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STATES COUNTERPLAN SAMFORD DEBATE INSTITUTE 09

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States Counterplan Index


Thesis: The thesis of this counterplan is that the states are better able to solve for social services for poverty than the federal government, and federal programs to increase social services in the United States will disrupt the delicate balance of power between the state and federal governments. The Affirmative teams use of the federal government to increase social services will pre-empt these state solutions, undermining the most effective means of alleviating poverty. In addition, the system of federalism is one of the best bulwarks against tyranny and the promotion of individual liberty. In its zeal to save the poor, the Affirmative plan merely risks undermining the foundations of the American system of government.

States Counterplan Index ........................................................................................................1 States Counterplan Shell (1/2).................................................................................................3 States Counterplan Shell (2/2).................................................................................................4 ***Theory***...........................................................................................................................5 States Counterplan Theory: Fifty State FIAT is OK...............................................................5 States Counterplan: Permutation Answers..............................................................................6 ***Solvency***.......................................................................................................................7 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Poverty Best....................................7 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best........8 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: State Solutions Solve Best...................................9 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best......10 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Better for Health Care...................11 States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Lopez Precedent................................................12 States Counterplan Solvency: State Action Leads to Federal Action...................................13 States Counterplan Solvency: No race to the bottom ..........................................................14 States Counterplan Solvency: States Arent Racist..............................................................15 ***Uniqueness***.................................................................................................................16 Uniqueness Extensions: Federalism is Strong Now.............................................................16 Uniqueness Extensions: Power over poverty being devolved now......................................17 Uniqueness: The Supreme Court is protecting federalism now...........................................18 ***Links***...........................................................................................................................19 Link Extensions: Social Services Are a State Responsibility...............................................19 Link Extension Wall...............................................................................................................20 Link Extensions: Health Care...............................................................................................21 Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism.....................................................22 Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism.....................................................23 ***Internal Links***.............................................................................................................24 Internal Links: Other nations model US Federalism............................................................24 ***Impacts***.......................................................................................................................26 Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops War..........................................................................26 Federalism Impacts: Liberty.................................................................................................27 Federalism Impacts: Ethnic Conflicts Impact Module ........................................................28

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Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops Ethnic Conflicts......................................................29 Federalism Good: Africa Impact Module.............................................................................30 Federalism Impacts: India Impact Module ..........................................................................31 Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions......................................................................32 Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions .....................................................................33 Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impact Module ............................................................................34 Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impacts.........................................................................................35 Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Module ......................................................................36 Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions..................................................................37 Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions .................................................................38 Federalism Impacts: Russia Impact Module ........................................................................39 Federalism Impacts: Russia Authoritarianism Module .......................................................40 ***States Counterplan Affirmative Answers***...................................................................41 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................41 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................42 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................43 States Counterplan 2ac Answers............................................................................................44 States Counterplan Answers--Extensions..............................................................................45 States Counterplan Affirmative Answers: States counterplan wont lead to federal action 46 Interstate Compact Answers...................................................................................................47 Interstate Compact Answers...................................................................................................48

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States Counterplan Shell (1/2)


TEXT: The fifty states, relevant territories and the District of Columbia will {insert
relevant affirmative plan mandates}. Any necessary authority will be devolved to the states via extension of the Lopez precedent. Enforcement guaranteed, we reserve intent.

Observation 1: The counterplan is not topical: states, not the federal government. Observation 2: Solvency The states offer the best anti-poverty solutions:

It uses the

D. Russell Crane, 2008 (Prof., Family Therapy, Brigham Young U.), HANDBOOK OF FAMILIES AND POVERTY, 2008, 3. *Because considerable variety exists in how states seek to promote work, their experience can suggest what policy innovations seem most promising as states continue to experiment with welfare policies. The devolution of welfare policy to states has important lessons for health care, education, food and hunger, immigration, and other policies where there is a similar belief that

these difficult problems could be best addressed by states.

Observation 3: The net benefit: global federalism (--) The state governments constitutionally have control over public welfare policies.
David Marion, 2009 (Professor of Government at Hampden-Sydney College, Washington Times, January 2, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). No similar constitutional argument can be made for federal assumption of obligations that historically have fallen under the states' police powers: law enforcement, public health/welfare, recreation, and education. Not only does the Constitution provide little support for much of the aid now sought by governors and local officials from New England to California, but such assistance threatens to weaken a fundamental structural feature of Madison's "partly national, partly federal" system. His "compound republic" was carefully designed to nurture and protect fundamental liberties while supporting competent government.

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States Counterplan Shell (2/2)


Federal action on poverty risks pre-emption or squeezing out state action in the poverty arena:
James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) In all of these areas the federal government has the predominant role. In some areas it has an exclusive role according to the Constitution. In others its exclusive authority is not constitutionally mandated, but, when it acts, it preempts state action. In yet other areas it may not be preemptive, but it still became a dominant or important presence in the twentieth century as the national ideal evolved and the economy changed. Many of these areas of federal action, of course, are seen as being about the economy, not about opportunity or economic security or poverty. But often they also have a more profound impact, for good or ill, on poverty and opportunity and security than most spending decisions.

(--) Other nations model U.S. federalism decisions:


Donald L. Horowitz, 2007 (Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University, Drake Law Review, Summer, 55 Drake L. Rev. 953. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008). Federalism is among those institutions. Indeed, the adoption of a federal regime in this country in 1787 was followed very closely in Europe and Latin America. In both, federal institutions were seen to provide a democratic solution to the problem of uniting diverse territories in a single regime. Switzerland, Germany, Argentina, Venezuela, Mexico, and Brazil were among the states that adopted federalism for this purpose, and their decisions were explicitly based on the American example. Issues of constitutional design, at long last revived in the United States by Professor Levinson's book, thrive outside the United States. Since the Third Wave of Democratization began in Portugal in 1974, dozens and dozens of constitutions have been written and rewritten. Some have taken their inspiration from the United States and adopted fixed-term presidencies,
bicameral legislatures, and upper houses with equal numbers of representatives from each federal unit; others have been more eclectic in their design. Whatever the design, outside of the United States, the configuration of institutions

is not regarded as an unchangeable feature of the landscape but an arena of purposive activity
in which the aim is to engineer institutions that can cope in a democratic way with the problems particular societies present.

(--) A strict system of federalism is necessary to preserve freedom and solve warfare around the globe.
Patrick M. Garry, 2007 (Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, Brandeis Law Journal, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008).
In creating a system of dual sovereignty between the state and federal government, "the Framers split the atom of sovereignty" by designating two different political entities (federal and state), "each protected from incursion by the other." This federalism

scheme not only lets the two different levels of government specialize in their respective functions, it provides a structure in which a multitude of heterogeneous communities can co-exist under a single national government. For instance, one of the benefits of federalism is that people of different views can gather in different
states with different policies and priorities. Hence, federalism supports and accommodates the wide diversity of American society.

As Professor Steven Calabresi explains, federalism has served as a vital ingredient of America's constitutional democracy: It prevents religious warfare, it prevents secessionist warfare, and it prevents racial warfare. It is part of the reason why democratic majoritarianism in the United States has not produced violence or secession for 130 years, unlike the situation for example, in England, France, Germany, Russia, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Cyprus, or Spain. There is nothing in the U.S. Constitution that is more important or that has done more to promote peace, prosperity, and freedom than the federal structure of that great document.

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***Theory*** States Counterplan Theory: Fifty State FIAT is OK


THEY USE MULTIPLE ACTORS TOOTHEY HAVE THE PRESIDENT ACT AND THE 535 MEMBERS OF THE CONGRESS. NECESSARY TO TEST FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IN THE RESOLUTION: ALL THEY HAVE TO DO IS DEFEND THAT ACTION. LITERATURE CHECKS ABUSE: WE HAVE EVIDENCE SAYING STATES SOLVE BETTERTHEY SHOULD HAVE EVIDENCE DEFENDING FEDERAL GOVERNMENT IS BETTER. IMPOSSIBLE BRIGHT LINE: CANT PROVE 4 CUPS OF FIAT IS WORSE THAN 2 CUPS OF FIAT. TURN: THEIR FIAT IS UTOPIANNO EVIDENCE CONGRESS WILL EVER PASS THEIR PLANVOTE NEGATIVE ON PRESUMPTION. CREDIBLE NET BENEFIT CHECKS ABUSE: THEY CAN ANSWER AND/OR TURN OUR NET BENEFITS. HARDER TO BE NEGATIVE: AFF SPEAKS 1ST AND LAST INHERENT PERSUASIVE ADVANTAGE AFF WIN PERCENTAGES WERE VERY HIGH BEFORE THE NEW WAVE OF COUNTERPLANS AND KRITIKSPROVES NEGATIVES NEED MAXIMUM FLEXIBILITY 8) TOPIC IS HUGE: AFF. HAS WIDE RANGE OF AFFIRMATIVES TO CHOOSE FROMNEGATIVE NEEDS CREDIBLE GENERIC STRATEGIES TO KEEP UP.

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States Counterplan: Permutation Answers


1) STILL LINKS TO THE NET BENEFITS: FEDERAL ACTION THEY STILL USE

2) TURN: MIXED SIGNALS A) PAST DECISIONS PROVE--Overlapping federal and state laws send mixed federalism signals:

Hayford, 2002 Prof. of Business Law, 2002 (Florida Law Review; April, 2002; Lexis)
The Supreme Court's stated understanding of the FAA has sent mixed signals about a state law-making role in commercial arbitration. On the one hand, the Court has interpreted the FAA to preempt state laws that negate or undermine the enforceability of commercial arbitration [*177] clauses-leaving no latitude for state regulation. On the other hand, the Court has understood the FAA to treat the question of contract revocation, on generally applicable grounds such as fraud, duress, and uncon-scionability, as one of state law-leaving no federal role. Additionally, on a variety of other matters affecting arbitration, the Court seems to recognize that the FAA speaks either ambiguously or not at all, such as post-award judicial review, arbitrators' standards of conduct and arbitral procedures-leaving potential gaps in the Act's pro-arbitration policy.

B) Conflicting signals undermine federalism:


Werhan, 2000 professor of Constitutional Law @ Tulane, 2000 (Washington & Lee Law Review, Fall,
2000; 57 Wash & Lee L. Rev. 1213) In the Supreme Court's recent, and potentially transformative, decision in United States v. Lopez, 13 which it recently solidified in United States v. Morrison, 14 a bare majority of the justices suggested an intriguing redefinition of the congressional commerce power. 15 The Lopez/Morrison innovation promises to integrate formal and functional approaches to federalism limits and to align contemporary doctrine with the original federalist understanding and the foundational jurisprudence of the Marshall Court. 16 The justices, however, have given mixed signals of their direction. Following on the heels of Lopez, the same narrow majority of justices in Printz v. United States 17 adopted a strongly formalistic approach to limiting congressional regulatory power. 18 The Printz [*1217] retrenchment reinforces the considerable doubts over whether the Court will be able to maintain a balanced federalism jurisprudence.

3) If the federal government and states act in lockstep it undermines meaningful federalism:
Marie Garibaldi, 1998 Justice for the Supreme Court of New Jersey, TULSA LAW JOURNAL, Fall 1998, p. 67. It is clear today that the assertion that a state constitution provides greater protection than the Federal Constitution is no longer novel. In my Court, when we base our decision on the New Jersey Constitution, we state clearly the "adequate and independent" state grounds that form the basis for that opinion. Nonetheless, there will continue to be cases where state courts will be faced with having to determine whether its constitution provides greater protection of individual rights than afforded under the Federal Constitution. In making that determination, state courts will still be presented with the vexing problem of how to prevent state constitutions from becoming "a mere row of shadows" of the Federal Constitution and from gleaning such little guidance from federal law as to make state law "incoherent."

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***Solvency*** States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Poverty Best


(--) Each dollar spent by the states is better than federal money for anti-poverty programs:
Edgar Browning, 2008 (Prof., Economics, Texas A&M U.), STEALING FROM EACH OTHER: HOW THE WELFARE STATE ROBS AMERICANS OF MONEY AND SPIRIT, 2008, 196-197. *Welfare programs operated by state, local, and nongovernmental entities can also be expected to be more effective per dollar spent than welfare administered at the federal level. Not only are the former entities closer to and more familiar with the problems faced by the poor but they also have greater flexibility in designing and carrying out programs of assistance. One of the virtues of a decentralized approach, as in a federal system, is that different states and organizations will utilize different approaches and can learn from both the successes and failures realized. It should not be
forgotten that the welfare reform of 1996, widely regarded as one of the few successes among welfare policy reforms, was built upon the experiences of several states experimenting with different approaches. These states had to receive waivers from the federal government just to try alternative approaches, but with the federal government out of the picture there would be a great deal more experimentation, which would lead over time to more effective policies.

