INTERAGENCYREALTIMEEVALUATIONOFTHE HUMANITARIANRESPONSETOTHEEARTHQUAKEINHAITI

20MONTHSAFTER

SilviaHidalgo,withsupportfromMariePascaleThodate January2012

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The evaluators wish to express their profound gratitude to all those who shared their constructive criticalviewsandhelpedshapetheconclusionsandrecommendationscontainedinthepresentreport. WeareespeciallygratefultotheHaitianswemetwho,onceagain,generouslyandpatientlyfoundthe timetocommunicateandtooffertheirconcernsandideas. We are grateful for the support received from Concern, OCHA, IEDA Relief, IOM, UNHabitat, UNICEF, UNFPAandUNOPS. Finally,theauthorswouldespeciallyliketothankTijanaBojanic,withoutwhosesupportthisevaluation couldnothavebeenundertaken.

LISTOFACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS
CAP CCCM CDAC CMO CNSA CNE CO CSC CTC CTU DAD DINEPA DPC DSRSG ECHO ERC FAO FTS GACI GoH ICG IHRC GBV HC HCT HQ HIC HRF IARTE IASC ICC ICRC IDB IDP IHRC IM IFRC INFP IOM ISF J/PHRO MARNDR MAST MENFP MICT MINUSTAH ConsolidatedAppealProcess CampCoordinationandCampManagement CommunicationwithDisasterAffectedCommunities CampManagementOperations CoordinationNationaledelaScuritAlimentaire CentreNationaldesquipements CountryOffice CoordinationSupportCommittee CholeraTreatmentCentre CholeraTreatmentUnit DevelopmentAssistanceDatabase(DAD) DirectionNationaledelEauPotableetdelAssainissement DirectiondelaProtectionCivile DeputySpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneral EuropeanCommissionHumanitarianAidandCivilProtection EmergencyReliefCoordinator FoodandAgricultureOrganization FinancialTrackingSystem GroupedAppuidelaCooprationInternationale GovernmentofHaiti InternationalCrisisGroup InterimHaitiRecoveryCommission Genderbasedviolence HumanitarianCoordinator HumanitarianCountryTeam Headquarters HumanitarianInformationCentre HaitiReconstructionFund InterAgencyRealTimeEvaluation InterAgencyStandingCommittee InterClusterCoordination InternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross InterAmericanDevelopmentBank Internallydisplacedperson InterimHaitirecoveryCommission Informationmanagement InternationalFederationoftheRedCross InstitutNationaldeFormationProfessionnelle InternationalOrganizationforMigration IntegratedStrategicFramework J/PHaitianReliefOrganization MinistredelAgriculture,desRessourcesNaturellesetduDveloppementRural MinistredesAffairesSocialesetduTravail MinistredelducationNationaleetdelaFormationProfessionnelle MinistredelIntrieuretdesCollectivitsterritoriales UnitedNationsStabilizationMissioninHaiti

MPCE MTPTC MSPP NGO OCHA OHCHR PDNA RC SRSG TRIAMS UN UNCT UNDP UNFPA UNIFEM UNHABITAT UNICEF USAID UNOPS WASH WatSan WFP WHO

MinistredelaPlanificationetdelaCooprationExterne MinistredesTravauxPublics,Transports&Communication MinistredelaSantPubliqueetdelaPopulation Nongovernmentalorganization OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffaires OfficeoftheHighCommissionerforHumanRights PostDisasterNeedsAssessmentandRecoveryFramework ResidentCoordinator SpecialRepresentativeoftheSecretaryGeneral TsunamiRecoveryImpactAssessmentandMonitoringSystem UnitedNations UnitedNationsCountryTeam UnitedNationsDevelopmentProgramme UnitedNationsPopulationFund UnitedNationsDevelopmentFundforWomen UnitedNationsHumanSettlementsProgramme UnitedNationsChildrensFund UnitedStatesAgencyforInternationalDevelopment UNOfficeforProjectServices Water,SanitationandHygiene Waterandsanitation WorldFoodProgramme WorldHealthOrganization

TABLEOFCONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 2 LISTOFACRONYMSANDABBREVIATIONS 3 EXECUTIVESUMMARY 6 INTRODUCTION 6 I. INTRODUCTION 17 17 I.1 BACKGROUNDANDAIMOFTHEEVALUATION 18 I.2 METHODS,SCOPEANDSTRENGTHSANDWEAKNESSESOFTHEEVALUATION 21 I.3 CONTEXT II. MAINACHIEVEMENTS,GAPS,LIMITSANDCONSTRAINTS 24 24 II.1 MAINACHIEVEMENTS 27 II.2 THEBIGGAPS:DURABLESOLUTIONS,LIVELIHOODS,ACCOMMODATION,COMMUNICATIONANDCONTINUEDSUPPORT 29 II.3 LIMITSANDCONSTRAINTS 31 II.4 PROGRESSONMAINRECOMMENDATIONSEMERGINGFROMFIRSTPHASEOFTHERTE III. COHERENCE,CONNECTEDNESSANDSUSTAINABILITYOFTHERESPONSE 33 33 III.1 LACKOFCLARITYANDCONSENSUSONWHATCONSTITUTESHUMANITARIANACTIONINHAITI 34 III.2 UNCERTAINPLANNING 34 III.3 TRYINGINTERRELATIONSHIPS 35 III.4 SUSTAINABILITYOFEFFORTS 35 III.5 LIMITEDTAKEUPOFHUMANITARIANCONCERNSINLONGERTERMRECOVERYEFFORTS 36 III.6 PILOTINGANDLINKINGEFFORTS IV. COORDINATIONANDCLUSTERTRANSITION 36 36 IV.1 LIMITEDCONNECTIONBETWEENDIFFERENTCOORDINATIONMECHANISMSANDACTORS 38 IV.2 CLUSTERTRANSITION V. INFORMATION 38 38 V.1 CLUSTERDRIVENINFORMATIONSYSTEMS 39 V.2 ENGAGINGWITHOTHERACTORSONINFORMATIONMANAGEMENT 39 V.3 COMMUNICATIONEFFORTS VI. SUMMARYOFFINDINGSANDLESSONSLEARNED 40 VII. CONCLUSION 42 VIII.KEYRECOMMENDATIONS 46 51 ANNEX1:TERMSOFREFERENCE 60 ANNEX2:REPORTONTHEFOCUSGROUPHELDWITHHAITIANSTAFFINVOLVEDINTHEHUMANITARIANRESPONSE 66 ANNEX3:REPORTONTHEIARTEWORKSHOPONTRANSITION ANNEX4:TRANSITIONSTRATEGIESOFCLUSTERSINHAITIANDOPTIONSFORLINKING/MERGINGTHEMINTOOFFICIALSTRUCTURES 71 93 ANNEX5:TIMELINE 94 ANNEX6:RECOMMENDATIONSFROMTHEWORKINGGROUPONCOMMUNICATIONSATTHERTEWORKSHOP 95 ANNEX7:OVERVIEWOFCOORDINATIONFRAMEWORKS 98 ANNEX8:FOCUSGROUPS,GENERALMEETINGSOBSERVEDANDVISITS 100 ANNEX9:LISTOFPERSONSMET 105 ANNEX11:SELECTEDREFERENCES

EXECUTIVESUMMARY Introduction
ThisreportsummarisesthesecondphaseoftheInterAgencyStandingCommitteesInterAgencyReal Time Evaluation of the response to the Earthquake, twenty months after the disaster event. The earthquake that struck Haiti on January 12th 2010 had a drastic effect on the countrys human and institutionalpublicandtheprivatesectorcapacity.Anestimated230,000peoplelosttheirlives;300,000 morewereinjuredandover1millionwerelefthomeless.1Thedevastatinghumanitariansituationwas compounded by Haitis underlying vulnerabilities and high level of chronic poverty. In response, the internationalcommunity mounteda massivehumanitarianreliefeffortandfiftyfive donorspledged a totalof$4.59billioningrantsfor2010and2011towardstherebuildingofthecountry.2 Given the scale of the disaster and subsequent humanitarian response, the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) launched a multiphase exercise to inform decision makers at national and headquarters levels, to draw lessons and allow corrections to be made where necessary. The Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is intended to be the most immediate user of the feedback and recommendationsoftheevaluation. The first phase of the InterAgency RealTime Evaluation, completed in May 2010, covered the initial response. The second phase was initially foreseen to take place in October 20103and focus in a forwardlooking manner on interagency coordination problems or operational challenges during the transitionphase.Theprocesswaspostponed,duetotheOctober2010choleraoutbreakandthedelays instartingthetransitionphase. Thissecondphasesoughtto: Analyse and provide lessons for the ongoing response, with a particular focus on coordination betweendifferentactorsinvolved; Examineoptionsforlinkinghumanitarianresponsestructureswithlongertermand/orgovernment establishedmechanisms;and Analyse the extent to which the findings and recommendations from the first phase of the Inter AgencyRealTimeEvaluationhaveinformedtheevolvinghumanitarianresponseinHaiti. MethodologicalApproach The evaluation team4carried out the evaluation between August and October 2011, starting with an initialthreeweekcountrymission.ThefieldworkwasfollowedbydebriefingsandmeetingsinHaitiand New York. A workshop on the preliminary findings of the evaluation was held in PortauPrince in advance of the Common Appeal Process (CAP) 2012 workshop. Additional data was gathered later in Haiti until the end of October 2011. Interviews were conducted with more than 250 individuals from Haitian institutions and international agencies (facetoface interviews, focus groups and teleconferences)aswellaswithindividualsandgroupsfromtheaffectedcommunitiesindifferentsites

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GoHfigures(estimatesofthenumberofdeadvary). PledgedattheMarch2010InternationalDonorsConferenceheldinNewYork. 3 TwoscopingmissionsinMarch2011andJuly2011furtherfinetunedtheinitialTermsofReference. 4 TheteamofthreeindependentevaluatorswasreducedtotwooneHaitian,oneinternationalaftertheinitialfieldphaseof theevaluation.

in PortauPrince and Logane and facing different situations 5 . An additional debriefing for IASC memberswasheldinGenevainDecember2011. Section1inthereportexplainsthebackground,methodologyandconstraintsoftheevaluation.Findings are presented in sections two to five. Summary of findings and lessons learned are in section VI, conclusioninsectionseven,andsummaryofkeyfindingsandrecommendationsarebroughttogetherin section eight. A note on cluster transition, prepared for managers in the field in advance of the finalizationoftheevaluation,ispresentedinfullinAnnex4. ContextualConstraintsontheHumanitarianResponse Atthetimeofthisevaluation,twentymonthsaftertheearthquake,thehumanitarianresponsetothe initial catastrophe has unfolded within a context of multiple crises, including a cholera epidemic, hurricanes,andpoliticalandsecuritychallenges.Peoplewhowerealreadylivinginsituationsofpoverty and vulnerability before the earthquake are now in a situation of severe need.Despite increasing constraintsonfunding,transitionhasbeenhighontheagendaasaresultofthegrowingdesiretomove awayfromhumanitarianresponseandreliefandtoofferdurablesolutionstoexistingneeds. As phasing out of humanitarian aid did not go hand in hand with concrete steps towards recovery, speedinguptherecoveryandreconstructionprocessbecameamajorpriorityin2011.Theabsenceofa governmentformuchoftheyear2011andthefactthattheworkofInterimHaitiRecoveryCommission (IHRC) was questioned (its mandate was due to expire in October 2011) resulted in prolonged uncertaintyandinstitutionalfragility.Atthesametime,therehavebeengroundsforoptimismlinkedto the newly elected Presidents leadership and elements of his programme. Vision, leadership and decisionmakinghavebeenlackinginthepastinHaiti.PresidentMartelly'scommitmentsoneducation andthe16/6Projectpresentbothchallengesandopportunitiesforpositivechange. Achievements,GapsandChallenges

Bytheendof2011,thekeyachievementsoftheresponsehavebeen:mainstreamingdisaster preparedness;aneffectiveresponseincamps,withpopulationslargelyfreeofcholera;recent progress on the rate of rubble removal, which had been a key obstacle for recovery;
developments on transitional shelter solutions; implementation of integrated neighbourhoodbased approaches;andprogressonimprovingwaterandsanitationinthelongerterm. Therewasconsiderableconsensusamongstrespondentsonthedeficienciesoftheresponseandcurrent existinggaps,withHaitianactorsfarmorecriticaloftheinternationalresponseatthisstage.Themain shortcomings as perceived in AugustOctober 2011 include: durable solutions; livelihoods; accommodation; communication; and provision of continued support to address remaining needs. International actors underlined that, despite the huge efforts deployed, many critical constraints have affectedtheoverallresponseandthespeedofrecoveryinthisperiod. Inadditiontoexistingcontextualconstraints,thehumanitariancommunityinHaitihasbeenfacingthree mainchallenges:

5Suchascampresidents,relocates,evictees,affectedremaininginneighborhoods,beneficiariesandnonbeneficiariesof

housesrepairedandtransitionalshelter,etc

Acutehumanitarianneedspersistwithonlylimitedresourcestoaddressthem.Operations arescalingdownwithoutsustainablesolutionsbeinginplace. Assistance that does not favour durable solutions no longer meets Haitian expectations. Humanitariangoalsarenotalwaysunderstoodandthehumanitariancommunitysmethods and instruments (i.e. forms of assistance, the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) as a decisionmaking body, the Consolidated Appeal Process (CAP), methods of needs assessmentandmonitoring)arerepeatedlyquestioned. Theaidcoordinationanddeliverysystemhasnotbeensufficientlyrationalisedoradaptedto thefastchangingrealityonthegroundandtheneedformoreinteractionwithotheractors (e.g.GovernmentofHaitianddevelopmentdonors).

The evaluation has identified many areas where data collection, needs analysis, consultation and communication,interagencyactionandactionwithgovernmentneedtobestrengthenedsothatgains madesofararenotlostasagencieswinddown.Themaininformationalchallengeishavinganoverall assessment of needs that can better guide the response, prioritisation and appeals. More precise informationontheneedsofearthquakeaffectedpopulationsandtheextentofcoverageisessentialto plantheresponseasitmovesforward. The evaluation found that there is a lack of continuing capacity for assessing and crossvalidating information.Intersectoralcoordinationhasbeenregardedasweakbymajorityofintervieweesandhas notfacilitatedfurthertakeupofeithercrosscuttingormultidimensionalissues.Amonitoringsystem recently established, with clusters quarterly reporting on progress against key indicators, is based exclusivelyondataemanatingfromtheclusters;aseachclusterhasitsownmethodsofdatacollection, consolidationofindicatorsandcorroborationofdataremainsachallenge.Atpresenttheprevalentview among actors is that the process is too timeconsuming and that the capacity for providing the informationisoftennotsuffcient.Informationmanagementsystemsrequiremorebuyin,andshouldbe expanded and connected to meet the needs of stakeholders and address progress on transition (i.e. achievingdurablerecoverysolutions). Transitionisontheagendabutneedsavision,astrategy,aplanandleadership.Theevaluationfound thatthecoordinationandplanningmechanismsarenotfullyadaptedtothecurrentcontext.Anoverall aid coordination framework integrating all phases of assistance has been lacking. In an evolving environmentwherethevastmajorityofagenciesarescalingdown,rolesandresponsibilitiesarefurther blurredbythemismatchinthelevelofresourcesacrosshumanitarian,developmentandgovernmental actors. There is a need for defining and understanding new roles and clarifying responsibilities in the movetowardstransitionanddevelopment. Amajorissue,consistentlyraisedwithevaluators,waslimitedfundingavailableforhumanitarianaidin the context of a projectdriven recovery and reconstruction process. While a focus on lifesaving activities is still required, with vulnerable populations facing multiple threats, the 2011 revised CAP is only56percentfundedand60percentofthegovernmentbudgetdependsoninternationalassistance. InSeptember2011,donorshadonlydisbursed43percentofthe$4.59billionofthetotalpledgedfor recoveryandreconstructioninthe20102011timeframe. The length of time required to achieve results was identified as a key limitation to planning for transition. The organisational structures of the main agencies are considered costly and not flexible enough,yetagenciesstillfeeloverstretchedintheircurrentcapacities.Withstructuresremainingintact andlargelyhavingtofocusonaddressingconstraintsratherthanonachievingresults,delaysinprogress

haveconsequencesforcosts.TheresponseinHaitihasbeenmoreexpensivethaninotherrecentcrises (e.g. Pakistan, Sri Lanka) and has far exceeded initial estimates, with projects reported as exceeding themby2.5to3times. Theresponsehasbeenhinderedbyalackofengagementinagenuinetwowaycommunicationandthe effectivesupportofHaitians,whofeelsidelinedandareincreasinglycriticalofNGOsandtheoverallaid effort.Thehumanitariancommunityhasbeenlimitedinitscommunicationsbynothavingasufficiently clear understanding of Government of Haiti (GoH) recovery plans with respect to, for example, a resettlementstrategy.WhileplanssuchastheActionPlanfortheNationalRecoveryandDevelopment of Haiti were drafted in advance of the March 2010 donors conference, they often lacked legitimacy withinthecountrybecauseofboththelimitedHaitianparticipationintheirpreparationandthe2011 change of government. The commitment of the new GoH and the need to progress from the initial humanitarian crisis response towards transition and longer term development present valuable opportunitiesforadjustingthecurrentaidarchitectureinHaiti. Followuptoevaluationrecommendations WhiletherewasnoformalfollowupormanagementresponsetothefirstphaseoftheIARTE,progress hasbeenmadewithrespecttothreeofitsmainrecommendations.First,thehumanitariancommunity hasincorporatedinitsresponsethechallengesofmainstreamingdisasterpreparedness.Second,thereis greaterawarenessoftheneedforhumanitarianactorstoadapttheirresponsetotheparticularneedsof an urban environment. Humanitarian efforts have continued to focus on neighbourhoods, and communitybased integrated approaches are increasingly favoured and implemented. Third, specific recommended actions were taken to make the response more inclusive. These have not yet proven sufficient to effectively address the extent of the problem. Finally, the response did not manage to extenditscoveragefullytotheearthquakeaffectedpopulationsinruralareas.Geographiccoveragehas beenextendedtosomedegreetomeetsomeurgentneedsinthecountryside(mainlycholera). The humanitarian community needs to improve utilizationfocused approaches to evaluation. At this timeinHaititherearenotenoughexamplesofsystematicfollowuptoevaluations(e.g.bydeveloping anoperationalplanbasedonrecommendationsandassessingprogress4to5monthslater).Moreover, systemwide evaluations like InterAgency Real Time Evaluations should be better integrated into operationalplanningtobeusedeffectively. KeyRecommendations The recommendations below are intended to offer insights into how continuing and urgent humanitarianneedscanbemetasthistransformationtakesplace. 1. Further engagewith the newgovernmentand Haitiansociety toclarifyandunderstandnew priorities,objectivesandstrategiesandbetteradapttheresponseandcollectiveaction. Thehumanitariancommunity,incoordinationwithdevelopmentactors,needstoreengagewiththe newgovernmentandtheHaitiansocietyandtakeadvantageofinstitutionalchangessuchasthe NewHousingAuthoritytoadaptitsapproach,bettercommunicateitsconcernsandjointlydefine anactionplanthataddresseshumanitarianprioritiesandprovidesclarityfortransition.Thisincludes reachingouttoandinvolvingthediasporaandtheprivatesector(e.g.learningfrominitiativeslike SoulofHaiti,andliaisingwithmembersofthePresidentialAdvisoryCouncil).

Intheimmediateterm,theHCTincoordinationwiththeUNCT,shouldtaskasmallleadgroup(4 5 of relevant key leaders in the response) to approach the new Haitian government and to collaborate at the highest level in the clarification of concerns and priorities. The group should, if possible,haveRedCrossparticipationandincludeOCHA,UNDPandUNICEFleadership. Either the recently formed advocacy working group or a new one should inform and followup on the processed described above and provide information to the lead group. By working with differentlevelsofgovernmentandotherHaitianactors,thisgroupcouldeventuallydefineaclearer roadmaptoguidetransitionandaddressremainingneeds.Thegroupshouldincludeparticipation fromprotectionclusterandCampCoordinationandCampManagement(CCCM)/shelterclusters. TheinternationalcommunityinHaitiHCT,UNCT,G12,OfficeoftheSpecialEnvoy,etc.needsto conveytheneedforacoherentprocessforformulatinganoverallresettlementstrategyandplan. Subsequentlytheplanshouldbesupportedandusedtoalignefforts.ThenewHousingAuthorityin Haitishouldbeencouragedtodefinepolicyandstrivetoworkwithinanagreedoverallresettlement strategy. The HCT should also oversee a process to redefine an advocacy plan which would convey humanitarianconcernsandencourage genuinetwowaycommunicationwith affectedpopulations andnationalNGOs.

To achieve this, additional leadership, decision making and a stronger and more strategic HCT is needed, and highlevel GoH presence at the HCT should also be considered. OCHA would also require additionalsupport. 2. Reformandrationalisecoordinationtofosterintegration,advancehumanitarianconcerns andconnecthumanitarianactionwithotherphasesorcategories(i.e.recovery,reconstructionand development)andstakeholdersintheframeworkofanoverallresponse. TheHC/RCofficeshoulddevelopaproposalforestablishinggreaterlinksbetweentheCAPandthe Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF), including joint monitoring of progress against established indicatorsandobjectives. TheHCTshouldfurtherreviewitsdecisionmakingcapacityanddefineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor 2012intermsofhowitcanengagewiththeGoH,developmentactorsandHaitiancivilsociety. Transition and Recovery as a topic should be a consistent agenda item at the HCT and in humanitarian donor coordination meetings. Similarly, humanitarian concerns should be a point of discussioninG12meetings. Had the IHRCs mandate been extended, their representation at the HCT should have been promoted and a humanitarian aid issues focus area created within the IHRC (i.e. treated in a similar way to DRR or other areas). OCHAs presence in Ministry of Planning meetings could be encouragedtoensurethathumanitarianconcernsareconsideredandprogressivelydealtwithina durableway. The HCT should encourage a new strategic multistakeholder exercise and planning process that includesrepresentationfromthehumanitariancommunity,takesstockofthecurrentsituationand develops a more detailed plan for transition to recovery and development. This should be done separatelyandinadvanceoftheCAPMYRexercisewhichfocusesmorenarrowlyonhumanitarian needsandisnotasinclusiveorHaitispecific. 3. RationaliseandtransitiontheclustersysteminHaiti Theprocessofproactiveplanningforclustertransition,basedonobjectives,shouldbecontinued.This

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processshouldbejointlydrivenbyOCHA,UNDPandUNICEF.Additionalsupportshouldbesoughtand providedbytheIASCatthegloballevel,OCHAHQ,UNDP/BCPRonclustertransitionandcoordinationon resettlement around key dates, outputs and milestones. The assessment for the rationalization and transitioningofclustersplancanbedonethroughafourfoldprocess: Abottomupapproachtounderstandthearrayofgeographicallybasedcoordinationneedsata decentralised level, at all scales, from neighbourhood, to communal section, communal, departmentaltonational.UNDPhasaroletoplayinsupportinglocalgovernanceandastronger longtermcoordinationarchitecture. Areviewoffuturescenarios,understandingtheplansandprioritiesoftheGoHunderthenew presidency,suchasnewinstitutionsliketheHousingAuthority.Thisshouldtakeaccountofthe implicationsforcoordinationandtheworkcarriedoutbyclusterstodate. Asectorbysectoranalysis,leadingtoasectorwideapproachinsupportofamorecoherent, seamless response, addressing humanitarian issues, recovery and development in parallel, as wellasstrengtheningpreparedness,decentralizationandothercrosscuttingissues. Specificconcertedactionforkeycrosscuttingandmultidimensionalissuesidentified. 4. Considerfunding,costsandefficiencies TheHCTandUNCTsupportedbythegroupthatwasdefinedtocoordinateprojectsubmissionstothe IHRC should oversee efforts that review, reassess and quantify funding gaps for both humanitarian actionandadequatetransitiontorecovery,anddefineacoordinatedfundraisingstrategy. TheERCandHCshouldreachouttospecificdonorsincludingattheHQleveltoobtainfunding andadditionalstaffcapacityinpriorityunderresourcedareaslikeprotection. The CAP instrument should be better utilized for fundraising, distinguishing between overall needsandthehumanitariancommunityscapacitytodeliver. Donorsshouldprovideflexiblefundingalignedwithprioritiesoutlinedinjointhumanitarianand recoveryplans. TheGoHanddonorsshouldemphasizetheneedforminimumtransactioncosts. Costandefficiencyconsiderationsshouldbefactoredinacrosstheresponse.Recoveryproject implementationmechanismsthatinvolvelessoverheads,reducedlevelsofsubcontracting,and lesslagtimeforprocurementandimplementationshouldbeconsidered. Giventhecostofhumanresources,attentionshouldbepaidtoprioritisingtheuseoftimeand moreefficientoperationalprocesses(e.g.fasterdraftingandapprovingofpolicypapers,limiting meetings,etc.) Humanresourcepoliciesandpractices,specificallyforUNagencies,shouldberevisedtobecome moreflexibleandbetteradaptedtotheneedsoftheresponse(e.g.hiringnationalstaff,rapid shorttermdeployments,betteruseofexistingrosters,etc.) 5. Supportcapacitystrengtheningandretaincapacityinpriorityareas OCHAandClustersneedtocontinuetofocusonbuildingthecapacityofnationalactors. Space for focusing on key humanitarian needs should be retained in a transition framework throughamoreconnectedOCHA(e.g.withincreasedpresenceintherecoveryanddevelopment coordinationefforts)andadditionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice. DRReffortsshouldbeprioritisedovertimeandfurtherintegratedintodevelopment.

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More resources and capacity should be dedicated to protection issues through PROCAP with continuedsecondmentofcapacitytotheprotectioncluster,andadditionalresourcestoworkat thecommunelevel. Clusterleadagenciesshouldembedclustercoordinationcapacityintheirprogrammetosupport counterpartsandbeinapositiontohelpreactivatetheclusterifneeded. Globallevelguidanceshouldbesoughtonthemultisectorialchallengeofresettlement.

Thetablebelowsummariseskeyfindingsandrelatedrecommendationsoftheevaluation.
Relatedfindingsandconclusions The international community is keen on backing the new Haitian leadership and its commitments.(23) Plans and objectives of the Government of Haitiarenotalwayswellknown.(54) Thereisaneedtofurtheralignresponseto objectivesofnewgovernment.(54) Top positions in the Government of Haiti have found it difficult to engage with the humanitariancommunity.(55) Engagement between the humanitarian community and government ministries has proven difficult without a new government inplace.(56) Haitianauthoritieshavefeltmarginalisedby thehumanitarianresponse(55) The priority for transitioning beyond post earthquake humanitarian response remains defining a comprehensive resettlement policy.(17) The goals and objectives of humanitarian responsearenotalwaysunderstood.(52) Twowaycommunicationismissing.(77) Recommendations R1. Further engage with the new government and Haitiansocietytoclarifyandunderstandnewpriorities, objectivesandstrategiesandbetteradaptresponseand collectiveaction. The humanitarian community, in coordination with development actors, needs to reengage with the new government and Haitian society and take advantage of institutional changes such as the New Housing Authority to adapt its approach, better communicate its concerns and jointly define an action plan that addresses humanitarian priorities and provides clarity for transition. This includes reaching out to, and involving the diaspora and the private sector (e.g. learning from initiatives like Soul of Haiti, liaising with membersofthePresidentialadvisorycouncil). In the immediate term, the HCT in coordination withtheUNCT,shouldtaskasmallleadgroup(45)of relevant key leaders to approach the new Haitian government and work with it at the highest level, to clarify priorities and concerns. The group should, if possible, have Red Cross participation and include OCHA,UNDPandUNICEFleadership. To achieve this, additional leadership, decision making and a stronger and more strategic HCT is needed. OCHA would also require additional support. Highlevel Government of Haiti presence at the HCT shouldalsobeconsidered. The recently formed advocacy working group or a new oneshouldbeformedtofollowuponandinformthese processes, provide information to the lead group and work at other levels with the GoH and other Haitian actors,andeventuallydefineaclearerroadmapthatcan further guide transition and address remaining needs. The group should include protection cluster and CCCM/shelterclusterparticipation.

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Anoverallaidcoordinationsystemhasbeen absent.(63) Therehasbeenlimitedinteractionbetween recovery and humanitarian coordination frameworks.(64) New frameworks and approaches are needed to overcome weaknesses in coordinationacrosssectors.(63) The main objectives have yet to be defined for an overarching transition plan that incorporates the humanitarian response. (68) There is lack of clarity on the thresholds of humanitarian response. Emergency response and development needs are intertwined.(59,61) There is no collective interaction between humanitariandonorsandtheirdevelopment counterparts.(63) There is limited takeup of humanitarian concerns in longerterm development efforts.(63) Thehumanitarianresponsehashelpedpilot approaches for recovery that can be continuedandreplicated.(62) Assistance is being phased out without an

The international community in Haiti HCT, UNCT, G12, Office of the Special Envoy, etc. needs to coherently conveytheneedforandconsequentlysupportaprocess offormulatinganoverallresettlementstrategyandplan that can be supported over time and help align efforts. ThenewHousingAuthorityinHaitishouldstrivetowork under an agreed resettlement strategy and help define thispolicy. The HCT should also oversee a process that involves redefining an advocacy plan to convey humanitarian concerns,andencourageatwowaycommunicationwith affectedpopulationsandnationalNGOs. R2. Reform and rationalise coordination to foster integrationandadvancehumanitarianconcerns and connect humanitarian action with other phases or categories (i.e. recovery, reconstruction and development)andstakeholdersintheframeworkofan overallresponse. Asastart,theHC/RCofficecoulddevelopaproposalfor establishing greater links between the CAP and the ISF, includingjointmonitoringofprogressagainstestablished indicatorsandobjectives. The HCT should further review its decisionmaking capacityanddefineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor2012in terms of how it can engage with the Government of Haiti,developmentactorsandtheHaitiancivilsociety. Transition and Recovery as a topic should be systematically made an agenda item at the HCT and humanitarian donors coordination meetings. Similarly, humanitarianconcernsshouldbeapointofdiscussionin G12meetings. Had the IHRCs mandate been extended, their representation at the HCT should have been promoted andahumanitarianaidissuesfocusareacreatedwithin theIHRC(i.e.inasimilarwayasDRRorotherareasare considered). OCHAs presence could be encouraged in Ministry of Planning meetings to ensure that humanitarianconcernsareconsideredandprogressively dealtwithinadurableway. The HCT should encourage a new strategic multi stakeholder exercise and planning process that includes representationfromthehumanitariancommunity,takes stock of the current situation and develops a more detailedplanfortransitiontorecoveryanddevelopment. Thisshouldbeseparatefromanddoneinadvanceofthe

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effective handover strategy. Recovery effortsarenotpickinguponmajorareasof need that have been covered by the humanitarian community. As a result, continuing humanitarian needs are largely unmet.(59,60) There has been much recent progress on planning for cluster transition. UNICEF has played a key role in advancing cluster transition(69) The cluster system and the IHRC face difficulties in rectifying the initial lack of inclusivenessandlimitedHaitianownership. (66) Involvement of Haitian NGOs has been largelyunsuccessful.(66) Focusing on sectoral tables for cluster transitionistoolimitedanapproach.(70) The current system can be further rationalised through merging key objectives oftheresponse.(68) The system is not yet adapted to geographicallybasedcoordination(70) Information management has to be reviewed in line with outcomes based coordinationandinformationneeds.(73) An overall needs assessment system is absent, and the existing system is highly dependentontheclusterframework.(73) Mayors have played a key role in the response.(27,68,25) Crosssector and intercluster coordination havebeenweak.(28,65)

CAP MYR exercise which more narrowly focuses on humanitarian needs and is not as inclusive and Haiti specific.

R3.RationaliseandtransitiontheclustersysteminHaiti Continue proactive planning for cluster transition based on objectives. This process should be jointly driven by OCHA,UNDPandUNICEF.Additionalsupportshouldbe sought and provided by the IASC at the global level, OCHA HQ, UNDP/BCPR on cluster transition and coordinationonresettlementaroundkeydates,outputs and milestones. The assessment for the rationalization and transitioning of clusters planning can be done throughafourfoldprocess: A bottomup approach to understand the array of geographically based coordination needs at a decentralisedlevel,atallscales,fromneighbourhood,to communalsection,fromdepartmentaltonational.UNDP has a role to play in supporting local governance and a strongerlongtermcoordinationarchitecture. A review of future scenarios, understanding plans andprioritiesoftheGovernmentofHaitiunderthenew presidency, and plans for new institutions like the Housing Authority. Also to understand the implications forcoordinationandthe workcarried outbyclustersto date. A sector by sector analysis for a sectorwide approach in support of a more coherent, seamless response that addresses both humanitarian issues and recovery and development, as well as strengthening preparedness, decentralization and other crosscutting issues. Specific concerted action for key crosscutting and multidimensional issues that tackle important priorities that are fundamental to address humanitarian needs, phaseout assistance (e.g. resettlement and livelihoods) and make way for a coherent framework for coordination.

