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The Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development (FASID) was established in April 1990.

FASID and its affiliate, International Development Research Institute (IDRI), conduct research, facilitate interaction among researchers and practitioners, and offer training programs to development specialists. These activities are aimed for improvement in the quality of development programs and policies.

Copyright 2000 by FASID Published in 2000 in Japan by the Foundation for Advanced Studies on International Development, 1-6-17 Kudan-minami, Chiyoda-ku, Tokyo 102-0074, Japan Fax. +81 (3) 5226-0023 Url. http://www. fasid. or. jp

CONTENTS
PREFACE Chapter I ARMED CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT TAKAHASHI Kazuo ------------------------- 1 1. New Fields of Development Research 2. Conflict Prevention and Development 1 4 21

3. Conflict Resolution and International Development 4. Peace-keeping Operations, Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation 6. Building Peace 32 36 24 5. Post-conflict Issues and International Development 7. Construction of International Cooperation Systems and International Development Chapter II

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ASEAN: COPING WITH MARGINALIZATION NG Chee Yuen --------------------------------- 40 1. Introduction 40 44 49 53 55 60 65 69 69 2. Understanding ASEAN 3. Relevance of ASEAN 4. Economic Crisis 6. Deepening of ASEAN 8. Emergence of New Leaders 9. Concluding Remarks 5. Expansion to ASEAN-10

7. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)

Chapter III

NGOs AND CIVIL SOCIETY: BEYOND SECTOR ANALYSIS AND FANATICISM Introduction 1. Civil Society 71 72 75 84 SUZUKI Naoki -------------------------------- 71

2. The NGO Research Environment: Research Institutions in the U.S. 3. Civil Society and Fanaticism 4. Conclusion 89

Chapter IV

A NEW STRATEGY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS Introduction 95 96 99 105 TANIMURA Mitsuhiro -------------- 95

1. The Emerging 21st Century Global Civil Society: The Shape of Things to Come 2. Peace Building and the Environment as a New Theme in International Development Cooperation 3. New Experiences in Japanese Architecture and Urban Planning 4. The Environment and Peace Building by the 21st Century Global Community Appendix IV. 1 Appendix IV. 2 Appendix IV. 3 Chapter V 113 117 119 129

MARGINALIZATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION ITO Sanae -------------------------------------- 139 Introduction Environment 3. NGO Interventions 4. Conclusion 156 139 141 144 153 1. The Shrimp Farming Industry in Asia and Its Impacts on the 2. Shrimps and Prawns in Bangladesh

Chapter VI

CAN WE OVERCOME MARGINALITY? UCHIYAMADA Yasushi --------------------- 161 1. Dialogue between Postcolonial Studies and Development Studies 2. Can the Subaltern Overcome Marginality? 164 169 170 3. Marginality in Development - Amartya Sen's Case 4. A Third Perspective for Understanding Marginality 161

Contributors

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PREFACE

The first issue Agenda for International Development: 1998 examined the interaction between globalization and international development from a broad perspective. As that book was being compiled from late 1997 to early 1998, the East Asian economic crisis was boiling over, throwing the traditional international development paradigm into disarray. I presumed that the dynamics giving rise to this disarray probably involved globalization. If this was indeed the case, it necessitated a detailed analysis of the relationship between these dynamics and international development theory, and that first issue sought to make as wide an observation as possible of that relationship. The second issue Agenda for International Development: 1999 examined how the world had coped with various international development issues brought about by globalization under the theme of "harnessing globalization." Based on these two books, Agenda for International Development: 2000 looks at international development issues from the viewpoint of "coping with marginalization." This is based on the perception that while the overall globalization process consists of market globalization and civil (politico-economic) globalization processes, under present conditions, the dynamics of market globalization are overwhelmingly powerful, and contain the diametrically opposed aspects: integration into and exclusion from the world economic community. These dynamics of exclusion, that is, marginalization, are now causing some very serious problems, and the focus of this edition is directed toward this. Chapter I (Takahashi) addresses the conflict-development relation as a fairly representative issue brought about by marginalization. The chapter broadly covers problems caused by this relation from the perspective that while this originally had been excluded from the international development viewpoint, it cannot but be tackled as one pivotal theme. It concludes that strengthening the process of civil globalization is an approach for coming to grips with international development while dealing with the problem of armed conflict. Chapter II (Ng) gives a picture of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its member countries that were buffeted by marginalization dynamics, and analyzes how they resisted those dynamics and worked to strengthen their constitutional structures. Though powerless during the East
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Asian economic crisis, ASEAN is nonetheless seeking to make the most of the opportunity marginalization presented to grow stronger by establishing a social safety net and bringing forward its implementation of common tariff policies. The chapter also touches on ASEAN efforts to prevent the countries of Indochina and Myanmar from further being marginalized from the rest of the world by integrating them into the ASEAN trade structure. It also analyzes ASEAN efforts to counter these marginalization dynamics through cooperation with Japan, China and South Korea, and building up its cooperative ties with the United States, Japan and Europe. Chapter III (Suzuki) analyzes nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), which are an important player in the dynamics to counter marginalization. The chapter examines the roles of NGOs in civil society from two perspectives. One is the potentials and limitations of NGOs through an analysis of the correlation between studies on non-profit organizations (NPOs) and NGOs in the United States; the other is a rigid distinction between a world controlled by the fanaticism of revolutionary movements and the like, and the NGO world based on the idea that voluntarism is synonymous with professionalism. Chapter IV (Tanimura) places the concept of global public goods at the center of dynamics that counter marginalization. Using the global environment and peace building as specific examples, the chapter examines the relationship between the two. Expanding from this, the chapter also addresses the theme of reconstruction following an urban disaster like the Great Hanshin Earthquake, and examines the move toward standardization in such fields, which is in its early stages, and the civil society that supports this. It then returns its focus on the role of civil society centered on specialist groups involved in fields ranging from urban reconstruction to the global environment and peace building, positioning global public goods as a counter to the dynamics of marginalization. Chapter V (Ito) tackles the issue of poverty reduction. The difficulty in reconciling poverty reduction and environmental preservation has long been highlighted, but in this chapter, the author, through an analysis of prawn aquaculture in Bangladesh, examines how NGOs can support efforts by local residents in developing countries who have to cope with marginalization. The chapter concludes that NGOs should deal with marginalization by serving as an active medium for providing local residents with the knowledge to build sustainable production systems. Chapter VI (Uchiyamada) addresses the issue of how to put the question of
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marginality in relation to the analytical approach to marginalization and specific problems. This is an issue relating to the subjective and objective sides of marginality. Subjective marginality deals with autonomy, pride and freedom. Objective marginality, on the other hand, considers development, indeed international development, that is, issues centering on the formation of and dealing with poverty. The chapter argues that delving more deeply into these two viewpoints and analyzing their interaction may provide a new opening to marginality analysis. Agenda for International Development: 2000 thus focuses on the various issues of marginalization caused by market globalization and the approaches that attempt to overcome the resulting problems. There are many issues other than the themes addressed by this edition, such as debt, currency crises and threat to human security. It is our hope that this book can in some way contribute to the further exploration of these issues.