(--) State initiatives are solving poverty now:


Thomas Billitteri, 2009 (Staff, Congressional Quarterly), URBAN ISSUES, 4TH Ed., 2009, 18. *As federal policymakers wrestle with the poverty issue, states and localities are making inroads of their own. Mayor Bloomberg has been promoting a plan to pay poor families in New York up to $5,000 a year to meet such goals as attending parent-teacher meetings, getting med ical checkups and holding full-time jobs. Patterned after a Mexican initiative, the plan aims to help poor families make better long-range decisions and break cycles of poverty and dependence that can last generations.

(--) State experimentation is critical at providing anti-poverty solutions:


D. Russell Crane, 2008 (Prof., Family Therapy, Brigham Young U.), HANDBOOK OF FAMILIES AND POVERTY, 2008, 8. *To encourage work, states have experimented with eligibility rules, self-sufficiency programs, and the structure of benefits, time limits, sanctions, provision of support services, and participation requirements. States have transformed their welfare systems from providers of cash assistance to employment offices. States have restructured state welfare and employment offices into employment-oriented departments and brought a number of social services under one roof. They have simplified the rules and streamlined the application forms for cash assistance, child care, Medicaid, and food stamps.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best
(--) The laboratory effect allows states to provide the best solutions:
JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). Many liberal thinkers skeptical of states' rights and state actions since the days of segregation have begun to see that the states, to use Justice Louis Brandeis's words from the 1930s, can ''serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest of the country.'' Professor Issacharoff said states were often quicker than Washington to spot a problem when it emerged, and so ''it may be the states that have the best initial take on it, and try different regulatory methods until we fasten on a single national solution.''

(--) The laboratory effect allows states to provide the best solutions:
Alan Well, 2008 (Dir., National Academy for State Health Policy), HEALTH AFFAIRS, May/June 2008, 738. Yet one of the most compelling federalism metaphors is dynamic. When people argue that states should function as the "laboratories of democracy," state action is not viewed as an end in itself but, rather, as a mechanism for determining effective policy, which can then be adopted or rejected by other states or the nation as a whole.

(--) The states are experimenting with poverty solutions now:


D. Russell Crane, 2008 (Prof., Family Therapy, Brigham Young U.), HANDBOOK OF FAMILIES AND POVERTY, 2008, 3. *Policy devolution to states is part of the New Federalism presidents have championed during the past three decades or so, but policy devolution became a particularly prominent part of welfare policy as frustration grew with expanding welfare rolls in the 1980s and early 1990s. Because it was unclear how welfare policy could produce self-supporting families, particularly if these families had a history of welfare dependency and numerous barriers to work, policymakers were willing to turn the problem over to states to experiment with alternative ways of solving these problems.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: State Solutions Solve Best


(--) State solutions are best at providing for low-income families:
D. Russell Crane, 2008 (Prof., Family Therapy, Brigham Young U.), HANDBOOK OF FAMILIES AND POVERTY, 2008, 4. *For decades, states have been experimenting with ways to encourage work among low-income families, particularly those who have been receiving cash assistance. States were the first to create welfare programs aimed at ensuring mothers could be at home with their young children.

(--) States provide the best solutions to social problems:


David Marion, 2009 (Professor of Government at Hampden-Sydney College, Washington Times, January 2, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). The Founders understood that the real home of democracy or self-government is in the localities and the states where people have a genuine shot at managing their own affairs. Local selfgovernment is the nation's principal nursery when it comes to cultivating good habits and sound opinions. If people believe they have little or no control over programs and services that touch them most directly, or if they believe they can pass along the ill effects (including the costs) of their decisions, they either will withdraw from the public arena or adopt a dangerous "free rider" mentality.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Laboratory Effect Means States Solve Best
The laboratory effect allows states to provide superior solutions to national problems.
Tonja Jacobi, 2006 (Assistant professor, Northwestern University School of Law, North Carolina Law Review, May, 2006, 84 N.C.L. Rev. 1089. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008). The states were intended to be independent from one another's policy preferences, to allow them to act as policymaking laboratories for the nation.

The laboratory effect allows states to find the best solutions:


Patrick M. Garry, 2007 (Associate Professor, University of South Dakota School of Law, Brandeis Law Journal, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008). Another value of federalism relates to the close relationship between state governments and their constituencies. It is generally thought that the smaller the governing unit the more likely it is to be responsive to the needs of the [*474] community. 20 Smaller political units are able to foster a deeper sense of community and increased opportunities for political participation. 21 As Professor Wechsler has observed, "the states are the strategic yardsticks for the measurement of interest and opinion, the special centers of political activity, [and] the separate geographical determinants of national as well as local politics." 22 Moreover, as Justice O'Connor has observed, "the 50 states have served as laboratories for the development of new social, economic, and political ideas." 23

Continued state experimentation allows other states to cherrypick the best solutions for their state.
Laura Thomas Gebert, 2007 (J.D. candidate, Barry University School of Law, Barry Law Review, Spring 2007, 8 Barry L. Rev. 149. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008). Many government projects of the past few decades have successfully addressed this country's environmental concerns. 239 Some of the energy policies currently being implemented by state and foreign governments will also prove successful. [*174] Florida should carefully monitor the successes and failures of such programs as California's Solar Initiative, Colorado's Amendment 37, and the solar programs in foreign countries such as Israel, Greece, and Japan. 240 By carefully analyzing the progress of these programs, Florida can "cherry pick" the most cost-effective and successful plans appropriate for our local conditions, while avoiding the pitfalls that are certain to occur in any untested government program.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: States Solve Better for Health Care
The states have significant advantages in providing quality health care:
Tom Price, 2007 (U.S. Representative, Georgia), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 8. *States have some significant advantages when it comes to health reform. They already have the responsibility of regulating health insurance and of licensing health-care providers, and often they have local demographic advantages with a more uniform population than the nation as a whole.

State health care solutions are superior to one-size fits all policies:
John Morrison, 2007 (Montana Commissioner of Insurance), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 29-30. *Solutions that work in Massachusetts or in California may not work in Montana, and that is why state-based health reforms may be the most expeditious solution to a growing national problem. States can experiment with reforms on a smaller scale, so the effectiveness of those reforms can be tested.

State health care solutions are superior to one-size fits all policies:
Tom Price, 2007 (U.S. Representative, Georgia), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 9. *An endless variety of approaches might be implemented, tax credits, expansion of Medicaid or SCHIP, creation of pooling arrangements like the Federal Employee Health Benefits program, single-payer systems, health savings accounts or a defined benefit insurance model. A custom-made health-care financing system can be designed to fit the states' preferences, rather than having to implement a system designed for the entire nation.

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States Counterplan Solvency Extensions: Lopez Precedent


(--) Extension of the Lopez precedent is critical to the worldwide federalism signal of the United States:
Steven G. Calabresi, Associate Professor of Law at Northwestern University, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, 1995, p. Lexis We have seen that a desire for both international and devolutionary federalism has swept across the world in recent years. To a significant extent, this is due to global fascination with and emulation of our own American federalism success story. The global trend toward federalism is an enormously positive development that greatly increases the likelihood of future peace, free trade, economic growth, respect for social and cultural diversity, and protection of individual human rights. It depends for its success on the willingness of sovereign nations to strike federalism deals in the belief that those deals will be kept. The U.S. Supreme Court can do its part to encourage the future striking of such deals by enforcing vigorously our own American federalism deal. Lopez could be a first step in that process, if only the Justices and the legal academy would wake up to the importance of what is at stake.

(--) A strong U.S. federalism model solves wars across the globe:
Steven Calabresi, Law Professor, Northwestern, 1995 (MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, p. 774) (PDBF469) Some of the best arguments for centripetal international federalism, then, resemble some of the best arguments for centrifugal devolutionary federalism: in both cases - and for differing reasons - federalism helps prevent bloodshed and war. It is no wonder, then, that we live in an age of federalism at both the international and subnational level. Under the right circumstances, federalism can help to promote peace, prosperity, and happiness. It can alleviate the threat of majority tyranny - which is the central flaw of democracy. In some situations, it can reduce the visibility of dangerous social fault lines, thereby preventing bloodshed and violence. This necessarily brief comparative, historical, and empirical survey of the world's experience with federalism amply demonstrates the benefits at least of American-style smallstate federalism. In light of this evidence, the United States would be foolish indeed to abandon its federal system.

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States Counterplan Solvency: State Action Leads to Federal Action The ratchet up effect means state action will cause federal action:
Peter Jacobson, 2007 (Prof., Health Law and Policy, U. Michigan School of Public Health), UNIVERSITY OF KANSAS LAW REVIEW, June 2007, 1201. *Federalism matters. For better or worse (to return to the marriage metaphor), we are stuck with state-level options in the absence of national health insurance. If government is responsible for ensuring some level of access to health care for uninsured populations, federal uniformity may be desirable, but states should also experiment with various approaches and policy alternatives until Congress acts. The federalism question is paramount for discussing access to health care. If health care is considered to have fundamental moral importance, it should arguably be available to all, regardless of where they live. For the foreseeable future, however, health care will not be available to all. As such, the burden falls on those states that are willing to accept the responsibility of caring for their own citizens. The number of states now willing to address the needs of their uninsured populations is encouraging and may

put pressure on other states and the federal government to finally accept responsibility.
State action eventually leads to federal actionthe Counterplan will solve all of the case: J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008) We argue here that states can be important catalysts of a federal policy response by stimulating both pro-regulatory and anti-regulatory forces to appeal to the federal government for relief sooner rather than later. To explain this phenomenon we piece together and build on insights from two literatures: the environmental federalism scholarship, which predicts when environmentalists and state and local governments will appeal for federal regulatory floors to prevent a race to the bottom, and when states will do so to overcome interstate externalities (ISEs); and what we have labeled
"defensive preemption theory" (DPT), which predicts when industry will seek federal regulatory ceilings. We show how, consistent with DPT, state regulation addressing climate change has prompted industry to seek uniform and preemptive federal regulation. In addition, we show that although the traditional assumptions of race-to-thebottom theory (RBT) and ISE theory do not apply to climate change (and thus do not generate demand for federal regulation), state regulatory measures nevertheless leave pro-regulation forces unsatisfied and drive them to Congress for relief. Thus,

state regulation aimed at climate change has produced a convergence of interest group support for federal intervention - what we call "hitting the regulatory sweet spot."

State regulation creates federal policy responses:


J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008)
The automobile industry signaled its preference for preemption by attacking California's tailpipe regulations in the courts. 134 And by mid-2006 it was clear that industry groups in other sectors, including [*1536] electricity generation, would seek relief from Congress sooner rather than later. 135 In sum, our point is not that industry demand is solely responsible for federal regulation, but that state regulation can prompt industry players to support a federal policy response sooner than they otherwise might have, increasing the likelihood of its passage.

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States Counterplan Solvency: No race to the bottom


(--) We FIAT uniform enforcement in the counterplan text: stops race to the bottom. (--) RACE TO THE BOTTOM THEORY EMPIRICALLY AND PRACTICALLY FALSE MULTIPLE REASONS Frank B. Cross, 2002 Herbert D. Kelleher Centennial Professor of Business Law, McCombs School of Business, University of Texas at Austin; Professor of Law, University of Texas School of Law, 2002 (CORDOZO LAW REVIEW, November, THE FOLLY OF FEDERALISM, p. 1) The race to the bottom theory suffers serious theoretical flaws. In the Prisoner's Dilemma, on which it is based, the prisoners cannot even communicate much less collaborate. However, states are perfectly capable of joining together to prevent the industrial blackmail. A second theoretical problem relates to industry's ability to make its threats credible. For an industry to move to a more lenient jurisdiction may have considerable costs, and many factors other than environmental regulation affect an industry's preferred location. Indeed, a clean environment might be highly desirable to some companies and their workforces. Empirical evidence generally suggests that environmental costs are not major factors in industrial locational decisions. Moreover, there is evidence that industry gains value from environmental protection and may be motivated to voluntarily adopt protections rather than bargaining for their elimination. The theory that industry universally minimizes its pollution control efforts, regardless of other variables, is plainly wrong. The strict race to the bottom theory is largely empirically unsupportable. The equilibrium
solution for the race to the bottom would have every state adopting the same policy at the absolute bottom - no environmental regulation whatsoever. The theory suggests that companies will negotiate for lower and lower environmental compliance costs. If any state adopted any more stringent policy than any other state, it would supposedly be undercut by the other states and be driven to weaken its standards to the bottom to save jobs or tax revenues. This obviously does not describe reality. States and localities have adopted a variety of independent environmental rules that disconfirm the race to the bottom fears. The theory cannot explain why states would ever create their own independent environmental protection actions, much less maintain and strengthen those actions. While the absolute race to the bottom hypothesis is plainly wrong, some may argue that the hypothesis has some marginal effect, after other factors are considered, reducing environmental controls below the level that is socially optimal and that would be chosen absent pressure to relocate. At the margin, though, it seems as if a democratic citizenry should be able to take a stand behind its preference for greater environmental regulation, even at the expense of some marginal level of economic growth.

