G.R. No. 168785 HERALD BLACK DACASIN, Petitioner Vs SHARON DEL MUNDO DACASIN, Promulgated: Respondent.

February 5, 2010 Facts: Petitioner Herald Dacasin (petitioner), American, and respondent Sharon Del Mundo Dacasin (respondent), Filipino, were married in Manila in April 1994. They have one daughter, Stephanie, born on 21 September 1995. In June 1999, respondent sought and obtained from the Circuit Court, 19 th Judicial Circuit, Lake County, Illinois (Illinois court) a divorce decree against petitioner. In its ruling, the Illinois court dissolved the marriage of petitioner and respondent, awarded to respondent sole custody of Stephanie and retained jurisdiction over the case for enforcement purposes. On 28 January 2002, petitioner and respondent executed in Manila a contract (Agreement) for the joint custody of Stephanie. The parties chose Philippine courts as exclusive forum to adjudicate disputes arising from the Agreement. Respondent undertook to obtain from the Illinois court an order relinquishing jurisdiction to Philippine courts. In 2004, petitioner sued respondent in the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 60 (trial court) to enforce the Agreement. Petitioner alleged that in violation of the Agreement, respondent exercised sole custody over Stephanie. Respondent sought the dismissal of the complaint for, among others, lack of jurisdiction because of the Illinois courts retention of jurisdiction to enforce the divorce decree. Issue: Is whether the trial court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of petitioners suit and enforce the Agreement on the joint custody of the parties child.

Rulings: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific performance, such as petitioners suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child custody, belongs to this species of actions.[ Thus, jurisdiction-wise, petitioner went to the right court. The Agreement is not only void ab initio for being contrary to law, it has also been repudiated by the mother when she refused to allow joint custody by the father. The Agreement would be valid if the spouses have not divorced or separated because the law provides for joint parental authority when spouses live together. However, upon separation of the spouses, the mother takes sole custody under the law if the child is below seven years old and any agreement to the contrary is void. Thus, the law suspends the joint custody regime for (1) children under seven of

(2) separated or divorced spouses. Simply put, for a child within this age bracket (and for commonsensical reasons), the law decides for the separated or divorced parents how best to take care of the child and that is to give custody to the separated mother. Indeed, the separated parents cannot contract away the provision in the Family Code on the maternal custody of children below seven years anymore than they can privately agree that a mother who is unemployed, immoral, habitually drunk, drug addict, insane or afflicted with a communicable disease will have sole custody of a child under seven as these are reasons deemed compelling to precludethe application of the exclusive maternal custody regime under the second paragraph of Article 213. There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy. We reiterated Van Dorn in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera to dismiss criminal complaints for adultery filed by the alien divorcee (who obtained the foreign divorce decree) against his former Filipino spouse because he no longer qualified as offended spouse entitled to file the complaints under Philippine procedural rules. Thus, it should be clear by now that a foreign divorce decree carries as much validity against the alien divorcee in this jurisdiction as it does in the jurisdiction of the aliens nationality, irrespective of who obtained the divorce.

A.M. NO. P-08-2590 JULIE ANN C. DELA CUEVA,Complainant Vs SELIMA B. OMAGA, Court Stenographer I, MTC-Calauan, Laguna, Respondent.

Facts: Complainant Julie Ann C. dela Cueva is the legal wife of P/Supt. Nestor dela Cueva. They were married on July 29, 1984, and the union bore three children. Due to the philandering ways of her husband, the couple separated on November 30, 1994.[3] Thereafter, the complainant cohabited with two different men in succession On May 31, 2007, P/Supt. Nestor dela Cueva filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage alleging as ground his own psychological incapacity.[5] This angered and prompted his wife, the complainant, to file a criminal complaint against him for bigamy and concubinage. Her complaint alleged that he and respondent, Selima B. Omaga, got married and were living together as husband and wife despite the subsistence of his marriage with her Complainant dela Cueva also filed an administrative complaint against both her husband and the respondent. In her defense, respondent averred that she first met P/Supt. dela Cueva in 1995 when he was assigned by the Philippine National Police as Chief of Police in Calauan, Laguna. Their relationship started on March 8, 1995 and continued until she received notice of the bigamy and concubinage case filed against him. It was only then that she discovered that he was married. Respondent further asserted that despite having had three children with P/Supt. dela Cueva, they did not live together in one house but rather, he would just visit her in her house from time to time. Issue: Whether or not respondent is indeed guilty of immoral conduct?

Rulings: There is no doubt that engaging in sexual relations with a married man is not only a violation of the moral standards expected of employees of the judiciary but is also a desecration of the sanctity of the institution of marriage which this Court abhors and is, thus, punishable.

