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cosmopolitanism 1nc


cosmopolitanism 1nc


cosmopolitanism 1nc


cosmopolitanism I nc


Inc civic engagement link


link: nationalism prevents cosmopolitanism



nationalism prevents



link: nationalism prevents cosmopolitanism



link: civic engagement


link: civic engagement


link: civic engagement


link: using the state to enforce national idcntity


link: state action


impact: national identity causes extinction


nationalism impacts: wadgenocide


nationalism impacts: warlgenocidc


nationalism impacts: warlgenocide


nationalism impacts: war


alternative solvency-2nc


alternative solvency-2nc


alternative solvency-2nc


alternative solvency


cosmopolitanism solves the case better


cosmopolitanism solves the case bcttcr


cosmopolitanism solves the case better


cosmopolilanism Solves Otherization/lnclusion


cosmopolilanism Solves- globalization impacts


alternative solvency- Public Sphere


alternative solvency- Universal Citizenship


Cosmopolitanism Solves Militarism


cosmopolitanism kcy to environmental protection


cosmopolitanism key to environmental protection


at: impossible lo reject identity


at: realism


at: realism


at: realism


at: cede the polilical


at: cede the political


at: world government bad


at: specific solvency evidence


at: fiat good


at: permutation: do both



at: permutation: do hoth




al: permutation: do both at: we makc nationalism safelcause civic nat~onallsm







safelcause civic




at: wc makc nationalism safehause civic nationalism


A2: Hahermas civic engagement key to civic nationalism


permutation solvency



permutation solvency


permutation solvency


permutation solvency


Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism


nationalism good: globalization


nationalism good: democracy


patriotism good: cede the political


patriotism good: solves racism


patriotism good: democracy


patriotism good: civic cngagernent


at: nationalism bad impacts


at: nationalism bad impacts


at: nazi germany proves nationalism is bad


Alternative fails


Alternative Fails


alternative fails


Alternative doesn't Solvc Public Sphere


Cosmopolitanism causcs intervention


cosmopolitanism fails


cosmopolitanism fails


cosmopolitanism fails


cosmopolitanism fails


cosmopolitanism fails


cosmopolitanism fails


cosmopolitanism Fails- Causes totalitarianism


at: nation state collapse inevitable


at: adorno critique of nationalism


jargon bad


Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism




Bass, 04 (Melissa, Brmdeis University, Docloral Candidatc, Civic Education Through National Service: Lessons from American History, CIRCLE Working Paper 12: March 2004 http://www.civicyouth.orglPopUpslWorkingPapers/WP12Bass.pdf)

CITIZEXSHIP AS PATRIOTISM .4 thud common way of ~tndersundingcitizenship is in terms of patriotism. as a deep commitment to onc's country md fcllow citizens. As described hy Stephen Nalhansnn. patrioik~nmeans having a spcchl alieclion fnr one's country. a personal idenliliution with it. a spccial concern tiir its well-heing. and a willingness lo make muitices to

prnmotc its good 11993: 78). National service, particularly military service, is often framed as a sacrifice citizens should be willing to make in order to protect. defend. or strengthen their nation. However, bv bringing citizens together to accom~lishthese ends, national service can go Surther and reflect and instill identification, affection. and concern. To the degree that national service brings togclher neople from different classes, races. regions and so forth, it may

help to

to help address them, anti sipports them in their endeavor. it may help increase particivants' concern and commitmerlt to the Countrv. PLII

anotkr way. patriotism Can be understood as lovalty - in B~IIChlston's words "the developed capacity to understand, to accept, ond m ~rcton thc core priliciples 01

O~C'Swcictyn (1991: 221) - which national service may be able to foster and reinforce in tangible wavs. While not "S contested ~5

eovernmeat- sminstrred nnli~kalactivism. whelher mlional service should do lhis - whether oatriotism is a rond thine - is own to debate (Mithanson. 1993: Cohen. 1906). in Nmhanuon's framing. patriutism can be exprcsqed in vru'ying degrees. ranging from "rnciderate." to "exlreme," from a proper regard lor one's own homel:bnd to a malevolent disregiud for nthers', from a

commitmenl to helping one's country live up to its ideals to a ratn~nalefnr excusing its wont B~iling,~(also see Hilary htnnnr.

CrGite a Sense of shared national idcntitv. TOthc cxtenl that natinnal service expses panicipants to national needs. prnvidm them with an opponunity



1996). Even in a moderate torn1Iocl Weslheimer and Joseph

Kahne express concern that "a focus on lovaltv

assume are essential to a democratic societv" (2002:12). R~~thcr,given the global, interdependent nature of the economy:

the environment, and human rights, some argue lhat stressinn national citizenship and patriotism is counter-

productive and so advocate framing

workrsl against the kind of critical refleclion and action many

citizenshin in global terms (Nusshum 1996). However. there is much less ofa consensus on thc meaning or

approprialenes!. of global citi~&n\nahipthan on citizenship in general (Coheli 1996). These arc tunhcr reasons why the idei~of citizcnshii. and naliunal service fnr citizenship. is ccinteured.


Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country:

Debating the Limits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 3-5)

Americnns have frequenlly suppnned thc principle 01Bande Mawm. pivinp the fact of being American a special salience in mum1 and politicill dclihcration. a~dpride in a specifically Ameri-

can identity and a specilicslly American citizenship a speck1 power mong the motivations to political action. I klieve. as do Tagore and his chmcter Nikhil. thnt this emphasis On

patriotic pride is both morally dangerous and. ullimatelv, subversive of some of the worthv goals patriotism sels out to serve-for example, the goal of national unity in devotion to worthy moral ideals of ius- tice and eauality. These


shsn argue. would be better served by an ideal that is in any case morc adequate to our situation in (be contemporary wur~d.namely the very old idealOf

the cosmopoli-tan, the person whose allegiance is to the worldwide communitv of human beings. MYanico~etionnfthese issues

is mot~vated,in part. hy my expe- rience working on international qn:~lity-of-lifeissrtes in an institute for development economics connected wilh the United Nations. It is also motivated by the renewal of'appeals to the nation. and na- tional pride, in some reccnt discussions of Americi~ncharacter am! Amcrican education. ln a well-known oped piece in the New York Times (13

17ebruary 1994). philosopher Richard Rorty urges Americans, especiallv the American left, not to

disdain patlintism

as a V:I~LIC, and idmd to give

central importance 10 "the cmotiu~lof naional pride" and "a Sense of shared national identitv." ~ortyN~~IESth81 we cantlot even criticize ourselves wEll

unless WE also "rqioice" in OUT American identity and define ourselves hrnda- mcnt:rby in terms orthat identity. Rorty Seems to hold that the pri-marv all~rnatjve

to a politics based on patriotismand national identity is what he calls a "politics of difference." one based on in-ternal divisions among America's ethnic, racial. religious. and other subrrrouus. He nowhere considers the possibilitv of a

more international basis for political emotion and concern. ws $

isolaleci casc. Rorfy's piece responds 11, and defends Sheldon Hackney's recent call

for a "tKit10nal conversation" to dk-CUSSAmerican identity.~As apmicipant ID its early phase, I was made vividly aware that thc project,


conceived.? pro-posed an inward-looking, task, bounded bv the bordcrs of the na-tion, rather than considering ties of obli~ationand commitment that join America to the rest of the world. AS with Rony's piece. the primary contrast drawn in thc proiect was between a politics based on ethnic and racial and religious difference and a politics based on a shared national idenlitv. What we share as both rational and mulually dependent human beings was simply not on

Lhc agenda.

One might wonder. howcva., how i;w the politics of nationalism I-enllyis frnm the politics of differcncc. The Home and the World t bctlcr known, perhaps, in S;ityajit Kay's

haunt~ngfilm of the sme title) is a tragic story of the defeat of a reasonable and pri~iciplalcosmopulitanism by tk forces of natio11;11ismand ethnncenlrism. I bciieve that 7ap1re sees deeply

wkn he okrrvcs thnt. l7t t~~t~ttomnationalism and ethnocentric particularism are not alien to one an-other. but akin-that

supDort lo nationalist sentiments sub-verts. u~imatc~y.eventhe values that hold a nation together, bc-cause it substitutes a

colorf~lidol for the substantive universal values of justice and right. once someone has mid. I am an lndi~nfirst. a citizen of thc world second. once he or she has made that morally questionable move of self-definition by a morally irrele-van1 charnctcristic, Lhe~iwhat, indeed, will stop that pmon Irom sdyiup. as Tagore's cku;lclcrs so quickly

learn to say. 1am 3 Hindu first. and an Indian second, or I m an upper-caste latdbrd first. IC Hindu second'! Onl~the co~mopolitanStance uf the land- lord Nikhil-so

to give

horingly i~slin the eyes of his young wire Bimsla md his passionate naio~wlist~indsundiphas

slanu: asks us lo give our first allegiance lo what $ morally goud-and that which. being good, I can commend as such lo illlhuman beings.

the promise of transcending these divisions, bemuse only this

Michigan 7week juniors




Smith, 203 (Rogers, Proi'essor of Political Science at University of Pennsylvania and PhD Harvard Univcrsily, Stories Of Peoplehood. Thc Politics and Morals of Political Membership. p. 166-169)

Lt is certaiuly i~n]mrlantto oppose such evulutin~~rydoctrines by all inlellectually crediblc mcans. But many have already been widely discredited: and tcld:ly it maV well prove

salutary, even indispensahle. to heighten awareness of human identity as shared membership in a species engapd inan

ages-long process olachpting to often da~lgerntlsand onfor~ivmgnatun~land mm-mdc environments.'" When we see ourselves in the light of general evolutionary patterns. w kcow awnre that it is gentlinely possible ti~ra species such as ourselves tn soller massive sethacks or even m become extinct if we pursue certain dlan~crouscourucs of action. That outcomc iloes not sum to

be in any human's interest. AM when we retlect on the state of our spcciu today, We See Or should see at least tive major challenges to Our collective

Survival, much less ourcoflective noorishirg.

that mz in some respects truly unprecedented. These are all challenges of

our own making, however,

and so they can all be met through suitably cooperativc human efforts. The first is our ongoing vulnerability to the

extraordinary WCaPOnS of mass destruction tht we have been building during the last half century. The tense anticipations of imminent conflagration that

characterized UI~Cold Warat its worst are now behind 11s. but thc nnc~cararsenafs that were so threatening are ~argelystill with us. and indeed the governments and, perhaps,

terrorist groups possessed of some nuclear weaponry have continued lo proliferate. The second great ~hrratis some son ofenvironmental

dkaster. broughl on by the by-prodncts of our effo~lsu~achieve ever-accelerating industrial and post-industrial prodttction and distribution of an incraliblc rangc of good and scsvices. Whcther it

is global wasmine. the spread of toxic wartes, biospheric disruptions due to new agricuicultum~techniques, or some combination oi these dothex consequences of human

interference with the air. water, climate. anci plant and animal spccics that sustain US, any mai0r environmental disaster can affect all of humanity.

Third, as our economic and technological systems have become ever more interconnected, the dan~erthat maior economic or technological failures in one part of the world might trigger global catastrophes may well increase. Stlch

i~ltcrdcpeudenciescan. to he sure. be n source oisrrength as well as weakness. as American and Eunlpean responses ro thc East Asian and Mexican economic cries of the 1990s indicated. Still. if global capitalism were to wllapse or a lechnuloglcal disaster compwoble to the imagined Y2K doomsday scentulo wese to (%cur. the cnnscqucnccs today would be more far-rcaching than they would have been formmpnrablc dcvclopmcnts in previous centuries. Fourth, as advances in food production, medical care. and other technologies have contributed lo higher infant survival nles and lotlger lives, the wc~rld'spopulation has ken rapidly increasing. placing intensifying pressures on our physical and social environmei~tsUI a great variety of ways. These

demographic trends, necessarily involvinn all of humanity. threaten to exacerbate a11 the preceding problems, generating political and military conflicts. spawning chronic and acutc environmental damages, and straining the

capacities of economic systems. The final majorehllenge we face as a species is a more novel onc. and it is onc that may brinp consciousness of our shared "species in-

tereasu even mcm to the forc. In LIE upcaning cmtury. human beings will increasingly be able to affect their own genetic endowment, in

ways lhat might polenthlly alter the vcry sonof organic species that we m.IIere as with modem weapons. economic processes. and population growth. We face risks that Our

efforts to improve our condition mav no disastrously wrong, potentially endangering the entire human race. Yet the appeal

oic~~dowingour ch~ld~nwith greater gifts is st~fficientlypuwerful thai nrgani~deffons to create such genetic technologies capable of "redesigning humans" nre illrcildy burpco~dng.both anlong

reputable acndemic researchers and less restriuned. but wcli-endowed, fringe

cnough by itself to fos~ermoral outlooks thai rrjett nm>wand invidioos particularistic conceptions of human identity. It is perfectly possible for leaders to feel that

to save the species, policies that run roughshod over thc claims of their rivals are not simply justified but morally

demanded. Indeed. like the wrirers I have emmined he^, my own more eg:~linarianant1cosmoplran moral leanings probably stem originally from religious and Kantian philosophical influellces, not from any consciousness olthe cornmtln "species interest^" of human beings. Rut the ethically constitutive story which contends that we have such interats. arid that we can see them as moral interests, secms quite realistic. which is of some ;ldv,mtage in any such nccuunt. And under the circumstances just sketched. it is likely that more and more people will hewme

persuaded that troday. thuse akd sprcirs interests face more protbund challenges thitn they h~vein *,st of human history. If yo. then ~tre~~ingOur shared identity as

members of an evolving snccies may serve as a highly credible ethically constitutive story that can challenge particularistic accounts and foster support for novel political arrangements. Many morr ~uptmdy come LO feel that it is no longer safe to

conduct their po1itic;ll lives ahsorbed in their traditional comrn~mities,with disregard for oiltsidcrs. without active concern about the hsuer that alfkct the whole species and withoul practical

collabor:~tiveeff~~nstoconfront tho= issus. That consciousness of shared interests has thc potential to promote stronger and much

more inclusive senses of trust, as people come to realize that the dmgws all* challenges they face in common matter more than the differences that will duubtless persist. I think this so11of awwness of a sharcd '"spcciesintnests" also can suppurtsenses of personal and oollectiw worth. though I acknuwlcdgc that this is not ohviot~slyh wsc. Mony people find thc spclacle of lhe human species struggting for survival amidst rival life fonlls aud an unfeeling material worW a bleak and dispirhing one. Many my still feel the need to comhine acceptance of m ~'volutbmryconstitutive stoq with relipic~atior phiIn.wphical accounts that supply some stronger sense of nmral purpose to human and cosmic cxistcncc. But ifpcoplc nrc st1 inclined, then nothing I am advocating here sra~~tlsin the way of such combinations. Many persons, moleover. may well kind a sustaining sense ooT moral wonh in a conceplion of the.m.msclvesas contrib~itorsto a spcies that has developed unique capacities to tieliherate and to act respo~tiibly111 regard to questions m other known species can yet alnceive: how should we liw? Whd relationships should wc havc, individually and collectively. to other people. other life forms, ad the hroader universe? In time. I hope that many more people may collie to agee that hu~u~mityhas shued responsibilities ofstrw;udship for thc 'mimate and physical worlds u-uuod 11s as well &s ourselves, ultimately seeking lo promote rhe florrrishing of all insofar as we are capahle and the finitude of

existence pennits. BU~even shod orsuch a grand sen= ofspecics vcxaticm the idea that we are part of humanity's endeavor to strive and thve

