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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 02 BOGOTA 003636 SUBJECT: APIAY DRUG SMUGGLING INCIDENT Classified By: DCM:MKDrucker, Reason 1.4 (d) 1. (C) SUMMARY: On March 28 cocaine was discovered on a military aircraft arriving at Fort Bliss, Texas from Colombia. After initial investigation three soldiers were detained and returned to the US. Investigation is ongoing. End Summary. 2. (C) On March 28, 2005 law enforcement authorities acting on information obtained from the JTTF in Dallas, seized 34.9 pounds of cocaine hidden on a military aircraft arriving from Apiay Colombian Air Force Base, at Fort Bliss, Texas. U.S. military personnel at Apiay (in Meta Department, Colombia) are providing support to Colombian counterinsurgency and counterdrug operations. Law enforcement officials in CONUS suspected that U.S. military personnel were involved in the cocaine shipment. Early on the morning of March 29 at the request of law enforcement personnel in Fort Bliss, the Bogota MilGroup Commander requested that two U.S. military personnel be detained at the U.S. Embassy and transported to their unit at Fort Bliss in CONUS.

3. (C) The Embassy Force Protection Detachment (FPD) contacted the military unit commander and verified that FPD agents had authorization to detain and transport the suspects and conduct local searches of the unit areas both in Bogota, and at Apiay Air Base. At 5:19 AM the FPD detained Staff Sergeant Daniel Rosas and Specialist de la Tejera (later released in the United States), and informed the two U.S. military personnel of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ. 4. (C) Mr. Rojas provided a voluntary, sworn statement that led to the identification and detention of a third military person, Sergeant Kelvin Irizarry, at Apiay Air Base, in addition to other leads that are being pursued at this time. Rosas also stated that he had cocaine samples in his living quarters at Apiay. Both detainees provided written consent to search their areas at Apiay Air Base and their hotel rooms in Bogota. OSI agents at Apiay, conducted a search and seized eight test tubes of cocaine from Rosas, quarters. Evidence was collected and handed over to the Bogota DEA office. 5. (C) At approximately 0845 hours, on March 29, 2005, the FPD notified the unit leadership in the United States regarding the third suspect and received authorization to detain and transport him. The Ambassador requested that all measures be taken to assure the safety and security of everyone involved and that travel arrangements be expedited. He offered full Embassy support to the

investigation. 6. (C) Two suspects (Rosas and de la Tejera), departed Colombia in a DEA aircraft later that afternoon on Tuesday, March 29, 2005, approximately nine hours after their detention and arrived in El Paso to be placed in custody of U.S. Army Criminal Investigation Division (CID) personnel. 7. (C) At the request of the FPD, the Defense Attache Office transported the third suspect, and evidence, from Apiay to Bogota. U.S. Air Force Security Policeman Luis Rucova stationed at Apiay Air Base escorted the suspect and evidence on board the DAO aircraft from Apiay to Bogota. On arrival in Bogota, at approximately 18:41 hours the evidence was turned over to DEA Bogota, and the suspect, Irizarry, was turned over to representatives of his unit to await transportation the following day. He left Bogota on a commercial flight for Houston , Texas the following morning (March 30). 8. (C) The RSO coordinated federal law enforcement team linkup at Houston Bush Intercontinental Airport to provide in transit security of the third suspect. The FPD agents in cooperation with RSO and DEA in Bogota, Dallas, and Houston, and the USDAO pilots, had interviewed the primary suspect, developed information leading to the further identification of the illegal ring and a third suspect, conducted searches and seizures of evidence, and transported all suspects to their military unit in El Paso.

9. (C) On April 4, 2005, the FPD and MilGroup Commander briefed Colombian Air Force Commander General Lesmez, and Colombian Military Commander General Ospina. Both Colombian Generals assured the MILGRP Commander and FPD that the USDR and FPD Colombia would receive all possible assistance in any investigations and joint force protection measures. General Lesmez said that Brigadier General (BG) Parga would be his staff point of contact for the matter. BG Parga is currently the Chief of Colombian Air Force Intelligence, but ironically, was the Commander at Apiay when some of the criminal activity was being conducted. 10. (C) On Tuesday, 5 April, FPD interviewed a U.S. walk-in source at Apiay Air Base and obtained a sworn statement providing further leads and suggesting that Rosas, the primary suspect in the criminal case, had made mistakes in intelligence missions in which he participated that could have resulted in faulty analysis. 11. (C) On April 6 the Ambassador ordered the FPD to organize and coordinate a threat working group to coordinate investigative activity with selected U.S. law enforcement and counterintelligence organizations, including host nation, to determine the scope and nature of the criminal activity, and to confirm or reject any security compromises occurring as a result of the criminal activity. The working group met on Wednesday, April 6, and exchanged information.

----------Conclusion ----------12. (C) This issue has become a matter of public controversy here, based mostly on press and congressional questions (including formal hearings) as to why the U.S. servicemen implicated in the matter were not turned over to Colombian authorities. Nationalism, resentment over extraditions, and other factors have combined to allow some to portray the removal of the servicemen as a unilateral disregard for Colombian military law enforcement. Some have even suggested that Colombia should seek the extradition of the servicemen back to Colombia. 13. (C) Embassy, in coordination with Southcom and with the cooperation of the Colombian Government, have kept details out of the public record, on the grounds that the investigation is still under way. We have noted, however, that in keeping with a 1974 bilateral agreement the military personnel had been notified by name in advance of arrival to the Colombian Ministry of Defense and formally accepted by the Ministry, which afforded them the privileges and immunities specified in the agreement. Although this reduced the shrillness of the public debate, it also refocused it on the agreement. We privately told the Minister of Defense that, in the context of reviewing our defense relationship, we would be willing to update the agreement (leading perhaps to a full SOFA). The Minister has said publicly that

the 1974 agreement might/might be in need of updating. This issue will form an important part of the context for the early May BWG discussions in Cartagena. 14. (C) The investigation continues in Texas and in Colombia. It will be crucial--in light of politicization of issue in Colombia--for all/all U.S. authorities working on the case to cooperate with appropriate Colombian officials through the Embassy. Embassy, of course, stands ready to assist and coordinate here. 15. (U) Post wishes to express its appreciation to the Office of the Legal Advisor for the copious assistance provided during the night of March 28/29, 2005. WOOD (Edited and reading.) reformatted by Andres for ease of