The idea, however, that the respondent never had the slightest notion that P/Supt. dela Cueva was married and that she did not cohabit with him despite having three children may be quite a stretch of the imagination. It is fairly inconceivable for a woman to have had a relationship with a married man for more than a decade without even a tinge of suspicion that he might have been lying about his true civil status. But then again, there is nothing on record which can refute respondents allegation. In view of the lack of proof showing that respondent willingly

entered into an immoral sexual liaison with a married man, she cannot be held liable for immoral and disgraceful conduct. It is a well-settled rule that administrative penalties must be supported by substantial evidence for the imposition thereof.[33] This is in keeping with the constitutional imperative that a person is entitled to due process of law. The Court will exercise its disciplinary authority over respondent only if the case against her is established by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.[34] In this case, the Court finds the evidence against respondent insufficient to warrant the imposition of an administrative penalty.

G.R. No. 137567. June 20, 2000 MEYNARDO L. BELTRAN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and HON. JUDGE FLORENTINO TUAZON, JR., being the Judge of the RTC, Branch 139, Makati City, respondents. Petitioner Meynardo Beltran and wife Charmaine E. Felix were married, after twenty-four years of marriage and four children, petitioner filed a petition for nullity of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code before Branch 87 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In her Answer to the said petition, petitioner's wife Charmaine Felix alleged that it was petitioner ] who abandoned the conjugal home and lived with a certain woman named Milagros Salting. Charmaine subsequently filed a criminal complaint for concubinage under Article 334 of the Revised Penal Code against petitioner and his paramour before the City Prosecutor's Office of Makati who, in a Resolution dated September 16, 1997, found probable cause and ordered the filing of an Information against them. Petitioner contends that the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of his marriage based on psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code is a prejudicial question that should merit the suspension of the criminal case for concubinage filed against him by his wife. Issue: Whether or not the case consist prejudicial question? Rulings: The rationale behind the principle of prejudicial question is to avoid two conflicting decisions. It has two essential elements: (a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and (b) the resolution of such issue determines whether or not the criminal action may [11] proceed. The pendency of the case for declaration of nullity of petitioner's marriage is not a prejudicial question to the concubinage case. For a civil case to be considered prejudicial to a criminal action as to cause the suspension of the latter pending the final determination of the civil case, it must appear not only that the said civil case involves the same facts upon which the criminal prosecution would be based, but also that in the resolution of the issue or issues raised in the aforesaid civil action, the guilt or innocence of the accused would necessarily be determined. Thus, in the case at bar it must also be held that parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to judgment of the competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists for all intents and purposes. Therefore, he who cohabits with a woman not his wife before the judicial declaration of nullity of the marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for concubinage. The lower court therefore, has not erred in affirming the Orders of the judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court ruling that pendency of a civil action for nullity of marriage does not pose a prejudicial question in a criminal case for concubinage.

G.R. No. 185833 ROBERT TAGUINODPetitioner, Versus PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES FACTS The incident involving the collision of the two side view mirrors is proof enough to establish the existence of the element of hate, revenge and other evil motive. Here, the accused entertained hate, revenge and other evil motive because to his mind, he was wronged by the complainant when the CRV overtook his Vitara while proceeding toward the booth to pay their parking fee, as a consequence of which, their side view mirrors collided. On the same occasion, the hood of his Vitara was also pounded, and he was badmouthed by the complainant's wife and daughter when they alighted from the CRV to confront him for the collision of the side view mirrors. These circumstances motivated the accused to push upward the ramp complainant's CRV until it reached the steel railing of the exit ramp. The pushing of the CRV by the Vitara is corroborated by the Incident Report dated May 26, 2002 prepared by SO Robert Cambre, Shift-In-Charge of the Power Plant Mall, as well as the Police ReporT. Issue: Whether or not the the act of petitioner consist malicious mischief? Rulings: Contrary to the contention of the petitioner, the evidence for the prosecution had proven beyond reasonable doubt the existence of the foregoing elements. First, the hitting of the back portion of the CRV by the petitioner was clearly deliberate as indicated by the evidence on record. The version of the private complainant that the petitioner chased him and that the Vitara pushed the CRV until it reached the stairway railing was more believable than the petitioner's version that it was private complainant's CRV which moved backward and deliberately hit the Vitara considering the steepness or angle of the elevation of the P2 exit ramp. It would be too risky and dangerous for the private complainant and his family to move the CRV backward when it would be hard for him to see his direction as well as to control his speed in view of the gravitational pull. Second, the act of damaging the rear bumper of the CRV does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction. Lastly, when the Vitara bumped the CRV, the petitioner was just giving vent to his anger and hate as a result of a heated encounter between him and the private complainant. In sum, this Court finds that the evidence on record shows that the prosecution had proven the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of malicious mischief. This adjudication is but an affirmation of the finding of guilt of the petitioner by both the lower courts, the MeTC and the RTC.[22] Article 327 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) That the offender deliberately caused damage to the property of another; (2) That such act does not constitute arson or other crimes involving destruction; (3) That the act of damaging another's property be committed merely for the sake of damaging it.[20]

