Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential

CITIZENS UNITED: CASE CITATIONS & SUMMARIES

1. Lebron v. National Railroad Passenger Corporation, 513 U.S. 374, 379, 115 S. Ct. 961, 130 L. Ed. 2d 902 Synoposis - Lebron v. Amtrak is a civil suit in which Michael Lebron charged Amtrak with violating his First and Fifth Amendment rights by refusing to display his political artwork at New Yorks Penn Station. 2. First Nat. Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 778, n. 14, 98 S. Ct. 1407, 55 L. Ed. 2d 707 Synopsis - A case in which the United States Supreme Court ruled 5-4 that corporations had a First Amendment right to make contributions in order to attempt to influence political processes. 3. Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., 556 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2252, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1208, distinguished. Pp. ____ - ____, 175 L. Ed. 2d, at 793-796 (2009) Synopsis - Amid reports of a recent "explosion" in campaign spending on state elections for judges, the Supreme Court explores how far the Constitution goes to set controls on judges who have taken hefty donations. The issue of when due process requires disqualification of such a judge is at the heart of the case 4. Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391, 46 S. Ct. 126, 70 L. Ed. 322 (1926). Synopsis - Whether, by reason of vagueness and uncertainty, a recent enactment of New Jersey, 4, R.S.N.J. 1937, 2:136-4, c. 155, Laws 1934, is repugnant to the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 5. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 867, 117 S. Ct. 2329, 138 L. Ed. 2d 874 (1997). Synopsis A case in which all nine Justices of the Court voted to strike down antiindecency provisions of the Communications Decency Act (the CDA), finding they violated the freedom of speech provisions of the First Amendment. This was the first major Supreme Court ruling regarding the regulation of materials distributed via Internet. 6. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 639, 114 S. Ct. 2445, 129 L. Ed. 2d 497 (1994). Synopsis - In 1992, Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992. Sections 4 and 5 of this Act required cable systems to allocate a percentage of their channels to local public broadcast stations, the must-carry rules. The Court held that the must-carry provisions were content neutral, thus not a violation of the First Amendment. The rules were not determined by the programming content, but by broadcast method. The rules promote fair competition in television programming.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 7. Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 403, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 168 L. Ed. 2d 290 (2007). Synopsis - a school speech case in which the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment does not prevent educators from suppressing student speech, at a school-supervised event, that is reasonably viewed as promoting illegal drug use. 8. United States v. Treasury Employees, 513 U.S. 454, 477-478, 115 S. Ct. 1003, 130 L. Ed. 2d 964 (1995) Synopsis - By law, government employees may not receive monies for making appearances, giving speeches, or writing books or articles, no matter if the subject matter is completely unrelated to the employee's official duties. The National Treasury Employees Union filed suit challenging this ban as an unconstitutional abridgement of the First Amendment's freedom of speech protection. 10. Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 450, 128 S. Ct. 1184, 170 L. Ed. 2d 151 (2008) (quoting Sabri v. United States, 541 U.S. 600, 609, 124 S. Ct. 1941, 158 L. Ed. 2d 891 (2004)) Synopsis - The Supreme Court held that the State of Washingtons primary election system does not on its face violate political parties right of free association under the First Amendment of the United States Constitution. The case dealt solely with the constitutionality of the primary structure and does not concern campaign finance or political contributions. 11. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 546 U.S. 410, 411-412, 126 S. Ct. 1016, 163 L. Ed. 2d 990 (2006) Synopsis - The District Court had dismissed an "as-applied" challenge to the prohibition of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 against the funding of "electioneering communications" from the general treasury funds of corporations, finding such challenges foreclosed by the Supreme Court's decision in McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93 (2003). The Supreme Court vacated, ruling that "as-applied" challenges to this provision had not been foreclosed by McConnell, and that the District Court had instead incorrectly interpreted a footnote from that case. 12. Southern Pacific Terminal Co. v. ICC, 219 U.S. 498, 515, 31 S. Ct. 279, 55 L. Ed. 310 (1911) Synopsis - Decision that held that while normally, in order for the court to hear a case, there must still be a controversy outstanding, when the issue was such that it would be of short duration, and would most likely become moot before appellate review could take place, and that the issue was likely to reoccur, then the court could hear the issue. 13. Near v. Minnesota ex rel. Olson, 283 U.S. 697, 712-713, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931) Synopsis - recognized the freedom of the press by roundly rejecting prior restraints on publication, a principle that was applied to free speech generally in subsequent jurisprudence. The Court ruled that a Minnesota law that targeted publishers of "malicious" or "scandalous" newspapers violated the First Amendment to the United States Constitution (as applied through the Fourteenth Amendment).

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 14. Thomas v. Chicago Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 320, 122 S. Ct. 775, 151 L. Ed. 2d 783 (2002) Synopsis Case concerned whether a municipal park ordinance requiring individuals to obtain a permit before conducting large-scale events must, consistent with the First Amendment, contain certain procedural safeguards. Court held that the First Amendment free speech guarantee does not require the Park District to initiate litigation every time the agency denied a permit for an event or specify a deadline for judicial review of a challenge to the denial of a permit. *15. Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451-452, 58 S. Ct. 666, 82 L. Ed. 949 (1938) Synopsis - This case was remarkable in its discussion of the requirement of persons to seek government sanction to distribute religious material. In this particular case, the Supreme Court ruled it was not constitutional for a city to require such sanction. 16. Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 57-58, 85 S. Ct. 734, 13 L. Ed. 2d 649 (1965) Synopsis - ended government-operated rating boards with a decision that a rating board could only approve a film and had no power to ban a film. The ruling also concluded that a rating board must either approve a film within a reasonable time, or go to court to stop a film from being shown in theatres. 17. Virginia v. Hicks, 539 U.S. 113, 119, 123 S. Ct. 2191, 156 L. Ed. 2d 148 (2003) Synopsis - Court held that the RRHA's trespass policy is not facially invalid under the First Amendment's overbreadth doctrine. Noting that he was not in Whitcomb Court to engage in constitutionally protected speech, the Court reasoned that Hicks had not shown that the RRHA policy prohibited a substantial amount of protected speech in relation to its many legitimate applications. Justice Scalia wrote, "both the notice-barment rule and the 'legitimate business or social purpose' rule apply to all persons who enter the streets of Whitcomb Court, not just to those who seek to engage in expression." 18. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 97-98, 60 S. Ct. 736, 84 L. Ed. 1093 (1940) Synopsis - Byron Thornhill joined a picket line that was protesting against his former employer. Section 3448 of Alabama state law made it an offense to picket. Pursuant to the law, Thornhill was arrested and fined $100. The Court held that labor relations were "not matters of mere local or private concern," and that free discussion concerning labor conditions and industrial disputes was "indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society." 19. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc. of N. Y., Inc. v. Village of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 153, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 153 L. Ed. 2d 205 (2002) Synopsis - The Watchtower Bible and Tract Society of New York, Inc., a congregation of Jehovah's Witnesses that publish and distribute religious materials, brought an action for injunctive relief, alleging that the ordinance violates their First Amendment rights to the free exercise of religion, free speech, and freedom of the press. The Court held that the ordinance's provisions making it a misdemeanor to engage in door-to-door advocacy without first registering with the mayor and receiving a permit violate the First

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential Amendment as it applies to religious proselytizing, anonymous political speech, and the distribution of handbills. 20. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N. Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 108, 123, 112 S. Ct. 501, 116 L. Ed. 2d 476 (1991) Synopsis - To keep criminals from profiting from crimes by selling their stories, New York State's 1977 "Son of Sam" law ordered that proceeds from such deals be turned over to the New York State Crime Victims Board. The Board was to deposit the money into escrow accounts which victims could later claim through civil suits. The Court concluded that "New York has singled out speech on a particular subject for a financial burden that it places on no other speech and no other income." This discrimination could only be justified if the state could show "that its regulation is necessary to serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn to achieve that end" 21. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., at 267, 84 S. Ct. 710, 11 L. Ed. 2d 686 Synopsis - This case concerns a full-page ad in the New York Times which alleged that the arrest of the Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr. for perjury in Alabama was part of a campaign to destroy King's efforts to integrate public facilities and encourage blacks to vote. The Court held that the First Amendment protects the publication of all statements, even false ones, about the conduct of public officials except when statements are made with actual malice. 22. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 445, 89 S. Ct. 1827, 23 L. Ed. 2d 430 (1969) Synopsis - Brandenburg, a leader in the Ku Klux Klan, made a speech at a Klan rally and was later convicted under an Ohio criminal syndicalism law. The Court used a twopronged test to evaluate speech acts: (1) speech can be prohibited if it is "directed at inciting or producing imminent lawless action" and (2) it is "likely to incite or produce such action." The criminal syndicalism act made illegal the advocacy and teaching of doctrines while ignoring whether or not that advocacy and teaching would actually incite imminent lawless action. The failure to make this distinction rendered the law overly broad and in violation of the Constitution. 23. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 19, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed. 2d 659 (1976) Synopsis - In the wake of the Watergate affair, Congress attempted to ferret out corruption in political campaigns by restricting financial contributions to candidates. Among other things, the law set limits on the amount of money an individual could contribute to a single campaign and it required reporting of contributions above a certain threshold amount. The Federal Election Commission was created to enforce the statute. 24. Eu v. San Francisco County Democratic Central Comm., 489 U.S. 214, 223, 109 S.Ct. 1013, 103 L. Ed. 2d 271 (1989) (quoting Monitor Patriot Co. v. Roy, 401 U.S. 265, 272, 91 S. Ct. 621, 28L. Ed. 2d 35 (1971)) Synopsis - Section 11702 of the California Elections Code (Code) forbids the official governing bodies of political parties to endorse or oppose candidates in primary elections, while 29430 makes it a misdemeanor for any candidate in a primary to claim official party endorsement. The challenged California election laws are invalid, since they burden

