International Experts' Meeting on Reactor and Spent Fuel Safety in the Light of the Accident at the Fukushima Daiichi

Nuclear Power Plant

International Atomic Energy Agency, VIC; Vienna, Austria 19-22 March 2012

FOCUSING ON FUKUSHIMA-DAIICHI DEFICIENCIES.

RATHER THAN ON GENERIC NUCLEAR SAFETY ISSUES

A.J. Gonzlez, R. Navarro, F. Spano and G. Terigi

(in alphabetical order)

Autoridad Regulatoria Nuclear de Argentina

(Argentine Nuclear Regulatory Authority)

Av. Del Libertador 8250; (1429)Buenos Aires,Argentina+54 1163231306

1

The tragedy of Japan was also an Argentine tragedy

1883 first Japanese immigrant arrived to Argentina 1915 Japanese newspaper Buenos Aires Shuno 1919 Japanese Garden (orchids and cyclamen) 1953, from 17m. inhabitants, 13.657 were Japanese Today: 32 000 Japanese are Argentineans
2

One year later it is fitting to pause for:

1. 2.

remembering the great losses suffered, reflecting on the Fukushima Daiichi accident, and

3.

taking stock of the current situation.

Content
(nuclear safety to protect people rather than NPPs)

1. Fukushima and its deficiencies 2. International response 3. Lessons being learned 4. The Argentine approach 5. Epilogue
4

1. Fukushima and its deficiencies

The fundamental question

Were the earthquake and tsunami the cause of the accident at Fukushima Daiichi? ..

or

simply, its initiating events?

These were devastating natural events that triggered the accident, . but not its fundamental cause!

The cause shall be found in safety deficiencies

7

Deficiency 1
Underestimation of potential external events, in particular:

siting the plant close to sea level in an area known to be subject to tsunamis and, vulnerability of the grid for earthquakes.

Deficiency 2
Insufficient design provisions to maintain power in any emergency situation for

cooling, instrumentation, control room habitability, lighting and communications, In particular, to ensure a reliable supply of electricity to the emergency cooling system.
9

Deficiency 3

Inadequate containment and mitigation devices to prevent the release of substantial amounts of radioactive material to the environment.

10

Deficiency 4
Unsafe spent fuel storage
(a particular problem for enriched uranium fuel)

11

Deficiency 5
Scarce planning and preparedness, e.g. for

accident management of various events, accidental prolonged situations and emergency response.

Absence of an unified technical command!

12

Deficiency 6
Insufficient regulatory control.

13

Consequence

Large quantities of radioactive materials were released into the environment.

14

15

2. International response

16

IAEA

The IAEA is the only organization within the UN family with specific statutory responsibilities in nuclear safety, namely:
establishing safety standards and providing for their application.

17

Did Fukushima comply with IAEA standards?

IAEA response

Convened a Ministerial Conference on Nuclear Safety, which took place in Vienna, on 20-24 June 2011.

Overall objective was: to strengthen nuclear safety throughout the world [sic]
rather than identifying and correcting the specific deficiencies!

The Argentine delegation was sceptic

19

The Action Plan

An IAEA mission to review Japan's approach for assessing safety. Strengthen IAEA peer review services. A report highlighting the results of the IRRS missions. Coordination and cooperation between the IAEA and WANO; 4 OSART missions have been conducted. A systematic review of the IAEA Safety Standards. Capacity building in Member States with nuclear power programmes and those planning to embark on such a programme has been developed. 3 INIR missions have been conducted. A web-based platform to strengthen communication has been launched A review of INES has been initiated. A number of meetings have been held, including:

on the IAEA RANET on Nuclear Liability (INLEX) in building the necessary infrastructure for a nuclear power programme; and on the establishment of a Technical and Scientific Support Organizations Forum.

20

There seems to be a disconnect between the Action Plan and the necessary concentration of efforts on the authoritative identification and correction of the deficiencies that caused Fukushima Daiichi

21

Why to divert attention to generic nuclear safety issues rather than concentrate efforts in the deficiencies of Fukushima Daiichi?