To be sure, iln awareness of thwe as well as otkr potenlial Jangers affecting all h11m;ln kings is not

across ever-greater expanses of space and timc may be one that can inspire a deep sense of worth in many ilnormOSf human beings. Hence it does not sccm unrealistic to hope that we can encourage increased acceptance of a universalistic sense of human pcoplehood lhat may help rein in popular impulses to get swept up in more parochial tales of their identities and interests. III the yearsahedd, this ethical sensibility might foster acceptance of various sorts of

transnatjonal political arrangements to deal with problems like exploitative ;md wildly tluctuathg inicrnational financial and labor markcts. desuuctive e~~vironmcntala~ldagricultural pracliceti, population control. and the momentous ksue of humi~ngenetic mrrdifications. The%arc,after all, problems that appear to need to be dealt with 011a near-global swlc if they are to be dealt with satisfactorily. Greater acceptance of such arrangements would necessarily entail increased willinft~ss10 view existing ~OVC~IIIC~I~Sat all kwls as at ksl only "semi-sovereign;" authoritative over some issucs and not others, in the manner lhsl acceptance of multiple parliculuislic constitutive stories would also reinforce. In the resulting political climatc. il might be~wmeeasier to construct the sons of systems of interwoven democratic international. regional. statc and kwal governments that theorists of "cosn~opolitan democracy." "liberal muI1icultur;ll nationahsrn." and "diffewmiarnl democracy" like David Held, Will Kymlicka, Iris Young. William Connolly. and Juqen Habemas all envision.

Michigan 7 week juniors






Roche, 1997 (Douglas, Progressive Conservative Member of Parliament for Edmonton Strathcona, Canadian Ambassador Sor Disarmament. Membcr of the Senate of Canada. World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity, Edited Joseph Rotblat, Page 139-141) (italics in the original)

Lovaltv to all humankind has both a philosophical and pragmatic imperative. It can be expresscd and taught in a

praclical manner. The multi-dimensional

including the nucletr threat; respect for the principle of non-use

confidence-buildingmeasures; disarmament; maintenance of outer space for peaceful uses; development: promotion of human rights and fundamental freedoms; decolonization; elimination of racial discrimination;enhancing the quality of life; satisfaction of human needs; protecting

the environment. A wide-ranging programme of action is opened up by this definition. Moreover, this approach enables us to comprehend better

that peace is established by thc implementation ofa system of values. Peace demands the attaininn of true human security SO that people everywhere can live free of the threat of war,free of violations of their human rights, free to develop their own lives to attain economic and social progress. All this is clearly an advance in global thinlung. This advance constitutes a signal of hope to a humanity that has for far too long been fractured and frustrated in the attaining of enduring human security. Though patience is requircd, today's turbulence has created an urgent situation. There are too many people suffering. there is too much political fixstration. too much fear of global devastation to allow a mood of passivity. In shorl, loyalty to all humanity means inculcating in people an attitude - not only to the world as

it is but as it can be. It means helping them understand the magnitude of the transformation occumng in the world. It means opening up their powers of creativity so that they do not just cope with the world but enlarge the community around them. As the Club of Rome's latest report. The

agenda for world$ concern has heen sct out by the United Nations: removal of lhreals ro peace,

of force; resolution


conflicts and peaceful setdement of disputes;

First Global Rawlurion.' points out, the global society we arc headinn towards cannot emerge unless 'it drinks from' the

source of moral and spiritual values. Beyond cultures, religions and phjlosophies,there is in human beings a thirst for freedom. aspirations to overcome one's limits, a quest for a beyond that seems ungmspable and is often unnamed.' The militarism, poverty and assaults on nature that conlinue to undermine the global agenda for human security underscore, rather lhan destroy. this resilient human need. Cultural

contradictions. excessive nationalism, loss of identity with its concomitant demoralization must

assertion from a thousand avenues of life that there is meaning - a profound meaning - to the life of every individual

on the planet. The trend line of history is favourable to the empowerment 01individuals because virtuallv

everywhere society is more open and informed. The idea of solidarity is changing from a concept limited to the fanlily tribe to a much

broader concept. while its strictly tribal connotation may be openly discredited.%niversal

community, cmbrace freedom, human rights and responsibililies,family life, equal rights for men and women, compassion for the aged and

disabled, respect for others, tolerance,respect for life and peace, and the search for truth. The firs1 rcquisite in helping people

understand this new reality is to give them a sense of world consciousness in which even individual realizes his or her role as a member of the world community. The historian Paul Kennedy declares that today 'we are all members of a world citizenry', which requires a systcm of ethics.'"he educator Edwin Rcischauer, in his book, Toward the 21st Cerztilvy: Education for a Cha~zgingWorld, said we will never operate successfully unless the bulk of the people develop a sense of world citizenship: This is clcarlv the biggest educational task of all, for millenniums of history have conditioned men to think in terms of smaller and more exclusive units, while suspicion and hostility toward other groups lie deep in their patterns of thought. IS education is to meet its resvonsibilities, it must give young people the stimulus to find and develop better ways of organizing global society lhan by dividing it into hostile, warring factions. Professional educators are the first to know that education can break down feelings of suspicion and hostility and provide an ernuathy for peoples of diverse histories, cultural and religious backgrounds. This is the work of forming young people's attitudes in the new age of transformation. As Virginia Satir notes in The New Peoplemuking: 'Creating peace in the world strongly resembles making Deace in the family'.

be overcome bv thc

norms and values, extending now to the global


Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism





Shaw 99--professor of political science at the University of Victoria--(Karena.


"Symposium: Re-Framing

International Law For The 21st Century: Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political", 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis.)

Political theorists tend not to recognize the violences of sovereignty. our joh bins after the question of the propcr space for politics is

resolved. and we work as diligently as wc can--within that space--to renhr political authority as reprewntativc, Icgitimate. democratic, and just as possible. An examplc of this tendency is Benhabib's recently dited book, Dernoaruc,~and Diffwtci,. 1138 While the analyses and debates in the book about thc chmcter and possibililies of democracy rodny are rich and important, nor one of the authors seriously questions the state or sovereignty as the necessary [*583] geography through which political possibility is constituted. n39

For each. however pcsscd, contlictecl. and limited the capacity of the hestate to respond to contemporary demands, the sovereign state remains the

unquestioned container (and authorizing precondition) for democratic Iheorv. Whatever violence has haupened prior to that space is unfortunate and regrettable, but we work within that space to minimize violence. What if: however, contemporary

cottditions we such that the distinction between "inside" and "outside" that space is increasingly problen~atic?What if the conditions under which the resolulions or sovereignty can define the exclusive space for politics are hecoming increasingly rare? n40 What if. in other words. contemporary material. ideological, economic and political conditions are increasinglyresistant to the particularity of discourses and practices of sovereignty? Whilc part of the staying power of sovereignty may be its elegance. its ability Lo consmin ~mssihilitiesfor thinking olhcrwise or outside of them, surely the far more significant mason for the slaying power of Hobbes' vision is thal it has bccn consistent and symbiotic with the material, economic and political circumstances ol' the day: the development of capitalism, technologies of mansportation,communication and movement: controls over

population; accessible and exploitable entironrnental resources: pautems of education: and so on. In other words. part of the reason soverei!-Vltv has

"worked" when and how it has is related to the presence of the material and economic conditions of ~ossibilityfor it and to the abilitv of these discourses and practices to adapt as these conditions have chanced. Given that these [*585] conditions have--atthe very least--changedsignificantly since Hobbes' time. and seem to be rapidly transforming yet again in our own times it seems reasonable to pose the question of whether the conditions under which

sovereigntv on this model might make sense still pertain., so,forexample, over thc past few centuries, the pattams ofin~lusionand exclusion expressed by sovereignty have been inscribed and reinforced through immi$nlion policies. citizenship and voting policies, bordcr patrols nationalist struggles. the creation of new states. and the divisions ofothers. It would he difficult to assert that these oatterns of inclusion and exclusion simolv "made sense." given the violences that have been cffected to


maintain them. However, thc structures and functioning of mechanisms of communication, transportation. war, economy, and so on, were such that sovereignty "worked" in some cases to the benefit of citizens within particular states,

protecting them from the vagrancies of capitalism. environmental disaster, particular kinds oC violcnces, some forms of discrimination and tjustice. It has never "works as

cffectively for others.which is no accident. of course. givm the particularity, the historical. social and cultural specificity. of the ontology of sovereignty. However, a

technologies--particularly of capitalism, war, and communication--have changed. so have both the potential dangers to citizens and the ability of any given sovcreien vower to ameliorate them. Given this, it is important to pose the question of whcther a territorially bounded, identitv-grounded sovereignty is eilhcr possible or desirable. If it is

not, the perpetuation of the mvtholog~of sovereigntv will provoke ever-increasing levels of violent resistance.

To pose this question is to open the problcm of whether we should read Ihc movements that Benhabib argues are struggles for identity as, rather, expressions of political conflicts that exceed the possibilities of an identity-based sovereignty to effectively address. What is, according to sovereignty discourse, the "non-politics" of what hawwns prior to relations of'governance (the effects of the production of the ontological foundation that enables governance),

is really where the action is these days'? 1141 What if, for example. instead of only or primarily reading contemporaly movements as demands for "inclusion" at the level of relations of governance, we read them as resistances and challenges to the violences of sovereignty- constitutionand subjectivity constitution'?In other words, what if we read them not only as calls for more inclusivc idcntities, but as effects of the

violcnce produced by and thus as critiques of the identity/differencearchitecture for the basis of legitimate political authority?


crucial to

d If we

simply refuse to consider what sovereigntv discourse effects (the distinctions between inside and outside, domestic

and international, politics atul WW. legilimale and I*~RII illegitimate violence. citizens and foreigners. mm ad women. sine and mad. modern and

primitive) and what it conceals (the traditions under which these distinctions are made) we thus contribute to a continuation of the mytholorv that these distinctions (and their constitutive violences) are beyond thc political. We reinscribe them as nccessary and natural, rather than as necessarv and contingent and produced through violences that are both ~Iipplingand ~on~titutiveof ~ersonaland political possibilitv. What differencemight it make to open these questions'! Rathcr than

cxclusivcly klcosing on rnakinE nicer idcntitiea. we could ask questions ahnut the condiiions-themeve highly polilical and onen intolc~~hlc--underwhich we come to rcly on identity as the f 01. political aulhority, and the effects of this reliance. We could ask questions about whether we csu recc>nstitnteibese conditroos. about whcther we can remicula[s the necessities and violences olpolit~cdpossibility.

Michigan 7week juniors Cosmopolitanism



Cohen 99--PH.D Political Science; Sociology Columbia University--(Jean L., "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos", International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3,245-268, 1999).

T~Cbackground presuppsihn of the modunpwsdigm of cilirenshipis thal citizenship involves membership in a sovereign. territorial nation- state within a system of states. The nation-state is not onlv a territorial organization monopolizing legitimate rule within a bounded space. it is also, as Brubaker rightly argues, a membership organization (Brubaker, 1992). Citizenship in such a state is an instrument of social closure. It always has an ascriptivc dimension and it always establishes privilege insofar as it endows members with particular rights denied to nonmembers (today, primarily, the resident alien or foreigner). Thus, in the modern system of states, the republican ideal of the self-determining demos merges with the sovereign state's interest in control over all those in the territory through the construction of national citizenship as a formal category of membership. Exclusion and inequality, not inclusion, thus attach to

citizenship seen as a membership principle (~rubaku,1992).

TO be sure, certain republican political thcorists noted long ago the tendency of the nation-

state to violate the editxian logic of constitutional democracy by fostering inequality and exclusion vis-a-\% national minorities and aliens. Hannah Arendt (1973) argued that

his danger is ntrinsic to the netiowstate system. Because the nation-state eauates the citizen with the member of the nation it collapses a politicalAepa1 category into a category of identity and perverts the egalitarian logic of the constitutional

state by rendering those who

problem lies in the reduction of the political vrinciple of citizenship to a substantive exclusionary conception of

collective identity: nationality. Accordingly Arendt nrgued fordisaggregating citizenship from ascriptive criteria of national belonging (ethnic or cultural) and

insisted that civil and political rights or citizens should not be allocated on the pre-political basis of nationnlity. States should not he nation-slates but civic polilics lhat gant

citizenship on legal crilerin (Arrndt, 1973).

on some form or this argument including contempraq theories of libcral vuitiosalism (Bmhaker. 1992: Habern~as,1995: Miller, 1995; Tamir. 1W3; Viroli, 1995). The revival of

this discourse in recenl ywrs is a response to the resurgence of ethno-. racialized and very illiberal or anti-democralic versions of nationalistlcommunilarianidentity politics.

