refugees and human rights. The separate offices of the
UNHCR and the UNCHR have pooled their resources together and have sent only one delegate to this
committee, who will represent the human interests surrounding the Darfur conflict. Usually, the UNHCR is
seen as a more tactile organization, taking active roles in the care and repatriation of refugees, while the
UNCHR deals with more abstract concepts, such as what rights an individual may have, but such lines are in
no way definitive. The UNHCR currently has about 139 staffers situated in Darfur and a budget of
approximately US$70 million to service refugees of the Darfur conflict (UNHCR). These are fully paid
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staffers, and so can be easily moved around the region as various needs arise. This figure, of course, does not
include the multitude of aid workers in Chad operating the refugee camps.
Among this representatives many duties, he/she will be responsible for the maintenance of the flow of aid to
the IDPs and refugees of the Darfur conflict. To help exercise this responsibility, the delegate will have great
influence over any action plan concerning the refugees. He/She may also find collaborating with the DPKO
and DPA as paramount when developing lasting protections over basic human rights.The main topics of
research should include the overall state of the refugee camps inside and outside of Sudan, including the size
and capacity of the major camps. The delegate should also be familiar with the magnitude of the influx of
refugees now and in the past, and how the UNHCR and the international community have reacted to large
waves of refugees.
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)
Sustainable development is a major concern in Darfur. With every passing week, more villages are burned
down, more refugees flee the country, and more valuable commodities are stolen by the Janjaweed militia,
making progressive development (a stated goal in the UNAMID mandate) incredibly difficult. The UNDP is
impartial toward the political conflicts surrounding Darfur, which should be kept in mind by the
representative (note that impartial is not the same as inactive). Instead, this representative should focus on the
economic and developmental issues working to restore the homes, farms, and economies of the Darfurian
people. The delegate should also keep in mind that Darfur is not the only region of Sudan that the UNDP
operates in and should manage commitments accordingly. Within the committee, the UNDP representative
will have the power to influence any plans that involve development projects (a task the committee should
take special care not to neglect).
The delegate representing this position should be well versed in the kinds of operations that the UNDP runs
inside and outside of Sudan. Logistics such as materials, manpower, and monetary resources should be closely
studied to evaluate the relative success of the UNDP’s efforts in Darfur. This representative will more than
likely solicit loans from the World Bank as well so knowledge of the shared history between the two
organizations would be beneficial. Ultimately, without proper concern given to the long-term implications of
the Darfurian conflict, all efforts of this committee will be null.
REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP)
The World Food Programme’s charge is to fight hunger in all sorts of locales around the globe, whether they
are combat zones or not. Sudan, however, is a major concern and focus for the WFP’s efforts, which service
western, southern, and eastern Sudan. The WFP’s dedication to Sudan is clear: “Sudan is WFP's largest
operation in the world” (WFP “Where we work – Sudan” 8). Their current operating budget is US$697
million aimed at assisting 5.6 million people deemed “vulnerable” (8). Their Darfur program accounts for
70% of this budget, feeding 2-3 million people per year (one half to one third of Darfur’s total population)
(9).
As with the UNDP, the WFP’s general policy is to be politically indifferent as long as a political entity is not
intentionally creating or facilitating famine. Therefore, the WFP delegate should be politically neutral in
committee and offer expertise on how best to distribute food to the most effective locales. In committee, the
WFP representative will have influence over all matters involving food distribution, an important topic for
most of the IDPs and refugees from the conflict. The delegate in this position should be familiar with the
multitude of operations that the WFP executes in all regions of Sudan, and how much of that aid could be
reallocated, if necessary. The representative should also be aware of the famine issues that surround the IDPs
and refugees, but also the people who continue to live in Darfur.
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REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDANESE RED CRESCENT
The Sudanese Red Crescent is a member of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement
(ICRC). All national chapters are actually independent from the International Committee of the Red Cross
