HSC

N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL
MODEL UNITED NATIONS

35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
BACKGROUND GUIDE
Historical Security Council

S p e c i a l i z e d A g e n c i e s
 2008-2009 International Model United Nations Association, Inc. Used and distributed under license.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
September 2008
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General
Boston University
Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

Director-General Welcome to NHSMUN 2009! I serve as the Undersecretary-General (USG) for Specialized
McGill University
Agencies, and this is my fifth NHSMUN and third on staff. I served as the Director and
Nancy Henry Assistant Director for the International Court of Justice (ICJ) during my first two years on
Conference Director staff, and as a delegate I was on the ICJ and Security Council, so Specials has been near and
Tufts University dear to my heart for a very long time now. I have always thought that the intimacy and
personality of our committees give our delegates a substantive experience that cannot be
Michelle Shevin
rivaled, and I am unbelievably excited to serve as the USG of Specials.
Chief of Staff
Barnard College
I’m usually a junior at Dartmouth College studying Economics and Classical Archaeology, but
Cristina Rade I’m taking the fall off to work an internship with the Naval Postgraduate School in sunny
Chief of External Relations Monterey, CA. My academic interests include international trade policy, the pottery of the
Adelphi University
Athenian empire, and the role of the UN in the modern world. In my spare time, I love
Ryan Burke arbitrarily changing the order of my Netflix queue and travel.
Director of Security
University of South Carolina My summer was spent working with your Directors to create the best background guides
possible. I can attest to the amount of thought, research, and analysis that went into making
Matthew Low Specials this year, and I can also guarantee that your conference experience will be the best
Under-Secretary-General
University of California,
possible. However, we fully expect you to put in a commensurate level of effort! Your research
Berkeley and analysis will be critical to make your committees a success.
Daniel Nowicki My only regret since I’ve become USG-Specials is that I’ll have far less interaction with
Under-Secretary-General delegates than I used to. So if you see me at any point during the conference, feel free to stop
Georgetown University
and ask me about archaeology, NHSMUN, college, or anything you want to chat about. I look
Deanna Maxfield forward to seeing you all in March, and good luck with your research!
University of Southern Sincerely,
California Jerry Guo
Emily Robertson
jerry.guo@gmail.com
Under-Secretary-General 860.420.7788
Duke University
Lisa Cuesta
University of Pennsylvania
Jerry Guo
Dartmouth College
NHSMUN is a project of the

International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL M ODEL U NITED N ATIONS
The 35th Annual Conference • March 18-21, 2009
Nick Stefanizzi
Secretary-General September 2008
Boston University
Rosa Akbari
Director-General
McGill University
Dear Delegates,
Nancy Henry
Conference Director Well I wish I could be the first to say welcome to the 2009 National High School Model United
Tufts University Nations Conference, but I guess I’ll have to settle for 3rd or 4th, maybe even 5th. At any rate, my name
is David Stern, and I’ll be your director this evening. I hope you are all as excited as I am to come to
Michelle Shevin
this committee and that you will bring all the enthusiasm and hard work that should make this a great
Chief of Staff
Barnard College committee and Model UN experience for all of us. But enough about you, let’s talk about me! I am
currently a senior at the George Washington University majoring in international relations with a minor
Cristina Rade in Asian studies while simultaneously working for my masters in political communications (I decided to
Chief of External Relations forfeit anything resembling a life). I went to over a dozen high school Model UN conferences during
Adelphi University
my four years, including three trips to NHSMUN. I also had the privilege of serving as director of
Ryan Burke Security Council last year at NHSMUN 2008, and could not be more excited to be directing the
Director of Security Historical Security Council this year.
University of South Carolina
The topics that have been chosen for Historical Security Council this year are both deeply complicated,
Matthew Low and present major challenges to fundamental international norms, given the gross human rights abuses
University of California,
currently going on, as well as difficult management issues concerning the mandates of United Nations
Berkeley Peacekeeping missions. The situations in Bosnia and Cambodia both involve the commitment of
atrocities that strain credulity, and therefore demand resolutions by this committee that address both
Daniel Nowicki the fundamental issue of how to stem the violence as well as design sustainable peacekeeping
Under-Secretary-General operations so as to help the situations both in the short term and long term.
Georgetown University
Deanna Maxfield The background guides that have been prepared for you should serve as a good foundation for
Under-Secretary-General understanding the nuances of these problems, but I hope that once you have read them you will find
University of Southern the topics as interesting as I do, and conduct a great deal more of your own research so we can have
California the most informative discussion possible. Feel free to use the bibliography, it should give you a good
Emily Robertson
start, and if you have any questions or would like any help, I am completely at your disposal. Beyond
Under-Secretary-General NHSMUN, you can also dispose of me (I really never did understand how exactly you were supposed
Duke University to be at someone’s “disposal”) when it comes to questions about college, life in DC, things like that.
See you in March! Oh, and allow me to apologize profusely and in advance for my rather idiosyncratic
Lisa Cuesta sense of humor.
University of Pennsylvania
Sincerely,
Jerry Guo
Under-Secretary-General David Stern
Dartmouth College dcstern@gwu.edu
The George Washington University
1701 N. Kent St., Apartment 202
Arlington, VA 22209
NHSMUN is a project of the
International Model United
Nations Association, Incorporated
(IMUNA). IMUNA, a not-for-
profit, all volunteer organization, is
dedicated to furthering global
issues education at the secondary
school level.
The 2009 National High School Model United Nations
A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Delegate preparation is paramount to a successful and exciting National High School Model United Nations
2009 Conference. We have provided this Background Guide to introduce the topics that will be discussed in
your committee; these papers are designed to give you a description of the topics and the committee. They
will not give you a complete description of the topic areas and they will not contain the most up-to-date
information, particularly in regards to rapidly evolving issues. We encourage and expect each delegate to fully
explore the topics and be able to identify and analyze the intricacies of the issues. Delegates must be prepared
to intelligently utilize their newly acquired knowledge and apply it to their own countries’ policy. You will
find that your nation has a unique position on the topics that cannot be substituted for or with the opinions
of another nation.
The task of preparing and researching for the conference is challenging, but it can be interesting and
rewarding. We have provided each school with a copy of the Delegation Preparation Guide. The Guide
contains detailed instructions on how to write a position paper and how to effectively participate in
committee sessions. (Note: some position papers have unique guidelines that are detailed within respective
committees’ Background Guides.) The Guide also gives a synopsis of the types of research materials and
resources available to you and where they can be found. A brief history of the United Nations and the
NHSMUN conference are also included. The annotated rules of procedure complete the Delegate
Preparation Guide.
An essential part of representing a nation in an international body is the ability to articulate that nation’s views
in writing. Accordingly, it is the policy of NHSMUN to require each delegate (or double-delegation team) to
write position papers. The position papers should clearly outline the country’s policies on the topic areas to
be discussed and what factors contribute to these policies. In addition, each paper must address the Research
and Preparation questions at the end of the committee Background Guide. Most importantly, the paper
must be written from the point of view of the country you are representing at NHSMUN 2009 and
should articulate the policies you will espouse at the conference. All papers should be typed and double-
spaced. The papers will be read by the Director of each committee and returned at the start of the
conference with brief comments and constructive advice.
You are responsible for sending a copy of your paper to the Director of your committee. Additionally, your
delegation is responsible for bringing a bound copy of all of the position papers—one for each committee to
which your school has been assigned—to the conference (to be submitted during registration). Specific
requirements of the bound copy have been sent to the faculty advisor/club president. In addition to position
papers, each delegation must prepare one brief summary statement on the basic economic, political, and
social structures of its country, as well as on its foreign policy. Please mail country summary statements to the
Director-General of NHSMUN 2009 at the address below. All copies should be postmarked no later than
February 16th and mailed to:
Rosa Akbari, Director-General David Stern