The fear that such nationalisms undermine liberal and democratic institutions motivates political lhcr>riststo draw distinctions belween good and pernicious forms of political identity, and between open and inclusive as opposed to essen-tialized and inegalitarian criteria of belonging and access lo citizenship. BU~we cannot lea*

are not members of the nation imlslicitly into second-class citizens. on the republicall account,

Every attempt to distinguish civic from etl~nicnationalism. or civic/constitutional pauiotisni Cram nationalist commonitilrianism, relies

the mattw there. FOTthere is anothu set or

contradictions inherent in he nation-state system that Arrndt noted, nmrely the tension bchveen the rule of law and the concept of sovereignty regdrdless of whether it is attributed

to the nation. to the state or 10 the people (the demos). Arendt understood lhal the attribution of exclusive territorialitv and inviolable

sovereignty to each nation-state over internal matters contributed to the willingness of states to deprive non-citizens of basic rights and to threaten the rights of national minorities,even if they were citizens. It is the presumed sovereinntv of the territorial nation-state, however democratic, that is at thc heart of the ambiguity notcd above, namely whether the legal status of the rights-bearing individual is eranted lo all human beings or onlv to the citizens of a particular stale.

Until quitc rccently the dilemma wab resolved everywhere in thc same way: legal persnnhood \x8r.ilsanichcd to citimnshi~~stalus in il discrete sialc. Rights ol'noo-cilize16depended on the stale's (as represcntarivc of the sovereign dcmos') will and on litlle rlse. Arendt and other demncracic republican political theorists tricd to moncik the egalitarian universalisLic principles they Dclieved

in wilh thc dixretencss and exctusiamy logic ol'dcmocntic citi~en~hipin the modem ~u2digmUI two ways: fist, by applying i~niversalismto the idea ofciti~enshipas membership, such that citiz*nship itsclr homes Ihc corn human risht: everyone born uiiu a territcuial state has the ilzhr lo citizenship within it and ought not to he deprived of it (Arendt, 19491. Second, democracy and the rule ol'hw could he recowiled if, inlernally. the claim ta unificd sovereignty by the stat6 (representing the demos) is rsistcd, disaggregated and contmlled through a constitutionalism which establishes and limits powers hy goerantecing rights, hy creating an overall separation and balance of powers, and by creatinl: counrw-powers through emling a federalist stmctiirr. Cunslitulionalismofthis son would recuncile democratic self-n~lcof thc demos, slate power and the n~leof law by denying the claim of absolute sovereignty lin the scnsc of l~~ibussolutus) of thc starc' nr of its panict~larorgans I ArenQt. 1963;Aralu. 1995: 202-4.) 'l'hm arc scveral thwretic;~land normative in;rdcquacies with this solutic,n. I address three of them. Pust, thc asurnpiion that the 'excli~sivcwssof the demos' is simply a function ol rr~lcsor access to cnizenship that 6t1.c~~prc-political (ethnnlcultural)instead of universalislic legal c~dteriais wrung. As I already indicated. if the democr~ticcomponent ofthe citilenship principk is interpreted to entail self-mlz hy a self-deternliaing demos (directly or thugh its Rptsent:ltivcs). 'and ifthis idea merges with Ihe conccpt of the suwreign state that n~lesall the inhabitants of a territory, then such a polity will be a nation-state.and the demos will incvilably undersvand itself as a nation.

Democratic citizenship in a slate entails a distinction between members and non-citizens, and it inevitably becomes a pole of identity-formation and identification even in the most liberal democratic constitutionally articulated states. T~CVCY ambiguity of the term 'national' implies as much: it is used bolh as a synonym for a state's citizenry (to be a French

national is to be a French citizen) and, at the vrr?, least, as acultural category of col~ectiveidentity. Even if citizenship laws are open and 'civic', even if

civic patriotism is all that is legally required of new and old citizens, even if the idenlilyof the nation is understood as an amalgam and open to constant reinternretation, national citizenship tends to 'thicken' and to take on a cultural connotation and identity over time (Hollinger. 1995: Lind, 1-5).

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Falk 04--~rofessorof international Law and Practice at Princeton University, Yale Law School (1955); J.S.D., Harvard University; Been on the editorial boards of about ten journals md magazines; Chairman of the Consuttative Council. Lawyers' Committee on American Policy

Toward Vietnam-. (Richard A.,

"The declining wortd order : America's imperial geopolitics", 2004, Rouiledge, pg 171-172)

The essential argument of this chapter is that the rise or transnational economic forces during the 1990s exerted n major influence on the understanding and pnctice of citizenship that mmks itself off fmm the preceding yrritxl of statism, as well as the emergent subsequent period of global wnrfarc directed at overcorning the challenges of megaterrorism. In

the pre-i990s, the Westphalian model of world order based on a society of states prevailed to such an extent as to associate citizenship, as a meaningful dimension of political participation, unconditiondlv with full membership by persons in a particular sovereign state.' The state. with the reinforcing: support of international law. deliberately appropriated the idea and practice of nationality by denying claims of "nationality" on the part ol ethnic and

religious minorities, attaching the slatus of citizen only to nationality understood iuridicallv as applicable lo all

persons who ~ualifv,regardless of identity.

effort WBS not consistenlly successful. Periodic attempts were made hy dissatisfied minorities to nxonfigurc the boundaries of states or lo establish zones of aulonomy within

existing boundaries, if not to breakaway en~itelytofonn a state ortheir OM.

The rise of "nationalism" as the basis for community was itself a

As a result, the state ignores the divergent ~lationalistidentities and loyalties of its n~inorityinhahitants. This

maior dimension of the secularizing process that accompanied the rise of statism lrom the seventeenth century onward, and was complementary to the determined effort to exclude religious and ethnic intluences from the vublic

sphere of governance. But this statist approach to citizenship often reached ambiguous results in practice. The insistence On conflating juridical

ideas of membership and affiliation with a more sDontaneous politics associated with identitv and desire gave rise to

resi~tancethat assumed varying- f0IXTl.S. 'The main sources of popular resistance lo this dominant statist trend arose mng groups that perceived themselves as marginalized 811ddissatisfird with political identity's prevailing legal ~urangcmmts.This often reflected intense ethnic attachnienls or arose fro111strong mtisec~~l;lrrefusals to

suprsede religious solidarity and rtccepr a tieid separation of church from state. Such captive "nations" remained trapved within state

boundaries generating autonomv and secessionist movements designed to achieve a maximal overlap of personal and group solidarity, nations. and stales in fully legitimate political units, what were claimed to be "natural political

exemption From and protection of their

special status when physiodly present in various non-Western counhies, an invidious dep,uture from territorial law that inculcated relations of superiority and inferiority, leading

the latter over time to resist and revolt. Despite these qualifications. the core reality of citizenshin in thc modern era could be accurately related to the territorial domain of the sovereign state. To be sure. there were all alon~idiosyncratic and visionarv claims of "global citizenship,"particularlv in the aftermath of the two twcnticth century world wars; bul these claims were usually animated by antiwar fervor and associated with isolated vearnin~sof individuals for world government. world peace. and affirmations of human solidarity. These plobalizing perspectives never acquired grassroots backing, remaining- so marginal in their ~oliticalrelevance as to bc treated as sentimental anomalies of an overwhelminply statist realitv and of no ~0nceptualOr political importance. Exempl~qindividuals seemingty

communities." Also, especially during the culonial period, citizens of colonial powers were given varying degws of exuaterritorial

dedicating their lives and energies to humanity. such as Alhen Schweitzcr and Dag Hanunxskjold. welz often identified as "c~dzensof the world" or "world citizens," giving a cemin weight to this ideal~stimage of an essentially unified human species.'

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Nussbaum 96 (Martha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country:

Debating the Limits of Patriotism,ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 14-5)

4. We make a consistent and coherent asument based on distinctions we arc prepared to defend, In Richard Rortv's and Sheldon Hackney's

eloquent appeals to shared values. there is something that makes me very uneasv. They seem to argue effectively when they insist on the centrality to dem- ocratic deliberation of certain values that bind all citizens together. But why should these values, which instruct us to ioin hands across boundaries of ethnicity, class, nendcr. and race, lose steam when they get to the borders of the nation? By conceding that a morally arbitrary boundary such as the boundary of the nation has a deer>and formative role in our deliberations, we seem to deprive ourselves of any principled way of persuading citizens they should in fact ioin hands across these other barriers. For one thing. the verv

same grouus exist both outside and in-side. Why should we think of people fromchina as our fellows the ninute they dwell in a certain place,

namely the United States, but not when they dwell in a certain other place, namely ~hina?Whatis it about the national boundary that ma~icallv

converts neople to- ward whom we are both incurious and indifferent into ~eoplcto whom we havc duties of mutual respect'! I think. in short, that we undercut the very case for multicultural respect within a nation by railing to make

central to

education a broader world respect. Rich- irrd Rorty's patriotism may be a way of hringinga11 Americans to- gether; but

patriotism is verv close to iinaoism, and I'mafraid I don't see in Rorty'sargument any proposal for coping with this very ohvious danger. Furthermore, the defensc of shacd national values in both Rorty and Hackney. as I understand it. requires appealing to cer- tain basic features

of human personhood that obviously also tran- scend national boundarics. SO if we fail to educate children to cross those boundaries in

their minds and imaginations, we are tacitly giving them the message lhat we don't rerlly mean what we say. We say that respect should be accorded to humanity as such. hut we really mean Ulat Americans as such arc worthy of special re- spect. And that. 1 think, is a story that Americans havc told for fa too long.

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Nussbaum 96 (Marlha, Brown Philosophy Professor, "Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism," For Love of Country:

Debating theLimits of Patriotism, ed. Nussbaum and Cohen, pp. 6-8)

When Diogenes the Cynic replied, "I am a citizen of the world," he meant, apparently, that he refused to be defincd by his local origins and group memberships, so central to the self-image of the more universal aspirations and concerns. The Stoics, who fol- lowed his lead, further developed his image of the kosrnou poliles (world citizen) arguing that each of us dwells. in effect, in two communities-the local community of our birth, and the comrnunitv of human argument and aspiration that "is truly great and truly common, in which we look neither to this comer nor to that, but measure the boundaries of our nation by the sun" (Seneca, Dc Olio). it is this community that is, fundamentally, the source of our moral obligations. With resuect to rhc most basic moral values, such as iustice, "We should regard all human beings as our fellow citizens and neighbors" (Plutarch, On the Fortunes of Alexander). We should regard our deliberations as, first and foremost, kliber- ations about human problems of oeoule in particular concrete situ- ations, not uroblems growing out of a national identity that is alto- gether unlike that of others. Diogenes knew that the invitation to think as a world citizen was, in a scnse, an invitation to be an exile from the comfort of patriotism and its easy sentiments, to see our own ways of lifc hm the point of view ofjusticc and the good. The accident of where onc is born is just that, an accident; any hu- man being might have been born in any nation. Recognizing this, his Stoic successors held, we should not allow differences of na- tionalitv or class or ethnic membership or even gender to erect barriers between us and our fellow human beings. We should rec- ognize humanity wherever it occurs, and five its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respecl. This clearly did not mean that the Stoics were proposing thc ah- olition of local and national forms of political organization and the crcation of a world state. Their point was cvcn more radical: that we should give our first allegiance to no mere form of novernment, no temporal vower, but to the moral community made up bv rhc humanity of all human beings. The idea of the world citizen is in this way the ancestor and the source of Kant's idea of the "king- dom of ends," and has a similar function in inspiring and regulat- ing moral and political conduct. One should always behave so as to treat with equal respect the dipnitv of reason and moral choice in every human being. It is this concept that also inspires Tagorc's novel. as the cosmopolitan landlord struggles to stem the tide of nationalism and factionalism by appeals to universal moral norms. Many of the speeches of the character Nikhil were drawn liom Ta- gore's own cosmopolitan political writings. Stoics who hold that good civic education is education for world citizenship recommend this attitude on three grounds. First, they hold that the studv of humanity as it is realircd in the whole world is valuable for self-knowledge: we see ourselves more clearly when we see our ways in rclation to those of other reason- able peoule. Second, they argue, as does Tagore, that we will be better able to solve our problems if we face them in this way. No theme is decper in Stoicism than the damage done by faction and local alle- piances to the political life of a group. Political deliberation, they argue, is sabotaged again and aeain bv artisan lovalties, whether to one's team at the Circus or to one's nation. Only by making our fundamental allegiance to the world community of iustice and rea- son do we avoid thcsc dangers. Finally, they insist that the stance of the kosmou polites is intrin- sicallv valuable, for it recogni~csin pcople what is esueciallv fun- damental about them. most worth^ of reswct and acknowledg- ment: their asuirations to iustice and goodness and their capacjties for reasoning in this connection. These qualities may be less color- ful than local or national traditions and identities-it is on lhis basis that the young wife in Tagore's novel spurns them in favor of qualities in the nationalist orator Sandip that she later comes to sec as superficial-but they are, the Stoics argue, both lasting and deep.