although they share the same basic principles and goals. Therefore, the Sudanese Red Crescent chapter is
made up of Sudanese people looking to improve the state of affairs within their own country. This creates an
important check on the influence of this body. While they may coordinate with other Red Cross and Red
Crescent chapters, ultimately, this representative only speaks for the budget and volunteers of the Sudanese
chapter. The Sudanese Red Crescent is a large organization, totaling 400,000 trained volunteers across Sudan
(SCRS 5). It is generally well regarded among most humanitarian groups as a reliable source of medical
treatment for civilians and combatants alike, and so enjoys a great degree of freedom within Darfur (5).
However, they also run a number of educational programs, including education about immunization and
AIDS, and also run a number of health clinics and pharmacies (7). Their operational budget is US$150
million, which is primarily spread across efforts in both Darfur and South Sudan (8).
The chapter’s independence means that they can restrict their goals to providing medical care and treatment
for Sudanese IDPs. Most of their efforts, however, are currently focused in South Sudan. Another stipulation
is that their efforts are directed only towards Sudanese people –whether that includes Darfurian refugees
outside of Sudan is up to interpretation. In committee, the representative will have to represent the goals of
the Sudanese Red Crescent and apply them toward productive solutions in the region. This delegate will have
strong sway over all issues surrounding medical care and how it is provided to the Darfurians. The delegate
should research all funding sources for Darfur for the purpose of providing medical care, whether it is from
the Sudanese Red Crescent or elsewhere. How aid gets to Darfur is a major concern; various modes of
transportation should also be carefully investigated.
CONSULTANT FROM THE WORLD BANK
The World Bank serves as the financer of many post-conflict reconstruction projects around the world.
Loans from the World Bank are typically in the tens or hundreds of millions of dollars with very specific
goals, providing countries with the financial resources necessary to rehabilitate economies and develop their
often shattered infrastructures. This delegate should note, however, that the World Bank only enters a
country after peace is established. In Sudan, their task is particularly interesting. Because Darfur is still a heavy
combat zone, the Bank has historically been hesitant to grant large loans. Concerns over the Sudanese
government’s transparency (or lake thereof) make it difficult to award loans in fear that they may never
actually arrive in Darfur. Though the Bank has yet to take any tangible action, the organization is not restless.
They have frequently warned that Sudan is not offering enough investments to Darfur. The Bank has also
continued to participate in exploration missions to probe how much aid the region will need when peace does
come and how best to distribute it (World Bank 19-20).
The current major contributions to the World Bank are towards development in South Sudan. Two Multi-
Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) have been established, presently totaling US$212 million, though US$418
million has been promised (World Bank 21). Because of concerns surrounding a 1993 default by Khartoum,
however, no loans have been made by the World Bank. The current focus of the existing investments is
“access to basic human services, and sustainable and pro-poor economic growth and support the CPA” (15).
Within the committee, the representative should aim to continue to investigate the financial prospects of the
region and should pursue the most rapid peace that can be achieved. This delegate will have considerable
discretionary power over all new development-related plans as he/she will be solicited for funds once plans
are drafted. This does not include extensions of development projects already in place, only new missions that
the committee may choose to create. The delegate filling this position should also be familiar with the nature
of the loans that the World Bank has already distributed to Sudan to get a sense of the types of loans that the
Bank distributed. The delegate should also be familiar with other investments in Darfur and where from,
comparing the terms of these agreements with the World Bank’s potential loan.
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BIBLIOGRAPHY
UN Sources
A/C.5/62/30. “Financing of the support account for peacekeeping operations and the United Nations
Logistics Base at Brindisi, Italy : note/by the Secretary-General.” 11 Jun. 2008.
“The Comprehensive Peace Agreement Between the Government of The Republic of The Sudan and The
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Sudan People’s Liberation Army.” 9 Jan. 2005.
S/RES/1556 (2004). “Resolution 1556 (2004).” 30 Jul. 2004.
S/RES/1590 (2005). “Resolution 1590 (2005).” 24 Mar. 2005.
SG/SM/10653. “Secretary-General Welcomes Extension of African Union Mission’s Darfur Mandate.” 21

