Public Management Research Association

Bureaucratic Reform and Issues of Political Responsiveness Author(s): Glen Hahn Cope Source: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory: J-PART, Vol. 7, No. 3 (Jul., 1997), pp. 461-471 Published by: Oxford University Press on behalf of the Public Management Research Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1181605 Accessed: 23/03/2009 11:21
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Bureaucratic Reform and Issues of Political Responsiveness

Glen Hahn Cope
Universityof Illinois at Springfield

ABSTRACT Many of the conceptsand techniquesassociated with conbureaucratic for reformare filled with implications temporary may result in political responsiveness.Being entrepreneurial savings but reducepolitical responsiveness.Serviceto customers while service to all of the citizens is is specific responsiveness reviewsand entrepreneurial Performance general responsiveness. and elected executives,but budgetingmay strengthenbureaucracy weakenpolitical responsiveness. will also probably Managing and budgetingsystemsthatframe policy alternativesand draw the citizensand theirpolitical leaders into comprehensive policyare preferableto the conceptsand techniquesof bureaumaking cratic reformas reinventing government. As the town meetingis both a real and a metaphorical of representation democracy,so also state and local government of for are organizations often the exemplification bureaucracy writ small in many local governmany citizens. Bureaucracy, the ments, has both the negativeconnotations word has acquired in the nationalcontext and the positive aspects, intendedby Max and Weber, of efficiency, impartiality, fairness(Weber 1992). reformhas to Althoughmuch recent attention bureaucratic and focused on the U.S. federalgovernment the emerging democraciesof Easternand CentralEuropeand to some extent embracedbureaucratic Asia, many state and local governments whetheror not called by that name, long before political reform, candidatesandjournalistsbegan to campaignagainstWashington State and local governmentswere and the "bloated bureaucracy." accountearly adoptersof the principlesof qualityimprovement; and customer,client, or perhapsmore appropriately, ability; citizen satisfaction.David Osborneand Ted Gaebler'sinfluential for Government, example, took most of its book, Reinventing reformactivities-what they termed examplesof bureaucratic reinvention-from local government(Osborneand Gaebler 1992). 461/Journal of Public AdministrationResearch and Theory