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Hayward, 04 (Clarissa Rile Hayward, Ohio State University Department of Political Science, Constitutional Patriotism and Its Others, the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, 2004

A second, a~dpotentially more wciphty objection centcrs on the relative Icgitimacy of constitlitional patriotism's exclus~ons. A Habermasian might concede that principled forms of

binding exclude: that the civic wc is necessarily defincd with rererencc to somc constitutive outside: that it is never fi~llyinclusive. However. shc might argue, this mCanS no

more than that the role for the political theorist must be to search for a way to define the civic we as inclusively as

possible: i.e

to approximate as cbseiy as possible the unattainable idcal of "democratic citizenship."


cannot eliminate the tension belween democratic principles and civic

ideals." she might ask (rhetorically). "should we wt a1 ki~tsearch for ways to minimizc it?" By this view, the relevant queslion is 1101. "Do principled definitions of thc civic 'wc' excludc?" but: "Whm do they exclude. and on what gmi~nds'? Some grounds for exclusion are normatively objectionable. bul others are not. Constitulional patriotism, the Habcrmasian nlight suggest, although ituieed it excludes, cxcludes in ways that are legitimate. The objection is not without br~e.Granted. there are. from a liberal dcmocratic perspective. beuer and worse Corms of political exclusion. Recall the dual demands that lute every democratic polity: demands for cohesion, which. above, 1suggested posc "hinding problems." and demands for inclusion, which I argued pose "boundaryproblems." If one couhl imagine the univcrsc of identities and potential doubt som would perform one or both or these functions poorly. or perhaps not at all. Some identities and some potential identities would prove imapable of generatine a civic bond sufficient to create cohesion ilcmvs lincs of interest andor paticulwislic irlentilirx.?tim. Others arbitrarily wouki exclude large numbers of pcople ador would Cue1extreme forms of vhlence and aggression duwred nr the exc111ded. Yet there is a range of idcnlities and pntential identities that one might think about as mectiny a minimal rlueshold for bolh cohesion and inclusiwness. Within this set. the second Habem~asianobjection suggests, should not the g~>albc lo

maxinlize cohesion and inclusion. or at kast a find UI optimal tr'xde-off between the two'! On a purely analytic kvrl, this apprts~hwms reasonable. However, given thdt

even relatively cohesive and inclusive political identities necessarily excludc, in practice, it can generate

comulacencv with respect to whichcver exclusions obtain. The principal diflicultv, in otherwords. with approaches to

bil1ding;lnd bon~ldqproblenisthat define an unattainable ideal

ideal, is that they function to legitimize the deficits of their own avvroximations. With rcsp~tto Habermos'il variant ofconslit~nional

patriotism. my worry is not simply that it exclodes illiberal and anti-democratic olhers. It is ako, and principnlly. that because it claims to do so on normativelv unobjectionable grounds. it

legilimizcs those vergexclusinns. Hence. as evidenced by the recent policies and practices of the Bush administration, it can serve

to fuel aggressive attitudes toward. and actions aimed, at its others.

between democratic principles and civic ideals, and to exploit that tension with a view to promoting contestation

over the boundaries that delineate the civic we. For an iltastratinn of whst SU~IIcontesration might Ike. I want to canqidcr bricfly some of Habermas's reccnt interventio~isinto political debates amor Cia~nanidentity. i~houtGerman asylum policy and citizenship law, and about Lhe pusibility of a transnational Ruropeau political ideruity.41 In his capacity as il political philosopher. 1hsve suggested. Habems aims lo discover a normatively unobjectionabb sct of civic exclusions: exch~sionswhich the claim to universabry it~nctionsto legitimi~e,rendering constirutional patriotism vulnerable to what. at times, can he treacherot~sforms ofillibtml and anti-democratic abuse. In his rolc as a political actor. however. he does something rather difrcrent. tIe argues pliblicly for a recontipration or the collective self-understanding of Ihe German pcople, and of the shape of the boundaries thal define and delimit that people. Ile issues a call for the conscious collective construction of nw, more expansive civic boundaries, which would define a trans- ~iationalEuropcan political identity. Hahermas advances nrgumcnts. that is to say, for the redefinition of a civic we: arguments that aim, priormatively, to act upon. or in ways that affect. its buundwies. In this more political cspacily, he works to unsettle for his audiencc the sense that "'democntic citimnship" has been achieved. Such interventions can be understootl as instances of what Ernesto 1.aclau and Chantal Mouffe call "hcgcmonic stnlggle."42 If thcy were lo sucwe&if IIakrmas were to pnuade the German, andlor the broader European public to i~flderstmdthcmsclvcs as self-consciously and post- ni~tic~nallywnstit~~tedpolitical peoples-then it likely would appear to future generations as if "'dmocntic citiwnship" always had heca [ot~ndedon constitutimal norms and valucs. but Gel-nian !atid other) nationalists simply had failed tu reillize this was so.43 Yet Laclau and Mouffe would urge denuxnts to resist the templation to be s~tkficdwill] this new definition: to view it as a good-enoi10 approximalion of an impossible id&~l.I~xtcial: they wuuld suggest, we should regard and approach u as a Jefnition that ~uctssinlyintroduces a new set of exclusions. ICthe task uf the political theorist prior to this inlerventiun was to uncover and to expse the exclusm~nsdefined by the extant interpretation of "democratic cilize~~ship."then. aner the intervenlnn, her task

rcmains the yam.

latter eniphasiws theconlenl of tk dfl~nitinnof "democratic citizenship," aiming to discover that co~~tentwhich best ;~ppl-c~ximatesthe (onasninahlel ideal. thc fornlcr emphui~sthe struggle

itself to define and to re-define that content. BYLaclau and Mouffe's V~W,this struggle is intrinsically valuable. both because it

of "democratic citizenship," and then work to approximate that

A better tack is to highlight the tension

The principal ditfcrence bet wen^ on the one hand. this appmach. and on thc other, Habermir.s's ss articulated in his more striclly philosophical lbl. while the

helps unsettle

extant understandings of the civic "we" and because it ekbodies democratic fre4om.a Democracy requires theconstittttioo ofa

hounded "pcoplc." and therefore necessarily prnduces exchdons. This effect enjoins the democrat. not to rcsolvc the tensio~ibetween de~nocraticprinciples ad civic ideals. by dcvising a

minimal andlor an nnobjcctionable set of exclusions. hut rather 10 lind ways m shape social and political institutions and practices such that they promote the ongoing interrogation of, and

suppo~tstmgglcs aimed at challenging. whiihcvcr escloaons obtain,

mechanisms that discoutage. for example. the pruduction and the mmhacnanccof idenlities that are explicitly intolerant. Bt~tthat IS not enough. In addilion. democralic illclu~ion

requires an active politics of identity contestation: a politics that. I want to stlggesr. consists in both deconstructivc and

reconstructive contestatory praclices. such a politics wouu be L-haranerized. by forms ofcontrsvation that draw attention to t~ieexclusions prodo~xdhy extant definitntns of thc civic wc: that advance wguments about what is wrong with those exclusion$: andlor thw voice claims for inclusion on bchnlf of at Ieasl sum of the excluded. One c~unpkor such deconsuuctive iitentity-contestation is Ihktmu's own critique of the difkrential trealmnt that German citizenship law ilccords. nn the ant! hand. so- called '$uest wurkers." and on the other, those who we considered '2thn1c (ierm:~ns." Cienmns, Hahermiw urgues, should nnt define membership in their political sclcietyalong liner oi presumed ethnic and cultural sameness, since to do so iq to fail m Lake into account significant mocll obligations, such asthose owed the immisrants whom state oflicials acctivcly rccmitd to serve as a WUIIX of cheap labor in the,

postwar ym3.45 Political ident~ty-conteaationmust involve. as well. efforts to anicalntc altcmative definitions of tk civic "we": trr offer accounts. that is, of how a pwicular political society


To be sure. prl of this task musl involve tinding ways lo avoU the most extreme terms of exclusion: institulio~ial

definc and nurture a cohes~vc~dentily.accounts which depart hm the dominsnt and/or the status quo drfmition.

Let me illu~tratc.agiain. with an example drawn from Habermas's

rccenl political writings. this time Irom his intervenlions into lhc historians' dehate about &man political i~kntity.I-IereHahermas argues ag.zinsl thc claim that Genna~isshould strengthen ethno-culturally particularistic understandings of tbet political identity via stories that miti7e and "normnlizc" thc nqtio~t'sNazi p~st.Instead, his claim is. the German people consciously sheuld rwonstruct its political idenlity, drilwiny on its "ties to thc Wcst's Enlightenment culture."4b They shr~olddo so. Habermas srcuas. lhmugh a process ulcrilical reflection and debatc that involves the ptublematization and the zpudiation olwhdt he calls Germany's most "disastrous hditions."47 To the extent that H;iberms advances these and similar clainu: for consritotional

patriotism as a form of pc~liticalinterventinn, his work is an instance of what I want to suggest is a demwmtically invalt~~blcform oleontestatory politics. MYq~a~el,then, &

not with such political interventions per se. but with Habcrmas's more programmatic affirmations of constitutional

patriotism. My cowern, in other wards. centers on a cenain way of regarding this reconstructive task: on understanding ix us an endeirror that might one day end, when somcone finally

gets it right, when some political philosopher finilll? discovers the most inclusive possible defmition ofLwhowc are."


& indeed, every definition Of the civic We

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produces exclusions, then the trouble with such an approach is that it deflects altcnlion from the very exclusions ekcted by contestalory reconstructions. Better an interative process. whereby deconslruclion accompanies every successful reconstruction, whereby plural forces contend. continually. to define and to re-dcline the terms that bind and bound the demos. 1t is not the case, then, that the political theorist's principal role is to provide the best possible content to the civic we: to reveal that "we" should define ourselves with reference to liberal and democratic principles, rather than, say, ethnic origin. To the contrary, her most crucial task is to dislurb thc very sense of having achieved a statc of "wew-ness.and hence to provoke democratic contestation over the terms that define who "~e"are.

111.Junerici~npolitics today. an important pan of that lask i~lvolvsshighlighting and drawing critical attenlion to the rnk of"terror'. as the constitutive outside of civic idenlily.

Ten, or twenty, ca fifty years from now, it will mcan ~0mCthlngdifferent. In tltis essay, 1 have argued that constihttional parriotism. as developed itnd defended by Jiirgeo Uzberrnas. fails to resolve the tension hetween democmiic and civic idedu th:~tb conrtitutive of democratic politics. In concluston, I wmt to sketch some insigh& this dis&ussion yields for those concerned oi

pmmoie both public-regarding crvtc engagement and detnnaatically inclusive collective self-determination. 'fhe argilmenl supges~s,for onc, that the tension between

democratic principles and civic ideals may be at its most extrcmc when what is at stake is a fixed and a sinpular

citizen-identity. Hence tkorLsis concerned with democratic citimnship's binding and boundary prohiems would do well to devote attention to reccnt wcork on multiple and overlapping, and in what Aihwo Ong hos termed '-tlcxiblc" citizcnship. including those forms of citizenship thal travem nation-sratc boundaries. Somc scholus point to the Europeo~Union as defining unponant new forms of transnatic>nnlcitizenship. for instance. Others vicw dinspuran identities as evidence of transnational political idenlification. Still others point to the allegiances forged in international civil society as signs of emerging transnaiional practices of civic solidarity.48 1 do no1 wi~n~to suggest. howcvcr, that moving in this direction will provide an euy answer or a solution to problems of "democratic citizcnship." To thc contrary. it seems likely that. to the extent that cilizemhip hecomes multiple and kxible, it surrelxlws some of its binding capacily. At thc same time. because people am differentially positioned to "flex" their flexible citizenships, il is far from evident that transnational righLs, obligations, and rolidiuilics ywantes

democratic equality and inclusiveness. Instcad. thc argument suggests what may strike some renders as a bs patilying conclusion: thal politics that promote civic ideals

often depend uvon boundaries that are, from a democratic uersuective, arbitrary, and that a commitment to democratic principles can recommend disrupting the binding work citizenship performs. The tension between democratic principles and civic ideals is a chronic tension. Yet it is a tension that can be productive of democratic contestation, since the very aspiration to "democratic citizenship7'-i.e., to a binding civic identity that is democraticallv inclusive<an propel the challenge of whichever exclusions obtain. And it can do so again, and again, and again.



Abowitz in '03 (Kathleen, Associate Professor Educational Leadership at Miami University, International Conference on Civic Education Research in New Orleans, "The dominant discourses of citizenship in American life

and schooling". November,

CArticulations of ]wlilical community in this dismurse focus on comnuonnlity, consensus, and unity. Ilnlike the exclusive cltrb of ancient Athcnion democr.xy. where only a small group of Ihe

adults were actually given rights of citizenship. civic republicans do often communicate an awnrencss of a multicultural An~erica.Still, asOldham (1998) describa. ClVlC republican

discoursc largely maintains the benefits of ~XC~US~V~~Y.All discourses of citizenship must define hountlaries (of rnemhership. of benefits, of rights. of

dnties). but the civic republican discourst: draws he sharpest lines of incl~lsionand exchsinn in its expressions of poli~iolllmemkrship. "In choosinv an identity for

ourselves, we recognize both who our fellow citizens are. and those who are not members of our community, and thus who are potential enemies" (Ibid., 8 1). Oldham states that this idea 01exclusivity, which lies at the heart of the civic republican tradition, gives priority to political community, when necessarv. over universalist or humanist ethics. For example, particularly in times of war or economic threat. the needs of nation suverccde global or cosmopolitan ethics - recall the nationalisl rhetoric that introduced the Nation at Risk (National Commission on Excellence in Education, 1983) under the threat of a strong Ja~aneseeconomy. Similarly, after 9/11/01 Lvnne Chenev stated that "the most important civics lessons for American children are found in American history" (2002,



p. XX).

Civics, it is implied here. does not involve a study of world historv except as a secondary matter -stt~denls

primarily need to know abont dimcult accomphshments of slaning and maintaining our democratic sucicty 12002, 14). Otherwise. our democratic society will not be reprodumd in future grnerdlions. Pulure generalions of U.S. citizens arc of gave concern lo civic republicans. and teas in this discoorsc cnlphasuc cognilive learning aboul democracy's history and institutions,

The civic revublican discourse strongly values civic knowledge, sometimes called civic literacy (~ilncr2002). as an essential

component of citizcnship. Civic educatiw has to do with students gainins the right mount of civic kmwledgr. virtues. iind skills lo successTully engage in the pmcess of dclnocracy (Butts

198%Milner 2002: Nic. Junn and steh~ii-wiy,1996). Such civic knowledge would focus on American history. institutions, seminal - texts (Constitution, Bill of Rights, etc.), reserving a lesser place for more humanistic, intcrnalional. and critical

content and pedagoay. Many knls in this discourse hemoan the diminished civics ofikrings in high schools, and the diminished scores that U.S.studenus receive in tests on civic kn~vilafgccompared with uthcr naiions (Quigley 2003.2. N.mP repon card. 1999).>

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism



Cohen 99--PH.D Political Science; Sociology ColumbiaUniversity4Jean L., "Changing Paradigms of Citizenship and the Exclusiveness of the Demos", International Sociology, Vol. 14, No. 3, 245-268, 1999).