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential the First Amendment rights of political parties and their members without serving a compelling state interest. 25. United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813, 120 S. Ct. 1878, 146 L. Ed. 2d 865 (2000) Synopsis - the United States Supreme Court struck down a portion of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) which required that cable television operators who offered channels "primarily dedicated to sexually-oriented programming" must scramble completely or fully block such material. the court held that the content-based restriction on speechspecifically section 505 of the CDAviolated the First Amendment because the government could have furthered its interests in less restrictive ways. 26. Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683, 106 S. Ct. 3159, 92 L. Ed. 2d 549 (1986) Synopsis - decision involving free speech and public schools. Matthew Fraser was suspended from school for making a speech full of sexual double entendres. The Supreme Court held that his suspension did not violate the First Amendment. 24. Jones v. North Carolina Prisoners' Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129, 97 S. Ct. 2532, 53 L. Ed. 2d 629 (1977) Synopsis - a 1977 United States Supreme Court case whose ruling stated that prison inmates do not have a right under the First Amendment to join labor unions. 25. Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759, 94 S. Ct. 2547, 41 L. Ed. 2d 439 (1974) Synopsis Case concerned whether military regulation of speech constitutionally valid. A commissioned officer of the military has the responsibility to act in accordance with and support the efforts of the military in time of war. 26. Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557, 93 S. Ct. 2880, 37 L. Ed. 2d 796 (1973) Synopsis - A ruling by the United States Supreme Court which held that the Hatch Act of 1939 does not violate the First Amendment, and its implementing regulations are not unconstitutionally vague and overbroad. 27. Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 96 S. Ct. 958, 47 L. Ed. 2d 154 (1976) Synopsis - Case concerns defamation suits against public figures. 28. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922, 95 S. Ct. 2561, 45 L. Ed. 2d 648 (1975) Synopsis - Three corporations (M & L, Salem, and Tim-Rob), on August 9, 1973, filed a complaint in District Court, seeking a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and declaratory relief, against Doran, a law enforcement official, claiming that a North Hempstead, N. Y., ordinance proscribing topless dancing, which the corporations had provided as entertainment in their bars, violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 29. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 95 S. Ct. 1239, 43 L. Ed. 2d 448 (1975) Synopsis - The issue in this case is whether First Amendment rights were abridged when respondents denied petitioner the use of a municipal facility in Chattanooga, Tenn., for the showing of the controversial rock musical "Hair." 30. Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 95 S. Ct. 1029, 43 L. Ed. 2d 328 (1975) Synopsis - The case determined that a Georgia law prohibiting the release of a rape victim's name was unconstitutional. 31. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 94 S. Ct. 2831, 41 L. Ed. 2d 730 (1974) Synopsis Case that overturned a Florida state law requiring newspapers to allow equal space in their newspapers to political candidates in the case of a political editorial or endorsement content. In effect, it reaffirmed the constitutional principle of freedom of the press (detailed in the First Amendment) and prevented state governments from controlling the content of the press. 32. New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 91 S. Ct. 2140, 29 L. Ed. 2d 822 (1971) (per curiam) The ruling made it possible for the New York Times and Washington Post newspapers to publish the then-classified Pentagon Papers without risk of government censure. President Richard Nixon had claimed executive authority to force the Times to suspend publication of classified information in its possession. The question before the court was whether the constitutional freedom of the press under the First Amendment was subordinate to a claimed Executive need to maintain the secrecy of information. The Supreme Court ruled that First Amendment did protect the New York Times' right to print said materials. 33. Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 87 S. Ct. 534, 17 L. Ed. 2d 456 (1967) Synopsis Determined whether a publication, containing misrepresentations about the subject of its coverage, protected under the First Amendment's freedom of speech guarantees. Court set aside the Appellate ruling against Time because the lower court failed to instruct the jury that Time's liability was contingent upon a showing that it knowingly and recklessly published false statements about the Hill family. 34. Kingsley Int'l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 79 S. Ct. 1362, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1512 (1959) Synopsis - The state of New York had refused to issue a license for the motion picture Lady Chatterley's Lover because it alluringly portrays adultery as proper behavior. The Court reaffirmed that motion pictures were within the scope of the First Amendment and proclaimed that the amendment's basic guarantee is the freedom to advocate ideas including the idea that adultery may in some cases be justified.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 35. Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 72 S. Ct. 777, 96 L. Ed. 1098 (1952) Synopsis - A landmark decision by the United States Supreme Court which largely marked the decline of motion picture censorship in the United States. It determined that certain provisions of the New York Education Law allowing a censor to forbid the commercial showing of any non-licensed motion picture film, or revoke or deny the license of a film deemed to be "sacrilegious," was a "restraint on freedom of speech" and thereby a violation of the First Amendment. 36. Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 117 S. Ct. 1174, 137 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1997) Synopsis This is the second of two United States Supreme Court cases dealing with the must carry rules imposed on cable television companies. The Court reiterated the constitutionality of the must-carry provision and noted that the provision had the considerable benefit of preserving free over-the-air broadcasting, promoting the widespread dissemination of information, and promoting fair competition in television programming. 37. Denver Area Ed. Telecommunications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 116 S. Ct. 2374, 135 L. Ed. 2d 888 (1996) Synopsis - Whether the government may constitutionally (1) permit cable operators to refuse to carry indecent material on leased local access channels, (2) require cable operators that choose to carry indecent local access programming to place such programming on a separate channel and to block the channel until the subscriber requests unblocking, and (3) permit cable operators to refuse to carry indecent programming on local public, educational, and governmental channels. The Court held that the first provision--that permits the operator to decide whether or not to broadcast such programs on leased access channels--is consistent with the First Amendment. The second provision, that requires leased channel operators to segregate and to block that programming, and the third provision, applicable to public, educational, and governmental channels, violate the First Amendment, for they are not appropriately tailored to achieve the basic, legitimate objective of protecting children from exposure to "patently offensive" material. 38. Sable Communications of Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 109 S. Ct. 2829, 106 L. Ed. 2d 93 (1989) Synopsis - Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 to ban indecent and obscene interstate commercial phone messages. Sable Communications had been in the dial-a-porn business since 1983. A judge in District Court upheld the ban on obscene messages, but enjoined the Act's enforcement against indecent ones. The Court held that the First Amendment does not protect obscene speech, as the Court found in Paris Adult Theater I v. Slaton (1973), the ban on obscene speech was legitimate. However, sexual expression that is simply indecent is protected.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 39. Florida Star v. B. J. F., 491 U.S. 524, 109 S. Ct. 2603, 105 L. Ed. 2d 443 (1989) Synopsis - A rape shield law is a law that limits a defendant's ability to cross-examine rape complainants about their past sexual behavior. The term also refers to a law that prohibits the publication of the identity of an alleged rape victim. The Court held that a Florida statute which provided penalties for media outlets that publicized the name of an alleged rape victim was unconstitutional. 40. Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 106 S. Ct. 1558, 89 L. Ed. 2d 783 (1986) Synopsis - In a series of articles, the Philadelphia Inquirer accused Hepps of links to organized crime and of capitalizing on that connection to influence the state legislature. Relying on its reasoning in Gertz v. Robert Welch Inc. (1974), the Court held that the newspaper was not obligated to prove its accusations true. 41. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 98 S. Ct. 1535, 56 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1978) Synopsis - A Landmark Communications newspaper, The Virginian Pilot, published an article regarding the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Commission's investigation into a state judge. The article, which was accurate, violated a Virginia law that prohibited the release of information from Commission hearings. The Court held that the state interest did not "justify encroaching on First Amendment guarantees" in the form of the criminal punishment. 42. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 96 S. Ct. 2440, 49 L. Ed. 2d 310 (1976) Synopsis - American Mini Theaters opened two theaters that showed adult movies in the city of Detroit. Two city ordinances enacted in 1972 prohibited the opening of adult theaters within 1,000 feet of other buildings with "regulated uses" or within 500 feet of any residential district. American Mini sued city officials challenging the ordinances on two grounds: that the ordinances imposed an undue burden on First Amendment rights and that ordinances violated the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal Protection Clause. The Court held that Detroit's ordinances were reasonable, and although erotic material could not be completely suppressed, Detroit had adequate reasons to restrict the distribution of such material. 43. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 94 S. Ct. 2997, 41 L. Ed. 2d 789 (1974) Synopsis - Gertz was an attorney hired by a family to sue a police officer who had killed the family's son. In a magazine called American Opinion, the John Birch Society accused Gertz of being a "Leninist" and a "Communist-fronter" because he chose to represent clients who were suing a law enforcement officer. Gertz lost his libel suit because a lower court found that the magazine had not violated the actual malice test for libel which the Supreme Court had established in New York Times v. Sullivan (1964). The Court reversed the lower court decision and held that Gertz's rights had been violated and established that ordinary citizens should be allowed more protection from libelous statements than individuals in the public eye. However, the actual malice standard did not lose all significance in cases involving ordinary citizens as the Court advised states to use it in assessing claims for punitive damages by citizens suing for libel.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential

44. Greenbelt Cooperative Publishing Assn., Inc. v. Bresler, 398 U.S. 6, 90 S. Ct. 1537, 26 L. Ed. 2d 6 (1970). Synopsis This case, which held that using the word "blackmail" in a newspaper article "was no more than rhetorical hyperbole" and that finding such usage as libel "would subvert the most fundamental meaning of a free press" guaranteed by the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. The ruling also touched on the plaintiff's status as a public figure. 45. Grosjean v. American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 244, 56 S. Ct. 444, 80 L. Ed. 660 (1936) Synopsis This case was over a challenge to a separate sales tax on newspapers with circulation of over 20,000. The Court held the tax to be an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. However, the ruling has been ignored by some states creating immense controversy. 46. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 8, 106 S. Ct. 903, 89 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1986) Synopsis A case involving the requirement that San Francisco-based public utility Pacific Gas and Electric Company carry a message supplied by a public interest group in rebuttal to the messages the utility supplied in its newsletter which it placed in its billing envelope. The Court held the order of the California Public Utilities Commission to be unconstitutional, as the right to speak includes the right not to carry messages one disagrees with. As the court stated, "the choice to speak includes within it the choice of what not to say." 47. United States v. CIO, 335 U.S. 106, 68 S. Ct. 1349, 92 L. Ed. 1849 (1948) Synopsis A case which held that a labor union's publication of a statement advocating that its members vote for a certain candidate for Congress did not violate the Federal Corrupt Practices Act as amended by the Labor Management Relations Act on 1947. Justice Reed refused to reach the constitutional question before the court, arguing instead that the use of funds to publish the statement did not constitute an "expenditure" under Section 313 as amended. 47. United States v. Automobile Workers, 352 U.S. 567, 77 S. Ct. 529, 1 L. Ed. 2d 563 (1957) Synopsis This case concerns 18 U.S.C. 610, which prohibits any corporation or labor organization from making "a contribution or expenditure in connection with" any election for federal office. An indictment of appellee, a labor organization, under this section charged appellee with having used union dues to sponsor commercial television broadcasts designed to influence the electorate to select certain candidates for Congress in connection with the 1954 elections. 48. Pipefitters v. United States, 407 U.S. 385, 400-401, 92 S. Ct. 2247, 33 L. Ed. 2d 11 (1972) Synopsis - Petitioner union and three of its officers were convicted of conspiracy to violate 18 U.S.C. 610, which prohibited a labor organization from making a contribution or expenditure in connection with a federal election. The Court held that Section 610, as confirmed by the Federal Election Campaign Act, does not apply to contributions or

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential expenditures from voluntarily financed union political funds. A legitimate political fund must be separate from the sponsoring union only in the sense that there must be a strict segregation of its monies from union dues and assessments, and solicitation by union officials, although permissible, must be conducted under circumstances plainly indicating that donations are for a political purpose and that those solicited may decline to contribute without reprisal.

48. California Medical Assn. v. Federal Election Comm'n, 453 U.S. 182, 201, 101 S. Ct. 2712, 69 L. Ed. 2d 567 (1981) Synopsis - The Court upheld the constitutionality of 2 U.S.C. 441a(a)(1)(C), which limits contributions to a political committee to $5,000 per year, per contributor. The Court concluded that the challenged provision did not violate the First Amendment rights of appellants because it was an appropriate means by which Congress could seek to protect the integrity of the contribution restrictions upheld in Buckley v. Valeo (424 U.S. 1 (1976)). The Court said that if First Amendment rights of a contributor are not infringed by limitations on the amount he may contribute to a campaign organization which advocates the views and candidacy of a particular candidate, the rights of a contributor are similarly not impaired by limits on the amount he may give to a multicandidate political committee, such as CALPAC, which advocates the views and candidacies of a number of candidates. 49. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Conservative Political Action Comm., 470 U.S. 480, 491, n. 3, 105 S. Ct. 1459, 84 L. Ed. 2d 455 (1985) (NCPAC) Synopsis Appellant claimed that the National Conservative Political Action Committee violated the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act by exceeding the $1,000 spending limit to support the election of a presidential candidate. The Court upheld district court finding that expenditures prohibited by the Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act were protected by the First Amendment and could not be restricted by the government. 50. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615, 93 S. Ct. 2908, 37 L. Ed. 2d 830 (1973) Synopsis The Court upheld an Oklahoma statute which prohibited state employees from engaging in partisan political activities. The statute provides that no classified service employee shall directly or indirectly, solicit, receive, or in any manner be concerned in soliciting or receiving any assessment . . . or contribution for any political organization, candidacy or other political purpose. Broadrick is often cited to enunciate the test for a facial overbreadth challenge, that "the overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the statute's plainly legitimate sweep." 51. Davis v. FEC, 554 U.S. 724, ___, 128 S. Ct. 2759, 2774, 171 L. Ed. 2d 737, 753 (2008) Synopsis The issue was whether BCRAs so-called Millionaires Amendment, which relaxes campaign finance limits for opponents of congressional candidates spending more than $350,000 of their own money, violates either the First or Fifth Amendments. The Court basically found that the law discriminated against candidates spending their own

