Joint-Stock Company of Open Type

Atomenergoproekt

New Approaches to Prevention and Mitigation of Severe Accidents in the Light of Fukushima-1 NPP Events

Russian Approach to Identification of Ways of Modern NPP Design Upgrading with Consideration of Fukushima Events

Main solutions to ensure nuclear, radiation and environmental safety of nuclear power facilities are based on national regulations supported by IAEA, ICRP recommendations, as well as design, construction and operation experience of civil nuclear power facilities built as per Russian designs. Russian National regulations are being updated as per the State regulatory procedure with consideration of plant operation events both in Russia and internationally, e.g. Three Mile Island, Chernobyl and Fukushima accidents.

VVER Technological Features

The core composed of hexagonal cassettes;

Horizontal steam generators; Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) of forged core barrels without longitudinal joints; Transportability of the main equipment by railroad; No penetrations in the reactor bottom; Location of fuel pond inside the containment; Reactor pressure vessel (RPV) of carbon alloyed steel; SG tubes of carbon steel with a relatively thick wall

Advantages of VVER Specific features of VVER reactor plants are high level of inherent protection implemented in the design bases of systems and equipment in all VVER designs : Large primary coolant inventory (reactor coolant circuit (RCC) & pressurizer (PRZ) with respect to fuel mass and core heat capacity; Large water inventory in horizontal steam generators via secondary circuit; Actuation of control rods to scram the reactor by gravitation forces; Inherent restriction of core energy release by negative reactivity coefficients; Using of passive components, isolation, restricting and discharge devices; Using inertia coastdown of reactor coolant pump (RCP) special flywheel masses to ensure the required decrease of flowrate through the core during blackout.
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Extreme External Impacts

1. Examples of external impacts:

earthquake, flooding; storm, tornado; airplane crash.

2. Extreme impact with intensity above the design-basis causing multiple equipment damage and failures

Extreme impacts may cause beyondthe-design-basis initiating events including a BLACKOUT

Initiating Events and Failures at Fukushima NPP

Seismic impact with a magnitude above 8 points on MSK scale; Loss of normal and emergency (Diesel-generators) power supply
(black-out);

Tsunami and resultant failure of ultimate heat sink (seawater); Hydrogen generation due to steam-zirconium reaction, hydrogen
release into the reactor building and its damage due to hydrogen explosion;

Reactor building foundation damage and activity release into the

environment

VVER-TOI Seismic Stability

Systems and components are to be designed for seismic impacts:

Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) 0.25g maximum horizontal ground acceleration (8 points on MSK-64 scale); Operation Basis Earthquake (OBE) 0.12g maximum horizontal ground acceleration (7 points on MSK-64 scale); VVER TOI withstand an earthquake with 40% margin by maximum horizontal ground acceleration during Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) (this impact is considered as a beyond-the-design-basis impact). In order to build NPP at sites with higher seismicity, it is possible to design a plant for Safe Shutdown Earthquake (SSE) level 0.41g (9 points on MSK-64 scale) without considerable modification of layout solutions.

VVER TOI Safety Analysis for Fukushima Accident Conditions 1. Seismic impact

According to the Russian Federation (-97) seismic zoning map, the

anticipated VVER-TOI sites has the maximum earthquake magnitude of 7 points once in 10,000 years. Therefore, in VVER-I design the safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) level is assumed as 8 points on MSK-64 scale. This value is used for design of all safety systems, as well as equipment, valves and pipeline of normal operation systems, important to safety, involved in safety function performance. Also, VVER TOI plants are to be proven for seismic impact beyond safe shutdown earthquake (SSE) by 40%, with realistic (non-conservative) approaches (EPRI NP6041 recommendations). During this impact no activity release is allowed. Possibility of further commercial using of NPP may be lost.