The m~ltnolcriricisms leveled hy advocates of each position often hit their mk. It

certilinly easy to point Out the abstractness

of ~osmopo~itan

individualism, its failure to take particular identities (political and cultural), contexts and traditions into account, as well as its quixotic effort to coniure away the discreteness of the political and to replace it with universalistic juridical relations based on the most abstract identity of all: humanity (henat. 1973: Cohen, 1996).Republican md democratic tl~rwrislsarr:

risht to insist that 'humanity', even if positivized into 'legal personhood', is too thin an identity to motivate much mobilization, participation or solidarity on its behalf. They

are also right to insist that democratic political institutions and active citizenship are indispensable for determining, the common good and .for protecting liberty, both public and private. ~lx:reciprocal i~~usiollsof civic republicanis~nare less ohvious. and 1 come back to them later, but certainly they include a peculiar naivete visa-vis the exclusiveness, particularism and arbitrariness that are usually at work when sovereign states or sovereign citizens delimit membershia in the demos and articulate the special rights of citizens. Our choice is not between liberal universalism that is focused on human rights and the rule of law US democracv construed as the sovereign self-determination of a people whose representatives have exclusive rule over all the affairs and inhabitants of a territory. This old antinomy between rights and democracy

(reminiscent ofcar1 Schmitt)re-emerges today

because theorists fail to adequately analyze the citizenship principle and to

transcend core assuniptions of a now anachronistic paradigm. Thus neither approach is able to discern whar I considerossibilities for a new paradigm of citizenship and new political forms of organization.

Michigan 7 week juniors




Shaw 99--professor of political science at the University of Victoria-( Karena, "Symposium: Re-Framing International Law For The 219 Century: Feminist Futures: Contesting the Political", 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis.)

If sovereignty is broadly constitutive of political possibility, why not simply assume it so that we can get on with our malyses and our progressive practices? As Benltabib notes,

manv conlemporary movements articulate their demands in languages of sovereigntv and identity, ;md thus lend themselves to being read as she does: as demands for identity production or recognition. After all, that thesc exclusions and violences have been resistcd through the appropriation of the same discourses used to effect them-- discourses of sovereigntv expressed in identitv oolitics. human rights discourses, humanism--is a testament lo the power of sovereignty

discourse, and to its domination of discursive spaces of power. SO why not acceptthesc dmnds at "face value" and work to facilitate these ideals, to "include" Ulose previously excluded from the polis, to gnnt them sovereignty and thus (apparently) political subjectivity? Why not, in other words. accept the ontology of sovereignty--not as perfect, but as what we have to work with-- and turn it to the empuwennenl of its previous victims? Why not accept the modem slate as thc contiliner for



politics and work to facilitate adequate representation ti,r each and all at the state level? 1"582] To be clear, this is a necessary strategy under some conditions. But It 1s also

both insufficient and potentially dangerous. The dan~erof assuming sovereigntv is twofold. First. the assumption of sovereignly forecloses thc questions that we most need to address. forcing us into a reading of politics that leaves us unable to respond to conlemporary political challenges. In particular, the assumptic>nof sovereignty prevents us from subiecling the discourscs and practices of sovereigntv themselves to the kind of critical scrutiny that is rewired, given changing material conditions for the production of political authority. Sccond, if we continue to assume that sovereignty is the necessarv precondition for political authority. and thus remain unable to engage the question of its character or appropriateness, we will continue to impose and enforce--however violently--the necessities of sovereignty onto material conditions that may be increasingly resistant to such an imposition. BY

maintaining;the mythology that sovereigntv is necessarv and natural as a precondition for politics. we will- however unintentionally--continueto sanction the violences done in the name of sovereignty, considering them

necessary and natural rather than contingent upon the particularity of the ontology of sovcrci~nty.Toopen thediscourses and

practices of sovereignly to questkon, on the other hand. enahles a range of questions about the conditions of possibility for political authority to he opened and engaged. 1believe that thc future of feminist politics depends upon an engagement wrth these questions. The dangcrs of assuming sovereignty emerge trum the ways in which the assumption of sovzrelgnly--the assumption of the necessity of thc panicular ontological resolutions that have enabled modem political authority--shapes and colatrains our thinking nbout politics

andour politic^ action. AS I haveemphasized, one of the particularly powerful aspects of Hobbes' architecture of sovereigntv is that it convincingly persuades us that there is no alternativc to sovereignty. It is the necessarv precondition for all that is good; all else is war. conflict and violence. If we believe this varticular mythology of sovereigntv, of course, we will be

compelled--as theorists and practitioners of poUtics--to do everything we can

to create, prolcct and strengthen the ontoloav of

sovereignty; we certainly do not want to be responsible for leading our fellow beings into the alternative. ~t is this

pnrticular clement of the architecture of sovereignty diswursc: thnt has led to prhaps ils greatest violences. Because the ontology of sovereignty is not assumed to be contingent,

bul necessary and natural, whatever violences go into its production me also rendered necessary and natural rather than political.

However. the ontology of sovereignty is neither

nahral norneutral. On the contrary, both the particularity of the ontology of sovereigntv and the belief in its necessitv have been responsible for incredible violences. It is not difficult to think of many examples of this: the extermination and colonization of indigenous peoples on the grounds that they lacked the social [*583]and political institutions to

survive in the modern world; 1136 the exclusion of large numben of people--not least women--fm political authcmty because they were not adequately "sovereign

individuals:" ~ariousfoms of religious persecution: and so on. In each of these cases, it is the naturalization of the O~~O~OEVof sovereignty that

has produced the victims of sovereignty discourse; they arc those who mark the edges of sovereignty: the non- rational. non-modern, and so on. This "othering" in turn enables campaigns to either convert or destroy them as non- sovereign, as dangerous or feeble. BU~theex:xnr~nplesdo not end there. Many of the violences that have accompanied recent nationalist struggles are legitimated through the samc logics. The necessitv of producin~a coherent, shared land ontoloaicallv homo~eneous)identitv has accounted for exclusions and violences in the name of the greater good:

the achievement of sovereigtsy, the precondition for political subjectivity, n37 Given the particularly violent past of sovereignt~discourse (or at least its

complicity in this past), to continue to assume, or even triumph, sovereimty's necessity or to continue to believe its own account of its necessary alternatives is highly problcmatic. It certainlv runs the risk of perpetuating further violences

under its tattered banner. Crucially, tk is not ro say that one cai simply deny the geography ot sovereignty ad try to cwde alternatives. (;iiven th;tt sovereigntyis cxpmsxii lhrnugh mcxlern suhjeclivity, irs accounl olits own alternatives has ail astonishing capacity to bs persuasive in action even if we dcny it in theory.-The queslion is not whether sovereignty is true or wal, but mther, what the conditions are under which we can t~~akeclaims to such rntth or reality (or legitimate authority. necessary force. md so on). It is this latter question that providcs the crux of contemporary political posbibility, as it opens the pssibilit4. for mnegotiations of discourses and practices of sovereignty.

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism

Michigan 7 week juniors



Shaw, 1999 (Karena, professor of political science at the University of Victoria, 9 Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems 569, lexis)

In this way, Benhabib asserts a particular reading of "global politics" as evidence for the necessily of (a particular theoretical form for conceptualizing) identity. By extension, hers js_also an argument for the continuation of the

modern ideal of volitical or~anization:sovereign states, or "polities," with firm insides and outsides and clear rules of entrance, where everyone can find his or her place. Her reading of global politicsthe "new constdlationU--thussimultaneouslyprovides the justification for and is inrormed by her theoretical commitments. This rcading of "politics" remains uninterrogafed in her article; it is presented as obvious. 1112 This enables her, in turn, to dismiss alternative conceptions of identity or political possibility, such as those presented by Judith Butler or

Rosi Braidolti. as "unrealistic."1113In this way, Benhabib's argument has the appearance (but only the appearance) of being

grounded in "real" political Concerns, to the extent that she canclaim to bc reorienting feminist theory IU respond to thcpolificel demanda oTIbe twenty-Ti1 crnlttry. I*5741 This fimili.~rclaim to poliljcul relevance in pzicular, and Benhabib's nepxiation of the relaiinship between theorctiwl arguments and political "reslii~~"more broadly, lead me to Ihc pmblem 1 scek to explore here. For those concerned wlth the inuicacies of global, trmsnatbnal, or feminist pohlics. it might be tempting tci dismiss Benhahib's argument, specificnlly thc larger debate in which it inlcrvenes, and even Bminist political theory more broadly. as at leal poliliwlly naive. and perhaps as irrelev,~~~.It b especially ditlicult to imdgine--even if one accepts her readinp of the "new constellation" on thc most general level--thal the yolulic~nto thi? chalienge lies in either narrative or perfomdive conccplions of identity. Surely. one might say, the resolution of such assertions of idcntity is at leas1 as mwh bound up in such things as access Lo muterial rrsources. economic am1 e~lvkonmcntalstability. political stnlnures and processes hislorics of viulence and oppressicln. and so on--all things to which Benhahih's strategy has only teigential access. Benhahihk focus on nmtivc--as opposcd lo material, economic, legal, or ecological-- webs ilJt~slralesthis troubling n;uTowness. While she might argt~that mtterial. a~lnomic,environmental and political Cum are expressed in narmtive wcbs. their exp~essbnin these webs

cannot account forthcir panicipation in tt~constructian of the oondirions otpussihjlity for na~ativewebs. Perhaps being a "cultural broker," helping to

construct more "inclusive" narrative identities, is all theorists are good for, and the rest should be left to practitioners of "real" politics? I argue otherwise on both counts: Benhabib's argument has considerable political relevance insofar as it continues a vractice--rampant within most modern and contemporary political theory--of obscurinrr the precise questions we mosl crucially need to engage in order lo envision and enact effective futures lor kminist or other forms of progressive politics. Benhabib assumes the framework of a modern and specificallv liberal politics, and forces not only gender, but all of the diversity and complexity of contemporary global politics into it. While this frame for understanding; politics remains very powerful, there is considerable evidence to suggest that it is increasingly inadequate not only as a frame for gender politics, but also much more broadly. Further, as long as we continue to assume this framework. we will remain unable to engage the political questions that most require our

attenlion. Whilc it remains extremely difftult to amid assomins this framework. 1 want lo SII~&!OY~a different way of approaching Ihc question of the day fur political and femini~t theorists. one that pruviks much richer terrain for poliksal an;llgsis and intervention In Section C.I explicate what Benhabib's assumpii>n of a specific account nithc political involves: in Scclion D. 1 explore the danger of failing to challenge it; and in lhc rcmainder of rhe paper, I snggcsl how we might more pmduclively reorient onr thinking.

C. Holrlrrsiun Erusure.~

Benhabib's arsumenr lrsts on the assumnption chi11we know what political struggles today are most cenlrdlly about--the search lor fitable and 1*575] cohcrent Wentitics and how we should rrspond lo them--by adiipling the framework of modem pulilts lu render identity more 'inclusive.* As others have noled. 1114this assumpli~~nexpresses o belief in distinctly ~nodcrn

philosophical resolutions to ,tk prohkms of social and political order. Moreprecisely, it expresses it belief that discourses and practices of sovereignty

should or must remain the limit condition of social and ~oliticalanalysis: the world is and should bc divided into sovereign units (individuals and polities), and these politics are the wecondition for individuals lo realize their full

potential as aUtOnOmOUS agents.

other by sovereign polities or statcs. "Outside" this frame individuals face anarchy, violence, conflict. and war; "inside"

resides the possibility for politics.For Bcnhnbib, the processes through which penonal subjectivity (ideality) and natiolwl sovereignty (identity) are achieved are isomorphic and can he analyzed as essentinlly similm phenomena. 1115 In one fonn or anuther. whether explicil or nul, the sssumptinn of this architeaurn is conventional both amongst contempormy prliticsl theorists and feminist thcorisls. The expresaic~nof this assumption varics. but mosl theorists assume that Ihe probk~ilol'lhc prciprr ioaatirm and character of polilical authority is settled. proceedins only to conlest how it h legitimated or organized. how it is genderell or not, and so on. As Duller especially has argued. many feminist theorists have tedd to &$.wme sex even as they critique thc gcndered characler of Lhe modern subject, n16 Ry illuslraring how the dualistic smn~cturesof sex and gender are produccd by and thus remxin embedded in our laa~uapand cconeeptiuns ofsubjectivity, Raller illt~stratcsthat we cannot assume

sex and simoltaneously "ongender" the sohject. In this way. she and olhcrs have opened crucial political ground, potentially rcarliculating the ternin of gcnder as an axis of analysis. The

analysis I develop here parallels Butler, in that it seeks to similarly disrupt what I argue to be the other pole of the assumed architecture of modern politics: the assumption ofthe polity that provides the condition of possibility for thc modern subject. It is only through a simultaneous disruption of this pole, I believe, that thc ~oliticalforce of Buller's critique can come to be articulated beyond the relatively constrained confines of feminist political theory.

As Benhabib indicates, this archilecture is framed on the one hand

by sovereign individuals and on the

Michigan 7 week juniors






Rapoport, 1997 (Anatol, Founder of the Society for Gcneral Systems Research, World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanitv, Edited Joseph Rotblat, Page 122-123.

TO assess thc role that Ihe mtbn state cm or should play in an increasingly intcrdcpendenl world, we must lkst form a clem. idca of whar in~erdependencemeans. It means thal &

important problems with which humans are faced are now global problems. This is explicitly recogni7ed in the realization (hat

the security of a state vis-a-visothcr states is a chimera. There is no such thing. The only security from violence on the levd of states, that is, war. is the security of all. Neither 'balance of power' nor 'deterrence' can provide this security. Pursuit of 'balance of powcr'

has consistenlly instigated arms races. Deterrence is predicated on the 'rationalitv' of the opponent and isregardcd themore crediblc the more reckless is thc deterring powcr.The idea of calculated risk' is an absurdity in this context, sincc no matter how small the probabilitv of catastrophe is, its occurrence in the age of wars of total destruction makes all formal

at tk close or World War 11 ;lrc now ~takiyapparent.