TAKAHASHI Kazuo Director International Development Research Institute FASID

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CHAPTER I

ARMED CONFLICT AND DEVELOPMENT


TAKAHASHI Kazuo

1. New Fields of Development Research


Once upon a time it was widely believed that "conflict" had nothing to do with development research, but should be left to the security experts. This view seems to have been underpinned by three factors. One is the idea that conflict accompanying independence from colonial powers will be settled once independence is achieved, and the focus will then shift to development (O'Brien 1998, p.201 et seq.). Depending on the circumstances, conflict can be a springboard for development, or, conversely, it can also be a major obstacle because of internal disunity or the emotional scar that may result, but analysis of these points has not been addressed by development researchers as a research theme. The second is the view that conflict during the Cold War period was fought by way of proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union in developing countries, and that since this was an element of high politics, it was not an area for development researchers to deal with. Certainly, the Korean and Vietnam wars were wars of high politics. However, in looking back now, it does seem quite strange that development researchers did not take this up as a research theme as the conflicts played a very decisive role in the subsequent development of these countries. The third is the myth of development liberalism.
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There was considerable belief in the scenario that the progress of development would create a middle class, and as this middle class expanded and became stronger, democracy would take root and grow, thereby removing the possibility and grounds for internal or external conflict. Under this myth, if energy is poured into the development effort, disputes should become irrelevant. There is, however, considerable evidence to the contrary; for example, Yugoslavia, Indonesia and Sri Lanka. The era of rigid distinction in studies of conflict and of development, which was backed up by decolonization struggles, proxy wars and the liberalism myth, continued right up until very recently. Between 1989 and 1997 there were 103 armed conflicts (Uppsala University 1999), and apart from a few areas such as Northern Ireland and the Basque region of Spain, all the conflicts occurred in developing countries or economies in transition. Expectations were that the peace process would take at the most three or four years to resolve these conflicts, after which the countries would resume the development process. These expectations were, however, way off the mark. Reality is that some countries may struggle to reach the development process after ten or 20 years or even longer (Ball 1996). There are more than 60 countries in this situation, and the only country that is perhaps entering the development process after going from conflict to the peace transition and peace construction phases is Mozambique. Through its own efforts and those of the international community, Cambodia may also be able to shift to the development process. There are, however, still no guarantees that even either of these two countries will in fact reach the development path. In many cases, civil war gives rise to a vicious psychological cycle of an "eye for an eye" hatred. A typical example is Kosovo where there have been many incidents in which returning Albanian Kosovars lynched and slaughtered Serbian residents in acts of retribution. These conflicts not only bring individual human tragedy, but also set back the development process at least ten years, and in some cases as many as 30 years. Today about 20 countries are being torn apart by high-intensity conflicts (more than a thousand deaths), a further 70 or so are engaged in low-intensity conflicts, while another 30-odd countries are facing the outbreak of conflict at any time because of political tension (Jongman and Schmid 1998). So in more than 120 developing countries conflict is a major issue. In all these countries the dynamics of marginalization contained within market globalization are fiercely at work. The most extreme effect of this takes the form of "conflict
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and development" through deepening poverty and other factors, and thrusts before us new themes of development research. An overwhelmingly large number of developing countries are confronted by conflict, and development research that focuses on the conditions of these countries and their people, and measures for improving those conditions, must not overlook this serious issue of conflict. Over the past several years, development researchers have gradually begun to show an interest in this issue. From about spring 1997, there were moves to set up an international research consortium to look into conflict and development. FASID-IDRI received a request to participate, and a preliminary meeting was arranged. A speech by then Dutch Development Cooperation Minister Jan Pronk in New York in October 1997 did much to attract the attention of practitioners and researchers to this theme. In his speech, the minister stated, "During the cold war period, once a proxy war started aid agencies had to evacuate the area as quickly as possible because it was always possible that the proxy war could escalate into a major war. The post-cold war world is different; there are no proxy wars. Political rivalries, social changes and economic competition within the country or the region itself are the major causes of conflict. And in many cases, conflict is extremely localized. Even if a conflict is raging in a town, in the rural areas people may be tending their crops. For development cooperation in such a situation, immediate evacuation is not the only right answer; sometimes it may be possible to gradually extinguish the flames of conflict by remaining in the country and contributing to the socioeconomic stability of non-conflict regions to expand the peace zone. In reality, most developing countries are in this situation; a situation of 'no peace, no war.' If aid agencies flee from the threat of danger, development cooperation will only ever happen in just a few countries. But we do not really know how we can expand these peace zones under such circumstances. This is a major research theme for the future." Minister Pronk's proposals were widely endorsed. Considering the current state of Indonesia and the implications of Japanese development aid in it, we cannot but give serious thought to these ideas. These days, research and work on this theme are being carried out along two lines. One is conflict prevention. The other is the transition process once a peace agreement has been concluded, and in fact many aid agencies (both bilateral and multilateral) are establishing post-conflict peace units. However, in this study I shall deal with the relation
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between conflict and development as broadly as possible, and delve deeply into the theme itself, because I believe shedding light on individual aspects alone is not enough to come to grips with the true essence of this theme. There are various approaches to the theme of conflict and development as a new field of development research. One is to focus on the primary factors of the conflict in relation to development, concentrating on expansion of the gap between the rich and poor (UNDP 1998), multiethnicity (Yamauchi 1991; Sato 1989) and competition to acquire resources. The second approach is to focus on the struggle for power (Takeuchi 1999). Major conflicts, without fail, involve discord between leaders, and concentrating on this will no doubt reveal some aspects quite clearly. The third approach is to emphasize the processes of development and conflict, and analyze the relation between the two; it follows a series of processes from prevention to peace-building. In this study I have decided to adopt the third approach because my aim is to tackle this theme as comprehensively as possible. And by analyzing the overall process, I believe I can address myself to the theme itself more effectively than through the other approaches.