J-PART7(1997):3:461-471

The WaldoSymposium review process, which has received Similarly,the performance considerableattentionsince it was embracedin the federal by government PresidentBill Clintonand Vice PresidentAl Gore, began in the states (Gore 1993 and 1994). State and local governments,because they are closer to the public (the demos of democracy),are microcosmsof the conflict values of political inclusion, equality, betweenthe democratic values of efficiency, rule-based and liberty, and the bureaucratic of policy, managerial implementation leadership,and administrative accountability. Conceptssuch as representativeness, equity, which are often cited as values of democracy, and individualism, also frequentlyare traitscitizens expect of government agencies, althoughthere are conflicts between these values and the characteristicsof bureaucracy, has been so clearly elucidatedby as his Waldo throughout career, and quite specificallyin Dwight The Enterpriseof PublicAdministration (1980). itself historicallywas proposedand impleBureaucracy mentedas a reformof the undemocratic, elitist, and often corrupt thatprecededit-systems and governmental systems political completewith patronage,special interestinfluences,inefficiency, and high taxes. Bureaucracy now is associatedoften with simiaction, larly pejorativeconceptssuch as inefficiency, rule-bound low productivity,lack of responsiveness,and high taxes. Bureaucratic reformoften is cited as the way to ameliorateif not eliminatethese ills, to increasegovernment'sresponsiveness to the political accountability the public's needs, and to improve of governmentagenciesand bureaucrats. reformis not as it seems, Everythingtoutedas bureaucratic however. The much ballyhooedReinventing and Government the reformmovementthat it spawneddo not proposea reformof so of method bureaucracy much as a substitution an alternative for operatingwithinwhat remainsan essentiallybureaucratic system. For example, as the book's subtitlesuggests, Osborne and Gaebler'sversion of bureaucratic reformor reinventing Entregovernment proposesmakinggovernment entrepreneurial. in theirview, can save money and increasegovernpreneurship, to ment's responsiveness citizens' demandsthroughchangingthe the way government agencies operate.Substituting "expenditure line controlbudget"for the traditional item budgetpreviously used in Fairfield,California,for example, createdincentivesfor to governmentmanagers "save"money from their annualbudgets, presumably being more frugal in their financialdecision by making,thus creatinga year-endsurplusthat they could then keep to use for otherpurposes(pp. 119-22). The incentivein this each year, system is clear: By spendingless than is appropriated
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The WaldoSymposium in can managers obtainfunds-not authorized the regularbudgetto purchasethings or employ people they believe they need in orderto do theirjobs better. that A numberof local governments have adoptedsome have found that this creates form of entrepreneurial budgeting strongincentivesto save money. It can increasethe cost effiagency and allow the agency's managers ciency of a government a to accumulate pot of moneythat is availablefor use with virtuallyno spendingcontrols.It also may create incentivesfor or managersto overestimate pad their budgetrequeststo the extentpossible withoutdetectionby the budgetoffice or legislative body in orderto createthe potentialfor savings. While the cause is different,this can have the same results as the old methodof cuttingthe next year's budgetbecause the bureaucratic full amountwas not spentin the currentor previousyear, or the civil service practiceof consideringthe size of a unit's budgetor the numberof employeessupervisedto determinepromotionsand if meritpay increases. Presumably, a governmentagency is able to effect savings in one year, its budgetshouldbe cut the next year to reflect its efficiency of operations.The entrepreneurial budgetscheme may help offset the negativeincentivesin that even practice, since at least this year's savings can be maintained if the budgetfor next year is lowered in recognitionof the unit's efficiency. Ultimately,however, to the extent this practicereformsthe bureaucracy changingthe incentivesystems it also reducesthe by of political responsiveness thatagency and the governmentas a the budgetis developedthrougha politicalprocess, whole. Since withoutapproval changesmade in the budgetby the bureaucracy with the politicaldecision makerswho repreby or consultation sent the public detractfrom the government'sresponsivenessto its citizens. Osborneand Gaeblerand their supporters suggest that governmentshouldthinkof those it serves as customers ratherthan as citizens, and it shouldstrive to be responsiveto its customers. to Responsiveness customersis differentfrom responsiveness to citizens, however. To be responsiveto customers,one shouldprovidea productthat is desirable,well made, and as inexpensiveas possible. It is not necessaryfor all of the customersto like, or even approveof, the product,since its purchaseis voluntaryand in most cases there are competing productsfrom which a customermay choose. Pleasingthe custo tomer tends to be drivenby economics. For the manufacturer breakeven or make a profit, it is sufficientthat enoughcustomerswant to buy the productat the price offered. To respond 463/J-PART, July 1997

The WaldoSymposium to citizens, on the otherhand, one shouldperforma service or producea productthatthe majorityof citizens want and approve throughthe politicalprocess, since in many cases citizens are not but buyingthe productvoluntarily are payingfor it through taxes, which they are requiredto pay on penaltyof fines or for This createsa specialresponsibility governimprisonment. customersand operatein a ment not only to satisfy its immediate cost-efficientmanner,but also to deliver services that its citizens have requestedthroughtheir votes and their elected representacan tives. Ultimately,if government operatemore efficiently, the rewardsystem shouldresult in lower taxes for citizens, not just incentivesfor public servantsto spendyear-endextra money in throughthe political ways thatwere not necessarilyauthorized process. review is anotheractivitythat received conPerformance reformin the early to midas siderableattention a bureaucratic review is a process wherebythe cost effi1990s. Performance operationsare analyzed ciency and effectivenessof government a team of evaluatorswhose job it is to find ways for governby mentto operatemore efficiently. The differencebetween the new review and previousefficiency evaluaversion of performance is tions is thatperformance now reviewedmostly by government and who are programevaluators policy analystsrather employees thanby task forces of businesspeople such as those who worked on earlierprojects(e.g., the GraceCommissionat the federal level in the 1980s and numerousstate-levelefficiency task forces review operatesbest when it serves in the 1970s). Performance as a conduitfor the ideas developedby government employees at all levels, who often can advise the programreviewers(and could have advisedtheir supervisorsif asked)on ways to perform functionsmore efficientlyand cost effectively. the organization's decision makingin In this sense it can enhanceparticipatory agencies, and in many cases it actuallycan achieve government the agency's goals of lower cost withoutloss of efficiency or effectiveness. review tends to emphasizedevelopmentof Performance it measurements; borrowsin partfrom the statistical quantitative and controltechniquesof total qualitymanagement from the of programevaluationmethodologies sociology, political science, and policy analysis. Quantitative analysisis conduciveto of efficiency and can informdecision makersof improvement ineffectiveness,but it is not as useful in evaluationof the shortand long-termnonquantifiable impactsof policies. Quantitative to while it attempts measurethe effecmeasurement, performance tiveness and impactof programsand policies, cannotalways do so becausethe real goals of manyprogramsand policies are not
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The Waldo Symposium