Sept. 2006.
“Statement by Right Honourable Paul Martin, Prime Minister of Canada, to the High-Level Meeting of the
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"Excess Deaths in the Darfur States." Map. Sudan: Death Toll in Darfur. 25 Mar. 2005. United States
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-42-
APPENDIX
I. UNAMID MANDATE
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, by its resolution 1769
of 31 July 2007 decided that UNAMID is authorized to take the necessary action, in the areas of deployment
of its forces and as it deems within its capabilities in order to:
(i) protect its personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and to ensure the security and
freedom of movement of its own personnel and humanitarian workers;
(ii) support early and effective implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement, prevent the
disruption of its implementation and armed attacks, and protect civilians, without prejudice to
the responsibility of the Government of Sudan.
The Council also decided that the mandate of UNAMID shall be as set out in paragraphs 54 and 55 of the
report of the Secretary-General and the Chairperson of the African Union Commission of 5 June 2007
(document S/2007/307/Rev.1), namely as follows:
(a) To contribute to the restoration of necessary security conditions for the safe provision
of humanitarian assistance and to facilitate full humanitarian access throughout Darfur;
(b) To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of

physical violence and prevent attacks against civilians, within its capability and areas of
deployment, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of the Sudan;
(c) To monitor, observe compliance with and verify the implementation of various ceasefire
agreements signed since 2004, as well as assist with the implementation of the Darfur
Peace Agreement and any subsequent agreements;
(d) To assist the political process in order to ensure that it is inclusive, and to support the
African Union-United Nations joint mediation in its efforts to broaden and deepen
commitment to the peace process;
(e) To contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development,

as well as the sustainable return of internally displaced persons and refugees to their
homes;
(f) To contribute to the promotion of respect for and protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in Darfur;
(g) To assist in the promotion of the rule of law in Darfur, including through support for
strengthening an independent judiciary and the prison system, and assistance in the
development and consolidation of the legal framework, in consultation with relevant
Sudanese authorities;
(h) To monitor and report on the security situation at the Sudan’s borders with Chad and
the Central African Republic.
In order to achieve these broad goals, the operation’s tasks would include the following:
(a) Support for the peace process and good offices:
-43-
(i) To support the good offices of the African Union-United Nations Joint Special Representative
for Darfur and the mediation efforts of the Special Envoys of the African Union and the United
Nations;
(ii) To support and monitor the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement and subsequent
agreements;
(iii) To participate in and support the major bodies established by the Darfur Peace Agreement and
any subsequent agreements in the implementation of their mandate, including through the
provision of technical assistance and logistical support to those bodies;
(iv) To facilitate the preparation and conduct of the Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, as
stipulated in the Darfur Peace Agreement;
(v) To assist in the preparations for the conduct of the referendums provided for in the Darfur
Peace Agreement;
(vi) To ensure the complementary implementation of all peace agreements in the Sudan, particularly
with regard to the national provisions of those agreements, and compliance with the Interim
National Constitution;
(vii) To liaise with UNMIS, the African Union Liaison Office for the implementation of the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement and other stakeholders to ensure complementary
implementation of the mandates of UNMIS, the African Union Liaison Office for the
implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement and the hybrid operation in Darfur;
(b) Security:
(i) To promote the re-establishment of confidence, deter violence and assist in monitoring and
verifying the implementation of the redeployment and disengagement provisions of the Darfur
Peace Agreement, including by actively providing security and robust patrolling of redeployment
and buffer zones, by monitoring the withdrawal of long-range weapons, and by deploying hybrid
police, including formed police units, in areas where internally displaced persons are
concentrated, in the demilitarized and buffer zones, along key routes of migration and in other
vital areas, including as provided for in the Darfur Peace Agreement;
(ii) To monitor, investigate, report and assist the parties in resolving violations of the Darfur Peace
Agreement and subsequent complementary agreements through the Ceasefire Commission and
the Joint Commission;
(iii) To monitor, verify and promote efforts to disarm the Janjaweed and other militias;
(iv) To coordinate non-combat logistical support for the movements;
(v) To assist in the establishment of the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programme
called for in the Darfur Peace Agreement;
(vi) To contribute to the creation of the necessary security conditions for the provision of
humanitarian assistance and to facilitate the voluntary and sustainable return of refugees and
internally displaced persons to their homes;
(vii) In the areas of deployment of its forces and within its capabilities, to protect the hybrid
operation’s personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, to ensure the security and freedom
of movement of United Nations-African Union personnel, humanitarian workers and
-44-
Assessment and Evaluation Commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation

of the Darfur Peace Agreement by armed groups and, without prejudice to the responsibility of
the Government of the Sudan, to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence
and prevent attacks and threats against civilians;
(viii) To monitor through proactive patrolling the parties’ policing activities in camps for
internally displaced persons, demilitarized and buffer zones and areas of control;
(ix) To support, in coordination with the parties, as outlined in the Darfur Peace Agreement, the
establishment and training of community police in camps for internally displaced persons, to
support capacity-building of the Government of the Sudan police in Darfur, in accordance with
international standards of human rights and accountability, and to support the institutional
development of the police of the movements;
(x) To support the efforts of the Government of the Sudan and of the police of the movements to
maintain public order and build the capacity of Sudanese law enforcement in this regard through
specialized training and joint operations;
(xi) To provide technical mine-action advice and coordination and demining capacity to support the
Darfur Peace Agreement;
(c) Rule of law, governance, and human rights:
(i) To assist in the implementation of the provisions of the Darfur PeaceAgreement and any
subsequent agreements relating to human rights and the rule of law and to contribute to the
creation of an environment conducive to respect for human rights and the rule of law, in which
all are ensured effective protection;
(ii) To assist all stakeholders and local government authorities, in particular in their efforts to
transfer resources in an equitable manner from the federal Government to the Darfur states, and
to implement reconstruction plans and existing and subsequent agreements on land use and
compensation issues;
(iii) To support the parties to the Darfur Peace Agreement in restructuring and building the capacity
of the police service in Darfur, including through monitoring, training, mentoring, co-location
and joint patrols;
(iv) To assist in promoting the rule of law, including through institution-building, and strengthening
local capacities to combat impunity;
(v) To ensure an adequate human rights and gender presence capacity, and expertise in Darfur in
order to contribute to efforts to protect and promote human rights in Darfur, with particular
attention to vulnerable groups;
(vi) To assist in harnessing the capacity of women to participate in the peace process, including
through political representation, economic empowerment and protection from gender-based
violence;
(vii) To support the implementation of provisions included in the Darfur Peace Agreement and any
subsequent agreements relating to upholding the rights of children;
(d) Humanitarian assistance:
(i) To facilitate the effective provision of humanitarian assistance and full access to people in need.
-45-
II. UNAMID DEPLOYMENT AS OF SEPTEMBER 2008
LEGEND FOR “UNAMID DEPLOYMENT IN DARFUR”

Symbol Description
I Company, ~60-250 personnel, led by Captain or equivalent
II Battalion, ~300-1000 personnel, led by Lieutenant Colonel
X Brigade, ~2000-5000 personnel, led by Brigadier General
Infantry
Engineers
Signals
Military Police
EXAMPLE
II
SENEGAL Senegalese Infantry Battalion (~300-1000 personnel)
-46-
III. VARIOUS CHARTS

SIGNIFICANT TREATIES AND RESOLUTIONS
Name Description
Composed of a number of related agreements signed between Khartoum and the
SPLM/SLPA that put an end to the Second Sudanese Civil War. The six agreements
CPA
decide on a number of different topics, including the sensitive subjects of independence
(2002-2004)
and political representation. Many consider this to be a model for a final solution for
Darfur (see DPA below).
Firm resolution passed by the Security Council that addressed a number of issues
Resolution 1556 important to the early years of the conflict. Among other operatives, it condemns the
(2004) janjawiid and calls upon Sudan for their swift disarmament. It also offers support for the
then-fledgling AMIS mission and support for humanitarian missions in the region
Early attempt to end the Darfur conflict, but was only signed between Khartoum and
DPA the SLM/SLA (Minnawi). Takes many of the ideas within the CPA that proved effective,
[May Agreement] notably including Minnawi in the top administrative level of government. The JEM and
(2005) other SLM/SLA factions complain that it does nothing to address the janjawiid threat,
and have chosen to continue their rebellion
Unanimously passed resolution that established UNAMID as the successor to the AMIS
Resolution 1769 mission. Is widely considered much more proactive, involved, and enforceable than the
(2007) AMIS mandate, and so has been well-received in the international community. Delegates
should observe this document as the definition of their executive privileges.
MAJOR CONFLICTS IN DARFUR