2. Conflict Prevention and Development


In 1992 then United Nations (UN) Secretary-General Boutros BoutrosGhali released the report An Agenda for Peace at the request of the Security Council. One of the special features of this report is that it focused in part on the importance of preventive diplomacy (immediately after, various terms were closely examined to avoid the undertone of the "external relations of a state" contained in the word "diplomacy" and at present the term "conflict prevention" with its wider meaning is generally used). The importance of preventive diplomacy had also been addressed before then in which the importance of prevention was highlighted through analogies with health, or advocated from a cost perspective in connection with the environment. In the 1950s and 1960s debate raged over then Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld's ideas of preventive diplomacy in which the possibility of UN intervention in proxy wars between the United States and the Soviet Union was raised (Zacher 1970), and in the 1980s, the focus was firmly on early warning. Thus, over the decades a range of proposals and ideas has emerged. But it was not until the publication of An Agenda for Peace that conflict prevention became a major theme of the international community. Here I shall examine types of conflict prevention
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and causes of conflict. 2-1 Types of Conflict Prevention Many approaches to conflict prevention have been tried, and in some cases several approaches have been combined and applied in individual circumstances. The following are the four main approaches. Extinguishing small fires in local communities Strengthening and expanding zones of peace Conflict resolution methods Development cooperation approach (1) Extinguishing Small Fires in Local Communities The Asian Conflict Prevention Forum began in 1999 (PeaceNet 1999). With its headquarters in Khon Koen University, Thailand, the Forum has established a network throughout Southeast Asia. What has been made clear by this networking is that the development process is a laborious process of reconciling the disparate interests of local residents. Cases of conflict or near conflict where reconciling of interests among residents has not proceeded well are referred to this network. Many are related to resources allocation, and most of these are disputes over environmental issues such as the use of water and forest resources, or over farmland. The situation would probably be similar in South Asia, Latin America and Africa. At this stage, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) play a pivotal role in resolving these problems. At the same time, the traditional control by elders is weakening, and in many cases a shadow is being cast over the capability of the elders to solve problems. On the other hand, calls for decentralization have grown louder in almost all developing countries, but the reality is that very little has changed. There are growing needs for reconciling the interests generated by the development process, and in most cases the NGOs are playing a key part in this reconciliation. The normal pattern is that local NGOs operate with the support of international NGOs. Without the conflict-prevention efforts of the NGOs, it would be hard to imagine the development process in developing countries that are facing the irresistible force of market globalization (Rodrik 1999). This approach is effective only for putting out small fires of dispute; it is not effective, or has only a limited effect, when a small fire has turned into a
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larger inferno, such as Chechnya. In such an inferno, the NGO approach can in fact merely add fuel to the flames. What should be done and how it should be done for the NGO approach to be effective at the various levels of conflict has become a major research issue. (2) Strengthening and Expanding Zones of Peace In many cases, regional cooperation and regional integration are aimed at building zones of peace. The European Union (EU) and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) are typical examples of this. The EU idea emerged from the question of how to overcome the antagonism between Germany and France, which was one of the major issues of contemporary European history, and how to build a zone of peace between these two countries. Based on the conception of Jean Monet, the European Coal and Steel Community (1953) and the European Community (EC) (1957) were formed, and following their expansion, the EU is today functioning as a strong and stable community of 15 European countries on the basis of subsidiary (the concept where everyday life should be basically dealt with by the local community, and issues that cannot be dealt with at that level should be taken to progressively higher levels on a geographical baseprovince, state, then the EUuntil resolution is achieved). At the same time, material integration is being promoted through European standardization in a range of areas, and introduction of a common currency. This is supplemented in moral and ethical aspects by the European Council through the European Court of Human Rights, while the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) strengthens the military aspects. Meanwhile, the conflict-prevention efforts of the EU sphere is evolving as the EU nations seek to extend this peace zone into adjacent regions. The EU is currently pursuing various multilevel initiatives for nonmember nations, especially those in Central and Eastern Europe, even if they are not members of the EU, such as economic cooperation based on special trade agreements, numerous policy-related talks at the formal and informal level, and strengthening cooperative relations through NGOs. Seeking socioeconomic stability in Central and Eastern Europe through initiatives such as these will alleviate the pressures of immigration from these countries to the EU countries, and is also preparing them for future EU membership. On the other hand, conflict in these countries will have a direct impact on the EU, beginning with waves of refugees fleeing the fighting. So EU cooperation with adjacent countries has a positive angle
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with a view to the future, but equally, it is also to a degree a "rearguard" action to protect their own gains. The relative stability of Europe in the transition period following the end of the Cold War can be largely attributed to the approach of strengthening and expanding this zone of peace. The limitations of this approach became clear, however, when faced with the realities of a disintegrating Yugoslavia. Traditionally, nationalism in Central and Eastern Europe is referred to as "salami nationalism," and the EU approach proved to be ineffective with a Yugoslavia where the bonding agent that had been keeping all the individual parts together melted. Without comprehending the limitations of the European approach, the EU persisted with a Europeanstyle solution, and in Kosovo, it went so far as to mobilize NATO without a UN Security Council resolution, and this indeed added fuel to a rapidly growing inferno. This failure to comprehend the limitations of the conflict-prevention approach took the worst turn; namely, the international community was asked to pick up the bill for it. ASEAN was formed in 1967 with the primary aim of creating mutual trust and building cooperative ties among member countries against the backdrop of an escalating Vietnam War. Its objective was to strengthen regional cooperation, not integration. One tacit understanding of the association was that while Indonesia is the core country, it would maintain a low profile. Another understanding was that it would expand its membership as quickly as possible to bring in all ten countries of the region. The key principle of ASEAN is noninterference in the internal affairs of other member nations. Apart from Thailand, these countries gained their independence after World War II, and are fiercely protective of their own sovereignty. The view is that although the political institutions may be different, if this principle is upheld, they can build a regional cooperative structure aimed at strengthening mutual trust. Another principle is decision making by consensus. This is done based on respect for sovereignty and harmony with the cultural climate. Under this principle, certain countries will take the initiative in certain areas, but the final decision at the ASEAN level will be by consensus. Indeed it is these tacit understandings and principles that have made a substantial contribution to the mutual trust that exists among ASEAN members. This was very effective in preventing the domino effect during the Vietnam War until 1975, and the political stability among member countries that this fostered played a pivotal role in attracting direct investment from the latter
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half of the 1970s. This direct investment underpinned the region's high economic growth from the latter half of the 1980s to the mid-1990s, and this economic performance brought with it social stability. This cycle of prosperity among the ASEAN members was largely attributable to the mutual trust within the association. When the impact of market globalization swept across the entire East Asian region in the form of the financial crisis, however, ASEAN ceased to function fully in relation to these tacit understandings and key principles. It stands to reason that the focus of conflict prevention naturally shifted to Indonesia, but ASEAN was essentially powerless to act because the central country of the association was itself the problem. Having chosen to broaden its membership to ten countries rather than deepening regional cooperation, ASEAN had not built the solid cooperative structures that could deal with the crisis and work to prevent the conflict flaring up in Indonesia. And with its major principle of noninterference in internal affairs, ASEAN was not in a position to say anything about what was happening in Indonesia. The positive aspect of ASEAN in this situation was that there was no senseless panicking, though it is perhaps more accurate to say that ASEAN could not do anything even if it wanted to. It left the problem of East Timor to the UN, suggesting that it was beyond the bounds of the association. In this way, the approach of strengthening and expanding the zone of peace can make a significant contribution, but it also has its own limitations. The main limitation is that it can only make an extremely indirect contribution to conflict prevention in other regions (for example, Africa) by perhaps serving as a model for those regions. An important lesson learned by ASEAN through the East Asian economic crisis from 1997 is that conflict prevention is ineffective if it runs counter to the principles on which the regional cooperation has been built. The key lesson in relation to the EU and Kosovo and the breakup of Yugoslavia is that when it is impossible to deal with the situation using the regional cooperation approach, a political decision has to be made to courageously abandon this approach. The main problem with the regional cooperation approach is a lack of research on its potential and limitations. There is a strong conviction that this approach should be useful for conflict prevention, but not enough research has been done to verify that reality in fact backs up this conviction. This research needs to be done covering the EU and ASEAN regions. And to supplement
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this, even more broad-ranging research should be conducted through research exchanges between the two regions, and participation by researchers from third countries such as Japan. (3) Conflict Resolution Methods Since the Cold War period, conflict resolution research and practice has been positioned as one of the mainstream social sciences in the United States. It has two themes: United States-Soviet Union relations centering on military power, and conciliation between third countries against this military power backdrop (Haass 1996). Conciliation between third countries against a power backdrop is significant for conflict prevention in relation to development. The conciliation process between Israel and Syria is an important theme for U.S. diplomacy in 1999 and 2000. Conciliation between Israel and Lebanon is also an important item on the U.S. diplomatic agenda. The Dayton Agreement worked out through U.S. mediation formed the foundation on which the situation in Bosnia could be stabilized. These were all carried out in the light of the overwhelming power of the United States. One aspect of this approach is that it is a combination of conflict resolution and prevention of its recurrence. One variation of this U.S.-style power-based conflict prevention is the conflict prevention efforts by former President Carter. This has taken several forms, including the monitoring of elections in Nepal and Ethiopia, and a visit to North Korea. This is why Carter is known as the best ex-president the United States has produced. One limitation of U.S.-style power-based conflict prevention is that it takes place in a setting where a small conflict is about to occur, and if the United States becomes involved in an attempt to extinguish the fire, its effort may have the opposite effect and actually add fuel to the flames. This limitation was also evident in Carter's efforts to mediate in regional conflicts in Africa. Another limitation is that it makes preventive interventions in domestic conflicts especially difficult. The reason is that because it is power-based, there is an even more intense aversion to the idea of interference in domestic affairs. (4) Development Cooperation Approach When development progresses smoothly, regional conflicts or civil wars are unlikely. For development to progress, the liberalism myth itself would seem to ring true, but in fact it is normal for stakeholders to try and manage
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these extremely complex development processes. Therefore, preventing conflict by emphasizing development cooperation aimed at helping along this complex and difficult process is also a very important approach. Japan mainly adopts this standpoint. It was not until the 1990s that this approach itself proved to be highly challenging as people began to realize that the development process is not a simple matter of cause and effect, but is in fact a complex system. That is, it was once thought that combining production elements such as labor, primary resources, land and capital with production functions such as technology can bring about economic growth, advanced industrial structures and fair income distribution. This is shown in Figure I.1. International development was considered to be the provision of capital and technology to make this process move along more smoothly. Figure I.1 Input Production elements (labor, primary resources, land and capital) Production functions (technology) Output Economic growth Advanced industrial structures Fair income distribution

