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Tubbs Public Policy 12 March 2012 Reparative Justice To say that slavery in the United States was unjust would grossly understate the issue. Indeed the mistreatment and oppression of black Americans, beginning with slavery and continuing until the civil rights movement, is perhaps the gravest mark on American history. African slaves were not only subjected to involuntary migration and labor, but were held as chattel. That means they could be bought and sold as property as well as separated from their families. In other words, they were stripped of their humanity and considered lesser beings in the eyes of the law. In light of these injustices, which were condoned and regulated by the United States government, there is a growing movement among black intellectuals pushing for compensatory reparations for descendants of slaves. This movement draws precedence from modern examples of reparations, ranging from Japanese Americans who endured internment during WWII to the Jewish survivors of the holocaust. Nevertheless, the reasoning behind these proposals for modern-day slave reparations is ultimately faulty. Though the enslavement of Africans was a great evil that seems to be morally deserving of compensation, the arguments for reparations cannot withstand the severe impracticalities and potential unintended consequences of such a policy. In short, justice in this case is not possible and to try to achieve it would simply extend the injustice. In order to properly consider the issue of reparations, this paper will make three points. First, it will give a brief history of reparations in the last century to analyze the precedence for

2 such measures and determine the capability of slave reparations to fit into this paradigm. Second, it will examine the moral arguments for reparations to find them compelling on the surface but eventually lacking in view of their limitations. Finally, it will address the practical side of the issue, concluding that the difficulties of implementation and potential harms of reparations outweigh the supposed benefits. Much of the reparations argument gravitates around the foundation of precedent. As Raymond Winbush points out, reparations are not only a common occurrence but firmly rooted in international law, which the United States recognizes (xxi). The argument is that we paid reparations to other groups to compensate them for the wrongs committed against them by the government, so we should also pay reparations to compensate for the wrongs of slavery. Though the United States and Canada have given many reparations to various indigenous peoples and American Indian groups, the examples that are most commonly cited as analogous to slavery are the reparations given to Japanese Americans and Holocaust survivors (Winbush xxii). The reason for this is that these examples demonstrate payment for more general deprivation of human rights such as life and liberty, whereas the other examples generally reflect more specific injuries like the taking of land or property. Therefore we will look at each of these examples individually to consider their relevance to this debate. The Japanese Americans example is important because it shows the United States compensating a group for having denied their constitutional rights. During the Second World War, over 100,000 people of Japanese heritage in California were forcefully removed from their homes and interned by the U.S. military. According to Robert Westley, the injustices committed against the Japanese Americans were not confined to their loss of freedom but also included holistic suspension of the rights guaranteed to them under the constitution (117). The reparations

3 given under Reagan in 1988 significantly provide group compensation for group injury. In other words, it set the precedent in American policy to repay not only the direct victims but also their family members. This provides the footing to argue for the legitimacy of giving payments to slave descendants. The example of reparations for European Jews offers another important element of precedence. When Germany gave payment in 1952 for the crimes of the holocaust, it did not simply give compensation to individuals but also to the newly formed nation of Israel (Westley 119). This example, which includes both individual and group compensation, permits proponents of slave reparations to argue that payment ought to be made not only to slave descendants but to all black Americans. Yet the movement for slavery reparations is inherently different from each of these examples. While arguing for reparations, Westley anticipates the counterargument that the Japanese American example fit tightly within the individual rights paradigm of the law, and unlike slavery, it satisfies the legal need for identifiable victims and perpetrators, direct causation, damages that are limited and certain, and acceptance of payment as final (119). Since slavery does not meet these essential legal prerequisites, the example does not apply. Also, the Holocaust reparations cannot be used to justify reparations for all African Americans because blacks, unlike the nation of Israel, have no single national heritage. Africa is not a single culture, says John McWhorter, who explains that this lumping tendency serves the ideological purpose of promoting reparations for all blacks. Yet, black conservative Armstrong Williams contradicts this idea. He emphasizes the Japanese American and Holocaust examples demonstrate that reparations must be limited to specific damages (166). So it is clear that according to precedent, reparations must only apply to the direct descendants of slaves if they are