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential money to advocate their own election, which violates the First Amendment to the United States Constitution. 49. Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 784, 105 S. Ct. 2939, 86 L. Ed. 2d 593 (1985) Synopsis A case in which the Court held that a credit reporting agency could be liable in tort if it carelessly relayed false information that a business had declared bankruptcy when in fact it had not. *50. McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n, 514 U.S. 334, 360-361, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 131 L. Ed. 2d 426 (1995) Synopsis - Margaret McIntyre distributed leaflets to persons attending a public meeting in Ohio expressing her opposition to a proposed school tax levy. Though they were independently produced, she signed them as the views of "Concerned Parents and Tax Payers." Mrs. McIntyre was subsequently fined $100 for violating Section 3599.09(A) of the Ohio Elections Commission Code prohibiting the distribution of campaign literature that does not contain the name and address of the person or campaign official issuing the literature. The Court held that the freedom to publish anonymously is protected by the First Amendment and "extends beyond the literary realm to the advocacy of political causes." When a law burdens such anonymous speech, the Court applies "exacting scrutiny," upholding the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an overriding state interest. 51. California Motor Transport Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508, 510-511, 92 S. Ct. 609, 30 L. Ed. 2d 642 (1972) Synopsis - Respondent highway carriers filed this civil action under 4 of the Clayton Act for injunctive relief and damages against petitioner highway carriers charging that petitioners conspired to monopolize the transportation of goods by instituting state and federal proceedings to resist and defeat applications by respondents to acquire, transfer, or register operating rights. The Court held that, while any carrier has the right of access to administrative agencies and courts to defeat applications of competitors for certificates as highway carriers, and its purpose to eliminate an applicant as a competitor may be implicit in such opposition, its First Amendment rights are not immunized from regulation when they are used as an integral part of conduct violative of the antitrust laws. 52. Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor Freight, Inc., 365 U.S. 127, 137138, 81 S. Ct. 523, 5 L. Ed. 2d 464 (1961) Synopsis - A group of trucking companies and their trade association sued under 4 of the Clayton Act for treble damages and injunctive relief against a group of railroads, a railroad association and a public relations firm, charging that the defendants had conspired to restrain trade in, and monopolize, the long-distance freight business, in violation of 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. They alleged that the railroads had engaged the public relations firm to conduct a publicity campaign against the truckers designed to foster the adoption and retention of laws and law enforcement practices destructive of the trucking business, to create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential public, and to impair the relationships existing between the truckers and their customers. The Court held that no violation of the Sherman Act can be predicated upon mere attempts to influence the passage or enforcement of laws. he Sherman Act does not prohibit two or more persons from associating together in an attempt to persuade the legislature or the executive to take particular action with respect to a law that would produce a restraint or monopoly; and it does not apply to the activities of these railroads, at least insofar as those activities comprised mere solicitation of governmental action with respect to the passage and enforcement of laws. 53. Federal Election Comm'n v. National Right to Work Comm., 459U.S. 197, 210, 103 S. Ct. 552, 74 L. Ed. 2d 364 (1982) Synopsis - On December 13, 1982, the Supreme Court issued a unanimous decision reversing a decision by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit in FEC v. National Right to Work Committee (NRWC) (U.S. Supreme Court No. 81-1506). The Court held that some 267,000 individuals solicited by NRWC for contributions to its separate segregated fund during 1976 did not qualify as solicitable members of NRWC under 2 U.S.C. 441b(b)(4)(C). NRWC is a nonprofit corporation without capital stock, which advocates voluntary unionism. The Court held that the persons solicited by NRWC were insufficiently attached to the corporation to qualify as members under Section 441b(b)(4)(C) of the Act. In this regard, the Court noted that the legislative history of Section 441b(b)(4)(C) indicated that members' of nonstock corporations were to be defined, at least in part, by analogy to stockholders of business corporations and members of labor unions. 50. Withrow v. Larkin, 421 U.S. 35, 46, 95 S. Ct. 1456, 43 L. Ed. 2d 712 (1975) Synopsis - A physician in the State of Wisconsin, Withrow, challenged the Wisconsin statutes which authorized the States Examining Board (Board) to investigate physicians and temporarily suspend their license. The Court held that the Board stayed within the accepted bounds of due process. Having investigated, it issued findings and conclusions asserting the commission of certain acts and ultimately concluding there was probable cause to believe the Appellee had violated the statutes. The risk of bias and prejudgment was not intolerably high. The initial determination of probably cause and the ultimate adjudication have different purposes; and the fact that same agency makes them in tandem and they relate to the same issues does not result in a procedural due process violation. 51. Montejo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 2079, 173 L. Ed. 2d 955 (2009) (overruling Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625, 106 S. Ct. 1404, 89 L. Ed. 2d 631 (1986) Synopsis This case concerned whether an indigent defendant must affirmatively accept the appointment of counsel to preclude future police interrogation in the absence the attorney. The Court held that that the Sixth Amendment right to counsel should instead be protected by the procedures the Court has established to secure the Fifth Amendment right to counsel, Miranda and its progeny.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 52. Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. ___, ___, 129 S. Ct. 808, 816, 172 L. Ed. 2d 565, 574 (2009) (overruling Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 121S. Ct. 2151, 150 L. Ed. 2d 272 (2001) Synopsis - This case stems from a search of Utah resident Afton Callahan's home by the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force. The Task Force, based on evidence that Callahan was a methamphetamine dealer, had sent an informant to his home to make a purchase. After receiving a signal from the informant that the sale had taken place, the Task Force entered the home and conducted a protective sweep of the house without a warrant but after getting Callahan's consent. At trial, Callahan was convicted of possessing and distributing methamphetamines based on evidence discovered during the search; however, the Utah Court of Appeals held the evidence inadmissible and reversed Callahan's conviction. held that it was not clearly established at the time of police entry that the consent once removed doctrine violated the Fourth Amendment and therefore that the Central Utah Narcotics Task Force was qualifiedly immune in its search of Mr. Callahan's home. The Court also overturned its prior decision in Saucier v. Katz, which prescribed a rigid two-part inquiry into government officials' qualified immunity claims: "1.) whether the facts alleged or shown make out a violation of a constitutional right, and 2.) if so, whether that right was clearly established at the time of the defendant's alleged misconduct." Rather, the Court held that this inquiry should be utilized at the discretion of the lower courts. It reasoned that substantial judicial resources were often expended in determining difficult constitutional claims that ultimately had little to do with the outcome of the case. 53. Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106, 119, 60 S. Ct. 444, 84 L. Ed. 604, 1940-1 C.B. 223 (1940) Synopsis - Decedent created a trust providing that the income from the trust property should be paid to his wife during her lifetime, that, upon his death, if she survived him, the corpus of the trust should go to her or to other named beneficiaries, but that, upon her death, if he survived, the property should revert to him. The wife survived. The Court held that the value of the remainder interest should be included in the decedent's gross estate under 302(c) of the Revenue Act of 1926, as a transfer intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or after the grantor's death. 54. Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 828, 111 S. Ct. 2597, 115 L. Ed. 2d 720 (1991) Synopsis - The Petitioner, Pervis Tyrone Payne (Petitioner), was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. During the sentencing phase of the trial, among other witnesses, the prosecution introduced the testimony of Mary Zvolanek (Zvolanek), who was the mother of one victim and the grandmother of the other to speak to the impact of the murder on Nicholas, a survivor of the attack leading to the murders and whose mother and sister were the victims. The jury sentenced the Petitioner to death on each count. The Court held that the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution does not prohibit a capital sentencing jury from considering victim impact evidence relating to the personal characteristics of the victim and the emotional impact of the crimes on the victims family.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 55. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 1 Cranch 137, 177, 2 L. Ed. 60 (1803) Synopsis Marbury requested the Supreme Court of the United States to issue a Writ of Mandamus ordering President Jefferson to appoint him Justice of the Peace. This case established that the Supreme Court has judicial review over acts of Congress. This power allows the Supreme Court to declare those acts that fall outside the legislatures enumerated powers unconstitutional. 56. United States v. Harris, 347 U.S. 612, 625, 74 S. Ct. 808, 98 L. Ed. 989 (1954) Synopsis This case is sometimes referred to as the Ku Klux Case. It was a case in which the Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional for the federal government to penalize crimes such as assault and murder. It declared that the local governments have the power to penalize these crimes. The fact that many of these crimes were racially motivated in the south was ignored. 57. Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 147-148, 48 S. Ct. 105, 72 L. Ed. 206, 1928-1 C.B. 324 (1927) Synopsis - The Revenue Act of 1924, 319-324, insofar as it undertakes to impose a tax on gifts fully consummated before its provisions taxing gifts came before Congress, is invalid under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. 58. Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346-348, 56 S. Ct. 466, 80 L. Ed. 688 (1936) Synopsis - The Tennessee Valley Authority was a government corporation established as part of the New Deal to improve the economy of the state. For example, projects of the TVA included improving navigation on the state's rivers, constructing flood control projects, and generating hydroelectric power. Shareholders in a private Tennessee power company sued to prevent the TVA from acquiring over half of the company's property and equipment. The proposed contract which detailed the sale would allow the government agency to allocate electric power to consumers. The Court held that Congress did not abuse its power with the TVA. Justice Hughes argued that the Wilson Dam, the location where the TVA was in the business of generating electricity, had been built originally in the interest of national defense: it produced materials involved in munitions manufacture. The government could sell excess electricity to consumers without violating the Constitution. 59. United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21, 80 S. Ct. 519, 4 L. Ed. 2d 524 (1960) (quoting Liverpool, New York & Philadelphia S. S. Co. v. Commissioners of Emigration, 113 U.S. 33, 39, 5 S. Ct. 352, 28 L. Ed. 899 (1885) Synopsis Attorney General brought suit to issue injunction against Raines and other Georgia public officials from discriminating against blacks wanting to vote. District court dismissed the suit because this could be brought by private citizens. The Court overturned the ruling of a U.S. District Court, which had held that a law authorizing the Federal Government to bring civil actions against State Officials for discriminating against black citizens was unconstitutional.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 60. Northwest Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2504, 174 L. Ed. 2d 140 (2009) Synopsis - Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District Number One ("Northwest") sought a declaratory judgment exempting it from Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 and alternatively argued that Section 5 was unconstitutional. Section 5 prohibits "covered jurisdictions" states and political subdivisions with histories of racial discrimination in voting from changing their voting procedures without permission from either the Attorney General or a three-judge panel of the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. The Court held that the VRA permits all political subdivisions, including the district, to seek to bailout from the preclearance requirements of the VRA. The Court reasoned that the language of the VRA did not constrict the availability of a bailout for political subunits like Northwest Municipal. Moreover, the Court reasoned that considering that only 17 of 12,000 jurisdictions covered by the VRA had bailed out suggested that Congress had never intended for it to be so difficult to bailout. 61. Federal Election Comm'n v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 123 S. Ct. 2200, 156 L. Ed. 2d 179 (2003) Synopsis - In 1971 Congress passed the Federal Election Campaign Act, banning direct corporate donations to federal election campaigns. In 2000, Christine Beaumont and the North Carolina Right to Life (NCRL), an anti-abortion advocacy group, challenged the act, saying it violated their right to free speech. The group is an incorporated non-profit that lobbies and backs political candidates friendly to its cause, but under the act it cannot make political donations. The Court held that applying the direct contribution prohibition to nonprofit advocacy corporations is consistent with the First Amendment. The Court reasoned that it could not hold for NCRL "without recasting our understanding of the risks of harm posed by corporate political contributions, of the expressive significance of contributions, and of the consequent deference owed to legislative judgments on what to do about them." 62. Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212, 104 S. Ct. 2305, 81 L. Ed. 2d 164 (1984) Synopsis - After a jury convicted respondent of armed robbery and first-degree murder, the trial judge conducted the required sentencing hearing and ultimately found that no aggravating or mitigating circumstances were present. He ruled, contrary to the State's contention, that the statutory aggravating circumstance relating to killing for pecuniary gain applied only to murders for hire, and did not apply to all murders committed in order to obtain money, such as murders committed during a robbery. Accordingly, respondent was sentenced on his murder conviction to life imprisonment without possibility of parole for 25 years, but he was also sentenced to 21 years' imprisonment for armed robbery, with the sentences to run consecutively. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits Arizona from sentencing respondent to death. This case is controlled by Bullington, which held that the Double Jeopardy Clause applied to Missouri's capital sentencing proceeding -- barring imposition of the death penalty upon reconviction after an initial conviction, set aside on appeal, had resulted in rejection of the death sentence -because that proceeding was comparable to a trial on the issue of guilt and the initial sentence of life imprisonment in effect acquitted the defendant of the death penalty.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 63. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577, 123 S. Ct. 2472, 156 L. Ed. 2d 508 (2003) Synopsis - Responding to a reported weapons disturbance in a private residence, Houston police entered John Lawrence's apartment and saw him and another adult man, Tyron Garner, engaging in a private, consensual sexual act. Lawrence and Garner were arrested and convicted of deviate sexual intercourse in violation of a Texas statute forbidding two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct. The Court held that the Texas statute making it a crime for two persons of the same sex to engage in certain intimate sexual conduct violates the Due Process Clause. After explaining what it deemed the doubtful and overstated premises of Bowers, the Court reasoned that the case turned on whether Lawrence and Garner were free as adults to engage in the private conduct in the exercise of their liberty under the Due Process Clause. "Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the government," wrote Justice Kennedy. "The Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual. 65. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101, 98 S. Ct. 2187, 57 L. Ed. 2d 65 (1978) Synopsis - Scott was a policeman charged with the distribution of various narcotics in March, 1975. He was tried in United States District Court. Both before and during trial, Scott moved to dismiss two counts of the indictment which concerned transactions that took place in September, 1974. Scott claimed that his defense had been prejudiced by pre-indictment delay. The court granted Scotts motion. The United States appealed. The Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause only applies if the government repeatedly attempts to try a person. However, in this case, the government was merely attempting to try a person for the first time. Defendant Scott wanted to end the proceeding without a determination of guilt or innocence. 66. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 16 S. Ct. 1138, 41 L. Ed. 256 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 74 S. Ct. 686, 98 L. Ed. 873 (1954) Synopsis - The state of Louisiana enacted a law that required separate railway cars for blacks and whites. In 1892, Homer Adolph Plessy--who was seven-eighths Caucasian-took a seat in a "whites only" car of a Louisiana train. He refused to move to the car reserved for blacks and was arrested. The Court upheld state-imposed racial segregation. The justices based their decision on the separate-but-equal doctrine, that separate facilities for blacks and whites satisfied the Fourteenth Amendment so long as they were equal. 67. Adkins v. Children's Hospital of D. C., 261 U.S. 525, 43 S. Ct. 394, 67 L. Ed. 785 (1923), overruled by West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578, 81 L. Ed. 703 (1937) Synopsis - In 1918, the District of Columbia passed a statute that established a minimum wage for women and children, the constitutionality of which was challenged in this matter. The Court held that it is inappropriate to restrict a womans freedom to contract for her labor service when such restriction is not equally applied to a man. The payment of a minimum wage puts a burden on the employer that is completely unrelated to his business.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 68. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 48 S. Ct. 564, 72 L. Ed. 944 (1928), overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S. Ct. 507, 19 L. Ed. 2d 576 (1967) Synopsis This case concerns the wire-tapping of conversations among various individuals involved in illegal liquor sales. The fourth amendment does not forbid this type of wire-tapping. The Court reasoned that there was no searching; there was no seizure; and the evidence was secured by the use of the sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants and therefore, the fourth amendment rights of plaintiff were not violated. 69. Randall v. Sorrell, 548 U.S. 230, 274-281, 126 S. Ct. 2479, 165 L. Ed. 2d 482 (2006) Synopsis - a decision by the Supreme Court of the United States involving a Vermont law which placed a cap on financial donations made to politicians. The court ruled that Vermont's law, the strictest in the nation, unconstitutionally hindered the citizens' First Amendment right to free speech. A key issue in the case was the 1976 case Buckley v. Valeo, which many justices felt needed to be revisited. The Court ruled against the state of Vermont on all three issues, reaffirming both Buckley and Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee and striking down the law as unconstitutional. Randall is particularly important as the first case in which the Supreme Court has struck down a contribution limit as unconstitutionally low. 70. Vasquez v. Hillery, 474 U.S. 254, 265, 106 S. Ct. 617, 88 L. Ed. 2d 598 (1986) Synopsis - Respondent Booker T. Hillery succeeds on habeas petition by arguing that the Equal Protection clause has been violated in the systematic exclusion of blacks from his grand jury. The Court held that a conviction must be reversed when an indictment has come from a grand jury from which the defendants race has been excluded because their Fifth Amendment due process rights have been violated. Neither harmless error arguments, nor the fact that they got a fair trial subsequently can overcome the taint of this flawed grand jury. 71. Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 231, 115 S. Ct. 2097, 132 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1995) Synopsis - A federal policy offered contractors working for the government extra compensation for hiring minority businesses. A construction company awarded a subcontract to a minority owned business, despite the fact that a non-minority owned business offered to do the work for less money. The Court held that Strict scrutiny of all governmental racial classifications is necessary because (1) it may not always be clear whether a so-called benign classification is in fact benign; (2) the courts should take a skeptical view of all racial classifications and (3) there should be consistency of treatment regardless of the race of the person burdened or benefited. Strict in theory does not necessarily imply fatal in fact. When race-based action is necessary to further a compelling interest, such action is constitutional when it satisfies the narrow tailoring requirement.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 73. Citizens Against Rent Control/Coalition for Fair Housing v. Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295, 102 S. Ct. 434, 70 L. Ed. 2d 492 (1981) Synopsis - The Court reversed a California Supreme Court decision that upheld an ordinance in Berkeley, California. The ordinance limited individual contributions to organizations attempting to influence the outcome of a local ballot initiative campaign (proposed instituting rent control) to $250 per person. The ordinance did not attempt to limit the amount an individual could spend personally to influence the initiative. 74. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247, 63 L. Ed. 470, 17 Ohio L. Rep. 26, 17 Ohio L. Rep. 149 (1919) Synopsis - During World War I, Schenck mailed circulars to draftees. The circulars suggested that the draft was a monstrous wrong motivated by the capitalist system. The circulars urged "Do not submit to intimidation" but advised only peaceful action such as petitioning to repeal the Conscription Act. Schenck was charged with conspiracy to violate the Espionage Act by attempting to cause insubordination in the military and to obstruct recruitment. The Court concluded that Schenck is not protected in this situation. The character of every act depends on the circumstances. "The question in every case is whether the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent." During wartime, utterances tolerable in peacetime can be punished. 75. Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 51 S. Ct. 532, 75 L. Ed. 1117 (1931) Synopsis The Court ruled 7-2 that a 1919 California statute banning red flags was unconstitutional because it violated the Fourteenth Amendment. This decision is considered a landmark in the history of First Amendment constitutional law, as it was one of the first cases where the Court extended the Fourteenth Amendment to include a protection of the substance of the First Amendment, in this case symbolic speech, from state infringement. 76. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301, 85 S. Ct. 1493, 14 L. Ed. 2d 398 (1965) Synopsis - struck down a federal statute requiring the Postmaster General to detain and deliver only upon the addressee's request unsealed foreign mailings of "communist political propaganda." Under the stricken code, a recipient of material deemed "political propaganda" was required to indicate their intent to receive such materials before they were delivered, accepting the material by indicating a desire to do so on a card provided by the Post Office. The Court held the Act, as construed and applied, is unconstitutional, since it imposes on the addressee an affirmative obligation which amounts to an unconstitutional limitation of his rights under the First Amendment. 78. Yee v. Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 535, 112 S. Ct. 1522, 118 L. Ed. 2d 153 (1992) Synopsis - Petitioners, mobile home park owners in respondent Escondido, California, rent pads of land to mobile home owners. When the homes are sold, the new owners generally continue to rent the pads. Under the California Mobilehome Residency Law, the bases upon which a park owner may terminate a mobile home owner's tenancy are limited to, inter alia, nonpayment of rent and the park owner's desire to change the use of