It has become clear that the connection between input and output is, however, quite complex. The input part is basically the same. While there may be variations in that the private-sector portion of the capital may increase and technology may be supplemented with knowledge for development, the basic idea does not change. Output, on the other hand, covers not just communities, but individuals as well. Clearly, all four fields have proven vital for linking input and outputstrengthening the base for development; social development, including reducing poverty; the classic package of economic growth, advancing industrial structures and equality; and environmental preservation. This connection is represented in Figure I.2. Influencing this central complex system from the periphery are the regional culture, history and the character of leaders. The development process is the sum of the interaction between this core system and peripheral influences, and is extremely dynamic.

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Figure I.2 Input Production elements (labor, primary resources, land and capital) Production functions (development expertise, technology) Field Development base Social development Economic growth, advancing industrial structures and equality Environmental preservation Output Individuals Communities

Strengthening the development base includes good governance, human resource development and conflict prevention. The process by which input, field and output elaborately interact stands at the core of development, and smoothing out the entire process is the aim of development cooperation. If any of these elements are missing, development may progress erratically, become distorted or even regress (Sano 1998). Conflict prevention forms complex systems with a diverse range of elements, all interwoven, but its relation with good governance is particularly important. Keeping a close eye on the various elements that make up the development process and, at the same time, backing from good governance are indispensable for conflict prevention. The reason is that reconciling the interests of the parties concerned is particularly important for development, especially development that accompanies liberalization (Rodrik 1999). For this, enhancing the legal system and fostering the personnel needed for its operation are crucial issues. Training of the people who are able to extinguish small fires of conflict is also important. These small fires require a local and an urgent response, and it is important to expand the capacity of the judicial, legislative and administrative structures and the civil society responsible for controlling conflict in the region. This should also be the case for cooperation aimed at making decentralization in developing countries a reality. The development cooperation approach is particularly effective in preventing the recurrence of conflict. I have stated before that bringing conflict to a true settlement takes much longer than the three or four years generally
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considered among the international community. During this period the key role is played by development cooperation. The path from the conclusion of a peace agreement after lengthy talks, through the transition and peace-building stages to the development process is indeed long and winding, and it is development cooperation, together with the efforts of the nation or nations concerned, that will see this path negotiated through successfully. The biggest limitation of the development cooperation approach is that it does not deliver an immediate result. Be it good governance, fostering personnel who can extinguish small fires of conflict or preventing conflicts from recurring, all require considerable and prolonged efforts, and the result can only be seen with long-term vision. However, as part of these efforts, structures to provide immediate support to personnel who are endeavoring to extinguish any small fires can and must be developed. 2-2 Causes of Conflict Studies into the causes of conflict and war are as old as history itself. Social science in the 20th century had set this as one of its central areas of focus. Most of these studies, however, revolved around the causes of conflicts between the developed countries. We can probably say that research on intervention by developed countries in developing countries (for example, in the Korean Peninsula and Vietnam) was the exception in which the focus was on conflicts in developing countries. Civil or regional wars in developing countries only became an important research theme from the 1990s. It is set to become one of social science's future areas of focus, and is also likely to attract considerable interest in related academic fields. In many cases, conflicts in developing countries or regional conflicts in the early post-Cold War stages (early 1990s) were triggered by the severe shock to the international community that came with the end of the Cold War. The old Yugoslavia, Nagorno-Karabakh and Somalia are just three examples. Later examples include the Great Lakes region in central Africa, the former Zaire, Liberia and Indonesia where conflict was mostly brought on by the forces of marginalization resulting from market globalization. In many cases the various contributing factors worked together. These factors can be classified conceptually into the following: Socioeconomic factors
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Multiethnicity Illegal activities 2-2-1 Socioeconomic Factors Marginalization resulting from market-based globalization have a substantial impact on socioeconomic conditions. This takes a different form in developing countries that are being integrated into the world economy, developing countries that are being totally marginalized, and developing countries in between (Takahashi 2000). There are also many cases where intervention by a developed country into a developing country in a scramble for resources because of the increasingly fierce economic competition among developed countries triggers or exacerbates a conflict. Factors include the following: Structural adjustment policies Poverty Gap between the rich and poor Competition for resources (1) Structural Adjustment Policies The introduction of structural adjustment policies for the past 20 years has brought the following kinds of results: Economically, countries whose fundamentals were sound before the crisis can get back on the path to growth before long, whereas for those whose fundamentals were weak, structural adjustment will not lead to growth. Socially, even after the policy shift by the World Bank in 1987, structural adjustment always has a negative social impact. Politically, in many cases structural adjustment has promoted democratization, but there are also cases where it has led to the collapse of a country. In a number of African countries structural adjustment did not lead to growth but instead had a seriously detrimental impact on the social framework and undermined the national foundations. In these countries structural adjustment could trigger civil wars, and these could escalate into regional conflicts. These negative factors were also present in the case of Indonesia. Here, the