~a~culationsof its

'probability' irrelevant. Threats not yet imagined by the dcsigncrs of;^ .world order'

TIICY are generated by the rapidly accelerating degradation of the environment. which transcends all national boundaries. The conseauences of this degradation may instigate struggles for arable land. or water or living spacc of

the Sort that fuelled the genocidal wars oiantiqoity. T~Cfcrocity of these st~ugpksfought with weapons now developed c;ln he readily imagined. It slands to rrasnn that

anticipating these threats and preparing to deal with them effectively reauires globally integrated actions, which can be undertaken only if sovercinnty of nation states as they arc ~resentlyorganized is drastically curtailed. It follows that national sovereigntv is an insuperable obstacle to the removal of threats to humanity that have had 110prehnts.

nanely. tllreals of irreversible destnlction magnified heyond imiiginatlon by technology specifically developed for that purpow and threats to the very substrare of human Life on this planet.


satisfactory solution to this dilemma is by no means guaranteed. It is predicated on the abrogation of sovereignty on any level below the global, which, in turn means either thc demise of the nation state as an institution, or its ildaptatinnma

new role in a h~erarchyof aathorities culminating in a global inqtitution entn~rtedwith seeking and impletnenling solutions of global problems.


Falk 04--professor of Interna~ionalLaw and Practice at Princeton University, Yale Law School (195.5);J.S.D.,Harvard Universi~y:Been on the editorial boards of about ten journals and magazines; Chairman of the ConsultativeCouncil, Lawyers' Committee on American Policy Toward Vietnam-- (Richard A., "The declining world order : America's imperial geopolitics", 2004, Routledge, pg 216-217)


respccl? With the rihe of ghhalizatios and poslmudernity. the nature of political community becomes far nlore cnlnpliwred and nu~ltilnycred.The state can no longer claim to exh;lusl thc senw

ofbelonging even with respect lo poiirical identity. And yet, despite erosion of the foundations of patriotism as conventionally conceived. it

remains a potent force in human affairs, perhaps accentuated in somc ways by thc emergence of many new states around the world in the last b~.centvly.d

the prevalence of nationalism as still the most powerful political creed active in world, moving people to support

that love of counrry is desirable, who1 should the alunlry ~epresent?Shnulln't 1l1e true patriot seek n counuy principled in dealing with othcr states, a world of conpration and mutual

wars and the sacrifice of the lhorlhripungen,mostby malt, citizzns.

American patriotic impulses in a climate of opinion that was ultranationalist in tone and substance. There wasarcfusa.1 to

explore the sources of rewnlmenl around the world, and especially in lhr Islamic world. that secmcd to ~ivrrlse tu such dcndly political extrcm~smaimed principally a Ihe United Staes utxi its

citizens. There was a willingness, even an eagerness. by America to become mobilized for war even thouch no clear connections could be drawn between the wars undertaken and the threats being posed. And there was an insistence on treat in^ the persons responsible for the attacks as evil enemies who deserved to be exterminated. m watment ofnl

Vaeda suspects held in the (ioanlanarno prison is emblematic of both a refusal by the American government to grant ~$ghtsto detained combntants demanded by internatiolwl huma~~ilari:tnI:iw and thc acccplance by the colmrry and its govcrrunental representatives of such wngeful pclctices that cannot be convincingly explained by reierencc to security considerntions.

Westphalian patriotism nives an often dysfunctional blank check to the state when the citizenry is successfullv mobilized in reaction to a perceived enemy, and the intensitv of the mobilization is often in direct pro~ortionto the magnitude and traumatizing impact of the threat posed. It is dysfunctional because it induces overreaciions that can bc self-defeating and harmful for everyone. It was Thucydides who first depicted this vulnerability of democracies to demagogic apueals in his classic account of the fall of Athens ill theaftermathoffhe Pebponnehian WWS. AS the ultranationalism oC Nazi Germanv demonstrated, even fascist states can invoke vatriotic sentiments to build vooular enthusiasm for irrationally grandiose schemes of conauest and expansion. Of course, this mobilization of the public for militarist advcntures has taken various forms over the centuries, with each instance exhibiting its own particularity. This conccrn

itbout the link berwcen patriotism and aggressive war making remoins a potentially fan1 flaw in cxisting political mangements at the interface of modernity and postmude.mity. American

patriotism in the aftermath of September 11 is the latest manifestation of this phenomenon. allowing the U.S. government to proceed with an ill-advised empire-building proiect wiihout confiontim domestic opposition and an accompanying public debate.

The attacks of September 11 reawakened and refocused


Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism




Rapoport, 1997 (Anatol, Founder of the Society for Gcncral Systems Research, World Citizenship: Allegiance to Humanity, Edited Joseph Rotblat, Page 111-113)


The destructive components of nationalism or tribalism, its primitive form, in their most aggressive manifestation provide rationalization of seeing others through the prism of an unbridgeable we-they dichotomy. Thisis w11at

observe today as conscqucnces of the hreak-up of multi-national states and the disintegrat~onof colonial authorities.

In thc last dccadc of our century n;lf 10nallSm must be



acknowledged as a state of mind thal denies common humanity. The collective group is prone to embrace hatred as

its moulding link when the gnmp has ken exposed to hi~miliatingexpcrienccs that havc been perceived as injorics to the identity of the goup. Forex;unpic, during Soviet uccupulion

Moldavinns had to wlite thcirRomanian language in the C:yrillic


Now that Moldaviil has become a 'sovereign stale'. its Russian inhnhitmts are afraid Ulill they will have to write

Rosrhn In the 1.atin alphahft. Wars, victories, defeats. catastrophes, pogroms and hunger, in COntrdSt to quiescent events, are

embraced in our memorv boxes as 'peak affective states'.

of its role. its self-perception and its position in the world. Memories during 'peak affective states' skew reality and

force assessment into primitive dichotomies - all good or all bad.

need and desire becomes a sure stepping Stone towards dehumanization. Dehumanization has been defined as 'a defence against painful or

overwhelming emotions wh~chdemase a penon's sense of one's own individuality and perception of the hnma~ienessof other people'.' The collective self under thc impact of h.2trcd perceives

the 'bad' others as though they werc vermin or inanimate dispensable objects. C~llectivegroup hatred leads to violence in its need Ir,

needed obiect. The enemy is usually the one who is both wanted and needed, and seems to be needed for affirmalion

These become seminal in moulding a group's perception

The.'bad7object is both needed and desired-'This

destroy the

of one's identity. For example. Ukrainians sccm to need Kussians for their animation ot.idcntily, and Kussians ueed Ukrainians for the same parpox.

negative identity to Jews and a positive identity to Ukrainians. In this way collective group hatred becolncs a niost su~~es~fuland handy tool in the h:mls of political arsonists.

Bloodletting in Somalia and Rwanda can be ascribed to the same sudden disintegration of power which had constrained interaouu violence by its own monopoly of violence - the essence of the nation state. The evil legacy of the nation State is the PC~V~S~V~identification of Security with military potential. This legacy is not confined to the pervasive idea that the

sccurity ot a state. culture, or way ol life means the ahility to repel med attack with armed fnrce. Even as the concrete military threat kom a designated cncmy disappears, Ihe military estahlbhment remains. Thc very semantics of the wrd 'defence' makes the dismantling or Ihe milimry machine unthinkable. since it would make the country 'del'enceless'. All ministlies of war have become ministries of 'defence'. and all war spending is uw'uiably callcd 'dcfeacc' spcnding. 11is iosuuctivc to compare he global armament levels and 'defence' spending hefore and after the end of the Cold War which fuelled the arms race. The tiurnher of nuclear warheads. a good indicator. was aha 70.000. At the cnd of START I1 in 2003. the number ul'stratagk wt.;tpuns is to he reduced lo atnul6000, or in about 15.000 if tactical weapoos are to be included." kqide from tk tact, however. that the rcduced numbrr still reprrsrnts a threat of tnlal destruction ol' civibz~tion.Ik agl-eedupon timescele (ten years) is ten to twenty rimcs longcr than necessary. 'The reduction could be accomplished in a few months by deactivating delivery systems and separating the warheads which cot~M[hen be stcmd under multilateral control. Arguments against this procallre rn based on the inviolate identification of dcst~nctivcpowcr with 'sccurity'. Global 'defence'expendilure, which peaked at $1.2 trillion in 1988. has kc11 reduced by about om-third. Thc saving oFMW million is snbstmthl and could he put to excellent use. However. thc damage of 'sccurity=defence spcnding' menlalily was nul confmed to the waste of funds. It entailed also diversion of human resources into 'defencet-related employments. Co~~scqucnllg, reduction of 'defence' spending cntails decline of employment atid of economic activity generally, and is for this ieason vigv~ouslyresisted not only by the military-industrial-scientific complex

establishment b11t by~mgcsections 01th~genmal population. T~&s,addiction to violence spiked by burgeoning killing technology is not the onlv evil legacv of the militarized nation state. It involves also an addiction to a war economy, identification of preparations for war with economic robustness. full employment, and so on.

Coss:rks rn ii source of


Savich, 03 (~rul,historian, "Nationalism: Origins and Historical Evolution", htt~:Nwww.~o~l~di.~o.wleneIi~hlnacionalimm.~h~)

IS gcnocide presupposed in aationalism? Nationalism is predicated on homogcneily---ethnic, linauistic, cultural, religious, racial--- best cxprcsscd in the Nazi SIO~UL~i Reich. Ein volk. Ein Fuehrer. There is (I logical necessity and imperative for homogeneity in nationalism, whether it be ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, or linguistic, that makes genocide implicit in its ideological

a~~~mptions.Gellner expressed it this w;ly: "Jt~slas every girl should have a huah;nid, preferably her own. so every culture mtlst have its state, p~eferablyits own:.


are archetypical Aliens. or Others, in this formulalion. In times of war. in times of crises, the perceived danger from

the Other is heightened. Even in the US during World warn. ;~ppmximatcly120,000 hpanese Americans. mcn, women, and children, were interned in detention cclllen, IWO- thirds of them wel-e US citizens. But kcause Japan had homhed Pearl Hnrhor. the "the duty Japs" were a perceived threat (M- danccx lo the US Mion and hid to bt.rounded t~pand put in camp. r*llowing the '111 1 attack on the World Trade Cenler, Muslim residenls of the US kcie auspect. US analysts called for the invasion and occuparinn of the AnbIMnslim world to forcetully convml Muslim? to Christianity. a replay of tllc Cmsadcs. Anti-Muslim and anti-Arab bigotry and racism was rampaut in the US. Many Mosli~nslkabs(or those who looked like same) wcrc attacked and murdered. Mosques were attacked and damaged. During World War I. German-Americans were perceived as the Other in anti-(icrman frenzy in the US and Caosda. 'The city of nerlin. Ontario w;~srenamed Kitchener in honor of rhc British War Sccrclnry Horatiu Kichenu. %~aucrkrautma renruncd "liberty cabhage" while "hamburger" became "libeny meat" and

.'Sal~bt~rystcnk" and 'Yrank[urters" kcame hot dogs in the US. During the US "regime change" of Iraq in 2003, this bigotedlracist phenomena in the US was repeated. Becaust: France had opposed the US military overthrow of the Saddam Hussein

There was a

regime, there was a pro~osalto change the name of French fries to "freedom fries", prencll toast to .*freedomtoast

shameless and strident glee jn this atavistic nationalist racism and bigotry. Racism and extermination directed at minorities evolved with nationalism. This is a phenomenon of recent ori~in,it has its roots in modern nationalism. The concept of destroying nationalities because they posed a military threat to the nation evolved with nationalism.

h plc-industrial perinds, nnlionnl armies were made up of professional soldiers. Thc conccpt of a Rfth Column is of rclarivcly =cent origul. Moreover. ethnic and religious diversity and

heterogeneity were pre-industrial norms. In the nationalist age, howev~l


and homo~eneitg---ethnic,rdipious, mcL1. cultural. linguistic--- bccmc the new norms.

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism




Zinn, 05 (Howard, Professor Emeritus in the Political Science Department at Boston University, 'The Scourge of

Nationalism'?,The Progressive, June, htt~://www.vro~ressive.or~/?~=node/199~

Is not nationalism--that devotion to a flag, an anthem. a boundary so fierce it enpenders mass murder--one of the great evils of our time, along with racism. along with religious hatred? These ways of thinking--cultivated. nurtured, indoctrinated from childhood on--have been useful to those in power, and deadly for those out of power. Nationalspiritcan

be benign in a country that is small and lacking both in military power iln~l:I hongcr fur expansion (Switxrhnd, Norway, Cos~:lRkl, atd many mrej. nut in a nation like Ours--

huge, possessine thousands of weapons of mass destruction--what might have been harmless pride becomes an arrogant nationalism daneerous to others and to ourselves. Our citizenry has been brought up to see our nation as different from others, an exception in the world, uniquely moral. expanding into other lands in order to bring

civilization, liberty, democracy. That self-deception simed enrly. Whcn thc tirst English scttkrs moved into lndiui land in Massachusetts nay and were resisted. thc viulmcr escalated into war wilh the Pequot Indians. 'The killing of Indians was scen as approved by God. the taking of land as com~nanddby Ihe Bible. The Puritans cited one of the l'salms, which says: "Ask of me. ad 1shall give thee, the healhen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost p'ns of the Eiuth for thy possssion." When the English set tire to a Pequot village and massacred mcn. women. and children, the Potitau thenlogia~~Cotton Mathcr said: "I( was supposed that no less lhsn 600 Pequot souls were brooght down w hell thlt day." It was our "Manifest Destiny to overspread tk continent allotted by Providence," an Americ;mjoumalist declared on the eve of the Mexican War. Aflcr the invasion of Mexico beyan. the New York Herald announced: "Wc klicvc it is a part of our dediny to civilize that butiful counfry." It was always supposedly br benign purposes that our counlry wen1 to war. We invaded Cuba in 1898 to libcrate the Cubans. and went to war in the Philippines shunly aflcr, as President McKinley pul it. "to civilize and Clu.isrianizeWthe Filipino people. As our armies were committing massacres in rht. I'hilippines (at Imst 600.000 Alipinus did m it few gears of conflict). Elihu Root, our Secretar). of War. was saying: "The American soldier is diirenl from aU ohr soldiers of all other

counuies rince the wx began. He is the advance guard of liberty and josticc. of law and order. and of peace and happiness." Nationalism is given a Special virulence

when it is blessed by Providence. Todav we have a President. invadin~Iwo countries in four years, who believes he

gets meSsdgeS from God. Our culture is permeated by a Chrislian fundamenlalism a, puisonuus as that of Cotton Mather. It pemlits the mass murder of