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Thereisinsufficientfundingavailableforthe humanitarian response and recovery (i.e. contributions to the CAP and the HRF). ( 43) Theresponseiscostlyanditscosthasbeen underestimated.(38,46) The CAPs effectiveness as a tool for fundraisingisquestionable.(43) IHRCisnotconsideredtobeacostefficient structure.(21) Areas like protection are underresourced. (37) Lack of funding prospects acts as a disincentivetoplanningtransition.(59)

R4.Considerfunding,costsandefficiencies The HCT and UNCT supported by the group that was defined to coordinate project submissions to the IHRC should oversee efforts that review, reassess and quantify funding gaps for both humanitarian action and adequatetransitiontorecoveryanddefineacoordinated fundraisingstrategy. TheERCandHCshouldreachouttospecificdonors attheHQleveltoobtainfundingandadditionalcapacity through staff secondments in priority underresourced areaslikeprotection. Donors should provide flexible funding commensurate to priorities outlined in joint humanitarianandrecoveryandplans. The Government of Haiti and donors should underlinetheneedforminimumtransactioncosts. Make better use of the CAP instrument for fundraising. Distinguish between overall needs and the humanitariancommunityscapacitytodeliver. Factorin cost and efficiency considerations across the response. Reconsider recovery project implementationmechanismsinfavouroflessoverheads, reduced levels of subcontracting, and less lagtime for procurementandimplementation. Giventhecostofhumanresources,attentionshould bepaidtoeffectivelymanagingtheuseofstafftimeand using more efficient work processes (e.g. ensuring efficient processes for drafting and approving policy papers,limitingmeetings,etc.) Human resource policies and practices for UN agencies should be revised to become more flexible and better adaptedtotheneedsoftheresponse(e.g.hiringnational staff,rapidshorttermdeployments,etc.)

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Haitifacesmultiplevulnerabilities(16)and not all elements of DRR have been consideredintheresponse.(36) Theabilitytotackleissueshasdependedon information available, whether there is a dedicated cluster, subcluster, working grouporhumanresourcecapacity.(35) Protection at this key juncture is viewed as increasinglycritical.(37) The absence of a resettlement policy has beenamajorgap.(33) Nationalcapacitiesarestillweak.(42) Capacitybuilding takes time, goes handin hand with engagement and is necessary for thesustainabilityofefforts.(56,59)

R5. Support capacitystrengthening and retain capacity inpriorityareas Prioritise DRR efforts over time which should be further integrated into development. OCHA/Clusters need to continue to focus on building the capacity of nationalactors. Ensure that space for focusing on key humanitarian needs is retained in a transition framework through a more connected OCHA (e.g. with increased presence in therecoveryanddevelopmentcoordinationefforts)and additionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice. Dedicatemoreresourcesandcapacitytoprotection issues at this key juncture, through continued secondment of PROCAP capacity to the protection cluster,andprovisionofadditionalresourcestoworkat thecommunelevel. Seek globallevel guidance on the multisectorial challengeofresettlement. Cluster lead agencies should embed cluster coordination capacity in their programme to support counterparts and be in a position to help reactivate the clusterifneeded. UN human resource practices should be reviewed to makebetteruseofexistingrosters,allowfortemporary redeployment,consideringthecapacitiesofpartnersand tobebetterabletoplaceHaitianstaffinkeypositions.

16

MAINREPORT I. Introduction
I.1 BackgroundandAimoftheEvaluation

Onthe12thofJanuary2010,anearthquakeofmagnitude7.0struckHaitisWestprovince,near Logne,affectingthecapitalPortauPrinceandsurroundings.Theearthquakehaddevastatingeffects andaccordingtotheHaitiangovernment,resultedinapproximately230,000deaths,300,000wounded, andovertwomilliondisplacedpersons.Amassiveresponsewasmountedtofaceboththeimmediate situation and establish a bridge towards recovery. Constant challenges including issues with land tenure,limitedgovernmentcapacity,psychologicaltrauma,crime,extremepoverty,protectionissues,a completely overburdened infrastructure system, and the array of actors involved foreshadowed the longanddifficultpathaheadforHaiti.
1.
Haiti - Population Esposed and Exposure Level
C U B A
200'N

10

20 km

30

40

50

LE DE LA TORTUE La Tortue

Port-de-Paix
Jean Rabel Mole St Nicolas Chansolme Bassin Bleu

D O M I N I C A N R E P U B L I C
Le Borgne Monte Criste

Saint Louis du Nord Anse-a-Foleur

NORD OUEST

Legend
Capital city Towns
1930'N

Bombardopolis Baie de Henne Anse Rouge

Gros Morne Terre Neuve

Bas Limbe Port Margot Limbe Pilate Acul du Nord La Branle Marmelade Ernnery

Cap-Hatien Fort Liberte

First admin capital Port International Boundary First admin boundary

Plaisance N O R D

Limonade

Caracol

Milot Dondon Bahon

Terrier Trou Rouge Ferrier du Nord Ouanaminte Perches

Dajabn

Gonaves

NORD EST
Mombin Crochu Cerca Carvajal

Vallieres Saint Raphael La Victoire Pignon Carice

A RT I B O N I T E
Preceived shaking
Extreme Violent Severe Very strong Strong Moderate Light

Population exposed
332,000 2,246,000 314,000 571,000 1,049.000 7,261,000 5,887,000

Desdunes Grande Saline

L'Estere

Saint Michel de l'Attatalaye

Dessalines Petite Riviere de l'Artibonite Maissade

Hinche

Cerca La Source

Saint Marc Verrettes

H A I T I
La Chapelle

Thomassique

CENTRE

190'N

Thomonde Boucan carre Mirebalais

Disclaimer:The designations employed and the presentation of material on this map do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country , territory,city or area or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries. Reference System:UTM 18N, WGS84. Map datasource:United Nations Cartographic Section,ESRI, Natural Earth, SR TM. Population exposure source: USGS

Belladere Lascahobas

LE DE LA GONVE Pointe-a-Raquette

Anse-a-Galets Archaie Cabaret

Saut D'eau

Abricot Dame Marie

1830'N

Bonbon

Jrmie
Roseau

LES CAYMITES PRESQU'LEDES Corail BARADRES Pestel Petit Trou de Nippes Anse-a-Veau Baraderes

Thomazeau

Cornillon

PORT-AU-PRINCE
Gressier Leogane Carrefour Petion Ville Kenscoff Ganthier

Moron

Anse d'Hainault Les Irois

Chambellan

GRANDE ANSE
Les Anglais

Beaumont Maniche

NIPPES
L'Asile

Miragone

Petit Goave

Grand Goave

OUEST

Jimani Fond Verrettes

Tiburon

Camp Perrin

SUD EST
Cavaillon St Louis du Sud Chantal Aquin La vallee de Jacmel Thiote

Chardonnieres Port-a-Piment Coteaux Roche A Bateau Port-Salut

7430'W 740'W

SUD

Jacmel Cayes Marigot

Bainet Jacmel

Belle Anse Grand Gosier

Arniquet
180'N

Torbeck

Les Cayes
LE VACHE Ile a Vache
7330'W 730'W

St Jean du Sud

Anse a pitres
7230'W 720'W

Visit http://www.reliefweb.int/haiti to access this map and other crisis information.

2.

In view of the magnitude of the disaster and the subsequent response, the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) launched a multiphase InterAgency RealTime Evaluation (IA RTE) for the country,toassessthedisasterresponse,informdecisionmakers,drawlessonsandallowcorrectionsto bemade,inrealtimewhennecessary.Thefirstphasetookplacethreemonthsaftertheearthquakeand evaluatedtheinitialresponse.TheIARTEmissioninAugustSeptember2011ispartofthesecondphase oftheevaluation,withthemainobjectivesto: Analyse and provide lessons for the ongoing response, with a particular focus on coordinationbetweenthedifferentactorsinvolved; Examine options for linking humanitarian response structures with longerterm and/or governmentestablishedmechanisms;and Analysetheextenttowhichthefindingsandrecommendationsfromthefirstphaseofthe InterAgency RealTime Evaluation have informed the evolving humanitarian response in Haiti.

17

BasedonthekeyevaluationquestionsforthesecondphaseoftheIARTE6thisreportfocuseson fourmainareasoftheresponse: Mainachievements,gapsandconstraints Coherence,connectednessandsustainabilityoftheresponse Coordinationandtransition Information I.2 Methods,ScopeandStrengthsandWeaknessesoftheEvaluation I.2.1. Background
3.

As per the Terms of Reference of the IA RTE of the Humanitarian Response to the Haiti Earthquake,thesecondphaseoftheevaluationwastocommencesixtosevenmonthsaftertheinitial missionandreflectuponrelevance,effectiveness,efficiencyandcoverageduringthetransitionphaseof theresponse.Theprocesswaspostponed,duetotheOctober2010choleraoutbreakandthedelaysin startingthetransitionphase.ThesecondphaseoftheIARTEintheendoccurredfourteenmonthsafter theinitialfirstphasemission,fromAugusttoOctober2011,withthetermsofreferencefinetunedover thecourseoftwofieldvisitsthattookplaceinMarchandJuly2011.7 In practice, however, the second evaluation phase was timely in that the transition process was very muchontheagendaofthehumanitarianactorsinHaiti.Themaindifficultyatthislaterstagewasthe evaluationslackofcapacitytoinfluencetheprocess,givenfundingchallenges,capacityconstraintsand downscaling or finalising of humanitarian operations in Haiti.8Evaluators also faced some difficulties arrangingmeetingswiththeHaitianauthoritiesandotherkeystakeholdersduringthefieldphaseofthe evaluation. 1.2.2. Methods 5. The findings of the evaluation are based on a triangulation process9drawing on six types of largelyqualitativesourcesofinformation: semistructuredinterviewswithover250keystakeholdersonanindividual orsmallgroup basisinHaiti,PanamaandNewYork,10
4.
Stakeholdergroup Numberofpersonsinterviewed

6 7

SeeTermsofReferenceinAnnex. ThefirstmissionincludedrepresentativesfromOCHAandUNICEFonbehalfoftheManagementGroupfortheevaluation;the secondmissionwasconductedbytheevaluationmanager,accompaniedbytheinternationalconsultantfortheevaluation. 8 Forthisreason,anumberoffindingsandconclusionswouldnothaverecommendationsatthislaterstage. andwerenottheresultsofbiasortheviewsofasingleagencyortypeofactor. ThefulllistofpersonsinterviewedisavailableinAnnexnumber9.Evaluatorsdidnotmanagetoobtainadditionalmeetings with GoH representatives or the IHRC in Haiti through UN agency contacts but met with authorities when observing the CGI Haiti Action Network meetings in New York and the Inaugural Assembly of the Presidential Investment Advisory Board in September2011.
10

9Evaluatorsusedtriangulationanddrewonmultiplesourcestoensurethatthefindingscouldbegeneralisedtotheresponse

18

Haitianauthorities HaitianNGOs Beneficiaries/affected populationsduringprojectvisits UNagencies IFRC InternationalNGOs Donors WorldBank/HRF OtherInternational Total

12 67 54

58 5 25 12 4 15 252

observationofmeetingsinHaitiandNewYork, sixfocusgroups, fieldvisitsintheareaofPortauPrinceandLeogane, feedbackfromaonedayworkshopheldinPortauPrinceinadvanceoftheCAPworkshop, whereevaluationfindingsandtransitionrelatedissueswerepresented, acomprehensivedocumentanddatareviewprocess.

Over one thousand documents mainly accessed via internet, the DRLA Haiti Humanitarian Aid EvaluationDatabaseandUNICEFwereconsultedtogatherinformation,compareandcontrastdataand establish timelines.11These included strategic plans, evaluation reports, surveys, project documents, minutesofmeetingsandotherreportsandinformationavailableonHaitiangovernment,clusters,OCHA HaitiresponseandNGOwebsites.Usingtriangulation,evaluatorswereabletocomprehensivelyaddress themajorityofevaluationquestionsandvalidatefindingsinasystematicmanner.Asoneofsevenfocus areas,theteamsetouttogatherresponsesandviewsonthelevelofinformationavailableforevidence baseddecisionmakingandinformationmanagement.Itisonthisissuethatevaluatorsfoundthatthere waslessinformationandsourcesforpropercrossvalidation. I.2.3. Timeline 7. The field phase of the evaluation in Haiti started in August 2011 and initially lasted three 12 weeks. AdditionalmeetingswereundertakenuntiltheendofOctober2011.AninitialIASCpreliminary debriefingtookplaceinNYonSeptemberandlaterinGenevainDecember2011.CAPrelatedfindings were also shared in advance with OCHA and with participants attending the September CAP 2012
6.

11

SeeAnnexnumber??onmeetings.Firstphaseprovidedabaselineagainstwhichtoassessprogress.HaitiDecember2009 Clustercasestudygivesanoverviewofthepreearthquakestructureandsimilarissues. 12 Whiletheevaluationteamwasinitiallycomposedofonenationalconsultantandtwointernationalevaluators,oneofthe internationalevaluatorshadtodropoutaftertheinitialfieldphase.Therewere,however,onlytwointerviewsthatthis consultantconductedalone.

19

workshop. The lead evaluator attended Haitirelated meetings in New York in September 2011 (e.g. ClintonGlobalInitiative,HaitiActionNetworkandMartellysPresidentialInvestmentAdvisoryCouncil). A note for the Cluster transition in Haiti was submitted on October 31st 2011, to inform the ongoing processesinlieuofthedraftevaluationreport.TheinitialdraftofthereportoftheIARTEphase2was submitted on November 10th 2011 and comments provided by the Advisory Group on the 7th of December2011. I.2.4. Strengthsandweaknessesoftheapproach The evaluation relied on mainly qualitative methods. A survey of affected populations perceptionsoftheoverallinteragencyresponseinHaiti,whichwastoformapartoftheevidencebase for the second IA RTE, was delayed and ultimately cancelled. The evaluation considered the results of theintentionssurveyamongearthquakedisplacedpeoplelivingincampsreleasedbyIOM,ACTEDand CommunicatingwithDisasterAffectedCommunities(CDAC)Haiti. 9. Theevaluationsoughtinformationfromdifferentsettingsandcategoriesofaffectedpopulation through purposive selection interviews (with population in neighborhoods and transitional shelters, owners, renters, people living in camps, evictees, yellow house repair beneficiaries, people that were relocated,beneficiariesindifferentcommunesofPortauPrinceandLeogane,etc.).Affectedpopulation viewsontheresponseandcurrentconcernswerehighlycorrelatedacrosscategoriesandevaluatorsfeel confidentthattheyhave,throughinterviewsandfocusgroups,accuratelycapturedHaitianviewsofthe response. 10. A focus group with Haitian national staff working on the response was held during the field segmentoftheevaluation,inordertoprioritiseHaitianviews(seeannex).13Forconsistency,thissecond phase also sought to follow one of the methods of the first phase when using information received through consultations with the affected population. The RTE identified key issues at the level of both directlyandindirectlyaffectedpopulation(outcomes)andtracedthembackthroughservicedeliverers. Atthetimeofthesecondevaluationphase,however,therewasverylittletotraceback,asthebulkof theaffectedpopulationwasnolongerreceivinganyformofassistanceandmanyagencieshadphased outtheiraidorwithdrawn.Insomeinstances,theevaluatorswerenotabletoverifyproblemsthrough servicedeliverersastheywerenolongerinthecountryoraccessible14.
8.

Theevaluationfacedotherchallengesrelatedtotheextentandfocusofsomeofthequestions containedintheToR.IARTEsaremeanttoplacegreateremphasisonprocessesandimmediatelessons learningthanonimpactevaluationandaccountability.ThequestionsintheToRfocusedontoagreater extent on past achievements, performance and accountability, rather than on learning at the national level. 12. As the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) is the most immediate user of the process and recommendationsofIARTEs,thelevelofinvolvementandownershipinthefieldisakeytoasuccessful IA RTE. However, support to the role of the evaluators during the field phase was limited, as the evaluationwasnotcloselytiedtotheongoingstrategicworkoftheHumanitarianCountryTeamandthe
11.

13

ThisfocusgroupwassuggestedbySavetheChildrensCountryDirectorinameetingwiththeCCOinJuly2011.Fora summaryonthecontentsofthemeetingseeAnnex??number. 14 AmongthosearetwogirlsrapedinCampJeanMarieVincentthatwerereferredbyIOMtoahealthfacilitybutwhocame backwithoutreceivingtreatment,aswellasseveralcasesofpoortransitionalhousing.

20

wider aid framework in Haiti. The IA RTE Advisory Board and a majority of the Humanitarian Country Teammemberswereengagedintheevaluationonanindividuallevelbutnotsomuchasagroup.The evaluationwaspresentedattheHCTbuttherewerenoopportunitiestodiscussitindetail,astheHC andthehumanitariancommunitywereoverstretchedwiththeConsolidatedAppealProcess(CAP).The person initially responsible for the evaluation within the office of the Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) and tasked with gathering of information on recommendationsemanatingfromevaluationsandtheirfollowupleftHaiti.Actorsinvolvedinrecovery and reconstruction efforts were not sufficiently engaged in an evaluation which, although focused on transition,wasstillperceivedasahumanitarianorattimesOCHAdrivenexercise. The IA RTE highlights the main points related to key evaluation questions, but also provides a snapshotofthesituationatthetimefieldworkwasconducted.Anindepthassessmenttheactivities undertaken since May 201015could not be undertaken given the weak monitoring and evaluation systems in place. Certain questions in the IA RTE TORs dealing with accountability were difficult to addressinthecontextofHaiti,whereinformationavailableonoverallneedsandresponseislimited.The level of institutional uncertainty at the time of the evaluation also affected its ability to define more specificrecommendationsandtobemoreforwardlooking.
13.

Recognising that one key characteristic of an IA RTE is that it can affect programming as it happens, the evaluation sought to be useful and focus on issues of practical implementation. A workshop was held in PortauPrince with multistakeholder groups in advance of the Consolidated AppealsProcess(CAP)workshop,inwhichkeyevaluationissueswerediscussed.Contentthatemerged from both the IA RTE and CAP workshops were used to further crossvalidate findings. Many of the inputsoftheIARTEworkshopworkinggroupsweresubsequentlytakenintoaccountintheevaluation. AspartoftheIARTE,anoteonclustertransitionwaspreparedformanagersinthefieldinadvanceof thisreport,basedonissuesraisedintheworkinggrouponclustertransition.16Theworkshopsupported learningbutdidnotresultinprioritizedrecommendationsthatcouldbethebasisofanactionplanwith identifiedtimeframesandresponsibleorganizations. 15. Asithasbeenconductedoverayearandahalfaftertheearthquake,thisIARTEdiffersinscope and focus from other similar exercises. It has focused heavily on transition issues and provides a snapshotofasituationshapedbyaresponsethathasbeenevolvingoveralongerperiodoftimeandhas beeninfluencedbyamultitudeoffactors. I.3 Context
14.

Remainingacutehumanitarianneeds 16. At the end of 2011, the humanitarian situation in Haiti remains a challenge and still requires internationalsupport.Atthetimeoftheevaluation,theERCdeterminedpriorityhumanitarianneedsin Haiti over the coming year as being: access to safe drinking water, sanitation and food, and guarding againstgenderbasedviolenceandforcedevictionsfromcamps.17Thesituationremainsfragile,marred bythechronicstructuralissuesthataffecteditevenbeforetheearthquake(PortauPrincehadnocity

Referencesinthereporttospecificprojectsorsectorsshouldberegardedasexamplesusedtoillustrateafindingandnotto specificallysingleoutanorganisationoractivity. 16 SeeAnnex4. 17 InSeptember2011,nearly70,000peoplehadbeenevictedfromcampswithoutalternativedurablesolutions.

15

21

planningandadeficitofhousingfor300,000people).AccordingtoIOMdata,despiteasharpdecrease inthecamppopulation(ataratethathasbeendecliningsinceMarch2011)over550,000Haitianslivein approximately800displacementcampsscatteredmostlyaroundthecapital,PortauPrince(seeFigure 1). There are continuing humanitarian needs, including protection concerns. A focus on lifesaving activities is still required with vulnerable populations facing multiple threats, such as food insecurity, cholera and natural disasters (mainly frequent heavy rains and hurricanes). 18 At the same time, humanitarian donors have drastically reduced their funding in Haiti and the vast majority of organisationshaverunoutofresourcesandarephasingoutorhavealreadyceasedtheiractivities.19The Government ofHaitilacksthemeans totakeoverkeyservicessuchascholeratreatment centresand sanitation. Humanitarian donors would prefer that recovery and development efforts cover these ongoingneeds.
Figure1:Internallydisplacedpersons(IDP) inrecordedsites
1,800,000 1,600,000 1,400,000 1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0

Number

Households Individuals

Source:IOMHAITICampCoordinationCampManagementClusterDTMv2.0 UpdateJulySeptember2011DisplacementTrackingMatrixV2.0UpdateSeptember30,2011

Continuinguncertaintyandfragility 17. PoliticalinstabilityanduncertaintycontinuedtoaffectHaitiin2011.Thecountrywaswithouta government until October of that year, and the mandate of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC)expiredthatsamemonth.ThenewPrimeMinisterreportedlysoughtitsrenewalbutalsowanted to strengthen the Ministry of Planning and Cooperation. While the mandate of the United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) has been renewed with the support of the President, its presence is increasingly questioned. Since the disaster, the country has had a negative annual growth rate of minus 8.5 percent in 2010. Sixty percent of the Haitian budget continues to depend on internationalassistance.Haitispresentscenarioisstillexplainedbyalackofleadership,decisionmaking on key issues, and an effective Government of Haitiled plan for recovery. The main priority and challengefortransitioningfromthepostearthquakehumanitarianresponseremainsthedefinitionofa comprehensiveresettlementpolicy. Transitionstrongontheagenda,complicatedinpractice 18. Transitionsareusuallycharacterizedbyashiftingemphasisfromlifesavingactivitiestorestoring

45%ofthepopulationfacesfoodinsecurity,thecholeraepidemichassofarinfected450,000peopleandclaimedmorethan 6,500lives. 19 The2011revisedCAPisonly56%funded.KeyagencieslikeOFDAnolongerhavefundingforecastedforHaiti.

18

22

livelihoods, achieving development goals, and an increasing reliance on national ownership through national development strategies. There is recognition that the focus on transition should take place immediately after a disaster. Transitioning is regarded as essential to avoid creating a situation of dependency. 19. The Government of Haiti had officially set the end of the relief phase for July 2010 but later extended the distribution of food aid until September of that year. Cholera and the 2010 hurricane seasonmaintainedthefocusonthehumanitarianemergency.Althoughspeedingupthereconstruction and recovery effort has been the priority in Haiti for 2011, the progress has been slow. For some, transitionisontheagendabutnotnecessarilyasaresultofaplannedprocessbutoffatigue(onthepart oftheaffectedpopulation,authorities,implementingagenciesanddonorswhoallwanttoseechange, tangibleresultsanddurableimprovements).Forthevastmajorityofthoseinterviewed(approximately 90 percent) reconstruction has not visibly begun. The means and activities of international NGOs are increasinglysingledoutasasignificantproblembythenewgovernment. 20. AttheInternationalDonorsConference:TowardsaNewFutureforHaiti,heldinNewYorkon 31March2010,55donors(nationalgovernmentsandmultilateralinstitutions)pledgedatotalof$4.59 billionforrecoveryanddevelopmentaidprogrammes.Forthecombined20102011timeframe,donors hadinSeptember2011disbursed43percentofthistotal($1.97billion).Anadditional$2.08billionhas beencommitted. 21. The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was set up in April 2010 to cover the recovery agendaforlimited18monthperiod(i.e.untilOctober2011).TheCommissionhasbeendescribedasa cumbersome structure with a complicated decisionmaking process and high operating costs, whose focus on projects has also restricted its ability to operate with strategic planning and oversight. Notwithstandingitsheavyandsluggishprocedures,internationalstakeholdersinterviewedfeltthatthe Interim Haiti Recovery Commission (IHRC) was at the time of the evaluation at the point where one wouldhavewantedittobeayearago,withacompetentanddedicatedteam.Indeed,inMay2011the IHRC was deemed as not fully operational due to delays in staffing the Commission and defining the role of its Performance and Anticorruption Office and its limited ability to direct funding to Haitian priorities,inpartbecausethoseprioritieshavenotbeenclear.SeveraldonorsandUNagencieswere, atthetimeoftheevaluation,consideringhowbesttorationaliseresourcesandhesitantoverwhether they should support staffing the IHRC at this stage or empower the Government of Haiti and its ministries.ThecurrentteamattheIHRChasbeenfocusingheavilyonbettercommunicatingitsmission andactivitiesandextendingitsmandate. 22. TheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionsPublicAccountabilityOfficereportedinJune2011that although not all projects provided financial updates less than $118 million had been reported as disbursedoutofthe$3.2billioninprojectsithadclearedforfunding.Amismatchofresourceshasalso prevailed and been consistently denounced by the Office of the Special Envoy, as the Government of Haiti has not been directly receiving sufficient funding. As an example, at the time of the evaluation PresidentMartellysteamwasstillworkingoutoftents.

23

 Newleadership,roomforoptimismandopportunities 23. President Martellys election and his "Four E's" programme of education, employment, environment and the rule of law (Etat de droit), have been met with enthusiasm. The administration wouldliketoproactivelyengagetheprivatesectorandthediasporainhumanitarianandreconstruction efforts.TheinternationalcommunityiskeenonbackingthenewPresidentandnationalleadership.His effort to talk with the affected population about their needs is an encouraging sign. One of the new authorities flagship programmes is the longterm reconstruction of sixteen neighbourhoods and corresponding closure of six camps in PortauPrince known as the 16/6 project. Despite some concernswiththe16/6project,itwasswiftlyapprovedattheIHRCandmanyhavewantedtoembraceit as a model of an integrated neighbourhood approach. The project is supported as part of the Humanitarian Coordinators proactive engagement with the new presidential team. Later on, in September2011inNewYork,thePresidentannouncedhisplantocreateanewhousingauthorityunder the Primature. This move was recommended by ICG among others.20Beyond the challenges and expectationscreated,theprospectoffreeeducationforallbytheendofthePresidentstermisalso seenasauniqueopportunitytopushfordevelopmentgoals.Mayorsthroughoutthepastyearhavealso exercised leadership and assumed roles enabling the response in many key areas within their communes.

II.

MainAchievements,Gaps,LimitsandConstraints

II.1 MainAchievements Disasterpreparednessmainstreaming 24. Preparedness was cited as a key Thethreemainobjectivesoftheresponsebasedonthecurrent achievement of the response. When revised2011CAPare: considering the three objectives of the 1. "Tofillcriticalgapsandprovidetargeted,catalytic interventionswhichenablereintegrationorrecoveryof current revised Consolidated Appeals affectedpopulationsandillustratehowdurablesolutionscan Process (CAP), most progress has been beproduced." made on supporting targeted disaster risk 2. "Toensurehumanitarianinterventionswhichprovide reduction interventions focused on protectionandsavelivesamonggroupsmadehighly vulnerablebyexposuretomultiplerisks:earthquakeinduced preparing for and mitigating the impact of displacement,choleraoutbreaks,cycloneseasonthreatsor the 2011 rain and hurricane season. In extremefoodinsecurity." preparation for the hurricane season, 3. "Tosupporttargeteddisasterriskreductioninterventions humanitarian actors have implemented focusedonpreparingforandmitigatingtheimpactofthe2011 activities in support of the Haitian cyclone. Government,particularlytheDirectiondela Protection Civile (DPC). A contingency plan was finalized and circulated, stocks were prepositioned by departmentandclusterandtwosimulationexercisesweresuccessfullycarriedout,testingcoordination mechanisms in the case of an emergency. The Direction de la Protection Civile has emerged strengthenedfromthecurrentresponse.21 Alargelyeffectiveresponseincamps

20

ICG,PostquakeHaiti:SecurityDependsonResettlementandDevelopmentLatinAmerica/CaribbeanBriefingN25,28June 2011 21 Interviews,observationofDPCsroleinmeetingsandinthefield,OCHAIMCAPmonitoring.(Clermontetal.)DECstudyUrban disasterslessonsfromHaitiAStudyofmemberagenciesresponsestotheearthquakeinPortauPrince,Haiti,January2010 foundthattheDPChademergedstrengthenedparticularlyatthedepartmentallevel."March2011(27)

24


25. Theevaluationfoundthattheresponseincampsandhadbeenaconsiderableachievementina challengingcontext.22Amajorsuccessofthehumanitarianresponseisthattherehavebeennocholera outbreaks in the camps. Assistance has been provided and camps have been managed under difficult circumstances under threat of evictions, stigmatisation of camp population, insecurity, declining assistance, and lack of durable solutions. The Camp Management Operation (CMO) units have also playedapositiveroleinstrengtheningleadershipatdecentralisedlevels,bothatthelevelofmayorsand the Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC). Although there has been much discussion regarding the international community being excessively focused on the camps, less visibility has been given to the workoutsidecamps. Progressonrubbleremoval 26. Debris removal and its management became a priority for the Government of Haiti, as it was affectingprogressinotherareas.Theearthquakecreatedanestimated10millioncubicmetersofdebris. Asinthecaseofcampmanagement,thecolossaltaskofdebrisremovalisanewneedcreatedbythe earthquake. An estimated 2 million cubic meters of debris were removed in 2010 (approximately 650 000m3ofdebristhroughinitialCashforWorkefforts)andthetargetfor2011wastomanageafurther4 million cubic meters. UNDP now estimates (October 2011) that almost half of the debris has been managed.23Thishasbeenachieveddespitedecisionmaking,logisticalandfundingchallenges.Strategy had been initially lacking and obstacles included obtaining permissions from Ministry of Public Works, accessingneighbourhoods,andenteringheavymachinery.Projectcoordinationamongactorsinvolved in debris removal and residents refusing to authorise demolition of their houses were also cited as difficultiesaffectingprogress. Transitionalshelter:Tshelter4.0 27. Local production and construction capacity on transitional shelter (Tshelter) has been developed, both in terms of agency capacity and through training.24While there is a preference for findingdurablesolutions,appropriateTsheltersarestillanoptioninthemediumtermgiventhecurrent situationandchallengesinHaiti,providedbeneficiarieshaveaccesstolivelihoodsandservices.Cluster leveldiscussionsontransitionalshelterstandardslastedformanymonthsinmid2010,duetohighcosts of all available designs, lack of materials and many logistical challenges. Criteria for Tshelters have includedbeingsimultaneouslyresistantenoughtowithstandCategory1hurricanewindsandlastforup to5years,beredeployableandquickenoughtomountrapidly,aswellasbeingreusable,sothattenants can relocate. Production and construction capacity has now been created and there are many good examples of how agencies have managed to adapt to the Haitian context and the many challenges of neighbourhoodsinPortauPrince.25Structurescannowtechnicallysupporttheweightoflaterimproved construction.Somenewdesignshaveamezzanineandcanfurtheradapttothelackofavailablespacein neighbourhoods and the fact that houses before the earthquake could have two stories and

22

Interviews,meetings,observation.Haitianssetupimpromtutentcitiesthroughthecapitalaftertheearthquake.Attheend ofJanuaryPresidentPrevalwasappealingfor300,000tentsandinitialintentionsweretomove400,000peopletolargercamps. 23 EvaluatorshadtheopportunitytodiscussJ/PRHOsrubbleremovalinBristouandBobinandtheCARMENproject(Centres dAppuipourleRenforcementdeMaisonsEndommages) 24 UNOPSforinstancethroughitswarehouseandproductioncentreinTabarrenowhasthecapacitytoproduce30sheltersa dayandmount20oftheminneighbourhoods. 25 Averyaccurateaccountofthechallengesandanexampleoftheprogressthatagencieshavebeenabletomakecanbe viewedonIFRCsiteandthelinkhttp://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bsjoADopKKA

25

accommodatetwofamilies.Giventhecomplexity,however,therearefewagenciesthathavebeenable to implement shelter projects successfully; costs, the need for technical expertise, procurement knowledge and especially time for community participation and dialogue have been underestimated. Major constraints have included land ownership issues, rubble removal in individual plots, and lack of suitable public land for organized new temporary settlements. Mayors have exercised new roles and demonstratedleadershiptoovercomesomeofthesebarriers.
OtherEarthquakeresponseprogressindicatorshighlightedin2011CAPMidyearreview Shelter:64000familieshavebeenrelocatedintotransitionalshelter 117200tents,1185052tarpsandover2.5millionNFIsweredistributedtorespondtoemergencyshelter needsIn2011effortsfocusedonsupportingthereturnofaffectedpopulationstotheiroforiginorto relocationsites. Agriculture:Emergencyagricultureprojectsfacilitatingaccesstoinputsbenefitted200,000householdsand neighbourhoodsseedmultiplicationeffortsafurther25,100families.Livelihoodsactivitiestargeted48,200 households. Education:371semipermanentsschoolsand139permanentschoolsreceivedassistance. 700,000schoolchildrenreceivedschoolmaterial.1,500,000studentsreceivedschoolfoodrations. Health:17fieldhospitalswereestablished.345,000medicalkitsweredistributedbetweenJanuaryand March2011byPROMESS.900,000dosesofvaccineswereadministered.Surveillanceestablishedandfree obstetriccareprovidedin63hospitalswithqualifiedpersonnel. Nutrition:NutritionalStabilisationUnits(USN)wereestablishedin9departments.

IntegratedNeighbourhood,SafeReturnandCommunityBasedApproaches 28. Humanitarian agencies have piloted a strategy encouraging integration of key programmes in targeted urban neighbourhoods, now recognised as the Neighbourhood Approach (NA). The NeighbourhoodApproachisacomprehensiveandrationalapproachtolongertermresettlementandto helping households and communities restructure neighbourhoods and rebuild safer houses (i.e., ultimately building back better and restarting city planning in PortauPrince). For IFRC it is part of its strategy to encourage integration of key programmes in urban neighbourhoods, involving the direct implementation of key services (shelter, water and sanitation, livelihoods support, community health andriskreduction).26UNHabitathasbeensuccessfullyadvocatingtheSafeReturnapproachthathas beenimplementedintheBristouandBobinneighbourhoods,amongstothers.27Theapproachalsohelps overcome problems related to intercluster coordination, although coordination and collaboration among different agencies remains crucial. 28 The agencies interviewed reported that they had underestimated the effort of consultation and participation within this communitybased approach, where processes are allimportant. Humanitarian projects that have shorter implementation periods tendtofocusmoreonresultsthanprocesses. 29. The 16/6 project follows a similar rationale but is costlier (78 million USD to resettle 30,000

26IFRCstrategyandOperationsupdaten28EighteenmonthsProgressReport2November2011 27AcoalitionofactorshavebeenworkingunderthisprojectmainlyimplementedbySolidariteswithECHOfundingwhere UNHabitathasbeensupportingneighbourhoodcommittees,UNOPSrepairingyellowhousesandmountingTsheltersinlieuof RedHouses,J/PRHOremovingrubble,etc.TheFrenchRedCrosshasalsobeenimplementingtheapproachinDelmas. 28InterviewsandDECstudy.