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promotion of democratization and the logic of national disintegration are at work. Returning to economic growth is possible because the economic fundamentals before the crisis were not entirely bad. The social impact was, however, significant, and how quickly social stability can be restored and how much the international community can back Indonesia in this objective is a key issue. This does not mean that structural adjustment policies always cause conflicts, but clearly there are cases where such policies are a contributing factor. In this light there is a need to keep an eye on developments arising from structural adjustment policies. (2) Poverty Marginalization dynamics are at work in about 80 low-income countries. In most of these countries either high- or low-intensity conflicts are raging. In regions characterized by advancing urbanization, deteriorating living environment and multiethnicity, stability can be maintained only when the economic growth rate outperforms the population increase (inflow plus natural increase) rate by at least 2 percent. However, in Africa, for instance, the urban inflow stands at the high rate of 5 percent each year. The natural population increase is about 3 percent. Stability, therefore, can only be achieved with a real urban economic growth rate of 10 percent. In reality, there is no such city or urban area. It is not surprising that most of the African countries are gripped by high- or low-intensity conflicts. In these societies it is a structural problem where conflict can readily break out at any time because of expanding and recurring poverty resulting from their marginalization. (3) Gap between the Rich and Poor In major developing countries such as China, India, Pakistan and Egypt, the integrating power and marginalization are at work, both resulting from market-based globalization. In parts of these countries modern sectors are sufficiently developed, and these are attractive areas for overseas direct investment, yet most parts of these countries have people living in poverty and have little hope of attracting investment. Consequently, and despite the efforts of governments, the chasm separating the haves and the have-nots continues to grow deeper and wider, and this in turn destabilizes the social framework. Under democratic structures, those holding the reins of political power can
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tend to intentionally create an external threat and stir up nationalistic fervor to bring the country together. This can be seen in the 1998 nuclear and missile tests by India and Pakistan. Under development authoritarianism, social instability tends to be held in check by force, and this can result in social distortion. Perhaps China's Falungong is a typical example of this. Therefore, a widening gap between the rich and poor may trigger regional conflicts under a democratic system, while underdevelopment authoritarianism, it may lead to internal upheavals. In many cases it is in the major developing countries where the possibility of conflict brought on by a widening wealth gap is greatest, and so this is a serious issue for the future stability of the international community. (4) Competition for Resources Rarely do the three factors mentioned above alone lead to conflict. Often intervention by developed countries triggers conflict, or causes a low-intensity conflict to escalate. Market globalization intensifies economic competition among individual firms, and also among developed countries. And both companies and countries are prepared to take considerable risks in their efforts to win in the competition. In their efforts, at times companies and countries can seek to secure resources in developing countries by fomenting discord among government leaders with a view to changing the political power structure. Some point to these factors in the tragedy in Africa's Great Lakes area. Some scholars, including Johan Galtung, maintain that no conflict in developing countries is without some form of external intervention. Here we can see the severity of market globalization where conflict flares up simply because a country is rich in resources. 2-2-2 Multiethnicity Harold Isaacs (1975) mentions four primary elements of group identity language, religion, historical perception and physical features. Where this group identity is strong, it can readily form into a political unit, and also form the foundations of a nation-state. In the case of the ethnicity factor there are 5,000 such groups in the world today (Kajita 1988). With these groups existing together in a global society made up of about 200 sovereign states, it is only natural that multiethnic nations are the norm. There would be nothing strange in the various individual ethnic groups that constitute a multiethnic nation wanting to form their own nations. Most countries suffer in various degrees
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from the strains of ethnic rivalry and the possibility of fragmentation. This does not, however, mean that all multiethnic nations are a hotbed of conflicts. Many are seeking to utilize their multiethnicity to create much more vibrant societies, and some are achieving a success. As pointed out by Blair Ruble, multiethnic nations are generally peaceful in the rural areas, but the problem is urbanization. People who migrate to the cities from traditional rural communities have no secure roots in their new environment and struggle between the uncertainty of city life and the many possibilities and opportunities it has to offer. They tend to mix with people from their own ethnic groups and form their own communities as an informal safety net. In a dynamic economy, they provide work and profit for each other, and this makes the economy even more dynamic. In an economic downturn, on the other hand, they set up their safety net and strengthen their mutual support structures. If the economy stagnates further, and these groups find they have to battle to ensure their share, it only needs a small incident to provoke conflict. So Ruble's theory is that a combination of urbanization and economic stagnation makes multiethnicity a contributing factor to conflict. Certainly, conflicts in many developing countries start in the cities, and most are between ethnic groups. That is not to say that conflicts never start in rural areas. Some do. Ruble's theory is for the most part correct, but not entirely. This is a subject for future research. 2-2-3 Illegal Activities Illegal activities can be a direct or indirect cause of conflict. This is especially so in the following areas: Small arms smuggling Illegal migration Drug trafficking (1) Small Arms Smuggling Small arms account for an extremely small percentage of all weapons, but the reality is that they cause 90 percent of conflict-related deaths (Mandel 1999). Lighter and cheaper weapons have helped to produce as many as 300,000 child soldiers throughout the world (Otunu 1998). In the early stages of the Cold War there was little arms smuggling, but it started to grow from the mid-1970s, and by the 1980s it had reached a massive
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scale through arms bazaars, parts sales, and bartering for drugs and the like. During the 1980s the legitimate arms trade also expanded so dramatically that illegal arms sales were seen as nothing more than business transactions. The illegal arms trade slowed down considerably immediately after the end of the Cold War, but over these past several years it has been expanding again. While it is difficult to give an accurate indication of the scale, Mandel (1999) estimates that in a normal year it is US$1-2 billion, and US$5-10 billion in years with major conflicts. The figure for 1998 is estimated at US$3 billion. Small arms flowing from the United States, Russia, China, France, Sweden, Austria, Italy, Germany, and so on have become the main weapons of choice for conflicts in developing countries. This is hard to overlook when considering conflict prevention. Nuclear weapons under the bipolar system functioned as a deterrent under the mutually assured destruction concept, but small arms in developing countries can only ever serve to fan the flames of conflict. (2) Illegal Migration People will always cross national borders. Orderly migration is the mother of civilization, but sudden surges of immigrants can overwhelm the civilization in the destination country and cause its collapse. In 1996 more than 100 million people migrated legally to foreign countries (settled for at least three months, not short-term visits such as for tourism), while 10-30 million settled in new countries illegally (Mandel 1999). In addition to these are about 20 million refugees. Most of this movement of people is from developing to developed countries. In the 1970s the legal migration across national borders became difficult. This was mainly because while enjoying the rapid economic growth in the 1960s, developed countries needed foreign workers (for example, the import of workers from Turkey by West Germany), as growth fell following the first oil shock these countries found themselves less able to absorb this new work force. At the same time, as developing countries steadily built up their own structures and institutions as independent nations, patrolling of their borders became even more stringent. Moreover, in the context of the East-West divide, immediately after the end of the Cold War concern was expressed in Europe about the possibility of a massive wave of people flooding into Western Europe from the former Eastern Bloc countries, and this was recognized as a serious security issue. In the 1990s illegal migration was consistently dealt with as an