or way. Quannecessarilymeasurable countablein a quantitative tifiableproxy measuresoften are used to evaluatenonquantifiable policy results, which may distortthe analysisor create biases in favor of those activitiesthat result in betterproxy results rather than in the best achievementof the actualgoals. This emphasis on measuring results, impacts,and, if possible, goal quantifiable leads reviewersand decision makersto focus on the achievement outcomes. This leads to programmatic improveprogrammatic ment or reformin many cases, but not necessarilyany true reform. bureaucratic review and the The dangerinherentin both performance of reinvention government budgetingand throughentrepreneurial relatedactivitiesis that the views and opinionsof the policy elites-performance reviewers, agency experts, policy or budget for analysts-may be substituted those of the elected representatives of the people. While this outcomewould not necessarilybe Weberianideal of bureaucracy, with the traditional incompatible and may therefore it is not conduciveto political responsiveness to be detrimental the democratic process. Democraticprocesses requirethatcitizens be able to make informedand meaningfulchoices. Citizensshouldbe able to based on informed choose their representatives judgmentand to throughthese representatives select their desiredpublic and methodsof implementation, the taxes and budgets policies, to pay for them. In some cases citizens have the opporrequired tunityto determinepublic policy directlythroughNew England town meetingsor ballot referenda,which gives them an even aboutpolicy proposalsand greaterneed for access to information their alternatives.Underwhatevercircumstances, democracy that information often has to be developedby the requires in bureaucracy orderfor it to be made availablein usable form to the citizens. in Simply to say that citizens need information order to make informedchoices is not sufficient,however. That information has to be in usable form, that is, it has to be writtenor to presentedin a way that is understandable citizens, and the citizens must have access to it. A reportwrittenin jargon that is unfamiliar the generalpublic is not usableeven if it is mailed to to each citizen's home. Conversely,a well-written,easy-todocumentdoes not furtherdemocraticaction if voters understand abouta topic alone is not enough, cannotobtainit. Information either. If voters do not know all the availableoptions it is difficultfor them to make informedchoices. Citizens also need to that may know aboutany potentialcosts or benefits, information it is not not be obvious from the information provided.While
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The WaldoSymposium possible to predictall the consequencesof policy choices, inforand mationaboutrelevantcausal relationships theirpossible influenceon particular policy options is necessaryif citizens and are their elected representatives to make appropriate choices. Assumingthatvoters have the information they need to make meaningfulchoices and that they are informedaboutall the availableto achieve a particular alternatives policy goal-and any consequences-democraticaction furtherrequiresthat potential their choices to policy voters have the abilityto communicate decision makers.Some citizens regularlyinformtheirelected of representatives theirviews on subjects,othersbelong to groups-such as the AmericanAssociationof RetiredPersonsor the AudubonSociety-that lobby legislaturesand Congressto make theirpositionsknown. Of course, in statesand communities thatconstitutionally allow citizens the initiativeto petitionfor referendaon policy issues, voters have the optionto participate in decision makingdirectlyand thus communicate their wishes to elected and appointed officials. Less directly, citizens also communicatetheir politicaldecisionsby voting for or againstlegislators, city council and countycommissionmembers,school boardmembers,mayors,governors, senators,membersof Congress, the president,and other elected officials. If information availableto citizens and they are able to is theirchoices to policy decision makers,a further communicate to requirement ensurethat democracyis politicallyresponsiveto citizens is that it must operatewithin a process thatgenerates standards performance criteriafor measurement the of and of success or failureof a policy. Withoutsome standard performof to ance, it is difficultfor constituents hold elected officials or the for accountable their actions. This is one of the most bureaucracy difficultproblemsfor democracyand bureaucracy-howto set that in policy achievementstandards are measurable ways that citizens can understand use to hold elected officials and and bureaucrats accountable. Withoutsome set of stanappointed has dards,the bureaucracy difficultyassessingits own performance, while elected officials and citizens have even more problems evaluating appropriateness, the success, or failureof and activities. bureaucracy's policy choices The difficultiescitizens have obtainingsufficientinfortheir mation, identifyingpolicy alternatives, communicating views to elected representatives appointedofficials, and and to accountable a standard holdingthese officials and bureaucrats of performance lead to imperfections the democraticand in can bureaucratic processes. For example, if citizens cannotinfluence then policy makingand hold government agencies accountable, 466/J-PART, July 1997