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential his land. The park owner may not require the removal of a mobile home when it is sold and may neither charge a transfer fee for the sale nor disapprove of a purchaser who is able to pay rent. The state law does not limit the rent the park owner may charge, but Escondido has a rent control ordinance setting mobile home rents back to their 1986 levels and prohibiting rent increases without the City Council's approval. The court held that the rent control ordinance does not authorize an unwanted physical occupation of petitioners' property and thus does not amount to a per se taking. 79. Wood v. Allen, ante, at ____, 130 S. Ct. 841, 175 L. Ed. 2d 738 Synopsis This case concerns whether the state courts conclusionthat during the sentencing phase of a capital case the defense attorneys failure to present the defendants impaired mental functioning did not constitute ineffective counselwas based on an unreasonable determination of the facts and whether the circuit court erred in its application of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) to the review of the state court decision. 80. Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Services, Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 168-169, 125 S. Ct. 577, 160 L. Ed. 2d 548 (2004) Synopsis - Texas prodded Aviall Services to clean up contaminated property bought from Cooper Industries. Aviall sued in federal district court to force Cooper to pay some of the clean-up costs. Aviall claimed it could sue Cooper under the federal Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA). Cooper admitted to being a potentially responsible party (PRP), but claimed it was not liable because Aviall was never sued to clean up the land and had no federal requirement to do so. The district court and a panel for the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled against Aviall. The entire appellate court reversed and ruled CERCLA does not require a PRP to first be sued before seeking clean up funds from other PRPs. The Court held that a private party, who, like Aviall, had not been sued under CERCLA could not obtain cleanup contributions from other liable parties. The Court reasoned that CERCLA's language made clear that parties could seek cleanup contribution only during or following a civil action. 81. Youakim v. Miller, 425 U.S. 231, 234, 96 S. Ct. 1399, 47 L. Ed. 2d 701 (1976) (per curiam) (quoting Duignan v. United States, 274 U.S. 195, 200, 47 S. Ct. 566, 71 L. Ed. 996 (1927)) Synopsis - The case originated in Illinois after four children were removed from their mother's care because of neglect. Initially, all the children were placed in foster care with non-relatives. Later, two of the children were transferred to the care of relatives who met the state's licensing requirements for foster homes. The state, however, would not pay these relatives the foster care rate because of their relationship to the children. Legal proceedings on behalf of all four children and others like them began at that time. The Court held that local child welfare agencies are directed to pay kinship caregivers the same rate foster parents are given, provided they meet foster home licensing requirements.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 82. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481, n. 15, 96 S. Ct. 3037, 49 L. Ed. 2d 1067 (1976) Synopsis - Lloyd Powell was convicted of murder by a California court. Powell sought relief in federal district court by filing a writ of federal habeas corpus. Powell claimed that the search that uncovered the murder weapon was unlawful and that the evidence should have been inadmissible at trial. The Court held that where states had provided opportunities for full and fair litigation of Fourth Amendment claims, the Constitution did not require the granting of federal habeas corpus relief. The Court also held that any additional benefits from considering search and seizure claims of state prisoners on collateral review would be small in relation to the costs. The Court found that the Fourth Amendment values protected by the exclusionary rule would not be significantly enhanced in such situations and that deterrence of police misconduct was unlikely to increase. 83. Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New Eng., 546 U.S. 320, 329, 126 S. Ct. 961, 163 L. Ed. 2d 812 (2006) Synopsis - After New Hampshire's state legislature approved the Parental Notification Prior to Abortion Act but before the act went into effect, Planned Parenthood of Northern New England challenged the law in federal district court. They claimed that the law, which requires that parents be notified before their minor daughter has an abortion, violated the "undue burden" test laid out in Planned Parenthood v. Casey, a 1992 Supreme Court decision that reformulated the constitutional protections given to abortion in Roe v. Wade. Specifically, they argued that an exemption in the law for abortions necessary to prevent the death of the mother, but not for those abortions necessary to protect merely her health, was unconstitutionally narrow. The Court held that the statute would be unconstitutional when applied to the very small percentage of minors for whom an emergency abortion would be necessary to avert serious damage to their health. The lower court's decision to invalidate the entire statute based on its unconstitutional results in this small percentage of cases, however, was unnecessary. Instead, O'Connor wrote, "in this case the lower courts can issue a declaratory judgment and an injunction prohibiting [only] the statute's unconstitutional application." 84. Brockett v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 504, 105 S. Ct. 2794, 86 L. Ed. 2d 394 (1985) Synopsis - A state law punished the publication of obscene materials. Obscene or lewd materials were defined by the law included all materials the appeal the prurient interest, among other things. Prurient was defined as material that incites lasciviousness or lust. The law was challenged as overbroad under the first amendment because material that arouses only a "normal, healthy interest in sex" is constitutionally protected, but was banned by the law. The Court held that the law was overbroad; however, it found that the entire statute could not be stricken. The code contained a severability provision indicating that the law should not be completely invalidated unless the one unconstitutional provision could not be stricken without making the law unworkable. *85. Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 127 S. Ct. 1610, 167 L. Ed. 2d 480 (2007) Synopsis In this case the Court upheld Congress's ban and held that it did not impose an undue burden on the due process right of women to obtain an abortion, "under

