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States Counterplan Index ........................................................................................................1 States Counterplan Shell (1/2).................................................................................................3 States Counterplan Shell (2/2).................................................................................................4 ***Theory***...........................................................................................................................5 States Counterplan Theory: Fifty State FIAT is OK...............................................................5 States Counterplan: Permutation Answers..............................................................................6 ***Solvency***.......................................................................................................................7 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Poverty Best....................................7 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best........8 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: State Solutions Solve Best...................................9 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best......10 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Better for Health Care...................11 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Lopez Precedent................................................12 States Counterplan Solvency: State Action Leads to Federal Action...................................13 States Counterplan Solvency: No race to the bottom ..........................................................14 States Counterplan Solvency: States Arent Racist..............................................................15 ***Uniqueness***.................................................................................................................16 Uniqueness Extensions: Federalism is Strong Now.............................................................16 Uniqueness Extensions: Power over poverty being devolved now......................................17 Uniqueness: The Supreme Court is protecting federalism now...........................................18 ***Links***...........................................................................................................................19 Link Extensions: Social Services Are a State Responsibility...............................................19 Link Extension Wall...............................................................................................................20 Link Extensions: Health Care...............................................................................................21 Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism.....................................................22 Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism.....................................................23 ***Internal Links***.............................................................................................................24 Internal Links: Other nations model US Federalism............................................................24 ***Impacts***.......................................................................................................................26 Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops War..........................................................................26 Federalism Impacts: Liberty.................................................................................................27 Federalism Impacts: Ethnic Conflicts Impact Module ........................................................28
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Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops Ethnic Conflicts......................................................29 Federalism Good: Africa Impact Module.............................................................................30 Federalism Impacts: India Impact Module ..........................................................................31 Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions......................................................................32 Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions .....................................................................33 Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impact Module ............................................................................34 Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impacts.........................................................................................35 Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Module ......................................................................36 Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions..................................................................37 Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions .................................................................38 Federalism Impacts: Russia Impact Module ........................................................................39 Federalism Impacts: Russia Authoritarianism Module .......................................................40 ***States Counterplan Affirmative Answers***...................................................................41 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................41 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................42 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................43 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................44 States Counterplan Answers--Extensions..............................................................................45 States Counterplan Affirmative Answers: States counterplan wont lead to federal action 46 Interstate Compact Answers...................................................................................................47 Interstate Compact Answers...................................................................................................48
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Observation 1: The counterplan is not topical: states, not the federal government. Observation 2: Solvency The states offer the best anti-poverty solutions:
It uses the
D. Russell Crane, 2008 (Prof., Family Therapy, Brigham Young U.), HANDBOOK OF FAMILIES AND POVERTY, 2008, 3. *Because considerable variety exists in how states seek to promote work, their experience can suggest what policy innovations seem most promising as states continue to experiment with welfare policies. The devolution of welfare policy to states has important lessons for health care, education, food and hunger, immigration, and other policies where there is a similar belief that
Observation 3: The net benefit: global federalism (--) The state governments constitutionally have control over public welfare policies.
David Marion, 2009 (Professor of Government at Hampden-Sydney College, Washington Times, January 2, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). No similar constitutional argument can be made for federal assumption of obligations that historically have fallen under the states' police powers: law enforcement, public health/welfare, recreation, and education. Not only does the Constitution provide little support for much of the aid now sought by governors and local officials from New England to California, but such assistance threatens to weaken a fundamental structural feature of Madison's "partly national, partly federal" system. His "compound republic" was carefully designed to nurture and protect fundamental liberties while supporting competent government.
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is not regarded as an unchangeable feature of the landscape but an arena of purposive activity
in which the aim is to engineer institutions that can cope in a democratic way with the problems particular societies present.
(--) A strict system of federalism is necessary to preserve freedom and solve warfare around the globe.
Patrick M. Garry, 2007 (Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, Brandeis Law Journal, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008).
In creating a system of dual sovereignty between the state and federal government, "the Framers split the atom of sovereignty" by designating two different political entities (federal and state), "each protected from incursion by the other." This federalism
scheme not only lets the two different levels of government specialize in their respective functions, it provides a structure in which a multitude of heterogeneous communities can co-exist under a single national government. For instance, one of the benefits of federalism is that people of different views can gather in different
states with different policies and priorities. Hence, federalism supports and accommodates the wide diversity of American society.
As Professor Steven Calabresi explains, federalism has served as a vital ingredient of America's constitutional democracy: It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document.