4 to be given at all. Nevertheless, Westley persists that though these examples fail to set the proper legal precedent for slavery reparations, they still apply as a moral precedent (119). The moral arguments for slavery reparations are, at first glance, convincing. The United States of America is set upon a tradition of natural rights, as seen in our founding documents. The Declaration of independence tells us that not only are all men created equal, but that they are also endowed by their creator with unalienable right that among them are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Furthermore, the Constitution provides citizens with many rights and protections including the guarantee of due process of law. All of these foundational promises were violated or denied by the institution of slavery. Thus reparations seem to be necessary, not only to resolve the personal injury to African Slaves, but also to satisfy the integrity of the nation from moral compromise. Yet all that has been established thus far is that slavery was an injustice; it is still unknown whether this injustice could be reconciled through reparations. To determine whether reparations could rightly compensate for the undeniable evils of slavery, one must consider the purpose of reparations. Molefi Asante recognizes that justice may be both retributive and restorative, it seeks to punish those who have committed wrong and it concerns itself with restoring to the body politic a sense of reconciliation and harmony (5). Perhaps the purpose of reparations is retribution. In other words, the United States government should be punished for having supported slavery as an institution. At face value, this might seem acceptable, but does such a policy really punish those responsible? No, it does not make sense to punish the government because the government is not a sentient being. When the government spends money, it does so at the expense of its citizens. Thus it is not reasonable to apply retribution as a principle of justice to the government itself.

5 If they are not retributive, reparations must be for the purpose of restoration. Asante affirms this herself and says, I believe the idea of reparations is a restorative justice issue (5). If this is true, then one must consider the degree to which it is currently possible to achieve restoration from the injuries of slavery. This is the crux of the issue. One of the strongest arguments against reparations is that there are no actual slaves or even any immediate family members of slaves alive today. In fact, most Americans today who are descended from slaves are removed by six generations. Therefore, since it is impossible to compensate the direct victims, the idea of restorative reparations presupposes that blacks today remain in a state of victimhood bearing the indirect effects of slavery. Westley summarizes this idea. He writes, The burden of the reparations argument is to show that current disparities in material resources are causally linked to unjust and remedied actions in the past (110). He goes on to claim that wealth gaps between whites and blacks are the result of structural and intergenerational dimensions of racial disadvantage and privilege (113). Even if this were true, it must also be shown that these elements are the result of slavery. After all, the topic at hand is not reparations for racism or even reparations for segregation, nor should it be. Reparations should be given on the basis of specific injuries, not simply discrimination. Yet as time passes, the connection between blacks and their ancestors becomes more and more obscure, as does the prospect of reparations. John McWhorter describes this phenomenon saying, I feel uncomfortable with the idea of taking money meant for someone I never knew My connection with my ancestors six generations back, about whom I know nothing, feels more academic than spiritual (191). Because the real victims cannot be repaid, restorative justice for slavery cannot be achieved in the truest sense. This fact invalidates the otherwise cogent moral argument for reparations.