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important issue of security, and this is expected to continue for some time. This is the same among developing countries as well. Major flows are from Indonesia to Malaysia, from Bangladesh to India, from Myanmar to Bangladesh, from Nepal to Bhutan, and from African countries to Cote d'Ivoire, South Africa and Nigeria. In Africa internal refugees increased sharply in the 1990s, and in countries where people live in tribal societies, this cannot but create a major security problem. Of this, illegal migration is thought to be a US$7 billion business (Mandel 1999). A global black market has been formed and is controlled by organized crime. Hopes and expectations built up about the "outside" world through radio and other media are reportedly the major factor in this market's formation and growth. It is also thought that the waning of authoritarian regimes has made it easier for organized crime to control this market. The pattern of the Great Lakes region in Africa in which refugees from internal conflicts flee to neighboring countries, sparking regional conflicts is a major problem confronting the international community. Considering that more than 100 countries are caught up in high- or low-intensity conflicts, this pattern must be seen as a current structural problem of security for the international community. Illegal migration is becoming a cause, either direct or indirect, of conflicts over large and diverse areas. And there is concern that it will become an even bigger problem in the future due to the increasingly powerful forces of the push and pull factors at work. (3) Drug Trafficking In historical terms dealing in drugs was made illegal only fairly recently from the 20th century. Today international drug trafficking is an enormous business involving massive amounts of money. According to the 1996 report of the UN Narcotics Control Program, the illegal drug trade has a turnover of US$500 billion a year (ten times the global ODA volume). This presents the following three problems from a development and conflict viewpoint: Growth of organized crime in producing countries, and civil wars triggered by it Spread of corruption involving huge amounts of graft money, and the resultant weakening of governance Rising anti-government sentiment by farmers growing drug crops, and the
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increasing difficulty of national unity Colombia is a typical example of the growth of organized crime in producing countries. One of the characteristics of Colombia, which supplies two-thirds of the world's cocaine market, is that the central mountainous region acts as a cover to conceal cocaine production facilities and runways from government surveillance. The United States is the main destination of Colombian cocaine, and reportedly, Colombian residents there are developing the trafficking network. The Colombian Government is also battling leftist guerillas, and the links between the guerillas and the drug cartels are quite strong, simply because it is in both groups' interests to weaken the power of the Colombian Government and the U.S. authorities concerned. This alliance between the drug cartels and the leftist guerillas in their confrontation and conflict with and resistance against the Colombian Government is the main reason development is stalled in this resource-rich nation with its skilled and educated work force. Graft money connected with the massive narcotics trade is based on the US$500 billion business and is extremely corrosive. Some of this also finds its way into the pockets of some government officials by way of bribes. The following are countries where corruption from drug money is said to have reached the higher levels of government and administration: Afghanistan, Armenia, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, India, Iran, Italy, Kenya, Laos, Paraguay, Peru, the Philippines, Romania, Senegal, Spain, Suriname, Syria, Tajikistan, Thailand, Turkey, Venezuela and Zambia (Mandel 1999). Of these 28 countries, 26 are developing countries, and drug money has given organized crime elements in these countries power and influence. Organized crime dealings can in part shape a nation's path, and this can provoke conflict. This list of 28 countries can be expanded, but there are no signs of it being reduced. For example, Russia perhaps should already be included in the list. If, however, we include countries where the drug corruption may not have reached the leadership levels but has certainly permeated through the slightly lower levels of government, the list will be even further expanded, but there are no data on this. The spread of organized crime through the international community is, more than anything else, linked to the drug trade, and this is expanding the causes of conflict. A rising anti-government sentiment by farmers growing drug crops and the
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difficulty in achieving national unity this causes can be seen in a number of developing countries, but nowhere more than in Myanmar, Bolivia, Colombia and Peru. The drug market is recording its fastest growth in Asia, and the major supplier to this burgeoning market is Myanmar. More than half of the opium poppy crops used in the production of heroin are grown in Myanmar. In the 1950s and 1960s the remnants of the Chinese Nationalists were the main players in opium poppy cultivation and opium smuggling in the northeastern regions of Burma. They also controlled the drug-producing Golden Triangle bordered by Burma, Thailand and Laos. These days, control has passed on to the ethnic minority groups in Myanmar. This is not to say that all traces of the Chinese Nationalist Party have been erased, but today the key players in opium production and smuggling are Myanmar's ethnic minority groups. The difficulty in unifying these ethnic minorities is one of the major obstacles to Myanmar's democratization, and this is caused mainly by the economic power to be gained from opium poppy cultivation and its illegality. Until these ethnic minority groups can be unified with the rest of the country, Myanmar will always remain in the dark shadow of conflict. Bolivia, Colombia and Peru also share this problem. Even if drug production is cut or even eliminated from these countries, the problem will most likely simply shift to other developing countries. The various problems facing communities in the developed countries give rise to social and personal tensions and alienation, and this is the reason why there is such a massive drug market. This problem is now structured within the international community as a cause of conflict. The international community itself is not sitting idly by and watching this problem grow. Numerous international conferences have been and are being held. In the 1970s donor communities led by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) started to tackle this problem by encouraging growers in Colombia's central mountain region to plant alternative crops, but nothing came of this because of pressure applied to the farmers by the drug cartels and left-wing guerillas. Similar conferences were held regarding Myanmar, but in the 1990s donor communities abandoned their efforts when they suspended aid to Myanmar's ruling military regime. These days, only some NGOs conscious of the depth of the problem are continuing to tackle rural development in this area. Little progress is being made by these international conferences. It has
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been pointed out that part of the reason for this is the undermining of these conferences by corrupt officials, and the general lack of ability of the officials concerned because theirs are not high-profile positions. If an agreement happens to be reached, its implementation will end up being ineffective because of the physical and financial power of the drug cartels, which can easily undermine the agreement. The spread of organized crime through the international community is largely drug-based, and its power is continuing to grow.