G.R. No. 182061 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES Appellee, - versus FERDINAND T. BALUNTONG,Appellant Facts: That on or about the 31st day of July 1998, at about 10:30 in the evening at Barangay Danggay, Municipality of Roxas, Province of Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did, then and there, with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to kill, set on fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on Josua (sic) Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which would produce the crime of murder as a consequance (sic) but which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator Issue: What omission thus the appellant made? Rulings: [I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in order to determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated whether arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson, and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand, the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly, (c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct crimes committed homicide/murder and arson. (emphasis and underscoring partly in the original; emphasis partly supplied) The Court finds that there is no showing that appellants main objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal. In her Affidavit executed on August 11, 1998,[10] Felicitas stated that what she knew is that Celerina wanted appellant, who was renting a house near Celerinas, to move out.

How Felicitas acquired such knowledge was not probed into, however, despite the fact that she was crossexamined thereon.[11] Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true with respect to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house, Celerina was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely entered the burning house to save her grandsons. As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson, the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed by arson. [12]

When there is variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense charged is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense proved

G.R. No. 177145 PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee -versus JOEY TORIAGA, Accused-Appellant Facts:

That on or about the 26th day of November, 1995 at Kalookan City, Metro-Manila, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and by means of threat and intimidation by using a bladed weapon (knife) employed upon the person of 13-year old AAA, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lie and have sexual intercourse with said AAA, against her will and without her consent. Issue: What crime commited by accused-appellant? Rullings:

In the CA, Toriaga changed his defense of denial and alibi for the first time to the affirmative defense of consensual sexual intercourse with AAA, whom he insisted had undressed herself freely and did not shout when the incident was taking place. He contended that he was liable only for qualified seduction because he was a domestic within the contemplation of the law. In its decision, the CA rejected his contentions, because, firstly, he was found not to have been charged with the custody or authority over the minor victim; secondly, AAA was not a member of the household of CCC, nor was he a member of the victims household; and thirdly, the complaint for rape neither averred nor embodied the elements of seduction. Consequently, the CA affirmed the conviction for rape. The information alleged the use of a bladed weapon in the commission of the rape. Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that whenever the crime of rape is committed with use of a deadly weapon the imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death. The Prosecution established that the accused wielded an icepick to intimidate her into submission and later to assault AAA with intent to kill her to seal her mouth forever. Under Article 63, 2, Revised Penal Code, where the prescribed penalties of reclusion perpetua and death, and there are neither mitigating nor aggravating circumstances present or attendant, like herein, the lesser penalty of reclusion perpetua is imposable

G. R. NO . 1 5 5 4 0 9 \ VI R G I LI O M AQ U I LA N, Vs D I TA M A QU I L AN,

P et it io ner, Re sp o nd e nt.

Facts:

Herein petitioner and herein private respondent are spouses who once had a blissful married life and out of which were blessed to have a son. However, their once sugar coated romance turned bitter when petitioner discovered that private respondent was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which thus, prompted the petitioner to file a case of adultery against private respondent and the latters paramour. Consequentl y, both the private respondent and her paramour were convicted of the crim e charged and were sentenced to suffer an imprisonment ranging from one (1) year, eight (8) months, minimum of prision correccional as minimum penalt y, to three (3) years, six (6) months and twent y one (21) days, medium of prision correccional as maximum p enalt y. Thereafter, private respondent, through counsel, filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage, Dissolution and Liquidation of Conjugal Partnership of Gains and Damages on June 15, 2001 with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 3 of Nabunturan, Compostela Valley, docketed as Civil Case No. 656, imputing psychological incapacit y on the part of the petitioner.
Rulings: wheter or not respondent be entitled of compromise agreement?