3631 av. Henri-Julien The George Washington University
Montréal, Québec H2X 3H4 1701 N. Kent St., Apartment 202
Canada Arlington, VA 22209
(Country Summaries) (Individual Position Papers)
Delegations are required to mail hard copies of papers to the Director-General and Directors.
NHSMUN Staff will not consider e-mail submissions as an adequate substitution.
Delegations that do not submit position papers to Directors or Summary Statements to the
Director-General will be ineligible for awards.
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COMMITTEE HISTORY
The Security Council was established by the United Nations Charter on 24 October 1945. According to
Article 24 of the Charter, the Council’s primary responsibility is the maintenance of international peace and
security. In addition to Chapter Five, which lays the “ground rules” for the Council, Chapters Six, Seven,
Eight, and Twelve detail the specific functions and powers granted the Security Council to carry out its
overall mission. These functions and powers include investigating escalating conflicts that may reach the
international theatre and recommending arbitration or settlement methods for such disputes. The Council
determines whether a situation constitutes a threat to international peace or an act of aggression, with the
ultimate goal to stop or prevent aggression by non-forceful measures (i.e. economic sanctions) or, at last
resort, military action.
Originally, the Security Council was comprised of five permanent, veto-wielding members and six
nonpermanent members; in 1965, the number of non-permanent members was increased to ten. Elected by
the General Assembly, non-permanent members serve for a two-year term and are not eligible for immediate
reelection. The Security Council has an alphabetically rotating Presidency, in which each member serves for
one calendar month.
Seeing that the purpose of the Security Council is to provide prompt and effective international action, UN
member states agree to accept and implement all decisions made by the Security Council. This agreement is
provided for under the UN Charter, and means that only the Security Council can make decisions that other
nations must follow. Non-Security Council nations can, however, make suggestions to the Council.
The Security Council also has the ability to appoint subsidiary bodies. These committees, working groups, and
peacekeeping operations help to structure the work of the Council and make its operations more efficient and
effective.
Additionally, the role of the Security Council in peacekeeping is particularly relevant to this committee. As of
1992, the Security Council has deployed UN peacekeepers to 28 observer or peacekeeping missions in twelve
regions— Nicaragua, Kuwait, Angola, El Salvador, Namibia, Iran-Iraq, Cyprus, India-Pakistan, the Golan
Heights, Lebanon, Cambodia and former Yugoslavia.
UN peacekeeping is guided by three principles: consent, neutrality, and impartiality. All parties to a conflict
must consent to UN peacekeepers’ involvement in the conflict in order for peacekeeping to take place.
Additionally, peacekeepers must be seen as neutral and impartial, not giving special favors or credence to any
one side of the conflict. Another important element of UN peacekeeping is mandates. Peacekeeping missions
can either have a Chapter VI mandate, which allows for monitoring, reporting, and confidence building; or a
Chapter VII mandate, which allows for enforcement of agreements and laws. As appropriate to their
mandate, peacekeepers are governed by Rules of Engagement, which usually only allow for self defense with
light weapons. The underlying theory of peacekeeping is that force begets force, so it is rare for peacekeepers
to be given a mandate to use any more force than is absolutely necessary (Greenhill).
1992 is a time of change for UN peacekeeping. In the past decade, UN peacekeeping was given a Nobel
Prize, an honor reflective of the great respect the international community has for the work of UN
peacekeepers. The past success of UN peacekeepers during the Cold War has left current expectations for
peacekeeping very high. The very recent successes of Namibia and El Salvador have only heightened these
expectations. This is significant, because the types of conflicts peacekeeping is now involved in are very
different from those which won it the Nobel Prize in the last decade. In recent years, many more conflicts
have been internal, like those in Namibia and El Salvador. Only three years ago, in 1989, did the UN even
involve itself in internal conflict; before 1989, UN peacekeeping was only a feature of interstate war (war
between two states, as opposed to war between different groups within a state) (Greenhill).
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Another key feature of peacekeeping in recent years is the unprecedented level of political involvement
peacekeeping missions have had. Peacekeepers are responsible for elections, policing, interim administration,
and human rights. Humanitarian mandates are also becoming more common, with concerns like refugee
resettlement and access to food becoming part of peacekeepers’ missions. So far, the same rules of
peacekeeping that have been applied to internationalized wars have been successful when applied to internal
wars (Greenhill).
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SIMULATION
One of the smallest committees at NHSMUN, the Historical Security Council of 1992 has 15 members.
Considering the special nature of the Security Council, this committee will have rules that are different from
other NHSMUN committees. Veto power will be in effect; if any of the five veto-wielding states votes
against a resolution it cannot pass, however, veto power does not apply to procedural matters. Additionally, in
order for a resolution to pass, nine of the fifteen member states must vote in favor of it. Abstentions do not
count as favorable votes; so if, for example, eight members of the Council vote in favor of a resolution, two
oppose, and the rest abstain, the resolution has not garnered enough support to pass.
A Director and Assistant Director will preside over the committee, and they will act as Chair and Co-Chair.
They will ensure compliance with the rules of Parliamentary Procedure as well as NHSMUN rules and
policies. They will guide but not influence debate; they will answer questions about procedural policy and
may clarify substantive points. At the start of committee, the Director and Assistant Director will introduce
themselves, and then provide a brief opportunity for delegates to do so as well. After that, the Council will
move on to business.
The first action of the Council will be to set the agenda. The dais will entertain no motions for caucusing,
and debate must be strictly limited to the order of the agenda; no substantive debate will be permitted.
Because of the timely nature of this committee, setting the agenda will also determine the timeframe of the
committee. If topic A is chosen, the committee will begin on 4 September 1992. If topic B is chosen, the
committee will begin on 25 July 1992.
After the agenda is set, the Council will begin formal debate on the first topic. At this time the speakers’ list
will be opened and motions for moderated and unmoderated caucusing will be in order. Both types of
caucusing require a suspension of the rules of parliamentary procedure. A moderated caucus allows delegates
to debate on a specific topic of discussion, to be named by the delegate moving for the caucus. Moderated
caucuses have speaking times of thirty to forty-five seconds, and speakers are selected at the Dais’s discretion.
Unmoderated caucuses provide delegates a chance to debate informally, with no speakers’ list. In addition to
providing an opportunity for committee members to organize and network, unmoderated caucusing is an
excellent tool for the creation of working papers and draft resolutions.
As compromise lies at the heart of the UN, an overly competitive debate style will only hinder a delegate’s
ability to be effective in committee. NHSMUN values compromise more than the content of a sponsors’ list,
and those delegates who are able to effectively collaborate are the most successful. Along these lines,
prewritten resolutions or draft resolutions are not permitted at NHSMUN. Though delegates will certainly
bring ideas into committee, to write these down in resolution form prior to the conference will hamper
debate and the delegates’ ability to collaborate. This having been said, delegates must always stand by their
country’s official foreign policy, even when that policy is uncompromising. NHSMUN is not only about
passing resolutions, but also about accurately reflecting policy and compromising whenever possible. Thus,
delegates should come prepared with exhaustive research and positive mindsets in order to create the most
viable solutions to the issues at hand.
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IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIRE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

TOPIC A
INTRODUCTION
Yesterday, 4 September 1992, a UN plane carrying humanitarian relief supplies was shot down over Sarajevo.
Although parties to the conflict agreed on a ceasefire in January, an American diplomat, speaking on
conditions of anonymity, claimed that the plane was shot down by a missile over the city (Sudetic). Sarajevo,
which houses roughly 522,910 people (“Short History”), has been subject to a siege by forces from
neighboring Serbia over the past five months.
The incident occurred just after the international community has begun to acknowledge the high level of
human rights abuses that are occurring in the recently-independent state of Bosnia and Herzegovina
(hereafter referred to as Bosnia.) Bosnia has been embroiled in a violent and ethnically-driven civil war since
its declaration of independence from the former Republic of Yugoslavia in March of this year. Two days ago,
US State Department spokesman Joseph Snyder admitted that detention camps, established throughout the
country and primarily run by the Serbian faction, are sites of consistent human rights abuses. There is, Mr.
Snyder claims, “a pattern of serious and ongoing human rights abuses in many of the detention centers,
particularly in those operated by Serbian forces” (“US Criticizes”).
In the face of these two most recent developments, this Council faces three imperatives: first, monitoring the
January ceasefire and ensuring security of key locations throughout the country; second, providing security
for humanitarian relief; and third, working with all involved parties to negotiate a long-term, workable peace
agreement.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
The former Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was comprised of six republics – Croatia, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Serbia, Slovenia and Bosnia-Herzegovina. Yugoslavia was an exceptionally diverse state, with
many ethnicities living side-by-side peacefully. During the Cold War, Yugoslavia was known as the Socialist
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFR Yugoslavia) and was governed by Josep Tito, who severed ties with
Stalin in the 1940s. Because of its animosity towards the Soviet Union and its strategic location as a buffer
between the West and the USSR, Yugoslavia was granted a great deal of foreign aid by the United States.
Supported by this aid and by Tito’s strong leadership, the SFR Yugoslavia prospered. After Tito’s death in the
1980s, the SFR Yugoslavia struggled to maintain its success; when the end of the Cold War spurred an end to
generous US aid, the country’s prosperity became a thing of the past.
Break-Up of Yugoslavia
Beginning in 1991, the various Yugoslav republics seceded from the Republic and formed independent states.
While some of the secessions were relatively bloodless, several were marked by violent resistance on the part
of Yugoslavia. In August of 1991, Croatia and Yugoslavia fought a full-scale war over Croatia’s desire to
secede; on a smaller scale, Slovenia and Yugoslavia clashed in June of 1991 as Slovenia struggled to
implement its decision to declare independence. Bosnia’s declaration of independence came towards the end
Yugoslavia’s disintegration; on 1 March, Bosnia held a referendum on independence and 99% of voters were
in favor (Greenhill “Mediation”). Two days later, Bosnia officially declared independence from Yugoslavia.
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The Bosnian W ar
Like the rest of the former Yugoslavia, the Republic of Bosnia has historically been very ethnically and
religiously diverse. Serbs, Croats, and Muslims lived in the same communities with little to no recent ethnic or
religious conflict ; indeed, many people did not even know the religion or ethnicity of their neighbors, and
such differences certainly played almost no role in the daily lives of people living in the Bosnia. As Yugoslavia
began to break down, however, ethnic and religious lines of distinction began to harden; extremist leaders
played to ethnic and religious identities to build support for expansionist policies, and they also played upon
more distant histories of ethnic conflict to build group memory of animosity and distrust. Even before its
declaration of independence, Bosnia had succumbed to civil war between its Serb, Croat, and Muslim
populations.
There are multiple causes of the civil war in Bosnia, but they are inter-related. Competing virulent
nationalisms were compounded by leaders, who manipulated people’s fears of minority status. Spurred by the
extremist national rhetoric of Slobodan Milosevic, the President of Serbia and Macedonia, Bosnian Serbs
sought to consolidate power and control over Bosnia to create a “Greater Serbia” (Greenhill “Mediation”).
Fearing the implications of minority status in such a state, Muslims and Croats resisted Serbian claims to
territory and power. These insecurities and ambitions were compounded by an ethnic security dilemma, a
concept which will be discussed later in this paper.
On 6 April 1992, the European Union and United States recognized Bosnia as an independent state; on the
same day, Serb paramilitaries stepped up their offensive in Bosnia. By the latest reports, taken in June of this
year, the Serbs have control of about 70% of Bosnian territory (Greenhill “Mediation”).
Humanitarian Situation
Detention Camps
The recent statement by US State Dept representative Joseph Snyder, referenced in the introduction to this
background guide, is one example of the growing international concern over the humanitarian situation in
Bosnia. Detention camps in Bosnia are purportedly sites of malnutrition, physical and sexual abuse,
starvation, and even execution (“US Criticizes”). Although all parties to the conflict run such camps,
according to Mr. Snyder “the overwhelming responsibility for this practice lies with the Serbs, who are using
detention centers as part of their ethnic-cleansing campaign” (“US Criticizes”). Mr. Snyder’s reference to
ethnic cleansing indicates the belief of the United States, as well as other countries, that the Serbs are forcing
Bosnian Croats and Muslims out of “Serb” territory in an effort to unite with Slobodan Milosevic in a
Greater Serbia. Additionally, parties to the conflict have denied representatives of the International Red Cross
access to the camps.
The camps violate the Geneva Conventions, as well as this Council’s resolutions 770 and 771, which demand
“that unimpeded and continuous access to all camps, prisons and detention centres be granted immediately to
the International Committee of the Red Cross and other relevant humanitarian organizations and that all
detainees therein receive humane treatment, including adequate food, shelter and medical care” (S/770).
Although the international community has stopped short of designating the detention centers as
representative of systematic efforts to exterminate a certain ethnicity or religion, grave human rights abuses
are perpetrated in the camps. These abuses of human rights must be addressed if the crisis in Bosnia, which
clearly represents a threat to international peace and security, is to be fully resolved.
Ethnic Cleansing
As indicated above, some members of the international community, particularly the United States, believe
that ethnic cleansing is occurring in Bosnia. It is important for this Council to understand exactly what ethnic
cleansing is in order to address the concerns of those who believe it is happening. Ethnic cleansing, which
comes from the Serbo-Croatian phrase etnicko ciscenje, is defined by one source as “the attempt to create
ethnically homogeneous geographic areas through the deportation or forcible displacement of persons
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belonging to particular ethnic groups. Ethnic cleansing sometimes involves the removal of all physical
vestiges of the targeted group through the destruction of monuments, cemeteries, and houses of worship”
(“Ethnic Cleansing”). A slightly different wording defines ethnic cleansing as “the expulsion of an
‘undesirable’ population from a given territory due to religious or ethnic discrimination, political, strategic, or
ideological considerations, or a combination of these” (Bell-Fialkoff, 110). These definitions are not mutually
exclusive, but provide slightly different shades of meaning and interpretation for the delegates to consider.
Three ideas about ethnic cleansing in general, and in Bosnia in particular, are extremely important for
delegates to consider. First, to say that ethnic cleansing is occurring is not to say that one group is
systematically killing another. Ethnic cleansing means that a group is systematically forcing another group out
of a particular territory – which can occur just as easily through forced relocation as it can through murder.
Second, the international community is by no means at a consensus as to whether ethnic cleansing is
occurring in Bosnia. Although the United States, in particular, believes that the Serbs are undertaking an
ethnic cleansing campaign in Bosnia, the situation is relatively new and still somewhat difficult to assess.
Finally, although it is clear that massive internal relocation is occurring in Bosnia, and that this relocation is
happening in ethnic and religious groups, much of the internal movement is occurring voluntarily – groups
are relocating themselves to live with one another and to be separate from other groups (Bell-Fialkoff 110).
Many states argue that not enough information exists yet to determine for certain whether one group is
forcing others to relocate, or if groups are doing it willingly.
United Nations Protection Force (UN PROFOR)
Mandate
The United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) was established in Croatia as “an interim arrangement
to create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the
Yugoslav crisis” (“Profile”). Last February, in light of increasing violence and escalating conflict, its mandate
was extended to Bosnia. When a ceasefire was brokered in January, this Council passed resolution 727, which
extended the mandate of UNPROFOR to “promote maintenance of the cease-fire [in Bosnia]” (S/727).
On 8 June, this Council again extended UNPROFOR’s mandate and “authorized the Secretary-General to
deploy military observers and related personnel and equipment to Sarajevo to supervise the withdrawal of
anti-aircraft weapons and the concentration of heavy weapons at agreed locations in the city” (S/758). 11
days later in resolution 761, the Council again expanded the mandate to “ensure security and functioning of
the airport” (“Profile”).
As a Chapter VI peacekeeping mission, UNPROFOR is responsible for monitoring and reporting on the
ceasefire. Confidence-building measures would also fall under UNPROFOR’s Chapter VI mandate. Because
it is not a Chapter VII mission, UNPROFOR does not have capabilities of enforcement.
Strengths and Weaknesses