Conflict or War Description
Important figures
• Egypt: Khedive Isma’il Pascha, al-Zubayr Rahma Mansur
• Darfur Sultanate: Sultan Ibrahim Hassan
Causes
• Egypt saw Sudan as a land of riches, and Darfur was along key
pilgrimage and trade routes
Khedive Annexation
• al-Zubayr entered Darfur with his own force, so the Khedivate had to
(1874)
move in itself before al-Zubayr consolidated his power
Effects
• The Darfur Sultanate was abolished
• Trade in Darfur saw some degree of revitalization
• Egypt soon saw how few resources Darfur had, and paid little
attention to the region
Important Figures
• Mahdists: Mahdi (Muhammad Ahmad Abdallah)
• United Kingdom: Sir Charles Gordon
• Darfur Sultanate: Sultan Ali Dinar
Causes
• Mahdi spurred a spiritual movement in Sudan, promising a new
Mahdist Revolt golden age for the Muslim faith.
(1881-1885) • Disenchantment with poor Egyptian rule helped spread the rebellion
Effects
• The invasion of Darfur was never truly complete, and the years of the
rebellion saw great infighting within Darfur
• The end of the rebellion marked the beginning of Egyptian
dependence on the UK and the establishment of the Condominium
• The Sultanate of Darfur was temporarily restored
-47-
Important Figures
• United Kingdom: Sir Reginald Wingate
• Darfur Sultanate: Ali Dinar
British Annexation Causes
(1916) • Personal resentment on Sir Wingate’s part of Darfur’s independence
• French pressure to create a rigid border between T’chad and Sudan
Effects
• Darfur Sultanate permanently abolished
• Subsequent neglect of Darfur under British rule meant that the region
lagged in terms of infrastructure and economic development
Important Figures:
• Sudan: Prime Minister Ismail al-Azhari Lt. Gen. Ibrahim Abboud,
President Omar al-Bashir
• South Sudan: Joseph Lagu, John Garang
Causes
• Christian and animist tribes in the south were opposed to Islamic rule
from Khartoum
• The South sought more regional autonomy to manage their own
affairs
Sudanese Civil War
• The Second Sudanese Civil War was largely an extension of the First
First: 1955-1972
Effects
Second: 1983-2005
• The prolonged conflict and high death tolls has retarded the
development of both South Sudan and Sudan as a whole
• The governmental representation clauses in the resolution of both
conflicts proved that southern Christians and animists could serve in
Khartoum peacefully
• The CPA is a model and largely successful peace agreement lauded by
many nations
• A plebiscite is still planned for South Sudan to decide on the question
of independence
Important Figures
• Chad: President Hissène Habré
• Libya: Col. Muammar al-Gadaffi, GUNT
Causes
• Libya was attempting to assert itself as the primary power in North
Africa, and refused to acknowledge Habré’s authority in Chad
• He funded the GUNT to overthrow him and to annex the Aouzou
Toyota War
Strip in Northern Chad
(1983-1986)
Effects
• Some of the GUNT training and staging grounds were located in
Northern Darfur, making it a target for attack
• Libyan propaganda instilled a sense of resentment among many Arab
tribes against “African” rule
The end of the conflict left large weapon stockpiles in the hands of the
predominantly Arab tribes of Northern Darfur
-48-
Important Figures:
• Sudan: President Omar al-Bashir, General Mohamed Ahmad al Dabi
Causes
• The Masseleit tribe, which hosted many Umma party members and
Mahdists, and local Arabs became increasingly estranged in the years
leading up to the conflict
Dar Masseleit Conflict • The question of one group’s disenfranchisement to benefit the other
(1995) was a recurring worry
Effects
• Few people died as a result of the conflict, but it set up psychological
grievances that last to this day
• It helped establish the African-Arab tribal dichotomy we observe in
Darfur today
• Seen as the founding moments of the Janjaweed, who formed to rout
the Masseleit into Chad
REBEL GROUPS IN DARFUR