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential precedents we here assume to be controlling," such as the Court's prior decisions in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey. In a legal sense, the case distinguished but did not overrule Stenberg v. Carhart (2000), in which the Court dealt with related issues. However, Gonzales was widely interpreted as signaling a shift in Supreme Court jurisprudence toward a restriction of abortion rights, occasioned in part by the retirement of Sandra Day O'Connor and her replacement by Samuel Alito. An editorial in the New England Journal of Medicine identified the case as a landmark: "This is the first time the Court has ever held that physicians can be prohibited from using a medical procedure deemed necessary by the physician to benefit the patient's health. 86. PDK Labs., Inc. v. United States DEA, 362 F.3d 786, 799 (CADC 2004) Synopsis This case concerns 21 U.S.C. section 971(c)(1), which authorizes the Agency to suspend importation of a listed chemical that may be diverted to the clandestine manufacture of a controlled substance, does not plainly cover the diversion of finished drug products such as plaintiff's ephedrine-containing pills, which could conceivably be sold to, or shoplifted by, people who will then use them to produce methamphetamine. 87. Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 657, 15 S. Ct. 207, 39 L. Ed. 297 (1895) Synopsis This is an insurance case pertaining to Section 439 of the Penal Code of California, making it a misdemeanor for a person in that state to procure insurance for a resident in the state from an insurance company not incorporated under its laws and which had not filed the bond required by the laws of the state relative to insurance, is not a regulation of commerce and does not conflict with the Constitution of the United States when enforced against the agent of a New York firm in California who, through his principals and by telegram, procured for a resident in California applying for it there marine insurance on an ocean steamer from an insurance company incorporated under the laws of Massachusetts, and which had not filed the bond required by the laws of California. 88. Colorado Right to Life Comm., Inc. v. Coffman, 498 F.3d 1137, 1148 (CA10 2007) Synopsis - In a right to life organization's challenge to a citizen-passed campaign finance reform amendment designed to limit the influence of certain types of corporations' general funds on state elections, partial summary judgment for plaintiff is affirmed where: 1) challenged sections of Article XXVIII regulating corporate expenditures and electioneering communications were unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff because plaintiff meets Supreme Court-approved exemption requirements for a voluntary ideological corporation that seeks to engage in political speech; 2) Article XXVIII's definition of a political committee is unconstitutional as applied to plaintiff because it fails to incorporate Buckley v. Valeo's "major purpose" test; and 3) the court declines to reconsider plaintiff's facial challenges. 89. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 864, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 120 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1992) Synopsis - The Pennsylvania legislature amended its abortion control law in 1988 and 1989. Among the new provisions, the law required informed consent and a 24 hour waiting period prior to the procedure. A minor seeking an abortion required the consent

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential of one parent (the law allows for a judicial bypass procedure). A married woman seeking an abortion had to indicate that she notified her husband of her intention to abort the fetus. These provisions were challenged by several abortion clinics and physicians. The Court again reaffirmed Roe, but it upheld most of the Pennsylvania provisions. The Court held that, to protect the central right recognized by Roe, while at the same time accommodating the State's profound interest in potential life, the undue burden standard should be employed. An undue burden exists, and therefore a provision of law is invalid, if its purpose or effect is to place substantial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking an abortion before the fetus attains viability. 90. Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695, 714, 115 S. Ct. 1754, 131 L. Ed. 2d 779 (1995) (quoting Hilton v. South Carolina Public Railways Comm'n, 502 U.S. 197, 202, 112 S. Ct. 560, 116 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1991)). Synopsis - Petitioner's falsehoods in unsworn papers filed in Bankruptcy Court prompted his indictment under 18 U. S. C. 1001, which criminalizes false statements and similar misconduct occurring "in any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States." He was convicted after the District Court, relying on United States v. Bramblett, 348 U. S. 503, instructed the jury that a bankruptcy court is a "department of the United States" within 1001's meaning. The Court held that, because a federal court is neither a "department" nor an "agency" within 1001's meaning, the statute does not apply to false statements made in judicial proceedings. 91. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 443, 120 S. Ct. 2326, 147 L. Ed. 2d 405 (2000) Synopsis - Under indictment for bank robbery and related federal crimes, the petitioner, a certain Dickerson, moved to suppress a statement he made to officers of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) under grounds that he had not been given his Miranda warning prior to interrogation. This motion was granted by the District Court; however, Government prosecutors took an interlocutory appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit. The Court of Appeals reversed the District Courts suppression order holding that despite no Miranda warning, 18 U.S.C 3501 was satisfied as the petitioners statement was voluntary. The Court upheld the requirement that the Miranda warning be read to criminal suspects, and struck down the federal statute that purported to overrule Miranda v. Arizona. 92. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 305, 124 S. Ct. 1769, 158 L. Ed. 2d 546 (2004) Synopsis - After the 2000 census reduced the size of the Pennsylvania Congressional delegation by two members, the Republican-controlled state legislature passed a redistricting plan that clearly benefitted Republican candidates. Several members of the Democratic party sued in federal court, claiming that the plan was unconstitutional because it violated the one-person, one-vote principle of Article I, Section 2 of Constitution, the Equal Protection clause, the Privileges and Immunities clause, and the freedom of association. In a split decision that had no majority opinion, the Court decided not to intervene in this case because no appropriate judicial solution could be found. Justice Antonin Scalia, for a four-member plurality, wrote that the Court should declare all claims related to political (but not racial) gerrymandering nonjusticiable, meaning that courts could not hear them. Because no court had been able to find an appropriate remedy

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential to political gerrymandering claims in the 18 years since the Court decided Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, which had held that such a remedy had not been found yet but might exist, Scalia wrote that it was time to recognize that the solution simply did not exist. Justice Kennedy, however, wrote in his concurring opinion (which provided the deciding fifth vote for the judgment) that the Court should rule narrowly in this case that no appropriate judicial solution could be found, but not give up on finding one eventually. 93. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585, 103 S. Ct. 1365, 75 L. Ed. 2d 295 (1983) Synopsis - From 1967 to 1971, the Minneapolis Star and Tribune Company, a publisher of a morning and evening newspaper in Minneapolis, was exempt from a state sales and use tax provided periodic publications. In 1971, the Minnesota legislature imposed a "use tax" on the cost of paper and ink products consumed in publishing. In 1974, the legislature exempted the first $100,000 worth of ink and paper consumed a year. After the enactment of this exemption, the Star Tribune found itself paying roughly two-thirds of the total revenue raised by the tax. The Court held that while the First Amendment did not prohibit all regulation of the press, Minnesota had "created a special tax that applie[d] only to certain publications protected by the First Amendment." Noting that there was "substantial evidence that differential taxation of the press would have troubled the Framers of the First Amendment," the Court held that when states single out the press "the threat of burdensome taxes becomes acute." The Court concluded that "recognizing a power in the State not only to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of the press presents such a potential for abuse that no interest suggested by Minnesota can justify the scheme." 94. Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75, 67 S. Ct. 556, 91 L. Ed. 754 (1947) (I dont think this is necessarily a campaign finance case, but Ill err on the side of caution) Synopsis - The political leanings of the UWFA led to passage of two pieces of legislation intended to restrict its political activities. In June 1938, Congress passed a rider to appropriations legislation which prevented the federal government from making payments (such as salaries) to any person or organization which advocated the overthrow of the federal government (as many communist organizations at the time proposed). In 1939, Congress passed the Hatch Act of 1939, which restricted political campaign activities by federal employees. A provision of the Hatch Act made it illegal for the federal government to employ anyone who advocated the overthrow of the federal government. The UFWA immediately hired lawyer Lee Pressman to challenge the constitutionality of the Hatch Act. Various individual employees of the federal government, some of whom were members of the United Public Workers of America, sought an injunction against the second sentence of 9(a) of the Hatch Act, and a declaration that the Act was unconstitutional. Congress repeatedly investigated the union for violations of the Hatch Act and prohibitions on advocacy of the right to strike. In January 1947, the House of Representatives Committee on Campaign Expenditures reported that it had found evidence that the UPWA (and other unions) had violated the Federal Corrupt Practices Act by failing to report expenditures in support of various

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential political parties and candidates for federal office. The Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hatch Act and affirmed the judgment of the district court. 95. Los Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 47, n.4, 120 S. Ct. 483, 145 L. Ed. 2d 451 (1999) Synopsis - The former version of the California public records statute required a state or local law enforcement agency to make public the name, address, and occupation of every individual arrested by the agency. In 1996, the state amended the statute to require that a person requesting an arrestee's address declare, under penalty of perjury, that the request was being made for journalistic, scholarly, political, governmental, or investigative purposes, and that the address would not be used directly or indirectly to sell a product or service. The United Reporting Publishing Corporation publishes the "JAILMAIL" list, which provides the names and addresses of recently arrested individuals for its customers. United received its information from the Los Angeles Police Department and other California law enforcement agencies under the former version of the statute. United sought declaratory and injunctive relief to hold the amendment unconstitutional under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court held that the amended statute was not an abridgment of anyone's right to engage in speech, commercial or otherwise, but simply a law regulating access to information in the hands of law enforcement agencies. The Court concluded that United's facial challenge to the statute was not warranted, as there was no possibility that protected speech would be muted. 96. Arkansas Ed. Television Comm'n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 118 S. Ct. 1633, 140 L. Ed. 2d 875 (1998) Synopsis - During the 1992 race for Arkansas' Third Congressional District, the Arkansas Educational Television Commission (AETC) -- a state-owned public television broadcaster -- sponsored a debate between the major party candidates. Running as an independent candidate with little popular support, Ralph Forbes sought to participate in the debate but was denied permission. After unsuccessfully challenging AETC's refusal in district court, Forbes appealed and won a reversal. AETC then appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari. the Court held that public broadcasters could selectively exclude participants from their sponsored debates, so long as these were not designed as "public forums." The Court found that by reserving participation rights only to candidates for a particular congressional district, rather than hosting an openmicrophone format, and selecting among those which were eligible to participate, based on objective indications of their popular support rather than their view points, AETC's debate was a "nonpublic forum." As such, AETC could decide who should and should not participate in its sponsored event. *97. Burson v. Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 112 S. Ct. 1846, 119 L. Ed. 2d 5 (1992) Synopsis - Freeman, a Tennessee political campaign treasurer, challenged the constitutionality of the Tennessee Code forbidding the solicitation of votes and the display or distribution of campaign materials within 100 feet of entrances to polling facilities. On appeal from a lower court's dismissal, the Tennessee Supreme Court reversed, finding that the 100-foot ban was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court granted Burson certiorari. After subjecting Tennessee's statute to exacting scrutiny, since it