Before there were any federal environmental laws, states and local governments adopted numerous regulations, though "race to the bottom believers would suggest that such programs should never have developed." During this period, standards got progressively stricter and air pollution was substantially controlled. In the more recent period, individual states have adopted standards more stringent than those of the federal government. Revesz has recently chronicled state environmental initiatives ranging from auto emission standards (where federal action restrained more vigorous state regulation), hazardous waste regulation, municipal solid waste regulation (where the federal government has left the field to the states), and other areas of environmental protection. This record blatantly contradicts the race to the bottom theory.
Ultimately, the validity of the fear should be empirically tested, and empirical evidence has not provided strong support for race to the bottom fears.

(--) State solutions will not create a race to the bottom.


Michael Cannon, 2007 (Dir., Health Policy Studies, Cato Institute), CATO BRIEFING PAPERS, Sept. 13, 2007, 9. States would be unlikely to engage in a "race to the bottom" by eliminating important consumer protections: the first people to be injured by such unwise regulatory policies would be the voters in that very state, who would then punish the responsible officials.

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States Counterplan Solvency: States Arent Racist


No link: no reason why state anti-poverty actions cause racism FEDERAL ACTION DID NOT ELIMINATE DISCRIMINATION
Donald M. Linhorst, PhD, ACSW, is assistant professor, School of Social Service, Saint Louis University, Social Work, July 2002 v47 i3 p201(8) Federalism and social justice: implications for social work) Although the examples provide support for the ability of the federal government to promote individual justice when it is not granted by individual states, a weakness of federal actions is their time frames. Slavery existed for almost 75 years after the signing of the U. S. Constitution. In addition, discrimination in both private and public settings was not prohibited until the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.

STATES NO LONGER RACIST


Melvyn R. Durchslag, Law professor, Case Western, LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW, June 2000, p. 1375-6. Upon reflection, I suppose that no one should be surprised by the renewed interest in states' rights, or federalism if you will. African Americans are no longer enslaved, nor do states subject them to the indignities of Jim Crow laws as they did thirty years ago. Consequently, the worst of states' rights history is just that - history.

Federalism does not conflict with fighting racism


Balko 03 [http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,100922,00.html, October 22, Radley]
However, one can passionately support states right and federalism and also think the 13th Amendment (search) and Brown v. Board of Education (search) were important and necessary. Federalism has nothing to do with segregation or, for that matter, anything related to race issues. Government works most efficiently when its most accountable to the people. If we must have government interference in our lives, its best to do it first at the local level, then at the state, and then -- only in limited circumstances -- at the federal level. Provincial government allows us the freedom to move away from
jurisdictions we find oppressive or unfair.

Post Civil War Amendments to the Constitution takeout the racism turn: McConkie, Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights Under Law, 1996 (1996 B.Y.U.L. Rev. 389, Brigham Young University Law Review; Lexis) Indeed, during the two periods in our history when federalism was most vehemently advanced, the overriding purpose was the oppression of African Americans: at first for the preservation of slavery, and then for the
preservation of de jure segregation and discrimination. Race provides a strong undercurrent or at least plays a part in today's debate as well. But regardless of the underlying motives behind the current debate over federalism, it remains clear

that traditional arguments that federalism could prevent federal civil rights enforcement have been severely weakened by the Civil War Amendments to the U.S. Constitution.

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***Uniqueness*** Uniqueness Extensions: Federalism is Strong Now


(--) President Obama is restoring federalism in the present system:
JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). A recent decision by President Obama that could open the way for California and other states to set their own limits on greenhouse gases from cars and trucks represents a shift in the delicate and often acrimonious relationship between the federal government and the states, legal experts say, possibly signaling a new view of federalism. ''I think it's quite significant,'' said Samuel Issacharoff, a professor of constitutional law at New York University law school. ''It shows the Obama administration's more benign view of government intervention,'' Professor Issacharoff said, and ''may indicate a spirit of cooperative federalism'' in which Washington will look to the states for new ideas and even a measure of guidance.

(--) Obama has embraced progressive forms of federalism.


JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). The Obama administration seems to be open to a movement known as ''progressive federalism,'' in which governors and activist state attorneys general have been trying to lead the way on environmental initiatives, consumer protection and other issues, several constitutional experts say.

(--) Obama is strengthening the role of the states now:


New York Times, 2009 (January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009).
Signs of a Stronger State Role A recent decision by President Obama points to his possible support of an increase in ''progressive federalism,'' possibly easing delicate relations between federal and state government. Before, the general theme was that the best law comes from Washington.

(--) Obama is ushering in a new era in federal-state relations:


JOHN SCHWARTZ, 2009 (staff writer, New York Times, January 30, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). Tom Miller, the attorney general of Iowa, who met with the transition team in December to discuss federalism and other issues, said he believed the Obama administration would ''usher in a new era in federal-state relations.'' Members of the new administration, Mr. Miller said, ''are open to what we're talking about, what we're thinking.'' They also appreciate, he said, the fact that state attorneys general often achieve a level of bipartisan cooperation when they band together to pursue lawsuits.

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Uniqueness Extensions: Power over poverty being devolved now


(--)Power over poverty policy is being devolved to the states now:
Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OF REACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 150. *The pressures of rising federal budget deficits also created incentives to reduce federal commitments to antipoverty programs. As a result, there began a gradual but steady downward transfer of safety net policymaking authority from the federal government to state governments, a process commonly referred to as the devolution of policymaking authority. Three decades of devolutionary activity have given state and local governments greater administrative and fiscal control over a host of safety net programs, including Medicaid, welfare cash assistance, and an array of social service programs.

(--)Multiple avenues of power over poverty policy are being devolved to the states now:
Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OF REACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 150. *For instance, building on experimental state welfare program waivers in the late 1980s and early 1990s, welfare reform in 1996 shifted substantial responsibility for welfare cash assistance programs to state and local governments for the first time since before the War on Poverty. The consolidation of many different federal categorical grant programs into block grants has also resulted in the devolution of program responsibility to state and local governments.

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Uniqueness: The Supreme Court is protecting federalism now


(--) The Supreme Court grants the states considerable control over anti-poverty policy now.
Bridgette Baldwin, 2008 (Assistant Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). In upholding this budgetary scheme, the Supreme Court confirmed, "there is no question that states have considerable latitude in allocating their AFDC resources, since each state is free to set its own standards of need and to determine the level of benefits by the amount of funds it devotes
to the [*33] program." n257 This case demonstrated a clear ideological shift that veered towards complete deference to "states' rights" in ways that had direct and dire implications for specifically working-class Black women navigating welfare.

Federalism continues to be a central lens through which current welfare cases are decided by the Supreme Court. n258 However, the emerging new federalist approach to welfare demonstrates the growing significance of fiscal concern as a legitimate claim and the rise of fiscal conservatism as a viable framework for endorsing a state's rights argument in welfare law and policy decisions.

(--) Multiple Supreme Court decisions prove: protecting federalism now:

the Court is

William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). Notwithstanding Ms. Greenhouse's writing of an obituary, the reports of the death of federalism, to paraphrase Mark Twain, n3 are [*586] greatly exaggerated. The decisions of the Supreme Court last term in Medellin v. Texas n4 and Riley v. Kennedy n5 establish that controversies about federalism have not disappeared from the docket, and in both cases, the states successfully challenged exercises of federal power. A wealth of recent scholarship also suggests that federalism remains a hot topic. n6 Federalism is still alive and well.

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***Links*** Link Extensions: Social Services Are a State Responsibility


(--) Social services are the responsibility of state and local governments:
Daniel Lips, 2007 (Education Analyst, The Heritage Foundation), DISCONNECTED AND DISADVANTAGED YOUTH, Hrg., House Comm. on Ways & Means, June 19, 2007, 47. Providing social services and education is primarily the responsibility of State and local governments, not the Federal Government.

(--) The states are responsible for the administration of social services:
Scott Allard, 2009 (Prof., School of Social Service Administration, U. Chicago), OUT OF REACH: PLACE, POVERTY, AND THE NEW AMERICAN WELFARE STATE, 2009, 151. *Social service provision itself is a highly devolved activity. Even though many social service programs are funded in full or in part by the federal government, they are designed to be administered by state and local government agencies. State and local governments, in turn, work with local service organizations to formulate programs that then deliver assistance to poor persons. Whether through block grants or other means, increases in federal social service expenditures necessarily increase the responsibility of lower levels of government for program administration.

(--) The federal government has no power to impose economic policy on the states.
Julie Nice, 2008 (Professor of Law @ the University of Denver, Fordham Urban Law Journal, April 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). Finally, the Court also invoked both federalism and separation of powers concerns, noting repeatedly that the federal courts have no power to impose their views of wise economic or social policy on the states.

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Link Extension Wall


First link is pre-emption: federal law will pre-empt state laws in a given field
Julie Lurman, 2007 (Assistant Professor of Natural Resources Law and Policy, University of Alaska, Alaska Law Review, December, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008). Preemption has been clearly recognized by the United States Supreme Court: If Congress

evidences intent to occupy a given field, any state law falling within that field is preempted. If Congress has not entirely displaced state regulation over the matter in question, state law is still pre-empted to the extent it actually conflicts with federal law, that is, when it
is impossible to comply with both state and federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Congress. Thus, a state statute may be preempted either because congressional legislation completely occupies a given field so that there is no room for state action, or because, although Congress left room for the state to legislate, the state's legislation directly conflicts with the federal statute.

Second link is sticky strings: federal conditions that destroy federalism:

funding

brings

Bridgette Baldwin, 2008 (Assistant Professor of Law at Western New England College School of Law. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). The King case demonstrates a conceptual shift in Supreme Court welfare ideology toward cooperative federalism, where the federal government conditioned funding according to how state governments regulated and legislated their AFDC programs in accordance with federal (constitutional) concerns. Moreover, under this theory, the Supreme Court concluded that states had an obligation (if they accept federal funding) to furnish aid to all eligible poor. n192 King signaled expanded control of the federal government over state policies and practices.

Third link is crowd-out: federal interventions undermine access to state benefits-Mila Kofman, 2007 (Prof., Health Policy Institute, Georgetown U.), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 23. *I encourage you to look for measures that will encourage and support meaningful state initiatives. It is also important to remember that many self-funded large employer plans provide generous benefits to workers and dependents, covering expensive medical conditions and covering people with significant medical needs. Federal interventions must be carefully crafted as to not undermine comprehensive benefits that many have.

(--) Federal legislation will pre-empt state legislation.


Julie Lurman, 2007 (Assistant Professor of Natural Resources Law and Policy, University of Alaska, Alaska Law Review, December, 2007. Online. Lexis. Accessed, April 28, 2008). "When Congress exercises a granted power, concurrent conflicting state legislation may be challenged via the Preemption Doctrine." In other words, state law must yield where it conflicts with federal law. The concept of preemption is derived from the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, which requires that state laws that "interfere with, or are contrary to," federal law be invalidated.

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Link Extensions: Health Care


(--) Health care is constitutionally a state function:
Eleanor Kinney, 2008 (Prof., Law, Indiana U. School of Law), RUTGERS LAW REVIEW, Winter 2008, 353. *In the federal system of the United States, the states, through the police power, have primary responsibility for the regulation and promotion of the public's health. The Federal Constitution is silent on the matters of health and health care.

(--) Federal inaction in the health care arena encourages state innovation.
John Tierney, 2007 (U.S. Representative, Massachusetts), HEALTH CARE REFORM: RECOMMENDATIONS TO IMPROVE THE COORDINATION OF FEDERAL AND STATE INITIATIVES, Hrg., House Comm. on Education & Labor, May 22, 2007, 13. *Absent federal action on the issue, many states have taken, or are beginning to take, action of their own accord to address their uninsured populations and expand access to care. Indeed, my own state of Massachusetts has been a pioneer in this regard, having enacted legislation last year to achieve near-universal coverage of the Bay State's residents through a combination of approaches.

(--) The plan pre-empts state public health agencies:


Eleanor Kinney, 2008 (Prof., Law, Indiana U. School of Law), RUTGERS LAW REVIEW, Winter 2008, 362. *All states have a public health agency that is responsible for the promotion and protection of the public health within state borders. Public health statutes grant governments certain powers within the state.

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Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism


(--) Now is the key time for federalism in the United Statesnew policies undermining federalism threaten to undermine the entire federal system:
David Marion, 2009 (Professor of Government at Hampden-Sydney College, Washington Times, January 2, 2009. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). The American federal system has weathered severe challenges in the past. The fact it has done so, however, does not diminish the severity of the threat that federalism faces at this moment. This would not be a good time for the friends of liberty and competent government to let down their guard. All the resources of Madison's republic will be needed to preserve the health of the federal system as the consequence of the financial crisis reverberate from Wall Street to Main Street. Madison's political
writings are all about harnessing private interest in the service of the general good. He believed self-government, properly construed and thoughtfully arranged, is defensible on the dual grounds of satisfying human ambitions and enriching human existence. His defense of the federal system cannot be separated from his defense of self-government. The American federal system was not valued by Madison as an end in itself, but as a means for "securing the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity" and for promoting "justice" and the "general welfare." Policies that weaken the federal system inevitably threaten the

noble objectives of the Founders' experiment in democratic republicanism.