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2) TURN: MIXED SIGNALS A) PAST DECISIONS PROVE--Overlapping federal and state laws send mixed federalism signals:
Hayford, 2002 Prof. of Business Law, 2002 (Florida Law Review; April, 2002; Lexis)
The Supreme Court's stated understanding of the FAA has sent mixed signals about a state law-making role in commercial arbitration. On the one hand, the Court has interpreted the FAA to preempt state laws that negate or undermine the enforceability of commercial arbitration [*177] clauses-leaving no latitude for state regulation. On the other hand, the Court has understood the FAA to treat the question of contract revocation, on generally applicable grounds such as fraud, duress, and uncon-scionability, as one of state law-leaving no federal role. Additionally, on a variety of other matters affecting arbitration, the Court seems to recognize that the FAA speaks either ambiguously or not at all, such as post-award judicial review, arbitrators' standards of conduct and arbitral procedures-leaving potential gaps in the Act's pro-arbitration policy.
3) If the federal government and states act in lockstep it undermines meaningful federalism:
Marie Garibaldi, 1998 Justice for the Supreme Court of New Jersey, TULSA LAW JOURNAL, Fall 1998, p. 67. It is clear today that the assertion that a state constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution is no longer novel. In my Court, when we base our decision on the New Jersey Constitution, we state clearly the "adequate and independent" state grounds that form the basis for that opinion. Nonetheless, there will continue to be cases where state courts will be faced with having to determine whether its constitution provides greater protection of individual rights than afforded under the Federal Constitution. In making that determination, state courts will still be presented with the vexing problem of how to prevent state constitutions from becoming "a mere row of shadows" of the Federal Constitution and from gleaning such little guidance from federal law as to make state law "incoherent."
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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best
(--) The laboratory effect allows states to provide the best solutions:
JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). Many liberal thinkers skeptical of states' rights and state actions since the days of segregation have begun to see that the states, to use Justice Louis Brandeis's words from the 1930s, can ''serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.'' Professor Issacharoff said states were often quicker than Washington to spot a problem when it emerged, and so ''it may be the states that have the best initial take on it, and try different regulatory methods until we fasten on a single national solution.''
(--) The laboratory effect allows states to provide the best solutions:
Alan Well, 2008 (Dir., National Academy for State Health Policy), HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 2008, 738. Yet one of the most compelling federalism metaphors is dynamic. When people argue that states should function as the "laboratories of democracy," state action is not viewed as an end in itself but, rather, as a mechanism for determining effective policy, which can then be adopted or rejected by other states or the nation as a whole.
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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best
The laboratory effect allows states to provide superior solutions to national problems.
Tonja Jacobi, 2006 (Assistant professor, Northwestern University School of Law, North Carolina Law Review, May, 2006, 84 N.C.L. Rev. 1089. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008). The states were intended to be independent from one another's policy preferences, to allow them to act as policymaking laboratories for the nation.
Continued state experimentation allows other states to cherrypick the best solutions for their state.
Laura Thomas Gebert, 2007 (J.D. candidate, Barry University School of Law, Barry Law Review, Spring 2007, 8 Barry L. Rev. 149. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008). Many government projects of the past few decades have successfully addressed this country's environmental concerns. 239 Some of the energy policies currently being implemented by state and foreign governments will also prove successful. [*174] Florida should carefully monitor the successes and failures of such programs as California's Solar Initiative, Colorado's Amendment 37, and the solar programs in foreign countries such as Israel, Greece, and Japan. 240 By carefully analyzing the progress of these programs, Florida can "cherry pick" the most cost-effective and successful plans appropriate for our local conditions, while avoiding the pitfalls that are certain to occur in any untested government program.
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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Better for Health Care
The states have significant advantages in providing quality health care:
Tom Price, 2007 (U.S. Representative, Georgia), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 8. *States have some significant advantages when it comes to health reform. They already have the responsibility of regulating health insurance and of licensing health-care providers, and often they have local demographic advantages with a more uniform population than the nation as a whole.
State health care solutions are superior to one-size fits all policies:
John Morrison, 2007 (Montana Commissioner of Insurance), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 29-30. *Solutions that work in Massachusetts or in California may not work in Montana, and that is why state-based health reforms may be the most expeditious solution to a growing national problem. States can experiment with reforms on a smaller scale, so the effectiveness of those reforms can be tested.
State health care solutions are superior to one-size fits all policies:
Tom Price, 2007 (U.S. Representative, Georgia), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 9. *An endless variety of approaches might be implemented, tax credits, expansion of Medicaid or SCHIP, creation of pooling arrangements like the Federal Employee Health Benefits program, single-payer systems, health savings accounts or a defined benefit insurance model. A custom-made health-care financing system can be designed to fit the states' preferences, rather than having to implement a system designed for the entire nation.
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(--) A strong U.S. federalism model solves wars across the globe:
Steven Calabresi, Law Professor, Northwestern, 1995 (MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, p. 774) (PDBF469) Some of the best arguments for centripetal international federalism, then, resemble some of the best arguments for centrifugal devolutionary federalism: in both cases - and for differing reasons - federalism helps prevent bloodshed and war. It is no wonder, then, that we live in an age of federalism at both the international and subnational level. Under the right circumstances, federalism can help to promote peace, prosperity, and happiness. It can alleviate the threat of majority tyranny - which is the central flaw of democracy. In some situations, it can reduce the visibility of dangerous social fault lines, thereby preventing bloodshed and violence. This necessarily brief comparative, historical, and empirical survey of the world's experience with federalism amply demonstrates the benefits at least of American-style smallstate federalism. In light of this evidence, the United States would be foolish indeed to abandon its federal system.