6 Furthermore, reparations are not needed to restore the economic status of AfricanAmericans. It is not true that blacks today are held down by the lingering, structural effects of slavery. Nor is it true, as Randall Robinson says in The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks, that there are fixed gaps between races; in fact, Williams states that the socioeconomic trajectory of black Americans since 1940 has been anything but static (169). This of course, does not mean that there is not a long way to go or that there are no race-related problems. The point is that socioeconomic recovery for African-Americans is not impossible, but rather a work in progress. Also, it is worth pointing out that there are currently systems in place for assisting blacks who are in poverty, such as welfare and affirmative action they just do not have the label of reparations. In practice, reparations for slavery would be difficult to implement and would likely have harmful effects. The main practical problems are identifying who exactly should receive payments, who should provide them, and how should they be made. If reparations are based on race, then what percentage of African blood would make one eligible? Even if the reparations are exclusively for descendants of slaves, how much documentation would one need to qualify? As for who should pay, most proponents of reparations say that it should come out of the general tax revenue. On this point, many people, especially those who immigrated to America after the abolition of slavery, argue that since their ancestors had nothing to do with slavery, their tax dollars should not be used. Christopher Hitchens responds in favor of general taxation by saying that all citizens of the country have benefited from the unrewarded heavy lifting done by kidnapped non-immigrants (177). This may be true, but Westley makes a better point that taxpayers do not generally get to pick and choose what their taxes go towards this decision must be made by policy makers (131). Even so, the circumstances are further muddied by the

7 fact that Africans were often sold by other Africans and that around 3000 blacks in the South owned slaves. How do their descendants fit into the equation? And then after all of these hurdles, policy makers would have to figure out how much compensation is appropriate and how to distribute it. Among the best proposals for distribution according to Asante would be to provide free public and private education to all descendants of enslaved Africans for 123 years (13). But what about adult descendants who are childless will they receive compensation? Clearly reparations on a practical level raise as many questions as they answer. It is also important to mention that slavery reparations could have unintended consequences that would be harmful to blacks. Williams warns that such a policy is dangerous because it encourages society to regard all members of a fixed group as victims (168). Instead of repairing race relations, it is possible that reparations would simply reinforce racial divisions. Instead of empowering black Americans, it is likely that reparations cause them to view themselves as victims. Shelby Steele writes The worst enemy of black Americans is not white racism but white guilt. This is what encourages us invent new pleas rather than busy ourselves with the hard work of development (198). By creating a culture of victimhood, compensatory payments for white guilt would cripple African-Americans rather than support them. Though in theory reparations are simply unnecessary, in practice they do more harm than good. Slavery is a wrong that the United States cannot simply right. Those who suffered the horrible atrocities of bondage and rightly deserve compensation are beyond the reach of human justice. In addition, reparations of this kind of complexity and scale are unrealistic and cannot deliver the racial utopia that they promise. But throughout the discourse of reparations, it is clear that the motivation behind this movement is just as much emotional as it is monetary. The reason for this, I believe, is that the American society still fails to treat its past with honesty. It is telling

8 that the United States, the land of exceptionalism, has a Holocaust museum commemorating the crimes of our enemies, and yet we still have no museum memorializing the injustice of slavery. Williams reminds us that MLK advocated not for special treatment, but merely for those basic human rights we associate with human happiness: equality and individual freedom (167). Only when we are able to face our sordid past with candor and still believe in the American narrative of equality of opportunity can we achieve racial healing.

9 Works Cited Asante, Molefi K. The African American Warrant for Reparations. Should America Pay?: Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations. Ed. Raymond A. Winbush. New York: Amistad, 2003. Print. Hitchens, Christopher. "Debt of Honor." Should America Pay?: Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations. Ed. Raymond A. Winbush. New York: Amistad, 2003. Print. Introduction. Should America Pay?: Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations. Ed. Raymond A. Winbush. New York: Amistad, 2003. Print. McWhorter, John. "Against Reparations." Should America Pay?: Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations. Ed. Raymond A. Winbush. New York: Amistad, 2003. Print. Steele, Shelby. "...Or a Childish Illusion of Justice?: Reparations Enshrine Victimhood, Dishonoring Our Ancestors." Should America Pay?: Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations. Ed. Raymond A. Winbush. New York: Amistad, 2003. Print. Westley, Robert. Many Billions Gone. Should America Pay?: Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations. Ed. Raymond A. Winbush. New York: Amistad, 2003. Print. Williams, Armstrong. Presumed Victims. Should America Pay?: Slavery and the Raging Debate on Reparations. Ed. Raymond A. Winbush. New York: Amistad, 2003. Print.