26

people)andmoreambitiousinscope(bothintermsoftermsofimprovedcityplanningasbulldozers willbeinvolvedtointroduceservicesandthenumberofneighbourhoodstargeted).AftertheInterim Haiti Recovery Commissions approval of the 16/6 project, the Haiti Reconstruction Fund (HRF) has funded an initial tranche with 30 million USD, and the United Nations Country Team (UNCT) is supportingandcoimplementingit.TheexperiencegatheredbyagenciessuchasIOMandUNOPSinthe humanitarianresponsewillprovehelpfulinthisregard. Sanitation 30. Much progress has been made on water and sanitation (WASH) in terms of supporting local capacity, and as a result of the response to cholera. Direction Nationale de lEau Potable et de lAssainissement (DINEPA) has undertaken the responsibility for sanitation infrastructure, which was nonexisting before the earthquake. The humanitarian intervention led to the establishment in September 2011 of the first excreta treatment facility in PortauPrince. In 2011 DINEPA has also recognisedthatwaterandsanitationforthecamppopulationliesunderitsresponsibility.29TheWater, SanitationandHygiene(WASH)clusterhasbeenabletofurthersupportDINEPAscoordinationcapacity anditsabilitytoadvocateforfundingforacutehumanitarianneedsanditsactivities.30 II.2 TheBigGaps:DurableSolutions,Livelihoods,Accommodation,CommunicationandContinued Support

In all interviews and focus groups carried out by evaluators, affected populations above all wanted durable solutions to their problems and to understand what was planned and what their entitlements,ifany,were.Caseswherehumanitarianworkerscanactuallyrespondtodifficultquestions arerarebecauseplansarenotknownandcommunicationisonesided,withmanyquestionsraisedand limited answers. 31 Similar findings were reported in the Care/SCF joint evaluation: Haitians encounteredandotherstakeholdersincludingwithinthehumanitariancommunity,increasinglyfeelthat the humanitarian community and government are not meeting peoples expectations. They feel that humanitarian activities and programs are financially unsustainable and are not helping Haitians to achievetheirowngoalssothattheycanmoveforwardfromastateofemergency.InternationalNGOs inthiscontexttendtobelumpedasoneandareincreasinglyquestioned,alsobecausetheyareoftenon the front line. 32 Responses that enable greater involvement of affected populations and greater capacitiesintherecoveryphasehavebeenlimited,astheyhavebeenimplementedbyafewernumber oforganisationsandbeenmoretargeted.33 32. The focus group held with Haitian staff involved in the humanitarian response also underlined that organisations have not focused enough on livelihoods.34Organisations involved in livelihoods projects emphasize that coverage is necessarily limited due to beneficiary/cost considerations and implementation capacity, with efforts needing multiyear commitments. Durable accommodation
31.

29Interviews,Projectdocumentation. 30Asaresultofphasedoutdonorassistanceinsanitation,afundingproposalfordislodgingincampswasputforwardby DINEPAtotheIHRC. 31Focusgroupswereheldinearthquakeaffectedneighborhoodswhererehabilitationhastakenplace,withpersonsevicted fromtheSylvioCatorcamp,withIDPpopulationsincampsandinterviewswithTshelterbeneficiariesinCorailandin neighborhoods. 32 Pressreviews,interviews,graffiti. 33 Interviews,clusterparticipationpresencebygroup/sector,beneficiaryfiguresandprojectlocationsbasedonFTS. 34 For humanitarian actors, livelihoods projects are extremely costly per beneficiary and some actors interviewed questioned whetherhumanitarianfundingshouldbeusedonprovidingsolutionsforafewinacontextlikeHaitis.

27

solutionsarealsolackingintheabsenceofavailableoraffordableland,asPortauPrincehadahousing deficitfor300,000peopleevenbeforetheearthquakeandmostearthquakeaffectedpopulationwere rentersasopposedtohousingowners. 33. Inpractice,HaitianpublicopinionbelievesthatInternallyDisplacedPersons(IDPs)incampsare receiving assistance when those affected in neighbourhoods are not. At the time of the evaluation, campsvisitedwerenotreceivinganymaterialassistanceandthiscoincideswithdatareportedthrough the clusters. Organisations face funding constraints and have phasedout their assistance in camps. Populations in camps are often stigmatised.35IOM, ACTED and Communicating with Disaster Affected Communities(CDAC)HaiticarriedoutIntentionsSurveypollingover15,000campdwellerstofindout whytheyarestilltheredespitethediscomfortandinsecurityposedbylivingintentsorundertarpaulins throughacholeraepidemicandtwoconsecutivehurricaneseasons.TheIntentionsSurveyfoundthat94 percent of people living in camps would leave if they had alternative accommodation. Most of those surveyed said if they had to depart immediately, they would not have the means to pay rent or the resources to repair or replace their damaged or destroyed homes. In interviews, the evaluation found that camp residents often had no other viable alternative to remaining in camps and that in any case theywerenotremainingincampsbecauseofcurrentconditionsbutbecausetheyhadbeenregistered and could hope to benefit from a durable shelter solution in the future. A major gap in this area continues to be the lack of a Government of Haitiled resettlement policy that could guide both communicationandresponse. 34. Based on interviews of humanitarian community representatives, the main gaps and key priorities at the time of the evaluation were in the water and sanitation and health sectors. Organisations have been scaling down water and sanitation and cholera operations and transferring theseresponsibilitiestoDINEPAandMinistredelaSantPubliqueetdelaPopulation(MSPP).Efforts totransitioncholeratreatmentcentrestoMSPPlackedthecapacityandfunding. Protection,DRR36andothercrosscuttingissues 35. With capacities overstretched and the present myriad of challenges, less attention has been giventocrosscuttingissues.37AttheIARTEworkshopitwassuggestedthatdisabilityandageingwere notreallyontheagendawasbecausetherewasnosubclusterforelderly,forpeoplewithdisabilities and other vulnerable groups while there is a cluster for genderbased violence (GBV) and child protection.Thelackofdisaggregateddatainassessmentswasalsomentionedasanissueaffectingthe abilitytosupportspecificvulnerablegroups.Withtheexceptionofdisasterpreparedness,intersectoral coordinationhasbeenregardedasweakandhasnotfacilitatedfurthertakeupofeithercrosscuttingor multidimensionalissues. 36. Atthelevelofspecificclusters,inclusionofcrosscuttingissuesislimited.Thiswascaseevenin the shelter cluster which, when led by IFRC, was considered one of the bestrun and most comprehensively resourced and coordinated clusters. 38 Disaster Risk reduction (DRR) and the

AworkinggroupintheRTEworkshopunderlinedthatmanyactorshavebeenworkingwheretherewerenocampsandwere workingincommunitiespriortotheearthquake.Evaluatorsfoundthatmorethatthebulkofeffortsareinfactfocusingon neighborhoodsbutthattheperceptioninHaitiisthattoomuchassistancehasgonetocamps. 36 TheconceptofDRRhasdifferentmeaningsamongactors. 37 Interviews,DARA2011HumanitarianResponseIndexdata. 38 The shelter Cluster Review (April 2011)found that; Technical references on the web site include links to guidance on disability,genderandhumanrightsmanualsbutcrosscuttingissuesfeaturerarelyifatallinClusterstrategicdocumentation.
35

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environmentwerealsoseenasnotmainstreamedintheresponse.Thereareelementsofdisasterrisk reduction that have not been considered in certain shelter projects. Only on environmental issues, throughanadviserrecruitedviaWWF,didtheclustermanagetoassembleanumberofkeyresources relevanttoshelter. 37. Protection in Haiti (camp evictions, gender based violence,39child protection) is viewed as increasinglycriticalonallfronts.Thepressureincommunestoforciblyclosecampsandevictresidentsis mounDirectiondelaProtectionCivileting.Theleadagencyonprotection,OHCHR,isseenasveryactive despite its limited human resources.40It however faces problems related to being part of a UN integratedmission,whichcanundermineitsadvocacyefforts.41 II.3 LimitsandConstraints Acostlyresponse 38. According to the Financial Tracking System (FTS) data, total humanitarian funding for Haiti amountedtooverUSD3.5billionin2010andUSD493millionin2011.42Theevaluationfoundthatthe responsetotheearthquakehasbeenfarmoreexpensivethananticipated.Onaverage,organisations includingdonorsandkeyUNagenciesrecognisedthatprojectcostshadbeenbetween2.5to3times more than what had been initially estimated. 43 There are several factors that affect the cost of operationsinHaiti,including: a. thecostoflivinginPortauPrince; b. technical solutions are more costly in urban environments (e.g. for water and sanitation (WATSAN); c. the amount of traffic that leads organisations to have to either double or triple their logisticsandstaffingcapacitybecauseofthetimeittakestogofrompointAtopointB; d. delays in implementation which increase project running costs as structures have to be maintained; e. the need for imports because of the limited amount of suppliers in Haiti and local procurementbeingmoreexpensiveingeneral; f. bringinginsuppliestoanisland; g. operational dynamics often entail major agencies subcontracting others, which entails additionaldelaysandoverheadcosts.

Thestrategicframeworktemplate,ResponsePlanandClusterPositionPapernamenoneoftheissues.TheAdvocacyDocument referencesparticipatoryassessmentandgender,ageandHIV/AIDSstatusinanannexe.Itrefersbrieflytoenvironmentalissues in the context of transitional shelter funding but nowhere to human rights. Performance standards in the Shelter Technical Guidancepaperrefertoage,genderandHIV/AIDSbutnottoparticipatoryapproaches,environmentorhumanrights. 39 Theevaluationobservedthattwogirlsrapedinacampreferredtotheintendedhealthfacilityreturnedtothecampwithout receivingtreatment. 40 AsanexampletheProtectionclusterthroughtheHousing,LandandPropertyworkinggroupissuedaproposalforredressing RenterspositionintheHaitianHousingAssistanceasmanypostdisasterresponsesfailtoincorporatetheparticularsituationof rentersinadurablemanner. 41 Atthetimeoftheevaluation,aPressstatementonforcedevictionswasreleasedjustaftertheallegedabusecommittedby MINUSTAHUruguayantroopsinSeptember2011.
42FTSdata.
43

SpecificexamplescomparingcostsofshelterinPakistanandSriLankawerementionedbuttherearenostudiesonthisissue orreferencestostandardunitcoststocomparetheresponseinHaititothatofothers.

29

Timelinessandresults:strikingthebalance 39. Agencies found it challenging to strike the right balance between responding to targets and focusingonbuildingcapacitiesandtransitiontowardsrecovery.Thecholeraepidemicstronglyaffected the ongoing operations, with even agencies not directly involved in water and sanitation or health dedicatingtheirlogisticandawarenessraisingcapacitytothecholeraresponse(foramonthandahalf onaverage). Representativesoforganisationsinterviewedalsofound that decisionmakingwithin the humanitariancommunitytooktoolongand,specifically,thatpolicydocuments,operatingframeworks andapproachestooktoolongtobeapproved. 40. Aminorityofagenciesinterviewedalsofoundthattheyhadunrealisticallybeenworkingunder assumptions of government capacity and decisionmaking at the national level and that this had been detrimentalfortheresponse.Governmentcapacityhadbeenassessedpreearthquakeatdifferentlevels andanumberofstudieshavebeencarriedoutorupdatedsincethedisaster.Clustershavealsosince engaged in government capacity mapping at different levels. UNDP has a database on these with informationfromdifferentactorsonthisissue.44 Multiplecriticalconstraints 41. The context in Haiti has had agencies move in and out of an emergency mode. The cholera outbreakledorganisationstodiverttheiractivitiesandshiftthefocusoftheresponse.Thevastmajority ofnonspecialisedagenciesprioritisedsensitisationactivities.45Activitiesarealsoaffectedbythethreat ofhurricanesandheavyrains. 42. Political turmoil and uncertainty affected the response and placed further uncertainty on defined national priorities, policies, institutions 46 and the capacity for decisionmaking. Structural problems,landtenure,landavailability,lackoflegislation,limitedgovernmentcapacityandinstitutional weaknesses, extreme poverty47, inequity, crime, impunity, an overburdened infrastructure system, limitedresources,theenvironment,dependencyandlimitedmarketsareallcitedasmajorconstraints. 43. Thelimitedleveloffundingisalsopercievedasamajorissueaffectingbothhumanitarianand recoveryefforts.48Emergencyfundinghasdriedupformanyagencies.TheConsolidatedAppealsProcess (CAP)inHaitihasnotbeenviewedasaneffectiveinstrumentforobtainingfunding,partlybecauseitis notpartofawiderfundraisingand communicationeffort.The CAPfailed toprovidea comprehensive overview of needs and a strategy for linking with recovery and development. Prioritization of projects continuestobeanissue.TheleveloffundingevenforthereducedmidyearCAPisconsideredlowand projectshavebeenmainlyfundedthroughtheindividualeffortsonthepartofappealingagencies.The midyearreviewoftheCAPwasonlyavailableinFrench,whichisalimitationwhenonewantstoreceive

44

IncludingtheEunidaGovernanceandCapacityBuildingProjectwhichaimstoreinforcetheHaitianadministrationthrough technicalassistancetothe11ministriesandthroughaidcoordination.Theevaluationteamhoweverwasnotabletoaccess UNDPsdatabase. 45 AnagencylikeUNOPSstoppedallitsregularprojectactivitiesforamonthtouseitscommunitymobilisersinthecholera preventioneffort. 46 WithPresidentMartellyfavoringtheestablishmentofaMinistryofDefenseandcivilprotection,concernswereraised regardingthefutureofwhatisnowastrengthenedDPC. 47 OverhalfofthepopulationlivedonlessthanUSD$1.25adaybeforetheearthquake.46%ofhouseholdslivedinextreme poverty(2008WorldBankdata). 48 TheHRFfacesimportantfundraisingchallenges.

30

fundingfromdonorsthatarenotpresentinHaitiorFrenchspeaking.49 II.4
44.

ProgressonmainrecommendationsemergingfromfirstphaseoftheRTE

Utilizationfocusedevaluationsemphasizetheneedforevaluatorstopresentfindings,evaluators anduserstoagreeonconclusionsandrecommendations,anduserstodraftandreportonanactionplan totakethoserecommendationsforward.ForInterAgencyRealTimeEvaluations(IARTEs)tobemore useful, basic recommendations should be discussed and concrete actions defined at the Humanitarian Country Team (HCT) level. Progress on this second phase should be reviewed in advance of the ConsolidatedAppealsProcess(CAP)midyearworkshop. 45. To the knowledge of the evaluation team, there was no formal followup or management response to the first phase of the IA RTE. The workshop was attended by a broad audience and the reportwaswidelycirculated.Despitetheintendedfocusofthefirstphaseoftheevaluationbeingonthe initialresponse,recommendationspointedtoissuesthatarecriticalforrecovery.Inthissense,manyof thethemescoveredbytheevaluationwouldhavebeenrelevantthroughout2010. 46. There are two main factors that impact the situation today. First, constraints on funding now provide for a very limited response on the part of humanitarian actors. Second, there is a greater recognition of the need for more realistic expectations of what agency interventions can achieve. The evaluation found that progress was made on most of the five main recommendations: 1. adjust the responsetoitsurbanenvironment;2.extendgeographiccoveragetoruralareas;3.maketheresponse inclusive;4.managethenegativesideeffectsofaid;and5.prepareforchallenges. Adjusttheresponsetoitsurbanenvironment 47. Atagloballevel,theIASCstrategyMeetingHumanitarianChallengesinUrbanAreasandTwo YearActionPlanwasdraftedinSeptember2010to:i)improvemultistakeholderpartnerships;ii)build technicalsurgecapacityandurbanexpertise;iii)developandadapttoolstourbancontexts;iv)promote theprotectionofvulnerableurbanpopulations;v)strengthenlivelihoods;andvi)enhancepreparedness amongnationalandlocalauthoritiesinurbanareas.TheDisasterEmergencyCommittee(DEC)studyon HaitialsofocusedonUrbanDisastersLessonsfromHaiti.50InHaitithehumanitariancommunityhas madesomeprogressinadjustingtoanurbancontextbyworkingthroughmunicipalitiesandattempting tostrengthenlocalstructures (e.g.CroixdesBouquetsTaskForcecoordinationmeetings).Community and neighbourhoodbased approaches have been piloted and are being supported as a model. The Water,SanitationandHygiene(WASH)clusterhasfavouredintegratingservicesincommunitiesusinga breakdownthewallsapproachtowaterandsanitation.ThereareexamplesoflongstandingNGOsin Haiti undertaking studies on livelihood approaches in urban settings, for instance. Lessons have been learned.Sphereindicators,forexample,havebeenviewedasnotappropriateinthesetypesofsettings. ThedifficultyofadaptingtothecontextofPortauPrincecannot,however,beunderestimatedandhas been a challenge faced not only by the humanitarian community but by the development community andpreviousHaitianauthorities.

49

TheneedtotranslatedocumentsintoEnglishtoimprovefundingwasalessonlearnedinthecontextoftheCentralAfrican Republic,anunderfundedemergency.TheHC/RCs(TobyLanzer)useoftheCAPwasconsideredbestpracticein2007. 50 TheevaluationalsocoincidedwithanIFRC/HaitianRedCrossExchangeExperienceRegionalWorkshoponUrbanRisk ManagementintheAmericasinPortauPrincefrom22to25August.TeresaCamacho,ActingIDRLCoordinatorforthe Americas,ledaworkshopentitledReducingredtape,andstrengtheningaccountabilityindisasterresponse.

31

Extendgeographiccoveragetoruralareas 48. Attempts to extend geographic coverage are viewed as having been too limited, with agency capacities already overstretched. People continue to migrate to PortauPrince in search of livelihoods and services. The cholera effort at least helped agencies to focus on other areas of the country; the Water and Sanitation (WASH) and Nutrition clusters for instance were decentralised. MINUSTAH Civil AffairshascontinuedtoworkondecentralisationandbethemainpresenceinoutsidePortauPrince. Recommendations from assessments continue to focus on the problem of overcentralisation and, for example, United Nations Country Team (UNCT) agencies deploying of personnel outside Portau Prince.51Recognising that the earthquakedisplaced are mostly no longer in rural areas, the current concernisthatvulnerabilityindicatorsmaybeworseinareasnotaffectedbytheearthquakeandthat theresponsefurtherexacerbatesthisimbalanceovertime. Maketheresponseinclusive 49. TheevaluationfoundthatmuchprogresshadbeenmadeinrecruitingFrenchspeakingstaffand thatthecoordinationmeetingsandkeydocumentsarenowinFrench.ManyUNagencieshavemoved andmeetingsareincreasinglyorganisedoutsideMINUSTAHsbase.Mostclustersare,however,stillseen as a forum for expatriates and Haitians do not feel that they are included enough in decisionmaking. NotenoughHaitiansareplacedinkeypositionsorsecondedasstaffinministries.Withthebenefitof hindsightitwouldappearnowthatrecommendingthatmeetingsorstaffspeakeitherFrenchorCreole wasnotsufficientandthattheneedforCreoletocommunicateandmaketheresponsetrulyinclusive was underestimated. OCHAs potential role in engaging with local organisations and coordinating with localentitiesisfrequentlyraised.52 Managenegativesideeffectsofaid 50. As in the case of adjusting to the environment of PortauPrince, managing the negative side effectsofaidprovesallthemorechallenginginacontextlikeHaitis,whereNGOswereknowntoplaya prominent role before the earthquake. A number of implementing agencies emphasized that product availability in Haiti is limited and local production and businesses were heavily affected by the earthquake.Thereisconcernthatlocalprocurementonlybenefitsthewealthyandfurtherexacerbates inequalities.Withpricessoaring,resortingtoimportsbothreducesthecostofoperationsandcanhelp curb price inflation and widening disparities. This second phase of the evaluation was unable to determine whether certain practices such as covering Government of Haiti staff costs or stipends to volunteerswouldhaveultimatelypositiveornegativeconsequences.53 Prepareforchallenges 51. As mentioned previously, most progress has been made on disaster preparedness both geographically and per sector through contingency planning, capacity strengthening and awareness

Cf.ECOSOCJuly2011Report. In interviews, RTE workshop working groups and OCHA RTE 2010. Organisations like UNICEF who face less funding constraints.andareprioritisinglongertermapproacheshavemanagedtoexpandtheircoverageinnutrition. 53Examplesofbothweregiven.Todecentralisetheservicesofonegovernmentalagencyallowancefortravelwerebeingpaid byoneUNagency.Thisapproacheventuallyledtothegovernmentalagencysupposedlynolongerwantingtocoverneedsin PortauPrinceandonlyworkoutside.Therewasalsosomelackofclarityonwhatwasbeingpaidandatwhatlevels.
52 51

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raising. The Disaster Emergency Committee study found that disaster preparedness is often the most clearly understood of all Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) priorities.54Disaster preparedness and national capacitystrengtheninghaveimprovedovertime,supportedbyprogrammesimplementedbyUNDPand OCHAamongothers.

III.
III.1
52.

Coherence,Connectedness55andSustainabilityoftheResponse
LackofclarityandconsensusonwhatconstituteshumanitarianactioninHaiti

Themandate,goalsandobjectivesofthehumanitarianresponsearedifficulttoestablishinthe contextofHaiti.Thereisanincreasingpressuretoreducehumanitarianaidinspiteoftherealityofthe situation (e.g. indicators on the ground and government capacity to take over key services). Humanitarian intervention and its phases are not always well understood by Haitian stakeholders (authorities and public). Those interviewed had differing views on what the role of the humanitarian response was.56For some humanitarian response should not be expected to address Haitis structural problems, while others underline that there was humanitarian action in Haiti prior to the earthquake and the objective should be to follow build back better approaches. The Humanitarian Coordinator/Resident Coordinator (HC/RC) has underlined how intertwined emergency response and developmentneedsareandhowdifficultitistoattempttoseparatethetwo. 53. Thelackofdefinitionwasalsorevealedbythegeneraldiscussionsand questionsraisedinthe Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) 2012 workshop, where there were mentions of the existence and need for both borders and bridges between the humanitarian response and recovery efforts and how far humanitarian actors should go in working on recovery, transition57and capacity building58. As Consolidated Appeals Process has not led to an action framework with clear links established with recovery and development efforts, collaborative approached for more seamless transitions are warranted.59There is some confusion regarding the timing of transition, when actors should start focusing on it, and specifically how the pace of recovery and reconstruction affects transition. On the fundingfront,thedilemmawasdepictedasoneinwhichdevelopmentdonorswerestilldefiningcamps as camps which for humanitarian donors were now slums. Overall, beyond the need for defining thresholds, there has been limited consultation or space for discussion between humanitarian and development actors regarding joint assessment and planning on who supports given priorities with

SeeDECstudyMarch2011. Connectednessreferstotheneedtoensurethatactivitiesofashorttermemergencynaturearecarriedoutinacontextthat takeslongertermandinterconnectedproblemsintoaccount. 56 Evaluators during the RTE were also asked whether we felt it was the role of humanitarian actors to ensure that those resettledinCorailoutsidePortauPrincehadaccesstolivelihoods. 57 Asinthecaseofdefiningthelimitsofhumanitarianaction,actorsinterpretthetermtransitionandwhatitencompasses differently.Itishoweverwidelyequatedwithasituationthatisgenerallyimproving.Transitionreferstotheperiodbetween theimmediateaftermathofcrisisandtherestorationofprecrisisconditions(recovery),ortheirimprovementtoasatisfactory 57 level(development). Transitionsarealsounderstoodasperiodswhenintensifiedeffortsofcapacitybuildingareneededand wherepartnershipsoftheinternationalcommunityaremostcrucialforsupportingeffortstoovercomeadversesituations,and createconditionsforstability,humansecurity,governanceandprotectionofhumanrights.57 58 (OECD)canbedefinedasaprocesswherebypeople,organisationsandtheinternationalhumanitariancommunityasawhole unleash,strengthen,createandmaintaincapacitytoidentifyandmeethumanitarianneedsinatimely,efficientandeffective manner.Thisinvolvestheindividual,organisationalandsystemiclevel. 59 Initial2011CAPwasforover900millionUSDandincludedcreatingdurableconditionsforreturnandcapacitybuildingastwo ofitsfourobjectives.Therevised2011CAPsoughttoadapttothefundingscenarioandrevisedtheobjectivesdowntothree that are far less ambitious: To support catalyst interventions to allow return, relocation and reintegration in order to progressively close camps 2. To maintain essential services in Camps where return or relocation solutions have not been identifiedorarestillinprogress.3.Toprepareacontingencyplanandrespondincaseofnaturaldisaster.
55 54

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what. The connection between the Consolidated Appeals Process and the UNs Integrated Strategic Framework(ISF)hasalsobeenlimited60 III.2 Uncertainplanning 54. Representatives of agencies and authorities underlined in interviews that the plans and the objectivesoftheHaitianGovernmentarenotwellknown.Asaresult,actorsdonotalwayshaveenough information to align with governmentled strategies; this also affects strengthening institutional capacities.61The Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) is based on the Government of Haitis March ActionPlanforReconstructionandNationalDevelopmentofHaiti.DevelopmentoftheGovernmentof HaitisActionPlanandtheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionsDecember2010Strategyinvolvedsome ofthesameexperts.LimitedHaitianinvolvementinbotheffortsandthePresidentsplatformforchange hasledtosomedoubtsonthecurrentvalidityofthesedocumentsforpriorityandtargetsetting.Indeed, theJuly2011ECOSOCemphasizedtheneedforincreasinglyfocusinginternationalsupportonpriority sectors identified by the authorities in power, including the four Es that President Martelly has identified as major components of the recovery programme, namely education, employment, environmentandtheruleoflaw(Etatdedroit). III.3 Tryinginterrelationships 55. Theinternationalhumanitarianresponseisrecognisedforitsachievementsinwhatisregarded asthereliefphaseandfortryingtoengagewiththehighestleadershippositionsintheGovernmentof Haiti. Senior Government of Haiti officials have found it difficult to deal with what they felt were so many organisations and people on specific issues like resettlement.62The issue of weak government oversight and low accountability of international aid efforts was brought up by internationals and Haitiansalike.Haitianshavealsooftenfeltmarginalisedbyaidagencies.63Theprevailingcurrentviewin Haitiisthatthereisalackofunderstandingofhowthecountryworksandthataidprofessionalstryto replicateprogrammesfromelsewhereinsteadofadaptingtothespecificHaitianenvironment.64 56. Any capacitybuilding approach goes hand in hand with engagement. At the time of the evaluation,mostexpatriatesinterviewedanestimated80percenthadbeeninthecountryforovera year.Theawarenessoftheneedforengagementwithandunderstandingthestrategiesofauthorities, civil society and affected populations was high. Those interviewed also underlined the need for understandingandframingengagementinthecontextofafragilestate,withrequiredguidanceanda differentiatedapproach. 57. Aid agencies were working primarily with local authorities at the time of the evaluation. Engagement at other levels and within ministries was more difficult given the prolonged context of outgoing ministers and uncertainty with respect to the plans of a prospective government. At the

60

Ultimately,certainCAPprojectscanbesupportedbydevelopmentdonors(e.g.theEUinthecaseofWFPschoolfeeding)and projectsintheIHRCcanbefundedbyhumanitariandonors(e.g.UNDPsDRRprojectbyECHO). 61 Interviews,RTEworkshopworkinggroup. 62 Interviews. 63 Interviews,focusgroupswithHaitians,documentreview. 64 Haitiansareincreasinglyfrustratedwiththepresenceofinternationalsandtheirapproachesandlookingforothermodels. OnepersonworkingfortheIHRCcommented:Iworkthroughouttheworldonanticorruptionandhere[inHaiti]Ispendall mytimeinmeetingsexcusingmyselffornotbeingHaitian.

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neighbourhoodlevel,organisationswerediscussinginterventionswithneighbourhoodcommitteesand establishingcomplaintsmechanisms(e.g.callcentres).Howrepresentativethecommitteesactuallyare, being unelected, was an issue for some agencies, while others found that successful engagement requiresnotquestioningoralteringstructuresfromthestart. 58. Humanitarian actors recognise the beneficiary involvement as the weakest area of the response.65. Affected populations interviewed the youth in particular were increasingly feeling disenfranchised,alsocitingthatcommitteeswerecomposedbyoldmen.66Youngpeoplesensedthat since the earthquake the rift between the elderly and youth and the wealthy and poor had widened. National NGOs and Community Based Organizations have often felt bypassed and only used for information gathering purposes. Despite the fact that many agencies are longstanding in Haiti, their engagementwithauthorities,HaitiancivilsocietyandtheHaitianprivatesectorwasconsideredweak.67 Haitians found it especially difficult to interact with organisations that are in MINUSTAHs logbase because of how complicated it is to access. OCHAs potential role in facilitating connections and engagementspecificallywithNationalNGOsandbetweentheNGOcommunityandtheGovernmentof HaitiatahigherlevelwasbroughtupinseveralinterviewsandattheRTEworkshop. III.4 Sustainabilityofefforts 59. SustainabilitywasdescribedastheAchillesheelofthehumanitarianresponse.Theissuesof exitstrategyandwhatascenarioofsuccesswouldlooklikewerefrequentlyraisedininterviews.Again, the problem in many instances was seeing who could take over, and many referred to the countrys chronicdependencyforservicesbeforethe earthquake (inHaiti,therealityisthatmostserviceshave been delivered privately, by companies and NGOs). Most actors were currently decreasing their assistance, often with a planned handover strategy that was not proving sufficiently effective. At the timeoftheevaluation,theproblematicphasingoutorhandoverofwaterandsanitationactivitiesand choleratreatmentcentreswereclearexamplesofthelackofsustainabilityofeffortsandthefragilityof transition plans. Absence of funding and time were mostly guiding the decision to transfer projects. Sustainabilityofserviceswasagainlinkedtocapacitybuildingeffortsandformanythecontinuanceof staff. 60. Fromahumanitarianperspective,twomaingapswereconsistentlybeingbroughtupascritical concerns: water and sanitation (more specifically, sanitation in camps) and the running of cholera treatment centres. Access to water, sanitation and hygiene (WASH) services has increasingly deterioratedincamps.Therearedifferingviewsontheneedfordiscontinuingfreewatertruckinginthis context. 68 A year after the cholera outbreak began, according to MSF, resources for adequately preventingthediseaseremainrudimentaryandatthemercyoftheuncertaintiesoflifeinthecountry. III.5 Limitedtakeupofhumanitarianconcernsinlongertermrecoveryefforts

DARAHumanitarianResponseIndexdataforHaitiin2011. 40%ofHaitiansareunder15. 67 See An Independent Joint Evaluation of the Haiti Earthquake Humanitarian Response that found that connections to and relationshipswiththewiderHaitiansociety,governmentandprivatesectorseemedtobeseriouslylacking. 68 ItwasdenouncedbyMSFbutpraisedbyotherswhofoundthatfreeserviceswereaffectingprivateprovidersandcreatingan imbalance.OrganisationsliketheRedCrosshavebeentransferringtruckingcapacitytoDINEPAtheHaitianwaterDepartment and supporting them for an additional time period with funding and training. The cluster transition strategy includes supportingthebuildingofnewneighbourhoodwaterkiosksinareaswhicharenotconnectedtopipedwatersupply,withkiosks beingmanagedandsupervisedbycommunitymembers.
66 65

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 Transitioning from relief and phasing out humanitarian response has also been difficult in a contextwherehumanitarianprioritiesarenotsufficientlytakenupbyotheractors.Themainconcernis thatthemostvulnerablewillnotbecoveredintherecoveryandreconstructionplans.Thehumanitarian communityconsidersthatadvocacyhasbeengenerallyweak.Therehasalsobeenlackofclarityonan overallstrategyandplanfortransition.Thereislimitedinteractionbetweendevelopmentdonors(theG 12) and the Humanitarian Country Team for planning purposes or around specific issues. Many development donors have preestablished relationships and sectors of intervention from before the earthquake and less flexibility to take on new needs or increase their support.69The Interim Haiti Recovery Commission has on several occasions mentioned that by mandate they dont cover humanitarian aid projects, while humanitarian donors were in fact encouraging all organisations to submittheirprojectstotheIHRC.Thelimitedtakeupofhumanitarianconcernsisbothaproductofthe wayprojectshavebeensubmittedtotheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionanditsarchitectureandthe limitedfundingavailableforrecovery.70 III.6 Pilotingandlinkingefforts 62. The humanitarian response has helped pilot approaches and interventions that could be continued and replicated on a larger scale by development actors. Examples of this are visible in all sectors.Onegoodexampleistheaforementionedneighbourhoodapproachandcapacitydevelopedto better understand and implement the 16/6 Project. Other humanitarian projects have purposefully integratedwhatwereconsidereddevelopmentfeaturessothattheyaremorerelevantforlongerterm actorswillingtotakethemover(e.g.sanitationexcretadisposalfacility).
61.