Because UNPROFOR is a relatively new mission, judging a success or failure at this stage would be
premature. The mission of this Council is to monitor a ceasefire, provide security for humanitarian relief, and
oversee successful negotiations for a long-term peace agreement. Therefore, delegates to this Council must
consider (a) whether UNPROFOR is so far successful in fulfilling its current mandate and (b) whether
UNPROFOR’s current mandate is sufficient for this Council’s mission to be fulfilled.
As outlined above, UNPROFOR has been specifically tasked with ensuring the security and functioning of
the airport, promoting the maintenance of a ceasefire, and establishing the conditions of peace and security
required for a peaceful settlement of the crisis. Thus far, it has been relatively successful in securing the
security and functioning of the airport; the parties to the conflict agreed on 5 June to hand over the airport to
UNPROFOR, and on 3 July the airport was opened for humanitarian aid. The recent downing of a UN relief
plane, potentially by a missile, indicates that the ceasefire is not being held. However, it is important to note
that UNPROFOR is responsible for monitoring, not enforcing, a ceasefire. In order to fulfill its current
mission, UNPROFOR must have a better conception of which groups are still using which weapons in which
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ways. UNPROFOR is not required to forcibly hold the parties to the ceasefire; indeed, as a Chapter VI
mission, it is not currently authorized to do so.
Whether or not the conditions of peace and security necessary for a peaceful settlement are in place is much
more difficult to determine than the other two elements of UNPROFOR’s mission in Bosnia. What
conditions of peace and security are required for a peaceful settlement? Is securing the airport and keeping an
eye on major arms movements throughout the country sufficient for a peaceful settlement to occur? Can a
truly peaceful settlement be negotiated if the detention camps are still in operation? Delegates should keep
these questions in mind as they read the rest of the background guide, specifically the portions on successful
mediation and peace implementation. The Council must determine whether it is fulfilling this element of
UNPROFOR’s mission. If a delegate believes that UNPROFOR is not fulfilling this aspect of the mission, he
or she must determine whether ensuring the necessary conditions of peace and security is even possible under
UNPROFOR’s current mandate; and if it is not, whether or not his or her country would support a
strengthening of the mandate.
International Involvement
In resolution 770, passed on 12 August, the Council called upon states to “take nationally or through regional
agencies or arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United Nations the
delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and others of humanitarian assistance to
Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina, to report to the Secretary General
on measures they are taking in coordination with the UN to carry out this resolution, and to provide
appropriate support for the actions undertaken in pursuance of this resolution” (S/770).
Many states have responded positively to resolution 770, by providing and/or delivering humanitarian
supplies throughout Bosnia. Additionally, international actors are becoming involved in the peace process.
Yesterday, the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia, co-sponsored by the United Nations and
the European Union, convened for its first session. Hopes for the Conference’s success in reaching a
mutually-acceptable peace agreement are high.
Last March, Lord Carrington of Britain and Ambassador Jorge Cutilero of Portugal unveiled the Carrington-
Cutilero peace plan. The plan divided Bosnia into three ethnic cannons, with territory based on population
levels. The cannons would participate in a central government, but be allowed to establish their own foreign
relations (Greenhill “Mediation”). Although the plan was rejected by the Bosnian president, it may well be an
outside actor who engineers a solution to the conflict. Outside actors can be useful in negotiating peace
agreements; at the same time, poorly-handled international mediation can hinder a peace process.
Likelihood of Successful External M ediation
External mediation is generally considered successful when the mediator has three characteristics: impartiality,
leverage, and status (Kleiboer 368). These three characteristics are important for fairly straight-forward
reasons. If a mediator is not seen as impartial, the parties to a conflict will not accept his assistance as fair and
in good faith. If a mediator has no leverage, he cannot force the parties to work out their differences and
compromise as necessary to reach, implement, and sustain a consensus. A mediator with leverage can force
parties to the conflict to compromise on hard positions, even when doing so is against the party’s interest.
And finally, a mediator’s personal status (his ability to deliver on his promises and make good on his threats)
and his institutional status (the reputation of the organization he represents, be it a state or a non-state actor)
contributes to the likelihood of successful mediation.
Another, less intuitive element of status is important as well – relative status. According to Marieke Kleiboer,
mediation is less likely to work if the mediator and the parties to the conflict have widely disparate ranks in
the international system. If the mediator has a much lower rank than the parties of the conflict, he will not be
able to enforce leverage. If he has a much higher rank, he may not be viewed as legitimate by the parties to
the conflict (Kleiboer 373). Thus, a successful external mediator in Bosnia is a state or entity who has no past
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history with any of the warring parties, and who has enough clout to force the parties to a resolution but is
still perceived as relatively the same rank as the three parties to the conflict.
Two characteristics of successful external mediators that are not related to the mediator’s relationship with
the warring parties are problem-solving aptitude and interest (Greenhill, “Conflict”). External actors must
understand the conflict and the many technical elements of constructing a successful long-term solution. In
the case of Bosnia, an external mediator must be well-versed in the legal dimensions of a solution to internal
ethnic/religious conflict, and must be capable of developing a constitution with power-sharing and minority
rights. Otherwise, not all parties will be able to sign onto an agreement because one of the major causes of
the conflict – insecurities augmented by virulent ethnic and religious nationalism – will still not be resolved.
And finally, a successful external mediator must have enough interest, or stake in the outcome of the conflict,
to remain engaged in the peace process for its entire duration.
Another important prerequisite to a successful external mediation attempt (or, for that matter, any mediation
attempt at all) is timing. There are different ideas about when parties to a conflict are most likely to
compromise and agree on a lasting peace. One theory argues that a conflict is most “ripe” for mediation
when there is a “hurting stalemate;” when both sides to a conflict recognize that neither is winning in the
current scenario, this theory argues, they will be most likely to compromise on a peace agreement (Zartman
1). Others contend that mediation is most likely to be successful when one or multiple parties have recently
undergone a leadership change; leadership changes introduce a bit of flexibility to parties’ stances and make
parties more likely to accept new ideas about acceptable terms of a peace agreement (Stedman).
Ethical Dilemmas of M ediation
Mediation will only be successful is all parties to the conflict sign onto a peace agreement and commit to
ending violence. This leaves mediators with several ethical dilemmas. First, if timing is important in ending
conflict, should mediators wait until the time is ripe? In the interim period, many more people could suffer,
be displaced, or die; but if time is not ripe, parties may never agree on an agreement, or may defect from a
weak agreement later. Additionally, any mediator must balance practicality against accountability. A party that
has committed crimes during a conflict will be unlikely to sign onto a peace agreement that holds it culpable
for past actions. But, society may struggle to reconcile and heal if those who have committed atrocities are
not held responsible. Unfortunately, recent reports of humanitarian crises in detention camps in Bosnia
indicate that the Council, and other external mediators, will have to choose between practicality and
accountability in formulating a peace agreement.
CURRENT STATUS
Currently, Serbs control approximately 70% of Bosnia (Greenhill “Mediation”). With the recent downing of a
UN relief plane and reports of abuses in detention centers flowing in, clearly the situation in Bosnia is
worsening. The Council must act quickly and decisively to enforce the ceasefire, provide security for
humanitarian assistance, and facilitate successful negotiations over a peace agreement.
The International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia is an exciting joint UN-EU development that may
well result in a successful peace negotiation. Co-chaired by Cyrus R. Vance (representing the United Nations)
and Lord Owen (representing the European Community), the Conference will focus its efforts on the
situation in Bosnia. Lord Own has said that a “primary concern [is] setting up a mechanism for control and
surveillance of heavy weapons held by the fighting forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina” (“Geneva Group”).
According to an article in the New York Times, both Mr. Vance and Lord Owen have fully committed
themselves to the peace process and expect to invest the time and resources necessary to reach a consensus.
According to the article, Lord Owen has stated that “the working group on Bosnia and Herzegovina was
awaiting ‘serious progress on a reduction of military activity’ around Sarajevo, the besieged capital, before
scheduling meetings with the contesting factions” (“Geneva Group”).
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The International Conference is promising on a few levels. First, the mediators involved clearly have the
problem-solving aptitude to negotiate a solution, and have expressed interest in seeing the project through to
the end. Additionally, the joint UN-EU initiative is certainly capable of exerting leverage on the actors – of
bringing them to the table and applying some pressure to force a compromise. The question about leverage is
whether the UN and EU will be willing to use the resources at their disposal – economic, political, and
perhaps military – to achieve an effective compromise. Since the UN has already imposed sanctions and
deployed peacekeepers in the former Yugoslavia, it is likely that the willpower to exert leverage is present.
Additionally, the statement of Lord Owen that the Conference is waiting for “serious progress on a reduction
of military activity” (“Geneva Conference”) before initiating contact with the warring parties indicates that
the mediators are prepared to take a hard line with the parties, utilizing leverage as necessary to force the
parties to cooperate.
Both the personal and institutional status of the mediators is good; they are likely to be perceived as able to
follow through with threats and promises, and the EU and UN are certainly institutions with solid reputations
and a high degree of clout. For all these reasons, the Council may anticipate positive results from the
International Conference.
At the same time, there are a few areas of potential weakness with the International Conference. Most
obviously, the rank of the mediators at the International Conference is significantly higher than that of the
parties to the conflict. Differing rank in either direction has been shown to decrease the likelihood of
successful mediation (Kleibor 373). Additionally, the timing of the Conference may be off; the Serbs, Croats,
and Muslims are not yet in a hurting stalemate, and no new changes of leadership that might increase
flexibility in negotiations have occurred recently. Still, the claimed resolve of the mediators indicates that
negotiations may last until the time is more ripe. Also, the inclusion of less powerful states in the Conference
could help equalize rank structure between the parties to the conflict and the mediators.
While there is reason for the Council to be optimistic about on-going peace negotiations, the current status of
the issue also leaves cause for pessimism; the Council must remain vigilant towards recent set-backs if it is to
capitalize on positive developments from the peace process.
BLOC POSITIONS
The European Community
The European Community (EC) is very interested in a peaceful resolution to this crisis. The breakup of the
former Yugoslavia into its constituent states was a large enough problem; that the breakup has led to violence
such as this is a major security risk, as well as a humanitarian disaster. The European Community will wish to
use the War to advance cohesion in defense matters and to show the world that it can act as one; intervention
from non-European powers like the United States will be frowned upon.
It will be difficult to convince the EC to commit large numbers of ground troops, however, as there are really
no vital interests at stake for any of the countries. To ask European countries to sacrifice lives for other
peoples’ problems will be a major challenge for the Committee to overcome. The extent to which the EC is
actually unified and can act cohesively will also be a question for the Committee to consider; will the
countries actually follow through and act as one, or will they consider their national interests only?
With that said, the EC has become a major player in the crisis. Leading the International Conference, the EC
is working closely with the UN to achieve a ceasefire. Whether this will be lasting is another question, but this
demonstrates the commitment the EC is willing to make.
The United States and her allies
The United States takes an interest in this topic, having used the term “ethnic cleansing” to describe the
situation on a number of occasions. The US is coming fresh from victory in the Cold War and the liberation
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of Kuwait; at the moment, its power is unrivaled in the world. This would ordinarily mean that the US will
attempt to flex its muscle and demonstrate its power in this situation, but this may not actually be the case.
The US has little national interest in the Balkans; the end of the Cold War meant that the Balkans lost their
strategic importance, despite the great amount of foreign aid the US contributed throughout the century. The
US will principally be interested in containing the conflict. Whether the US will take an active role in the
conflict will be seen; the rhetoric is there, but the US, for the time being, has allowed its NATO allies to take
the lead in containing the situation.
The Former Soviet Bloc
The former Republics of the Soviet Union and its close allies in Eastern Europe will also take a strong
interest in this situation. Tito had a notoriously difficult relationship with Stalin, and the former Yugoslavia
received a great deal of aid from the US throughout the Cold War. However, the new Russian government
has forged strong ties with the Serbs, who now control large swaths of the country.
This group of countries has had little involvement in the conflict so far, although there are reports of Russian
volunteer fighters joining the Serbs. It is definitely a security risk for those countries that are located in the
region, but Russia is taking a backseat and letting the EC do the heavy lifting. Whether Russia will block
direct action is questionable; it has blocked attempts to lift the arms embargo. Given Russia’s ties with the
Serbs, it seems likely at this point that Russia would oppose intervention unless a compromise is made, or if
lobbied heavily by EC countries.
COMMITTEE MISSION
Yesterday’s downing of a UN relief plane and the humanitarian abuses in detention centers are only the most
recent indications that the crisis in Bosnia is worsening. It is critical that this Council act discerningly in
fulfilling the three elements of its mission:
1 – Monitoring the January ceasefire and ensuring security of key locations throughout the country.
2 – Providing security for humanitarian relief.
3 – Working with all involved parties to negotiate a long-term, workable peace agreement.
Over the past year, this Council has liberally reinforced UNPROFOR’s mandate to achieve the first two
elements of its mission. It has proven willing to commit more troops with a mandate to secure the airport and
other key locations throughout the country, and to witness arms movements throughout the country in an
effort to monitor the ceasefire. Given recent developments, the Council must consider whether augmenting
UNPROFOR’s mandate may again be necessary.
The commencement of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia shows promising steps
towards the fulfillment of the third element of this Council’s mission. However, the Council should closely
examine the Conference to ensure that it is on track and remains on track towards successful mediation.
Additionally, delegates to this Council must consider what security conditions are necessary for a successful
peace agreement to be reached and implemented. Delegates must question what impact, if any, humanitarian
issues like detention centers and ethnic cleansing create an environment that is not conducive to successful
negotiation.
Keeping in mind its three goals, this Council must work as quickly as possible to identify a strategy to achieve
its mission. The Council should continue strategies and tactics that are working, and be unafraid to change
those that are ineffective. Additionally, the Council should think creatively about new strategies and tactics
that may help resolve the current situation in Bosnia.
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THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