22

Why the successful Chernobyl experience is not used?

First, authoritatively, identify what has happened:

A few months after Chernobyl, the IAEA had organized a high-level technical assessment of the accident causes, which was recorded by INSAG.
23

Second, authoritatively, assess the consequences:

For the Chernobyl aftermath, the IAEA launched:

the Chernobyl Project The Chernobyl Conference and the Chernobyl Forum,

which produced a solidly based, authoritative account of the consequences of the accident.

24

EC FAO IAEA ILO UNSCEAR WHO WMO

INTERNATIONAL CHERNOBYL PROJECT

VILNIUS ORSHA
Molodechno Borisov Lida Novogrudok
Gorki
D

p ne

SMOLENSK
Aleksin

R
zh So

S
Roslavl

I
Kirov

A
Lyudinovo

KALUGA

ka

TULA

Novomoskovsk
Kimovsk

MINSK
Be re z in a

MOGILEV
Bykhov Cherikov
Krichev

Plavsk Dyatlovo Bolkhov Mtsensk

Ok

R
Slutsk

Baranovichi

Bobruysk

BRYANSK
D es na

Efremov Yelets

Soligorsk

OREL

GOMEL
Dn ep r-B al ug ski C anPinsk

Novozybkov

Sosna

Pr i p y a t

Mozyr Khoyniki Bragin

Shostka

Pr i p y a t
d

Narovlya Sarny
G o ryn

KURSK
S ey m
O sk ol

kho

St o

CHERNIGOV
Ovruch Polesskoje Chernobyl Narodichi
Pripyat

Slavutich

Korosten Novograd Volynskiy

re

De

sna

SUMY
P sel

ROVNO

Te

te

BELGOROD

KIEV

ZHITOMIR
Berdichev Ternopol Khmelnitskiy VINNITSA Belaya Tserkov
R os ka
Dn

U
ep

Vo r s k l a

KHARKOV

POLTAVA

1480-3700 kBq m-2 555-1480 kBq m-2 185-555 kBq m-2 37-185 kBq m-2 <37 kBq m-2 27

CHERKASSY

Chancellor Angela Merkel, who at the time was Minister of Environment of Chancellor Helmut Kohl, was the President of the Chernobyl Conference

Recovery: Chernobyl Forum

29
29

Parallel International Initiatives

UNSCEAR: Estimate of the global impact WHO: Assessment of doses incurred ICRP: Lessons learned

30

31

33

3. Lesson being learned

35

Radioactive discharges from Fukushima

Less than Chernobyl?

36

Discharges from Chernobyl

1.2 1019 Bq
131 I 134,137 Cs

55% (50 000 000 Ci) 33% 100%

3,2 1018 Bq 4,0 1017 Bq 7,0 1018 Bq

37

Noble gases:

21 March, 2012

38

39

Calculated air dose rate (shaded area) and measured (plot with values) air dose rate]
The Universal Time Constant (UTC) is presented at the top (Japanese Standard Time: + 9 hours).
40

Belorus

42

Ukraine
43

Radiation Survey in Iitate Village ( )

(conducted on March 28th and 29th) On 22 April 2011, residents asked to leave within a month In early June about 1,500 residents remained. By August only about 120 residents remained

Soil Contamination Levels in Iitate

Evacuees & Doses

Evacuees
Chernobyl
Ucrania Belarus 91,406 24,725

Russian Federation 186

Total 116,317 (187 towns)

As many as more than 110,000 people have been evacuated [sic]

48

Te + I
134 Cs

Contribution to doses

137 Cs

Summary of radiation doses to the main population groups due to the Chernobyl accident
Population group Number (ths.) Mean thyroid dose (mGy) N/A 490 N/A Mean effective dose in 19862005 (mSv) 117 31 61

Workers (19861990) Evacuees (1986) Area of strict control (in B, R, U) Belarus, Ukraine and 19 Russian regions Distant European countries