IV.
IV.1
63.

CoordinationandClusterTransition
Limitedconnectionbetweendifferentcoordinationmechanismsandactors

An overall aid coordination framework integrating all phases of assistance has been lacking. Therearelimitedconnectionsbetweencoordinationmechanismsandsomeoverlap.71TheStrategicPlan for the Remainder of the Interim Haiti Recovery Commissions Mandate (December 2010) recognised that coordination was a major challenge for both humanitarian and development efforts. It further identified that lack of coordination was often a result of lack of leadership, or lack of recognized leadership and called on all concerned ministries or Haitian entities to be involved in all stages of all major humanitarian or development efforts. The need for moving away from a multitude of silo coordinatingmechanismsthathaveonlysuperficiallinkswitheachotherandthegovernmentalonesis underlined.Inadditionthestrategyemphasizedthatthegovernmentintheshorttermshouldleadthe existingmechanisms(humanitarianclustersandsectortables). 64. TherehasalsobeenlimitedinteractionbetweentheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionandthe HumanitarianCountryTeamorOCHA.Thehumanitariancommunitywasnotintegratedenoughintothe processofestablishingorsupportingIHRCandhasbeensomewhatisolated.72SeveralNGOsfeltthatthe

Ininterviews,onlytheWorldBankfoundthattheyhadmorethansufficientfunding. DINEPA,withthesupportoftheWASHclusteritcoleads,submittedaprojecttotheIHRCtocoverdesludging.Desludging activitiesconductedbyUNOPSwithDINEPAtrucksstoppedon31Augustduetoalackoffunding.Projectapprovaltakestime andonceclearedthereislimitedfundingavailableforrecoverytocoverneeds. 71 SeefiguresandtablesoncoordinationinAnnex. 72 Interviews.Documentreviewofdraftcoordinationframeworks.

70 69

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preparingproposalforIHRCwastootimeconsumingandthattheyhadtoprioritiseproposalsforthose channelswheretheyweremorelikelytoreceivefunding. 65. Theproblemwithfocusingcoordinationonsectorsisthatbothinterministerialandintercluster coordinationareregardedasweak.Thishasconstrainedeffortstoworkonmultidimensionalandcross cutting issues and address humanitarian transition challenges in a more concerted way. Recent proposals reflect the need to move away from a sectorbased approach. An important example is the HumanitarianCoordinatorsactioninresponsetotheproblemofevictionsthatproposessettingupa platform that links relevant ministries, local authorities, the Haitian National Police, the private sector andthehumanitariancommunity[to]allowforeffectiveplanningforprogressivecampclosures,while identifyingalternativehousingsolutionsinbothurbanandruralsettings.73 66. TheclustersystemandtheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommissionbothsufferfromthedifficultto rectify initial lack of inclusiveness of Haitian actors. 74 Despite efforts, the clusters suffer from stigmatizationasa mechanism thathaslimited Haitianownership.75InvolvementofHaitian NGOshas been largely unsuccessful.76The IHRC also faces capacity issues and has had limited relations with humanitarianactorsandtheclusters.Thesefactorsinadditiontoitslimitedmandatehavenotfavoured a process where clusters could merge with, phaseout or handover some of its functions to the Commissionanditspriorityareas. 67. InthecaseofMINUSTAH,thereisstrongerinteractionoutsidePortauPrinceandrecognitionof the important role that civil affairs officers have traditionally played on decentralisation and at the departmental level. UN agencies also welcome receiving further political analysis and guidance from MINUSTAH.MINUSTAHfeelsactorsincreasinglyapproachitbecausetheyhavefewerresources.77 68. ThemainobjectivesofanoverarchingtransitionplanunderaHaitianledvisionhaveyettobe defined.Intermsofunderstandingthecomponentsofandplanningtransition,theevaluationfoundthat fewactorsthathadleftandphasedouttheiractivityinHaitiwereabletodevelopmorecomprehensive transitionplansthatwouldconsiderelementsofthefollowing: Purposeandobjectives Strategies Guidelines Processes Keycomponents Schedules Keyindicators

ReliefWebreporthttp://reliefweb.int/node/446209,ThehumanitariancommunityinHaiticoncernedabouttheincreasing numberofevictionsincamps,StatementattributabletotheHumanitarianCoordinatorinHaiti,PortauPrince/09September 2011. 74 Keytotransitionistheroleofthegovernmentandtheemphasisonpartnershipswithlocalactors.Capacityissues,thetop downclusterrolloutdynamicandthenatureofclustermeetingsoftenpositiontheUNastheleadinhumanitarianresponse. 75 The focus group held on 30 August 2011 with Haitian National staff working in the aid effort signaled national capacity buildingasoneofthemajorweaknessesofthehumanitarianresponse.Inthetransitionphase,nationalstaffexpectedtoplaya strangerrolebuthaveseenthatkeypositionsarestillheldbyexpatriates. 76 See Hedlund, Kerren, Strength in Numbers: A Review of NGO Coordination (ICVA case study in Haiti 2010), provides an accountoftheproblemsfacedwithlocalNGOinvolvement. 77 Interviews.
73

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Majoroutputs Resourcerequirements Funding Budgets Staffrequirement

69. Interviewsshowedthatthelackofprospectsforreceivingfundingfortransitionactsasa disincentivefororganisationstopreparecomprehensiveplansandforthesetoinformoverallprocesses. IV.2 Clustertransition 70. TherehasbeenmuchrecentprogresswithadditionaldirectionfromOCHAandapresentationat an ad hoc HCT meeting in September 2011, where a deadline was defined for establishing a tentative plan on cluster transition. Evaluators did not find, however, that the objectives of overall cluster transition and a concerted strategy had been defined. This may prove helpful when considering the suitabilityofoptions,definingprioritiesandselectingapproaches(overallandforspecificsectors).The detailedNoteonClusterTransitionispresentedinAnnex4ofthisreport. 71. The evaluation found that coordination at the local level could be hampered by a compartmentalised cluster approach. With the benefit of hindsight and examples from other crises, it appears that focusing on ministries and sectorial tables is a too limited approach. Decentralised coordination and intermediate options can also prove effective. The role of the Camp Management Operations(CMOs)andtheDirectiondelaProtectionCivileinsupportofmayorsinmunicipalitieslike CroixdesBouquetsisextremelypositive. 72. The transfer of humanitarian coordination activities to national authorities and development actors requires assessing services against ongoing and expected coordination needs various actors, as well as thir capacities. The number of partners in certain key areas like camp coordination and camp management (CCCM) has rapidly declined despite ongoing needs,78which creates a different set of challengesandaneedforfurtherrationalisationofcoordinationstructures.Clustershavetodealwith the departure of actors and phasing out of assistance (e.g. water and sanitation (WATSAN) and camp coordination).

V.
V.1
73.

Information
Clusterdriveninformationsystems

Themaininformationalchallengeishavinganoverallassessmentofneedsthatcanbetterguide theresponse,prioritisationandappeals.79TherehasnotbeensufficientinterestinOCHAdrivenneeds assessmenttoolsforthemtobeusedinHaiti.InOctober2010,theHumanitarianCountryTeam,with thesupportofClusterLeads,developedandagreedonacommonstrategicmonitoringplanfor2011.It was not until April 2011 that OCHA was able to introduce a Consolidated Appeals Process (CAP) Monitoringtool,whichthenhadtoberefined.ThefirstquarterlymonitoringreportwasissuedinJune 2011,coincidingwiththeCAPmidyearreview.

78 79

550560personsremainedincampsinSeptember2011aspertheDisplacementTrackingMatrix. TherevisedCAP2011nolongerprovidedafigureforIDPs.Itwasreportedasbeing1.3millionininitial2011CAP.

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74. Consolidationofindicatorsandcorroborationofdataremainsachallenge.Amonitoringsystem hasbeenrecentlyestablishedforclusterstoreportprogressagainstkeyindicatorseverythreemonths. Thesystemisfunctioningbutinformationgatheredhastobecredibleandbettercollated.80Itisbased exclusivelyondataemanatingseparatelyfromeachoftheclusters,eachclusterwithitsownmethods. Actors need to be encouraged to provide credible information, continue tracking needs based on disaggregateddata,andunderstandthebenefitsofprovidinganoverallpictureofneeds.Atpresentthe prevalent view is that the process is too timeconsuming and that the capacity for providing the informationisntalwaysthere.Thosereportinginformationarestilltounderstandhowthiscanbeuseful inadvancingtheirefforts.

TheproblemforclustersinreportingagainsttheCAPisthattheinstrumenthasnotbeengiven sufficient relevance and that it is not necessarily seen as a useful tool for advocacy and fundraising. Timeliness of reporting is also challenging, mainly with respect to partners completing their activity matrix.ThiswasseenasagreaterpotentialproblembecauseoflimitedNGOcoleadpresence(i.e.only SCFascoleadwithUNICEFfortheEducationCluster).Externalactorsmentionedtheneedforwidening thesources,ifonlyforcrossvalidationpurposes.Theissueofinformationandcommunicationbeingtoo strictly tied to data eminating exclusively from the clusters and the UN was mentioned in interviews. Moreover,resultsarenotvalidatedwiththepopulationandjointassessmentsacrosssectorsarelimited. V.2 Engagingwithotheractorsoninformationmanagement
75.

The system needs to further adapt to the need for stronger geographically based local and departmentalinformationsharingandtwowaycommunication.Intermsofengagingwithotheractors oninformationmanagement,thereisstillnoarticulationbetweentheprocessesofreportingagainstthe Cosolidated Appeals Process (CAP) and the Integrated Strategic Framework (ISF) or the IHRC. Without furtherintegration,thesystemsinplacearenotbroadenoughtocomprehensivelyreportandevaluate theefficiencyandeffectivenessoftheoverallresponse.Authoritiesintechnicalministriesfeelthatno entity is collecting or centralizing information. OCHA wishes to improve its relations with state actors andsupportthem,butisonlynowseekingtoengagemoreeffectivelywiththemoninformation.81 V.3 Communicationefforts 77. Theneedforimprovingcommunicationbothwithaffectedpopulationsanddonorswasraisedby thefirstphaseoftheRTE.Communicationwasnotdirectlyaddressedintheevaluationquestionsasa subthemebutcameupconsistentlyasakeyareaandinrelationtoallotherevaluationissues.82 78. CommunicationhasbeenextremelychallenginginHaiti,inthenecessaryuseofthreelanguages. Twowaycommunicationwasfoundtobelacking.Therehasbeenagenerallackofcommunicationwith the affected population and despite individual project or sector or geographic efforts to improve accountability, there are no effective channels for people to voice their needs, suggestions and complaints.Ministriesareconsultedbutthereisnofeedbacktoauthoritiesoncetheyhavegiventheir
76.

80

ThefactthatanOCHAstaffmemberwasattheinitialphaseoftheresponsegatheringassessmentsandtryingtocross validateinformationwashighlightedasgoodpracticeinthreeinterviews.Theeffortwasdiscontinuedwhenthepersonleft. 81 OCHAreportedhavingmeetingswiththeIHSI(lInstitutdeStatistiqueetdInformatique),theMPCE(MinistryofPlanningand ExternalCooperation),theMoHwithWHO,theCNGSandtheDPConstrengtheningnationalcapacitiesforinformation management.TheyplantoappealtoUNDPforequipment,databasetrainingetc. 82 Tofurtheraddresscommunicationissues,aworkinggroupfocusedonthethemeduringtheRTEworkshopandprovidedthe detailedrecommendationsthathavebeenincludedasanAnnex.

39

views.AuthoritiesandnationalNGOsalikefeelthatthereisnoroomforeithergenuinepartnershipor realparticipation.

79. Projectshaveusedcommunicationtools,andthereareexamplesofgoodpractice,butthese haveoveralllackedthenecessarytractiontomakeadifference.Implementationtimeframesand prioritisationofcertainresultsoverprocessesarenotconducivetoenhancedcommunicationefforts. NewcommunicationeffortshavebeenpilotedintheHaitianresponse.TheCoordinationwithDisaster AffectedCommunities(CDAC)initiative,madeattheinterclusterleveltostrengthencommunication efforts,alsolackedfunding. 80. Communication efforts are still considered to be bureaucratic or traditional, driven by fundraising objectives, and not adapted to the communication needs of affected populations. A particular problem area is that presentations to the media focus on the overall figure of funding provided,whichgivesadistortedviewofwhatwillactuallyreachthepopulation. 81. Withinvestmentsrequiringfurtherrationalisation,protectioneffortsinparticularareviewedas apriorityissueforthecountry,requiringcomprehensiveadvocacyandcommunicationstrategies. 82. Movingforward,thereisagreaterneedforcleardefinitionsandconsistencyinterminology.83

VI.

SummaryofFindingsandLessonsLearned

PrimaryChallenges 83. Inadditiontoexistingcontextualconstraints,thehumanitariancommunityinHaitihasbeen facingthreemainchallenges: 1. Thereareremainingacutehumanitarianneedsonthegroundandlimitedresources. Operationsarescalingdownwithouttherenecessarilybeingsolutions. 2. Haitians expect durable solutions; assistance not favouring durable solutions no longer meets their expectations. Humanitarian goals are not always understood and the humanitariancommunitysmethodsandinstruments(i.e.formsofassistance,Humanitarian Country Team as a decisionmaking body, Consolidated Appeals Process) are repeatedly questioned. 3. Theaidcoordinationanddeliverysystemhasnotbeensufficientlyrationalisedoradaptedto thefastchangingrealityonthegroundandtheneedforfurtherinteractionwithother actors(e.g.developmentdonors,GovernmentofHaiti). 84. Transition is on the agenda but needs a vision, a strategy and a plan. The major lessons and tenetsofearlyrecoveryandtransitiontowardsdevelopmentare,inpractice,difficulttoimplementand prioritise. There is a need for clarifying and understanding roles and responsibilities for transition to development, which are further blurred by mismatch in the level of resources across actors (humanitarian,developmental,andgovernment).

Forexample,isahouseholddisplacedwhenitremainsinitsneighbourhoodorevendamagedhouse?Similarly,arepeoplein campsdisplaced?
83

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85. Effortsarestillcompartmentalizedandconnectionsbetweenthehumanitariancommunityand development actors are limited. Effective joint planning and response needs to be guided by a consideration of national priorities and leadership is necessary to bring all actors around the table. Currentapproacheshavefavouredaproliferationofindividualswithmultipleroles. 86. Sectoralandlocaldifferencesdiscouragetheuseofblanketapproaches;therearemanylevelsof transitioninHaitiscontext. Acostlyresponse

TheresponseinHaitihasbeenmoreexpensivethaninothercrisesandhasfarexceededinitial estimates.Structuresofthemainagenciesareconsideredcostlyandnotflexibleenoughandagencies stillfeeloverstretchedintheircurrentcapacities.Delayshaveconsequencesforcosts. Limitedcommunicationandasymmetricperceptions 88. There are significant differences of opinion regarding the level of effectiveness of the humanitarian response in Haiti. Haitians though not exclusively tend to be far more critical of the response at this stage, while recognising the importance of initial efforts. Representatives of international agencies tend to value the work and progress that has been made and believe that the initial weaknesses in the response have had a negative impact on the speed and sustainability of recovery. Engaging in genuine twoway communication and supporting Haitians effectively has been a serious limitation. The humanitarian community has also been limited in its communication, by not havingenoughclarityonGovernmentofHaitirecoveryplans.Anothermisconceptionisthatdonorsnot presentinHaitibelievetheresponsetobewellfunded.Thereislimitedrecognitionofhowcostlythe responsehasbeencomparedtoothercrisesandtoinitialestimates. Progressonevaluationrecommendations
87.

Thereisagenuineawarenessoftheweaknessesraisedinpreviousevaluations.Althoughmany oftheshortcomingsstillapply,progresshasbeenmadeonmanyoftheissuesraised,andthereisnot enoughrecognitionofthechangesthathavetakenplace(e.g.practicallynoassistanceincamps).There arenotenoughexamplesoffollowupstoevaluations,suchasdevelopinganoperationalplanbasedon recommendationsandassessingprogressfourtofivemonthslater.Theclustercoordinationframework also limits the system's ability to effectively take on key issues raised in systemic and agency based evaluations. 90. Itisopentodiscussionhowlateistoolatetochangeorimplementcertainimprovements.Some of the recommendations raised in the IASC 6Month After Review could still apply. The humanitarian community still struggles with what should be taken up at this stage, what should have been done earlier and what is still worth doing given the timing and the resources available. Acting on recommendations from previous evaluations often requires leadership and time, both precious commoditiesinthehumanitariansector. Rationalcoordination 91. Coordination and planning mechanisms are not fully adapted to the current context. Coordination can be tailored to achieving results and responding to agreed objectives. For the
89.

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humanitariancommunity,effectivecoordinationisdrivenaroundtheoutcomesforHaitiansinneedof humanitarianaidandearlyrecovery.TheoverallcoordinationframeworkinHaitishouldbeadaptedto meetingthisgoal.Thisinvolvesstrengtheninglocalintegratedcoordinationandcreatingaframeworkfor effectiveoverallcoordination,whichbreaksdownthecurrentisolationofthehumanitariancommunity anditsefforts. 92. Time and effort are what is most required for effectively engaging with other actors and strengthening capacities. Emergency response timeframes and topdown sector standards are not conducive enough to extended consultation and fostering participation. The Consolidated Appeals Process as a strategic exercise was well facilitated in 2011 but reproduced the same structure of the clusterstoachieveresults.Ingeneral,thelessonfromHaitiforthehumanitariansystemisthatunless the response is clusterised or sufficient capacity is consistently dedicated to the issue, it is not adequatelyprioritised. Anincompleteassessment 93. Information is lacking on the level of needs, coverage and record of earthquakeaffected populations.Aproblemareahasbeenthelackofcontinuedcapacityforassessingandcrossvalidating information.ProgressagainsttheobjectivesandtargetsoftheCAPisnowmonitoredandreportedby theindividualclusters.Thesystemneedsadditionalbuyinandtobefurtherexpandedandconnectedto meettheneedsofotherstakeholdersandalsotoaddressprogressontransition(i.e.achievingdurable recoverysolutions). Leadershipandnewopportunities 94. Vision, leadership and decisionmaking have been lacking in the past in Haiti. Martelly's commitments in education and the 16/6 Project are both challenges and opportunities for positive change.Thereisanopportunityforrealengagementandacapacityforcollectivework.Staffturnoveris nolongerandissue;theHC/RCandthetoppositionsinthehumanitarianagencieshavecommittedto Haiti.

VII.

Conclusion

WiththefocusonthetransitiontowardsrecoveryandanewleadershipinHaitithereareopportunities for focusing on and supporting change. Taking advantage of the opportunities requires increased engagementwiththenewgovernmentandHaitiansociety,alignmentandflexibility.Intheimmediate future,attentionshouldbegiventoclarifyingthenewgovernmentspriorities,objectivesandstrategies tobetteradaptsupport.Akeygoalshouldbetoconveytheneedforformulatinganoverallresettlement strategyandaplanthatcanbesupportedovertimeandhelpalignefforts. There is an opportunity for starting anew and reversing the negative stigma that clusters, tables and IHRChavehadinthepast.OCHAandUNDPcanplayaroleinthisrespect.ItisrecommendedthatOCHA encouragetwowaycommunicationwithaffectedpopulations,furtherengagewithnationalNGOsand help discuss concerns and common NGO positions with the Government of Haiti. Principledriven professionalinternationalNGOswiththeComitedeCoordinationdesONGs(CCO)shouldseehowthey canpresentacommonstanceandapproachthatdefendstheirworkandshieldsthemfromincreased criticism(i.e.aformofcertificationoradherencetocertainpracticesthattheyalreadyfollowandthat responds to certain oversight and transparency concerns that the Government of Haiti has). The HumanitarianCoordinatorandOCHAshouldsupportNGOpartnersinthisprocess.

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 A concerted effort should be made to connect humanitarian action with other phases or categories and stakeholders in the framework of an overall response. Recognising, in the words of the HumanitarianCoordinator,thatemergencyresponseanddevelopmentneedsareintertwined,thereis evenlessofarationaleforcompartmentalisedcoordinationthatismuchlesseffectiveatthisstage.The HumanitarianCountryTeam(HCT)shouldinearly2012furtherreviewitsdecisionmakingcapacityand defineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor2012intermsofhowitcanengagewiththeGovernmentofHaiti, developmentactorsandHaitiancivilsociety.ItshouldalsoconsiderhowGovernmentofHaiticouldbe best engaged on humanitarian issues and in HCT discussions. Responsibilities should be assigned to differentactorsrepresentedattheHCTbytheme.Milestonesforthetransitiontowardsrecoveryandfor furtherengagementwithotheractorsandstructurescanbeidentifiedandprogressfollowedtoadapt the strategy and approaches as necessary. This will require further commitment on the part of actors participatingintheHCTwhocanstepuptotheresponsibilityandassumearole. TransitionandrecoveryshouldtogetherbeatopicthatissystematicallyanagendaitemattheHCTand in humanitarian donor coordination meetings. Similarly, humanitarian concerns should be a point of discussionin G12meetings.Should theIHRCsmandatebe extended,theirrepresentationattheHCT should be encouraged. Humanitarian concerns should be integrated as a focus area within the Commission (in a similar way to Disaster Risk Reduction. OCHAs presence at the IHRC should also be encouraged as additional means of ensuring that humanitarian concerns be considered and progressivelydealtwithinadurableway.TheHCTshouldrecommendandtrytoensurethatthereisa newstrategicmultistakeholderexerciseandplanningprocesstodevelopadetailedplanfortransition to recovery and development that takes place involving representation from the humanitarian community.Suchanexercisewillhelprationaliseavailableresourcesandavoidthatfundinghastobe channelledtowardsactivitiesthatdonotofferdurablesolutionsorarelesssustainable. There is a real opportunity to rationalise the current cluster system based on objectives, outcomes coordination or a coordinating results framework. The humanitarian community is taking a proactive approach to transitioning humanitarian aid coordination. This can make way for both more comprehensive sectorwide approaches and stronger geographically based decentralised coordination. TheprocessshouldbejointlydrivenbyOCHAandUNDP.Itisimportantthatdatesforclustertransition beset.Consideringtheneedforguidanceandthatcapacitiesinthefieldareoverstretched,additional support on cluster transition and coordination on resettlement (around key dates, outputs and milestones)shouldbesoughtandprovidedbytheIASCatthegloballevel,OCHAHQ,UNDP/BCPR. A cluster transition plan should include intermediate solutions if these are more forthcoming and transitioningcanbedoneatdifferentspeeds.Theassessmentfortherationalizationandtransitioningof clustersplancanbedonethroughafourfoldprocess: Abottomupapproachtounderstandthearrayofgeographicallybasedcoordinationneedsata decentralisedlevel,atallscales,fromneighbourhood,tocommunalsection,communal, departmentaltonational.UNDPhasaroletoplayinsupportinglocalgovernanceandastronger longtermcoordinationarchitecture. Areviewoffuturescenarios,understandingplansandprioritiesoftheGovernmentofHaiti underthenewpresidency,suchasnewinstitutionslikeastheHousingAuthority.Alsoto understandtheimplicationsforcoordinationandtheworkcarriedoutbyclusterstodate. Asectorbysectoranalysisforasectorwideapproachinsupportofamorecoherent,seamless responseaddressinginparallelthehumanitarianissuesandrecoveryanddevelopment,aswell

43

as strengthening preparedness, decentralization and other crosscutting issues. This includes supporting stronger sector groups through Government and National organizations, reviewing plans, expectations and longerterm donor agency priorities, international agencies seconding personnelandplacingnationalHaitianstaffinkeypositions. Specific concerted action for key crosscutting and multidimensional issues that tackle importantprioritiesthatarefundamentaltoaddresshumanitarianneeds,phaseoutassistance (e.g. resettlement and livelihoods) and make way for a coherent framework for coordination. Determining whether these multisectorial issues should act as umbrellas for sectors in the recovery phase under a new revamped and improved mechanism (i.e. if the IHRC can be reformedasoftenareothernationalframeworksforrecoverycoordinationoritsmandateas suchisnotrenewed)

Attention should be given to developing key guidelines and principles and clarifying expectations and approaches for partnership on coordination. Information gathering and dissemination tools need to adapt to the needs of geographically based coordination. A productive partnership between local authorities and international actors rests on the latter recognising the governments ownership of the recovery process. UN agencies and international NGOs must find practical ways of prioritising the strengtheningoflocalgovernmentcapacity,suchassecondingnationalandinternationalstafftolocal institutions, handson training, and sharing resources. A key challenge to be met is that the system should empower stakeholders. Information gathering and dissemination tools need to be further harmonized, strengthened and made more accessible. There may be a need to better understand the appropriateness of tools for national and local counterparts and incorporate notions of longerterm sustainability. Currentfundingconstraintsandgapsforbothhumanitarianactionandadequatetransitiontorecovery shouldbereassessedandquantified.Afundraisingstrategytocovertheseneedsshouldbedefined.As donor countries have understood that the Government of Haiti wants to phase out humanitarian assistance, renewed efforts need to be placed on raising funds and communicating that the lack of fundingwillthreatenhardwongains.TheCAPshouldbebetterusedtofurtherthispurpose.Itshould be available in English as well as French, and efforts to reach out to donors at HQ levels should be doubled(includingtheuseofroadshows).InternationalNGOsintheircountriesalsohavearoletoplay to raise awareness on the continued need for funding in Haiti. Donors across the spectrum need to furthercoordinateandadapttheirfundingtocoverneedsforhumanitariantransitiontorecovery. As costs have become a major issue in Haiti, cost and efficiency considerations should be factored in acrosstheresponse.Projectimplementationmechanismsinrecoveryshouldbereconsideredtofavour lessoverheads,reducedsubcontracting,andmorelimitedlagtimeforprocurementandimplementation. Given the cost of human resources, attention should be paid to prioritising the use of time and more efficient investments and processes (e.g. in meetings, in processing documents). Human resource policiesandpracticesspecificallyforUNagenciesshouldberevisedandbetteradaptedtotheneedsof theresponse. GivenHaitisunderlyingvulnerabilities,significanteffortsinDRRshouldbemaintainedovertime.Actors inHaitihaverecommendeddistinguishingbetweenlongertermdisasterriskreductionandshortterm preparednessandresponsewhenconsideringtransition.Additionalguidanceontransitionandretaining capacitiesshouldbeprovidedspecificallyforcontextslikeHaitis,wheredisastersarereoccurring.Space forfocusingonkeyhumanitarianneedsshouldberetainedinatransitionedframeworkthroughamore connected OCHA (e.g. with increased presence in the recovery and development coordination efforts)

44

andthroughadditionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice.Inaddition,moreresourcesandcapacity should be devoted to protection issues at this key juncture and increasingly for resettlement. Global level guidance on the multisectorial challenge of resettlement in Haiti should still be sought. Cluster leadagencies should attempt to embed cluster coordination capacity in their programme to support theircounterpartsandbeinapositiontoreactivatetheclusterifneeded.Recommendationsalsofocus on reforming human resource practices and making better use of existing rosters, allowing temporary redeployment,theconsiderationofadditionalcapacityofpartners,andplacingHaitianstaffinkeyroles. Inaddition,whilethefocushasbeenontheroleofClusterCoordinators,theexperienceofHaitishows thatthereisaneedfordeployingwitharangeofdifferentfunctionsandskills.

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VIII.KeyRecommendations
Thetablebelowsummariseskeyrecommendationsandrelatedfindings. Relatedfindingsandconclusions Recommendations The international community is keen on R1. Further engage with the new government and backing the new Haitian leadership and its Haitiansocietytoclarifyandunderstandnewpriorities, objectivesandstrategiesandbetteradaptresponseand commitments.(23) collectiveaction. Plans and objectives of the Government of Haitiarenotalwayswellknown.(54) The humanitarian community, in coordination with development actors, needs to reengage with the new Thereisaneedtofurtheralignresponseto government and Haitian society and take advantage of objectivesofnewgovernment.(54) institutional changes such as the New Housing Authority to adapt its approach, better communicate Top positions in the Government of Haiti its concerns and jointly define an action plan that have found it difficult to engage with the addresses humanitarian priorities and provides clarity humanitariancommunity.(55) for transition. This includes reaching out to, and involving the diaspora and the private sector (e.g. Engagement for the humanitarian learning from initiatives like Soul of Haiti, liaising with community with government ministries has membersofthePresidentialadvisorycouncil). proven difficult without a new government In the immediate term, the HCT in coordination inplace.(56) withtheUNCT,shouldtaskasmallleadgroup(45)of relevant key leaders in the response to approach new Haitianauthoritieshavefeltmarginalisedby Haitiangovernmentandworkwithitatthehighestlevel thehumanitarianresponse(55) and clarify priorities and concerns. The group should if possiblehaveRedCrossparticipationandincludeOCHA, The priority for transitioning beyond post UNDPandUNICEFleadership. earthquake humanitarian response remains To achieve this, additional leadership, decision defining a comprehensive resettlement making and a stronger and more strategic HCT is policy.(17) needed. OCHA would also require additional support. Highlevel Government of Haiti presence at the HCT The goals and objectives of humanitarian shouldalsobeconsidered responsearenotalwaysunderstood.(52) The recently formed advocacy working group or a new Twowaycommunicationismissing.(77) oneshouldbeformedtofollowuponandinformthese processes,provideinformationtoleadgroupandwork at other levels with government and with other Haitian actorsandeventuallydefineaclearerroadmapthatcan further guide transition and address remaining needs. The group should include protection cluster and CCCM/shelterclusterparticipation. The international community in Haiti HCT, UNCT, G12, Office of the Special Envoy, etc. needs to coherently conveytheneedforandconsequentlysupportaprocess offormulatinganoverallresettlementstrategyandplan that can be supported over time and help align efforts.

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Anoverallaidcoordinationsystemhasbeen lacking.(63) Therehasbeenlimitedinteractionbetween recovery and humanitarian coordination frameworks.(64) New frameworks and approaches are needed to overcome weaknesses in coordinationacrosssectors.(63) The main objectives have yet to be defined for an overarching transition plan that incorporateshumanitarianresponse.(68) There is lack of clarity on the thresholds of humanitarian response. Emergency response and development needs are intertwined.(59,61) There is no collective interaction between humanitariandonorsandtheirdevelopment counterparts.(63) There is limited takeup of humanitarian concerns in longerterm development efforts.(63) Thehumanitarianresponsehashelpedpilot approaches for recovery that can be continuedandreplicated.(62) Assistance is being phased out without an effective handover strategy. Recovery effortsarenotpickinguponmajorareasof need that have been covered by the humanitarian community. As a result, continuing humanitarian needs are largely unmet.(59,60)

ThenewHousingAuthorityinHaitishouldstrivetowork underanagreeduponoverallresettlementstrategyand helpdefinepolicy. The HCT should also oversee a process that involves redefining an advocacy plan to convey humanitarian concerns, encourage twoway communication with affectedpopulationsandnationalNGOs. R2. Reform and rationalise coordination to foster integrationandadvancehumanitarianconcerns and connect humanitarian action with other phases or categories (i.e. recovery, reconstruction and development)andstakeholdersintheframeworkofan overallresponse. Asastart,theHC/RCofficecoulddevelopaproposalfor establishing greater links between the CAP and the ISF, includingjointmonitoringofprogressagainstestablished indicatorsandobjectives. The HCT should further review its decisionmaking capacityanddefineitsaspirationsandtargetsfor2012in terms of how it can engage with the Government of Haiti,developmentactorsandHaitiancivilsociety. Transition and Recovery as a topic should be systematically made an agenda item at the HCT and in humanitarian donor coordination meetings. Similarly, humanitarianconcernsshouldbeapointofdiscussionin G12meetings. Had the IHRCs mandate been extended, their representation at the HCT should have been promoted andahumanitarianaidissuesfocusareacreatedwithin theIHRC(i.e.inasimilarwayasDRRorotherareasare considered). OCHA presence could be encouraged in Ministry of Planning meetings to ensure that humanitarianconcernsareconsideredandprogressively dealtwithinadurableway. The HCT should encourage a new strategic multi stakeholder exercise and planning process that includes representationfromthehumanitariancommunity,takes stock of the current situation and develops a more detailedplanfortransitiontorecoveryanddevelopment. Thisshouldbeseparatefromanddoneinadvanceofthe CAP MYR exercise which more narrowly focuses on humanitarian needs and is not as inclusive and Haiti specific.

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There has been much recent progress on planning for cluster transition. UNICEF has played a key role in advancing cluster transition(69) TheclustersystemandtheIHRCsufferfrom a difficult to rectify initial lack of inclusivenessandlimitedHaitianownership. (66) Involvement of Haitian NGOs has been largelyunsuccessful.(66) Focusing on sectoral tables for cluster transitionistoolimitedanapproach.(70) The current system can be further rationalised through merging key objectives oftheresponse.(68) The system is not yet adapted to geographicallybasedcoordination(70) Information management has to be reviewed in line with outcomes based coordinationandinformationneeds.(73) An overall assessment of need is lacking with the system being highly dependent on theclusterframework.(73) Mayors have played a key role in the response.(27,68,25) Crosssector and intercluster coordination havebeenweak.(28,65) Thereisinsufficientfundingavailableforthe humanitarian response and recovery (i.e. contributions to the CAP and the HRF). ( 43) Theresponseiscostlyanditscosthasbeen underestimated.(38,46) The CAPs effectiveness as a tool for fundraisingisquestionable.(43) IHRCisnotconsideredtobeacostefficient

R3.RationaliseandtransitiontheclustersysteminHaiti Continue proactive planning for cluster transition based on objectives. This process should be jointly driven by OCHA,UNDPandUNICEF.Additionalsupportshouldbe sought and provided by the IASC at the global level, OCHA HQ, UNDP/BCPR on cluster transition and coordinationonresettlementaroundkeydates,outputs and milestones. The assessment for the rationalization andtransitioningofclustersplancanbedonethrougha fourfoldprocess: A bottomup approach to understand the array of geographically based coordination needs at a decentralisedlevel,atallscales,fromneighbourhood,to communalsection,communal,departmentaltonational. UNDP has a role to play in supporting local governance andastrongerlongtermcoordinationarchitecture. A review of future scenarios, understanding plans andprioritiesoftheGovernmentofHaitiunderthenew presidency, such as new institutions like as the Housing Authority. Also to understand the implications for coordination and the work carried out by clusters to date. A sector by sector analysis for a sectorwide approach in support of a more coherent, seamless response addressing in parallel the humanitarian issues andrecoveryanddevelopment,aswellasstrengthening preparedness, decentralization and other crosscutting issues. Specific concerted action for key crosscutting and multidimensional issues that tackle important priorities that are fundamental to address humanitarian needs, phaseout assistance (e.g. resettlement and livelihoods) and make way for a coherent framework for coordination. R4.Considerfunding,costsandefficiencies The HCT and UNCT supported by the group that was defined to coordinate project submissions to the IHRC should oversee efforts that review, reassess and quantify funding gaps for both humanitarian action and adequatetransitiontorecoveryanddefineacoordinated fundraisingstrategy. TheERCandHCshouldreachouttospecificdonors also at the HQ level to obtain funding and additional capacity through staff secondments in priority under resourcedareaslikeprotection.