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States Counterplan Solvency: State Action Leads to Federal Action The ratchet up effect means state action will cause federal action:
Peter Jacobson, 2007 (Prof., Health Law and Policy, U. Michigan School of Public Health), UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAW REVIEW, June 2007, 1201. *Federalism matters. For better or worse (to return to the marriage metaphor), we are stuck with state-level options in the absence of national health insurance. If government is responsible for ensuring some level of access to health care for uninsured populations, federal uniformity may be desirable, but states should also experiment with various approaches and policy alternatives until Congress acts. The federalism question is paramount for discussing access to health care. If health care is considered to have fundamental moral importance, it should arguably be available to all, regardless of where they live. For the foreseeable future, however, health care will not be available to all. As such, the burden falls on those states that are willing to accept the responsibility of caring for their own citizens. The number of states now willing to address the needs of their uninsured populations is encouraging and may
put pressure on other states and the federal government to finally accept responsibility.
State action eventually leads to federal actionthe Counterplan will solve all of the case: J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008) We argue here that states can be important catalysts of a federal policy response by stimulating both pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory forces to appeal to the federal government for relief sooner rather than later. To explain this phenomenon we piece together and build on insights from two literatures: the environmental federalism scholarship, which predicts when environmentalists and state and local governments will appeal for federal regulatory floors to prevent a race to the bottom, and when states will do so to overcome interstate externalities (ISEs); and what we have labeled
"defensive preemption theory" (DPT), which predicts when industry will seek federal regulatory ceilings. We show how, consistent with DPT, state regulation addressing climate change has prompted industry to seek uniform and preemptive federal regulation. In addition, we show that although the traditional assumptions of race-to-thebottom theory (RBT) and ISE theory do not apply to climate change (and thus do not generate demand for federal regulation), state regulatory measures nevertheless leave pro-regulation forces unsatisfied and drive them to Congress for relief. Thus,
state regulation aimed at climate change has produced a convergence of interest group support for federal intervention - what we call "hitting the regulatory sweet spot."
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Before there were any federal environmental laws, states and local governments adopted numerous regulations, though "race to the bottom believers would suggest that such programs should never have developed." During this period, standards got progressively stricter and air pollution was substantially controlled. In the more recent period, individual states have adopted standards more stringent than those of the federal government. Revesz has recently chronicled state environmental initiatives ranging from auto emission standards (where federal action restrained more vigorous state regulation), hazardous waste regulation, municipal solid waste regulation (where the federal government has left the field to the states), and other areas of environmental protection. This record blatantly contradicts the race to the bottom theory.
Ultimately, the validity of the fear should be empirically tested, and empirical evidence has not provided strong support for race to the bottom fears.
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Post Civil War Amendments to the Constitution takeout the racism turn: McConkie, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1996 (1996 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 389, Brigham Young University Law Review; Lexis) Indeed, during the two periods in our history when federalism was most vehemently advanced, the overriding purpose was the oppression of African Americans: at first for the preservation of slavery, and then for the
preservation of de jure segregation and discrimination. Race provides a strong undercurrent or at least plays a part in today's debate as well. But regardless of the underlying motives behind the current debate over federalism, it remains clear
that traditional arguments that federalism could prevent federal civil rights enforcement have been severely weakened by the Civil War Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.
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(--)Multiple avenues of power over poverty policy are being devolved to the states now:
Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OF REACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 150. *For instance, building on experimental state welfare program waivers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, welfare reform in 1996 shifted substantial responsibility for welfare cash assistance programs to state and local governments for the first time since before the War on Poverty. The consolidation of many different federal categorical grant programs into block grants has also resulted in the devolution of program responsibility to state and local governments.
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Federalism continues to be a central lens through which current welfare cases are decided by the Supreme Court. n258 However, the emerging new federalist approach to welfare demonstrates the growing significance of fiscal concern as a legitimate claim and the rise of fiscal conservatism as a viable framework for endorsing a state's rights argument in welfare law and policy decisions.
the Court is
William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). Notwithstanding Ms. Greenhouse's writing of an obituary, the reports of the death of federalism, to paraphrase Mark Twain, n3 are [*586] greatly exaggerated. The decisions of the Supreme Court last term in Medellin v. Texas n4 and Riley v. Kennedy n5 establish that controversies about federalism have not disappeared from the docket, and in both cases, the states successfully challenged exercises of federal power. A wealth of recent scholarship also suggests that federalism remains a hot topic. n6 Federalism is still alive and well.