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential constituted a facial content-based restriction on political speech in a public forum, the Court held that the statute was narrowly drafted to serve a compelling state interest. By creating a safe zone around polling sites, the statute served the state's interest in protecting its citizen's right to vote freely and effectively. Moreover, the 100-foot zone was acceptable since it was not so large as to completely block out the presence of political messages. 98. United States v. Wurzbach, 280 U.S. 396, 50 S. Ct. 167, 74 L. Ed. 508 (1930) A member of the United States House of Representatives from Texas was indicted under the Federal Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that he had received money from employees of the United States government. The District Court of the United States for the Western District of Texas had thrown out the indictment on two grounds: 1) That the term "political purpose" did not include the behavior in question; and 2) If the term did include the behavior, then the Act was unconstitutional. A unanimous Court held that the term "political purpose," as used in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, was not impermissibly vague. The Supreme Court reversed the district court, which had quashed an indictment under the Act. 99. Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517, 548-549, 53 S. Ct. 481, 77 L. Ed. 929 (1933) Synopsis Thirteen chain storeowners filed a class action seeking an order enjoining tax officials from enforcing Chapter 15624 of the Laws of Florida, 1931 (Ex. Sess.). Defendant successfully moved to dismiss and the Supreme Court of Florida affirmed. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court held that a single shop employs distinguishable methods of conducting business, and the Legislature may make the difference in method and character of the business the basis of classification for taxation. Those provisions that increase the tax if the owners stores are located in more than one county are unreasonable, arbitrary and violate the Fourteenth Amendment. 100. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. 518, 4 Wheat. 518, 636, 4 L. Ed. 629 (1819) Synopsis - In 1816, the New Hampshire legislature attempted to change Dartmouth College--a privately funded institution--into a state university. The legislature changed the school's corporate charter by transferring the control of trustee appointments to the governor. In an attempt to regain authority over the resources of Dartmouth College, the old trustees filed suit against William H. Woodward, who sided with the new appointees. the Court held that the College's corporate charter qualified as a contract between private parties, with which the legislature could not interfere. The fact that the government had commissioned the charter did not transform the school into a civil institution. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion emphasized that the term contract referred to transactions involving individual property rights, not to the political relations between the government and its citizens. 104. Nixon v. Shrink Missouri Government PAC, 528 U.S. 377, 402, 120 S. Ct. 897, 145 L. Ed. 2d 886 (2000) Synopsis - Missouri law imposes campaign contribution limits, ranging from $250 to $1,000, to candidates for state office. The statute allows for periodic adjustments, which

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential increased the 1998 contribution limit to $1,075 for candidates for statewide office, including state auditor. In 1998, Zev David Fredman, a candidate for the Republican nomination for Missouri state auditor, and the Shrink Missouri Government PAC, a political action committee, filed suit, alleging that the Missouri statute imposing limits on contributions to candidates for state office violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The PAC had contributed $1,075 to Fredman and argued, without the limitation, it would contribute more to Fredman's campaign. Additionally, Fredman alleged he could campaign effectively only with more generous contributions. The Federal District Court, applying Buckley v. Valeo, upheld the statute. The Court held that Buckley is the authority for comparable state regulation and, but that the federal limits approved in Buckley, with or without adjustment for inflation, do not define the scope of permissible state limitations. The Court held the Missouri statute not to violate the First Amendment. 105. FEC v. Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Comm., 533 U.S. 431, 456, and n.18, 121 S. Ct. 2351, 150 L. Ed. 2d 461 (2001) Synopsis - The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971's definition of "contribution" includes "expenditures made by any person in cooperation, consultation, or concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, his authorized political committees, or their agents." The U.S. Supreme Court, in Buckley v. Valeo, held that the limitations on political campaign contributions in the Act were generally constitutional, but that the Act's limitations on election expenditures infringed political expression in violation of the First Amendment. In Colorado Republican Federal Campaign Committee v. FEC, the Court held that the First Amendment prohibits the application of the Party Expenditure Provision of the Act to "an expenditure that the political party has made independently, without coordination with any candidate." In the wake of this decision, the Committee's broader claim remained, that the congressional campaign expenditure limitations on parties themselves are facially unconstitutional and thus unenforceable even as to spending coordinated with a candidate. The Court held that "a party's coordinated expenditures, unlike expenditures truly independent, may be restricted to minimize circumvention of contribution limits." Justice Souter noted that there is little evidence to suggest that coordinated party spending limits adopted by Congress have frustrated the ability of political parties to exercise their First Amendment rights to support their candidates. 105. FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 371, n. 9, 104 S. Ct. 3106, 82 L. Ed. 2d 278 (1984) Synopsis - The Public Broadcasting Act of 1967 allocated federal funds to noncommercial television and radio stations to support operations and educational programming. The act did not allow stations receiving money under the act to engage in editorializing. The Court held that the ban on editorializing violate the First Amendment. Even though the Commerce Clause gives Congress the power to regulate the broadcast medium, since broadcasters are engaged in a vital and independent form of communicative activity, Congress must use the First Amendment to inform and give shape to its regulation. Justice Brennan argued that no legitimate government interest was served by the law which broadly banned all editorializing, a form of speech which lies at the heart of First Amendment protection.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 106. Burroughs v. United States, 290 U.S. 534, 545, 54 S. Ct. 287, 78 L. Ed. 484 (1934) Synopsis - Ada L. Burroughs was the treasurer of a political election committee from July 22, 1928, to March 16, 1929. During that time, the committee accepted contributions and made expenditures to influence the election of presidential and vice presidential electors in two states. They agreed that they would not file the requisite reports. James Cannon, a powerful lobbyist, was investigated by Congress, and found in violation of the FCPA. A grand jury returned an indictment with 11 counts against Burroughs and Cannon. The first eight counts alleged a substantive violation of the Act, but poorly described the crimes. A ninth count against Burroughs more specifically alleged a violation of the Act. A tenth count made a conspiracy charge against Cannon based on the ninth charge. 107. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 165 L. Ed. 2d 609 (2006) Synopsis - n 2003, the Texas State Legislature passed a redistricting plan that replaced the one created by a federal judge following the 2000 census. Critics of the plan charged that it was unconstitutional and violated section 2 the Voting Rights Act because it diluted racial minority voting strength and was designed to maximize partisan advantage. A three-judge district court panel disagreed, finding that the plan was constitutional and that the legislature had the right to redistrict in 2003 using census data from 2000. The Court held that the Texas Legislature's redistricting plan did not violate the Constitution, but that part of the plan violated the Voting Rights Act. Justice Kennedy stated that District 23 had been redrawn in such a way as to deny Latino voters as a group the opportunity to elect a candidate of their choosing, thereby violating the Voting Rights Act. 108. Consolidated Edison Co. of N. Y. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N. Y., 447 U.S. 530, 534, n. 2, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 65 L. Ed. 2d 319 (1980) Synopsis The issue in this case is whether the First Amendment, as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, is violated by an order of the Public Service Commission of the State of New York that prohibits the inclusion in monthly electric bills of inserts discussing controversial issues of public policy. The Court held that the Commission's suppression of bill inserts that discuss controversial issues of public policy directly infringes the freedom of speech protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The state action is neither a valid time, place, or manner restriction, nor a permissible subjectmatter regulation, nor a narrowly drawn prohibition justified by a compelling state interest. Accordingly, the regulation is invalid. 109. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375, 47 S. Ct. 641, 71 L. Ed. 1095 (1927) Synopsis - Under the Criminal Syndicalism Act of California, any person who organized or became a member of any organization that assembled to advocate or teach criminal syndicalism was guilty of a felony. The term criminal syndicalism was defined as any doctrine advocating, teaching, or aiding or abetting the use of crime or violence to accomplish change in industrial ownership of government control. Anita Whitney, a member of a prominent California family, helped organize a California branch of the Communist Labor Party. She held positions on a number of committees and took an