(--) Even small decisions threaten federalism:


Inter-State Council Secretariat 2008 (Online. Internet. Accessed May 1, 2009.
http://interstatecouncil.nic.in/CHAPTERXII.pdf, Sec 12.5.01, September 3
An eminent American expert, while dealing with Federal legislative power in the United States of America, has observed: Of course, no one expects Congress to obliterate the states, at last in one fell swoop. If there is any danger,

it lies in the tyranny of small decisionsin the prospect that Congress will nibble away at State sovereignty, bit by bit, until essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell.

(--) There must be limits to federal power in order to preserve federalism:


Elizabeth Weeks, 2007 (Assoc. Professor at Kansas Law, Journal of Health Law & Policy, Vol. 1, p. 79, 2007. Online. Internet. http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? abstract_id=1012053] (The national government has unique needs in maintaining the supremacy of federal law and an orderly federal system, yet there must be a limit to federal power and a corresponding reservoir of state power if federalism is to have any meaning at all.); Rich & White, supra note 115, at 862
(noting historical tension between national and state governments and the basic principle . . . of division of powers between distinct and coordinate governments).

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Link Magnifiers: New Actions Can Destroy Federalism


POWER IS ZERO-SUM: FEDERAL ACTION UNDERMINES THE STATES
John Yoo, 1997 law professor, (SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW, v. 70, p. 1352) It is important to note that Justice Kennedy did not differentiate between laws that regulated states qua states and those that regulated private parties in areas that might be thought to lie within state power. Following Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion, Justice Kennedy's concurrence treated the exercise of any federal power as a diminution of the power of the states and hence a reduction of state sovereignty.

EVEN SMALL DECISIONS THREATEN FEDERALISM.


Gillian Bradford, 2006 (reporter, ABC Transcripts, SHOW: The World Today, July 21, 2006. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008). MIKE RANN: I think all of us have seen, over decades, bit by bit the powers of the states being stripped away. We've sat by either legislative action by the Federal Government, by court decisions, High Court decisions, or by just the simple financial power of the Federal Government. So what we're trying to do is to actually improve federalism by enhancing, rejuvenating, reinvigorating the states.

EVEN SMALL DECISIONS CAN GREATLY AFFECT FEDERAL BALANCE


Tracy Kaye, 1998 Associate Professor of Law at Seton Hall, HARVARD JOURNAL ON LEGISLATION, Winter 1998, p. Lexis Individually, the fiscal impact of each of these bills may seem small, but as Professor Laurence Tribe has noted, "if there is any danger, it lies in the tyranny of small decisions -- in the prospect that Congress will nibble away at state sovereignty, bit by bit, until someday essentially nothing is left but a gutted shell".

Each step is importantfederalism is eroded bit by bit


Nivola 01 [http://www.brook.edu/Views/Articles/Nivola/2001PI.htm] In contrast to the overloaded central administrations of unitary regimes, a federal system attains efficiencies through a division of labor and the decentralization of routine tasks. This advantage of federalism will erode if Congress persists in preempting one state function after another.

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***Internal Links*** Internal Links: Other nations model US Federalism


(--) Other nations look to U.S. federalism as a model.
William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). For more than two centuries, the structure of our Constitution has made America the beacon for the free world. It has prevented our Bill of Rights from becoming a parchment guarantee. The structure of our Constitution, which divides sovereignty to empower states to address local problems, the federal government to address national problems, and both levels to check each other, remains an enduring gift that, true to its promise, secures the blessings of our liberty. In our post-9/11 world, where freedom is our hope, we need federalism, which secures freedom, now more than ever. Both federalism and the separation of powers must endure as structural limits of government.

(--) MANY COUNTRIES HAVE MODELED AMERICAN FEDERALISM


Steven Calabresi, 1995 Law professor, Northwestern, MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW, December 1995, p. 759-60. At the same time, U.S.-style constitutional federalism has become the order of the day in an extraordinarily large number of very important countries, some of which once might have been thought of as pure nation-states. Thus, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Republic of Austria, the Russian Federation, Spain, India, and Nigeria all have decentralized power by adopting constitutions that are significantly more federalist than the ones they replaced. Many other nations that had been influenced long ago by American federalism have chosen to retain and formalize their federal structures. Thus, the federalist constitutions of Australia, Canada, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico, for example, all are basically alive and well today.

(--)

UNITED STATES' MODELED

FEDERAL

ARRANGEMENTS

ARE

Norman Ornstein and A. Coursen, Fellows at the American Enterprise Institute, AMERICAN ENTERPRISE, January/February, 1992, p. 24 The United States may be able to at least point the way. Our innovations in decentralized federal arrangements as well as our experience in sorting out powers and rights between Washington and the states could well be adapted to many troubled situations elsewhere today.

(--) US FEDERALISM MODEL EFFECTIVE WAY TO MEET ETHNIC CHALLENGES AROUND THEWORLD
Will Kymlicka, Law professor-Queens University, The Canadian Journal of Law & Jurisprudence, July, 2000, 13 Can. J.L. & Juris. 207, p. 213 The history of ethnic relations in Western democracies contains many examples of injustice, oppression, coercion, discrimination and prejudice. Yet over the past thirty years, Western democracies have developed a number of interesting, and I believe effective, models for accommodating ethnocultural diversity. One of these models involves the use of federal or quasi-federal forms of territorial autonomy to enable selfgovernment for national minorities and indigenous peoples. I believe that these forms of territorial autonomy are in general a success, and contain potential lessons for other countries around the world struggling with issues of minority nationalism.

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***Impacts*** Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops War


Federalism stops conflicts abroad.
Donald L. Horowitz, 2007 (Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University, Drake Law Review, Summer, 55 Drake L. Rev. 953. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008). Eighth, federalism can provide a stimulus for interethnic alignments and coalitions. Once the Hausa-Fulani could no longer govern essentially alone, their political party was driven to seek genuine coalitions with other groups. 31 If, then, federalism helps to proliferate groups and subgroups, or if it helps to confine the power of groups to a more or less proportional share, it will, all else equal, make it impossible for one group to aspire to control the whole government through the democratic process. If that is so, and if parties remain ethnically based, as they are likely to be, then it follows that incentives to form interethnic coalitions will be enhanced. Interethnic coalitions are much more likely to attend to the interests of multiple groups, thereby reducing conflict, especially if the coalitions are formed before elections.

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Federalism Impacts: Liberty


A) Federalism preserves liberty and prevents tyranny:
William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). Six years ago, in the aftermath of the victory by my former office in Board of Trustees of the University of Alabama v. Garrett, n12 I published an essay about the judicial enforcement of federalism as one part of the "double security" of freedom predicted by James Madison in The Federalist No. 51. n13 Madison described the structure of the Constitution this way: In a single republic, all the power surrendered by the people, is submitted to the administration of a single government; and the usurpations are guarded against, by a division of the Government into distinct and separate departments. In the compound republic of America, the power surrendered by the people, is first divided between two distinct governments, and then the portion allotted to each subdivided among distinct and separate departments. Hence a double security arises to the rights of the people. The different governments will control each other; at the same time that each will be controlled by itself. n14

B) MUST REJECT EVERY INVASION OF LIBERTY


Sylvester Petro, 1974 Professor of Law, Wake Forest University, TOLEDO LAW REVIEW, 1974, p. 480
It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once. Thus it is unacceptable to say that the invasion of one aspect of freedom is of no import because there have been invasions of so many other aspects. That road leads to chaos, tyranny, despotism and the end of all human aspiration. Ask Solzhensyn. Ask Milovan Dijilas. In sum, if one believes in freedom as a supreme value and the proper ordering principle for any society aiming to maximize spiritual and material welfare, then every invasion of freedom must be emphatically identified and resisted with an undying spirit.

(--) Federalism provides a double protection of liberty:


William Pryor, 2008 (Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, Tulane Law Review, December, 2008. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed May 1, 2009). Madison viewed the structural restraints of federalism and the separation of powers as the double security of liberty. Horizontally, each level of government, state and federal, checks its abuses of power. Vertically, each government checks the other.

Federalism prevents foreign dictatorships:


Nicole Herther-Spiro, 2007 (Emory International Law Review, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). The balance of power in any federal system is a delicate thing. n4 Every state that implements federalism must determine how to balance the autonomy granted to the states or regions against the authority of the central government. n5 Many of the countries that adopt federal systems do so in the hope that the federal system will provide for both a unified central government and real control at the local level. One theory of federalism argues that the system prevents abusive government by decentralizing power. n6 By vesting some power in regional governments, federalism renders central governments less [*322] able to establish authoritarian dictatorships. n7 The trend towards federalism among states that have previously experienced strong and oppressive central regimes can be understood in the context of this theory - a federal system might help to prevent oppressive dictators from once again monopolizing the power of the state to the detriment of its people. n8

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Federalism Impacts: Ethnic Conflicts Impact Module


A) CONSENSUS OF STUDIES CONCLUDES FEDERALISM PROMOTES ETHNIC ACCOMMODATION

Nancy Bermeo, professor of politics at Princeton University, writes on regime change, 2002 (JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 13.2, pp. 96-110 A New Look at Federalism) Since the evidence for and against federalism is clearly mixed, we must weigh it as carefully as possible. Toward this end, Ugo Amoretti and I organized an international research team in 2000 to study the relative merits of federalism versus unitarism in divided societies. With the horrors of the Yugoslav breakup paramount in my mind, I expected our project to conclude that federalism exacerbated ethnic conflict. Instead, despite considering a great diversity of cases, our authors were nearly unanimous in concluding that federal institutions promote successful accommodation.

B) ETHNIC CONFLICTS KILL MILLIONS OF CIVILIANS


Nancy Bermeo, professor of politics at Princeton University, writes on regime change, 2002 (JOURNAL OF DEMOCRACY, 13.2, pp. 96-110 A New Look at Federalism) At a time when globalization is supposedly producing homogeneity, differences derived from ethnicity have become especially lethal. Ethnic violence within states is now much more common than interstate violence and also tends to be harder to stop. Since 1945, ethnic violence has played a major role in half of all wars, turned more than 12 million people into refugees, and caused at least 11 million deaths. Precisely because today's wars are so often between peoples rather than states, civilian casualties have risen dramatically. Fewer than half of the casualties in World War II were noncombatants, while today some three-quarters of all war casualties are civilian.

FEDERALISM ACCOMMODATES ETHNO-CULTURAL DIVERSITY


CANADIAN JOURNAL OF LAW & JURISPRUDENCE, 2000 (July, p. 207) The history of ethnic relations in Western democracies contains many examples of injustice, oppression, coercion, discrimination and prejudice. Yet over the past thirty years, Western democracies have developed a number of interesting, and I believe effective, models for accommodating ethnocultural diversity. One of these models involves the use of federal or quasi federal forms of territorial autonomy to enable selfgovernment for national minorities and indigenous peoples. I believe that these forms of territorial autonomy are in general a success, and contain potential lessons for other countries around the world struggling with issues of minority nationalism.

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Federalism Impacts: Federalism Stops Ethnic Conflicts


Federalism can prevent ethnic conflicts in other countries:
Nicole Herther-Spiro, 2007 (Emory International Law Review, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). A theory of federalism's potential to prevent ethnic conflict has also developed in recent years. n9 Ethnic-or identity-based federalism, as an idea, holds a certain appeal in the post-colonial context. As a system of government, it attempts to resolve one of the problems that imperialist, colonial history created by granting autonomy to groups whose culture and identity have long been suppressed in the "unity" of modern nation-states. n10 A nation-state adopting an ethnic-based federal system gives the "nations" within its borders some degree of self-governance as regions or states in a federal system. n11 Ethnic federalism is one method by which a country may attempt to manage the interests of multiple ethnic groups within its borders and prevent violent ethnic conflict or attempts at secession.

Federalism resolves secessionism:

ethnic

tensions

and

prevents

Nicole Herther-Spiro, 2007 (Emory International Law Review, Spring, 2007. Online. Lexis/Nexis. Accessed, May 1, 2009). Ethnic federalism is an attempt to create a territorial solution to ethnic conflict by acknowledging the need to grant some degree of autonomy to ethnic groups within a state but attempts to do so without complete secession. As Professor Tully explains: The most familiar form of the politics of cultural
recognition is the claims of nationalist movements to be constitutionally recognised as either independent nation states or as autonomous political associations within various forms of multinational federations and confederations. n68 Federalism

based on ethnic divisions provides a solution to demands for recognition without dissolving the unity of the nation-state. Ethnic-based federalism is an institutional arrangement that acknowledges and uses ethnic units "as a basis for local governments," in the hopes that doing so will harmonize inter-group conflicts. n69

Federalism can prevent ethnic conflicts in other countries.