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(--) The states are responsible for the administration of social services:
Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OF REACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 151. *Social service provision itself is a highly devolved activity. Even though many social service programs are funded in full or in part by the federal government, they are designed to be administered by state and local government agencies. State and local governments, in turn, work with local service organizations to formulate programs that then deliver assistance to poor persons. Whether through block grants or other means, increases in federal social service expenditures necessarily increase the responsibility of lower levels of government for program administration.
(--) The federal government has no power to impose economic policy on the states.
Julie Nice, 2008 (Professor of Law @ the University of Denver, Fordham Urban Law Journal, April 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). Finally, the Court also invoked both federalism and separation of powers concerns, noting repeatedly that the federal courts have no power to impose their views of wise economic or social policy on the states.
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evidences intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is preempted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it
is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Thus, a state statute may be preempted either because congressional legislation completely occupies a given field so that there is no room for state action, or because, although Congress left room for the state to legislate, the state's legislation directly conflicts with the federal statute.
funding
brings
Bridgette Baldwin, 2008 (Assistant Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). The King case demonstrates a conceptual shift in Supreme Court welfare ideology toward cooperative federalism, where the federal government conditioned funding according to how state governments regulated and legislated their AFDC programs in accordance with federal (constitutional) concerns. Moreover, under this theory, the Supreme Court concluded that states had an obligation (if they accept federal funding) to furnish aid to all eligible poor. n192 King signaled expanded control of the federal government over state policies and practices.
Third link is crowd-out: federal interventions undermine access to state benefits-Mila Kofman, 2007 (Prof., Health Policy Institute, Georgetown U.), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 23. *I encourage you to look for measures that will encourage and support meaningful state initiatives. It is also important to remember that many self-funded large employer plans provide generous benefits to workers and dependents, covering expensive medical conditions and covering people with significant medical needs. Federal interventions must be carefully crafted as to not undermine comprehensive benefits that many have.
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(--) Federal inaction in the health care arena encourages state innovation.
John Tierney, 2007 (U.S. Representative, Massachusetts), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 13. *Absent federal action on the issue, many states have taken, or are beginning to take, action of their own accord to address their uninsured populations and expand access to care. Indeed, my own state of Massachusetts has been a pioneer in this regard, having enacted legislation last year to achieve near-universal coverage of the Bay State's residents through a combination of approaches.
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it lies in the tyranny of small decisionsin the prospect that Congress will nibble away at State sovereignty, bit by bit, until essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell.
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(--)
FEDERAL
ARRANGEMENTS
ARE
Norman Ornstein and A. Coursen, Fellows at the American Enterprise Institute, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, January/February, 1992, p. 24 The United States may be able to at least point the way. Our innovations in decentralized federal arrangements as well as our experience in sorting out powers and rights between Washington and the states could well be adapted to many troubled situations elsewhere today.
(--) US FEDERALISM MODEL EFFECTIVE WAY TO MEET ETHNIC CHALLENGES AROUND THEWORLD
Will Kymlicka, Law professor-Queens University, The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, July, 2000, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p. 213 The history of ethnic relations in Western democracies contains many examples of injustice, oppression, coercion, discrimination and prejudice. Yet over the past thirty years, Western democracies have developed a number of interesting, and I believe effective, models for accommodating ethnocultural diversity. One of these models involves the use of federal or quasi-federal forms of territorial autonomy to enable selfgovernment for national minorities and indigenous peoples. I believe that these forms of territorial autonomy are in general a success, and contain potential lessons for other countries around the world struggling with issues of minority nationalism.
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Nancy Bermeo, professor of politics at Princeton University, writes on regime change, 2002 (JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 13.2, pp. 96-110 A New Look at Federalism) Since the evidence for and against federalism is clearly mixed, we must weigh it as carefully as possible. Toward this end, Ugo Amoretti and I organized an international research team in 2000 to study the relative merits of federalism versus unitarism in divided societies. With the horrors of the Yugoslav breakup paramount in my mind, I expected our project to conclude that federalism exacerbated ethnic conflict. Instead, despite considering a great diversity of cases, our authors were nearly unanimous in concluding that federal institutions promote successful accommodation.
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ethnic
tensions
and
prevents
Nicole Herther-Spiro, 2007 (Emory International Law Review, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). Ethnic federalism is an attempt to create a territorial solution to ethnic conflict by acknowledging the need to grant some degree of autonomy to ethnic groups within a state but attempts to do so without complete secession. As Professor Tully explains: The most familiar form of the politics of cultural
recognition is the claims of nationalist movements to be constitutionally recognised as either independent nation states or as autonomous political associations within various forms of multinational federations and confederations. n68 Federalism
based on ethnic divisions provides a solution to demands for recognition without dissolving the unity of the nation-state. Ethnic-based federalism is an institutional arrangement that acknowledges and uses ethnic units "as a basis for local governments," in the hopes that doing so will harmonize inter-group conflicts. n69
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Shaheen Mozaffar, Associate Professor of Political Science at Bridgewater, and James R. Scarrit, Professor of Political Science at University of Colorado- Boulder, IDENTITY AND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, ed. Safran and Maiz, 2000, p. 243 Ethnopolitical conflicts in contemporary Africa thus reflect the interplay of historically configured social structures and the strategic choices of political actors involved in traditional struggles for power and resources. For the most part, these conflicts have involved the activation of ethnicity to define group interests and articulate political demands concerning equity and proportionality in the allocation of cabinet positions, administrative appointments,
public sector jobs, and development funds. These instrumental demands are generally negotiable and readily accommodated within the existing institutional framework of the state through 'ethnic arithmetic' in forming multiethnic government coalitions and formulating affirmative action policies. More problematic are ethnopolitical conflicts that involve the
These demands are difficult to deal with because they usually require a fundamental restructuring of the state, for example, the transformation of a unitary to a federal system, the creation of additional units in an existing federal system, or outright secession.