TOPIC B
INTRODUCTION
The date is 25 July 1992. Yesterday, United Nations Secretary General Boutros-Boutros Gali released a report
on the current situation in Cambodia. The report, UN document S/24578, outlines the UN’s progress so far
in implementing the Paris Peace Agreement, an agreement which ended the civil war in Cambodia and
outlined steps for the reconciliation and rehabilitation processes. Although much progress has been made to
date, the Secretary General’s report reveals that the United Nations, represented in Cambodia by the UN
Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC, a peacekeeping mission), may not be quite on track to
completing its work in Cambodia as outlined in the Paris Agreement. The Secretary General’s report provides
a unique opportunity for this Council to re-evaluate the progress of UNTAC in implementing the Paris
Agreement. This Council will be asked to identify ways to integrate all parties to the conflict in the
implementation of the Agreement, and to reconsider the effectiveness of UNTAC’s current methods.
HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE
The Kingdom of Cambodia: 1953 – 1989
The Kingdom of Cambodia gained its independence on 9 November 1953; it had previously been part of
French Indochina. Cambodia was ruled by Prince Sihanouk from its independence until 1970. The early years
of Cambodian independence were defined by the Viet Nam War, which began in 1959. During the war,
Sihanouk maintained an official policy of neutrality. However, wary of antagonizing the more powerful state
of Viet Nam, he secretly allowed communist North Viet Nam several bases inside Cambodian territory.
Sihanouk’s reign witnessed the development of the Communist party in Cambodia. Throughout this period,
North Viet Nam acted as a patron to the communists in Cambodia; because Sihanouk allowed it basing
privileges, North Viet Nam encouraged the communists in Cambodia not to overthrow Sihanouk.
In 1970, a coup led by Prime Minister General Lon Nol and Prince Sirik Matak overthrew Sihanouk and
drove him into exile in neighboring Thailand. The government of Cambodia was then decidedly pro-
American. Freed of North Vietnamese constraints, the communist resistance (now the Khmer Rouge) began
in earnest, operating from the jungles outside the capital of Phnom Penh. On 17 April 1975, the Khmer
Rouge overthrew the pro-American government and took power in Cambodia. The next three and a half
years in Cambodia were marked by a brutal campaign of socialization. Led by Pol Pot, the Khmer Rouge
forcibly collectivized agriculture, marching urban populations to rural areas, where they slaved in labor camps.
These camps were marked by horrendous conditions; from April 1975 to December 1978, 1.5 million
Cambodians died from malnutrition and another 200,000 were executed (Chandler). Overall, one out of every
five Cambodians died during this period (Chandler).
After taking power, the Khmer Rouge allied themselves with the People’s Republic of China, an alliance
which antagonized North Viet Nam. In December of 1978, after repeated hostilities and small clashes, North
Viet Nam attacked Cambodia and ousted the Khmer Rouge, whose leadership also fled to Thailand. The
Vietnamese-backed Khmer People’s Revolutionary Party (KPRP) ruled Cambodia throughout the 1980s, but
was not recognized internationally. Instead, a coalition made up of three different parties – all in exile –
represented Cambodia in the UN and to other international bodies and states. The coalition was comprised
of the National Front for an Independent, Neutral, Peaceful, and Cooperative Cambodia (FUNCINPEC), led
by Prince Sihanouk; the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK), led by Pol Pot and Khmer Rouge; and the
Khmer People’s National Liberation Front (KPNLF).
Throughout the 1980s, Cambodia was embroiled in a foreign-sponsored civil war; the three-party coalition
made periodic attacks on the KPRP and also maintained a relatively consistent offensive on the Thai-
Cambodian border. The coalition was backed by both China and the US, which used the Cambodian
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resistance to destabilize North Viet Nam throughout the 1980s. In 1989, succumbing to the consistent
pressure, North Viet Nam pulled out of Cambodia. The exit of Viet Nam marked the beginning of the end
for Cambodia’s civil war, which began with the Khmer Rouge’s seizure of power in 1975.
Failed Negotiations: 1988 – 23 October 1991
The four parties to the conflict met in person for the first time at the Jakarta Informal Meeting held in
Indonesia in July of 1988 and sponsored by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
Additionally, representatives from Viet Nam, Laos, and ASEAN members attended. According to a US
Department of State bulletin, the first Jakarta meeting emphasized the need for a total Vietnamese withdrawal
from Cambodia, and addressed many participants’ concerns that the Khmer Rouge not regain total power
(Lambertson). A second informal meeting in Jakarta, held in February of 1989, resulted in no additional
progress.
The informal meetings in Jakarta helped build momentum for the next major round of peace negotiations in
Cambodia was the first Paris Conference, which took place from 30 July to 30 August of 1989. At this
conference, Cambodia was represented by officials from all four parties to the conflict. The international
community had high hopes for the success of the first Paris Conference for four primary reasons:
1. The four major parties realized that “their objectives could not be achieved by military
means within acceptable costs”
2. The four parties believed that “the costs of continuing the conflict were higher than the cost
of a political settlement”
3. The wide-spread conviction among many in the international community that the Paris
Conference represented an “appropriate negotiating forum” for this type of peace process
4. The “changing international climate, with superpower détente and the willingness of the
United Nations and several other nations to take a more active role in the peace process”
(Sodhy 129)
Each of these elements, particularly the first two, are considered important pre-conditions for a successful
peace negotiation. However, the first Paris Conference did not result in a successful peace settlement.
According to Pamela Sodhy, two factors prevented a peaceful settlement in August 1989. First, the four
Cambodian parties to the conflict, as well as Viet Nam and China, “still had a vested interest in continuing the
stalemate” (Sodhy 129). More significantly, the four Cambodian parties to the conflict refused to agree on a
power-sharing formula. Thus, the first Paris Conference ended in failure.
With little progress being made in the relatively inclusive negotiations, the co-Presidents of the Paris
Conference (representing France and Indonesia) and representatives from the five permanent members to the
UN Security Council began a series of meetings aimed at developing a viable solution to the conflict, which
could be presented to all involved parties for discussion and adoption. The idea behind such meetings is that
when the parties to a given conflict cannot agree on a peace settlement, it may be useful for powerful external
actors to hammer out details and present a completed agreement to the parties, who will ideally sign on to the
agreement after a period of negotiation.
After some scattered rounds of talks, on 9 and 10 November 1990 the co-Presidents called for a working
group to “assist the co-Presidents in exploring various ideas regarding the elaboration of a draft settlement
agreement” (A/46/617). At the end of that meeting, participants had “a general understanding on the
structure and approach to be followed in elaborating the draft settlement agreement” (A/46/617). Several
weeks later, from 23 to 26 November, the co-Presidents and permanent five built on that meeting and
produced the draft Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict, a text in
three parts:
1. A general agreement on the proposed mandate for the United Nations Transitional
Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC); “the military arrangements during the transitional period;
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elections; the repatriation of Cambodian refugees and displaced persons; and principles for a
new constitution” (A/46/617)
2. An agreement on international guarantees
3. A declaration on “the rehabilitation and reconstruction of Cambodia” (A/46/617)
This Agreement formed the basis for the eventually successful second Paris Peace Conference in October of
1991. From 21 to 23 December, the permanent five presented the representatives of the Supreme National
Council of Cambodia with the draft Agreement, and the SNC agreed on the general points of the document.
Discussions among and within the SNC, the permanent five, and the co-Presidents continued throughout the
winter, spring, and summer of 1991. These discussions were priming the participants for the second Paris
Conference, in an attempt to avoid the pitfalls that plagued the first Paris Conference. Additionally, on 22
April 1991, the parties to the conflict in Cambodia signed a temporary cease-fire agreement to honor on-
going peace negotiations.
The Paris Agreement
Cambodia, represented by the SNC, and nineteen states – including the PRC, France, India, Japan, Thailand,
the USSR, the UK, the US, and North Viet Nam – convened in Paris from 21 to 23 October 1991. This
meeting resulted in successful peace negotiations and produced the Paris Agreement. The Paris Agreement
was comprised of nine parts:
Part One: Arrangements During the Transitional Period

