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and What-If Worksheets

A worksheet (data base spreadsheet) form is used to collect and collate the process hazard analysis review data. A computer software generated spreadsheet is typically used. For a complete description of commercially available HAZOP or What-If software, the user should refer to the manufacturers HAZOP or What- If software User Although pre-printed forms may be Instructions. used, they are highly inefficient and should be maintained only as a backup in case of computer hardware or software failures. The worksheet is organized with identification data at the top of the page, followed with columns for the review discussions and notes. The columns are usually organized from left to right with the sequence of the review information that is gathered and analyzed. In this respect the deviations are written on the left, causes and consequences in the middle and safeguards, possible recommendations and comments and remarks at the right. Examples of suggested HAZOP and What-If worksheets are given in Tables 11 and 12 respectively. 8.1 HAZOP Worksheet For a typical HAZOP worksheet the columns are identified a description of the contents is given: by the following titles and

Guideword (GW): Simple word or phrase used to generate deviations by application on a system or process activities (e.g. pressure, level, level, temp, etc.). Deviation: less, etc.). Causes: A departure from the design and operating intention (e.g. high, low, more,

Reasons that deviations

occur (failures, wrong operation,


Consequences: The effects of a deviation resulting from various causes (fire, explosion, process upset, etc.). Safeguards: surveillance, Measures taken to prevent or mitigate instrumentation, ESD, blowdown, etc.). the risk of accidents (operator

Severity: The magnitude of physical or intangible loss consequences of consequences compared to industry experience).

(qualitative measure





Likelihood: A measure of the expected frequency of an events occurrence measure of probability based on historical data or theoretical estimate).


Ranking: The qualitative estimation of risk from severity and likelihood levels, in order to provide a prioritizing of risk based its magnitude (refer to corporate risk matrix for ranking based on severity and likelihood levels). Recommendations: Activities identified which may reduce a risk through the lowering of a probability or consequence levels (suggested safety improvement to a process to reduce risk level). Comments: (supplemental Technical information notes of the facility, system, about the issue being discussed). related to the review (project or process under study

Other information Remarks: pending studies, etc.).


related data,









Table 11 Suggested HAZOP Worksheet


HAZOP Company: Facility: S.arlcn: 2 03-30-93 Nod.: I V-116 Permeter: Flou Revfriar: 0 INLET SEPARATOR INEW Int.ntionrT450 Dug& 50151-01-016
Node: 1 Page: 1

_--__.._______. .+CAUSES ..---.-.__.___. v - 301



SAFESUARDS I CONSECUEWCES 1 .+-------.---.----..+...-.---.-..--.-.__._.._. 0 rlgnlficmt onsequcncc this ode - posrlbl. recess qmct ptrem

tEClMMENOAllCUS 1 REMARKS .----~--~~.~~~.~+__.~~~_~~__~___-__. M conwrnt NOTE: derlgneted V-116 as an inlet reperator with no rlug catching rcquiremntr; refer to ninutr fran February project revieu ieeetin!g CUWENTS i --.--.---_.__-_______+

ug voluw needs to k tenabed for rlrlna


Figure 1 Sample HAZOP Worksheet

.l..s. to flare pstrem of the sv N-34 llfuvxlon IOU releaser to lore. including ,ecycl. frun :arprerror8 Ntelt check rive dour&rem If ESV to prevent eck flow of Ba. roe the :onprerrorr with Block valve end m-inch bypesr lor starting and xrrglng OTE: Check alv. ad ona nch byparr nrtelted; refer 0 revired PUO I.V. n

tcycle on conprerror
111 opw - *yltan )t rhut dan Ml1


cv - 34
eft open 0 flow from pstrem nod.

Flow relerres f lar. No rignlflcmt node


perrtor training


and What-If

Q Flow ter Out>

In. pLUBg.d i.e., nirt ped 01 lepacr)

Syota Boer Into recycle; PIC-SO rtleaeea rpstrem flw to flare; pressure bull&q in verrsel


In8t~lllng PSV101 directly on ver8.1 Btock vatv. to k installed *tree4 ~IBI donstrem of PR for servlclng

10TE: PSV-401 Inatelled; refer to revised PRID Rev. B ROTE: Block valve Installed; refer to revised PRIO Rev. B

sv-401 located on Iln. nd will not relieve if (no p1~g.d out of easel


IO Floe :Llquid jut)

.cv- 150 Mlflnctlon ._.___.._______

Porafbl. high Level and carryover to ldounstream node i~~~-~-_---_~~-~_

.AN-150, LANN-151 .ocal LG-50 with operet wrveillance ..~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~_.~~~

Confllm SD phi lo.MW

NOTE: Nigh-high level in V-116 411 close 50-30 only;

.AtlH-151 (Level Switch iigh) activates SD on xqwessors


__- - ___________. . _

56 8.2

Application of HAZOP What-If Worksheet For a typical What-If worksheet the columns are identified description of their contents is given: by the following titles and a

What If: What-If questions scenarios that prompts process hazard analysis concerns. Hazard: Characteristic, (physical or other) that has the potential for causing harm to people, property, the environment, or continued business operation. Consequences: Safeguards: Severity: Likelihood: The effects of a deviation resulting from various cases. Measures taken to prevent or mitigate the risks of accidents. The magnitude of physical or intangible loss consequences. of an events occurrence. levels in order

A measure of the expected frequency

Ranking: The qualitative estimation of risk from severity and likelihood to provide a prioritizing of risk based on its magnitude.

Recommendations: Activities identified which may reduce a risk through the lowering of probability or consequence levels. Comments: Remarks: Technical notes of the facility, sys:em, or process under study. related to the review.

Other information








Table 12 Suggested What-If Worksheet Arrangement



Facility: session: 1 08-10-93 Revision: 0 08-10-93 System: 2 tlycol Indirect Heater and utilities UHAT IF... HAZARD Dug): 81C-It-02 SAFEWARDS RECablENDATlONS


system: 2 Page: 1



Lou pressure gas line .oss of fuel for heater 'otslshutdoun md lnstrunent gas pLugg=J. IUPPLY Loss of fwl gss to lter. @Irate formation blugging line

S afe,

fail ESD occurs mtall TSL on H-l Itletend camon an beacon

Werprcssure upstream Local 11 iystem PWs on the System 'ossiblee@poent

SilWS 1 SL

LOSS of fuel gas to :alyticheater.

.ou a&lent tenp in uilding

initiates ESD

ndiract firs i eater should FIrovideheat 4iource Loss of instrwnt A system. Liquid build up In el gas system. Liquid deep of V-2 ils closed.

iemeas I1

above System shutdom bock L

'lugged instrments

cut drus V-2

xstsll desiccant ryer on instrunent BS (disposable type)

Plug@ instrments, liquid in system

System shutdowc


level gauge shutoff and nclude in operation soUs

IWhanical IPeriodical Inaintmance

ESD system fails to Failure of safety devices due to pluggin operate ard corrosion Liquid duq~ of V-2 ils open. Tenperature ntroller fails. No significant hazard Possible loss of glyco frm system from boil over


Tube is exposed. 1SH on V-l Possible tube failure TSH on H-l Local TI LSL

Possible high teep in scrubber V-l Flame arrestor .ugs.

May exceed design tq 3 TSH on V-l Equipment dsmsge Local TI Air intake designed 3 feet above grou-d lace in opsrator onus1 squiraments for

Insufficient ccotustic Loss of hestcr equipnent shutdom, air possible equipment







worksheet should be provided with an identification and a means to correlate it to the node and design conditions it was evaluated against. Locations for date, location, node identification or description, and design parameters should be drawing reference, noted on each worksheet.