Donald L. Horowitz, 2007 (Professor of Law and Political Science, Duke University, Drake Law Review, Summer, 55 Drake L. Rev. 953. Online. Lexis. Accessed April 28, 2008). There are at least eight ways in which federal institutions - and here I mean specifically the existence of substate territorial units holding some governmental power that the central government does not hold - can have benign effects on ethnic conflict. Some of these effects involve providing satisfactions at one level of government that are unavailable at others. Others entail restructuring of cleavages, interests, relations, and alliances. First, units placed below the central government, whether those are called provinces, regions, or states, can allow a group that is a minority in the country as a whole but a majority in a substate unit to exercise governmental power in ways that would be foreclosed if the whole country were one undifferentiated territory. For example, in Malaysia, where Chinese are about one-quarter of the total population and no longer exercise great power at the center, they nevertheless are a majority in the state of Penang. 17 The Chief Minister of that state has always been Chinese, and despite the rough edges of ethnic relations there, there is [*959] some sense of a government responsive to Chinese interests in Penang. 18 Where groups are territorially differentiated, this is a very common function of federalism, and it can certainly mitigate, but not vitiate, a sense of minority exclusion at the central government level. The important point is that such provincial power, while not completely satisfying, may be sufficient to avert attempts to secede, particularly because most such attempts fail anyway.

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Federalism Good: Africa Impact Module


A) AFRICAN FEDERALISM KEY TO STOPPING AFRICAN CONFLICTS:

Shaheen Mozaffar, Associate Professor of Political Science at Bridgewater, and James R. Scarrit, Professor of Political Science at University of Colorado- Boulder, IDENTITY AND TERRITORIAL AUTONOMY IN PLURAL SOCIETIES, ed. Safran and Maiz, 2000, p. 243 Ethnopolitical conflicts in contemporary Africa thus reflect the interplay of historically configured social structures and the strategic choices of political actors involved in traditional struggles for power and resources. For the most part, these conflicts have involved the activation of ethnicity to define group interests and articulate political demands concerning equity and proportionality in the allocation of cabinet positions, administrative appointments,
public sector jobs, and development funds. These instrumental demands are generally negotiable and readily accommodated within the existing institutional framework of the state through 'ethnic arithmetic' in forming multiethnic government coalitions and formulating affirmative action policies. More problematic are ethnopolitical conflicts that involve the

These demands are difficult to deal with because they usually require a fundamental restructuring of the state, for example, the transformation of a unitary to a federal system, the creation of additional units in an existing federal system, or outright secession.
activation of ethnicity to define group identity and articulate expressive demands dealing with the very survival of the group against real or perceived threats to it.

B) AFRICAN CONFLICTS PUT MILLIONS AT RISK:


Edmond J. Keller, Professor of Political Science at University of California, THE INTERNATIONAL SPREAD OF CONFLICT, ed. Lake and Rothchild, 1998, p. 275 Since 1960, Africa has witnessed more than a score of civil wars, and in just the past decade between two and four million people have died in such wars. In 1993 alone, there were 5.2 million refugees and 1.3 million displaced persons in Africa. Domestic insecurity in Africa, then, has had an increasingly high propensity to spill over borders, resulting in new regional security dilemmas. For example, in a matter of weeks the 1994 civil war in Rwanda resulted in five hundred thousand deaths, and in more than three million refugees fleeing to Zaire and Tanzania. It is clear that what were once thought to be mere domestic conflicts are now increasingly seen as potential sources for regional insecurity. Domestic ethnic conflicts in places such as the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Rwanda, have led to intense and bloody internal wars, massive refugee flows, and threats to the continuity of multi-ethnic nation states.

C) African conflict escalates to global nuclear war


Jeffrey Deutsch, Rabid Tiger Project founder, professor of political

science at New

World University, November 18, 2002, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9,
http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to national borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. Weve got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since
been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and dont need any help, thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may

not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

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Federalism Impacts: India Impact Module


A) India models US federalism
IYER 5/15/01 [THE HINDU, V. R. KRISHNA] The United States, the most powerful state in the world, despite considerable autonomy to the 50 states is proof that nationalism and devolution of power to states are not self-contradictory. The founding fathers of the Indian Union did recognise the federal destination of India but their vision was blurred by the bleeding Partition and massive migrations, as well as religious and ghastly massacres. Thus these transient traumas made the leaders feel a case for over-centralised polity. What is more, the Constitution made the states weak, holding on to the Raj creed of centrifugalism. Federalism for India is fundamental but a few key provisions strike a different note.

B) INDIAN FEDERALISM STOPS BLOODSHED OVER KASHMIR:


Shastri, Obtained Bachelors of Arts at Santa Clara University, HASTINGS INTERNATIONAL LAW REVIEW, 1994, p. 133 The Indian federal system is undergoing a period that is likely to result in a gradual controlled decentralization of power to the states and, eventually, to local levels. In the past thirty to forty years, the Indian
government has created new institutions, thereby responding to the demands and needs of various groups for self-recognition. Despite meeting such demands, the central government has not compromised the central unity and democracy of the overall system. In the future, as part of this ongoing process, new states and hill councils may be formed, particularly in response to tribal, linguistic, and other local concerns. Furthermore, the increasing liberalization of the economic system will also allow states to create their own economic policies and work with the private sector on their own terms. While threats from separatist terrorism will continue to exist,

particularly in Kashmir, the past experience in Tamil Nadu, Punjab, and the Northeastern states has shown that after prolonged conflicts in which the center holds its ground, separatists will eventually realize, under popular pressure, that the federal system provides an opportunity for them to gain a share of power, while the alternative is violence and bloodshed.

C)

VIOLENCE OVER KASHMIR THREATENS NUCLEAR WAR AND THE END OF LIFE ON THE PLANET

FAI, STAFF, Islamic Horizons January, 2004 - February, 2004; LEXIS The Kashmir dispute involves not only the lives and futures of the Kashmiris, but it also significantly impacts India-Pakistan relations and the peace and stability of the South-Asian subcontinent-home to one-fifth of the
world's population. The dispute appears to be irresolvable peacefully because international apathy encourages the obduracy of one of the parties. To distract from its occupation of Kashmir in defiance of UN resolutions, India has mastered the art of propagating myths about the genesis and nature of the dispute. The UN Security Council unanimously agreed with the common position taken by the three parties in the dispute--the Kashmiris, Pakistan, and India--that the status of Jammu and Kashmir can be settled only in accordance with the will of the Kashmiris, ascertained through the democratic method, i.e. a free and impartial plebiscite. The U.S. and other democracies, also, endorsed this agreement. The terms stipulated by the UN Commission for India and Pakistan (UNCIP), in close and continuous consultation with both countries, were crystallized in two resolutions adopted on Aug. 13th, 1948 and Jan. 5th, 1949. Both governments formally accepted the terms in a binding international agreement similar to a treaty. A ceasefire was immediately enforced, and UNCIP started negotiations on a plan for the withdrawal of Indian and Pakistani armies from Kashmir, a plan that would not disadvantage either side or imperil impartiality of the plebiscite. The U.S., Britain and France sponsored all of the Security Council resolutions that called for a plebiscite. Their commitment was indicated in a personal appeal made by President Harry Truman and British Prime Minister Clement Atlee that differences over demilitarization be submitted to arbitration by the plebiscite administrator, a distinguished American war hero: Admiral Chester Nimitz. Unfortunately, India rejected this appeal and, later, objected to an American acting as the plebiscite administrator. No permanent obstacles bar the establishment of a UN-run plebiscite administration in Kashmir. The world organization has proved its ability, even in the most forbidding circumstances, to institute an electoral process under its supervision and control, with the help of a neutral peacekeeping force. One such striking example is Namibia, which was peacefully brought to independence after seven decades of occupation and control by South Africa. More recently, the UN peacefully settled the East Timor issue. Four decades ago, UN Representative Sir Owen Dixon envisaged that the Kashmiri plebiscite could be so regionalized that none of the state's different zones would be forced to accept an outcome contrary to its wishes. The idea of a referendum or plebiscite can be seamlessly translated into the idea of elections to one or more constituent assemblies that will determine the future status of the state or of its different zones. However, any such election must be completely free, transparent, and conducted under UN control and supervision.

Kashmir, it might be said, is the Alsace-Lorraine of South Asia, substituting India and Pakistan for France and Germany. It has sparked two conventional wars and a nuclear arms race between the South Asian rivals, making it the world's most dangerous territory. Any new war may have nuclear implications that could endanger every nation and every human. Both India and Pakistan are nuclear powers that have developed sophisticated missile delivery vehicles, and both are adamant against signing the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Furthermore, both feature domestic constituencies that universally celebrate their muscular, nuclear postures; no political party or serious private association champions nuclear controls or disarmament.

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Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions


INDIA USES FEDERALISM TO DECREASE TENSIONS NEAR KASHMIR
PTI NEWS AGENCY, July 25, 2001, p. Lexis New Delhi, 25 July: Indian Home Minister L K Advani on Wednesday as dateline said that the federal government, as part of devolution of power to states, was willing to give special powers to Jammu and Kashmir if the demand so arose. Replying to supplementaries during question hour in Rajya Sabha (upper house of parliament), Advani reiterated Jammu and Kashmir was an integral part of India and there would be no compromise on it. Stating the government was moving towards devolution of more powers to states, Advani said, "in this process if Jammu and Kashmir needs special powers, we are willing to give it".

FEDERAL STRUCTURE ESSENTIAL TO INDIA'S FUTURE


THE HINDU, May 15, 2001, p. Lexis To be unitary at the whim of the Union and federal at the pleasure of the Centre makes our Republic a quasi-federal chameleon. Indian pluralism, rich in diversity and deep-rooted in group identity, is not a mere coat of paint. In constitutional politics and justice there is no room for hide-and-seek jurisprudence. Law and life shall shape their modus vivendi in the integral yoga of federal justice.

FEDERAL FRAMEWORK IN INDIA IS NECESSARY TO PREVENT CONFLICT


GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, January 22, 2002, p. Lexis The home minister said the federal government would welcome the J and K government to identify areas for the exercise. In his speech on 'My India: The Vision for the Future', Advani said "I think that it is not out of place to mention my hope and desire to see the coming together of India and Pakistan in some type of confederal framework in the years to come. This is not an impossible dream." Advani recalled how the two Germanys reunited by pulling down the Berlin Wall and referred to signs of reconciliation even between the two Koreas and Europe becoming a single monetary union with a common currency.

DENIAL OF SELF-DETERMINATION FOMENTS KASHMIR CRISIS


Michael Kelly, Director of Research at University of Detroit College of Law, DRAKE LAW REVIEW, 1999, p. Lexis As history has shown, this was a tactical, political mistake, the repercussions of which carry over to the present: "The refusal to recognize self-determination movements can also produce severe international ramifications. The current conflict in Kashmir demonstrates how a previous denial of a people's right to self-determination can foment the conflicts of the present and ensure the uncertainty of the future."

Federalism is crucial to Indias cohesion


IYER 5/15/01 [THE HINDU, V. R. KRISHNA] In India, when linguistic states were demanded, there was no contra-national passion. On the other hand, it was a great nationalist who urged that linguistic states be formed. Central resistance to this desideratum was, at root, "Delhi Mughaldom". A people's right cannot be suppressed and this was demonstrated by Poti Sriramalu going on a fast unto death and actually his martyrdom accelerated the driving force of linguistic autonomy. Today, when we look back on the various states, is there one single patriot who regrets or rejects the formation of Kerala and Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, Gujarat and Maharashtra? Likewise, the other states were formed in due recognition of the power and passion which supported the just claim of limited self- determination. Let me repeat that autonomy, only within the Indian sovereignty, is not antinational but strengthens the country's fraternity.