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structure.(21) Areas like protection are underresourced. (37) Lack of funding prospects acts as a disincentivetoplanningtransition.(59)

Haitifacesmultiplevulnerabilities(16)and not all elements of DRR have been consideredintheresponse.(36) Ability to tackle issues has depended on information available, whether there is dedicated cluster, subcluster, working grouporhumanresourcecapacity(35) Protection at this key juncture is viewed as increasinglycritical.(37) The absence of a resettlement policy has beenamajorgap.(33) Nationalcapacitiesarestillweak.(42) Capacitybuilding takes time, goes handin hand with engagement and is necessary for thesustainabilityofefforts.(56,59)

Donors should provide flexible funding commensurate to priorities outlined in joint humanitarianandrecoveryandplans. The Government of Haiti and donors should underlinetheneedforminimumtransactioncosts. Make better use of the CAP instrument for fundraising. Distinguish between overall needs and the humanitariancommunityscapacitytodeliver. Factorin cost and efficiency considerations across the response. Reconsider recovery project implementationmechanismsinfavouroflessoverheads, reduced levels of subcontracting, and less lagtime for procurementandimplementation. Giventhecostofhumanresources,attentionshould be paid to prioritising use of time and more efficient processes (e.g. drafting and approving policy papers, limitingmeetings,etc.) HumanresourcepoliciesandpracticesspecificallyforUN agenciesshouldberevisedtobecomemoreflexibleand betteradaptedtotheneedsoftheresponse(e.g.hiring nationalstaff,rapidshorttermdeployments,etc.) R5. Support capacitystrengthening and retain capacity inpriorityareas Prioritise DRR efforts over time which should be further integrated into development. OCHA/Clusters need to continue to focus on building the capacity of nationalactors Ensure that space for focusing on key humanitarian needsisretainedinatransitionedframeworkthrougha more connected OCHA (e.g. with increased presence in therecoveryanddevelopmentcoordinationefforts)and additionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice. Dedicatemoreresourcesandcapacitytoprotection issues at this key juncture through PROCAP continued secondment of capacity to the protection cluster, additionalresourcestoworkatthecommunelevel. Seek globallevel guidance on the multisectorial challengeofresettlement. Cluster lead agencies should embed cluster coordination capacity in their programme to support counterparts and be in a position to help reactivate the clusterifneeded. UN human resource practices should be reviewed to makebetteruseofexistingrosters,allowfortemporary redeployment,consideringthecapacitiesofpartnersand beabletoplaceHaitianstaffinkeyroles.

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ANNEXESTOTHEINTERAGENCYSTANDINGCOMMITTEES INTERAGENCYREALTIMEEVALUATIONOFTHERESPONSETOTHE HAITIEARTHQUAKE,TWENTYMONTHSAFTER

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Annex1:TermsofReference
INTERAGENCYREALTIMEEVALUATION(IARTE)OFTHEHUMANITARIANRESPONSETOTHE EARTHQUAKEINHAITI,PHASEII TermsofReference 1. INTRODUCTION The InterAgency RealTime Evaluations (IA RTEs) are an initiative of the InterAgency Standing CommitteeIASC).Theycanbedefinedasevaluationswhichalmostsimultaneouslyfeedbackfindingsfor immediate use by humanitarian community, and which are primarily intended for suddenonset disasters or protracted crises undergoing a phase of rapid deterioration or escalating violence. One phaseIARTEwouldbecarriedoutattheearlyimplementationstagesofahumanitarianoperationand consist of remote monitoring and a field mission, whereas a multi phase approach would include a second, follow up evaluation mission (with a different focus corresponding to real time needs at that stageintheresponse). InterAgency RealTime Evaluations seek to resolve interagency coordination problems or operational bottlenecks and provide realtime learning to the field. They differ from other forms of humanitarian evaluationsintheirspeed,coverage,methods,andoutputs.InterAgencyRealTimeEvaluationsarealso typified by their shared management and methodological oversight through global and national level interagencysupport,managementandadvisorygroups;speedofmobilization,feedbackandfollowup; light,agileapproaches;restrictedscope;andparticipatorymethods. 2. BACKGROUNDTOTHECRISIS HaitiisthepoorestcountryintheCaribbean,with72percentofthepopulationlivingonlessthantwo USdollarsaday,andahighlevelofincomeinequality.TheIntegratedUNStabilizationMissionforHaiti (MINUSTAH) has been present in the country since 2004, mandated by the Security Council to strengthensecurity,governanceandtheruleoflawfollowingtheperiodofpoliticalunrestandviolence. On12January2010,a7magnitudeearthquakestruckHaiti,devastatingPortauPrince,thecapitalcity, andvariousareasinlOuestandSudestdpartements.Theearthquakeaffectedover3millionpeople, approximately222,650ofwhichwerekilledand310,930injured.Atthepeakofdisplacement,closeto 2.3millionpeoplelefttheirhomes,including302,000children.Over400,000buildingsareestimatedto be damaged or destroyed, including sixty percent of government and administrative buildings, the PresidentialPalace,parliamentandcathedral,aswellas80percentofschoolsinPortauPrinceand60 percentintheSudandlOuestdpartements. The impact on national response capacity was severe. More than 16,000 civil servants died in the earthquakeandmanyleftthecountryafter.TheHaitiangovernmentlost33percentofitsofficialsand theUnitedNationslost102staffmembers. AtaninternationaldonorsconferenceheldinNewYorkinMarch2010,55donorstogetherpledgeda total of $4.58 billion in grants in 2010 and 2011 for rebuilding the country; of that, $1.74 billion (38

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percentofthepledges),havebeendisbursedasofJune201184.Atthetimeofthisevaluation,eighteen monthsaftertheearthquake,massivehumanitarianresponsehasdevelopedincontextofmultiplecrisis, includingcholeraepidemics,hurricanes,andpoliticalandsecuritychallenges. 3. RATIONALE Inviewofthescaleofthedisasterandthesubsequentresponse,theInterAgencyStandingCommittee (IASC) launched an InterAgency RealTime Evaluation (IA RTE) in Haiti to inform decisionmakers at nationalandheadquarterslevels,drawlessonsandallowcorrectionstobemadewherenecessary.The IARTEinHaitihasbeenenvisagedasamultiphaseprocess85.Thefirstphasetookplacethreemonths after the earthquake and focused on the ongoing humanitarian response. The second phase of the IA RTEinHaitiwillbeforwardlookingandfocusontransitionalissuesandconnectednesstolongerterm recoveryprocesses. TheseTermsofReferencearebasedonthepreparatorymissiontoHaiticonductedbymembersofthe IARTEHaitiManagementGroupbetween1stand11thMarch2011.Theywerefurtherrefinedfollowing thevisittoHaitibytheEvaluationTeamLeaderandEvaluationManager,conductedbetween18thand 22ndofJuly2011. 4. USEANDOBJECTIVES The main objective of the InterAgency RealTime Evaluation is to assess the current phase of the humanitarianresponseandproviderealtimefeedbackandinputintoongoingdecisionmakinginthe field.TheIARTEwillprovidesnapshotsofthesituationandrealtimefeedbackandlearningtotheHCT, aswellaslocalIASC,Clusters,NGOsinvolvedinthehumanitarianresponse,andGovernmentofHaitiat variouslevels.Thiswillenabletheadoptionofcorrectiveactionsasneeded. Theevaluationwillinthiswaysupport theongoingoperationalplanningof theHumanitarianCountry Team(HCT),whichwillbethemostimmediateuserofthefeedbackandrecommendations. Theevaluationwillidentifytheextenttowhichthehumanitarianresponseachievedthekeyobjectives, including addressing in a timely and meaningful way the needs of all segments of the affected population.Thekeyobjectivesareto: Analyse and provide lessons for the ongoing response, with a particular focus on coordination betweendifferentactorsinvolved; Examine options for linking humanitarian response structures with governmentestablished mechanisms;and AnalysetheextenttowhichthefindingsandrecommendationsfromthefirstphaseoftheInter AgencyRealTimeEvaluationhaveinformedtheevolvinghumanitarianresponseinHaiti. Theevaluationwillseektoidentifylessonswithregardstocommunityandareabasedapproachesand durablesolutions.

HaitiReconstructionFundAnnualReport,WorldBankJuly2011 The initial plans for the multiphased IA RTE in Haiti included a separately managed interagency survey of affected population; the findings of the survey were to form a part of the evidence base for this and future evaluations. Due to the cancellationofthesurvey,theevaluationwillrelyinsteadonconsultationswiththeaffectedpopulation.
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 5. SCOPE ThesecondphaseoftheInterAgencyRealTimeEvaluationwillcoverthehumanitarianresponsetothe earthquakeinHaitifromtheendoffieldworkforthefirstphaseoftheevaluation(May2010)untilthe beginning of the evaluation (August 2011). The evaluation will cover all sectors of the humanitarian responseinaffecteddpartementsofPortauPrince,lOuestandSudest. 6. FOCUS The IA RTE will focus in large part on the effectiveness and efficiency of the coordination and managementsystems,addressingcriticalissuesrelatedtoboththeprovisionofreliefandtransitionto recovery.Thefollowingissuesformthefocusoftheevaluation: 1 MainAchievements,CoverageandGaps 1.1 How timely and successful is the humanitarian response in delivering against stated objectives/indicators? 1.2 To what extent have critical needs and gaps been identified and addressed in a timely way, bothbetweenandwithinclusters? 1.3 Howeffectivelyarecrosscuttingissues86beingaddressedinthehumanitarianresponse? 1.4 How adequately are recovery considerations and the basic tenets of disaster riskreduction (DRR)incorporatedintothehumanitarianresponse87? 1.5 Howeffectiveisthehumanitariancommunityinadaptingtorespondinginurbanenvironment andadoptingcommunitybasedapproaches? 1.6 What is the humanitarian systems level of commitment and compliance to humanitarian principlesandstandards? 2 CriticalFactorsandTheirImpactontheEffectivenessoftheHumanitarianResponse 2.1 Which critical factors (e.g. security events, infrastructure, government capacity, legal/policy issues)helpexplainwhytheresponsewasorwasnotdeliveredinatimelyandadequatemanner? 2.2 Howeffectivewasthehumanitariancommunityinidentifyingandaddressingtheconstraints ontheresponse? 2.3 HasthecapacityoftheHaitiangovernmentatalllevelsbeenadequatelyassessed?Howwell targetedandeffectivearecapacitybuildingefforts? 2.4 What were the effects of subsequent natural disasters and cholera epidemics on the humanitarianresponsetotheearthquakeinHaiti? 3 Consistency and Connectedness of the Goals of the Humanitarian Response with Those of the Counterparts 3.1 How clear, coherent and well articulated are the mandate, goals and objectives of the humanitarianresponse?

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e.g.protection,gender,HIV/AIDS,environment,earlyrecovery assessments,planningandprovisionof..

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3.2 How adequately are national context and the coping mechanisms of the population being takenintoaccountinplanningandprovisionofassistance? 3.3 To what extent have the objectives and strategies of the Haitian government and various developmentactorspresentbeentakenintoaccountwhenplanningforthehumanitarianresponseand transitiontorecovery? 3.4 How effective is the humanitarian community in ensuring that humanitarian concerns are takenintoaccountinplanningforthelongertermrecoveryprocesses?Whyorwhynot? 4 CoherenceofCoordinationMechanismsEstablished 4.1 How relevant, inclusive, and coherently interlinked and have various appeals, strategies and operationalplans(e.g.theFlashAppeal,PDNA,CAP,RFandtheNationalRecoveryPlan)been?Towhat extenthavethesebeenbasedontimelyandinformedanalysis? 4.2 How connected/coherent are the different coordination mechanisms for humanitarian response, transition and recovery established between the humanitarian and development actors, GovernmentofHaiti,InterimHaitiRecoveryCommission,andMINUSTAH88atalllevels? 4.3 How effective is the engagement of the humanitarian actors with the Haitian government, Haitiancivilsociety,affectedpopulation,andprivateactors?Whatwere/arethemainchallenges? 5 Transitionstrategiesofclustersandoptionsforlinking/mergingthemintogovernmentstructures 5.1 How effective is cluster and intercluster coordination (with specific focus on crosscutting issuesandearlyrecovery)? 5.2 Howconnectedareclusterswiththegovernmentstructuresatvariouslevels?Towhatextent have the options for further linking/merging the clusters into government structures been examined? Haveappropriatetransitionstrategiesbeendefinedanddevelopedforclusters? 5.3 Inwhatways,ifany,havenationalandlocalcapacitiesbeencapitalizedonandstrengthened? 6 Sustainability of basic service provision by NGOs and the UN in the context of drying up of fundingforhumanitarianneedsandmajoractorsleaving 6.1 Towhatextenthavesustainability,costsandbenefitsofsubstitutionofbasicserviceprovision byNGOs/UNhavebeenassessedandtakenintoaccountwhenplanningforhumanitarianresponseand transition? 6.2 Howhavetheeffectsoftheexitordecreasedpresenceofhumanitarianactorsengagedinthe response been assessed and factored in planning and advocacy for humanitarian and recovery response? 6.3 How have the effects of potential changes in MINUSTAH mandate been analysed and incorporatedinplanningfortheresponse? 6.4 Have funding flows been sufficient, both in quantity and timeliness, so as to allow humanitarian actors to respond effectively to both humanitarian and early recovery needs? How adequateisthecontinuityoffunding?Howflexibleisthefundingavailabletothechangingcontextand needs? 7 Evidencebaseddecisionmaking

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Theevaluationisexpectedtomapvariouscoordinationmechanismsestablished,theircomposition,mandatesand interlinkages;thisinformationshouldbepresentedasanAnnextothefinalevaluationreport

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 7.1 How adequate and timely is statistical evidence on contextual factors (e.g. needs/movements/coping strategies of the population, degree of infrastructure destruction) to the needsofoperationaldecisionmaking? 7.2 Does analysis of needs, vulnerabilities and capacities include variant effects on men and women, girls and boys, and vulnerable groups? Has the disaggregated data (by age and gender) been availabletoinformtheanalysis? 7.3 What systems have been put into place to monitor, report and evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of the overall response? How adequate are these for measuring progress against objectives? 7.4 Towhatextenthavepreviouslyidentifiedlessonsandtheconclusionsandrecommendations of evaluations and reviews conducted, and in particular the first phase of the InterAgency Real Time Evaluation,beenincorporatedintothehumanitarianresponse?Whyorwhynot? 7. METHODOLOGY Theapplied methodsfor IARTEshall belightand participatory.Theevaluationwill be conductedby a teamofindependentexperts.Theevaluationwillbecarriedoutthroughanalysesofvarioussourcesof information including desk reviews; field visits; interviews with key stakeholders; and through cross validation of data. While maintaining independence, the evaluation will seek the views of all parties, especiallytheaffectedpopulation.Evaluationteamswillserveasfacilitators,encouragingandassisting fieldpersonnel,bothindividuallyandcollectively,tolookcriticallyattheiroperationsandfindcreative solutionstoproblems. In order to best prepare the evaluation team for the upcoming evaluation, members of the IA RTE ManagementGroupwillprovidethemwithrelevantinformationandalsorequestrelevantdatafromthe HCT in this regard (situation reports, needs assessment reports, key messages, timelines of key decisions,HCT&clustermeetingminutes,maincontactlistsofkeyhumanitarianstakeholders).Thedata willbehandedoverconfidentiallytotheevaluationteamtocarryoutadeskreviewinadvanceofthe fieldmission. 8. STAKEHOLDERINVOLVEMENT The evaluation team will consult staff from UN agencies, international NGOs, national NGOs, national stakeholders,governmentanddonororganizations,aswellasmilitaryactors,andisexpectedtoengage inextensiveconsultationswithaffectedpopulation. InteragencytechnicalandpolicysupportwillbeprovidedthroughtheIARTESupportGroup. TheincountryAdvisoryGroupfortheevaluationmaybeformedbymembersoftheHCTonavoluntary basis. The main role of the InCountry Advisory Group is to provide feedback and advice to the evaluationteamthroughouttheRTEprocessincludingattheplanningphase,duringthemissionphase aswellasduringboththepostmissionandfollowupphaseswhenanycorrectiveactionsidentifiedare being implemented. AG members are also expected to attend any debriefing workshops, review and provideinputondraftreports,andhelpcoordinatethefollowupprocess. SpecifictasksoftheAdvisoryGroupmayincludethefollowing:

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 ProvideinputsintotheRTEworkplanbasedonthefinalTermsofReference, Providerelevantdocumentsandalistofrelevantcontacts Provideinputsintoaplannedscheduleoffieldvisits,includingadviceontheappropriatesitesto bevisitedandkeystakeholderstobeconsulted ProvideadviceandsupporttotheIARTEteamtohelpprioritizekeyissues Ensurethatincountryagenciesinvolvedintheresponsearekeptadvisedandinformedonthe RTEplans,objectivesandfindingsastheyemerge Representagencyviewsandconcernsonkeyinteragencycoordinationissuesandchallenges Participate in debriefings with the RTE team on key findings at select points during the evaluation, Ensurethatthisfeedbackissharedwiththeirownagencies,andasappropriate,provideinput andinitiatepotentialcorrectiveactions. Provideadviceonthedevelopmentofsuitablemodalitiesfororganizingrealtimefeedbackprior totheRTEteamsfinaldeparturefromthecountry Coordinate agency and countrylevel feedback on documents related to the IARTE (i.e. ExecutiveSummary,draftsofthefinalreport) ProvideadvicetotheHCandtheHCTonthedevelopmentofappropriatefollowupplanslinked toRTErecommendations Assistinmonitoringtheimplementationoffollowupplans. TheteamwillreportitsfindingstoallmembersoftheHCT(Clusters,IASClocally)andtheirinternational and local counterparts in Haiti (including Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, IOM, local NGOs, government etc.) during a series of workshops planned for the week of 26th September 2011. PresentationsinNewYorkwillfollowwithintwoweeksoftheconsultantsreturnfromthefieldmission. 9. MANAGEMENTARRANGEMENTS The InterAgency RealTime Evaluations are overseen by the IASC IA RTE Support Group. Overall management of the second phase of the Haiti IA RTE will be conducted a smaller management group (MG), led by the evaluation manager from OCHA. The management group is chaired by OCHA and comprisesofrepresentativesfromFAO,ICVA,IFRC,UNICEFandWHO,withtheparticipationofDFIDfor theDACHaitiEvaluationTaskForce. Managementgroupmemberswillbeexpectedto: Manage the entire evaluation process (including financial resource mobilization, inputting into theTermsofReference,teamrecruitment,reviewingtheinceptionreport,reviewingdraftreports)for theparticularphase; OfferincountrysupportduringcriticalphasesoftheevaluationandtraveltoHaitiasneeded; Monitorandassessthequalityofalloutputsontheevaluation; Provide guidance and institutional support to external experts(s), especially on issues of methodology; ApprovethefinalIARTEreport; Representtheparticipatingagenciesindiscussionwithexperts(s)conductingtheIARTE; Represent the participating agencies in dealings with the UN country team, donor representativesandNGOcommunities; KeeptheIARTEsupportgroupadvisedonkeydevelopmentsthroughouttheevaluation.

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 Theevaluationteamwillreporttothemanagementgroup,throughtheevaluationmanager. Allevaluationproductswillfirstbesubmittedtotheevaluationmanager,representingthemanagement group,andwillthenbesharedwiththeadvisorygroup,humanitariancountryteam,otherrelevantin countrystakeholdersandtheIASCmembersthroughwiderIARTEsupportgroup. 11. EVALUATIONTEAM:CompetencyandExpertiseRequirements Theevaluationwillemploytheservicesofaconsultingcompany/researchinstitutewhichwillprobably consistsofateamof2internationaland1or2nationalconsultants.Evaluationteammustbegender andagebalanced,andembodythefollowingcollectiveexperiences: Proven seniorlevel experience and ability to provide strategic recommendations to key stakeholders; Theevaluationteamshouldincludedevelopment,capacitybuildingandurbanplanningexperts, andperhapsananthropologist; Excellent knowledge of relocation strategies and reintegration, recovery and capacity development.Familiaritywithissuesoftransitioninfragilestates.Understandingoftheprivatesector andrecoveryagencies(e.g.WorldBank,IADB); Good knowledge of strategic and operational management of humanitarian operations, preferablyinHaiti;theabilitytobringonboardnationalconsultants(s)fromHaitiwouldbeanasset; Goodknowledgeofhumanitariansystemanditsreforms,includingofUNagencies,IFRC,NGOs, andlocalgovernmentdisasterresponsestructuresandsystems; Demonstrated experience in conducting evaluations of humanitarian programmes and the capacitytoworkcollaborativelywithmultiplestakeholdersandonateam; Strongexperienceinkeysectorsand/orincrosscuttingissues; Strong analytical skills and ability to clearly synthesize and present findings, draw practical conclusionsandtopreparewellwrittenreportsinatimelymanner; Strongworkshopfacilitationskills; ExcellentwritingandpresentationskillsinEnglishandFrench;and Immediateavailabilityfortheperiodindicated. 12. REPORTINGREQUIREMENTSANDDELIVERABLES 1. FieldvisitstoPortauPrinceandSud,SudEst,andOuestdpartmentstogatherinformationand evidenceonissueddescribedinthisToR.Fieldvisitswilltakeplaceoverathreeweekperiod. 2. A brief (up to 5 pages) inception report, outlining key questions the evaluation will address , primarystakeholdersandmainmethodologicalandorganizationalissues,tobesubmittedwithin5days ofthebeginningofthefieldwork. 3. Draft executive summary of the report, containing a matrix of findings, conclusions and recommendations.

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4. Aseriesofpresentationsandlessonslearntworkshops89toHCTinHaitionalllevels(capitaland departments Jacmel and Leogane). The workshops are considered, together with the final evaluation report,astheprimaryoutputoftheevaluation.Thepurposeoftheworkshopsistopresentanddiscuss findings,conclusionsandrecommendationsandreformulatethemifnecessaryandtoidentifykeyactors and timelines to responds to these recommendations. The workshops should be carried out after completionofdraftexecutivesummaryoftheIARTEreport. 5. Anoutcomesummary(25pages)ofproceedingsoftheworkshops,tobecompletedwithinone weekaftertheytakeplace. 6. AdraftIARTEreport,tobecompletedwithinthreeweeksafterthefieldmission.Adraftreport will be submitted to the HCT and IA RTE Management Group, who will be afforded seven days to comment.Thedocumentwillsubsequentlybedisseminatedtoawideraudienceforcomment. 7. A final RTE report containing an executive summary of no more than 2,000 words and a main textofnomorethan10,000words,bothinclusiveofclearandconciserecommendations.Theoutcome summary of workshops proceedings shall become an integral part of the final RTE report. Annexes shouldincludealistofallindividualsinterviewed,abibliography,adescriptionofmethod(s)employed, and any other relevant materials. The final report will be submitted one week after the reception of stakeholdercommentstothedraftreport. 8. A matrix outlining comments received to the draft evaluation report, whether they were accepted, partially accepted or rejected, and if partially accepted or rejected, the rationale for that decision. The evaluation team is solely responsible for the final products. While maintaining independence, the team will adhere to professional standards and language, particularly that which may relate to the protection of staff and operations. Direct consultations with affected populations will be a formal requirement of the evaluation unless security conditions are overriding. Additionally, the Evaluation Managerwillbeconsultedpriortothedisseminationofanyproductsemanatingfromtheevaluation. All analytical results and products arising from this evaluation will be owned by the IASC RTE Support Group.Theteamleaderand/ormemberswillnotbeallowedwithoutpriorauthorizationinwritingto presentanyoftheanalyticalresultsashis/herownworkortomakeuseoftheevaluationresultsfor privatepublicationpurposes. AllexternalevaluationreportswillbesubmittedtoALNAPforinclusionintheregularmetaevaluation processthatratesthequalityofevaluationreports. 10. DURATIONOFEVALUATIONANDTENTATIVETIMEPLAN Action/event ProjectedDates TRIGGERINGANDREMOTE MONITORINGPHASE Done

Placesfortheworkshops:JacmelforDpartementsduSud/SudEst;LeoganeforDpartementdel'Ouest;Portau PrinceforHatioverall.Workshopsformat:1dayhrsworkshopshappeningeachdayfrom09h0013h00withlunchatthe end.DebriefingincountrytoDSRSG/HC/RC

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PREPARATORYEVALUATION MANAGEMENTMISSION Scopingmissionbytheevaluation managementtoidentifykey questionsandissues,aswellasto explainprocesses. MISSIONONTRANSITION HiringofConsultantsContract signed Preparatorymissiontocountry teamleaderandevaluationmanager Fieldvisits:Missiontothecountry interviews,fieldvisits HQinterviews:NewYork DRAFTEXECUTIVESUMMARY Fieldvisits:INCOUNTRY WORKSHOPS FIRSTDRAFT Commentingon1stdraft FINALDRAFT FinalCheck&Approvalbyadhoc ManagementGroupofFinalReport DebriefinginNewYorkand/orGVA

Done

111March2011 15Jul11 1820July 20 August 2011 7 September 2011 89September 15September 2630September 4October 415October 21October 30October November

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Annex2:ReportonthefocusgroupheldwithHaitianstaffinvolvedinthehumanitarian response
VALUATIONINTERAGENCESENTEMPSRELDELINTERVENTIONHUMANITAIRE ENHATISUITEAUTREMBLEMENTDETERREPHASEII COMPTERENDUDELARENCONTREAVECDESREPRSENTANTSDUSTAFFNATIONALDONGLOCALES ETINTERNATIONALES,DAGENCESDESNU DATE : 30aot2011 LIEU : SalledeconfrencedeCONCERN PARTICIPANTS : Voirlisteenannexe Larunionacommenc9h30aveclesproposdebienvenuedelaConsultanteNationale,MariePascale Thodate, qui a prsent les deux autres membres de la mission dvaluation, Silvia Hidalgo (Chef dquipe)etEvaFaye.P.Thodatearappellemandatdelquipedvaluationetlordredujourdela runion. 8 PRINCIPALESRALISATIONS,COUVERTUREETLACUNES 1.1 RALISATIONS Ramassagedesdblais:momentumassezserr. Laction humanitaire a t trs efficace ds lapparition des premiers cas de cholra, ceci grce la coordinationentrelacommunauthumanitaireetleGouvernementpourfairefacelpidmie,cequi a permis de limiter lexpansion de la maladie. Grce aux services de base qui taient offerts dans les camps et galement aux activits de sensibilisation et dinformation, il a t possible de rduire la propagationdelamaladie. LengagementdelaDINEPAdanslafournituredeaupotableconstituelundesprincipauxpointspositifs. Cetorganismeessaiedtreprsentdanslescommunes.Lesinterventions dansle mondeurbainsont plusdifficiles.Danslemonderural,lesentitsdnommesComitsdapprovisionnementdeaupotable onttprvuesenvuedegarantirladurabilitdesinterventions. LaccsauxsoinsdesantatpossiblegrceauxONGtraverslescliniquesmobilesetfixes.Laction positive de certains acteurs en termes de renforcement de capacit nationale a t note. titre dexemple, MSF a organis une formation pour les cadres du Ministre de la Sant Publique et de la Population(MSPP)avantdefaireunepassationdesesactivitsauditMinistre. Lamiseenplacedesclustersatunetapeimportantedansladfinitiondemcanismesenvuedun meilleur cadrage de laide humanitaire. Le systme de clusters a t une russite en ce sens quil a facilit la collecte de linformation et la coordination de laide humanitaire. Logane, titre dexemple,cesttraversleclusterquelesngociationsonttengagespourlarelocalisation. Certainesinstitutions,commelePAM,constatedesprogrsralisspardesorganisationsdebaseavec lesquellesiltravaille.CestlefruitdeseffortsconsentisparlePAMdanslecadredunpartenariatavec desorganisationslocales(rvisiondesprojets,desbudgetstitredexemple).