1. Transitional Period: The transitional period began with the signing of the Agreement and will end
once free and fair elections have been held under the auspices of the UN.
2. UNTAC: In accordance with a mandate defined elsewhere in the agreement (and discussed in a
subsequent section of this paper), UNTAC has been established with civilian and military parts.
3. Supreme National Council: The SNC is identified as the legitimate, authoritative government in
Cambodia and its representative in the international community.
4. Withdrawal of Foreign Forces and its Verification: All foreign forces are to withdraw from Cambodia
and not return.
5. Cease-Fire and Cessation of Outside Assistance: Immediately upon ratification of the Agreement, a
cease-fire was to be implemented. Until UNTAC is deployed, the Secretary-General is to use his
good offices by designing a transitional military agreement to “stabilize the security situation and
build confidence among the parties to the conflict” (“Final Act”).
Part Two: Elections

Calls for elections “held under United Nations auspices in a neutral political environment with full respect for
the national sovereignty of Cambodia” (“Final Act”). The elections should be monitored by UNTAC.
Part Three: Human Rights

In accordance with the Declaration of Human Rights, UNTAC is responsible for ensuring that all citizens are
granted full rights during the transitional period. For the long-term, the government of Cambodia has agreed
to act in compliance with the Universal Declaration.
Part Four: International Guarantees

All nations party agree to respect Cambodia’s sovereignty.
Part Five: Refugees and Displaced Persons

Voluntary repatriation of refugees is recognized as critical to Cambodia’s long-term recovery, and the
government of Cambodia pledges to foster conditions conducive to refugees’ return.
Part Six: Release of Prisoners of W ar and Civilian Internees

All prisoners of war and civilians who have been arrested for political reasons should be released.
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Part Seven: Principles for a N ew Constitution for Cambodia

The Constitution will take into account ideals established in other parts of the Agreement, and will be based
on a system of liberal democracy and pluralism.
Part Eight: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

The international community should take part in the reconstruction of Cambodia. Special attention should be
paid to “food security, health, housing, training, education, the transport network and the restoration of
Cambodia’s existing basic infrastructure and public utilities” (“Declaration”). Additionally, the International
Committee on the Reconstruction of Cambodia (ICORC) is to be established to ensure a smooth transition
to the reconstruction phase, in conjunction with the UN.
Part Nine: Final Provisions