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Federalism Impacts: India Impact Extensions


Failure of Indian federalism causes nuclear war in Kashmir
Kelly, Director of Legal Research, Writing & Advocacy at Michigan State University's Detroit College of Law, 99 [47 Drake L. Rev. 209, Michael J.] Fraying Federations There are several federations around the world that continue to hobble along in their present form but show signs of strain, and are subjected to demands from internal groups both for more autonomy and, in some cases, outright secession and independence. India, Russia, Canada, and Mexico are representative of such instances.1. India: The Kashmir Dilemma Despite the many ethnic and religious separatist movements from all over the country that threaten the central government in India, the most vexing problem, and the one that has drawn the most international attention, has been with that region in the north known as Kashmir. n249 The formerly independent state of Kashmir has been the object of a political and military tug-of-war between the nation-states of India and Pakistan since the independence of these two large states from Britain in 1947. n250 The "Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir" was constituted under the Treaty of Amristar in 1846 n251 and was one of 565 "princely states" that were considered nominally independent when India and Pakistan were both part of the single British colony on the Asian sub-continent known collectively as "India," but who, upon the British exodus from the region, were given the free choice to accede to either of the two successor dominions: Pakistan or India. n252 [*253] Kashmir's Hindu ruler chose India, even though the majority of Kashmiris were Muslim, in exchange for troops to repel tribal raiders. Lord Mountbatten, Governor- General of India, provisionally accepted the accession but noted that the final question would be settled by a plebiscite. n253 That plebiscite has never been held. n254 As history has shown, this was a tactical, political mistake, the repercussions of which carry over to the present: "The refusal to recognize self-determination movements can also produce severe international ramifications. The current conflict in Kashmir demonstrates how a previous denial of a people's right to self-determination can foment the conflicts of the present and ensure the uncertainty of the future." n255 Moreover, the international community has never recognized India's claim to Kashmir. n256 [SEE MAP IN ORIGINAL] Kashmir is now occupied by three sovereign nation-states: India, which controls the lion's share; Pakistan, which occupies a small western portion; and China, which controls Ladakh. n257 Various mediations of the situation have been attempted (the United Nations from 1948-58, the U.S.S.R. from 1965-66, and the United States in 1990), but to no avail. n258 Predictably, the situation in Kashmir has degenerated. There are both secessionist groups and unionist groups taking militant action against each other and the Indian army that has occupied the state to enforce military rule for most of the 1990s. n259 Violence has become the daily norm for this region. In 1990 alone, there were 3000 deaths related to the unrest in [*254] Kashmir. n260 Complicating matters, and of concern to the world community and the United Nations, is the recent development of nuclear capabilities on the part of both India and Pakistan. n261 Indeed, as the realistic and potential flashpoint amongst the three occupying nuclear powers, Kashmir has been referred to as a "nuclear tinderbox" waiting to be ignited. n262 One formula recently put forward, and significantly based on principles of self- determination, calls for the creation of a "Kashmiri Autonomous Region" under nominal Indian control that would exist until a referendum can be held, at which point the various parts of Kashmir can freely choose with which sovereign they wish to associate without the entire region going as a single entity. n263

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Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impact Module


A. Federalism is crucial to prevent multiple civil wars and the destruction of Democracy in Iraq
Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, 04 [The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2; Pg. 7, Dawn] Establishing a governmental system that can accommodate Iraq's different ethnic and religious groups, previously kept in check by the political and military repression of the Saddam Hussein regime, is paramount to securing that peace. In the absence of a system uniquely designed toward this end, violent conflicts and demands for independence are likely to engulf the country. If not planned precisely to meet the specific ethnic and religious divisions at play, any democratic government to emerge in Iraq is bound to prove less capable of maintaining order than the brutal dictatorship that preceded it. By dividing power between two levels of government -- giving groups greater control over their own political, social, and economic affairs while making them feel less exploited as well as more secure -federalism offers the only viable possibility for preventing ethnic conflict and secessionism as well as establishing a stable democracy in Iraq.

B. War in the Middle East will escalate into global nuclear war
Steinbach, DC Iraq Coalition, 02 [John, http://www.globalresearch.ca/articles/STE203A.html]
Meanwhile, the existence of an arsenal of mass destruction in such an unstable region in turn has serious implications for future arms control and disarmament negotiations, and even the threat of nuclear war. Seymour Hersh warns, "Should

war break out in the Middle East again,... or should any Arab nation fire missiles against Israel, as the Iraqis did, a nuclear escalation, once unthinkable except as a last resort, would now be a strong probability."(41) and Ezar Weissman, Israel's current President said "The nuclear issue is gaining momentum(and the) next war will not be conventional."(42) Russia and before it the Soviet Union has long been a major(if not the major) target of Israeli nukes. It is widely reported that the
principal purpose of Jonathan Pollard's spying for Israel was to furnish satellite images of Soviet targets and other super sensitive data relating to U.S. nuclear targeting strategy. (43) (Since launching its own satellite in 1988, Israel no longer needs U.S. spy secrets.) Israeli nukes aimed at the Russian heartland seriously complicate disarmament and arms control negotiations and, at the very least, the unilateral possession of nuclear weapons by Israel is enormously destabilizing, and dramatically lowers the threshold for their actual use, if not for all out nuclear war. In the words of Mark Gaffney, "... if the familar pattern(Israel refining its weapons of mass destruction with U.S. complicity) is not reversed soon- for whatever reason- the deepening

Middle East conflict could trigger

a world conflagration." (44)

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Federalism Impacts: Iraq Impacts


Federalism would solve in Iraq
White 2004 (Roger, assc prof, poly sci, Loyola U, New Orleans; The Guardian; February 13. l/n)) If there were ever a case for federalism, Iraq is it. The United States was the first federal government, thanks in great measure to the genius of James Madison. In the years since our Constitution was ratified in 1789, many countries -- Canada, Australia and lately Mexico, to name a few -- have developed federal institutions. The essence of federalism is divided sovereignty. Federal rule applies in situations characterized by different, distinct communities, each wanting to rule over themselves but also having good reasons to stick together. The Yankees of Massachusetts and the Planters of South Carolina were, after all, not terribly fond of each other in 1787, but most knew that unless they surrendered a portion of their sovereignty they would lose all of it to one or another European power.

Liberal democracy solves Iraqi instability


White 2004 (Roger, assc prof, poly sci, Loyola U, New Orleans; The Guardian; February 13. l/n)) One of our main jobs today in Iraq is to stop the Kurds, Shias and Sunnis from engaging in a destructive civil war of their own. This said, we can still retain a healthy sense of our own political limits. Liberal democracy, as we have come to know it, is predicated upon the defense of inalienable rights, as Thomas Jefferson famously announced in 1776. The idea that rights belong to individuals and not to groups is not yet readily accepted in Iraq and probably will not be for some time. While some basic level of individual freedom will have to be built into the new Iraqi Constitution if anything like a democracy is to arise, the demand for individual freedom will have to be advanced prudently. The recognition of inalienable rights will have to be balanced against local traditions and conventions.

Failure to establish power-sharing will cause a civil war


Robberson 12/10/03 [The Dallas Morning News, Tod, L/N] The creation of democratic governance, after 35 years of brutal dictatorship, is a key aspect of Washington's reconstruction and stabilization plan for Iraq. Without a stable democracy that balances power between Iraq's disparate religious and ethnic groups, U.S. officials warn, the nation threatens to slide into further chaos and potential civil war. Finding a formula that satisfies everyone is an enormous challenge.

The Failure of federalism in Iraq causes civil war that escalates through the region and destroys global federalism
Brancati, visiting scholar at the Center for the Study of Democratic Politics at Princeton, 04 [The Washington Quarterly, Vol. 27, No. 2; Pg. 7, Dawn] The potential consequences of failing to design federalism properly and to establish a stable democracy in Iraq extend far beyond Iraqi borders. Civil war in Iraq may draw in neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran, further destabilizing the Middle East in the process. It may also discourage foreign investment in the region, bolster Islamic extremists, and exacerbate tensions between Palestinians and Israelis. A civil war in Iraq may even undermine support for the concept of federalism more generally, which is significant given the number of countries also considering federalism, such as Afghanistan and Sri Lanka, to name just two. Finally, the failure to design and implement the kind of federalism that can establish a stable democracy in Iraq might undermine international support for other U.S. initiatives in the region, including negotiations for Arab-Israeli peace.

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Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Module


A) FEDERALISM IS CRITICAL TO STABILIZE NIGERIA
AFRICA NEWS SERVICE, 2002 (Sept 11, p. 1008254u6672) Governor James Ibori of Delta State has said that for democracy to be strengthened, there was the need for the re-affirmation of the structure of the nation and for all Nigerians to support the constitution that emphasized true federalism. The governor said most of the problems facing the country could be resolved by keeping to the true practices of federalism. Fielding questions from newsmen during the monthly press chat at Government House, Asaba, Ibori said, "if you take from the local government elections to the issue of revenue allocation, and in fact, also to the issue of the threat of impeachment of Mr. President, to my mind, the core issue at play: as true federalism." He reiterated that until unless Nigerians were committed to the practice of true federalism, the nation's polity would continue to witness various hiccups. The federal government has appointed prosecutors to enforce gun laws and has initiated tort reform to stop state suits against gun manufacturers. Both initiatives are unconstitutional. They intrude on rights reserved for the states and are not justified under the commerce power of Congress.

B)

NIGERIAN STABILITY KEY TO STOPPING VIOLENT INSTABILITY THROUGHOUT WEST AFRICA

Akwei 03 (Adotei, Africa Director @ Amnesty International, NPR, 4/7) Ms. AKWEI: Well, Nigeria is absolutely critical to West Africa. You have conflicts in Liberia. You have conflict now in Cote d'Ivoire, which was one of the most stable countries in Africa. You have a very fragile situation Sierre Leone and you have fighting on the border of Guinea. So that whole Manu River region of West Africa is just on the precipice. You have very weak democracies in Benin and in Ghana. The saying is 'That if Nigeria, you know, sneezes, the rest of West Africa catches a cold.' It also impacts all of Africa because it has this population that's massive. It has economic potential to really pull the region up--the West Africa region. You know, we're all kind of waiting and hoping for Nigeria to assume and lead the way it was meant to because of its size and its resources. And we're still waiting.

C) African conflict escalates to global nuclear war


Jeffrey Deutsch, Rabid Tiger Project founder, professor of political

New World University, November 18, 2002, The Rabid Tiger Newsletter, Vol. II, No. 9,
http://www.rabidtigers.com/rtn/newsletterv2n9.html The Rabid Tiger Project believes that a nuclear war is most likely to start in Africa. Civil wars in the Congo (the country formerly known as Zaire), Rwanda, Somalia and Sierra Leone, and domestic instability in Zimbabwe, Sudan and other countries, as well as occasional brushfire and other wars (thanks in part to national borders that cut across tribal ones) turn into a really nasty stew. Weve got all too many rabid tigers and potential rabid tigers, who are willing to push the button rather than risk being seen as wishy-washy in the face of a mortal threat and overthrown. Geopolitically speaking, Africa is open range. Very few countries in Africa are beholden to any particular power. South Africa is a major exception in this respect - not to mention in that she also probably already has the Bomb. Thus, outside powers can more easily find client states there than, say, in Europe where the political lines have long since been drawn, or Asia where many of the countries (China, India, Japan) are powers unto themselves and dont need any help, thank you. Thus, an African war can attract outside involvement very quickly. Of course, a proxy war alone may not induce the Great Powers to fight each other. But an African nuclear strike can ignite a much broader conflagration, if the other powers are interested in a fight. Certainly, such a strike would in the first place have been facilitated by outside help - financial, scientific, engineering, etc. Africa is an ocean of troubled waters, and some people love to go fishing.

science at

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Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions


Federalism is crucial to preventing ethnic conflict in Nigeria Innocent Anaba 04 [Africa News Service, August 24, 2004 pNA, Abuja, Aug 24, 2004 (Vanguard/All
Africa Global Media via COMTEX)] EMINENT Lawyer, Professor Itse Sagay, SAN, yesterday warned that unless Nigeria returns to the path of true federalism, she may never record real growth, progress, development and harmony amongst the ethnic nationalities that make up the country, even as he blamed the country's woes on bad leadership. He also justified the restiveness of the people of Niger Delta region, saying "the people of the Niger Delta, whose land produce all this stolen wealth have every reason to be restive in the midst of their misery, squalor, wretchedness and extreme poverty and neglect."

Sharia threatens Nigerian federalism, resulting in conflict J. Isawa Elaigwu, Institute of Governance and Social Research & Habu Galadima, University of Jos, 03 [Publius, Summer 2003 v33 i3 p123(22)]
The transition from military to civilian government on 29 May 1999 had raised hopes for a new democratic Nigeria. However, no sooner had civilian politicians taken over the reins of power than an emotional religious issue--Sharia--burst upon the political scene, casting a dark shadow over Nigerian federalism. Political leaders in the North began implementing Islamic law over criminal matters in Nigeria's 12 mostly Muslim northern states. Communal violence emanating from conflict over Sharia soon consumed more than 3,000 lives, often under brutal and barbaric circumstances.

Nigerian federalism is crucial to prevent conflict Vanguard 04 [Asia Africa Intelligence Wire, July 14, 2004 pNA

[Byline: Mcphilips Nwachukwu, Ikechukwu Eze, Charles Ozoemena & Nduka Uzuakpundu] ON the occasion of the 70th birthday celebration of Nobel Laureate, Professor Wole Soyinka, one-time military governor of Imo and Lagos States, Rear Admiral Ndubuisi Kanu, declared yesterday in Lagos that the therapy for Nigeria to attain true development, prosperity and political stability laid in its capacity to embrace true federalism.
Prof. Soyinka himself reviewing the polity on BBC, accused the ruling People's Democratic Party (PDP) of trying to manipulate elections to transform the nation's political landscape into a "one-party democracy." President Olusegun Obasanjo, who has been locked in a running battle with the Nobel Laureate since his (Obasanjo's) return to power in 1999, surprised on lookers at the birthday lecture by congratulating an author widely seen as his most eloquent critic. Only two months ago, the acclaimed playwright and activist was tear-gassed and briefly arrested during an anti-government rally in Lagos. Admiral Kanu, guest speaker at the lecture organised by the Pyrates Confraternity co-founded by Prof. Soyinka, said the

inability of Nigerian leaders to toe the path of true federalism and their failure to appreciate the implication of the heterogeneous nature of the country had only resulted in the various political uprisings, marginalisation, and social injustices in the country.