530 115 216

98 000

16

1.3

500 000

1.3

0.3
50
50

Fukushima dose bands

More affected locations of Fukushima prefecture

(examples, committed dose from the first 4 months only)

Namie, Iitate: 10-50 mSv; Katsurao, Minami-Soma, Naraha, Iwaki: 1-10 mSv

Rest of Fukushima prefecture: 1-10mSv Neighbouring prefectures: 0.1-10 mSv

51

Variation of Air Radiation Dose Rate in Iitate Village Office (7Gy/h after 3 months)

Cumulative Dose at Iitate Village Office and Magata

Natural Background

annual dose
mSv/year

Iitate

Few people In few areas ~100

VERY HIGH

Katsurao, Namie, Minami-Soma, Iitate Naraha, Iwaki

Many people In many areas ~ 10

TYPICALLY HIGH

Majority of people around the world ~ 2.4

AVERAGE

~1

MINIMUM
54

Chernobyl drama: thyroid

55

56

Chernobyl Thyroid doses

Average 300 mSv? Higher 10 000 mSv?, Or more?

57

Thyroid cancer in Chernobyl

Children received substantial thyroid doses due to the consumption of contaminated milk.

In total, about 7000 thyroid cancer cases were detected.

More than 99% of cases were successfully treated, but fifteen died.
58
58

Thyroid dose bands (mSv)

More affected locations of Fukushima prefecture

(examples, committed dose from the first 4 months only)

Namie: 10-100 adults and 10y; 100-200 1y; Katsurao, Minami-Soma, Naraha: 10-100 all ages Iwaki: 1-10 adults; 10-100 for 10y and 1y

Rest of Fukushima prefecture (less affected): 1-10 adults; 10-100 for 10y and 1 y Neighbouring Japanese prefectures: 1-10
59

Calculated rain intensity (shaded area) and I-131 air concentration accumulated in vertical air column (red contours)]
The Universal Time Constant (UTC) is presented at the top (Japanese Standard Time: + 9 hours).
60

Nuclear safety

61

Prevention

Prevention of accidents cannot be solely based on deterministic dogmas:

maximum credible accidents, design basis accident, etc.

Rather, prevention should be supported by wide quantitative criteria, within a probabilistic context, a priori of design and operation.
62

Quantitative standards for siting and design

The big lesson

The

big lesson of Fukushima is to

confirm that mitigation may be even more important than prevention.

Why?

64

.because Fukushima confirmed:

the dominance of the implausible & unpredictable over the unlikely but foreseeable.

Nuclear safety experts might be

ignoring a priori the possibility of unpredictable causes of accidents, concentrating on what they already know,

and then

struggling to intellectualize, a posteriori, the factual occurrence of no-prevented causes.

66

Mitigation!

It should be accepted that - however robust the prevention is there is always the possibility of implausible unpreventable eventsand in our view,

mitigation should therefore became paramount for nuclear safety

67

What mitigation means

1. Containing radioactivity to reduce releases

2. Protecting people to reduce doses

68

Inadequate contention

Protecting people: Shared Objetives

1. To regain control of the situation; 2. To render first aid and treatment of injuries; 3. To prevent deterministic effects; 4. To limit stochastic effects; 5. To resume normal social and economic activity.
70

Relevant lessons being learned

72

Misuse of nominal risk coefficients

September 11-12, 2011

Modeling

Collective doses Discharges

Collective Dose x Nominal Risk Coefficient = Nominal Deaths

X 5%/Sv

75

Chernobyl:
Consequences of the Catastrophe for People and the Environment Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences
Alexey V. Yablokov (Editor), Vassily B. Nesterenko (Editor), Alexey V. Nesterenko (Editor), Janette D. Sherman-Nevinger (Editor)

It concludes that based on records now available, some 985,000 people died of cancer caused by the Chernobyl accident!
76

77

Will I be one of the 500,000?

78

79

Misuse of the fundamental safety principles

80

 Justification of Actions Optimization of Protection and Safety Individual Dose Limitation

Justification

September 11-12, 2011

Justification

Good > bad

Is evacuation justified?