Rebel Group Description
Nebulous term used for the various Arab militias throughout Darfur. May have logistical
support from Khartoum, but has no semblance of a centralized leadership. Members
Janjaweed fight for many reasons, including tribal rivalries and competition for dwindling resources
among others. Overall, the goal of the militias seems to be to drive the African tribes out
of Darfur via violent attacks. As their control expands, many of these groups have started
to fight amongst themselves.
Politically-oriented rebel group in Darfur. Has a well-published (The Black Book) pro-
Islamist ideology. Seeks to end the NIF’s humanitarian violations rather than its
JEM enforcement of Islamic values and law. Possess only a small military force, formerly
depending on the SLA for military support. Has yet to sign any peace agreement with
Khartoum, but with the dissolution of the SLA, attacks have been cut.
Large, tribally-oriented rebel group first established as an alliance between the Fur,
Zaghawa, and Masseleit tribes. Espouses a very secularist and regional ideology, citing
lack of political representation and investment as major complaints about the NIF
SLM/A regime. Movement always lacked centralized control, and today is splintered between
various factions with Minna Minawi as the leader of the largest one. Has collaborated
with the SPLM/A and the JEM, but lack of coherent leadership has made external
cooperation difficult.
SIGNIFICANT FIGURES SURROUNDING DARFUR

Person Description
President of Sudan since 30 June 1989 after a coup by the NIF. Was instrumental in
al-Bashir, Omar the conclusion of the SPLM/SPLA rebellion, and has taken equally robust measures
Hassan Ahmad to end the Darfur rebellion. Currently under investigation by ICJ prosecutors for war
crimes and genocide.
Charged with the responsibility to raise militias to put down the Darfur rebels in 2003.
Haroun, Ahmed There is considerable evidence that he armed and funded the Janjaweed and other
Mohamed Islamic militias, giving them explicit permission to loot. Has since been jailed and later
placed under house arrest by Khartoum
Founding leader of the JEM. Formerly a supporter and bureaucrat for the NIF,
Ibrahim, Kahlil breaking ranks to form the JEM due to economic and humanitarian complaints. Has
since kept a political focus to his rebellion rather than a military one. Has not signed
the DPA.
-49-
President of Chad since 2 December 1990. His country is host to many Darfurian
rebels and is victim to many anti-government insurgents based in Sudan. His capital,
Déby Itno, Idris N’djamena, has been victim to two major attacks in 2006 and 2008. Has asked the
international community to remove Darfurian rebels to alleviate political tensions
with Sudan.
Head of the SLM/A (Minawi), signed the DPA with Khartoum on 5 May 2006.
Minawi, Minna Presently serving as the Senior Assistant to the President (fourth in the line of
Arkoi succession). His SLM/A faction continues to fight against other rebel groups in
Darfur.
Leader of the 1989 NIF coup, now he has lost influence in Sudan. Is believed to be a
al-Turabi, Hassan primary instigator of many alleged human rights violations. His wing of the NIF
formerly espoused a desire to spread shari’a law to neighboring countries. Breaks with
NIF leadership have forced him into political exile
IV. SAMPLE COMMUNIQUÉ: PRESIDENT BASHIR TO ATTACHÉ FROM SUDAN
From: President Hasan al-Bashir (Government of Sudan)