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Federalism Impacts: Nigeria Impact Extensions


Failure of federalism in Nigeria causes civil war Jide Ajani, Political Editor & Olasunkami Akoni 04 [Africa News Service, May 4, 2004
pNA, Lagos, May 04, 2004 (Vanguard/All Africa Global Media via COMTEX)] On his own part, Governor Tinubu declared that any policy of government which neglects the spirit of true federalism or which makes it difficult or impossible for a state to cater for the needs of its citizen would amount to riding the tiger. Speaking extempore, the governor made it clear that if the leadership refuses to provide the basic needs of the people, like health, education and security, the same citizens would someday turn the heat on the leadership.

Federalism is crucial to the future of Nigeria Comtex 8/20/04 [Africa News Service, Olapade Agoro, NAC Presidential Candidate, (Vanguard/All
Africa Global Media via COMTEX)] He made some assertions, just as he also made some claims regarding what transpired at the polls. For instance, he asserted that without true federalism, Nigeria as a nation would not work. He is right. And many others before him had said that much.

Federalism is crucial for the progress of Nigeria Innocent Anaba 04 [Africa News Service, August 24, 2004 pNA, Abuja, Aug 24, 2004 (Vanguard/All
Africa Global Media via COMTEX)] "It has thus become clear that unless Nigeria returns to true federalism, there can be no real growth, progress, development and harmony amongst the ethnic nationalities that make up the country," He noted that democracy is yet to arrive in Nigeria, saying "part of the grave problem facing us today is our stubborn and consistent refusal to accept the practice and culture of democracy. And so, we have civilian government and no democracy."

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Federalism Impacts: Russia Impact Module


A) FEDERALISM IS KEEPING RUSSIA TOGETHER
Michael Kelly, Director of Research at University of Detroit College of Law, DRAKE LAW REVIEW, 1999, p. Lexis With the notable exception of Chechnya, Russia has managed to hold itself together in a cohesive federation through a combination of offering a significant degree of autonomy to its constituent parts and the gradual empowerment of its regional governments. There are twenty-one ethnically homogenous republics under the new federal constitution, and these are more worrisome for Russia's central government in Moscow than the provinces, autonomous provinces, districts, autonomous districts, or territories.

B) RUSSIAN COLLAPSE INCREASES RISK OF NUCLEAR TERRORISM


Henry E. Hale, Assistant Professor of Political Science, Rein Taagepera, Professor of Political Science, University of California, 2002 (EUROPE-ASIA STUDIES, November, p. 18) A fragmenting Russia could pose extreme security concerns for the West, of which the nuclear danger is the most obvious. While the former Soviet republics were willing to cede their arms to Russia, a collapsed Russia would be likely to have no clear single 'successor' to which the weapons would best be transferred. This could make it nearly impossible to consolidate Russia's nuclear arsenal, which would in turn seriously complicate international diplomacy. Indeed, given the tendency of some Russian regional leaders to spout anti-Semitic slogans or otherwise thumb their noses at norms of human rights, their hold on nuclear weapons could radically increase the likelihood that these weapons might fall into the hands of terrorists or other groups that would like to use them for more than just defensive deterrence. Even if this likelihood is small, the possible outcome is sufficiently grave to merit significant effort to prevent it from occurring.

C) THE IMPACT IS EXTINCTION


BERES, 1984 (TERRORISM AND GLOBAL SECURITY; PG. 50-51) Nuclear terrorism could even spark full scale nuclear war between states. Such war could involve the entire spectrum of nuclear conflict possibilities, ranging from a nuclear attack upon a nonnuclear state to systemwide nuclear war. How might such far-reaching consequences of nuclear terrorism come about? Perhaps the most likely
way would involve a terrorist nuclear assault against a state by terrorists hosted in another state. For example, consider the following scenario: Early in the 1980s Israel and her Arab state neighbors finally stand ready to conclude a comprehensive, multilateral peace settlement. With a bilateral treaty between Israel and Egypt already several years old, only the interests of the Palestiniansas defined by the PLOseem to have been left out. On the eve of the proposed signing of the peace agreement, half a dozen crude nuclear explosives in the one kiloton range detonate in as many Israeli cities. Public grief in Israel over the many thousand dead and maimed is matched only by the outcry for revenge. In response to the public mood, the government of Israel initiates selected strikes against terrorist strongholds in Lebanon, whereupon the Lebanese government and it allies retaliate against Israel. Before long, the entire region is ablaze, conflict has escalated to nuclear forms, and all countries in the area have suffered unprecedented destruction. Of course, such a scenario is fraught with the makings of even wider destruction. How would the United States react to the situation in the Middle East? What would be the Soviet response? It is entirely conceivable that a chain reaction of interstate nuclear conflict could ensue, one that would involve the superpowers or even every nuclear weapon state on the planet. What, exactly, would this mean? Whether the terms of assessment be statistical or human, the consequences of nuclear war require an entirely new paradigm of death. Only such a paradigm would allow us a proper framework for absorbing the vision of near-total obliteration and the outer limits of human destructiveness.

Any nuclear war would have effectively permanent and irreversible consequences. Whatever the actual extent of injuries and fatalities, it would entomb the spirit of the entire species in a planetary casket strewn with shorn bodies and imbecile imaginations.

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Federalism Impacts: Russia Authoritarianism Module


A) FEDERALISM IS ESSENTIAL TO PRESERVATION OF DEMOCRACY IN RUSSIA
GLOBAL NEWS WIRE, April 23, 2002, p. Lexis St Petersburg, 23 April, RIA-Novosti correspondent Svetlana Chikirova: Federalism in Russia is a guarantee of the authorities' accountability to citizens, deputy head of the Russian president's administration Dmitriy Kozak believes. RIA-Novosti news agency reports that Kozak said this today when addressing an international conference on the division of powers among the various levels of public authorities in Russia. According to Kozak, the generally-recognized principles of federalism have over the past decade "in Russia been implemented extremely haphazardly or not implemented thoroughly". This has led to the start of a process of abolition of local self-government, there are "more and more discussions about replacing it", Kozak said. However, Russia made its historic choice in favour of federalism at the start of the 1990s, he said. This choice was enshrined in the new Russian Federation Constitution of 1993. Kozak said that federalism and local self-government are for Russia primarily a means of increasing citizens' participation in running the state, bringing the authorities closer to the public and guaranteeing the stability of public institutions. The issues to be discussed at today's conference are therefore of "immense, vital importance" for Russia, Kozak stressed.

B)

Failure of Russian democracy risks the use of 1000s of nuclear warheads

Shelton 01 Shelton, Chair of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1-15-2001 (Henry) Vital Speeches No. 7, Vol. 67; Pg. 194 ; ISSN: 0042-742X Force, Forces, and Forecasting; Henry H. Shelton speech; Transcript In much the same way while the Balkans remain a serious concern in Europe, but the situation there pales in comparison with events in Russia. The future of Europe will not swing on the status of Kosovo or the establishment of a new Serbia. No, the future of Europe swings on the path that Russian nationalism takes and whether Russia can continue its peaceful evolution into a fully democratic nation with a stable economy that abides by the rule of law. As I discussed with my counterpart, Russian Chief of Staff Kvashnin, this past Tuesday, one of the most potentially destabilizing factors in the region is the thousands of nuclear and chemical weapons, stored in facilities throughout Russia. And as we all know, there are still thousands of nuclear warheads in the Russian arsenal. They present a very profound danger to our security should they fall into the wrong hands and there are many "wrong hands" out there trying to get them.

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***States Counterplan Affirmative Answers*** States Counterplan 2ac Answers


(--) Fifty state FIAT is illegitimate and a voting issue: A) Its utopian: All 50 states have never taken an action at the same time B) No literature base: No literature assumes all 50 states take a uniform actioncant research answers C) Voting issue for fairness & ground (--) Counterplan doesnt solve the case: it doesnt mobilize resources or collective action as well as federal action: Weill evidence in the 1ac. (--) No proof other nations will model state religious doctrineour 1ac evidence says the federal governments policy is modeled: meaning they dont solve our 2nd advantage. (--) The federal government is the best actor to address poverty: it has a mountain of empirical successes:
James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) When Attacking Poverty, the Federal Government Often Is Very Effective That the business sector, state and local governments, and charity are inadequate to the task of redressing poverty and ensuring opportunity would not mean that the federal government should play an important role if the federal government also were unsuccessful or institutionally incapable. But the federal government possesses the resources and has proven itself as an actorthe most successful actorin these arenas, especially when (as discussed earlier) it moves both economic and spending policy in the
same positive direction. When it did that in the 1960s and the late 1990s, progress was substantial. Separately in this issue Peter Edelman addresses the canard (from Ronald Reagan among others) that we fought a war on poverty and poverty won.49 The fact is that many federal initiatives from the last seventy years have been

extraordinarily successful. Their impact has been incomplete but still formidable: The federal government has transformed old age from a frequent sentence of poverty to, typically, albeit not universally, a state of economic and health security. In 2003 public benefit programs reduced by more than 80 percent the number of seniors who otherwise would be living in poverty (14 million fewer seniors).50 Public benefit programs (overwhelmingly federal or federal-state programs), such as TANF, social security, Supplemental Security Income, food stamps, and others, lifted nearly one in three otherwise poor children out of poverty in 2003.51 Public benefits substantially reduce the severity of poverty even for those they do not lift out of poverty. In 2003 for those who remained poor the programs increased their average income from 29 percent to 57 percent of the poverty line.52 In the 1960s studies found deep hunger and malnutrition in many poor areas of the country. While hunger and food insecurity are still widespread problems, food stamps, school meals, WIC, and related programs have made severe hunger much less common. In the first fifteen years after Medicaid began, black infant
mortality dropped by 49 percent, more than nine times the rate of improvement of the preceding fifteen years.53 Indisputably these results are not good enough. The work of ensuring that the federal government lives up to its responsibilities and appropriately takes on poverty, insecurity, and unequal opportunity through its economic and spending policies is hardly finished. And that work is not easy, short-term, or assured of success. But there is no alternative. The federal

government is the indispensable player in redressing poverty.

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States Counterplan 2ac Answers


Permute: do boththis solves best: allows for national organization and support while still maximizing state solutions:
James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) Second, the federal government already has played a successful and central role, especially during the last seventy years, in moving the country toward more nearly equal opportunity, greater economic and health security, and reduced poverty.21 There is no substitute for a robust positive federal role. That the federal role is absolutely necessary does not mean that the federal government always will do the
right thing. Nor, when it does the right thing, will the federal government always do so decisively enough, completely enough, or in a timely way. Bitter experience shows us otherwise. The federal role, moreover, does not mean that individual self-reliance, a strong and effective charitable sector, a more supportive workplace, and engaged state and local governments are unimportant. The federal government does not substitute for the role of other sectors that themselves are critical components of a broad social strategy to build economic security, develop opportunity, and reduce poverty. American history, economic and government structure, politics, and culture all mean that a robust economy, a civil society, and vibrant state and local government are fundamental to economic security. But having real national leadership in the mix

is essential. As Pres. Lyndon Johnson said early in the war on poverty: Unfortunately, many
Americans live on the outskirts of hopesome because of their poverty, and some because of their color, and all too many because of both. Our task is to help replace their despair with opportunity. Poverty is a national problem, requiring improved national organization and support. But this attack, to be effective, must also be organized at the State and the local level and must be supported and directed by State and local efforts.The program I shall propose will emphasize this cooperative approach.22

Turn: Federal spending on anti-poverty solves racism:


James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) The two periods of greatest leaps in empowering and creating opportunity for African Americans in our nationthe Reconstruction period after the Civil War and the period of the civil rights movement in the 1960s and 1970swere periods of political and economic progress complemented by federal spending policy. In both instances the economic change created through access to property, to jobs, to political power, to the courts, and to education dwarfed that created by new federal spending initiatives. But, in both periods, spending initiatives were an important secondary source of change.32 And both produced a fierce reaction stemming from the defense of the economic and political power of whites and of economic elites. Both times the challenge to poverty, economic injustice, and racial discrimination slowed or reversed. In other words, political cycles tend to drive federal economic management and federal spending policy to move in tandem: both are likely to be inadequate
for the poor when political weakness means that the national government can ignore their needs. For example, in the last few years Congress passed damaging bank-ruptcy law changes and the Bush administration sought damaging changes in overtime and civil rights policy, while Congress cut Medicaid, child support, child care, and other spending for the poor. But when

spending and economic policy are positive and complement each other, great strides can be made in increasing opportunity and reducing poverty.