Ramsar, Iran
If some of the evacuation in Fukushima is justified, why is not justified to evacuate some of the inhabitants of this city?

Optimization

September 11-12, 2011

Optimization

Best under the prevailing circumstances

Harm

Radiation harm

Social harm

Radiation harm + Social harm

Optimal

safety
88

Individual Dose Limitation

What is the maximum tolerable level of individual risk regardless of justification and optimization?

September 11-12, 2011

Planned exposure situation

Expected additional dose

Dose limit ()

Natural background radiation Activity introduced

21 March, 2012 90 90

mSv in a year

Dose Limit Dose constraint

Restrictions on the additional individual doses attributable to regulated practices

(additional annual dose)
0.01

Regulatory exemption

91

Extant Sources

September 11-12, 2011

Extant radiation source in the aftermath

(Emergency or existing exposure situation)

Avertable dose Extant dose

21 March, 2012

Residual dose

Reference level

93 93

100

NO INDIVIDUAL/SOCIETAL BENEFIT ABOVE THIS

20
Simplified summary of individual dose restrictions
(in mSv in a year)

DIRECT OR INDIRECT BENEFIT TO THE INDIVIDUAL

SOCIETAL, BUT NO INDIVIDUAL DIRECT BENEFIT

0.01

Exclusion, exemption, clearance

94

A typical question from the Japanese public is: Why doses of 20 to 100 mSv per year are allowed now, after the accident, when doses greater than 1 mSv per year were unacceptable before the accident? The Japanese expression for the 1mSv/y dose limit,

, [= beam,= amount,=border,=time]
is unequivocal: dose amount not to be exceeded in the time.

B A C K G R O U N D S P E E D

Protection of children
Parents do not believe that children are adequately protected by the radiation protection standards

The protection of children from the consequences of the accident has been of particular concern in Japan

98

Detriment-adjusted nominal risk coefficients

for stochastic effects after exposure to radiation at low dose rate

[% Sv-1] Nominal Population Cancer & leukmia Hereditable

Total

Whole Adult

5.5 4.1

0.2 0.1

5.7 30% 4.2

Rounded value used in RP standards~5%Sv-1

99

"Contamination"
Connotations that:

worsened the lives of residents, generated anxiety, and ruined the economy.
100

VILNIUS ORSHA
Molodechno Borisov Lida Novogrudok
Gorki
Dn

ep

SMOLENSK
Aleksin

R
zh So

S
Roslavl

I
Kirov

A
Lyudinovo

KALUGA

ka

TULA

Novomoskovsk
Kimovsk

MINSK
Be re z in a

MOGILEV
Bykhov Cherikov
Krichev

Plavsk Dyatlovo Bolkhov Mtsensk

Ok

R
Slutsk

Baranovichi

Bobruysk

BRYANSK
D es na

Efremov Yelets

Soligorsk

OREL

GOMEL
Dn ep r-B al ug ski C anPinsk

Novozybkov

Sosna

Pr i p y a t

Mozyr Khoyniki Bragin

Shostka

Pr i p y a t
d

Narovlya Sarny
G o ryn

KURSK
S ey m
O sk ol

kho

St o

CHERNIGOV
Ovruch Polesskoje Chernobyl Narodichi
Pripyat

Slavutich

Korosten Novograd Volynskiy

re

De

sna

SUMY
P sel

ROVNO

Te

te

BELGOROD

KIEV

ZHITOMIR
Berdichev Ternopol Khmelnitskiy VINNITSA Belaya Tserkov
R os ka
Dn

U
ep

Vo r s k l a

KHARKOV

POLTAVA

1480-3700 kBq m-2 555-1480 kBq m-2 185-555 kBq m-2 37-185 kBq m-2 <37 kBq m-2

CHERKASSY

Contamination in consumer products

The international intergovernmental agreements on acceptable levels of radioactivity in consumer products are incoherent and inconsistent. The situation created serious problems in Japan.