activation of ethnicity to define group identity and articulate expressive demands dealing with the very survival of the group against real or perceived threats to it.
science at New
World University, November 18, 2002, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9,
http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to national borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. Weve got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since
been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and dont need any help, thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may
not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
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particularly in Kashmir, the past experience in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and the Northeastern states has shown that after prolonged conflicts in which the center holds its ground, separatists will eventually realize, under popular pressure, that the federal system provides an opportunity for them to gain a share of power, while the alternative is violence and bloodshed.
C)
VIOLENCE OVER KASHMIR THREATENS NUCLEAR WAR AND THE END OF LIFE ON THE PLANET
FAI, STAFF, Islamic Horizons January, 2004 - February, 2004; LEXIS The Kashmir dispute involves not only the lives and futures of the Kashmiris, but it also significantly impacts India-Pakistan relations and the peace and stability of the South-Asian subcontinent-home to one-fifth of the
world's population. The dispute appears to be irresolvable peacefully because international apathy encourages the obduracy of one of the parties. To distract from its occupation of Kashmir in defiance of UN resolutions, India has mastered the art of propagating myths about the genesis and nature of the dispute. The UN Security Council unanimously agreed with the common position taken by the three parties in the dispute--the Kashmiris, Pakistan, and India--that the status of Jammu and Kashmir can be settled only in accordance with the will of the Kashmiris, ascertained through the democratic method, i.e. a free and impartial plebiscite. The U.S. and other democracies, also, endorsed this agreement. The terms stipulated by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), in close and continuous consultation with both countries, were crystallized in two resolutions adopted on Aug. 13th, 1948 and Jan. 5th, 1949. Both governments formally accepted the terms in a binding international agreement similar to a treaty. A ceasefire was immediately enforced, and UNCIP started negotiations on a plan for the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani armies from Kashmir, a plan that would not disadvantage either side or imperil impartiality of the plebiscite. The U.S., Britain and France sponsored all of the Security Council resolutions that called for a plebiscite. Their commitment was indicated in a personal appeal made by President Harry Truman and British Prime Minister Clement Atlee that differences over demilitarization be submitted to arbitration by the plebiscite administrator, a distinguished American war hero: Admiral Chester Nimitz. Unfortunately, India rejected this appeal and, later, objected to an American acting as the plebiscite administrator. No permanent obstacles bar the establishment of a UN-run plebiscite administration in Kashmir. The world organization has proved its ability, even in the most forbidding circumstances, to institute an electoral process under its supervision and control, with the help of a neutral peacekeeping force. One such striking example is Namibia, which was peacefully brought to independence after seven decades of occupation and control by South Africa. More recently, the UN peacefully settled the East Timor issue. Four decades ago, UN Representative Sir Owen Dixon envisaged that the Kashmiri plebiscite could be so regionalized that none of the state's different zones would be forced to accept an outcome contrary to its wishes. The idea of a referendum or plebiscite can be seamlessly translated into the idea of elections to one or more constituent assemblies that will determine the future status of the state or of its different zones. However, any such election must be completely free, transparent, and conducted under UN control and supervision.
Kashmir, it might be said, is the Alsace-Lorraine of South Asia, substituting India and Pakistan for France and Germany. It has sparked two conventional wars and a nuclear arms race between the South Asian rivals, making it the world's most dangerous territory. Any new war may have nuclear implications that could endanger every nation and every human. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers that have developed sophisticated missile delivery vehicles, and both are adamant against signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both feature domestic constituencies that universally celebrate their muscular, nuclear postures; no political party or serious private association champions nuclear controls or disarmament.
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B. War in the Middle East will escalate into global nuclear war
Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, 02 [John, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html]
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should
war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the
principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening
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The Failure of federalism in Iraq causes civil war that escalates through the region and destroys global federalism
Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, 04 [The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2; Pg. 7, Dawn] The potential consequences of failing to design federalism properly and to establish a stable democracy in Iraq extend far beyond Iraqi borders. Civil war in Iraq may draw in neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran, further destabilizing the Middle East in the process. It may also discourage foreign investment in the region, bolster Islamic extremists, and exacerbate tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. A civil war in Iraq may even undermine support for the concept of federalism more generally, which is significant given the number of countries also considering federalism, such as Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, to name just two. Finally, the failure to design and implement the kind of federalism that can establish a stable democracy in Iraq might undermine international support for other U.S. initiatives in the region, including negotiations for Arab-Israeli peace.