VVER TOI Safety Analysis for Fukushima Accident Conditions

2. Blackout (without primary circuit accident)

During station blackout, the reactor core residual heat is removed by the
passive heat removal system (PHRS) for a long time. After 15-20 days, operator interference is required to fully open the passive heat removal system (PHRS) controller in order to use hydro accumulator-2 (HA-2) inventory

Heat from the spent fuel in fuel pond is removed by water boiling. Fuel pond
(FP) water inventory is sufficient for 10 days in case of regular refueling. Subsequent fuel pond (FP) makeup for 10 days during regular unloading is possible from 2nd stage hydro accumulators (HA) located on the maintenance platform inside the containment

Rate of containment pressure rise due to fuel pond boiling is such that
approximately after 1015 days the pressure will reach the design containment pressure. Further measures are required to limit the pressure rise.

VVER TOI Safety Analysis for Fukushima Accident Conditions

3. Ultimate heat sink failure
Reactor core residual heat is removed by passive heat removal system (PHRS) with atmospheric air-cooled heat exchangers. Thus, system operation does not depend on other heat sinks, e.g. service water, seawater, cooling pond water, etc.

The heat exchangers are located at a height of around 40m and protected by civil structures. Thus, their failure due to flooding or other natural or man-induced impacts (hurricanes, tornadoes, air shock waves resulting from on-site or nearby explosions, airplane crash, etc.) is ruled out.
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VVER TOI Safety Analysis for Fukushima Accident Conditions

4. Hydrogen release inside the containment and its damage by hydrogen explosion

Reactor building in VVER TOI design consists of two containment shells: 1) primary
pre-stressed concrete containment designed for 0.4 P (gage) internal pressure with 1.5 reliability factor and inner sealed steel liner; 2) secondary reinforced concrete containment designed to withstand man-induced and natural impacts

Passive hydrogen recombiners are arranged inside the primary containment. They
prevent hydrogen concentration rise to hazardous limits in all accident modes including beyond-the-design basis conditions

Thus, both hydrogen explosion and reactor building

damage are excluded. Therefore, possibility of a beyond-the-regulation release of activity products into the environment is ruled out. Additional protection against activity release into the environment is ensured by annulus underpressure with the help of active and passive (annulus passive filtration) systems

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VVER TOI Safety Analysis for Fukushima Accident Conditions

5. Reactor building raft damage and activity release into the environment VVER TOI design includes a core catcher on the containment bottom for molten core isolation and cooling in case of hypothetic accident, which may cause reactor core damage

Core catcher keeps the containment integrity and thus excludes activity release into the environment even in case of hypothetical severe accidents

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Main Safety Features

Passive safety features in VVER TOI design
Passive annulus filtration system System of 2nd-stage hydro accumulators

Inner containment

Outer containment

System of 1st-stage hydro accumulators Annulus

Passive heat removal system from the steam generator

Pressurizer Steam generator Reactor

RCP

Primary circuit

Corium catcher

Active emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

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VVER-TOI Safety Assessment Under More Severe Than Fukushima Conditions

Blackout with primary (Large Break, Loss-Of-Coolant Accident) LB LOCA
Under this accident conditions, reactor core residual heat is removed by combined operation of passive heat removal system (PHRS) and 2nd stage hydro accumulators. Self-sufficiency (no core damage) of VVER TOI in this mode depends on water inventory in 2nd stage hydro accumulators. Water inventory in the fuel pond ensures self-sufficiency in case of any leak rate for at least 72 hours. Fuel pond (FP) is connected with hydroaccumulator-2 (HA-2) pipeline. After hydroaccumulator-2 (HA-2) and fuel pond (FP) water inventory is over, and if normal or emergency power supply is not recovered, reactor and fuel pond makeup may be needed with the help of pumps fed from mobile air-cooled diesel-generator (water as diesel generator (DG) coolant may not be available).
Corium catcher

Passive annulus filtration system Inner containment Outer containment

System of 2nd-stage hydro accumulators

System of 1st-stage hydro accumulators

Annulus
Passive heat removal system from the steam generator Pressurize r Reacto r Steam generator

RC P

Primary circuit

Active emergency core cooling system (ECCS)

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Power Plant Robustness to Blackout

Reactor plant robustness to BLACKOUT depends on availability of passive safety systems to perform all main safety functions. Analysis of blackout conditions including coincidence with primary loss-of-coolant-accident (LOCA) inside the containment has demonstrated: if passive safety systems perform their functions the reactor plant is maintained in a safe state for 24 h. This time can be extended up to 72 h. Reactor heat is removed to the ultimate heat sink by Passive Heat Removal System (PHRS).