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La MINUSTAH a facilit la distribution de laide humanitaire. Les interventions dans les zones dites rouges ont t particulirement apprcies compte tenu du contexte difficile dans lequel il fallait travailler.LessoldatsdelaMINUSTAHontassistlesfemmesges,lesenfantslorsdesdistributions; leurprsencetaitncessairepourlemaintiendelordreetlassistanceauxplusvulnrables. Lune des structures de ltat qui fonctionne, cest la DPC dont la majeure partie du personnel est constituedebnvoles. 1.2 COUVERTURE Les oprations humanitaires taient en grande partie limites aux camps alors que la majorit de la population vit en dehors des camps et demeure dans une situation critique en termes daccs aux services de base. En privilgiant ainsi cette approche, on constate que le camp a remplac la communautcrantdesconflitsentrelespopulationsvivantdansleurquartierdorigineetcellesvivant danslescamps. Lecritredeslectiondesbnficiairesatprincipalementlecamp,limitantainsilaccsdesservices debaselamajoritdelapopulation,cellequinevitpasdanslescamps.Ilestvraiquelesproblmes daccsauxservicesdebaseexistaientavantlesisme.Cependant,lapopulationaffecteparlesisme neselimitepascelledescamps. 1.3 LACUNES Ilnyapaseuuneutilisationrationnelledesdbrisdanslecadreduneventuellereconstruction. Pour ce qui est de lutilisation des clusters en tant que mcanismes de coordination de lopration humanitaire,certainesfaiblessesonttnotes;cesmcanismessontquelquepeulimitsencesens quils ont permis une meilleure coordination des interventions lies lurgence seulement. Des questions juges primordiales telles que le renforcement des capacits locales dans le cadre de la gestiondelurgence,limplicationdesautoritslocalesdanslarflexionsurlesproblmesdelogement nontpastadresses(ExempledeTurgeau:desONGvoulaientnettoyercequartierdesdbrispour relocaliserlesdplacsduChampdeMars,cecisanslaparticipationdelaMairiedePortauPrincequi cependantentantquautoritestappelegrertoutconflitentrelespropritairesdecespropritset les dplacs). Selon les participants la rencontre, les mmes problmes vont surgir si une autre catastrophenaturelledevaittoucherlepays.Lesautoritsneparticipaientpasvraimentauxclustersau dbutdesoprations,cequiafacilitlecontrledesactivitsparlesinternationaux.Cenestqupartir demai2010,queltatcentral,surtoutleMinistredelaSantPubliqueetdelaPopulation(MSPP)a intgrlesclusters. En ce qui a trait au secteur sant, la gratuit des soins a facilit laccs un nombre important de victimesdusisme.Cependant,lunedesfaiblessesnotesdemeurelafortedpendancevisvisdes oprateursinternationauxquigre8090%loffredesant.Cettesituationaconduitlafermeturede certainesstructureshospitalireshatiennes.Deplus,unepertedecontrleparlesautoritshatiennes dutypedemdicamentsoffertslapopulationatgalementobserve. Lesmcanismesdesuivintaientpasadquats.titredexemple,desmaladesouvictimesdusisme transfrs sur des bateaux pour y recevoir des soins de sant et qui, une fois ces bateaux partis, ne pouvaientpoursuivreletraitementalorsquedesrendezvousavaienttfixs. LesrisquesdepropagationducholranontpastadquatementadressspardesONGquinontpas ncessairementlacapacitoulescomptencesentermesdegestiondedchetsparexemple.Vules

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capacitsexistantes,lecholranauraitpasdfranchirleslimitesdelArtiboniteolespremierscasont trecenss. Lesbesoinsimmdiatsdelapopulation(nourriture,eaupotable,etc.)onttadresssdslelancement desoprationshumanitaires.Parcontre,quelquesmoisaprslesisme,lasituationadgnrdansles campssuitelaugmentationconsidrabledelaviolenceavecnotammentdescasdeviolstouchantles femmes, les adolescentes et mme des fillettes. La suspension des activits de distribution de nourriture, dalimentation en eau potable, titre dexemple, a aggrav les conditions de vie juges prcairesdelapopulationvivantdanslescamps. Dsle14janvier2010,denombreusesONGsontvenuesausecoursdelapopulationhatienne.Aprs mai2010,lesobservateursnotentlarriveduneautrecatgoriedONGcherchantsurtouttirerprofit delasituation.LesONGlocalesetinternationalesprsentessurleterrainavantjanvier2010affirment trevictimesdelinvasiondecesONGquienraisondeleursactionsontcrunclimatdemfiance. Desmcanismesdeconcertationexistaientauseindelasocithatienneavantlesisme.Endpitdes consquences de cette catastrophe naturelle, ces mcanismes fonctionnaient aprs le 12 janvier mais nontpastexploitsbonescientparlacommunauthumanitaire.Lesstructureslocalesnontpas t utilises. Lapproche retenue consistait travailler avec des individus au lieu de privilgier un partenariat avec les organisations de base. Ces individus ont certaines fois jou le jeu des acteurs internationauxenrecherchantlesopportunitsdemploi.titredexemple,uneplateformedONGqui constituaitlecomitdeliaisonentrelesONG,atcarteledansladynamiquederponse.Lesforces contradictoires lintrieur de la rponse humanitaire ont affaibli cette plateforme. Des acteurs importantscommelesuniversitsnontpastimpliquesdansleprocessus. LesONGlocalesquiconstituentlelienentrelapopulationetlesacteursinternationaux,remettenten questionlaformedecollaborationactuellequireposesurlutilisationdesorganisationslocalespourla collectedinformationsmaissansperspectivesdunvraipartenariat.Deplus,lespratiquessalarialesdes organisations internationales ont cr des conflits au sein de la socit en raison du manque de comptitivit des institutions nationales qui en raison de contraintes financires ne peuvent offrir des salairesallchants.LespratiquesdesONG(passeulementsalariales)ontaffectlconomienationale, tout particulirement la production nationale dj affaiblie par le sisme. La rponse humanitaire ne doit pas venir remplacer ce qui existe sur le plan local. Il aurait fallu renforcer la capacit des fournisseurslocaux,aprslaphasedurgence,leurpermettantainsideprofiterdesopportunits. Un manque de coordination est galement not pour ce qui est de lvaluation des besoins. Les participantsonttitredexemplesoulignlefaitquedesComitsdecampdonnaientdeschiffrestrs diffrentsetexagrs. Le renforcement des capacits nationales demeure jusqu prsent lune des principales faiblesses de loprationhumanitaire.Lesnationauxsattendaient,danslecadredelatransition,cequilyaitmoins dexpatris sur le terrain et ainsi la possibilit dinclure des nationaux forms dans les diffrentes structures, leur offrant ainsi la possibilit de mettre en pratique les connaissances et comptences acquises.Malheureusement,lespostesclefssontencoreoccupspardesexpatris.Lesnationauxqui onttintgrsdanscesinstitutionsinternationales,nontmalheureusementpasvoixauchapitre. LesparticipantslarencontreontmentionnlecasduneONGinternationalequisestinstalledansle NordOuestsuitelapparitionducholra.Aucuneformationsurlapriseenchargedecettemaladiena

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tdispenselintentiondupersonnelhatienparcetteONG,dolincapacitdesnationauxfairele suiviaudpartdelorganisationinternationale. Ilnyapaseudepriseenchargedespersonnesbesoinsspciauxlorsdesdistributions. Lesbesoinsdelapopulationentermesdemoyensdesubsistancenontpastadresss.Cesbesoins vont au del des opportunits offertes par le Cash for Work, qui rpond la ncessit dinjecter des capitauxdanslimmdiatmaisnerentrepasdansunelogiquedactionsstructurantes. Ltatetlesacteursinternationauxontratloccasiondeconduiredesactivitsdesensibilisationetde formation.Citonsleplanningfamilialtitredexemple. La rponse humanitaire est reste dans une phase durgence. Selon les participants latelier, ceci sexplique dune part par le manque de vision et de capacit du ct hatien (pas de rceptacle pour lassistance externe, manque de vison de la bourgeoisie hatienne) et dautre part, par le manque de volontdelacommunauthumanitairedesortirdustatuquo. UneoccasionuniquesestprsentederenforcerleMinistredelaPlanificationetdelaCoopration Externe (MPCE), organe de tutelle des ONG. Malheureusement, les diffrents acteurs impliqus, incluantleMPCEnontpassuprofiterdecetteopportunit. Ilyaunedimensionurbainequiatdifficileconstruiredansuntelcontexte(manquedetransmission desavoiretdecohsionsociale). 9 LESFACTEURSCRITIQUESETLEURIMPACTSURLEFFICACITDELINTERVENTIONHUMANITAIRE Le contexte politique a constitu un lment de blocage surtout la priode des lections (enjeux politiquesettentativesdecorruptionduprocessuslectoral). Dansdautrespaystouchspardescatastrophesnaturelles,ilexistaitdjunestructure,unrceptacle pourfaciliterlacoordinationdesactivits. Lesismesestproduitdansuncontextemondialparticulieralorsquedesdbatssontencourssurle mandat des NationsUnies, ce qui a des effets sur Hati en mettant laccent sur les enjeux dans une rponsecommecelleci. Lemanquederflexionsurlesproblmesactuelsquiseposentbeaucoupplusentermesdelogement dfinitif(dfinitiondunepolitique,solutionsauxproblmesfonciers,etc.),dopportunitsdemplois,de recapitalisationpourlesentreprisesnotammentnapasfacilitlarecherchedesolutionsdurables. 10 COHRENCEETINTGRATIONDESOBJECTIFSDELINTERVENTIONHUMANITAIREETDECEUXDES AUTRESACTEURS DenombreusesONGsesontinstallesenHatiaprslesismesansobjectifs,sansplandactionetsans capacitrelledadresserlesproblmesdelapopulation.CetteinvasiondONGaeudeplusdeseffets ngatifs sur les conomies locales. Il convient galement de souligner le manque dexpertise de certainesONGdanslagestiondecamps.

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Unmanque darticulationentrelediscoursdu Gouvernement et celuidela Communauthumanitaire est observ. En effet, depuis avril mai 2010, lEtat Central travers le Prsident de la Rpublique a publiquement annonc la fin des actions humanitaires et le lancement de la transition vers la reconstruction. La Communaut humanitaire demeure dans cette logique de lhumanitaire alors que desinterventionsmarquantledbutdelatransitionnontpastengages. Avant le sisme, le DSNCRP constituait le document de rfrence en matire de dveloppement. En mars 2010, le PDNA a t approuv. Aucune adaptation na t faite, encore moins le lien entre ces documentspourrengocieraveclespartenaires.Latendanceatpluttdefinancerdautresprojets quinesinscrivaientpasdanslecadreduplanenvigueur. 11 LECONSETRECOMMANDATIONS Il convient de proposer des solutions qui rpondent la ralit hatienne (lexemple des modles de latrinesutilissenAfrique).Lesshelters,titredexemple,devraienttrecartscommesolutionpour treremplacspardesmaisons.Plusde18moisaprslesisme,ilnepeuttrequestiondeshelters commesolutionauxproblmesdelogement. Les ONG internationales se sont contentes de reproduire ce quelles ont fait ailleurs sans chercher innoverouproposerdesmodlesmieuxadaptslaralithatienne.Lundespremiersprincipesde lhumanitairesavoirlarutilisationdesmatriauxnapastappliqu. Ilauraitfalluprofiterdelopportunitofferteparlesismepouradresserlesproblmesstructurelset ainsifairelelienentrelhumanitaireetledveloppement. Ilfautviterquelarponsecausedestortsnoncrsparlesisme. LesHatiensontapprisgrerjusquuncertainpointlescrisesquionttouchlepays:lecholra,le sisme,lesintempries.IlyasuffisammentderessourceshumainesenHatipourmenerdesactivits auniveaulocal.IlfaudraitdoncprivilgierlesONGlocalesetainsivaloriserlesressourcesnationales.Au niveaudeladiasporagalement,lesressourcesexistent.Uneffortciblpermettraitdelesintgrerdans leprocessusdereconstruction. Lesystmedesclustersapermisdemieuxcoordonnerlarponsehumanitaireauniveaucommunal. Lemanquedetransparencedanslagestiondesfondsestlunedeslacunesquilfaudraitcomblerdans lesprochainesinterventions(redevabilit). Ilconvientderenforcerlagouvernancelocale,plusspcifiquementlesmunicipalits. Lesinterventionsfuturesdoiventsinscriredansuncadreplusglobal(dpassantceluidelarponseau sisme)commeceluiduDSNCRPouduPDNA(desactionsstructurellesenvuedadressergalementles problmes des populations vivant dans les bidonvilles ou tout simplement de lensemble de la populationhatienne). Cestlinstinctdesurviequiportelacommunauthumanitaireprivilgierlarponsehumanitaire.Les ONGinternationalesetlesagencesdesNUdoiventtisserdenouveauxliensaveclesacteurslocauxafin quesinstalleunclimatdeconfiance.Ellessedoiventgalementderespecterlespromessesfaitesen tenantcomptedesbesoinsexprimsparlespopulationsetsurtoutdassurerlesuivi.

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Decetteexprience,unensembledeleonspeuventtretiresetdontpourraientbnficierdautres paysfaceunecatastrophedelammeampleur: tremieuxformetinformdelasituationdupays; Apprendreconnatrelinterlocuteur,lapopulationaffecte,sescoutumes(lagestiondeleau danslesbouteillesVSgestiondesdchets); Sasseoir sur quatre piliers: tre humain, faire la communication avec la population qui doit participer,prcisersesattentesetlafaondefaire,leprojetdoitatterrir. Envisagerdesplansintgrs(exempledelatrinesconstruitespourunecolealorsquilnyapas deciterne); Engagerunerponseimmdiatepoursauverdesvies; Mainteniruncadredeconcertationtoutaulongduprocessus; Dterminerleseuilpourpasserdelarponseimmdiatelatransitionverslareconstruction. Nepasstablirdanslemodeurgence. Larponsehumanitairedoitcomprendredeuxphases: Lapremire:aidemassivedolancessitdeconnatrelemarch. Laseconde:leciblageenrponselvolutiondesbesoinspournepasaffaiblirlesstructures locales. Ilfautexigerunecoordinationpournepasdtruirelesystmequiexistait(parexemple,desinstitutions quioffrentdessalairespluslevsqueceuxdesnationaux). Larunionaprisfin14h25.

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Annex3:ReportontheIARTEworkshoponTransition
INTERAGENCYREALTIMEEVALUATIONOFTHEHUMANITARIANRESPONSETOTHEHAITI EARTHQUAKE,PHASE2WORKSHOP FOCUSINGONTRANSITIONINTHECURRENTCONTEXTOFHAITI:BRIDGINGTHEGAPBETWEEN HUMANITARIANRESPONSEANDRECONSTRUCTION,ANDLINKINGRELIEFEFFORTSTODEVELOPMENT INTIMESOFCHANGE September27th,2011 PortauPrince,Hati INTRODUCTION The InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC) launched in August 2011 the second phase of the Inter AgencyRealTimeEvaluation(IARTE)forHaititoassessthedisasterresponse,informdecisionmakers, drawlessonsandallowcorrectionstobemade,wherenecessary,inrealtime.Themainobjectivesof thissecondphaseoftheIARTEwereto: Analyze and provide lessons for the ongoing response, with a particular focus on coordination betweendifferentactorsinvolved; Examine options for linking humanitarian response structures with longerterm and/or Governmentestablishedmechanisms;and AnalyzetheextenttowhichthefindingsandrecommendationsfromthefirstphaseoftheInter AgencyRealTimeEvaluationhaveinformedtheevolvinghumanitarianresponseinHaiti. FieldvisitstoPortauPrinceandLeoganetogatherinformationandevidenceonissueddescribedinthe ToR took place over a 3week period. As per the ToR, a workshop has been held on September 27th, 2011inordertocrossvalidatefindings. OBJECTIVES Thepurposeoftheworkshopwastopresentanddiscussfindingsandpotentialrecommendationstokey stakeholdersandengagetheminvalidatinganddiscussinganarrayofrecommendationsforconcerted action.Theworkshopsoughttopromptautilizationfocusedapproachandprovideworkinggroupswith issuesinbulletpointformtogeneratediscussionandfosterownership. Thespecificobjectiveswereto: 1. EnhancetheunderstandingamongkeyactorsoftransitionissuesinthecurrentcontextofHaiti, includingchallenges,opportunitiesandgoodpractices. 2. ReviewkeyissuesinHaitiaffectingtheresponse,recovery,andthetransitiontodevelopmentin oftenoverlappingkeyareas90. These include the areas covered by the RTE, its preliminary findings, conclusions and recommendations.
90

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PARTICIPANTS Attendeesincludedkeystakeholdersintheresponsesuchasrepresentatives fromthe Governmentof Haitiatvariouslevels,UnitedNationsagencies,localandinternationalNGOs,internationalorganizations anddonors.TheparticipantsincludedpersonsinterviewedduringtheinitialfieldphaseoftheRTE. METHODOLOGY AninitialpresentationbytheRTEfocusedonfivekeyareas: Achievements, coverage, gaps including strengthened DRR and critical factors affecting the response; Coordinationmechanisms,platforms,connectednessandexistingstrategies,plansandfunding instruments; Clusters,clustertransitionandeffectivegovernmentcapacitybuildingconsiderations; Sustainability of services, coverage of remaining humanitarian needs and challenges, including resettlement,fundingandcapacities; Communication,advocacy,engagingHaitiansintheresponse,attentiontoprotectionandother crosscuttingissues. Working groups were formed for each issue. Following the opening session, the evaluation team distributedtotheparticipantsasummarymatrixoffindingsandpotentialrecommendationsrelatedto thefivekeyareas.Theattendeeswereinvitedtoformheterogeneousgroupstodiscussandpotentially validatethecontentofthematrix.Eachgrouphadfirsttobrainstormonthefindingsandthenonthe recommendations and their operationalisation. The workshop concluded with a plenary session with thepresentationsdonebythebreakoutgroups. COMMENTS&RECOMMENDATIONS Severalcommonconcernsemergedfromthebreakoutgroupswhofirstpresentedtheircommentson thefindings: Findings should be better referenced.91 Data on specific issues should be included in order to helpunderstandthefindings. Theevaluationdoesnotacknowledgeenoughwhathasbeenaccomplishedagainstgreatodds (forinstancethecholeraepidemic,theabsenceofGovernmentandcoordinationmechanisms,poverty inHati,etc.)92 ItisoftennotclearwhethertheevaluationteamisreferringtotheperiodstartinginMay2010 or to a different one. The evaluation does not highlight a time continuum which might help measure change.Itneedstobeacknowledgedinthereportthattheenvironmenthadimprovedgreatlysince thelastRTE. RTE usually tries to offer different possibilities as to what could have been done another way priortocriticizingexistinginitiatives. AcoherentoverviewofthecontextwithinwhichtheIARTEtookplaceismissing.

91Theevaluationteamhadnotreferencedfindingsinthecontextofamatrixandthis exercise. 92Thematricesfocusedtoagreaterextentonareasrequiringimprovement.

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Inthis RTE, thereseemstobeverylittlenewfindingscomparedtothefirst one.Keyfindings oftenlackdepth.Someparticipantswereexpectedspecificandpertinentexamples,whichcouldhave illustrated the case better. Furthermore, the analysis remains superficial. There is too much generalization. There could have been better assessment in some cases taking into account issues such as disability,gender,DRR,age.Disabilityandageingarenotreallyontheagenda.Thereisnosubcluster for elderly, for people with disabilities and other vulnerable groups while there is a cluster GBV, child protection. ElementofDRRwasnotcarefullyconsidered. Bydefinition,cashforworkisusedtoalleviatepoverty.Itisjustastrategytoputmoneyinthe handofthepeopleafteranaturaldisasteroracrisis.Humanitarianinterventionisnotintendedtobe sustainable. Participantsquestionthestatementregardinghumanitarianactorswhoonlyworkedincamps. They rejected this statement because many of them have worked in communities before the earthquake.TheyhaveworkedinHaitiwheretherewerenocamps.Theyrecognizetheneedtoworkin communitiesmorethaninthecampsandtheyhavestartedtodothat.Forexample,thesameNGOs workedthroughoutthecountry. Fundingdriesupafteremergency,whichisalsorelatedtoglobalrecession.Humanitarianactors havenocontroloverexternalfactors. The humanitarian actors should focus more on local capacities and not only on national capacities,whichbythewayalsoincludesthecivilsociety. The evaluation team opinion should be separated out from evidencebased findings. Furthermore, there is also a need to clearly distinguish individual perceptions from a clear trend from respondents.Thereareverystrongstatementsmadebutnoexplanationsregardingthosestatements. Thereforetheyshouldbeomitted. Theworkinggroupsconcludedwithasetofgeneralandspecificcommentsonkeyrecommendations: Recommendationsmadebytheevaluationteamarenotnecessarilyveryuseful.TheRTEshould provideconcreteandactionablerecommendationstoguideanddirectcurrentefforts.Itshouldfocuson exploringoptionstoadaptclusterstobothalignandsupportgovernmentledcoordinationmechanisms. The link between findings and recommendations is sometimes missing. It should be straightforward.Makingthelinkwillhelpunderstandthelogicbehindeachrecommendation. OCHAshouldrisecrosscuttingissues,makingsurethattheyareintegratedinCAPprojects. OCHAneedstointeractmorewithgrassrootsactorsandlistenmoretotheirneeds. Giveavoicetoallactors,especiallytothecommunitiesandnotonlytothecamps. Include Youth in the communication agenda, civil society and Universities in the debate about transition. Opentheparticipationofthepopulationindecisionmakingprocesses. Putpeoplefirstinthecommunicationprocessandinformationsharing. Implementtheaccountabilityframework. Mainstreamaccountabilitytowardtheaffectedpopulation. Cashforworkmodelcouldbeusedtoencouragemoredurableactivities.

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TransformCashForWorkintoWorkForCash. Whatmechanismsareinplacetointegratetheconceptoftransition?Whataretheconceptsof transition? Itistruethatahousingpolicyshouldhavebeenincludedatthebeginningofthehumanitarian response. Improvethecapacityofthegovernmenttocommunicate.MaybeUNDPcouldalsoplayarole. The government designs a national strategy based on their citizens consensus, which could conducttoadecentralizedstrategy. Itisnoteasytofindspecialists,qualifiedhumanresourcesandthissituationisevenworsefor NGOswithlimitedbudget.Therefore,onlytheUNandnottheNGOscanhiremoreHaitianatahigher leverandputthemintostrategicposition. Thereisaneedtoreinforcetheleadershipoflocalauthorities,bygettingtheminvolvedinthe wholeprocess. Jointassessmentoflocalneedsandcapacitiesshouldbeconsideredinordertofixpriorities. An exchange platform between the Haitian authorities and the local organizations could be implemented. Inthehumanitarianresponse,acommunityapproachbasedonneighborsshouldbeprioritized. Itistooearlytotalkaboutonlydevelopmentactivities.Therearestillmanyvulnerablegroups livingincamps.Therefore,theexitstrategyshouldtakethemintoaccountbyprovidingservicesduring thetransitionperiod. ImprovingarticulationbetweenCAP,ISFandIHRCisindeedamust.ButtheRTEshouldprovide moreexplanationsonhowtomakeitmoreeffective. Theevaluationshouldincludeapropercosteffectivenessanalysisoftheavailableresources. CONCLUSIONS Sincetheworkshopincludedhumanitariananddevelopmentactors,itcreatedanopportunityforjoint assessment of recommendations and planning. The results will be used to further crossvalidate findings.Theevaluationteamshouldanalyzetheinputsoftheworkinggroups.Thecontentemerging fromthosediscussionsshouldguidetheteamworkduringtheelaborationofthereport.

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VALUATIONINTERAGENCESENTEMPSRELDELINTERVENTIONHUMANITAIREENHATISUITEAU SISME,PHASEII ATELIERDU27SEPTEMBRE2011 PROGRAMME 9h009h15 : Arrivedesparticipants 9h159h30 : Prsentationdesobjectifsdelvaluation,delamthodologie etdesprincipalesconstations SilviaHidalgoetMariePascaleThodate 9h309h35 : Constitutiondesgroupes 9h3511h10 : Travailenateliersurlesconstations 11h1011h15 : Proposdebienvenue NigelFischer,CoordonnateurRsidentetHumanitairedu SystmedesNationsUnies 11h1511h30 : Pausecaf 11h3012h30 : Prsentationdesrsultatsdesatelierssurlesconstatations 12h3012h45 : QuestionsetRponses 12h4513h45 : Djeuner 13h4515h15 : Travailenateliersurlesrecommandationsetunplan oprationnel 15h1516h15 : Prsentationdesrsultatsdesatelierssurlesconstatations 16h1516h35 : QuestionsetRponses 16h3516h45 : Prsentationdesprochainestapes 16h4516h50 : Motsderemerciement PhilippeVerstraeten,ChefdeBureaudeOCHA

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Annex4:TransitionstrategiesofclustersINHaitiandoptionsforlinking/mergingtheminto officialstructures
I.Introduction 1. Thisnoteonclustertransitionhasbeenpreparedformanagersinthefieldinadvanceofthefull IASCRTEHaitiPhaseIIevaluationreport.AstheprimarypurposeofanRTEistoprovidefeedbackinreal time to those executing and managing the humanitarian response, this paper seeks to provide (1) a background to the cluster approach in Haiti93and concept of transition, (2) an overview of ongoing cluster transition efforts and explore the range of options (3) inform the current process. Evaluators recognizethateffortsareunderwayandthatmanagersinHaitiwilloftenhaveabetterunderstandingof bothprospectsandchallenges.94Thisnotesimplyintendstoshedlightonthewiderrangeofdifferent optionsandconsiderationsandrespondtomanyofthecommentsprovidedbystakeholdersduringthe RTEworkshopheldinSeptemberinPortauPrince. 2. While discussions on the transition of clusters initiated in August 2010, these were very much disrupted and set back by the cholera response. In March 2011, over a year after the earthquake, concerted efforts were made to consider and plan for cluster transition in Haiti. A document on the status of cluster adaptation was drafted on March 22nd 2011 by the intercluster (OCHA). That same month,UNICEFheldaworkshoponclustertransitionstrategiesforthoseclustersandthesubclusterit leads.95ConsultationensuedbetweentheHCandinitiallyclustercoordinators96andthenwasenlarged toalsoincludeclusterleadagenciesundertheHCTumbrella.Aconcertedapproachisunderwaytohave an overall plan for cluster transition in which there is recognition that there is no one size fits all approachandindividualclustersaretodefinetheirstrategybyNovember11th2011. 3. This process is taking place against the backdrop of decreased funding and amidst concerns regarding overall aid coordination and more specifically that of development aid. 97 There is an opportunityforreassessingcapacities againstneedsandrationalizing the coordinationapparatus.One example has been the merger of the shelter and CCCM clusters. This has been done in an attempt to rationalizethecoordinationframework,avoidcompartmentalizationandadapttothedecreasedlevelof fundingavailable.Atthe sametimeinadditiontotheinitialcoordination hubsinearthquakeaffected areas,importantclusterdecentralizationeffortshavebeenunderwaytostrengthencoordinationatthe

Theclusterapproachaimstoensureamorecoherentandeffectiveresponsebymobilizinggroupsofagencies,organizations andNGOstorespondinastrategicmanneracrossallkeysectorsorareasofactivity. 94 Theassessmentistimelimitedandtakesintoaccounttheviewsofindividualsandorganizationsconsulted,observationsin thecontextofmeetingsattendedandamoreextensivedeskreview.Notallstakeholderswerenecessarilyabletocontributeto theprocess.Insightsdonotencapsulateallviewsorspecificitiesofdifferentsectorsandanassessmentofhowclustershave evolved.Also,asthisanalysisreflectsonapointintimeinafastevolvingprocessofclustertransition,findingsandconclusions mayhavebeensurpassedbyeventsormayhavebeenincorporated.IndeedatthetimeoftheworkshopheldinPortauPrince preliminaryfindingsandrecommendationshadnotfactoredinprogressthathadtakenplaceaweekbefore. 95 TheHumanitarianCoordinatorandOCHAparticipatedintheworkshopStratgiedeTransitiondesclustershumanitairesa unecoordinationnationaledelaideauniveausectorialetintersectorielpourlesclusterspourlesquelslUNICEFassurelerolede chefdefileenHaiti.2829March2011MarchWorkshopDraft0. 96 Ininterviewstheproblemofsolelyrelyingonclustercoordinatorsforinputontransitionwasraisedascoordinatorsmaybe biasedorhaveaconflictofinterestfeelingtheneedtoextendtheirroleandposition. 97 TheECOSOCJuly2011reportunderlinesthataidcoordinationwasamajorchallengeandthatalmostalloftheinterlocutors oftheGroupheldtheviewthataidisstillnotsufficientlycoordinated,whichcreatesduplicationandreducestheeffectiveness ofinterventions[andthat]developmentaidactivities,areoftencriticizedforbeingdispersed.http://daccessdds ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N11/416/76/PDF/N1141676.pdf?OpenElement
93

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locallevelandsupportthekeyroleofmayorsincoordinatingandrespondingtoneeds.Coordinationhas been effectively decentralised in certain areas and for certain sectors through a Sub Hub system and followinganintegratedapproachincertaincases.(e.g.meetingschairedbythemunicipalitiesofCroix desBouquetsandTabarre). II.BackgroundtotheClusterApproachinHaitiandTransition 4. WhenconsideringclustersinHaitiandtransition,theevaluationhassoughttoascertainboththe need for transition and what this would entail. Questions that emerged had to do with what is to be transitioned and to whom and the components of transition. These issues often led to discussions on remaining acute humanitarian needs, what has been the purpose and value of clusters at this stage, OCHAsandtoalesserextenttheIHRC(InterimHaitiRecoveryCommission)andUNDP/BCPRspotential roles. II.1CoordinationandtheclustersysteminHaiti 5. InJanuary2010intheaftermathoftheearthquake,theHumanitarianCountryTeamagreedto theestablishmentoftwelveclustersand2subclusters:CampCoordinationandCampManagement(led by IOM); Education (UNICEF/Save the Children); Emergency Shelter and NonFood Items IFRC, then handed over to UNHabitat in August 2010); Food Aid (WFP); Logistics (WFP); Nutrition (UNICEF); Protection(OHCHR,UNICEFforChildProtectionandUNFPAforGBV);WASH(UNICEF);Agriculture(FAO) andFoodAid(WFP);EarlyRecovery(UNDP);EmergencyTelecommunications(WFP);andHealth(WHO). TheGovernment,totheextentpossibleappointedMinistrycounterpartstocoleadeachcluster,andby May2010hadintensifieditsinvolvementwithclustersinresponseplanningandimplementationatall levels. Coordination capacity was established in PortauPrince, Logne, Petite Goave, Jacmel and Gonaives.TheInterimHaitiRecoveryCommission(IHRC)wasestablishedinApril2010. 6. TheclusterapproachwasfirstintroducedinHaitiinearly2008andevaluatedattheendof2009 (see Binder and Grunewald, IASC cluster approach evaluation, 2nd phase Haiti country study, April 2010). The assessment found that the main coordination challenge was at the time not necessarily a lack of coordination, but an abundance of parallel and sometimes dysfunctional coordination mechanisms.98At the end of 2009, before the earthquake no formal decision had been taken on the clusters and these were still officially in place and had not officially been deactivated even after the Hurricaneseason.Priortotheearthquake,significantefforthadbeenmadetoimproveexistingdisaster coordination investing in the System National de Gestion des Risques et des Desastres (SNGRD) a permanent secretariat coordinating 26 governmental and nongovernmental organisations and the Direction Nationale de la Protection Civile (DPC), in charge of national, regional and communal operationsandcoordination.WithintheSNGRD,theHaitiangovernmentestablishedaGroupedAppui de la Coopration Internationale (GACI) bringing together donors, UN agencies, MINUSTAH, and international NGOs and the IFRC and the Haitian Red Cross. The GACIs role was to coordinate preparedness activities and, during an emergency response, mobilise funds and organise technical cooperation. Within the GACI, the Comite Permanent InterOrganisation (CPIO), established in 2008, representedthehumanitariancommunityandincludedtheUNand9INGOs,andtheHaitianRedCross/ IFRC. 7. Haitis longerstanding aid coordination setup has relied on sectorial tables at the level of

98

Binder&Grunewald,IASCclusterapproachevaluation,2ndphaseHaiticountrystudy,April2010,p.16.

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Ministries.Theirlevelofeffectivenessinthepastvariedgreatly.Themostrecognisedsectorialtableis theoneforAgriculture(relaunchedinDecember2008)butwhereNGOshavebeentraditionallyunable toparticipateatthenationallevel.MultistakeholdermeetingstakeplacemonthlyineachofHaitis10 departments.99Postearthquake,inadditiontotheclustersandtablessectoriellesfunctioningtovarying degreesdependingonthesector,theIHRCsetupadhocworkinggroupsforcertainsectorsasofOctober 2010. The Recovery Commission (IHRC) has itself foreseen strengthening the links between the tables sectorielles and the G12 group of development donors but with limited contact with the cluster system.100OtherinitiativessuchastheCGIsupportedHaitiActionGroup,101whichwassetupbeforethe earthquake,alsoprovideaframeworkforsectorialcoordinationofefforts(seeTable1). 8. Clusters, to varying degrees, have undeniably developed capacity and knowledge. The main clustershavecarriedoutgapanalyses,definedguidelines,standardoperatingproceduresandstrategies. Contingency and preparedness plans have been developed. Most importantly, the clusters have establishedtoolsforinformationmanagementandimportantlessonslearned.Specificbenchmarksfor assessingtheperformanceofclusterandinterclustercoordinationhavehowevernotbeenestablished inHaiti.Therearenowdifferentperspectivesonthevalueandusefulnessofclustersdependingonthe cluster,theactorinterviewedandthestageoftheresponse.Despiteexistingdifferencesinviews,there isoverallaconsensuson the importanceof theframeworkfor coordination andof thepaststrengths andweaknessesoftheclusterapproachinHaiti.Clustercoordinatorswereforthemostpartconsidered qualified,withtherightskills,andsufficientleadershipand potential tofulfil theirrole.Sustainingthe coordination mechanism and transitioning it requires renewed investment. The level of Human Resourcesinthehumanitarianoperation,atthisstageintermsofthequalityofthepersonnelinvolved andtheirknowledgeofthecontext,wasgenerallyviewedashigh.102 9. ClusterTransitionPlanning

Timeline
Post2008 Hurricane season December 2009 Clusters from2008 stillinplace butdormant 12January Earthquake official Cholera Elections endof outbreak Hurricane relief Thomas phase June October November 2010 2010 2010 Discussionontransition President Martelly elected March 2011 Negotiationstoforma government

January2010 Earthquake response Clusterroll out

September 2011

November 2011

AdaptationPlan Unicefdriven workshop

Cluster Coordinator/ ClusterLead Planning

Sources:various,OCHAAdhocHCTPresentationonClusterEvolution(September2010),GPPiURDHaitiCaseStudyon Clusters(April2010)

99

www.agriculture.gouv.ht.

ministries,sectoraltablesandtheG12donotmentiontheclusters.(ref.UNDPjobsApril2011).

100TermsofreferenceforpositionoftechnicaladvisertosupportaidcoordinationwithintheIHRCandbetweenthe

101LedbyDenisO'Brien,headoftheHaitiActionNetwork,networkmembersmeetmonthlytoreportonanddiscuss issuesandchallengesinachievingtheirobjectivesinworkinggroupsineducation,energy,enterprise,environment, health,sanitation,shelter,andnurturingHaiti'sdeepculture. 102 Interviews,observation.Personnelengagedintheresponseinkeypositionsisforthemostpart

experienced,Frenchspeakingandhasbeenpresentincountryforover6months.

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10.