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B)
Akwei 03 (Adotei, Africa Director @ Amnesty International, NPR, 4/7) Ms. AKWEI: Well, Nigeria is absolutely critical to West Africa. You have conflicts in Liberia. You have conflict now in Cote d'Ivoire, which was one of the most stable countries in Africa. You have a very fragile situation Sierre Leone and you have fighting on the border of Guinea. So that whole Manu River region of West Africa is just on the precipice. You have very weak democracies in Benin and in Ghana. The saying is 'That if Nigeria, you know, sneezes, the rest of West Africa catches a cold.' It also impacts all of Africa because it has this population that's massive. It has economic potential to really pull the region up--the West Africa region. You know, we're all kind of waiting and hoping for Nigeria to assume and lead the way it was meant to because of its size and its resources. And we're still waiting.
New World University, November 18, 2002, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9,
http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to national borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. Weve got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and dont need any help, thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.
science at
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Sharia threatens Nigerian federalism, resulting in conflict J. Isawa Elaigwu, Institute of Governance and Social Research & Habu Galadima, University of Jos, 03 [Publius, Summer 2003 v33 i3 p123(22)]
The transition from military to civilian government on 29 May 1999 had raised hopes for a new democratic Nigeria. However, no sooner had civilian politicians taken over the reins of power than an emotional religious issue--Sharia--burst upon the political scene, casting a dark shadow over Nigerian federalism. Political leaders in the North began implementing Islamic law over criminal matters in Nigeria's 12 mostly Muslim northern states. Communal violence emanating from conflict over Sharia soon consumed more than 3,000 lives, often under brutal and barbaric circumstances.
Nigerian federalism is crucial to prevent conflict Vanguard 04 [Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, July 14, 2004 pNA
[Byline: Mcphilips Nwachukwu, Ikechukwu Eze, Charles Ozoemena & Nduka Uzuakpundu] ON the occasion of the 70th birthday celebration of Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka, one-time military governor of Imo and Lagos States, Rear Admiral Ndubuisi Kanu, declared yesterday in Lagos that the therapy for Nigeria to attain true development, prosperity and political stability laid in its capacity to embrace true federalism.
Prof. Soyinka himself reviewing the polity on BBC, accused the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) of trying to manipulate elections to transform the nation's political landscape into a "one-party democracy." President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has been locked in a running battle with the Nobel Laureate since his (Obasanjo's) return to power in 1999, surprised on lookers at the birthday lecture by congratulating an author widely seen as his most eloquent critic. Only two months ago, the acclaimed playwright and activist was tear-gassed and briefly arrested during an anti-government rally in Lagos. Admiral Kanu, guest speaker at the lecture organised by the Pyrates Confraternity co-founded by Prof. Soyinka, said the
inability of Nigerian leaders to toe the path of true federalism and their failure to appreciate the implication of the heterogeneous nature of the country had only resulted in the various political uprisings, marginalisation, and social injustices in the country.
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Federalism is crucial to the future of Nigeria Comtex 8/20/04 [Africa News Service, Olapade Agoro, NAC Presidential Candidate, (Vanguard/All
Africa Global Media via COMTEX)] He made some assertions, just as he also made some claims regarding what transpired at the polls. For instance, he asserted that without true federalism, Nigeria as a nation would not work. He is right. And many others before him had said that much.
Federalism is crucial for the progress of Nigeria Innocent Anaba 04 [Africa News Service, August 24, 2004 pNA, Abuja, Aug 24, 2004 (Vanguard/All
Africa Global Media via COMTEX)] "It has thus become clear that unless Nigeria returns to true federalism, there can be no real growth, progress, development and harmony amongst the ethnic nationalities that make up the country," He noted that democracy is yet to arrive in Nigeria, saying "part of the grave problem facing us today is our stubborn and consistent refusal to accept the practice and culture of democracy. And so, we have civilian government and no democracy."
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Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.
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B)
Shelton 01 Shelton, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1-15-2001 (Henry) Vital Speeches No. 7, Vol. 67; Pg. 194 ; ISSN: 0042-742X Force, Forces, and Forecasting; Henry H. Shelton speech; Transcript In much the same way while the Balkans remain a serious concern in Europe, but the situation there pales in comparison with events in Russia. The future of Europe will not swing on the status of Kosovo or the establishment of a new Serbia. No, the future of Europe swings on the path that Russian nationalism takes and whether Russia can continue its peaceful evolution into a fully democratic nation with a stable economy that abides by the rule of law. As I discussed with my counterpart, Russian Chief of Staff Kvashnin, this past Tuesday, one of the most potentially destabilizing factors in the region is the thousands of nuclear and chemical weapons, stored in facilities throughout Russia. And as we all know, there are still thousands of nuclear warheads in the Russian arsenal. They present a very profound danger to our security should they fall into the wrong hands and there are many "wrong hands" out there trying to get them.