3. Conflict Resolution and International Development


If conflict prevention fails, conflict will break out. At times conflict will erupt all of a sudden, but in most cases, it comes from an internal power struggle that has been simmering for some time or trouble in regional communities gradually taking a definite shape. As Rupesinghe (1998) pointed out, the moment just before the flames start to grow is the ideal time for external intervention. Classical means of conflict resolution include the UN Charter provisions: peaceful resolution stipulated in Chapter 6, forceful measures in Chapter 7, the authority of the Secretary-General under the provisions of Article 99, and early intervention in conflict under the current expression (Marks and Frankel 1997), though former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjld used the expression preventive diplomacy (Kozai 1991). It is often pointed out that since these means do not assume internal conflict, they are ineffective against the rapidly increasing number of civil wars that have broken out since the end of the Cold War. Those who subscribe to this view tend to believe that NGOs must therefore take the initiative in conflict resolution. However, over the past 55 years the UN Charter itself has dealt with a vast number of situations that could not possibly have been imagined when it was drafted. Therefore, in view of this, surely civil wars are not beyond the scope of the flexibility which the UN Charter offers. New possibilities for the UN, the NGO approach that is unfolding in many areas, and the roles played by regional bodies in concert with the UN are being examined as new aspects of conflict resolution. In this the role of international development in relation to these efforts by the international community must be considered. The following two points are important: Participation in cease-fire/peace negotiations Strengthening and expanding socioeconomic activities in nonconflict
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regions 3-1 Participation in Cease-fire/Peace Negotiations Peace negotiations generally follow a set pattern, regardless of whether they are for a regional conflict or civil war. First, an agreement on key issues is sought to put an end to hostilities. Following this, negotiations will move toward the signing of a peace agreement, and if this is successful, armed action will be suspended, after which combatants are disengaged. The introduction of peacekeeping operations (PKO) follows this stage. What is important is that those responsible for assistance should take part in the negotiations from the start, that is, initial negotiations aimed at reaching agreement on the key issues. The aims of this are threefold: to help advance the negotiations, to help bring expectations to realistic levels, and to facilitate the implementation of aid in the process from the transition period to peace building. As for helping to advance the negotiations, it is often an important matter of interest and concern to the opposing sides in a conflict whether the suspension of fighting is linked to aid. The need to be a part of negotiations can, therefore, be readily understood. There are four kinds of conflictideological conflict, conflict over resources, conflict over identity, and conflict over power and authority (Rupesinghe and Kuroda 1994)but in the post-Cold War world of today, we only have to think of non-ideological conflicts, and in any such conflict, aid is an important incentive for ending hostilities. Directly linking conflicts over resources, power or authority with economic aid is indeed a strong incentive. The Middle East and North Africa Development Bank concept was negotiated for a number of years with an eye to promoting the resolution of Middle East conflicts by making the possibility of water resource, agriculture or tourism development and the like an incentive for advancing the peace process. Tribal wars are typical identity conflicts. In these kinds of conflicts, cooperation in the social development fields, such as medical services and health care, food security and primary education, is vital. The possibility of aid aligned to the type of conflict is an important incentive for the combatants to sit at the negotiating table and, therefore, the possibility of development cooperation can contribute to conflict resolution. Making sure that expectations about aid that will be available following a cease-fire are brought to realistic levels is extremely important. In cease-fire negotiations ambiguous expressions are often deliberately used, and those
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involved will tend to have higher hopes and expectations of what the aid can deliver. In reality, experiences over the past several years tell us that the transition and peace-building periods can be quite protracted, and can be a considerable financial burden. This is why expectations about aid tend to be on the higher side. Because of this, aid officials should be a part of peace negotiations from the start and, while always taking diplomatic considerations into account, make sure that aid expectations are realistic. There are few examples of progress from peace negotiations through peace building to normal development processes, and one reason for this is that often one side becomes very dissatisfied with the gap between aid expectations and reality, and fighting breaks out again. The process from the transition period to peace building is indeed a rocky road full of twists and turns. In a protracted civil war there tends to be huge numbers of troops under arms on both the government side and the rebel side. First, these troops have to be disarmed, and split into appropriately sized police and armed forces. Beginning with a constitution, electoral laws and other basic laws have to be enacted and essential institutions have to be constructed. And the people to administer these systems have to be identified and trained. The country also has to start rebuilding the socioeconomic infrastructure. And finally an effort has to be made to overcome the divisions and hatred that the protracted civil war may have engendered. For this to proceed smoothly, aid officials must be a part of the peace process, and have a good feel for the overall political situation. In the process from the transition period to peace building there is a need to execute highly political projects under an extremely precarious political and military situation. The peace agreement is the basis for this, and without a clear understanding of its implications, the task is virtually impossible (Ball 1996). 3-2 Strengthening and Expanding Socioeconomic Activities in Nonconflict Regions As Jan Pronk highlighted, even though one part of the country or region may be affected by a civil war or regional conflict, often in other areas people are leading normal or near-normal lives. This is the situation in more than 100 developing countries. Unlike conflicts during the Cold War period, these days development cooperation might be able to play an important role in countries and regions caught up in conflicts. First the nonconflict regions have to be stabilized so that society as a whole
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does not fall into the depths of instability. The aim should be to ensure supplies of water, energy and food, and continue education services and economic activities. Aid activities can make a substantial contribution. Depending on the region, protecting religious activities may be important. And depending on the situation, it may also be necessary to stop traffic between conflict and nonconflict regions. Preventing conflict from expanding through measures such as these is a new role for aid activities. Next, from the foundation of stability in the nonconflict region, an effort has to be made to steadily contract the battle zone. Normally, in urban conflict isolating separate areas within the city and transforming them to nonconflict areas is itself an extremely difficult challenge. In rural areas though, depending on the situation, if a conflict flares up it is not impossible to stabilize the areas, using the promise of development cooperation. A stable and secure food and water supply is often a good place to start. If rural areas are stabilized, combatants will find it more difficult to continue fighting in the urban areas alone, and this makes mediation in peace talks much easier. This approach of strengthening and expanding socioeconomic activities in nonconflict regions is a new area for international development. As national sentiment in donor countries grows less tolerant of the sacrifices by their own people because of circumstances in other countries, aid agencies have to examine how they can proceed with their aid activities as safely and effectively as possible. Whether NGOs or ODA officials, the security of aid officials is an important issue in donor countries. If they shirk this theme, they will be found wanting as major donors. Proposing new and better ways of providing aid will be one of the requisites for being a leading donor country. In fact, the aid activities in such countries as Indonesia will need to be considered from this perspective.