Table1:SectoralCoordination:Clustersandothercoordinationinitiatives.
ClustersactivatedinHaiti (20102011) GoHclusterco leador counterpart MoA/Table MTPTC Mairies Futurehousing authority(HA) MoE Mairies&HA MoA CNSA DPC DPCandMairies CIRHObjective/ expertise Haiti Action Network group x x Shelter WASH

Globalclusters

AgricultureFAO EarlyRecoveryUNDP

AgricultureFAO EarlyRecoveryUNDP Debrisworkinggroup Livelihoodsworkinggroup LogementQuartier workinggroupunder shelterandsince SeptemberunderER EducationUNICEF/SCF ShelterIFRCUNHabitat ETCWFP FoodAidWFPunofficial phaseout LogisticsWFP CCCMIOM(mergedwith sheltersinceSeptember 2011) ProtectionOHCHR/ MINUSTAH SUBCLUSTERS ChildProtectionUNICEF GBVUNFPA

Recovery Debris Jobcreation Shelter

EducationUNICEF/SCF EmergencyShelterIFRC ETCOCHA/WFP/UNICEF FoodSecurityFAO/WFP (asofApril2011) LogisticsWFP CCCMUNHCR/IOM

Education Housing Housing

X X (shelter)

ProtectionUNHCR SUBCLUSTERS ChildProtectionUNICEF GBVUNFPA RoL/JusticeUNDP/OHCHR Housing/Land/PropertyUN Habitat MineActionUNMAS HealthWHO NutritionUNICEF WASHUNICEF Crosscuttingissues HIV/AIDSUNAIDS GenderUNFPA EnvironmentUNEP AgeHelpAgeInternational DisasterRiskReduction

IBRS MCF

HealthWHO NutritionUNICEF WASHUNICEF

MoH MoH DINEPA

Health Water& Hygiene Gender DRR Environment

X X Culture Energy

Source:Various

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Table2:IHRC:11PlannedSectoralTables103

PlannedSectortables/coordinatingentitiesIHRCStrategyforSupportingandReinforcingthe CapacityofHaitianInstitutions(December2010) Sector Housing GovernmentChair MAST,aschairofthe interministerial commissionon Housing MTPTC MARNDRandMOE Sector Water,sanitationand hygiene GovernmentChair DINEPA

Debrisremoval Agricultureand environment Foodsecurity

Ruleoflaw Riskreductionand management Institutionalbuilding anddecentralization Infrastructure

MSPJ MICT

CNSA

MPCEandMEF

Healthandnutrition Education

MSPP MENFP

MTPTC

11. National participation and ownership as principles guiding the cluster approach are viewed as key for transition. OCHAs RTE (December 2010) also found that the interface between clusters and governmentledcoordinationmechanismshadinmostsectorsbeenweakandthattherehadbeenlittle guidanceonhowthetworelatetoeachotherandensurecoherencebetweenhumanitarianresponse andrecovery/developmentwork.104Asmechanismsandpracticesareputinplace,itisdifficulttoadapt dynamicsandturnthetideofweakinitialHaitianownershipoftheclusters.Limitedownershipofthe cluster system is cited in many crises. In Haiti, many different reasons are provided to explain limited nationalparticipationandnotallareseenasnegative.105 12. The Strategic Plan for the Remainder of the IHRCs Mandate (December 2010) recognised coordination as a major challenge in both the humanitarian and development efforts. It further identified that lack of coordination was often a result of lack of leadership, or lack of recognized leadership and called on all concerned ministries or Haitian entities to be involved in all stages of all major humanitarian or development efforts. While recognising that prior to the earthquake, sector tableshadbeenputinplacewithmixedresults,itarguesinfavourofhumanitarianclustersultimately foldingintosectortablestocreateaplatformforthewiderrecoveryeffort.Theneedformovingaway fromamultitudeofsilocoordinatingmechanismsthathaveonlysuperficiallinkswitheachotherand

The Commissions mandate is set to expire in October 2011. The main goal of one of the seven objectives of the CIRH capacity building for coordination has not been targeted by projects. After growing pains implementers now claim that the IHRCisatthepointwhereonewouldhavewanteditbeoverayearago.CapacitybuildinginthecontextofresigningMinisters andinabsenceofanewgovernmenthasalsobeenaconstraint. 104 Bhattacharjee,AbhijitandLossio,Roberta,EvaluationofOCHAResponsetotheHaitiEarthquake,FinalReport,January2011. 105 Interviews. In the case of the Food Aid cluster the GoH preferred not to have to use its overstretched capacity on NGO coordinationandbepresentinmeetings.Inotherinstances,governmentrepresentativesinmeetingsfeelthattheyareputon thespotandlackdecisionmakingcapacityormeans.
103

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the governmental is underlined and for government in the short term to lead existing mechanisms (humanitarianclustersandsectortables). 13. The IHRC strategy further emphasises the need for further rationalisation of coordination structuresinlinewithcapacityconstraintsandtoavoidexcessivecompartmentalisationandforsectorial tables to be reinforced with a broader composition and more ambitious mandate than before the earthquake.(seeTable2) 14. An important investment has been made on the part of actors in terms of time of human resources. Actors in Haiti will also appreciate how time consuming going to meetings becomes. If one follows guidelines for cluster coordinators and these have to remain distinct from programme staff, managingclustersbecomesarealinvestmentandcostlyexercise.106Beyondtheinitialcoordinatingand informationsharing role that clusters have played, strategies, standard operating frameworks and proceduresandguidelineshavebeencreatedinkeysectors. II.2 Understandingtransition Althoughactorsinterpretthetermtransitionandwhatitencompassesdifferently,itiswidelyequated with a situation that is generally improving. Transition refers to the period between the immediate aftermath of crisis and the restoration of precrisis conditions (recovery), or their improvement to a satisfactorylevel(development).107Transitionsarealsounderstoodasperiodswhenintensifiedefforts ofcapacitybuildingareneededandwherepartnershipsoftheinternationalcommunityaremostcrucial for supporting efforts to overcome adverse situations, and create conditions for stability, human security,governanceandprotectionofhumanrights.108Capacitybuilding109canbedefinedasaprocess whereby people, organisations and the international humanitarian community as a whole unleash, strengthen,createandmaintaincapacitytoidentifyandmeethumanitarianneedsinatimely,efficient andeffectivemanner.Thisinvolvestheindividual,organisationalandsystemiclevel. 15. Thereissomeconfusiononthetimingoftransition,whenactorsshouldstartfocusingonitand specificallyhowthepaceofrecoveryandreconstructionaffectstransition.Clustertransitionisalsooften aresultofdecreasedfunding.WhilethiswasnottheonlyreasonforthemergerbetweentheCCCMand shelter/NFIclusters,UNHabitatwasunabletosecurefundingforitscontinuedcoordinatingrole. 16. Understanding of what has to be transitioned varied between what was felt would entail essentially handing over information a USB drive before leaving to a designated actor to comprehensivecapacitybuildingeffortspursuedatthenormativeandpolicylevel,institutionalleveland individuallevel.Thelatteroftenfeltthathumanitariansessentiallyexitwhenthecontextimproves.The notion of how far humanitarian efforts should go in terms of strengthening capacities even the role

UNICEF that together with the child protection subcluster manages a fourth of cluster efforts. The cost of cluster coordination for UNICEF in Haiti was estimated at 12 million USD NEED TO CHECK WITH UNICEF AS THEY RECENTLY TALKED ABOUT9mINSTEADFORTHESAMEPERIODfor2years. 107 Foroperationalpurposes,OCHAdefinestransitionasthephaseofahumanitariancrisisinwhichacutevulnerabilitybegins to decline, leading to a reduction in international lifesaving assistance and an increase in early recovery, recovery and rehabilitation activities. See OCHA on Message: Transition http://ochanet.unocha.org/p/Documents/OOM_Transition_English.pdf 108 SeeWhoTowardsAFrameworkForHealthRecoveryinTransitionSituationsGlobalConsultationonHealthRecoveryIn TransitionSituations, Montreux,Switzerland46December2007 109 OECDDACdefinition2006.
106

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altogether was also publicly questioned in so far as funding was not available and the humanitarian communitycouldonlyfocusonrespondingtoresidualacutehumanitarianneeds.110 17. Transitionis verymucha partof OCHAsmandatethatrecognizesthathumanitarianresponse should be undertaken in a way that supports recovery activities. 111 Groundwork for a successful transitionstartswellbeforethetransitionphasebegins. 18. Intermsofunderstandingthecomponentsofandplanningtransition,theevaluationfoundthat fewactorsthathadleftandphasedouttheiractivityinHaitiwereabletodevelopmorecomprehensive transitionplansthatwouldconsiderelementsofthefollowing: Purposeandobjectives Keyindicators Strategies Majoroutputs Guidelines Resourcerequirements Processes Funding Keycomponents Budgets Schedules Staffrequirements Interviewsshowedthatthelackofprospectsforreceivingfundingfortransitionactsasadisincentivefor organisationstopreparethesecomprehensiveplans. 19. At the global level, guidance for cluster transition and exit strategies includes among others focusingon: a. Supporting transition process by reinforcing longerterm coordination and collaboration mechanisms(sectorworkinggroupsetc.) b. Supporting preparedness strengthening of sector groups, Government and National organizations c. Reviewinglongertermdonoragencyprioritiesandexpectations d. Transitionalawareness,capacitybuildingofnationalagencypersonnel e. Confirminglinkagesbetweenactivitiesofmajorpartnersinthefield f. Consideringlongtermagencyconsortiumpossibilities.112 20. The transfer of coordination activities to national authorities and development actors requires assessingservicesagainstongoingandexpectedcoordinationneedsandthecapacitiesofvariousactors. IncertainkeyareaslikeCampCoordinationandCampManagement(CCCM),despiteongoingneeds,113 thenumberofpartnershasrapidlydeclinedwhichcreatesadifferentsetofchallengesinthisphaseand aneedforfurtherrationalisationofcoordinationstructures.Clustershavetodealwiththedepartureof actorsandthephasingoutofassistance(e.g.Wash,healthandcampcoordination). II.3 Limitationsandconstraints 21. In Haiti, elections, changes in leadership and months without a government have acted as a constraint. These critical factors, in addition to the outbreak of cholera, have affected transition

110 111

ERCresponsetoquestioninCAPworkshopSeptember2011. SeeOCHAsRoleinTransition,June2010. 112 FoodSecurityClusterInceptionMeeting,Rome3031May2011 113 550560personsremainedincampsinSeptember2011aspertheDisplacementTrackingMatrix.

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planning. Haitis environment is admittedly complex, and there are many simultaneous needs to consider,withlimitedfunding,capacity,andtime.Themostcomplexchallengeinthestrategicprocess maybeprioritizationandsequencing.114Clustersdonothelpprioritiseresponseacrosssectors.Another limitationisthattheCAPinthecontextofHaitihastoprioritiserespondingtoacuteneedsoverrecovery andincludingmoreelementsoftransition. 22. As transition planning should aim to support national objectives, strengthen the lead role of Haitianinstitutionsandcomplementlongertermplanningofdevelopmentactors,limitedclarityatsome levelsandstageswithrespecttogovernmentprioritiesandcounterpartshasbeenaseriouslimitation. Inaddition,thelackofspaceforjointassessmentandplanningbetweenhumanitariananddevelopment actorshasweakenedpotentiallinksbetweenclustersandlongertermsectorgroups.Uncertaintywith respect to the renewal of the IHRC whose mandate was set to expire in October 2011 has created an additionalfragility. 23. Another limitation for transitioning cluster coordination is that clusters (and cluster hubs), despite cholera and preparedness for the hurricane season, are viewed as focusing on more on earthquake affected areas (i.e. where OCHA is present). Establishing links with a system that is to effectively address overall coordination needs at the national, departmental and communal and local levelsisallthemorechallenging. 24. Thelackofagovernmentcounterpartforagivenclusterisalsoseenasamajorconstraintfor transition.ThisisespeciallythecasefortheProtectioncluster.ThischallengeisnotuniquetoHaiti. 25. Afurtheraimoftheclusterapproach,whichisimportantfortransition,istoincreaseownership andconnectednessofhumanitarianresponsebybuildingonlocalcapacities,ensuringappropriatelinks, coordination and information exchange with national and local authorities, state institutions and civil society organizations. Strong ownership and connectedness facilitate the transition from relief to developmentandensurethattheachievementsofhumanitarianactorscanbesustained.Itishowever inthisareathattheclusterapproachhasbeenconsideredtenuousinHaiti.Theclustersystemsuffers fromthe difficult torectifyinitiallack ofinclusivenessofHaitianactors.115Despiteefforts,the clusters suffer from a stigmatization and a mechanism that has limited Haitian ownership.116Involvement of HaitianNGOshasbeenlargelyunsuccessful.117 26. TheIHRChassufferedfromweakownershipandcapacityissues.Ithashadlimitedrelationswith humanitarian actors and the clusters. These factors in addition to its limited mandate and uncertain futurehavenotfavouredaprocesswhereclusterscouldmergewith,phaseoutorhandoversomeofits functionstotheCommissionanditspriorityareas. ActorsinHaitihaverecommendeddistinguishingbetweenlongertermdisasterriskreductionandshort term preparedness and response when considering cluster transition. The cluster evaluation Phase II alreadyemphasizedtheneedfordevelopingguidanceforclustersincontextslikeHaitiwheredisasters

PrioritizationandsequencingwerevoicedasakeyisuewhereformerPMBelleriveinOctober2010indicatedtheGoH neededfarmoreguidanceandsupportassectorsandMinistrieswereindividuallydevelopingtheirplans. 115 Keytotransitionistheroleofthegovernmentandtheemphasisonpartnershipswithlocalactors.Capacityissues,thetop downclusterrolloutdynamicandthenatureofclustermeetingsoftenpositiontheUNastheleadinhumanitarianresponse. 116 The focus group held on 30 August 2011 with Haitian National staff working in the aid effort signaled national capacity buildingasoneofthemajorweaknessesofthehumanitarianresponse.Inthetransitionphase,nationalstaffexpectedtoplaya strangerrolebuthaveseenthatkeypositionsarestillheldbyexpatriates. 117 See Hedlund, Kerren, Strength in Numbers: A Review of NGO Coordination (ICVA case study in Haiti 2010), provides an accountoftheproblemsfacedwithlocalNGOinvolvement.
114

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arereoccurring.Itshouldbementionedthatthespecificconstraintsandlackofflexibilitywithrespectto HumanResourceswithin theUNin particularareadisincentive toadaptingresourcesto actualneeds andscalingdown.Countrymanagersinterviewedexplainedjusthowmuchofadisincentivetherewasto reducepersonnel,includingthosesupportingclustercoordination,knowinghowdifficultandlengthya processitistorecruitorrecoverpersonnelwhenyouwerenotsureifyouwouldhaveanewcrisislike thecholeraoutbreakandneedtheminthreemonthstime.

27. Externalassessmentsof the clustersinHaitihavefound thatthesystemis compartmentalized andthatthereisroomforincreasinglymergingsectorsofactivity.Thefactthattherearemoredifferent defined agencies acting as leads, in clusters, which could be merged, does not help rationalize the system. There is also a tendency to retain certain areas of activity to access funding. The IHRC in its strategyidentifiedforexampleonesectortableforbothNutritionandHealththathasdifferentcluster leads. In Uganda, at the national level, the CCCM sub cluster and Protection cluster meetings were mergedbutthesewereledbothledbyUNHCR. 28. Intercluster coordination has been regarded as weak in Haiti and this has limited working on multidimensionalandcrosscuttingissuesandaddressingtransitionchallengesinamoreconcertedway. ThemainobjectivesofatransitionplanhaveyettobedefinedandtheHCThasnotyetbeenaneffective forumtodevelopstrategyandtheoperationalplanfortransition.Therehasbeensomerecentprogress with additional direction from OCHA and a presentation at an adhoc HCT meeting in September 2011 whereadeadlinehasbeendefinedforestablishingatentativeplanonclustertransition. II.4 Timingoftransition 29. Thereisrecognitionoftheimportanceofplanningearlyfortransitionandrecovery.Thisincludes definingcriteriaforwhenandunderwhatcircumstancestheclusterwillclosedownandhandoverto anotherentity.ClustersinHaitiwerenotabletocoverthisaspartoftheirstrategicplanningwhenthey weresetup.Ideallycriteriaforphasingoutorhandingovershouldbedefinedandclustermembersand the group should monitor throughout whether the criteria are being met. Clusters have not defined focal points within their group that would work on transition and recovery and define an operational plan. Much progress has recently been made with this effort to define a plan for cluster transition by November 2011. Through further Intercluster coordination, additional benchmarks and triggers for phasingoutandhandingoveractivitiescanbedefined.

30. Box1Questionsforclustertransition Asguidance,questionshavebeenidentifiedatagloballeveltohelpinformthecriteriaforhandoverandphase out:

Hasthecoordinationmechanismachieveditsobjectivesaccordingtoitstermsofreference? Whenthecoordinationmechanismdisbands,aretheresignificantissuesoractivitiesthatstillrequireattention? Istheresufficientcapacitytoensureacoordinatedapproachtorecoverywhentheclusterdisbands?Isthereacontinued needforcoordinationthroughtheclusterapproach? Isthereanappropriatenationalauthoritytowhichthecoordinationrolecanbetransferred?Whatisitscapacityto undertakethis,andwhatsupportdonationalauthoritiesneedinthehandoverphase,e.g.oncrosscuttingissues? InLifespanofClusters,ClusterWise,J.SheperdBaron118suggeststhefollowingquestions:

118

JamesShepherdBarron,LifespanofClusters,ClusterWise,clustercoordination.org

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 Dothecircumstancesofthewiderreliefeffortjustifyamerger,amodification,oraphaseout? Clusterobjectivesasdescribedtheclusterstrategy/strategicframeworkintermsofmeetingreliefneedshavebeenmet(note goodsinthepipelinedoesnotfulfilthiscriteria) ArethereanyInterClusterorcrosscuttingissuesoractivitiesthatmightbeleftunattended? Capacitiesofthegovernmentordevelopmentagencytowhomresponsibilityisbeinghandedoveraresufficient AreGovernmentauthoritiesinagreement? NorelatedClusterobjectsi.e.theirprogrammeswontbejeopardizedbyprematurehandover. Hasdueconsiderationbeengiventotheprospecthandingovertonationalorlocalauthorities? DoanyoftheClustermembersormembersoftheInterClustergroupobject?

31. In Haiti the government had initially officially defined July 2010 as the cutoff date ending the humanitarian relief phase for the earthquake response (i.e. unrelated to the cholera effort and HurricaneThomas).Similardeadlineshavebeenestablishedinotherpostdisastercontextssuchasthe Pakistan 2005 earthquake. Following the immediate relief effort after the earthquake in Pakistan in 2005,thePakistangovernmentsetadateof31March2006astheendofreliefandthebeginningofa shift into recovery and development. Food aid programmes were later nonetheless extended to September2010beforeelections.Themovephasedoutfoodaidandfoodaidclustercoordination.In Pakistan,thesixmonthcutoffdatewaslaterseenasausefulwayofhelpingtoswitchmindsetsfrom shorttermtolongertermthinking.119 32. Many agencies in the field 120 felt that it was entirely too early to consider phasing out humanitarianactivityanditscoordinationgivencurrentindicatorsandtheleveloffragilityofthecontext (vulnerability to disasters, cholera and weakness of national means and institutions). The problem of equating the end of the humanitarian phase with the end of a cluster coordination mechanism was raised.121 33. Actors who implement integrated approaches advocated for an earlier merging of clusters becausetheyfeelthatseparatesectorscurtailorganizedthinkingandlocalactionintheresponse. III.1 Approachandoptionsconsidered 34. ClustersandclustertransitioneffortsinHaitihavefocusedonthecoleadroleoftheGoHand the concept of tables sectorielles (sectorial tables). In the context of a changing government, further engagingministrieshasbeenachallenge.Sectoraltablesinmostcasesalsosufferfromnegativestigma andtheIHRCProjectfortheirstrengtheninghasnotgottenofftheground.Developmentdonoraidwill increasinglyreturntobeingbilateralinHaitiandthemaindonorswilllargelycontinuetoworkwithinthe same sectors with their preferred partner counterparts (e.g. DINEPA, CNSA, etc.) unless there is a concertedprogrammethateffectivelytakesoff. 35. Whenconsideringclustertransition,discussionsincountryhaveunderlinedthatthereisnoone

119

ClusterWorkingGrouponEarlyRecoveryincooperationwiththeUNDGECHAWorkingGrouponTransition,Guidancenote onEarlyRecoveryp.18. 120 Approximately80%ofpersonsinterviewedfoundthathumanitarianassistancewasbeingphasedouttooearlyduetolackof funding. 121 Thechildprotectionglobalclusterontransitionemphasizesthatthesituationismuchmorecomplexthanthat!

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size fits all approach. The workshop organized by UNICEF in March 2011 had already identified that transitionwouldcomeatdifferentspeedsandforms.Whiletransfertoministriesandsectoraltableshas beenemphasizedastheapproachtobefollowed,intermediateoptionscanbeneeded. 36. Insomecases,transitioningintoMinistryledsectoraltablescanbethemostlogicaloptionand clusters folding into these groups can add capacity and support a more coherent seamless response wherethehumanitarianissues,recoveryanddevelopmentcanbeaddressedinparallel.Thiscouldimply both the Health and Nutrition clusters merging and folding into Health and Nutrition table. The institutional restructuring that is foreseen in Haiti has in certain areas added some uncertainty to the sustainabilityofsomeoptions. 37. Beyond sectorial tables, the priority may be to have a single forum where sectoral issues are discussed.IASCClustersSelfAssessment(2007)recognizedthat:totheextentpossible,dependingon thecontext,discussionsaboutreliefandrecoveryandwherepossibledevelopmentonagivenissue(e.g. health)shouldbediscussedinasingleforum,withtheaimoffosteringmorenaturallinkagesbetween relief and development, minimizing meetings, and ensuring that development takes preparedness for emergenciesintoconsideration. 38. With the benefit of hindsight and examples from other crises, it appears that focusing on Ministries and sectoral tables is a too limited approach. There has been too much emphasis on a complete transfer to an official structure. INGOs were also heavily advocating for support for secretariatsofthesectoraltablesandfordonorstospecificallyprovidefinancialsupporttointegrated developmentandemergencyfundingthatsupportsrelevantHaitiangovernmentinstitutions.(seeShaye 2011). 39. Inadditiontoidentifyingagovernmentalcounterpartandtakingstockofthecurrentstateofthe cluster,anotherwayofconsideringthetaskofclustertransitionaheadistounderstanddifferences,with thefollowingissuesnonexhaustiveinmind: a. towhatextentarethedemandsforclusterandsectorcoordinationtheresultofthe earthquakeandtiedtoaneedcreatedbytheearthquake?(e.g.debris) b. wassectorialcoordinationaneffortalreadyinplacebeforetheearthquake?(e.g. agriculturaltable) c. wastheneedforclustercoordinationtemporary?(e.g.aswithfoodaid,theclusterfunction primarilyaneedforliaisingorcoordinatingwithlargenumberofactorspresent) d. Arecognisedneedbeforetheearthquakebutnotsufficientlycovered?(e.g.nutrition) e. Aneedforcoveringanewareaofresponseundertakenbythecluster?(e.g.sanitation) f. Aneedthatcanincreaseincrementallyovertime(e.g.protection) 40. Much effort has gone into defining how the CCCM and shelter clusters could be merged and theirlinkswithothersectors.Thishasbeenverypositiveforassessingtheimplicationsandtakingstock ofneedsforsetoralcoordination.Thereisaneedtofurtherrerationalizetheclusterapproacharound corethemesthatwillhelp:betteraddressremaininghumanitarianchallengesandmainlyresettlement, link with other existing and new structures and avoid duplication of coordination mechanisms, some frustration with excess meetings. Clusters can contribute to stronger coordination and humanitarian objectives if they effectively address multidimensional issues and are able to present themselves as partsofacoherentframework.TheestablishmentofaHousingAuthorityinHaitiisseenasapositive development on all fronts. Many clusters, including the protection cluster, will identify this new

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structureasacleargovernmentcounterpartformanyoftheiractivities.Itwillbeessentialthattherebe a coordinated approach and that the cluster system be understood and not overwhelm the new governmentandHousingAuthority.Thiswouldbebettermanagediftherewereadditionalintegration ofclustersaroundresettlementissuesandreneweddiscussiononaresettlementstrategy.Thedecrease in the number of actors and the renewed support for integrated approaches also favours additional integration. Less meetings and increased participation also tend to favour coherence, strategic discussionandincreaseddecisionmaking. 41. Onedonoragencyinthefieldstronglyrecommendedrationalisingclustersnowaroundtheissue ofdisplacement.Thereportcompiled6monthsaftertheEarthquakeattherequestofthePrincipalsof the InterAgency Standing Committee (IASC), also signalled that one area which required some additionalthinkingatthegloballevelwasidentifyingthemosteffectivewaystocoordinateonspecific multisectorialchallenges,suchastheresettlementofIDPsintheHaiticontext.Itfurtherconcludedthat these multisectorial issues, involving 3 to 4 key clusters, were not always effectively strategized and coordinatedthroughexistinginterclustercoordinationforaandthatwasimperativetocounteractthe silo effect, whereby each cluster focuses solely on sectorspecific activities, to the neglect of critical crossclusterandmultisectorialthematicareasofneed. 42. There is room for further adaptation of the cluster approach in the current context of Haiti throughfurtherreorganizationandmergingofclusters.Thereisaneedtoclarifythemandateandrole ofeachclusteratthisstage:Areclustersacoordinationmechanismforanemergencysituationorshould clusters keepworkingon transitionandrecoveryneeds?Haverecoveryplansbeenestablished?What canbethelinkswiththeIHRCandcanClustercoordinationandcertainIHCRworkinggroupsbemerged? Howcan clustersand ICC adapttothe needforstrongergeographically basedlocalanddepartmental coordination? 43. Decentralised coordination can be more effective. The RTE working group on decentralised coordination emphasized that effective decentralization depends on partnership and involving decentralised actors at all stages (i.e. project definition, conception, implementation, etc.). The evaluationfoundthatcoordinationatthelocallevelcouldbehamperedbyacompartmentalisedcluster approach. Sectorbased coordination mechanisms like the clusters need to make room for stronger geographicallybasedcoordination.TheroleoftheCMOandtheDPCinsupportofmayorsplayingalead roleinmunicipalitieslikeCroixdesBouquetsisextremelypositive.Localauthoritiesdonotalwayshave an overview of the assistance planned in their area and need to be supported to take on a stronger coordination role across sectors. Information gathering and dissemination tools need to adapt to the needsofgeographicallybasedcoordination. 44. Justasthereisrecognitionthatglobalclusterleadscanonlyofferservicestothefieldandnot impose anything on them, clusters at the field level should not necessarily seek to transfer their tools and working methods to long term Haitian structures. In some cases there was little consideration of what type of tools and systems can be viably handedover and their level of suitability in the longer term. As suggested by the working group at the RTE workshop on cluster transition, information gathering and dissemination tools need to be further harmonized, strengthened and made more accessible.Theremaybeaneedtobetterunderstandtheappropriatenessoftoolsfornationalandlocal counterpartsandincorporatenotionsoflongertermsustainability. III.2 Objectivesofclustertransition

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 45. Evaluatorsdidnotfindthattheobjectivesofoverallclustertransitionandaconcertedstrategy hadbeendefined.Thismayprovehelpfulwhenconsideringthesuitabilityofoptions,definingpriorities and selecting approaches (overall and for specific sectors). UNICEF, in its March 2011 workshop, did define axes and guiding principles for a transition from clusters towards other government led mechanismsthatprioritiserecoveryanddevelopmentefforts.

Box2.Fourmainobjectivesofaclustertransitionplancanbe: (1)Tosupportaprocessinwhichhumanitariancoordinationstructurescanbeadjustedtomeet theneedsoflongertermrecoverycoordinationandhandoverandtransferappropriateservices andcoordinationactivitiestonationalauthoritiesanddevelopmentactors,phasingoutservices nolongerrequired,includingredressingpotentialimbalancescreatedbyfocusondisaster affectedareas (2)Tocapitaliseontheexistingknowledgebasewithintheclustersalreadyobtainedduringthe earthquakeandcholeraemergencyresponse (3)Considerasystemtoaddressremainingacutevulnerabilitythroughwellcoordinated assistanceeffortsandworkwithnationalauthoritiesanddevelopmentactorsintheaffected countrytointegratehumanitarianneedsintosocialservicesnetworksanddevelopment frameworks; (4)ToallowaneffectivereactivationoftheClustershouldanothereventoccurovertheensuing yearsasmoreformaldevelopmentprojectsstarttotakeoverfromthoseofthehumanitarian emergencyandassistmembersoftheincountrycoordinationsystemtoprepareforresurgentor newcrises. IV. Otherpossibleoptionsandconsiderations

46. ParticipantsintheSeptember2011RTEworkshopbreakoutgrouponclustertransitionreported the need for additional guidance from the IASC at a global level, OCHA Headquarters, the UN Development Operations Coordination Office and BCPR on cluster transition: benchmark definition, examples of transition from other countries and their usefulness, specific advice on working in fragile states, lessons learned and good practice.122Evaluators have drawn examples of transition options followed in other countries. The merit and benefits of these options have to be assessed against the objectivesofastrategyandthespecificitiesofeachsector. i)Focusingnotonlyongovernment

122

TheneedforHQinvolvementinadvocacyeffortsfortransitionalfundingwasalsoraised.Evaluatorsfoundthatfundingisnot onlyanissueinthegreytransitionalareabutlimitedonthewholeandthattherehasbeenlittletonoadvocacyonfunding the2011CAP.

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 In a number of other countries, 123 clusters transition to thematic groups that are not governmentled.TheWASHClusterinKyrgyzstanplannedahandoverofthecoordinationrole totwoagencies(UNICEFandoneInternationalNGO)savingrelevantdataontheOCHAwebsite andhandingoverthegovernmentliaisonroleforWASHtoalocalNGO.124 ii)Mergingmeetingsinadvanceoftransfer InUganda,atthenationallevel,theCCCMsubclusterandProtectionclustermeetingswere merged. iii)Handingoverfunctionstootherlongertermactorspresentinthecountry InCotedIvoire,ClustercoordinatorsandspecificactorsliketheInformationManagementUnit developedalongertermstrategyandhandedoverfunctionstootherlongertermactors(RC, UNDP,etc.) iv)Retainingshorttermpartialresponsibility In Uganda, transferring full cluster responsibility for coordination to authorities was seen as a probleminsofarasitwasfeltthatthegovernmentshouldfocusmoreonsubstantivethinking, buildingupitsowndeliverycapacityratherthanmanagingtheworkofNGOs.Inthiscase,the taskofcoordinatingNGOsandinternationalactorscanbecarriedoutbytheclusterleadagency foralongerperiodoftime. v)Foreseeingaspecifictransitionfund Inothercountries,transitionfundscancoverremaininghumanitarianneeds.InCotedIvoire OCHAworkedwiththeRCOtosupportthelocaltransitionfundtocoverremaininghumanitarian needs. vi)Retaininghumanitariancapacity InthelongtermaHumanitarianAdvisoryUnitwithkeysectorialcompetencecanbecreatedand thenintegratedintotheRCtosupportresidualhumanitarianneeds,preparednessandearly warning. vii)Systematicallyintegratinghumanitarianandrecoveryissuesinlongstandingsectorial meetings In Somalia, efforts to ensure that humanitarian and recovery issues were integrated into all sectorworkincludedthehealthsectormeetingincorporatinganagendaitemonearlyrecovery

123 124

MyanmarafterCycloneNargis,Kyrgyzstan,etc. SeeWASHClusterTransitionStrategyforKyrgyzstan http://kg.humanitarianresponse.info/Portals/0/KeyDocuments/WASH/WASH_Cluster_Transition_Strategy.pdf

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andanagendaitemonhumanitarianissues,butbothareaddressedwithinthesameforum. viii)Transitioningintoarecoverycoordinationmechanism In Myanmar, after Cyclone Nargis, clusters were replaced by a newly created coordination mechanism to support implementation of the plan for recovery (PONREPP). The mechanism developed was based on a sectorintegrated approach with three Recovery Groups (basic services,livelihoods,physicalandspecialprotection),supported byfourRecoveryHub Offices, replacingsixOCHAcoordinationhubs. ix)Buildinglocalcapacityforfutureclusterrollout InMyanmar,clusterphaseoutwasaccompaniedbythedevelopmentofcontingencyplansper cluster, which had been in the process of development before Cyclone Nargis hit. Local resources and additional capacities, such as training local NGOs so they would be able to implementaclusterapproachinanewcrisis,wereincludedineachplan. x)InvolvingnationalNGOs The inclusion of national/local actors remains a significant challenge for clusters globally. In Myanmar,NationalNGOsintime becamebetterinvolvedinclusters.Envisagingagenuinerole for a national NGO in a specific sector/cluster could be feasible, a means of fostering greater ownershipfortheclusterapproachinacountryfacedbyrecurringdisastersandanexampleto befollowed. xi)ParticipatinginRecoveryPlans ClustersinMyanmaralsoparticipatedinthedefinitionofathreeyearrecoveryplan. xii)StrengtheningtheRecoveryClusteronthekeyhumanitarianissue InUgandaitwasrecommendedthatsomeformoftransitionaltaskforcebeestablishedwithin the existing Early Recovery Cluster to provide oversight of the returns, rehabilitation, and transitional shelter activities. A fulltime lead coordinator was required, with individual focal pointsestablishedinallrelevantClusters. xiii)Addressingcontinuinghumanitariancoordinationneedsthroughatransitionalmechanism In Pakistan in 2006, there was continued need for coordinating residual relief to displaced populations,thefocusforoverallcoordinationofplanningandimplementationwasshiftedtoa Transition Relief Cell, with a focus on coordinating early recovery, longerterm recovery and development. xiv)DefiningastrategyandmodalitiesforclustercoordinationcoledbyanNGOand governmentbeforeidentifyingtheinstitutions InKyrgyzstan,theGBVsubclusterimplementedatransitionstrategyandpreparedthehandover of GBV coordination to national stakeholders. The GBV sub cluster was to become The GBV

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CoordinationNetworkandbeledbyalocalNGOandarelevantgovernmentstructure.Thetwo institutionsweretobeidentifiedwithin6monthsandUNFPA,UNICEFandUNIFEMtoprovide technicalsupport,asrequired,tothelocalstakeholdersforGBVcoordinationforanadditional6 monthperiod.ThemembersoftheGBVCoordinationNetworkweretomeetonceamonthin oblastlevelandonceintwomonthsatthenationallevel. xv)Renamingmechanismorcoordinationgroup InKyrgyzstan,asthenameClusterremainssynonymouswithformalOCHAactivitiesafterJune 2011theWASHClusterwastoberenamedWASHSector. xvi)ExpandingthecapacityoftheRC/HCtobettermanagetransition InNepal,anexpandedResident&HumanitarianCoordinatorsOffice(RCHCO)wasestablishedin August2010tosupportNepalthroughitscurrentperiodoftransitionandwasexpandedfortwo years.TheRCHCOinitscurrent,expandedformisintendedasatemporarystructureinresponse tothespecificchallengesofatransitionsituation,thehighexpectationsontheRC/HCfunction intheseperiods,andtheinstitutionalfluxthattypicallyoccursintheUNduringthesephases. V. Mainconclusionsandrecommendations

47. Atransitioninacontextofamajordisaster,recurringcrisesandchronicpoverty,frominsecurity to relative stability, from humanitarian relief to development, is inherently complex: competing needs overlapandactorsmustadjusttonewroles.Institutionalconfusionandweakleadershiphaveaffected Haitis transition at certain stages both within the international response and in the national setting. OCHAhasthecapacitytoforgemoredirectrelationswithGoHandcivilsocietytoplayastrongerrolein the transition phase. It needs to strengthen its direct connections with the GoH. In this transition context, OCHA can encourage strategic and operational coherence between humanitarian, recovery, reconstructionanddevelopmentassistance andhelpaddressresidualorpotentiallynewhumanitarian needs. The HCT could take on a more proactive role and further engage with the government and developmentcounterpartstoplanforclustertransition. 48. The Cluster Approach in Haiti and in other contexts can be recognised for the role it plays maintainingafocusonhumanitarianneedsandthediresituationthatcontinuestoaffectasignificant proportionofthepopulation.ItisimportantthatthiscapacityberetainedgivencurrentneedsinHaiti andits exposure to newcrises.Spaceforfocusingon keyhumanitarian needsshould beretainedina transitionedframeworkthroughamoreconnectedOCHA(e.g.withincreasedpresenceintherecovery anddevelopmentcoordinationefforts)andthroughadditionalcapacityattheleveloftheHC/RCoffice. Inaddition, moreresourcesandcapacityshouldbedevoted to protectionissuesat thiskeystageand resettlement.GloballevelguidanceonthemultisectorialchallengeofresettlementinHaitiassuggested intheIASCJuly2010reportshouldbesoughttoinformthisprocess. 49. There is a real opportunity to rationalise the current cluster system and take a proactive approachtotransitioninghumanitarianaidcoordinationtowardsbothmorecomprehensivesectorwide approaches and stronger geographically based decentralised coordination. The GoH has above all advocatedforchangeandmovingawayfromthehumanitarianphase. 50. Inpreparingforclustertransitionandtakingstockofthesituationofeachclusterandsector,the

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full range of synergies should be mapped and the attempt to merge clusters, products, and meetings exploitedtothefullestsothattheoverallcoordinationstructureisaslightandmanageableaspossible. Some have been identified (e.g. Food Aid with Agriculture, Agriculture with the livelihoods group) but there are more. In addition and as suggested at the UNICEF March workshop there is room for joint managementofMandEresourcesandprogrammingandIMfunctions. 51. Under the HC/RCs leadership with cochairing, guidance from OCHA, UNDP, UNICEF and the IHRC,andwithIASCsupport,aworkshopcouldbeconvenedtodevelopatentativejointtransitionplan for clusters/reinforcing the capacity of Haitian institutions with elements of the following could be developedanddiscussedwiththeGovernmentofHaiti:

Purposeandobjectives Strategies Guidelines Processes Keycomponents Schedules

Keyindicators Majoroutputs Resourcerequirements Funding Budgets Staffrequirements

The key objective will be to help foster coherence in the international response. It is important that dates for cluster transition be set. The plan should include intermediate solutions if these are more forthcomingandtransitioningcanbedoneatdifferentspeeds.Considerthemeritofothertransitional options.PhasingoutcaninvolveClustersmergingorreversingintootherstobecomesubClustersor workinggroups.TheClustercanalsobeintegratedintoadifferentbutrelatedentity(e.g.IHRCworking groupifitslifespanislonger).125BothOCHAandUNDPinHaitiareoverstretcheddealingwithdaytoday issues. In OCHAs case, support from the HQ level as with the CAP but on transition, and for UNDP from BCPR/Early Recovery or specifically on governance and institutional capacity building would be welcome.Muchofthetimeofstaffisnecessarilydominatedbyreactingtooperationalissues,leaving little space for strategic or proactive and creative thinking, or for ensuring stronger links between immediateplansandmidtolongertermplanning. 52. Theneedsassessmentfortherationalizationandtransitioningofclustersplancanbedone throughafourfoldprocess:

Abottomupapproachunderstandingwhatthearrayofgeographicallybasedcoordination needsareat adecentralisedlevelfollowing theladderfromneighbourhood,to communal section, communal, departmental to national. At the local level the institutions and processescanberevitalisedandstrengthened(seeFigure2).Localauthoritiesshouldbeina position to access and understand the tools available and take the lead role defining their coordinationneeds.UNDPhasaroletoplayinsupportinglocalgovernanceandastronger longtermcoordinationarchitecture. AreviewofthefuturescenariounderstandingtheplansandprioritiesoftheGoHunderthe 4/5Es:Employment,Education,Environment, EtatdeDroit (RuleofLaw),newinstitutions suchastheHousingauthorityandtheimplicationsforcoordinationandtheworkcarriedout

125JamesShepherdBarron,LifespanofClusters,Clusterwise,clustercoordination.org

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byclusterstodate. A sector by sector analysis for a sector wide approach in support of a more coherent seamless response where the humanitarian issues, recovery and development can be addressed in parallel and preparedness, decentralization and other crosscutting issues strengthened. This includes supporting stronger sector groups through Government and National organizations, reviewing plans, expectations and longerterm donor agency priorities, international agencies seconding personnel and placing national Haitian staff in keypositions.
Specific concerted action for key crosscutting and multidimensional issues that tackle

important priorities that are fundamental to address humanitarian needs, phaseout assistance (e.g. resettlement, livelihoods) and make way for a coherent framework for coordination.Determiningwhetherthesemultisectorialissuesshouldactasumbrellasfor sectorsintherecoveryphaseunderanewrevampedandimprovedmechanism(i.e.ifthe IHRCcanbereformedasoftenareothernationalframeworksforrecoverycoordination oritsmandateassuchisnotrenewed).