The WaldoSymposium can to bureaucracy proceedas if there are no alternatives the it develops. Similarly, if governmentoffiplans and procedures cials do not trustcitizens with information,or if they provide that information is not accessibleand usable by citizens, then so can bureaucracies withholdinformation that public participation in the democraticprocess is thwarted.A third imperfection that afflicts democraticand bureaucratic processes is that the of clearly and precisely inabilityto define standards performance assessmentsby and reducesthe effectivenessof performance to accountability the public. These imperfections,however, are in not insurmountable; some instancesthey can be ameliorated by reforms. bureaucratic meaningful reform, intended Budgetreformis a subsetof bureaucratic and to addresssome of these bureaucratic democraticimperfections. Among the purposesof budgetreformsthat have been proposed since the beginningof the twentiethcenturyare the develand alternatives the evaluation opmentof policy or management in of agency and programmatic performance orderto accomplish political goals more cost efficiently. Similarly,more recent reformproposalsfor both budgetsand annualfinancialreports have emphasizedtheirpurposeas public documentsand the informationalbenefits they can provideto citizens. While it is not allencompassingand certainlynot the only methodpossible, budget reformcan help addressthe reformas a type of bureaucratic that have been identifiedhere. issues of political responsiveness Severalbudgetreformshave emphasizedthe developmentof policy alternatives.As early as 1952, Verne B. Lewis proposeda proposalswould be budgetingsystem in which alternative developedin orderto allow decision makersto evaluateoptions and and choose the one most appropriate cost effective (Lewis two decades later 1952, 43-54). This procedurewas elaborated when Peter Pyhrrproposedzero-basebudgetingfor public organizations(Pyhrr 1973; 1977, 1-8). In both cases these budget reformersproposedthatpublic agencies shoulddevelop alternative budgetproposalsabove and below the targetedbudgetlevel to enabledecision makersto assess the quantityand qualityof services thatcould be providedand to make informeddecisions. in (PPB), which was introduced Planning-programming-budgeting the early 1960s in the defense budget, appliedto all civilian to federalagencies in 1965-and subsequently many state and local governments-also suggesteddevelopmentof alternative policy proposals,especiallyfor new programs,althoughit did not requireseparatebudgetsto do so (Schick 1966, 243-58). More recentbudgetingsystems, especially those developedby local and state governments,have includedthe alternative budget developmentideas from these budgetreformsas a way to force 467/J-PART,July 1997