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extraordinarily successful. Their impact has been incomplete but still formidable: The federal government has transformed old age from a frequent sentence of poverty to, typically, albeit not universally, a state of economic and health security. In 2003 public benefit programs reduced by more than 80 percent the number of seniors who otherwise would be living in poverty (14 million fewer seniors).50 Public benefit programs (overwhelmingly federal or federal-state programs), such as TANF, social security, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, and others, lifted nearly one in three otherwise poor children out of poverty in 2003.51 Public benefits substantially reduce the severity of poverty even for those they do not lift out of poverty. In 2003 for those who remained poor the programs increased their average income from 29 percent to 57 percent of the poverty line.52 In the 1960s studies found deep hunger and malnutrition in many poor areas of the country. While hunger and food insecurity are still widespread problems, food stamps, school meals, WIC, and related programs have made severe hunger much less common. In the first fifteen years after Medicaid began, black infant
mortality dropped by 49 percent, more than nine times the rate of improvement of the preceding fifteen years.53 Indisputably these results are not good enough. The work of ensuring that the federal government lives up to its responsibilities and appropriately takes on poverty, insecurity, and unequal opportunity through its economic and spending policies is hardly finished. And that work is not easy, short-term, or assured of success. But there is no alternative. The federal
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is essential. As Pres. Lyndon Johnson said early in the war on poverty: Unfortunately, many
Americans live on the outskirts of hopesome because of their poverty, and some because of their color, and all too many because of both. Our task is to help replace their despair with opportunity. Poverty is a national problem, requiring improved national organization and support. But this attack, to be effective, must also be organized at the State and the local level and must be supported and directed by State and local efforts.The program I shall propose will emphasize this cooperative approach.22
spending and economic policy are positive and complement each other, great strides can be made in increasing opportunity and reducing poverty.
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of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down once and for all, the walls of racism.
relocators, jurisdictions offer selective tax breaks or lower the overall burden or progressivity of broad-based taxes. This, then, cripples the ability of the jurisdictions to fund public goods and services through a tax system based on ability to pay.46 Although the extent to which businesses actually make
location decisions based on state incentives and taxes is in doubt, that these considerations weigh heavily on state officials making budget decisions is not. The result is an interstate competition to create the best business
climate. At the same time, states fear that if their public benefits are more generous than those of other states, they will become magnets for the poorthat low-income people will move into the state to obtain the benefits.47 Again, many doubt how valid this fear is, but it is common. It is a contributing factor to what has been called the race to the bottomthe perceived need of states to keep their benefits as low as or lower than those in other states, and particularly neighboring states. Through this mechanism the interstate competition squeezes down antipoverty efforts.
(--)
The net benefit is empirically deniedthe federal government has massive involvement in anti-poverty initiatives:
James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) Today the shape of hunger and poverty in America is very different from during the Depression. So is the shape of the federal government. And the Red Cross. And the town of England, where 500 children every day receive federally funded free or reduced-priced school lunches.6 Social Security, child support payments, food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Medicaid also are part of the town fabric.
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(--)NO INTERNAL LINK: OTHER NATIONS MODEL THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM; NOT INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS. (--) Federalism is cyclicalthe plan is insignificant in the overall move of federalism Ann O'M. Bowman, James F. and Maude B. Byrnes Professor of Government at the University of South Carolina, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p3(21)]
The federalism scenarios make no assumptions about the length of time represented by the dotted lines. It is quite possible, even likely, that the next decade or two will see several of these trends unfold at different periods. Increases may be followed by decreases, periods of no change could be interspersed among upward or downward trends.
(--) FEDERALISM DOESNT SOLVE IN OTHER COUNTRIES: Michael A. Pagano, Professor of Public Administration and Director of the Graduate Program in Public Administration at the University of Illinois at Chicago, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p1(2)]
This, the first issue of the Global Review of Federalism, reaches toward the future, rather than the past, and sketches out the important factors and features of established federal systems in the future. Although the notable successes of ethnic, religious, racial, and other minorities in securing a voice in emerging democratic societies are laudatory, many attempts at enhancing the autonomy of groups and of integrating them into a larger society have been less than satisfactory. Alongside the South African and Belgian stories stand the Palestinian and Kashmir debacles; then there are the swings of the federalism pendulum that characterize places such as Nigeria and Russia.
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James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) By contrast, when the federal government provides both funds and direction, the outcome usually is better. Some of these programs are so successful that we no longer remember how deep (how intractableto use a phrase often applied to the problems of the poor) the problems that they tried to solve supposedly were. Social security, Supplemental Security Income, Job Corps, Medicare, Medicaid, Head Start, school lunch and school breakfast, food stamps, child support enforcement, immunizations, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (commonly known as the WIC program) are among the many programs that fit this model.