Attentionshouldbegiventodevelopingkeyguidelinesandprinciplesclarifyingexpectations
and approaches for partnership on coordination. A productive partnership between local authorities and international actors rests on the latter recognising the governments ownershipoftherecoveryprocess.Ifonlyinrhetoric,thelatterisrecognized.UNagencies and international NGOs must find practical ways of prioritising strengthening local governmentcapacity,suchassecondingnationalandinternationalstafftolocalinstitutions, handsontraining,andsharingresources.Inaddition,aslocalgovernmentofficialslackclear understandingoftherolesintheclustersandhowtheycanpushforaction,akeychallenge willbethatthesystembeunderstoodandempowerstakeholders. 53. Thereisanopportunityforstartinganewandreversingthenegativestigmathatclusters,tables and the IHRC have had in the past. The evaluation would recommend if possible renaming groupings based on the preferred term of national actors and to communicate this new restart. Although IASC guidanceisflexibleonterminology,thetermclusterisincreasinglyusedasthenorm.Thisisnotalways helpfulinsettingslikeHaiti.126 54. InHaiti,mostactorsarefacingresourceconstraintsandtherepeatedchallengeofbridgingthe humanitarian phase with the recovery phase and securing continuous funding. Strengthening coordination capacity and transitioning clusters will require funding. A funding strategy rests on a coherentplanandproperbudgetpreparation.Abudgetshouldestimatethecostofcoordinationduring thisrecoveryphase(20122014).TheIHRChadcalculatedUSD1.5millionpersectortocoverthecostof secretariats for the sectorial tables. An estimate of the cost of coordination and the support being currently provided through cluster leads towards funding national counterparts (e.g. the support that

IASCGuidanceNoteOnUsingTheClusterApproachToStrengthenHumanitarianResponse24November2006:Concerning terminology,someHumanitarianCountryTeamsprefertospeakofclustersandclusterleads,whileothersprefertostickto the more traditional terminology of sectors, sectoral groups and sector leads (or in some cases, working groups, thematic groups or task forces). It should be left to Humanitarian Country Teams to decide on a casebycase basis on appropriate terminology for the country in question, depending on the working language and agency preferences. Toensure coherence, standard terminology should be used within each country and similar standards should be applied to all the key sectorsorareasofhumanitarianactivity.
126

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IOMprovidestocoverDPCincentivesforinstance)shouldbeincludedintheanalysis.Theproportionof fundingthathasbeenforeseenintheCAPtocoverthisneedshouldbementioned.Costanalysiscanbe factoredintotheplanandovertime.Theoverallbudgetshouldbeabletobedividedacrosssectorsand yearstoadaptasmuchaspossibletotheconstraintsandlackofflexibilityofmanydonors.127 55. Clusterleadagenciesshouldattempttoembedclustercoordinationcapacityintheirprogramme tosupportcounterpartandbeinapositiontoreactivatetheclusterifneeded.Recommendationsalso focus on reforming Human Resource practices and making better use of existing rosters, allowing temporaryredeployment,consideringadditionalcapacityofpartners,placingHaitianstaffinkeyroles. Inaddition,whilethefocushasbeenontheroleofClusterCoordinators,theexperienceofHaitishows thatthereisaneedfordeployingwitharangeofdifferentfunctionsandskills.128

Figure1.TransitioninOCHAspolicy

127

IdeallyinstrumentsliketheHRFwouldhavebeenabletofundthisprogrammebutinpracticeatthetimeoftheevaluation thefundhadonlyUSD15millionleftandestimatedthatbestcasescenariotheycouldhaveUSD40millionfor2012. 128 Interviews,Educationclusterdocumentedrecommendations.

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Figure2.LocalInstitutionalArchitecture129

Source:FENU,LeonsduProgrammedeGouvernanceLocaledansleNordEst,(October2007)

Conseil de Dveloppement de la section communale (CDSD), Conseil de Dveloppement de la commune (CDC), Conseil de Dveloppement du dpartement (CDD). CCC are comprised by the Mayor, deputy Mayors, CSO representatives, the CCSC (coordinatorsCASEC,ASECmembers)etmembersofthedecentralisedAdministration.TheCCSCcompriselocalelectedleaders (CASEC),ASECmembersandrepresentativesofthehabitations.
129

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References
Bhattacharjee,Abhijit&Lossio,Roberta:EvaluationofOCHAResponsetotheHaitiEarthquakeFinal Report,January2011. Binder,Grunewald,GPPiURD,IASCClusterEvaluationPhaseII,HaitiCountryReportEnglishDD06HR 1.pdf CAPSomalia2012,EarlyRecovery,GuidancenoteforClusterleadsandparticipatingagencies/NGOs CIRH,PlanStratgiquepourlerestantduMandatdelaCIRH,dcembre2010 ClusterWASHSitRepHati,Date:21Avril2011,CoordinateurduCluster:HerbertSchembri,WASH Cluster,http://haiti.humanitarianresponse.info/Default.aspx?tabid=83 ECHO/URDBeyondEmergencyReliefInHaiti,January2011, http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/policies/evaluation/2011/Beyond_Relief_in_Haiti_en.pdf FAO,CadreNationalPrioritairedesPrioritsaMoyenTermeRvis20092012(December2010) 2011.01.13FAOCadreNationalPrioritaireMoyenTerme FAO,WFP,FoodSecurityClusterInceptionMeetingRome3031May2011,MeetingReport, http://foodsecuritycluster.org/c/document_library/get_file?p_l_id=266412&groupId=120482&folderId= 271464&name=DLFE11667.pdf FENU,LeonsduProgramme deGouvernanceLocaledansleNordEst,(October2007) www.ht.undp.org/_assets/fichier/publication/pubdoc19.pdf?PHPSESSID=e8300b03e35ea8bd63821d66b a6bdbb8 GBVSubClusterTransitionStrategy2011,Kyrgyzstan. Hedlund,Karen,ICVA,StrengthinNumbers:AReviewofNGOCoordinationintheFieldCaseStudy:Haiti 2010. ICTEmergencyTelecommunicationsPlatformWavelength,ISSUE#1,2BridgingtheGapSteveHailey, ETCNGOCoordinatorinHaiti,July2011 INTERAGENCYSTANDINGCOMMITTEE(IASC)GenericTermsofReferenceforSector/ClusterLeadsat theCountryLevel,oneresponse.info/.../Generic_TORs_Sector.doc INTERAGENCYSTANDINGCOMMITTEE(IASC),GuidanceNoteonUsingTheClusterApproachTo StrengthenHumanitarianResponse,24November2006 INTERAGENCYSTANDINGCOMMITTEE(IASC),ClusterWorkingGrouponEarlyRecovery,GuidanceNote onEarlyRecoveryApril2008 IASCpaperonExitStrategyforHumanitarianActorsinthecontextofcomplexemergencies, http://reliefweb.int/node/21970

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IASCResponseToTheHumanitarianCrisisInHaitiFollowingThe12January2010Earthquake: Achievements,ChallengesAndLessonsToBeLearned,July2010. http://reliefweb.int/node/361016 JointProtectionTransitionStrategyoftheUgandaHumanRightsCommissionAndIASCProtection Cluster.(2009) LattimerandBerther,HPN,HumanitarianExchangeMagazine,TheworkoftheEducationClusterin Haiti,Issue48,October2010. http://www.odihpn.org/report.asp?id=3132 MinisteredelAgriculture,DesRessourcesNaturellesetduDeveloppementRural(MARNDR)Unite dEtudeEtDeProgrammation(UEP),TableSectorielleAgriculture,10novembre2010. MinisteredeLAgriculture,DesRessourcesNaturellesetduDeveloppementRural(MARNDR)Unite dEtudeEtDeProgrammation(UEP),TableSectorielleAgriculture,1erjuin2011. GuidanceNote:ReconstructionandLongtermCapacityDevelopmentinHaitiOslo,October2010 OxfamBriefingPaper,FromRelieftoRecovery,SupportinggoodgovernanceinpostearthquakeHaiti www.oxfam.org,6January2011. Shaye,Gary,SavetheChildren,RebuildingHaitiintheMartellyEraTestimonybyGaryShaye,Haiti CountryDirector,SavetheChildrenBeforeTheSenateForeignRelationsCommittee,Subcommitteeon InternationalDevelopmentandForeignAssistanceandSubcommitteeonWesternHemisphere,June23, 2011 UNICEFHaitiSituationReport23July2010. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A148FDA2EA8703978525776C0056A663 Full_Report.pdf UNOCHAAdhocHCTEvolutiondesclustersPortauPrince,20septembre2011 www.haiti.humanitarianresponse.info UNOCHA,OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,LaunchofHaiti2012ConsolidatedAppeal ProcessWorkshop(PortauPrince/29September2011) UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,PolicyInstruction,OCHAsRolein Transition,15June2010. UnitedNationsJointMeetingoftheExecutiveBoardsofUNDP/UNFPA,UNICEFandWFP20and23 January2006,Backgrounddocument,Agendaitem2:Transitionfromrelieftodevelopment,focusingon naturaldisasters WASHClusterDINEPA,HAITIEARTHQUAKERESPONSE,WASHCLUSTER,STRATEGICOPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK,JuneDecember2010,DRAFT2

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Annex5:Timeline
2008 2008 2008 2009 2009 2009 2010 August/SeptemberNearly800peoplearekilledandhundredsareleftinjuredasHaitiishitbya seriesofdevastatingstormsandhurricanes. SeptemberMichelePierreLouissucceedsJacquesEdouardAlexisasprimeminister. NovemberAschoolinPortauPrincecollapseswitharound500pupilsandteachersinside.The authoritiesblamepoorconstructionmethods. MayFormerUSPresidentBillClintonappointedUNspecialenvoytoHaiti. JulyWorldBankandInternationalMonetaryFundcancel$1.2bnofHaiti'sdebt80%ofthe totalafterjudgingittohavefulfilledeconomicreformandpovertyreductionconditions. OctoberNovemberJeanMaxBellerivebecomesprimeministeraftertheSenatepasses censuremotionagainsthispredecessor,MichellePierreLouis. JanuaryUpto300,000peoplearekilledwhenamagnitude7.0earthquakehitsthecapitalPort auPrinceanditswiderregiontheworstinHaitiin200years. UStakescontrolofthemainairporttoensureorderlyarrivalofaidflights. MarchInternationaldonorspledge$5.3billionforpostquakereconstructionatadonor conferenceatUNheadquarters. AprilFirstphaseoftheIARTE JulyPopularangergrowsoverslowpaceofreconstructionsixmonthsafterquake. OctoberRunuptopresidential,parliamentarypollsdueon28November.Concernover exclusionofpopularcandidates.Protests. OctoberDecemberCholeraoutbreakclaimssome3,500livesandtriggersprotests. NovemberPresidentialandparliamentaryelections. DecemberAnnouncementofinconclusiveprovisionalresultsofpresidentialelectiontriggers violentprotests. JanuaryFormerpresidentJeanClaudeDuvalierreturnsfromexile,facescorruptionandhuman rightsabusecharges. MarchMichelMartellywinssecondroundofpresidentialelection. MayMichelMartellytakesupofficeaspresident. JulyCAPMidYearReviewisrevisedfromover910millionto382millionUSD. AugustDeathtollfromcholeraoutbreakclimbstonearly6,500. SeptemberCAP2012WorkshopandERCvisittoHaiti OctoberPresidentMartellyappointsUNdevelopmentexpertGarryConilleashisprime minister,afterparliamentrejectedhistwopreviousnominees.

2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2010 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011 2011

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Annex6:RecommendationsfromtheworkinggrouponCommunicationsattheRTEworkshop
September27th2011,HotelMontana,PortauPrince. Implementtheaccountabilityframework Mainstreamaccountabilitytowardtheaffectedpopulation Improvecommunicationaboutevictiontowardpeoplelivinginthecamps Giveavoicetothecommunitiesandnotonlytothecamps IncludeYouthinthecommunicationagenda Integrateotherstakeholdersinthecommunication/advocacychain:ArtistsandArtisans, Universities Useofnewtechnologiesinthecommunication/capacitybuildingeffort(cellulartechnology, socialnetworks) Strengthenprotectionissuesresponsivelyintheinformationsharing Opentheparticipationofthepopulationindecisionmakingprocesses Developcommunicationmessageswiththepopulationincludingpretestofmessages(language codes) Giveavoicetoallactorsandimproveinformationsharingglobally Establishaclearinghousewithcriticalbaselineinformation ApproachCDACtoserveastheclearinghousemanager UseIHRCinmappingprogress SharethetoolsvalidatedbytheMCFDFMinistryofWomenAffairs(nationalconcertationtools) Communicatepopulationneedsassessmenttodonors Briefjournalistsandmediaonthecriticalneedsofthepopulation,keyproblemsandtheresults oftheresponse ImprovecommunicationregardingevictiontowardIDPsbeyond16/6initiative Designandimplementanadvocacycampaigntoaddresshousingandkeysectoralissues IntegratecivilsocietyandUniversitiesinthedebateabouttransition Strengthendecentralizationofinformation Improvecommunicationonneedsassessmentinternallybetweencountryofficeand headquarters(donorswillbebetterinformed) Coachlocalauthoritiesandcommunityorganizationsbeforetransferringtheinterventionsto them Integrateconflictpreventionandmitigation(donoharm)intheresponsecommunication strategy Ensurethepopulationiscontinuouslybriefedaboutplansandprogressesduringtheresponse cycle Putpeoplefirstinthecommunicationprocessandinformationsharing Implementacommunicationnetworkamongallactorsusingthemodernmediaconnectedto theWeb

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Annex7:Overviewofcoordinationframeworks
1. OverviewofCoordinationFrameworkforeseenJuly2010 Source:InterviewofficeofthePM

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2.

SectoralCoordination:ClustersandOtherCoordinationInitiatives.
Clustersactivatedin Haiti(20102011) GoHcluster coleador counterpart MoA/Table MTPTC CIRH Objective/ expertise Recovery Debris Jobcreation Haiti Action Networ kgroup x x Shelter WASH

Globalclusters

AgricultureFAO EarlyRecoveryUNDP

AgricultureFAO EarlyRecoveryUNDP Debris Livelihoods LogementQuartier

EducationUNICEF/SCF EmergencyShelterIFRC ETCOCHA/WFP/UNICEF FoodSecurityFAO/WFP (asofApril2011) LogisticsWFP CCCMUNHCR/IOM ProtectionUNHCR SUBCLUSTERS ChildProtectionUNICEF GBVUNFPA RoL/Justice UNDP/OHCHR Housing/Land/Property UNHabitat MineActionUNMAS HealthWHO NutritionUNICEF WASHUNICEF Crosscuttingissues HIV/AIDSUNAIDS GenderUNFPA EnvironmentUNEP AgeHelpAge International DisasterRiskReduction

EducationUNICEF /SCF ShelterIFRCUN Habitat ETCWFPdormant FoodAidWFP unofficialphaseout LogisticsWFP CCCMIOM(tobe merged) ProtectionOHCHR/ MINUSTAH SUBCLUSTERS ChildProtection UNICEF GBVUNFPA

Mairies Shelter Future housing authority(HA) MoE Education Mairies&HA MoA CNSA DPCand Mairies IBRS MCF Housing Housing

X X (shelter)

HealthWHO NutritionUNICEF WASHUNICEF

MoH MoH DINEPA

Health Water& Hygiene Gender DRR Environment

X X Culture Energy

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3. IHRC11:PlannedSectoralTables130 Source:Various

PlannedSectortables/coordinatingentitiesIHRCStrategyforSupportingand ReinforcingtheCapacityofHaitianInstitutions(December2010) Sector GovernmentChair Sector Government Chair DINEPA

Housing

MAST,aschairof theinter ministerial commissionon Housing MTPTC

Water,sanitation andhygiene

Debrisremoval Agricultureand environment Foodsecurity

Ruleoflaw

MSPJ MICT

MARNDRandMOE Riskreductionand management CNSA Institutional buildingand decentralization Infrastructure

MPCEandMEF

Healthand nutrition Education

MSPP

MTPTC

MENFP

The Commissions mandate is set to expire in October 2011. The main goal of one of the seven objectives of the CIRH capacity building for coordination has not been targeted by projects. After growing pains implementors now claim that the IHRCisatthepointwhereonewouldhavewanteditbeoverayearago.CapacitybuildinginthecontextofresigningMinisters andinabsenceofanewgovernmenthasalsobeenaconstraint.
130

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Annex8:Focusgroups,generalmeetingsobservedandvisits
DATE August29, 2011 DESCRIPTION HCTmeeting ORGANIZATION NAME ProjectManager CoordonnateurSuivi, valuation,Plaidoyer PDG POSITION

MarieGuerdaJ. ConcernWorldwide Dbrosse YvesLaurent CARE Rgis LCH/Droits GabrielToussaint humains Stphane OPSOMS Lapierre SaveTheChildren

August30, 2011

Focusgroup

August31, 2011 August31, 2011 August31, 2012 September 1rst,2011

CampVisit(Croixdes Bouquets/Marassa) CampVisit(Corail) TaskForceMairie CroixdesBouquets Focusgroupwithlocal basedorganizations(2 women&13men)in Leogane Focusgroupwitha groupofIDPsevicted fromSylvioCator Stadium(5women,3 men) CampVisitParcJean MarieVincent Meetingoftheworking groupCluster Protection(Tabarre) VisittoUNOPS warehouseshelter productionsitein

PAM Groupede Concertationdes Marguerite FemmesVictimesde Salomon Violence Groupede Concertationdes OlguineDouarjy FemmesVictimesde Violence Annabel IOM Monplaisir IOM AlainKamgary

CoordonnateurSant/ PED Plaidoyer,Politiques, MartialN.Bailey LiaisonavecGoH WidlineCherichel SrProgrammAssistant Coordonnatrice

AgentCommunautaire CampManager Marassa

September 1rst,2011

September 1rst,2011 September 2nd,2011 September 5,2011

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Tabarreand surrounding communities September Focusgroupwitha 6,2011 groupofwomen September VisittoBristouBobin UNOPS 6,2011 September Focusgroupwithlocal 7,2011 authoritiesand representativesfrom localbased organizations UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF

MathieuBastein

FieldCoordinator

EricaMattellone CeciliaSanchez

KateAlley September UNICEFHQFocus 9,2011 groupinNY UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF VijayaSingh BillWilliams JamesHedges

EvaluationSpecialist Humanitarian HealthSpecialist, ProgrammeDivision EmergencySpecialist, Emergency Programmes EmergencySpecialist, EarlyChildhood Development, ProgrammeDivision GlobalWASHCluster ProgrammeSpecialist, ProgrammeDivision

CARE CARE September Focusgroup 16,2011 CARE CARE IEDARelief September CampvisitinLeogane 16,2011 September CampvisitinLeogane 16,2011 September CampvisitinLeogane 16,2012 CARE CampTetAnsanm

EnitheJoseph LauciaMalvoisin WidaMarc Emmanuel Marieu Schyler Lamartinire HerbyPaul JeantyJude Andr GrardFoster Boulin JeanAugustin Dieujuste

FieldSupervisor LeoganeSubOffice Coordonnateur d'enregistrementetde validationdesshelters Prsident

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Annex9:ListofPersonsmet
ORGANISATION ACF Office of the PM of Haiti /NORAD AECID APDDLF Camp Tet Ansanm CARE CARE CARE CARE CARE CARE CARE CARE Caritas Austria Caritas Austria CASEC CCO CCP Ch CDAC Comit Jeunesse Concern Worldwide Coopration Canadienne Coopration Canadienne Croix Rouge Canadienne Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC) Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC) NAME Alain Coutand Joel Boutroue POSITION Chef de Mission a.i. Adviser/ Representative Responsable de proyectos para la Reconstruccin Punto Focal de Asuntos Humanitarios Oficina Tcnica de Cooperacin en Hait

Maria Civit Isral Laurore

Jean-Augustin Dieujuste Prsident of the Camp (Leogane) Enithe Joseph Grard Foster Boulin Herby Paul Laucia Malvoisin Rosna Baptiste Schyler Lamartinire Wida Marc Emmanuel Marieu Yves-Laurent Rgis Grev Hunt Joseph Tout-Puissant Victor Vilbon Aurlie Proust Ernest Fleurisca Benjamin Noble Paul Darlne Anne O'Mahony Roberts Waddle Sandra Berberi Isabelle Hachette Jean-Rilus Wilson Mme Nadia Lochard Directrice de la Protection Civile, Dpartement de l'Ouest CCO Representative Coordonnateur Country Director Coordonateur de l'aide Premiere Secretaire (Cooperation) Project Manager de sant / reproduction Coordonnateur d'enregistrement et de validation des shelters

Coordonnateur Suivi, valuation, Plaidoyer

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Direction de la Protection Civile (DPC) de Logane DRLA Tulane University ECHO ECHO ECHO

Joseph Philippe Shannon Strother Damien Berrendorf Daniel Urea-Cot Elke Leidel Sansoir Boyer Adam Vinaman Yao Carmen Morales Fales Volny Paultre Marguerite Salomon Olguine Douarjy Diego Osorio Josef Leitmann Pauline Zwaans Simon Ashmore Charles Edson Jeanty Jude Andr Camelia Marinescu Eduard Tschan Ignacio Martin Eresta Luis Luna Marcel Goyeneche Margaret Stansberry Paula Fitzgerald Xavier Genot Xavier Gnot PM&E Delegate Shelter Movement Coordinator Shelter Movement Coordinator - Coordinateur Abris Mouvement Chef de Mission Coordonnateur du Programme des Urgences et de la Rhabilitation Coordonatrice des Oprations Humanitarian Evaluation Consultant Head of Office Technical Assistant Technical Assistant, former Concern Worldwide Country Director

Ecole Nationale de Corail

FAO FAO FAO Groupe de Concertation des Femmes Victimes de Violence Groupe de Concertation des Femmes Victimes de Violence Haiti Reconstruction Fund Haiti Reconstruction Fund Haiti Reconstruction Fund ICRC IEDA Relief IEDA Relief IFRC IFRC IFRC IFRC IFRC IFRC IFRC IFRC IFRC

Coordonnatrice Agent Communautaire Senior Operations Officer Administrator Agent des Operations Field Coordinator Field Supervisor Leogane Sub Office IFRC Watsan programme WATSAN Delegate

Independent consultant, shelter study Humanitarian Diplomacy Coordinator

Internews IOM IOM IOM IOM

Philippe Allouard Alain Kamgary Alix Cherisier Annabel Monplaisir Bakary Doumbia

CMO/ Parc Jean Marie Vincent Camp Manager Marassa Head of Programme Support and Coordination Unit

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IOM IOM IOM IOM IOM IOM IOM IOM IOM IOM IOM IRC LCH / Droits humains Mairie de Gressier Mairie de la Croix des Bouquets Mairie de Logane MINUSTAH MINUSTAH

Bradley Mellicker Flore Hibart Frantzy Bazelais Giovanni Cassani Leonard Doyle Luca DallOglio Marc Levesque Melanie Megevand Nathalie Adolphe Oscar Umerez Pierre Thbuseats Anissa Badaoui Gabriel Toussaint Paul Jean Michelet Larius Jean Saint-Ange Jean-Ponny Charles Abah Kadiri Shayne Gilbert

Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer Assistante Protection Cluster Coordinator Public Information Officer Chief of Mission Protection Officer Assistante Protection Assistant du CMO Croix des Bouquets et Cite Soleil CYPD Coordinator, Haiti PDG

Chief Joint Operations and Tasking Centre JOTC Coordonnateur Responsable des Travaux Publics Consultant OCHA Leogane Information Management Cluster Lead

MODEL Mouvement Organisationnel pour Yonel Bissainthe lEnvironnement et le Loisir MTPTC MTPTC OCHA OCHA OCHA OHCHR ONU-HABITAT ONU-HABITAT OPS - OMS OXFAM GB OXFAM GB PAHO/WHO PAHO/WHO PAHO/WHO PAHO/WHO PAM PLAN HAITI Alfred Piard Ronald Laraque Ibrahima Barry Jean Herve Beauport Jean-Luc Kramo Elsa Le Pennec Denise Venturini Jean-Christophe Adrian Stphane Lapierre Franklin Gregory Pierrot Eslandre Dr. Dana Van Alphen Esther vand der Woerdt Josiane Bizimana Juan Carlos Gustavo Alonso Widline Cherichel Sissi Lamour

Coordonnateur Sant / PED

Regional Advisor Area on Emergency Preparedness and Disaster Relief Cluster Coordinator Advisor Emergency Prepardness and Disaster Relief Sr Programm Assistant

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PAHO/WHO President's Cabinet Projet Winner Protection Civile Reprsentant du Prsident SASH SASH Save the Children Save The Children UN HC/RC UN HC/RC UNDP UNDP UNDP UNDP UNDP UNFPA UNFPA UNFPA UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF UNICEF CO UNICEF CO UNICEF CO UNICEF CO UNICEF TACRO UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA

Peter Graaff Patrick Rouzier Jean Robert Estime Sal Idelonde Raoul Kessa Melanie Coull William Brown Gary Shaye Martial N. Bailey Elisabeth Diaz Nigel Fisher Fenella Frost Hind Sadik Jessica Faieta Rebeca Grynspan Thomas Pitaud Gabriel Bidegain Hernando Clavijo Sian Evans Bill Williams Cecilia Sanchez Erica Mattellone Francoise GruloosAckermans James Hedges Kate Alley Mohammed Fall Vijaya Singh Asako Saegusa Kelly Ann Naylor Sandra Lattouf Silvia Danailov Gianluca Buono

Representant de l'OPS/OMS en Haiti Advisor to the President / Housing Director

Exective Director Plaidoyer, Politiques, Liaison avec GoH Coordination Officer Office of the Resident Coordinator and Humanitarian Coordinator Humanitarian Coordinator / Resident Coordinator / DSRSG

Senior Country Director Associate Administrator, UN Under-SecretaryGeneral Chief Technical Advisor, PASNGRD Country Representative Protection Sub cluster GBV Global WASH Cluster Health Specialist, Programme Division Evaluation Specialist Humanitarian Country Representative Programme Specialist, Programme Division Emergency Specialist, Emergency Programmes Education Cluster Coordinator Emergency Specialist, Early Childhood Development, Programme Division M&E Manager WASH Cluster (working on transition strategies)

Chief of Field Operations Senior Recovery Advisor Regional Emergency Adviser Humanitarian Affairs Officer Anna Dmitrijewa OCHA - Logane Charles Bernimolin Desk Officer, Haiti Esteban Sacco Strategic Planning Officer Gwi-Yeop Son Director, Corporate Programmes John Ging Director, CRD Matthew Hochbrueckner Planning Officer Philippe Verstraeten Head of Office Rosaria Bruno Humanitarian Affairs Officer

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UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOCHA UNOPS UNOPS UNOPS UNOPS USAID USAID USAID USAID Viva Rio WFP WFP WFP Wingroup World Bank

Sarah Muscroft Tijana Bojanic Valerie Amos Zola Dowell Brian Leo Treacy Felipe Munevar Irfan Hameed Suranga Mallawa Andrew Kent Anthony S. Chan Herbie Smith Susan DeCamp Pedro Penna Myrta Kaulard Stephen Kearney Viviana De Annuntiis Gregory Mevs Alexander Abrantes

Policy Advisor on Transition and Early Recovery en United Nations Humanitarian Evaluation Officer Evaluation and Guidance Section Emergency Relief Coordinator Chef de section de l'Afrique et de la region Caraibes Operations Centre Director and Representative Shelter Programme Manager Program Officer, OFDA Deputy Director Deputy Mission Director for USAID/Haiti Deputy Program Officer Assistant, Directeur Centre Perles Noires Country director Deputy Country Director Emergency Preparedness & Civil Military Liaison Officer Special Envoy, Haiti

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Annex11:SelectedReferences
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UNICEFHaitiSituationReport23July2010. http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/A148FDA2EA8703978525776C0056A663 Full_Report.pdf UNDPEarlyRecoveryCluster,UnitedNations,FastFactsDebris2011:TimeForRecovery,July2011 UNOCHAAdhocHCTEvolutiondesclustersPortauPrince,20septembre2011 www.haiti.humanitarianresponse.info UNOCHA,OfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,LaunchofHaiti2012ConsolidatedAppeal ProcessWorkshop(PortauPrince/29September2011) UnitedNationsOfficefortheCoordinationofHumanitarianAffairs,PolicyInstruction,OCHAsRolein Transition,15June2010. UnitedNationsJointMeetingoftheExecutiveBoardsofUNDP/UNFPA,UNICEFandWFP20and23 January2006,Backgrounddocument,Agendaitem2:Transitionfromrelieftodevelopment,focusingon naturaldisasters. UnitedStatesGovernmentAccountabilityOffice:HaitiReconstruction:U.S.EffortsHaveBegun, ExpandedOversightStilltoBeImplemented,GAO11415May19,2011. http://www.gao.gov/Products/GAO11415 WASHClusterDINEPA,HAITIEARTHQUAKERESPONSE,WASHCLUSTER,STRATEGICOPERATIONAL FRAMEWORK,JuneDecember2010,DRAFT2

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