The WaldoSymposium before resourceallocation the developmentof policy alternatives decisionsare made. If policy, program,or administrative alternatives are developedin the budgetprocess, they can be considered by appointedand elected officials who make resourceallocation the decisions, thus ameliorating bureaucratic tendencyto consider the most expedientoption staff membershave identified. only hold public budgethearings Similarly,when local governments that are attendedby citizens, the latteralso have the opportunity to considerand proposevariouspolicy alternatives.In this way the tendencyto budgetreformhas ameliorated bureaucratic as if there were no necessity to consideralternative proceed methods,policies, or programs,and it has made bureaucracy somewhatmore politicallyresponsive. to The tendencyfor bureaucrats withholdinformation from the public, or to provideit in a form that is not readilyunderor standable usable, also can be somewhatoffset by recent While traditional reformsin budgetingand financialmanagement. line-itembudgetsand annualfinancialreportswere developedby and for accountants, makingit difficultfor even other governtheir contents, ment officials, let alone citizens, to understand currentpracticehas been rapidlymoving in the oppositedirecFinanceOfficersAssociation, a profestion. The Government associationof state and local governmentfinancialand sional budgetofficers, has for a numberof years offered competitions to which state and local governments,authorities,school disentities may submittheir tricts, and other subnational government annualfinancialreports annualbudgetsand comprehensive (CAFR) for awardsand recognition.The criteriafor these awardsfor outstanding budgetsor CAFRs includereadability, in completeness,and presentation ways that are understandability, and readilyunderstandable usableby the generalpublic as well as such as bond raters. These highly by specializedconstituencies in coveted awardsusually are reproduced the front of the official that receive and CAFRs of the governments printedbudgets have given strongincentivesto state and local govthem. They and ernmentsto providerelevantfinancialinformation to present it clearly. The presenceof C-SPAN camerasin the U.S. Congresshas somewhatmore availableto the made federalbudgetinformation but in most cases what is broadcastis the political debate public, or the public hearing,ratherthanthe contentsof the budget proposals.The federalbudgetis very difficult for the ordinary It citizen to understand. is difficultto follow and it is nearly differfor the nonexpertto reconcileprogrammatic impossible ences from one year to the next, even thoughseveral books that the describehow to understand federalbudgetas proposedand 468/J-PART, July 1997

The Waldo Symposium printedare writtenand updatedannually.In the federalgovernand to ment the bureaucratic tendencyto withholdinformation is thwartpublic participation still operableand is aided and abettedby the sheer volume of information.Budget and financial reportingreformshave been much more successful in openingup channelsand increasingpolitical responsivenessat information the local and state levels than in the nationalgovernment. and The necessity to develop standards criteriafor assessment of efficiency, effectiveness, and success within government because it is agencies and programsis perhapsmost problematic criteriathat can be understood measurable difficultto develop accountable.Budget and used by citizens to hold the bureaucracy this reformshave attempted feat since performance budgeting was proposedin local government the Bureauof Municipal by Researchin New York City in 1907, and in the federalgovernment by the first Hoover Commission(Commissionon Organizain tion of the ExecutiveBranchof the Government) 1949. Develmeasuresto assess how effiperformance opmentof quantitative ciently governmentagencies or programsare operatingand how could be improvedis the primarycharacteristic their performance of performance budgets. Oftenthese measuresare based on performancestandards developedby professionalorganizations, (e.g., responsetimes for emergencycalls to police, fire, and or emergencymedical services departments, caseload sizes for assistanceand child welfare workers).PPB systems simipublic measures,but larly proposedthe developmentof quantitative these were programmeasuresthatemphasizedassessmentof goal and attainment programeffectivenessratherthan efficiency. budgeting,as describedabove, is anotherin this Entrepreneurial cost savings and effiseries of budgetreforms.In emphasizing and it has broughtbureaucratic political attentionback to ciency, and the standards criteriaof performance budgetingand measurewith its ment of efficiency, as has total qualitymanagement on statisticalcontrol. As these budgetreformshave emphasis been adoptedby governments,especiallyat the local and state circumstance,they levels, and then adaptedto each particular to have contributed the possibilityof criteriadevelopmentand assessmentsby elected officials and the citizens accountability who elect them. While these budgetreformshave had an impactat the that they have federaland state levels, it is in local government most increasedpolitical responsiveness.Many local governments in the 1990s have adaptedthe conceptsand proceduresof various budgetreformsto their needs and have used them to respondto and in citizen demandsfor participation bureaucratic political and counties, 18 processes. In a recent survey of U.S. cities 469/J-PART, July 1997