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States Counterplan Affirmative Answers: States counterplan wont lead to federal action
Industry will water down the federal standard created from state action:
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008)
Elliott and his coauthors made this point in the context of a larger argument that sought to debunk prevailing myths about the origins of federal statutes, namely that they are either the product of a well-intentioned Congress seeking to solve policy problems, or the result of conventional interest group politics in which environmentalists successfully pressure the national government for legislation. 10 To properly understand federal statutes, the authors argued, one must recognize that they are the product of organizational and political exigencies 11 (a position that we, of course, embrace). Under this
"evolutionary" model of federal statutes, state-level legislative successes by environmental groups tend to be countered by federal legislative successes by industry groups. 12 This insight was the genesis
of DPT. Since then, others have identified additional examples of this phenomenon, although no one has elaborated on it in any depth. 13 The Elliott et al. account of industry demand for federal legislation provides an important piece of the puzzle of how federal statutes take shape. First, it disabuses us of the notion that industry will always resist regulation. Indeed, industry groups sometimes provide the impetus for regulation, in both domestic and international settings. 14 Although [*1506] industry may lead the charge for federal legislation only infrequently, industry support for federal regulation undoubtedly has a powerful effect on the prospect of its passage. 15 Yet what will industry demand from Congress? It will demand a federal standard that preempts inconsistent state regulation and eliminates regulatory uncertainty. Uniformity is not enough, however. Industry will also try to undercut the most aggressive state standards by seeking a lower federal ceiling. 16 States thus establish the boundaries within which the federal negotiation over standards takes place - the more stringently states regulate at the outset, the more leverage they create for a compromise in the end. If the federal standard turns out to be weaker than the most
aggressive state standard, and if preemption prevents any deviation, then industry achieves a double win. 17
The unified FIAT of the Counterplan will prevent industry from appealing to Congress for a federal standard:
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008)
States can increase regulatory uncertainty in this way either by taking action alone or by joining together with other states in regional compacts. Moreover, because states will be responding to somewhat different interest group
configurations within their own jurisdictions, there is a high likelihood that different states will adopt different regulatory approaches. This practically ensures inconsistency and helps drive industry to Congress. At the same time, some states are likely to be more important than others in provoking this
reaction. Historically, California seems to have been especially influential in prompting industry demand for federal uniformity, perhaps because of the state's disproportionate market power 27 and history of engaging in product regulation targeting automobiles. 28
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TURN: ROLLBACK:
Hasday, Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit., 97 [49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, Jill]
Congress' role is the first issue that should be reexamined in light of the democratic tension within compacting. Every interstate agreement must win the approval of the party state legislatures, but only some [*12] interstate agreements are compacts, directly bound to the compact jurisprudence on permanency and constitutionally required to garner congressional as well as state assent. n50 Only those agreements that may " 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States' " n51 must take the compact form and receive Congress' consent. Yet Congress, unlike the states, is not bound by the compacts it approves. It can
condition its consent or simply supersede its approval legislation with subsequent law. n52
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Congress must approve interstate compactsproves they link to all their net benefits: Richman, Old Dominion University, 03 [Publius, Spring 2003 v33 i2 p79(4)]
In his discussion of formal interstate compacts, Zimmerman explains the requirement for congressional approval, originally included in the Articles of Confederation and imported into the Constitution as a basic protection against regional or sectional state alignments against other states, or against the federal government. In the nineteenth century, most compacts addressed particular interstate boundary conflicts, and thus did not involve general policy concerns; increasingly in the twentieth century, compacts addressed more substantive interstate subjects. In 1921 Congress approved creation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the first bistate compact creating a quasi-independent permanent entity with a commission as board of directors and an executive staff to build and manage revenue-producing transportation and port facilities in the New York and New Jersey Hudson River port region.
Congress must approve all interstate compactsand it is not a slam dunk Richman, Old Dominion University, 03 [Publius, Spring 2003 v33 i2 p79(4)]
Although congressional approval has been forthcoming in many interstate compacts, it is not to be assumed that Congress plays an insignificant role (i.e., by routinely endorsing compacts agreed upon by two or more states). Zimmerman's discussion of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, approved by Congress in 1996 for a period of three years, offers a recent instance where the congressional approval requirement was a key factor in avoiding inter-regional conflict. The dairy compact's aim was to help (i.e., to offer economic protection to) the northeastern states' declining family dairy farms by stabilizing milk prices in the those states. The measure involved stabilization of the price of milk by New England's state regulatory agencies by setting common minimum prices at the farm. The compact was opposed by the national milk-processing industry, and significantly by a group of midwestern states that perceived the compact as a restraint on their ability to freely market their dairy products in New England. Due to the regional controversy, Congress refused to extend its approval of the compact more than the original three years granted. Consequently, lacking congressional approval, the compact expired in 2001.