Establishes the procedures for states to become signatories of the Agreement.
In order to support the implementation of the Paris Agreement, it is important for this Council to understand
why the agreement was successful in the first place. Sorpong Peou has commented that “the Paris Agreement
was deliberately pragmatic. The retroactive application of criminal law was prohibited. The agreement also
omitted any discussion of accountability mechanisms for atrocities, war crimes, and human-rights violations.
Instead, the Khmer Rouge…was recognized as a legitimate party; no provisions in the agreement suggested
that its leaders be tried for crimes against humanity” (Peou 504). This practicality brought all sides to the table
and increased the likelihood that everyone would sign on to a peace agreement, but also removed
accountability for atrocities. It remains to be seen what long-term impact this lack of accountability will have
on Cambodian reconciliation and reconstruction.
Although the Paris Agreement was successful in getting all parties to the conflict to sign on to a peace
agreement, it still has several flaws that this Council should consider as it moves forward into implementation.
First, the Agreement assumes that all the signatories will fulfill their commitments – both military and
political. As will be explained shortly, some parties to the conflict have already begun to renege on their
commitments, and the Peace Agreement provides no mechanisms for keeping this in check. Additionally, the
Paris Agreement divided FUNCINPEC / PDK / KPNLF coalition into its three original parties, effectively
granting the SOC an advantage in the elections since it would not have to compete against a unified
opposition. This upset in the balance of power between the four parties led to distrust and left the three
minority parties with incentive to renege on their commitments. (Peou 506-507)
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
UN peacekeepers have been on the ground in Cambodia since October of 1991, when the United Nations
Advance Mission in Cambodia (UNAMIC) was established. This Council gave UNAMIC its mandate in
resolutions 717 of 16 October 1991 and 728 of 8 January 1992. These resolutions mandated UNAMIC to
monitor the ceasefire the parties reached in April of 1991, as well as to institute a mine awareness program
for the civilian population.
UNAMIC was absorbed by UNTAC in March of this year. In Security Council resolution 745, this Council
has mandated UNTAC to:
1. Supervise the ceasefire, the end of foreign military assistance and the withdrawal of foreign
forces;
2. Regroup, canton and disarm all armed forces of the Cambodian parties, and ensure a 70 per
cent level of demobilization;
3. Control and supervise the activities of the administrative structures, including the police;
4. Ensure respect of human rights;
5. Organize and conduct free and fair elections” (“Summary”)
To fulfill its mandate, the Council has granted UNTAC “between 15,000 and 20,000 United Nations
personnel, including human rights, civil administrative and military components, as well as a police
- 17 -
component of some 3,600 police monitors” (“Summary”). According to Peou, UNTAC represents the first
time in UN history that “a sovereign state’s administrative agencies, bodies, and offices in the ministries of
foreign affairs, national defense, public security, and information [are] to be placed under the direct control of
the United Nations” (Peou 505).
During its first months of operation, in March, April, and May of 1992, UNTAC began carrying out a
mandate with a stronger emphasis on nation-building than any previous UN peacekeeping mission. UNTAC
began its operations by establishing a framework for its relationship with the SNC. Most significantly,
UNTAC began drafting electoral law in conjunction with the SNC and began drafting laws for the protection
of liberal ideals like the right of assembly (“Full Text”). UNTAC also began working on other elements of its
mandate. UNTAC established a quick-response mechanism for human rights abuses, established
regroupment and cantonment areas, and created checkpoints to monitor the withdrawal and non-return of
foreign forces. Additionally, UNTAC deployed six mine-clearing teams, employing civilians and demobilized
soldiers and thus creating jobs and improving rehabilitation (“Full Text”). 5,763 refugees have been
repatriated as of April 1992 (“Full Text”); however, UNTAC is having a difficult time finding non-mined
areas of the country which can support these numbers. Finally, UNTAC began an information campaign to
inform the country and international community of its activities.
Since 13 June of this year, UNTAC has been in its second phase of operations. In May, UNTAC began
transitioning from its initial phase to phase two – the cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase. In
order for UNTAC to enter the second phase, it was necessary for each of the four Cambodian parties to
“grant freedom of movement to UNTAC personnel, vehicles and aircraft; mark minefields in the areas under
its control; provide to UNTAC by 20 May information on troops, arms, ammunition and equipment; and
adhere to the Paris Agreements, in particular not interfere with troops moving to regroupment and
cantonment areas, and inform its troops of the plan for regroupment and cantonment” (“Full Text”).
Disarmament, Regroupment, and Cantonment
The UN considers the process of disarmament in the peacekeeping context as “the collection, control and
disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of
the civilian population…also includes, the development of responsible arms management programs”
(Disarmament…). Often, disarmament is carried out in regrouping centers; central locations where troops
congregate to undergo the disarmament process.
Cantonment, also described as quartering or assembly, is considered an important step in reintegration by the
Department of Peacekeeping Operations. In their essay, “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament,
Demobilization and Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace,” Mark Knight and
Alpaslan Ozerdem describe cantonment as “a halfway house between a mobilized state and the dissolution of
forces” (Knight and Ozerdem 507). Knight and Ozerdem list three reasons why cantonment is useful,
including providing opportunities to gather information on former combatants (such as health status, gender,
age, etc) and allowing for pre-discharge orientation sessions. They note that cantonment “may also have a
political objective, particularly during the war-to-peace transition, of demonstrating factions' willingness to
demobilize forces while retaining the forces in concentrated areas, where they could be remobilized if the
peace agreement is not implemented” (Knight and Ozerdem 507).
Non-Compliance of the Khmer Rouge
Although the Khmer Rouge initially accepted some military observers in its zones of influence, when the
official cantonment, disarming and demobilization phase began, the Khmer Rouge reneged on its
commitments at Paris, denying UNTAC its cooperation, as well as access to Khmer territory. The Khmer
Rouge based its non-compliance on three demands: first, that UNTAC confirm a complete Vietnamese
withdrawal; second, that UTNAC deconstruct the SOC’s administrative structures; and third, that the SNC’s
relationship to UNTAC be loosened at that the SNC be given power to govern the country (Peou 509).
- 18 -
Although some have raised the possibility of giving in to the Khmer Rouge’s demands, this Council has
decided to proceed with phase two as planned (S/766). Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Gali has written
that “the continuing refusal of the Party of Democratic Kampuchea (PDK) [the Khmer Rouge] to grant
UNTAC personnel access to the zones it controls or to commit its forces to cantonment as called for in the
implementation plan (S/23613) gives grounds for serious concern. (S/24578)” Mr. Boutros-Gali’s advice to
the Council has been to continue with phase two as planned because, “although [the] Special Representative
[of the Secretary General to Cambodia] has carefully studied all these proposals with a view to identifying
ways of accommodating PDK’s concerns, it has not been possible to accept them because they are
inconsistent with the Paris Agreements. (S/24578)”
CURRENT STATUS
Secretary-General’s Report
Yesterday’s report by the Secretary General had was overall positive in tone, while admitting to the set-backs
UNTAC faces as a result of the Khmer Rouge’s reluctance to comply with the Paris Agreement. The report
notes progress in most areas of UNTAC’s mandate and the UN’s work in Cambodia, including:
1. The electoral law was adopted on 5 August. Political parties have begun to register and
progress towards voter registration is on-track.
2. Over 115,000 refugees have returned to Cambodia as of 15 September, all without major
incident.
3. UN civilian officials have been integrated into the administrations of all major parties except
for the Khmer Rouge, which has allowed UNTAC to fulfill its mission in all but the Khmer
areas.
4. Human rights organization and civilian police units are now in every area and have began
establishing infrastructure and programs.
5. The SNC has approved a number of rehabilitation programs. (S/24578)
In response to the Khmer Rouge’s non-compliance with the terms of the Paris Agreement, the Secretary
General recommends in his report that UNTAC continue with elections, currently scheduled to take place no
later than May 1993, as planned. Additionally, the report states that UNTAC should continue pressing for
access to Khmer-controlled territory, attempting to fully implement the terms of the Paris Agreement. The
report states “while the attitude of the PDK has limited implementation of the plan, UNTAC has consistently
stressed that the door is still open to PDK to participate fully and constructively in the peace process and that
the military component stands ready to undertake the cantonment of NADK [Khmer] forces. (S/24578)”
One potential issue that this Council should consider is the likelihood that other groups may become
reluctant to participate in the disarmament process. The Khmer Rouge’s refusal to disarm may leave other
parties feeling vulnerable, which holds potential to de-rail the entire cantonment and disarmament process.
The end of the Secretary General’s report emphasizes the need for the entire international community to
support UNTAC’s efforts. The report notes that particularly neighboring countries can play a positive
supporting role in UNTAC’s efforts, “not least in helping to communicate to the leadership of the PDK the
firm resolve of the United Nations that UNTAC should implement its mandate vigorously and to the full.
(S/24578)”
In this vein, the report indicates the Secretary General’s intention to request that the co-chairmen of the Paris
Conference undertake a series of consultations “with the aim of finding a way out of the present impasse or,
if that should prove impossible, exploring appropriate steps to ensure the realization of the fundamental
objectives of the Paris Agreements. (S/24578)”
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BLOC POSITIONS
France and the European Community
Despite France’s previous role as colonizer, the country’s mediation and hosting of the Paris Conference
places the country in a somewhat neutral role regarding the Cambodian conflict. The European Community
as a whole finds itself aligning with the projected policies of the United States and the Association of
Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). That said, the European Community is more hesitant to follow the
staunch anti-Communist rhetoric that dictated past US policies regarding Cambodian conflict. Ultimately, the
region wholly supports the Paris Agreement and its request to form a coalition government that opposes the
People’s Republic of Kampuchea (PRK) and Khmer Rouge.
The United States and China
Similar to the Balkan conflict, Cambodia lost its strategic importance with the end of the Cold War. Even still,
the US is a known supporter of regime change in Cambodia to the extent that they clandestinely funnel
money to anti-Communist resistance forces. It should be noted, however, that the US’s interest in the conflict
depreciated after the end of the Vietnam War. Like the US, China also supports a change from the ruling
Khmer Rouge. The US and China’s historic dissension with the former Soviet Union consequently forced an
alliance between the two. Expect China to affirm its interest in conflict resolution more readily than the US,
however, as it is immediately affected by any instance of instability within the region. China also has
economic incentive to support a new, internationally recognized regime as Cambodia’s prolific amounts of
raw materials hold great value to a rapidly industrializing China. With the Khmer Rouge gone, China can
openly invest without backlash from the international community; China will therefore support any initiatives
that promote a new government and expanded economic opportunities for investment.
The Former Soviet Bloc and new Russian Federation
Prior to dissolution, the Soviet Bloc assisted the initial Vietnamese insurgency in Cambodia; the USSR openly
supported the PRK and Khmer Rouge regime. Now, the former Soviet satellites have little interest in the
conflict. Vietnam is the proxy with the most at stake, but has less involvement with the situation after its
retraction of troops. Given the novelty of the Russian Federation, it is uncertain what policy route the
country will now take. Some expect the country to start appeasing the rest of the international community in
an attempt to distance itself from previous Soviet leadership –meaning that support for the Khmer Rouge
will slowly disintegrate. It is fairly certain, however, that the Russian Federation will rely on carefully
calculated decision making in an attempt to balance its new initiatives as a state alongside the fragility of past
alliances with proxy regimes.
COMMITTEE MISSION
In his report, the Secretary General notes that the Security Council will play an especially important role in
ensuring the implementation of UNTAC’s mandate. The report states that, “the Council may wish to take
further action to impress upon the parties the international community’s firm determination to press ahead
with the implementation of the settlement, so as to bring peace to Cambodia and enable the Cambodian
people to look to a better and more stable future. (S/24578)”
The report hints at a possible radical transformation of the UN operation in Cambodia:
“The present drift in the peace process cannot be allowed to continue without seriously
impairing UNTAC’s ability to carry out its mandate within the time-frame set by the Security
Council. It is clear that the time is approaching when some difficult decisions regarding ways
and means of pursuing this operation will have to be seriously considered. (S/24578)”
- 20 -
Given the Secretary General’s recommendations, the mission of this Council is (a) to determine the
most appropriate means of trying to convince the Khmer Rouge to comply with the Paris Agreement
and (b) to begin to make the difficult decisions about the UN’s operation in Cambodia. If the
Council determines that the operation is not effective, it must identify what portions of the
Agreement are and are not being implemented, and determine the appropriate changes to make to
the operation to better implement the Agreement.
- 21 -
RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