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used some aspects of 1400 respondents percentof approximately a performance format, 35 percentused some type of probudget grambudgetformat(the less formal successorto PPB), and 6 percentused elementsof zero-basebudgeting(Cope 1995, 42these local governments 52). More importantly, reportedthat measuresin their budgetprouse programand performance they activities. Measuresof activity, cesses and in othermanagement are efficiency, effectiveness, and goal attainment performance, or by developedpredominantly departmental programstaffs (in and are reportedto 87 percentof the respondent governments) officer in 18 to 33 percentof the manageror chief administrative to the local governments, the elected legislativebody in 15 to 30 of the governments,and to the public in a published percent documentin 11 to 23 percentof the jurisdictions(Cope 1995, 49). While these survey resultsare not overwhelming,they do to indicatethatmany local governmentsare attempting be more and reportinginformation politicallyresponsiveby developing that the publiccan use to make informeddecisionsaboutthe that of performance the bureaucracies serve them. reformis not a Budgetreformas a type of bureaucratic It can, however, increasethe political responsivenessof panacea. to governments their citizens throughdevelopmentof alternative of policy proposals,provisionof information,and measurement and programmatic success. The budgetreformsthat performance have resultedin the budgetingsystems of the 1990s have, espeto cially in local governments,helped the bureaucracy become and more attunedto the informational assessmentneeds of citizens and thus increasedthe potentialfor politicalresponsiveness. in This is likely to improvepublic management the long run by process. aligningit more closely with the ideals of the democratic All conflict is not resolved thereby,however. Citizenexpectacannotbe met simply tions of responsiveness the bureaucracy by in the annualbudgetdocuthe information reported by increasing annualfinancialreports.Most citizens ments and comprehensive do not read those documents,althoughthey may watchtelevision news reportsthatuse the information they containor even read in detaileddescriptions the daily newspaper.Any activitythat tendenciesof helps to reducethe inherentantidemocratic shouldbe considereda favorablecontributor the to bureaucracy even if it is slight. democratic process, however, and Reductionof the conflict betweenbureaucracy democis racy throughincreasedpolitical responsiveness desirable,even if completeeliminationis not necessarilyachievable.Bureaucratic reformis one way to enhancethis process throughthe mechanisms budgetreformand the increasedinformation of it can make availableto citizens. Some local governments have
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The WaldoSymposium embarkedon this path, as have some state governments.It remainsto be seen how much impactbudgetreformswill have and on politicalresponsiveness whetherthey can be effective in improvingpoliticalresponsivenessat any level of government fartherremovedfrom citizens than local government. REFERENCES
Commission on Organizationof the Executive Branch of the Government. 1949 Budgeting and Accounting. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office. Cope, Glen Hahn. 1995 "Budgetingfor Performancein Local Government."The Municipal Yearbook1995. Washington, D.C.: InternationalCity/ County ManagementAssociation. Gore, Al. 1993 From Red Tape to Results: Creating a GovernmentThat WorksBetter and Costs Less: Report of the National Performance Review. Washington, D.C.: U.S. GovernmentPrinting Office. 1994 Creating a GovernmentThat WorksBetter and Costs Less: Report of the National Performance Review: Status Report. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office. Lewis, Verne B. 1952 "Towarda Theory of Budgeting." Public Administration Review 12:(winter):43-54. New York Bureauof Municipal Research. 1907 Making a Municipal Budget. New York City. Osborne, David, and Gaebler, Ted. 1992 ReinventingGovernment:How the EntrepreneurialSpirit is the Transforming Public Sector. Reading, Mass.: AddisonWesley. Pyhrr, Peter A. 1973 Zero-Base Budgeting. New York: John Wiley. 1977 "The Zero-Base Approachto GovernmentBudgeting." Public AdministrationReview 37: (Jan./Feb.): 1-8. Schick, Allen. 1966 "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Budget Reform." Public AdministrationReview 26: (Dec.):243-58. Waldo, Dwight. 1980 The Enterpriseof Public Administration: A SummaryView. Novato, Calif.: Chandlerand Sharp. Weber, Max. 1992 "Bureaucracy." Jay M. ShaIn fritz and Albert C. Hyde., eds. Classics of Public Administration, 3d ed., 51-56. Pacific Grove, Calif.: Brooks/Cole. Reprintedfrom From Max Weber:Essays in Sociology, H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, ed. and trans. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946.

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