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Conclusions and Further Steps in VVER TOI Safety Analysis

VVER-TOI design includes full complex of design features, which 1) ensures NPP safety; 2) exclude a beyond-the-regulation activity release into the environment in case of external (natural and man-induced) impacts combined with internal initiating events and additional failures.

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Conclusions and Further Steps in VVER TOI Safety Analysis

To enhance plant stability to low probable hypothetical events and self-sufficiency during beyond-the-design-basis (BDBA) accidents it is proposed to ensure:
Spent fuel pond heat removal and prevention of long-term containment pressure rise; Long-term reactor makeup when primary circuit is leaktight and during primary loss-of-coolant accidents (LOCA); Safety and other plant parameters monitoring.

The proposed measures include installation of additional equipment such as mobile diesel-generators with heat removal only to atmosphere.
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Design Improvements Based on Fukushima Lessons

Fukushima plants demonstrated their design survivability under combined external impacts; however, the design did not envisage safety functions recovery. Fukushima lessons:

Combine active and passive safety systems

Ensure safety functions performance at different accident stages (redundant power supply sources with guaranteed connection, long-term stable functioning of passive safety systems);

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Design Improvements Based on Fukushima Lessons

Ensure safety systems self-sufficiency and diversity, protection against dependent failures under extreme conditions, common-cause; Ensure NPP accessibility for emergency services during accidents and disasters; Ensure the possibility of replenishment of media and energy sources in case of destruction and blockage (by air inclusive); Develop within the INSAG group recommendations to enhance operational stability and safety of water-cooled reactors, based on proposals made at this conference.

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VVER Design Developments in JSC Atomenergoproekt

NVNPP Unit 5

Small series

Government Order No 1026 of 28.12.92 and within the Environmentally Cleary Energy National Program

Kudankulam NPP

Belene NPP

Novovoronezh-2 NPP

VVER-TOI NPP

U- 87 (V-320)
3 trains of active safety systems; single-shell containment; emergency heat removal via secondary circuit is limited in time by water inventory in chemically demineralized water tanks; core damage after 2-3 hours in case of active safety systems failure

AES-92
4 trains of active safety systems; passive safety systems for all critical safety functions (CSF); double-shell containment with controlled annulus; emergency heat removal via secondary circuit is not limited in time both in active and passive mode; long-term (no less than 24 h) ability to prevent damage to fuel above the limits established for design-basis accidents; a certificate in compliance with the EUR requirements has been documented

AES-2006
2 trains of active internally
redundant safety systems; passive safety systems for all critical safety functions (CSF); double-shell containment with controlled annulus; emergency heat removal via secondary circuit is not limited in time both in active and passive mode; long-term (no less than 24 h) ability to prevent damage to fuel above the limits established for design-basis accidents under SBO conditions and without operator intervention; performing, jointly with the EUR club, an analysis of the project for compliance with the EUR requirements

AES VVER-I
2 trains of active safety systems; passive safety systems for all critical safety functions (CSF); double-shell containment controlled annulus; with

emergency heat removal via secondary circuit is not limited in time both in active and passive mode; the power unit has enhanced resistance to extreme external impacts; long-term (no less than 72 h) ability to prevent damage to fuel above the limits established for design-basis accidents under SBO conditions and without operator intervention; performing, jointly with the EUR club, an analysis of the project for compliance with the EUR requirements

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Joint-Stock Company of Open Type

Atomenergoproekt
Thank You for Your Attention!

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