"thc other" with the same confidence as it accepts the death penalty for individuals convicted of crimes. ASupremeColrn

justice. Antunin Scalia. told all audience at the University of Chicago Divinity Schuul, speaking of capital punishment: "For the believing Ciu.isliiln.dcalh is no big de:il." How many time8 have we had Bush and Rumsfeld lak to the troops in Imq. victims thcmsclvcs. but also perpetmtors of thc demhs of thousands of Iraqis. telling them that if they die. if they return without arms or legs. or biindcd, it is kir "libeny," for "democracy"? Nationalid super-patriotism is not confined to Republicans. When Richnrd Hofstadtcr analyzed American presidents in his hokThe American Political Tradition, he found that lkmocl-atic lcadcrs as well as Republicans, liberals as well as conservatives. uivded other countrier. sought to expand 1I.S. pwer acrnss the globe. Libenl imperialists have been amon$ the most fervent of expansionisls, more effective in their claim to moral rectitude precisely kcause they are liberal on issues olher than foreign policy. Theodore a bvcr of war, md all enthusiastic snpporter of the war in Spain and the conquesl of Lhc Philippines, is still seen as a Pro~ressivehecause Ix:supponed caain datnestie reforms and was concerned with the niltlomi environment. lndd, hc ran as President on the I'rogressive ticket in fV12. Woodrow Wilson. a Democrat, wi~sthe rpitotne of lhc liberal apologist for violent actious abruad. In April of 1914, hr nnlered Ihe homhardment ofthe Mexican coast. and tk occupation of the city of Vcra Cruz. in retalialion for the mst oI several U.S. sailors Ile sent Marines into Haiti in 1915. killhig thousands of Raitiat~swho resisted, beginning a long mililiuy wupalion of that tiny country. He sen1 Marines to occupy ths L)ornh~icaoRcpuhli in 1916. And, after runninz in 19 Id on a platform of peace, he brought the naiion into the slaughter that ww taking phcc in Europe in World W.x I, saying it was a war lo "make the world safe for democracy." In uur thnc, it was he liberal Bill Clinton who salt bornhers over Raphdad ns soon as he came into office, who fvst cds~lthe spccter oi"weapons of mws destruction" as a justification for a series of homhing attacks on Iraq. Liberals today criticize Cinrge Bush's unilatcmlism. But it was Climun's Secrerary of State. Madeleine Alhright. ~-hotold the United Nations

Securiry Coullcil tha~Lhe U.S. would act "multilateraily when we can. unilaterally whell we most." One of the effects of nationalist thinking is a loss of a

sense of pro~ortion.The killing of 2.300 people at Pearl Harbor becomes the iustification for killing 240,000 in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Thc killing of 3,000 people on Se~tember11 becomes the iustification for killing tens of

thousands of people in Afghanistan and Iraq. wh~tden our nation immunc from the normal standmds of human decency'? Surely, we must renounce

nationalism and all its svmbols: its $lass. its pledges of :~Uegiance,its anthems. im insistence in song that God must singlc out America to he blessed. We need to

assert our allegiance to the human race, and not lo any one nation. We need to refute the idea that our nation is different from, morally superior to, the other imperial powers of world history.


Savich, 03 (Carl, historian, "Nationalism: Origins and Historical Evolution".

who was retponsiblc for

Holocaosl? One can argue that the Holocaust had nothing to do wjth nationalism but was motivated bv

Hitler's own personal obsession. The contrary argument is that lhc Holocaust resulted as a natural end-result of modern nationalism. Modern nationalism by its very nature dcmands ethnic. racial, and religious homogeneity.

Thus. modern natlonall~mmade the Holocaust possible. Similarly, mndern nationalism h~elsthc criscs in Kosovo. Georgia. Nagncm,-~arshakh. Chechnya; and llle Israel-Palestinian conflict. Conclusion Zlntinnalism is a political ideology thst has originated and evolved since its emergence after the French Revolution of 1789. Nationalism is based on the creation of a gro~ipfantasy and an "unagincd commanity" bawl oil a common language. commt)n religion. common race or ethnicity, and a common cnltore. Natmnalism is also the product of industrialization/modemi~Liun/crpilaliBothsm. industnaliutiin and natiol~ilismrequire homogeneity in Ihe society. ethnically. racially. culturally, linpuislicaily. Nationalism and indusuialism thus developed symbiotically, each reinfi>rcingthe other, So ~l;ltionalismhas both an ideological cumpunmt md a component hased in economic, social. and political developmcnt. Idcc>logyand industhli7ation require homogeneity. standarduation. mobility. and uniformity. Nationalism is thus bsed an hom~gefleitgand a slmdardi.ccllionarxi commonality of language.

racc. cthnicity. u~dcolmre. The logic and idmlogicsl imperative of natiunalim demands homogeneity. Genocide Or the destruction and eIirninati0n of

minorities or those groups who threaten the homoaeneitv of the nation is assumed in nationalism. The loeic of nationalism thus results in homogeneilv that threatens heterogeneous minorities within these nations. Genocide is a

by-product of modern ntltJ0IlaliSm. we cannot blind outselves to the fxt tht mtiurwliim by 11s very nature requires conformi~yand homogeneity. Indeed, modern

industria~i~edsuciely itselfrcquires oniformity, stanlardiz~tion.and homogeneity. so nationalism and industrialized society offer manv benefits but

one of the costs is antipathy towards heterogeneity in any form. Genocide is thus the inevitable by-product of modern nationalism.


Michigan 7 week juniors




Klitou, 05 (Demctrius, presented this paper for his master's thesis at the Mediterranean Academy of Diplomatic Studies in Malta, '"The Friends and Foes of Human Rights", Ask: The Journal of the College of Arts & Sciences at Drcxel University, http:l/

As rwny scholars argue. such as Eric Iiobsbawm. Bcnedict Anderson nnd Erncsr Gellner, n;~tionalismant1 natioml identities ue nunlern inventions constructed hy the elite. and their creatiolls

ci~nixhistorically med. Nationalism has been the most pathogenic force in history. It has replaced religion as the dominant "weapon of mass division," and as such has become the dominant cause of wars, bigotry, fascist regimes and gross human rights violations. The creation of multiple national consciousnesses divides the single ~lobalconsciousness, creates r>svcholo~icalopposing sides. and epitomizes a nationalized frame of mind of us and them; onrs and theirs; we and they:

self a~ldan~i-self:ad 1i~notion nfthe othrr. The inward takc on identity, created by nationalism, dehumanizes human beings. BY

chssifying similm human heiilps like 7oology classifies diflerent animals. nationalism overe~l~phasizeswhat distidg~iishcsone nation from anothcr. heir~pshnve become manifold divided peoples, as opp)sed to singlc unified people. A problem that cvcn plagurs human ~ighlswnvcnticlns. such as Ihe African Chaner a1Human and Peoples Rights. and the charters of universal

institutions. such as the UN Chmeh "we thc Peoples." The artificial credence of nationalism as the paramount realization of pT-actica~lv evcrv important element of human bein~s,includin~identity. culture. social existence, consciousness and political will, strips the 'human' element from human beings. The national being replaces the human being. Subsequentlv, the

dehumanization of human beings causes the

dehumanization of human riehts,

also stripping from it the estntial hllman elemclit. AS a result.

human riyhls have been weclkened kcaus~humans do not considcr thc existe~~ceoia hum;m identity. or hi1 lo acknowledge that we arc dl human Wngs. Human beings ace born without

distinction, hilt a'e immediately and permanently baptkcd. for example. as a Jordanian. Italian, Colombian or Canadian. Thcy are compelled to attach lhemselves lo clne uatbnal identity tor their entlre lives, withlittle npponi~nityfor disamiiatk~nor rmfliliation. Nationalism denies individl~alslhc freedom to decide and to express who they really are or want to be. thusdenying lkm the right to freedom of speech or expression. As Thomas Franck also argues in his book. The Empc~weredSelf: Law and Society in the Asc of Individualism. the individual choiar of identity is a human righl prohibited by natio~lalism.Since these nalional identitis or idfiliatinns are not voluntarily made hy autonomoos individuah. they we in contest with human rights. When on individual is compelled lo he called an Ammiurn. a Chineqe. a Mexican, a Canadian. an Israeli. or a Gemx~n.jua lo name a few, that pcrson is also co~npelledto build a psychological wall1 around hi or herself. Ciroups of ind~vidualshehind the same wall share the samc national identity. Anpne nnt behind thci dcaignnted wall, or not mong people of the wme national identity.

thereforc $ convidered an ootsider and. in the extreme sen*.

an intruder.

.h a sentiment, ndi~nllllsminvokes an unqualiiiai obedicnceand loyalty of the individual Lo the collective entilies.

and mtion. I" doing SO. nationalism feeds on these acauiesces of national solidarity, transforming them into exploitable national loyalties. such as the support for war or the violation of human riehts. As a result, nationalism has time after time produced conscquences that arc grossly criminal. It has caused people to disrenard other woples' claims to justice and human rights through thc practice of ethnic cleansing and genocidc. Nationalism fosters hatred and disgust of the other and easily permits the judgement of the other as evil or as the "problem." The first staees of

genocide, revealed by Gregory Stanton, =the

following: Classification: Symbolization; Dehumanization. The

classificarioa stagc cotego~isesthe relevant humans into target groups according lo ~IICU elhnicity or nationality and promotes an hs against thcm' mind-set. The symholixalion sage givcs

symbols lo these grnups. The dehumanization stage equates the target goup to animals. vermin or disease. and therefore unqualified make legitimate claims to human rights. This allows the murderers to iuslify killing and to overcome the natural revulsion against murder. Nationalism does the same, but ~crmanentlyand iudiciouslv, on a global scale. It dehumanizes humans by depriving them of their innate human qualities and brands non-mcrnbers of a nation as

allens Or sub-humans. Naiionalism desensitizes and justifies the wrongs committcd by one nation against nnnther nation. causing penple to declarc. 'My colmtq. right or wrong.''

no matter how ~ILISSIYinhumane theactions. The totalitarian ideological movements, fascism and Nazism, were both fuelled by nationalism, national pride and their associated desire for national aggrandizement. riefore w,nationalism I& tn a period of excess

pr~dein Germung's dominaiw and a desire ro satisfy it. The subsequent deiert of Germany and the huh conditions dictated by the Tre;~lyof Versailles diminished their national pride. However. cxtremc nallonalism once again led to the intensifiwtkl~lof national pride and ultimately facilitated the risc of the Naei Party. Hitkr rosc to power bdsd on this loss of 11atiolta1pride by making it urnlerstood to the Germans that he would do anything tci restore it. Forthcnnare, the NwiGemm government invcntcd mn;inml myhs that incunated nationid pride, such as the "purc blood"

theoly, which aimed lo "pnrify" the rutinn by killing millions of Jews and other minority. non-German grnups. Gcnocide Was Seen as a means towards "national

rebirth." and nationalism was used to justify the mass murdering of nations deemed inferior. Thus, as political philosopher Hans Morgcnthau rightfully points out, Nazism is iust a degree of nationalism.


Savich, 03 (Carl?historian, "Nationalism: Origins and Historical Evolution",

tiationalim ab a modem phical ideolo~yemerged only following the French Revolution of 1789 md dewloping during the 10th maury. Nationalbm reached ils climax ni the time of World War I. Nationalism is based bnth on group fantasy or an "imagined commonity" and as the produn of indnstri~lization.capitalism. and mndernizntinn. Industrialization and fi~tiondismevolved and developd in a symb~oticrelationship, each rcinlbrcing the other. Nationalism nd industrialism require uniformity, standardization, md homogeneity---cthnic, r;ri;ll, religious, linguistic,

adcultun~l.The homogeneitv fostered by both nationalism and industrialization and modernization Doses a threat to minorities who, as heterogeneous members of the modcrn nation-state. are perceived as a threat. Genocide is a by- product of modern nationalism. The logic of nationalism mandates homoncneitv. Genocide is a by-product of nationalism and of industrialism and modernization. Genocide is one of the costs of modern industrialized societies. The ideologv of modern nationalism makes genocidc possible.

Michigan 7 week juniors Cosmopolitanism




Kaldor, 2k (Mary, Centre for the Study of Global Governance, London School of Economics, "Cosmopolitanism and organiscd violence", httu://

These are the circumstances that give rise to the 'new wars'. I1 is the lack of authority of the stale. the weakness of representation. the loss of confidence that the state is able or willing to respond to public concerns, the inability and/or unwillingness to regulate the privatisalian and informalisation of violence that gives rise to violent conflicts.

Moreover, this 'uncivilising process', tends to bc reinforced by the dynamics of the conflicts, which have the effect of futther reordering political, economic and social relationships in a negative spiral of incivility. I call the conflicts 'wars' because of thcir political character although they could also he described as lnassive violations of hum rights {repression against civilians) and organised crime (violence for private gain).