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential active part in the partys convention which she attended as a delegate. The state of California charged that the Communist Party of California was devoted to advocating the violent overthrow of the government, and Whitney was convicted under the Criminal Syndicalism Act for her role in the organization. Whitney asserted that she had not intended the party to become an instrument of violence and that her mere presence at the convention was not a crime. Whitney asserted that the Act was unconstitutional for violating her rights to due process, and freedom of speech, assembly, and association. The Court held that a law that penalizes those who advocate violence as a means of changing industrial and political conditions, but does not penalize the use of violence to maintain such conditions, is not an unconstitutional violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 110. Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24, 91 S. Ct. 1780, 29 L. Ed. 2d 284 (1971) Synopsis - A 19-year-old department store worker expressed his opposition to the Vietnam War by wearing a jacket emblazoned with "fuck the draft. Stop the war." The young man, Paul Cohen, was charged under a California statute that prohibits "maliciously and willfully disturbing the peace and quiet of any neighborhood or person by offensive conduct." Cohen was found guilty and sentenced to 30 days in jail. The Court held that California's statute, prohibiting the display of offensive messages such as "Fuck the Draft," violate freedom of expression as protected by the First Amendment the Court reasoned that the expletive, while provocative, was not directed toward anyone; besides, there was no evidence that people in substantial numbers would be provoked into some kind of physical action by the words on his jacket. Harlan recognized that "one man's vulgarity is another's lyric." In doing so, the Court protected two elements of speech: the emotive (the expression of emotion) and the cognitive (the expression of ideas) 111. New York State Bd. of Elections v. Lopez Torres, 552 U.S. 196, 208,128 S. Ct. 791, 169 L. Ed. 2d 665 (2008) Synopsis This case involved a constitutional challenge brought against New York State's judicial election law, alleging that it unfairly prevented candidates from obtaining access to the ballot. The Supreme Court rejected this challenge and held that the state's election laws did not infringe upon candidates' First Amendment associational rights. Several concurring Justices emphasized, however, that their decision reflected only the constitutionality of the state's election system, and not its wisdom or merit. 112. ProtectMarriage.com--Yes on 8 v. Bowen, Case No. 2:09-cv-00058-MCE-DAD (ED Cal.), P 31. Synopsis This case concerns supporters of Proposition 8 who have experienced extensive acts of harassment including death threats and the ProtectMarriage.com - Yes on 8 committee urged a federal court judge to issue a preliminary injunction prohibiting the state from requiring further disclosure of the committee's donors.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential 113. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 707-710, 120 S. Ct. 2480, 147 L. Ed. 2d 597 (2000) Synopsis - A Colorado statute makes it unlawful for any person within 100 feet of a health care facility's entrance to "knowingly approach" within 8 feet of another person, without that person's consent, in order to pass "a leaflet or handbill to, display a sign to, or engage in oral protest, education, or counseling with that person...." Leila Hill and others, sidewalk counselors who offer abortion alternatives to women entering abortion clinics, sought to enjoin the statute's enforcement in state court, claiming violations of their First Amendment free speech rights and right to a free press. In dismissing the complaint, the trial court held that the statute imposed content-neutral time, place, and manner restrictions narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and left open ample alternative channels of communication. The Colorado Court of Appeals affirmed, and the Colorado Supreme Court denied review. The U.S. Supreme Court vacated that judgment after holding that a provision creating a speech-free floating buffer zone with a 15-foot radius violated the First Amendment. On remand, the Colorado Court of Appeals reinstated its judgment. In affirming, the Colorado Supreme Court reiterated the lower court's conclusions. The court concluded that the statute struck a proper balance between a person's right to protest and a person's right to medical treatment. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the Colorado statute's restrictions on speech-related conduct are constitutional. The Court concluded that the statute "is not a regulation of speech. Rather, it is a regulation of the places where some speech may occur." "Although the statute prohibits speakers from approaching unwilling listeners, it does not require a standing speaker to move away from anyone passing by. Nor does it place any restriction on the content of any message that anyone may wish to communicate to anyone else, either inside or outside the regulated areas. It does, however, make it more difficult to give unwanted advice, particularly in the form of a handbill or leaflet, to persons entering or leaving medical facilities. 114. Federal Election Comm'n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168 L. Ed. 2d 329 (WRTL) Synopsis - Wisconsin Right to Life (WRTL), a nonprofit political advocacy corporation, ran three advertisements encouraging viewers to contact two U.S. Senators and tell them to oppose filibusters of judicial nominees. WRTL intended to keep running the ads through the 2004 election, but the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act of 2002 (BCRA) prohibits corporate funds from being used for certain political advertisements in the 60day period prior to an election. WRTL sued the Federal Election Commission (FEC), claiming that the BCRA was unconstitutional as applied to the advertisements. In 2006, the Supreme Court let the "as applied" challenge proceed (see Wisconsin Right to Life v. Federal Election Commission, 04-1581). In McConnell v. Federal Election Commission, the Court had upheld Congress's power to regulate "express advocacy" ads that support or oppose political candidates, but WRTL claimed that its ads were "issue ads" rather than express advocacy. WRTL also argued that the government lacked a compelling interest sufficient to override the corporation's First Amendment free speech interest. The FEC countered that WRTL's ads were "sham issue ads," which refrain from explicitly endorsing or opposing a candidate but are intended to affect an election. The Court ruled that BCRA's limitations on political advertising were unconstitutional as they applied to issue ads like WRTL's. Chief Justice John Roberts's majority opinion held that the ads

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential were genuine issue ads, not express political advocacy or its functional equivalent (which Congress can concededly regulate). The Court held that McConnell v. FEC did not establish the test that any ad intended to influence an election and having that effect is express advocacy. Such a test would be open-ended and burdensome, would lead to bizarre results, and would "unquestionably chill a substantial amount of political speech." Instead, the Court adopted the test that "an ad is the functional equivalent of express advocacy only if the ad is susceptible of no reasonable interpretation other than as an appeal to vote for or against a specific candidate." The Court further held that the compelling state interests invoked by the government to regulate advocacy did not apply with equal force to genuine issue ads. Neither the interest in preventing corruption nor the goal of limiting the distorting effects of corporate wealth was sufficient to override the right of a corporation to speak through ads on public issues. This conclusion, the Court held, was necessary in order to "give the benefit of the doubt to speech, not censorship." 115. McConnell v. Federal Election Comm'n, 540 U.S. 93, 124 S. Ct. 619, 157 L. Ed. 2d 491 (2003) Synopsis - In early 2002, a many years-long effort by Senators John McCain and Russell Feingold to reform the way that money is raised for--and spent during--political campaigns culminated in the passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002 (the so-called McCain-Feingold bill). Its key provisions were a) a ban on unrestricted ("soft money") donations made directly to political parties (often by corporations, unions, or well-healed individuals) and on the solicitation of those donations by elected officials; b) limits on the advertising that unions, corporations, and non-profit organizations can engage in up to 60 days prior to an election; and c) restrictions on political parties' use of their funds for advertising on behalf of candidates (in the form of "issue ads" or "coordinated expenditures"). The campaign finance reform bill contained an unusual provision providing for an early federal trial and a direct appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States, by-passing the typical federal judicial process. In May a special three-judge panel struck down portions of the Campaign Finance Reform Act's ban on soft-money donations but upheld some of the Act's restrictions on the kind of advertising that parties can engage in. The ruling was stayed until the Supreme Court could hear and decide the resulting appeals. Because the regulations dealt mostly with soft-money contributions that were used to register voters and increase attendance at the polls, not with campaign expenditures (which are more explicitly a statement of political values and therefore deserve more protection), the Court held that the restriction on free speech was minimal. It then found that the restriction was justified by the government's legitimate interest in preventing "both the actual corruption threatened by large financial contributions and... the appearance of corruption" that might result from those contributions. In response to challenges that the law was too broad and unnecessarily regulated conduct that had not been shown to cause corruption (such as advertisements paid for by corporations or unions), the Court found that such regulation was necessary to prevent the groups from circumventing the law. Justices O'Connor and Stevens wrote that "money, like water, will always find an outlet" and that the government was therefore justified in taking steps to prevent schemes developed to get around the contribution limits. The Court also rejected the argument that Congress had exceeded its authority to regulate elections under Article I, Section 4 of the Constitution.

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential The Court found that the law only affected state elections in which federal candidates were involved and also that it did not prevent states from creating separate election laws for state and local elections. 116. Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 110 S. Ct. 1391, 108 L. Ed. 2d 652 (1990) Synopsis - The Michigan Campaign Finance Act prohibited corporations from using treasury money for independent expenditures to support or oppose candidates in elections for state offices. However, if a corporation set up an independent fund designated solely for political purposes, it could make such expenditures. The law was enacted with the assumption that "the unique legal and economic characteristics of corporations necessitate some regulation of their political expenditures to avoid corruption or the appearance of corruption." The Michigan Chamber of Commerce wanted to support a candidate for Michigan's House of Representatives by using general funds to sponsor a newspaper advertisement. The Court held the Michigan Campaign Finance Act violate the First and Fourteenth Amendments and thus, disagreed and upheld the Michigan law. Justice Marshall found that the Chamber was akin to a business group given its activities, linkages with community business leaders, and high degree of members (over seventyfive percent) which were business corporations. Furthermore, Marshall found that the statute was narrowly crafted and implemented to achieve the important goal of maintaining integrity in the political process. 117. NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-429, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 Synopsis - The NAACP was prosecuted for violating a Virginia statute which banned "the improper solicitation of any legal or professional business." The Court held that the activities of the NAACP amounted to "modes of expression and association protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments which Virginia may not prohibit." NAACPinitiated litigation was "a form of political expression" and not "a technique of resolving private differences." 119. Federal Election Comm'n v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 249, 107 S. Ct. 616, 93 L. Ed. 2d 539 (1986) Synopsis - In September 1978, Massachusetts Citizens For Life, Inc. (MCFL), a nonprofit corporation without members, printed 100,000 copies of a special election edition flyer captioned "Everything You Need to Vote Pro-Life." The publication contained the position of state and federal candidates on abortion-related issues. It included at least two exhortations to "vote pro-life" and the statement that "No pro-life candidate can win in November without your vote in September." Photographs of pro-life candidates were also included in the publication. To correct minor errors in the special election edition, MCFL subsequently issued a supplement to the edition. MCFL distributed copies of the two special election editions to 5,985 MCFL contributors and 50,674 noncontributors. MCFL also sent copies to its local chapters for distribution, mailed out copies on request, and left copies in public areas for general distribution. In response to a complaint filed with the Commission, the FEC found probable cause to believe that MCFL's expenditures for the publications (amounting to $9,812.76) had violated the Federal Election Campaign Act's (the Act's) ban on corporate spending in

Attorney Work-Product Privileged and Confidential connection with federal elections. 2 U.S.C. 441b. After unsuccessfully attempting to conciliate the matter with MCFL, on February 22, 1982, the FEC filed suit against MCFL in the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts. The Court held that the law's prohibition on corporate expenditures is unconstitutional as applied to independent expenditures made by a narrowly defined type of nonprofit corporation. The Court's December 15, 1986, decision affirmed an appeals court ruling. The Supreme Court unanimously affirmed the appeals court ruling that, as the FEC had argued, MCFL's expenditures were in violation of 441b. In making this determination, the Court rejected MCFL's arguments to the contrary. In determining whether 441b was unconstitutional as applied to MCFL's independent expenditures, the Court examined the provision's effect on political speech protected by the First Amendment. In ruling that 441b is unconstitutional as applied to MCFL's activities in this case, a decision from which four Justices dissented, the Court first explained that when a statutory provision burdens First Amendment rights, it must be justified by a compelling state interest. The Court disagreed with the Commission's arguments that 441b's prohibition on MCFL's expenditures was justified.