The CA held that the conviction of the respondent of the crime of adultery does not ipso facto disqualify her from sharing in the conjugal property, especially considering that she had only been sentenced with the penalty of prisioncorreccional, a penalty that does not carry the accessory penalty of civil interdictio n which deprives the person of the rights to manage her property and to dispose of such property inter vivos; that Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code, which pertain to the effects of a nullified marriage and the effects of legal separation, respectively, do not apply, considering, too, that the Petition for the Declaration of the Nullity of Marriage filed by the respondent invoking Article 36 of the Family Code has yet to be decided, and, hence, it is premature to apply Articles 43 and 63 of the Family Code; that, although adultery is a ground for legal separation,

nonetheless, Article 63 finds no application in the instant case since no petition to that effect was filed by the petitioner against the respondent; that the spouses voluntarily separated thei r property through their Compromise Agreement with court approval under Article 134 of the Family Code; that the Compromise Agreement, which embodies the voluntary separation of property, is valid and binding in all respects because it had been voluntarily entered into by the parties; that, furthermore, even if it were true that the petitioner was not duly informed by his previous counsel about the legal effects of the Compromise Agreement, this point is untenable since the mistake or negligence of the lawyer binds his client, unless such mistake or negligence amounts to gross negligence or deprivation of due process on the part of his client; that these exceptions are not present in the instant case; that the Compromise Agreement was plainly worded and written in simple language, which a person of ordinary intelligence can discern the consequences thereof, hence, petitioners claim that his consent was vitiated is highly incredible; that the Compromise Agreement was made during the existence of the marriage of the parties since it was submitted during the pendency of the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage; that the application of Article 2035 of the Civil Code is misplaced; that the cooling -off period under Article 58 of the Family Code has no be aring on the validity of the Compromise Agreement; that the Compromise Agreement is not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, and public policy; that this agreement may not be later disowned simply because of a change of mind; that the prese nce of the Solicitor General or his deputy is not indispensable to the execution and validity of the Compromise Agreement, since the purpose of his presence is to curtail any collusion between the parties and to see to it that evidence is not fabricated, a nd, with this in mind, nothing in the Compromise Agreement touches on the very merits of the case of declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion; and, finally, that the Compromise Agreement is merely an agreement between the parties to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending case of declaration of nullity of marriage.

G.R. No. 168733. March 27, 2006] ROXAS DE JESUS, a.k.a. MARIA TERESA LAZATIN DE JESUS v. SALVE BARICAN DE JESUS, FRANCIS GILBERT DE JESUS, MARIA JOVELYN DE JESUS AND JENIFER DE JESUS Facts Pete Roxas de Jesus (Pete) married respondent Salve Barican on 4 September 1960. Their union produced three children named Francis Gilbert, Maria Jocelyn, and Jennifer, all surnamed de Jesus and all co-respondents in this case. Pete emigrated to the United States of America. he obtained a divorce decree against Salve and married petitioner, Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus, in the state of Nevada.[7] Notably, however, he only became a citizen of the United States in 1988.[8] He died in Daly City, California, on 4 December 1994.[9]

On 3 March 1995, petitioner instituted with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, a petition for the probate of the holographic will of the decedent, entitled "In the matter of the Petition for the Probate of the Will of Pete Roxas de Jesus, a.k.a. Peter Roxas de Jesus or Pedro de Jesus; Maria Teresa Lazatin de Jesus v. Salve Barican de Jesus, Francis Gilbert de Jesus, Maria Jocelyn de Jesus, and Jennifer de Jesus." In his will, the decedent instituted petitioner as his sole heir and disinherited the respondents. After trial, the probate court rendered a Decision dated 26 October 2001 holding that even as the will is extrinsically valid, i.e., duly executed in accordance with the requisites and solemnities prescribed by law, it is intrinsically void for containing illegal dispositions and institution of an heir.[10] Issue: Whether or not the marriage is bigamous and can claim the estate of the estator? Ruling: Petitioner's claim to the entire estate of the decedent having failed, she now argues that since the lower courts upheld the intrinsic validity of the will, the testamentary provision therein in her favor should be given effect even if only to the extent that it does not affect the legitime of the respondents. She argues that the pronouncement of her marriage with the decedent as bigamous does not detract from the fact that the testator had intended to leave something for her, entitling her to at least the free portion of the decedent's estate. The argument is untenable. Under Article 739[12] of the Civil Code, donations made between persons in a state of adultery or concubinage are void. Article 1028 of the same code mandates that the same prohibition be similarly applied to testamentary provisions.[13] Since the courts below have made the factual finding that the marriage between petitioner and the decedent was bigamous, necessarily, petitioner and decedent are considered as having been in a state of concubinage in the context of Article 739. Significantly, a conviction for adultery or concubinage need not be had before the disabilities mentioned in paragraph (1) of Article 739 may effectuate.[14] Thus, in a case for the probate of a will where the testator bequeathed to his bigamous wife the free portion of his estate, this Court ruled, inter alia, that the disposition is void under Article 739 in relation to Article 1028 of the Civil Code

CASE DIGEST FOR CRIMINAL LAW

SUBMITTED BY JAPHETH G. ALEGRADO