Thcy are about access to state power. Thev are violent struggles to gain access to or to control the statc. As the state

becomes privatised, that is to say, it shifts from being the main organisation for socictal regulation towards an Instrument for the extraction of resources by the ruler and his (and it is almost always 'his') privileged networks. so access to state power becomes a matter of inclusion or exclusion, even, in the latter case, of survival. In the majority of cases, these wars are fought in the name of identity - a claim to power on the

basis of labels. These are wars in which political identity is defined in terms of exclusive labels -ethnic, linguistic. or

religious - and the wars themselves give meaning to Ihc labcls. Labcls are mobilised for political purposes; they offer a new sense of security in a context where the political and economic certainties of previous decades have evaporated. Thcy provide a new populist form of communitarian ideology, a way to mainlain or capture power, that useithe language and forms of an earlier undoubtedly, these ideologies make use of pre-existing cleavages and the legacies of past wars. It is also the case that the appeal to tradition and the nostalgia for some mythical or semi-mythical history gains strength in the social upheavals associated with thc opening up to global pressures. But nevertheless, it is the deliberate manipulation of these sentiments. often assisted by Diaspora funding and techniques and speeded up through thc electronic media, that is the immediate cause of contlict. in these wars, violence is itself a form of political mobilisalion. Violence is mainly directed against civilians and not another army. The aim is to capture tenitory through political control rarhcr than military success. And po1itic;ll control is maintained through terror, through expulsion or elimination of those who challenge political control, especially those with a different

label. Population displaccment. massacres. widespread atrocities are not iust sidc cffects of war; thev are a deliberate strategy for political control. The tactic is to sow the 'fear and hate' on which exclusive identity claims rest. These are

also globdised wars in another sense. Unlike inter-statewars. which wcrc highly regulated and which indeed provided a modcl for statist forms

of planning. these wars could be almost be described as the model for the contemporary informal economy, in which privatised violence and unregulated social relations feed on each othcr. In these wars, physical destruction is very high. tax revenues plummet furlher, and unemployment is very high. Thc various parties finance themselves through loot and plunder and various forms of illegal trading; thus they arc closely linked into and help to generate organised crime nelworks. They also depend on support from neighbouringstates, Diaspora groups, and hullunitarian assistance. The 'new wars' are no longer discrete in time and spacc. The various actors -states. remnants of states, para-military groups,

liberation movements, etc. - depend on continued

brathing spaces, which do not address the underlying social relalions -the social conditions of war and peace are not much different. The networks of politicians, security forces. legal and illegal trading groups, which are often ~ransnational.constitute a new distorted social formation, which has a tendency to spread through refuges and displaced persons, identitybased networks often crossing continents, as well as criminal links. Moreover, the conditions which give rise to the 'new wars' and which are cxacerbated by them, exist in weaker forms in most urban

conglomerationsin the world and indeed often have direct links with the most violent regions. All the same. social formations that depend

on violence are alwavs vulnerable, fragile and close to exhaustion. As Hannah Arcndt pointed out, power devends on legitimacy not on violence -it is vcry difficult to sustain forms of uolitical mobilisation that depend on violence. Hcrein lies the uossibility for a cosmopc>lilan,i.e. non-exclusive, alternative.

violence for both political and economic reasons.

Cease-fires and agreements are truces.

Michigan 7week juniors




London 2K- Independent journalist and radio producer based in Southern California-(Scott, "Global Civil

Society." in The American Prospect, September 11, 2000. www.scottlondon.corn/articles/civilsocie~

Civil society

Snv~etwtlrld. lurexample. and it is having an increasingly visible impact on global citizen movements, such as the rise of

environmentalism, the uush for human rights, and the backlash against economic globalization. rll blowing

paps. 1 survey threc articles lhi~taddress the vital role of civil solciety 111shi~plngglubal i~ffi~u-studay. In the iusl. polili~~lphilosopher Bc~JnminBxhcr cxarnines the impact of global citizen movements, aguing that a new form ol borderkss adivism k emerging toli;ly under the banner ol tmnsndliunai nnn-pnvernmental organv~tions. In the second, economist


from a p~~blicspcrch in 1992, Vxlav I-lavel make$ an etoquenl case for what he sees as a new civil ethic emerging in the pst-c(~mmun~stern. Erch of these xticlcs sws to the prr~foond

and growing imponance of citixn movelncnts in creating a more peiceful and sustainable wilrld in the 21st ceaury. In "Globalizing Demrrcracy." Benjamin Barber

argues that the debate over globalization has paid insufficient attention to the role of citizen-lcd groups. "We are entering a new era," he writes, "in which global markets and servile governments will no longer be completely alone in planning the world's fate." He cites numerous examdes in which citizens have reshaped public debate worldwide, including the campaign apainst land mines, efforts to protect dolphins from the tuna industry,

and the "microcredit" movement in which small loans are made to women in developing countries to help them slalt hnsinesses. According tu ste el; these sons of

movcmcots arr having a trementto>us positive impact and deserve greater intemational attention and support. Kot only do they promise a measure of

countervail in^ vower" in the intcrnational arena as a bulwark against reactionary movements (such as the ultra-Right wing politics of Pat Buchanan or Rance's J~~~-M~~~~e Pen); but they also cmbody a sari of' global public opinion. InBwber'sworJs, "they put flesh on the bare boncs of legalistic doctrines and universal rights These new transnational civic spaces offcr ~ossibilitiesfor transnalional citizenship and hence an anchor for global rights.

While Barber is gemlly oplimihlic about the growing influence of these civic movements, he cautions ap~inst uwrstaling their importance. "These transnational civic projects

should not fan1 us into thinking that Amnesty Lntcrnntionalor blcdecins Sans i-rontieres [Imclors Without 13ordersl are the equivalent in clout of AUL Tie W,mcr or the Inenulional

Monelxy Fund." This is a powerful argument and one which I lplieve deserves grmter attention, especially as a cosntcrwdght tn Thomas L. Fnalman.

bukuyanu~and other

As ;I maverick cconomisl and highly respected futurist. Hazel Henderson has been making this case tor uver a decadc. In "Sacid Innovation and CiliLen Movements." she exiunincs the

growing inlemalionnl significance of thc voluntary. civic, or "third" sector comprising vnriol~stypes of innovative cidzns organizations. She pays special attcnlion to non-

governmental organizalions. NGOhnnge llwn bcal *mice

eleclmnic nelwurks. The rise of these type? of organizations is "one of the most striking phenomena of the 20th century,'' she Aqserts. One of Ihe most diaunctiw ieaturcs nt NCjOs. in

Henderson's view. i~that they are orientad tow,ud "preferred rulures" and "invoke the possible by mapping social plenlials." By contrast. curplr;!tions md government-sponsored

institutions are usually developed

kgislaton tn ~tspo~dto pssslrres i~tthe<w~skvt.1. ln addition. NC;~Sare often quick to find creative and innovative i~lternariveslo social prnhlems. They can network

play no increasingly pivolnl rok in shaping the pslFold War world I1 had a centla1 part in the shili from colnm~~nismtu Western-stylc dcmtlcracy in the former

that international

citizen movements lepresent one of the most powerh~l;tnd ondervalt~edforces for social innovation

[oday. Filly, in an css~yadapted

Hcndcrson maintains

Samuel Huntington. Francis Rr the twenty-first century.

high-protilc observers of globalization

whu have little. iran)thing. t say abuut he role trlcitirens in shaping a new h)rderless world

chbs. chmbcrs uf cummel-ct

ad prufusional as.wciations.

to international human rishts orgnnizations and glohal

lo meet pncstablishcd social nccds. In this way. NGOs ohcn .%me as precurstlrs to national and international governmental u~stitutionshy prodding

across national borders, as well as corporate and

of new or ~reviouslyoverlooked information. Government and corporale elites, on thc other hand, "often remain innorant of viable policy alternatives. insulated within top-down hierarchies" from the -inconvenient" views of citizen

aovernmenl boundaries, thereby enabling rapid syntheses

organi7atians and the public at ku-ge. Hedenon observes that NGDs m usually founded on a

by tradit~onalecclnomic development theorists." In this respect, they constime a "priceless social resource" by "offcrinp new paradigms to societies stuck in old w;~ys."Hdersun believas that thc world has become too complex for the traditional gbbal and national insritmions. Thc proliferation of international citkcn o~~anizatmns,Uansnatioml corporations. global satellirc communications. media companies. and electronic securities and currmy trading is gl~~duallyundermining thc sovereignty and competence of nation-states. "Only when

Ihe UN is reshaped." she says, "together w~thother needed gluhal stmcto~rs,c:ut a more lunited but cffcctive form olsovereignly k cxcrciscd

discussion ol'thc ~lecessilyin any ~umplexsysum for fdb~ckand input. Shc stresses the need for "the rclooling c~fdemocracics"to accommodale a greater~nkfor the public in the

decision-makhg pmccss. She cites Joseph Tainter's fidings that "hierarchies collapse all leaders topple lpcaose of lack of leedback CII~I the governed. it


pmicipatinn. She describes not only the unique characleristics os citizen movements and how they differ fiom the mectx~nismsof gclvernmenr ami the fire mrirket. but

shows that they are more receptive to constructive social change than either the state or private enterprise. laal

said. she nlay be overly oprituistlc about the actual influence of citizewled :rwps. As Benjamin B;lrlxr ivould no dwht remind Iler. the power ol'lrawnal~onal NCiOs canna hdd a raixile lo lllc inllucncc of

intermtional hdies sucll as Urn %'<wid Trade Organiznum or multinarional corpnrtii~nssuch as Nestle and Coca-Cola hen so, ha1 is MI excuse tor ignoring civil sociny iu an cmr~?ent and

signiiicant global plmolllenon. Like Barber and Henderson. Czwh prwident Vaclav 1Iavd sw a growing rult. for citizens and civic urganizaticms in shaping glohal affairs. In a profound ad moving =say adapted a lalk presented a1 ll~cWurld Econunuc FONII~in Switzerland in February 1992. Havel points cmt that we arc moving into a new era in rvcrld affairs, me that has litlle in common with "the

older systems of order forged in Helsinki. Yalta, and Vers:ulla." What tlus cllange xpesents.

"Ttle cn~lof alnlmunirrn is, first and torcniOSt, a niessagc to (he hlman ncc." Havcl insists. "lt js n mcssacc we havc not ye1 hlily &nphued and mprehcndcd. In its derpcst sense. tle end dmnrlnunisn~Ims, I

belivvc. hruuph~a major en in human luslwy to an end. It has brought an end not just to the ninaeenth uml twentieth centuries. hut tlle mndzrn age as a u~Imle.".Tnis lnndern ap, as Havel defines il. 18

characterized by the Ediplnenntea notlcln of a clrckwork universe that is rationally wderd. suhjat to universal laws. and capahle of heing understood hy scientific nlcans. ln political lernis, thir ethos

cxpresscd itself in systems, institutions, a~ecl~anis,w.nalistic;~l avuags. and lwnliziny idcul(>yits~fi-nllkinds. "Cunnmnisnl

the bais of a few propositions masg~watlingas tlie on1y sciwlific truth, tt) mgmizc all of Iiie according to a sin&

wll~llife wmted." We are nd ye! fiec from this apprwh to human affairs. according to Haucl. 1t still lives witlun cur politi~xl and ocum7ulic sptelns. our institutions. and even our habits of 11u1d.Yd

Ifie~eis something altosetha new emerging amund the world. It expresses itself in a new opnness. What we nezd now is to give voice to tlut impulse. says

rrsponaibilily, archclypdl wisdom. good taste. munge. cumpassion. and faith in the inlponanceot particular measures tlml do not we to be a universal key to salvatim." Havel concludes wrth a

hwl~tifulstatenent which err~bocliesa sinular Iailll to Illat of Benjamin Barher and tkuzl Hendawn: "ln a wurld aigobcrl civiliralion.unly those who are looking for a technical nick lo save that civilizacjon

need feel despair. Rul dlose tvlro bclierc. in all n~odtsy,in tlr ~nyslwimspawm uf their onvn Imman Bdnp. which

"trickle-up" model-the very opposite of the "elitisL technocmtic 'trickle-down' promoted

by nations." Hcndersor~wncludes with a brier

they lack the requisile complexity

casc lor c~tize~>activism and


global ethic.






information." What Henderson does in these pages is prcsent an inspiring, and in my vjcu pcrsuasivc.

hr says, is ml only the collapse of tlle Cold War system, hut the emergence of a pn>iwndly new

was the

pcrverse extreme ofthis trend." Havel suggests. "11 was an attempt on

mudcl. and to bubjm it to central plannin~and control regardless ofwlrdler or not that was

nredhlcs hdwwn

Havel. We nwl "a st:rrsc of lransccrulenlal

them and the nlystmims pcwer of the world's Being, have noreason to

dcspairalaI1:Benearh tksonlewhatesnaic mewphm. what Havel is expressing is a politics of hopc, a politics of Lhe future, a politics in which the attitudes and actions of everv individual have an important place and luncdon. It is an openness to change, to uncertainty. and to the possibilitv that the best is yet to come. Thequestion IE leaves unanswered is Ihis: DO we, a,sciti>ens orthis new

era of human history, have the faith In go forward inlo the unknown. to crilte r glnbnl Culure lhal rdecls our dignity and highest potenlii~l?It is o question without an answer. of coursr. but one wonh asking ull rhe same. For that reason. 1think Havcl's aniclc should be essential leading lor my and all obscrvcrs of globaliration.

Michigan 7 week juniors






Satz, 1999 (Debra, Assosciate Professor of Philosophy and Stanford University. Nomos XLI: Global Justice, Edited by Ian Shapiro and Lea Brilmayer. Page 60)


Let me conclude by taking up one last argument against cosmopolitanism made bv Miller. This is that cosmopolitanism cannot be right because ils implications-forcxamph. about IIK IM~rt~rinternational retlistribotion-~~nfli~twith widelv held convictions. The same would no doubt have been true two centuries ago if it had been suggested that slavery should be abolished worldwide. And a prolo-Millerian only a century ago would have laughed to scorn the idea that

women should have the same political and civil rights as men. Perhaps in snothw century, it will be a matter for amajtcrnent that tnnsfen rrom rich

countries to pwr oncs 010.2 or 0.3 per cent ocGNP werr uncc thrlught xkquate m meet the mom1ohligntio~~sof people in rich countries. Whether thcy do or nor, to adduce as an

argument against there being such an obligation that a lot of people currently do not believe that there is seems to me unuttcrablv feeble. If we have convictions, let us have the courage of those convictions.



Calhoun, 02 (Craig, president of the Social Science Research Council and a professor of sociology and history at New York University, "Imagining Solidarity: UCosmopolitanism, Constitutional Patriotism, and the Public Sphere," Public C~tlture14.1(2002) 147-171 http://muse.ihu.eduliournalslpublic culturc/v0l4/14.lcalhoun.html)

The U.S. example couW inform a different conccplinn of constitutional patriotism. stronger than that advocated by Aabermas.