To: Attaché from Sudan
CC: Chris Talamo (Joint AU-UN Representative); Jason Fortin (Deputy AU-UN Representative)
This morning I received an urgent report from military command stationed in West Darfur that the number
of cross-border raids has spiked in the past weeks; they claim that all attacks originated in Chad. The JEM’s
aggressive attacks and continuous violations of cease-fire brokered by your efforts are putting the entire
peacekeeping operation on the brink of a total failure.
The participation of the Government of Sudan (GoS) in your peace efforts cannot continue under these
conditions. Hence, continued GoS cooperation will depend of the following:
1 – Withdrawl of JEM forces from the Darfur area, including heavy weapons,
2 – Proper prosecution of insurgent nonstate actors,
3 – Verification of the cease-fire
I have to reiterate that any failure of UNAMID will depend on the rebels’ actions,
Sincerely,
President Hasan al-Bashir
V. SAMPLE ACTION PLAN
Sponsors: Force Commander, Police Chief, Attaché from China, Attaché from the EU
1 – Reassign two Nigerian companies, one from from El Da’ein and the other from Graida,
and station them at Malha in Northern Darfur for the purposes of investigating cases of
domestic violence.
2 – Apportion US$500 thousand to expand the amount of forensics equipment in the region
to assist these investigations.
3 – Assign a liaison to work with the WFP and keep them apprised of recent attacks to
protect them from rebel raiding parties.
-50-

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N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

United Nations/African Union

Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

NHSMUN is a project of the

Rosa Akbari Dear NHSMUN delegates,

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Rosa Akbari, Director-General Chris Talamo

(Country Summaries) (Individual Position Papers)

Communiqués and Press Releases:

POSITION PAPER GUIDELINES

Figure I: Tribal Lands in Modern Darfur It is difficult to find accurate

PRE-COLONIAL DARFUR: SHATTERING A FRACTURED NATION

The end of Egyptian dominance over

COLONIAL DARFUR: RESURGENCE AND REMISSION

SUDANESE DARFUR: THE FORGOTTEN CONFLICT

Though famine-causing droughts continued, it

COUP D’ÉTAT AND THE RISE OF MODERN SUDAN

SPARK OF CONFLICT IN DARFUR: FEBRUARY 2003

Fractioning Among Rebels

SOUTH SUDAN: THE COMPREHENSIVE PEACE AGREEMENT (CPA)

While the CPA was drafted in response to festering

DARFUR PEACE AGREEMENT (DPA)

Responsibility 2 Protect (R2P)

BASIC INFRASTRUCTURE AND

In the immediate, humanitarian

Resolving increasingly limited access to

Food and W ater Security

PERCENT OF AFFECTED POPULATION ACCESSIBLE TO UN HUMANITARIAN AID SINCE APRIL 2004

Source: UN Darfur Humanitarian Profile, 1 July 2008.

Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) Camps

CONCENTRATIONS OF IDPS AS OF AUGUST 2008

CHADIAN REFUGEE CAMPS

SECURITY SECTOR REFORM

Disarming the M ilitias

ATTACHÉ FROM SUDAN

ATTACHÉ OF THE JUSTICE & EQUALITY MOVEMENT (JEM)

ATTACHÉ OF THE SLM/A

ATTACHÉ FROM THE CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC (CAR)

ATTACHÉ FROM CHAD

ATTACHÉ FROM CHINA

ATTACHÉ FROM THE UNITED STATES

ATTACHÉ FROM THE EU

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (DPKO)

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS (DPA)

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UN HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR) &

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAMME (UNDP)

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE WORLD FOOD PROGRAMME (WFP)

REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SUDANESE RED CRESCENT

CONSULTANT FROM THE WORLD BANK

S/RES/1556 (2004). “Resolution 1556 (2004).” 30 Jul. 2004.

S/RES/1590 (2005). “Resolution 1590 (2005).” 24 Mar. 2005.

SG/SM/10653. “Secretary-General Welcomes Extension of African Union Mission’s Darfur Mandate.” 21

"Mission Statement." Department of Peacekeeping Operations. United Nations. 6 Sept. 2008

Metz, Helen C. "INSTITUTIONS OF GOVERNMENT." Sudan: A Country Study. 1991. Library of

(b) To contribute to the protection of civilian populations under imminent threat of

(e) To contribute to a secure environment for economic reconstruction and development,

(a) Support for the peace process and good offices:

(iv) To coordinate non-combat logistical support for the movements;

Assessment and Evaluation Commission personnel, to prevent disruption of the implementation

(c) Rule of law, governance, and human rights:

(d) Humanitarian assistance:

II. UNAMID DEPLOYMENT AS OF SEPTEMBER 2008