102

Foodstuff

Water

Non edible

Incoherence in drinking liquids

+ +

= 10 Bq/l for 137Cs

= 1000 Bq/l for 137Cs

106

Incoherence in non-edible vs. edible

= 1000 Bq/kg for 137Cs

= 100 Bq/kg for 137Cs

107

Guidance values in Japan

108

New radiation limits for food in Japan

On 22 December 2011 the Japanese government announced new limits for cesium in food. (The new norms would be enforced in April 2012). Rice, meat, vegetables, fish: 100 Bq/Kg (500 Bq/Kg), Milk, milk-powder, infant-food: 50 Bq/Kg (200 Bq/Kg) Drinking water10 Bq/Kg (200 Bq/Kg)

111

Stigma
Those affected by the accident suffer from stigma due to their association with radiation and radioactivity. Consequently, they also suffer from psychological effects harmful to health,

112

For many there is a social stigma associated with being an "exposed person"

Stigma is responsible for anxiety and psychological trauma on people

Sterility
(People sincerely believe that school girls in Fukushima will not be able to have a baby in future!)

Would we be able to have a baby?

115
115

Pregnancy
Should I terminate my pregnancy?

Stigma is responsible for great apprehension among pregnant women and probably for unnecessary terminations of pregnancies.
116
116

4. The Argentine approach

117

Atucha NPP

Atucha II
745 MW(e)

Atucha I
357 MW(e) Operates since 19th March 1974

Embalse NPP
648 MW(e)
operates since April 25th 1983

119

Stress tests

http://www.foroiberam.org

Results: are being cross checked until May, and will be jointly reviewed in June 2012.

Siting: common sense

123

Prevention
Probabilistic criteria. Not academic, but regulatory!

Some of Atuchas prevention strengths

Diverse and independent shout down systems

(control roads and injection of neutron poisons).

Unique on-line leak-before-break-system (tritium) Greater volume of coolant per unit power. Supplementary heat sink: Moderator at low T. Greater thermal inertia. Gentler plant response Longer time for recovery actions.
125

(High pressure injection system to mitigate hypothetic piping breaks is not required: water in the moderator expands and diverts to the core through the upper plenum. )

Containment

126

Natural uranium fuel: Impossibility of criticality accidents Less energy per unit mass (MW/ton)
PHWR PWR 14 70 12 10 8 6 4 1 0 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

(MW/ton)
127

Emergency response
The American Nuclear Society concluded that the severity of the Fukushima Daiichi accident was exacerbated by an unclear chain of command.

128

Emergency response in Argentina

In Argentina, a centralized and unique conduction is established by law ARN

Submission to ARN: Licensee, Civil Protection & Defence, Gendarmerie, Police, local governments.

Permanent coaching of the involved organizations and verification of the response capacity: drills with the participation of the population.
129

5. Epilogue

 Many lessons can be extracted from the Fukushima accident experience.

We have the ethical duty of learning from these lessons and feeding-back the results into the international system.

Fukushima is reassuring, because in spite of the amazing scenario of deficiencies, as far as we know, no one has so far received a lethal dose of radiation!

But reassurance should not be misunderstood as complacency

132

Reflections

The nuclear community, namely

governmental agencies, regulators and industry,

should learn, understand and apply the concrete lessons on safety deficiencies derived from Fukushima.
133

Is the international nuclear community prepared to identify the NPPs that do not comply with elementary safety requirements for

siting, emergency energy supply, and, fundamentally, containment?

134

Generic stress tests or action plans are not really needed to identify such NPPs.

E.g., NPPs that do not have efficient containment, or even no containment at all, are well known: they shall shut down!
135

"Plus a change, plus cest pareil The more it changes, the more it's the same thing

J.B.A. Karr

Av. del Libertador 8250 Buenos Aires Argentina

Thank you!

+541163231758

www.arn.gob.ar

137

Containment?

1250 MW(e) - Start up: 1988 Closure date: 2023 (?)