As mentioned in the Note on Research and Preparation, it is imperative that delegates answer each of these questions in their
position papers.
TOPIC A
1. How does your country define “conditions of peace and security necessary for a peaceful
settlement?” How secure does Bosnia have to be before implementation for a peaceful settlement to
be negotiated? Does the humanitarian situation play a role?
2. Can UNPROFOR fulfill its mission under it current mandate, or does its mandate need to be
expanded?
3. Is your country currently involved, or has it ever been involved, in any mediation efforts in Bosnia?
In any other country? What lessons has it learned from past mediation experiences that may be useful
to today’s peace negotiations?
4. What is your country’s position on practicality vs. accountability, and how might that impact peace
negotiations?
5. What is your country’s position on timing in this case – is the time ripe for negotiations? If not,
should the International Conference wait until the time is ripe?
TOPIC B
1. Did your state support a particular Cambodian party or external actor during the civil war? If so,
which, and does your state maintain ties to that group now?
2. Does your state think further efforts should be made to get the Khmer Rouge to comply with its
promises in the Paris Agreement? If so, what steps? Does your state believe that UNTAC will be
delegitimized if the Khmer Rouge officially withdraws its consent?
3. What are some of the implications of continuing with the elections as scheduled, without the Khmer
Rouge’s participation? How could some of these implications be minimized?
4. Is UNTAC on task to fulfill its mission? Does your state believe the current UNTAC mandate is
sufficient for the task at hand? Do your answers differ for various portions of the Paris Agreement?
5. Is there a difference in the role regional actors should play in implementing the Paris Agreement, as
opposed to other external actors?
- 22 -
IMPORTANT DOCUMENTS
The following documents have been hand-selected by Directors to further aid in delegate preparation. Please make a concerted
effort to read and analyze these documents prior to the conference.
TOPIC A
S/727. “Security Resolution 727.” 8 Jan. 1992.
S/758. “Security Council Resolution 758.” 8 June 1992.
S/770. “Security Council Resolution 770. 14 Aug. 1992.
Appendix A: Members of the 1992 Security Council
TOPIC B
“Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.” Facts About Cambodia.
23 October 1991. Cambodian Information Center. 15 Oct. 2008
<http://www.cambodia.org/facts/Paris_Peace_Agreement_10231991.php>
S/24578. “Second Progress Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Transitional Authority in
Cambodia.” 21 Sept. 1992.
S/745. “Security Council Resolution 745.” 28 Feb. 1992.
- 23 -
BIBLIOGRAPHY
COMMITTEE HISTORY
Greenhill, Kelly. “Conflict and Its Management.” PS188: Understanding Civil Wars. Tufts University.
Medford, MA. Jan. 2008.
A lecture with some background on UN peacekeeping in the 1990s.
TOPIC A
UN Sources
“Background: UNPROFOR.” Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR. Sept. 1996. Department of Public

Information, United Nations. 26 Sept. 2008
Provides critical background on UNPROFOR from the start of the conflict in 1991.
“Profile: UNPROFOR.” Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR. 31 Aug. 1996. Department of Public

Information, United Nations. 26 Sept. 2008
<http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unprof_p.htm>
Traces the development and expansion of UNPROFOR, with an emphasis on Security Council resolutions that impacted the
peacekeeping force.
S/752. “Security Council Resolution 752.” 15 May 1992.

Demands a ceasefire, the end to foreign military intervention, and calls for disarmament of irregular forces and for international
participation in the peace process.
S/757. “Security Council Resolution 757.” 30 May 1992.

Deplores the failure of the international community and the warring parties to uphold past Security Council resolutions and calls
for sanctions on Serbia and Montenegro (the former Yugoslavia).
S/764. “Security Council Resolution 764.” 13 July 1992.

Authorizes additional forces to secure the Sarajevo airport.
Non-UN Sources
Bell-Fialkoff, Andrew. “A Brief History of Ethnic Cleansing.” Foreign Affairs 72.3 (Summer 1993): 110-122.
Describes the characteristics and history of ethnic cleansing, with a focus on ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia.
“Ethnic Cleansing.” Britannica. 2008. Encyclopedia Britannica. 26 Sept. 2008.

<http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/194242/ethnic-cleansing>
“Geneva Group Starts Work.” World. 4 Sept. 1992. The New York Times. 26 Sept. 2008
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CEEDF173AF937A3575AC0A964958260&
sec=&spon=&pagewanted=2>
Describes initial thoughts at the start of the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia.
Greenberg, Melanie and Margaret McGuinness. “From Lisbon to Dayton: International Mediation and the
Bosnia Crisis.” Words Over War. Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict. 26 Sept.
2008 <http://wwics.si.edu/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/frame.htm>.
Discusses the challenges to an effective international response to the situation in Bosnia.
Greenhill, Kelly. “Conflict Mediation.” PS188: Understanding Civil Wars. Tufts University. Medford, MA. 20
Feb. 2008.
- 24 -
Information on the theoretical dimensions of successful conflict mediation by external actors.
Greenhill, Kelly. “Mediation in the War Over Bosnia and Herzegovina.” PS188: Understanding Civil Wars.
Tufts University. Medford, MA. 21 Feb. 2008.
A lecture with some background on the conflict and international attempts at mediation, particularly in the context of Bosnia.
Hillin, John. Blue Helmets: The Strategy of UN Military Operations. Brassey's UK Ltd: 15 January 2002. 2nd
Edition.
This book has a solid explanation of UN peacekeeping missions and their capabilities, including a description of Chapter VI vs.
Chapter VII capabilities.
Kleiboer, Marieke. “Understanding success and failure of international mediation.” The Journal of Conflict
Resolution 40.2 (June 1996): 360-389.
A comprehensive explanation of when international mediation is likely or unlikely to be successful.
Lewis, Paul. “UN Rules Out a Force to Halt Bosnia Fighting.” World. 14 May 1992. The New York Times.
26 Sept. 2008
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE7DE1E30F937A25756C0A964958260&s
cp=7&sq=bosnia&st=nyt>.
Gives a concise summary of UN position on the use of force in Bosnia.
Rosenthal, Andrew. “Conflict in the Balkans: Bush Urges UN to Back Force to Get Aid to Balkans.” World.
7 Aug. 1992. The New York Times. 26 Sept. 2008
<http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E0CE0DF1E3AF934A3575BC0A964958260&
scp=2&sq=bosnia&st=nyt>
Outlines the US position on use of force to secure foreign aid.
“Short History of Sarajevo.” History of Cities. Union of Central and Southeastern European Capitals. 26
Sept. 2008 <http://www.cseecunion.org/HistoryOfCities/Sarajevo.html>
Provides very basic background information on the history of Sarajevo, including its pre-war population levels and the impact of
the siege on population.
Stedman, Stephen J, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousins, eds. Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation
of Peace Agreements. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 2002.
Includes a chapter on Bosnia, with analysis of peace implementation and negotiation during the crisis.
Stedman, Stephen J. “Mediation and Negotiation in Internal Conflicts.” International Dimensions of Internal
Conflicts. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 1996.
Stedman identifies the characteristics of successful mediation attempts.
Sudetic, Chuck. “UN Relief Plane Reported Downed on Bosnian Mission.” World. 4 Sept. 1992. The New
York Times. 26 Sept. 2008.
Describes the initial conjectures and known facts about yesterday’s downed UN relief plane.
Zartman, William. “The Timing of Peace Initiatives: Hurting Stalemates and Ripe Moments.” The Global
Review of Ethnopolitics 1.1 (Sept. 2001): 8-18.
Zartman discusses one theory of when parties to a conflict are more likely to agree on a peace proposal.
TOPIC B
UN Sources
A/46/617. “The Situation in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary-General.” 7 Nov. 1991.