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States Counterplan 2ac Answers


REJECT RACISM AT EVERY TURN:
BARDNT 1991 (JOESEPH, MINISTER, DISMANTLING RACISM) To study racism is to study walls. We have looked at barriers and fences, restraints and limitations, ghettos and prisons. The prison of racism confines us all, people of color and white people alike. It shackles the victimizer as well as the victim. The walls forcibly keep people of color and white people separate from each other; in our separate prisons we are all prevented from achieving the human
potential that God intends for us. The limitations imposed on people of color by poverty, subservience, and powerlessness are cruel, inhuman, and unjust; the effects of uncontrolled power, privilege, and greed, which are the marks

of our white prison, will inevitably destroy us as well. But we have also seen that the walls of racism can be dismantled. We are not condemned to an inexorable fate, but are offered the vision and the possibility of freedom. Brick by brick, stone by stone, the prison of individual, institutional, and cultural racism can be destroyed. You and I are urgently called to join the efforts of those who know it is time to tear down once and for all, the walls of racism.

States will race to the bottom in the poverty area:


James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) Many in state governments believe that grants to and tax benefits for businesses are necessary to retain jobs or win the interstate (and increasingly international) competition to lure businesses that create local jobs and economic growth. Businesses already in the state, or thinking of migrating in, look for public investments in roads, other infrastructure, and education. These take a large share of state revenues. At the same time, many state officials believe that laws supporting higher compensation (e.g., a state minimum wage or laws mandating health benefits or paid leave) and laws granting more generous public assistance, potentially accompanied by higher taxes, will repel business and wealthy individuals. As one
expert observer of this phenomenon explained, [t]he ability of jurisdictions to break the link between taxes and expenditures is limited by the threat of relocation by highly mobile, relatively wealthy individuals. In an effort to attract these

relocators, jurisdictions offer selective tax breaks or lower the overall burden or progressivity of broad-based taxes. This, then, cripples the ability of the jurisdictions to fund public goods and services through a tax system based on ability to pay.46 Although the extent to which businesses actually make
location decisions based on state incentives and taxes is in doubt, that these considerations weigh heavily on state officials making budget decisions is not. The result is an interstate competition to create the best business

climate. At the same time, states fear that if their public benefits are more generous than those of other states, they will become magnets for the poorthat low-income people will move into the state to obtain the benefits.47 Again, many doubt how valid this fear is, but it is common. It is a contributing factor to what has been called the race to the bottomthe perceived need of states to keep their benefits as low as or lower than those in other states, and particularly neighboring states. Through this mechanism the interstate competition squeezes down antipoverty efforts.

(--)

The net benefit is empirically deniedthe federal government has massive involvement in anti-poverty initiatives:

James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) Today the shape of hunger and poverty in America is very different from during the Depression. So is the shape of the federal government. And the Red Cross. And the town of England, where 500 children every day receive federally funded free or reduced-priced school lunches.6 Social Security, child support payments, food stamps, Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), and Medicaid also are part of the town fabric.

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States Counterplan 2ac Answers


(--) No link: Federalism will adapt to the plan Ann O'M. Bowman, James F. and Maude B. Byrnes Professor of Government at the University of South Carolina, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p3(21)]
Richard H. Leach once commented that the adaptability of federalism was perhaps its most prominent feature. (7) Adaptability suggests that the American federal system can adjust and evolve to handle challenges and changes effectively. If the next decade or so takes the trajectory of trend lines (a), (c), or (d)the paths with the highest probability of realization-American federalism will easily accommodate it. Shifts in authority have characterized the U.S. federal system since its founding and are likely to continue.

(--)NO THRESHOLD: FEDERALISM.

NO REASON ONE PLAN KEY TO

(--)NO INTERNAL LINK: OTHER NATIONS MODEL THE STRUCTURE OF FEDERALISM; NOT INDIVIDUAL DECISIONS. (--) Federalism is cyclicalthe plan is insignificant in the overall move of federalism Ann O'M. Bowman, James F. and Maude B. Byrnes Professor of Government at the University of South Carolina, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p3(21)]
The federalism scenarios make no assumptions about the length of time represented by the dotted lines. It is quite possible, even likely, that the next decade or two will see several of these trends unfold at different periods. Increases may be followed by decreases, periods of no change could be interspersed among upward or downward trends.

(--) FEDERALISM DOESNT SOLVE IN OTHER COUNTRIES: Michael A. Pagano, Professor of Public Administration and Director of the Graduate Program in Public Administration at the University of Illinois at Chicago, 02 [Publius, Spring 2002 v32 i2 p1(2)]
This, the first issue of the Global Review of Federalism, reaches toward the future, rather than the past, and sketches out the important factors and features of established federal systems in the future. Although the notable successes of ethnic, religious, racial, and other minorities in securing a voice in emerging democratic societies are laudatory, many attempts at enhancing the autonomy of groups and of integrating them into a larger society have been less than satisfactory. Alongside the South African and Belgian stories stand the Palestinian and Kashmir debacles; then there are the swings of the federalism pendulum that characterize places such as Nigeria and Russia.

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States Counterplan Answers--Extensions


Federal government solves poverty better: Medicare, Medicaid all prove this is true: Social Security,

James D. Weill, 2006 (President Food Research and Action Center, Journal of Poverty Law and Policy, MayJune 2006, http://www.frac.org/pdf/Weil06.pdf) By contrast, when the federal government provides both funds and direction, the outcome usually is better. Some of these programs are so successful that we no longer remember how deep (how intractableto use a phrase often applied to the problems of the poor) the problems that they tried to solve supposedly were. Social security, Supplemental Security Income, Job Corps, Medicare, Medicaid, Head Start, school lunch and school breakfast, food stamps, child support enforcement, immunizations, and the Special Supplemental Nutrition Program for Women, Infants, and Children (commonly known as the WIC program) are among the many programs that fit this model.

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States Counterplan Affirmative Answers: States counterplan wont lead to federal action
Industry will water down the federal standard created from state action:
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008)
Elliott and his coauthors made this point in the context of a larger argument that sought to debunk prevailing myths about the origins of federal statutes, namely that they are either the product of a well-intentioned Congress seeking to solve policy problems, or the result of conventional interest group politics in which environmentalists successfully pressure the national government for legislation. 10 To properly understand federal statutes, the authors argued, one must recognize that they are the product of organizational and political exigencies 11 (a position that we, of course, embrace). Under this

"evolutionary" model of federal statutes, state-level legislative successes by environmental groups tend to be countered by federal legislative successes by industry groups. 12 This insight was the genesis
of DPT. Since then, others have identified additional examples of this phenomenon, although no one has elaborated on it in any depth. 13 The Elliott et al. account of industry demand for federal legislation provides an important piece of the puzzle of how federal statutes take shape. First, it disabuses us of the notion that industry will always resist regulation. Indeed, industry groups sometimes provide the impetus for regulation, in both domestic and international settings. 14 Although [*1506] industry may lead the charge for federal legislation only infrequently, industry support for federal regulation undoubtedly has a powerful effect on the prospect of its passage. 15 Yet what will industry demand from Congress? It will demand a federal standard that preempts inconsistent state regulation and eliminates regulatory uncertainty. Uniformity is not enough, however. Industry will also try to undercut the most aggressive state standards by seeking a lower federal ceiling. 16 States thus establish the boundaries within which the federal negotiation over standards takes place - the more stringently states regulate at the outset, the more leverage they create for a compromise in the end. If the federal standard turns out to be weaker than the most

aggressive state standard, and if preemption prevents any deviation, then industry achieves a double win. 17

The unified FIAT of the Counterplan will prevent industry from appealing to Congress for a federal standard:
J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008)
States can increase regulatory uncertainty in this way either by taking action alone or by joining together with other states in regional compacts. Moreover, because states will be responding to somewhat different interest group

configurations within their own jurisdictions, there is a high likelihood that different states will adopt different regulatory approaches. This practically ensures inconsistency and helps drive industry to Congress. At the same time, some states are likely to be more important than others in provoking this
reaction. Historically, California seems to have been especially influential in prompting industry demand for federal uniformity, perhaps because of the state's disproportionate market power 27 and history of engaging in product regulation targeting automobiles. 28

States only have a limited effect to create federal policy change:


J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, 2007 (University of Pennsylvania Law Review, June, 2007, Lexis, accessed June 20, 2008) Based on the climate change example, we argue that although states [*1539] can have a significant catalytic effect on the demand for federal legislation (by stimulating pro-regulatory demand, defensive preemption, or both simultaneously), they have less to do with its content. The climate change example shows that state regulation can have some effect - for example, by helping to create path dependence for certain policy tools - but that far more influential are three other factors: the goals of key interest groups, the physical and technical properties of the regulatory problem they face, and the compatibility of the potential points of regulation (what we call "regulatory nodes") with available regulatory tools.

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Interstate Compact Answers


(READ REGULAR STATES ANSWERS AND THEN)

TURN: DEMOCRACY PROMOTION: A) Interstate compacts destroy democracy


Hasday, Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit., 97 [49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, Jill] Yet while the benefits of compacting for devolutionists are clear, the compacting form raises serious democratic concerns. Perhaps the core meaning of democracy is that it allows the majority in a polity to largely determine the shape of their government and the course of its pursuits. No matter the benefits of permanency, there is still a tension between this principle and long-term contracts by governments. Even if compacts are the product of deliberative, collective self-determination, [*8] which often is doubtful, they severely hamper the people's ability to continue to guide their own fate by strictly limiting a party state's power to respond to changing preferences and circumstances. At the heart of the meaning of compacts, this tension has gone essentially unexplored by compact writers, who instead expound on the advantages of finality and hail compacts as augmenting the voice of the citizenry as they empower the states. n34

B) Democracy promotion key to preventing inevitable extinction


Diamond, senior research fellow at Hoover Institution, 95
(Larry, Promoting Democracy in the 1990s: Actors and Instruments, Issues and Imperatives, A Report to the Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict, December 1995, p. 6) This hardly exhausts the lists of threats to our security and well-being in the coming years and decades. In the former Yugoslavia nationalist aggression tears at the stability of Europe and could easily spread. The flow of illegal drugs intensifies through increasingly powerful international crime syndicates that have made common cause with authoritarian regimes and have utterly corrupted the institutions of tenuous, democratic ones. Nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons continue to proliferate. The very source of life on Earth, the global ecosystem, appears increasingly endangered. Most of these new and unconventional threats to security are associated with or aggravated by the weakness or absence of democracy, with its provisions for legality, accountability, popular sovereignty, and openness.

TURN: ROLLBACK:
Hasday, Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit., 97 [49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, Jill]
Congress' role is the first issue that should be reexamined in light of the democratic tension within compacting. Every interstate agreement must win the approval of the party state legislatures, but only some [*12] interstate agreements are compacts, directly bound to the compact jurisprudence on permanency and constitutionally required to garner congressional as well as state assent. n50 Only those agreements that may " 'encroach upon or interfere with the just supremacy of the United States' " n51 must take the compact form and receive Congress' consent. Yet Congress, unlike the states, is not bound by the compacts it approves. It can

condition its consent or simply supersede its approval legislation with subsequent law. n52

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Interstate Compact Answers


Compacts dont strengthen federalism
Hasday, Law Clerk to Judge Patricia M. Wald, United States Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit., 97 [49 Fla. L. Rev. 1, Jill] From the states' perspective or that of people who support compacts as a way to increase state power, this asymmetry is yet another reason to be reluctant to compact. Not only are the states bound almost irrevocably, n53 but the omnipresent threat that Congress will change its mind deprives them of the full benefit of reliance.

Congress must approve interstate compactsproves they link to all their net benefits: Richman, Old Dominion University, 03 [Publius, Spring 2003 v33 i2 p79(4)]
In his discussion of formal interstate compacts, Zimmerman explains the requirement for congressional approval, originally included in the Articles of Confederation and imported into the Constitution as a basic protection against regional or sectional state alignments against other states, or against the federal government. In the nineteenth century, most compacts addressed particular interstate boundary conflicts, and thus did not involve general policy concerns; increasingly in the twentieth century, compacts addressed more substantive interstate subjects. In 1921 Congress approved creation of the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey, the first bistate compact creating a quasi-independent permanent entity with a commission as board of directors and an executive staff to build and manage revenue-producing transportation and port facilities in the New York and New Jersey Hudson River port region.

Congress must approve all interstate compactsand it is not a slam dunk Richman, Old Dominion University, 03 [Publius, Spring 2003 v33 i2 p79(4)]
Although congressional approval has been forthcoming in many interstate compacts, it is not to be assumed that Congress plays an insignificant role (i.e., by routinely endorsing compacts agreed upon by two or more states). Zimmerman's discussion of the Northeast Interstate Dairy Compact, approved by Congress in 1996 for a period of three years, offers a recent instance where the congressional approval requirement was a key factor in avoiding inter-regional conflict. The dairy compact's aim was to help (i.e., to offer economic protection to) the northeastern states' declining family dairy farms by stabilizing milk prices in the those states. The measure involved stabilization of the price of milk by New England's state regulatory agencies by setting common minimum prices at the farm. The compact was opposed by the national milk-processing industry, and significantly by a group of midwestern states that perceived the compact as a restraint on their ability to freely market their dairy products in New England. Due to the regional controversy, Congress refused to extend its approval of the compact more than the original three years granted. Consequently, lacking congressional approval, the compact expired in 2001.

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