Outlines the progress of peace negotiations from 1990 to November 1991 in almost excruciating detail.
- 25 -
Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment:

Principles and Guidelines. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. New York:
United Nations, 2000. 1-119.
I used this source for my definition of disarmament.
S/22110/Add.43. “Summary Statement by the Secretary General on Matters of Which the Security Council is
Seized and on the Stage Reached in their Consideration.” 5 Nov. 1991.
Summarizes several longer documents and transcripts; provides an excellent summary of the Security Council’s actions up to
November 1991.
S/668. “Security Council Resolution 668.” 20 Sept. 1990.

Affirms the Security Council’s support of the on-going peace process, lists states involved in that process, and determines that in
the future, only the SNC will represent Cambodia internationally.
S/717. “Security Council Resolution 717.” 16 Oct. 1991.

Resolution 717 gave UNAMIC its mandate of monitoring the ceasefire and instituting a mine-awareness program.
S/718. “Security Council Resolution 718.” 31 Oct. 1991.

Requests that the Secretary General provide periodic reports on the situation in Cambodia.
S/728. “Security Council Resolution 728.” 8 Jan. 1992.

Resolution 728 intensified the mine-awareness program that UNAMIC operated.
S/766. “Security Council Resolution 766.” 21 July 1992.

In this resolution, the Council determines to go on with phase two of UNTAC despite the Khmer Rouge’s opposition.
S/PV.3057. “Provisional Verbatim Record of the Three Thousand and Fifty-Seventh Meeting.” 28 Feb. 1992.
Verbatim transcripts of speeches by the Secretary General, as well as representatives to the Security Council, on the situation in
Cambodia. Will be invaluable to some states’ bloc position.
Non-UN Sources
“Agreements on a Comprehensive Political Settlement of the Cambodia Conflict.” 23 October 1991. Paris.
The full text of the Paris Peace Agreement, as well as all relevant annexes and supplementary agreements. This document is
summarized in the paper, but a careful reading of the entire agreement will serve delegates well as they discuss implementation of
the Paris Agreement.
Chandler, David. “Cambodia’s Historical Legacy.” Cambodia. Nov. 1988. Conciliation Resources. 25 Sept.
2008 <http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/historical-legacy.php>.
Chandler describes the rise and fall of the Khmer Rouge, and places it in Cambodia’s cultural and historical context.
Farris, Karl. “UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia: On Balance, a Success.” Parameters (Spring 1994): 38-50.
This essay provides some detailed and clear background, but be aware that the author is studying at the United States Army
War College, and thus the analysis is heavily influenced by the US government position.
“Final Act of the Paris Conference on Cambodia.” Paris Agreements. Conciliation Resources. 26 Sept. 2008
<http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/cambodia/final-act.php>
The text of the Paris Conference in 1991.
Jeldres, Julio A. “The UN and the Cambodian Transition.” Journal of Democracy 4.4 (October 1993): 104-
116.
Provides some excellent, succinct historical and contemporary background on the topic.
- 26 -
Knight, Mark and Alpaslan Ozerdem. “Guns, Camps and Cash: Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reinsertion of Former Combatants in Transitions from War to Peace.” Journal of Peace Research 41.4
(July 2004): 499-516.
Provides good background on disarmament and cantonment; contains ideas about both that did not enter peacekeeping discourse
until after 1992, so use with caution.
Lambertson, David. Statement before the Subcommittee on Asian and Pacific Affairs of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee. May 1989. Washington, D.C.
The text of a US Dept of State bulletin, which outlines the US position on Cambodia as of May 1989 and also provides some
relevant historical background.
Matheson, Michael J. “United Nations Governance of Postconflict Societies.” American Journal of International
Law 95 (2001): 64-76.
Good analysis of the role UNTAC played in administering the Cambodian state.
Peou, Sorpong. “Cambodia’s Peace Agreement.” Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace
Agreements. Ed. Stephen Stedman, Donald Rothchild, and Elizabeth Cousens. Boulder: Lynne
Reinner Publications, 2002. 499-530.
Sodhy, Pamela. “Review: Cambodia – The 1989 Paris Peace Conference.” Pacific Affairs 66.1 (Spring 1993):
128-131.
Sodhy has written a very succinct book review, of a book that is no longer in print or available online. The review is extremely
detailed and informative, with useful discussion of the book’s content.
Statement of the ASEAN Foreign Ministers on the Jakarta Informal Meeting. Bangkok. 3 July 1988.
Provides some good background for bloc analysis and historical setting.
“Summary: Cambodia-UNTAC Background.” Cambodia: UNTAC. United Nations. 15 Oct. 2008

<http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/co_mission/untacbackgr1.html>.
Provides a succinct summary of UNTAC’s formation and early years.
- 27 -
APPENDIX
I. MEMBERS OF THE 1992 SECURITY COUNCIL:
Austria
Belgium
Cape Verde
China
Ecuador
France
Hungary
India
Japan
Morocco
Russian Federation*
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland
United States of America
Venezuela
Zimbabwe
* The Security Council recognized the Russian Federation as the legal successor to the
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (U.S.S.R.)
II. CHART
PARTIES TO THE CAMBODIAN CONFLICT (1975 – NRESENT)
State of Democratic FUNCINPEC KPNLF
Cambodia Kampuchea
(SOC) (DK)
Government People’s Republic Democratic United National Khmer People’s
al Identity of Kampuchea Kampuchea Front for an Liberation Front:
(PRK): 1979 – 1989 (Khmer Rouge): Independent, 1979 – 1982
State of Cambodia: 1975 – 1982 Neutral, Peaceful CGDK: 1982 –
1989 - Present CGDK: 1982 – and Cooperative 1990
1990 Cambodia: 1981 – NGC: 1990 –
NGC: 1990 - Present Present
Present CGDK: 1982 –
1990
NGC: 1990 -
Present
Party Cambodian Party of FUNCINPEC: Buddhist Liberal
People’s Party: Democratic 1981 Democratic Party
Identity
1991 – Present Kampuchea (BLDP): Present
Khmer People’s (PDK): 1976 (1992)
Revolutionary Communist Party
Party (KPRP): of Kampuchea:
1979 – 1991 1960 – 1981
(secret)
- 28 -
Leaders Hun Sen, Prime Khieu Samphan, Prince Sihanouk, Son Sann, former
Minister Foreign Affairs former Chief of State Prime Minister
Pol Pot, Head of
Heng Samrin, State
President of PRK Ieng Sary, China
relations
Regional Socialist Republic of Thailand (covert ASEAN (Brunei, ASEAN
Vietnam (SRV) border traffic) Indonesia, Malaysia,
Supporters China (arms supply) Philippines,
Singapore, Thailand)
Aligned *U.S.S.R. *China (1975 – Australia, Japan, Australia, Japan,
Present) *France, *UK, *US *France, *UK,
External *US
Supporters
*USSR (Russia), China, France, the UK, and the US started conferring monthly from January 1990 as
permanent members of the UN Security Council.
- 29 -

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N ATIONAL H IGH S CHOOL

MODEL UNITED NATIONS

Historical Security Council

Rosa Akbari Dear Delegates,

NHSMUN is a project of the

A NOTE ON RESEARCH AND PREPARATION

Rosa Akbari, Director-General David Stern

(Country Summaries) (Individual Position Papers)

IMPLEMENTING CEASEFIRE IN BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia

United Nations Protection Force (UN PROFOR)

Strengths and Weaknesses

Likelihood of Successful External M ediation

Ethical Dilemmas of M ediation

The European Community

The United States and her allies

The Former Soviet Bloc

THE SITUATION IN CAMBODIA

HISTORY AND DESCRIPTION OF THE ISSUE

The Kingdom of Cambodia: 1953 – 1989

Failed Negotiations: 1988 – 23 October 1991

The Paris Agreement

Part One: Arrangements During the Transitional Period

Part Two: Elections

Part Three: Human Rights

Part Four: International Guarantees

Part Five: Refugees and Displaced Persons

Part Six: Release of Prisoners of W ar and Civilian Internees

Part Seven: Principles for a N ew Constitution for Cambodia

Part Eight: Rehabilitation and Reconstruction

Part Nine: Final Provisions

United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia

Disarmament, Regroupment, and Cantonment

Non-Compliance of the Khmer Rouge

France and the European Community

The United States and China

The Former Soviet Bloc and new Russian Federation

The report hints at a possible radical transformation of the UN operation in Cambodia:

RESEARCH AND PREPARATION QUESTIONS

S/727. “Security Resolution 727.” 8 Jan. 1992.

S/758. “Security Council Resolution 758.” 8 June 1992.

S/770. “Security Council Resolution 770. 14 Aug. 1992.

Appendix A: Members of the 1992 Security Council

S/745. “Security Council Resolution 745.” 28 Feb. 1992.

“Background: UNPROFOR.” Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR. Sept. 1996. Department of Public

“Profile: UNPROFOR.” Former Yugoslavia: UNPROFOR. 31 Aug. 1996. Department of Public

S/752. “Security Council Resolution 752.” 15 May 1992.

S/757. “Security Council Resolution 757.” 30 May 1992.

S/764. “Security Council Resolution 764.” 13 July 1992.

“Ethnic Cleansing.” Britannica. 2008. Encyclopedia Britannica. 26 Sept. 2008.

Information on the theoretical dimensions of successful conflict mediation by external actors.

A/46/617. “The Situation in Cambodia: Report of the Secretary-General.” 7 Nov. 1991.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in a Peacekeeping Environment:

S/668. “Security Council Resolution 668.” 20 Sept. 1990.

S/717. “Security Council Resolution 717.” 16 Oct. 1991.

S/718. “Security Council Resolution 718.” 31 Oct. 1991.

S/728. “Security Council Resolution 728.” 8 Jan. 1992.

S/766. “Security Council Resolution 766.” 21 July 1992.

“Summary: Cambodia-UNTAC Background.” Cambodia: UNTAC. United Nations. 15 Oct. 2008

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