4. Peace-keeping Operations, Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation


The major issue in conflict and development is that external intervention involves three different groups of players in PKO, humanitarian aid and development cooperation all operating at the same time. Normally the country at the center of the conflict has all but collapsed. Into this being placed three completely different groups to carry out their respective operations, the situation naturally becomes even more difficult. Chronologically speaking, a range of
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problems will emerge as the focus shifts from emergency and short-term humanitarian aid to long-term development cooperation. Moreover, poverty brings its own difficulties. I have already stated that poverty is one cause of conflict. Dealing with poverty is a major challenge, and in the situation where these three groups are operating side by side and government functions are paralyzed, measures to counter poverty are crucial. 4-1 Compatibility of the Three Groups of Players PKO is normally the responsibility of those in the security field. Often their mentality follows the concept generally accepted during the Cold War that security is high politics and all other operations are low politics. They tend to think that they are the ones directly involved in conflict resolution, and as long as they are operating, those involved in humanitarian aid and development should follow the security logic. This view is not limited just to the military, but is also followed by civilian organizations as well. Those involved in humanitarian aid, such as refugee support, hold a different view. Their work is looking after people's lives by providing food, shelter, water and emergency medical care. Nothing is more important than life. They, therefore, believe that as long as they provide emergency support, those involved in PKO and other security operations and those responsible for development cooperation should follow their reasoning. Equally, it is quite normal for those in the development cooperation field to have yet a different view from those in security and humanitarian aid. To these people, developing countries are their "territory," and funds earmarked for PKO and humanitarian aid should be used for development cooperation as ODA. Because the situation is as it is, the "diversion" of funds into the other two areas cannot be helped, but an overwhelmingly large percentage take it for granted that with operations in developing countries, development cooperation must be positioned at the top, and those in the other two fields should yield to this logic. There is no common framework for operations among these three groups of players. While they talk to each other as the situation requires, this lack of a common framework means that often the problem deteriorates or becomes even more convoluted, or other problems may arise because the original problem was avoided. At present they are at a loss as to how to tackle the key issue of building this framework. The players include not just governments and
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intergovernmental organizations, but NGOs as well. Various cases in the 1990s should be able to provide an abundance of material for study. Practical researchers should perhaps begin by working out exactly what the problems are for discussion. Informal discussions can then be held among the people concerned where they can reach a consensus on the details of more formal conferences. This is just one approach. 4-2 Bridge between Humanitarian Aid and Development Cooperation The importance of a bridge linking refugee support and full-scale development cooperation has long been recognized. Over the past two years, UN High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata and World Bank President James Wolfensohn have been working together to tackle this issue head on. Various concrete proposals will emerge, and of these, the following are the more important points: Consistent participation of development cooperation from the conflict resolution stage Cooperation in the social development field Trauma Interaction among staff (1) Consistent Participation of Development Cooperation from the Conflict Resolution Stage The major reason for the problems in transition from humanitarian aid to development cooperation is that development cooperation officials are not involved when PKO and humanitarian aid operations are being carried out. As stated in the previous section, if aid officials did participate from the cease-fire negotiation stage, this would not be a major issue. If development cooperation officials are involved during the conflict and cease-fire negotiations and immediately after the cease-fire, cooperation with emergency aid officials will take place relatively smoothly. Therefore, what should happen is that aid officials should be involved from the conflict resolution process. Providing aid from the "no peace, no war" situation would be a more persuasive argument for aid officials to be involved from this stage. A separate potential problem is whether aid at this stage would make aid officials appear to the belligerents at the ceasefire negotiations as though they are benefiting the other side. Aid agencies
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must always keep this possibility in mind. The perception of neutrality is as important as its reality. (2) Cooperation in the Social Development Field There is no clear distinction of the start and end points in the process from emergency food aid to food security. Once the emergency food aid phase comes to an end, experts in food security should immediately step in, and steadily steer the aid focus in this direction. This is, however, not necessarily a linear process. Emergency food aid officials must still continue their work for a certain period. Food security must be consistent with agricultural development and poverty measures, and the link between emergency humanitarian aid and the various issues of mid- and long-term development policies must be grasped as a clearly defined concept. The same can be said about the relation between experts in emergency medical care and experts in basic medical and health care. The gap between these two groups of experts seems to be closer than in food and agriculture. In this field it is especially important to consider human resource development (doctors, nurses and medical care administrators) from the emergency support phase. It is also possible for development cooperation to work together with primary education under emergency support structures, and this cooperation must be strengthened. Especially when linked with trauma, which is covered next, this cooperation will be both unique and, from an educational viewpoint, very significant. (3) Trauma Trauma following a conflict has become a major issue. A particularly brutal civil war leaves severe psychological aftereffects. Care must be provided with the emergency humanitarian aid, and must also be viewed in the longer term as an issue for development cooperation. Emergency aid and development cooperation must join forces to tackle this problem. Conflict is like a multiple disaster (Kita 2000), and unless the trauma that accompanies conflict is dealt with urgently and from a medium- to long-term perspective as well, it can be merely sowing the seeds for the next conflict.

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(4) Interaction among Staff In a situation where a common framework has not been set up, establishing a system of interaction among staff can effectively facilitate the functioning of the cooperative structures. This interaction among staff from bilateral, multilateral and NGO humanitarian aid organizations and development cooperation organizations will not only promote mutual understanding, but enable both sides to learn much from each other. New revelations may come to staff at humanitarian aid organizations when they must look at emergency situations from a long-term perspective. One major problem with development cooperation organizations is that they tend to be slow to act. This would be an ideal opportunity for them to learn how to act promptly. Through processes such as these, emergency humanitarian aid and development cooperation will be able to function much more closely together. This can be further enhanced by setting up a more formal system of personnel exchanges between the two functions, which at present are extremely limited and carried out on an individual basis. Expanding the scale and scope of these exchanges should contribute significantly to improving relations between development cooperation and humanitarian aid.

5. Post-conflict Issues and International Development


In 1997 the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) adopted the Conflict, Peace and Development Cooperation: DAC Guidelines, and current revisions to the guidelines are scheduled to be completed in December 2000. These focus primarily on post-conflict development cooperation. Moreover, an increasing number of multilateral and bilateral aid organizations are establishing post-conflict peace-building units. Much needs to be done during this process, and a considerable amount of this is not normally a part of development cooperation activities. 5-1 Disarmament The first issue is disarmament. This mostly concerns nongovernment forces, but there are also many occasions when government military forces are reduced to ease the financial burden on the country. Convincing people who have had guns all their lives to hand in those guns is an extremely difficult task. To them, not having a weapon is worse than standing completely naked in front of a crowd. Having them leave their jungle or mountain sanctuaries and assemble
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at a set location is hard enough, but how do we then get them to give up their weapons? If we offer them a high price for their guns, they could then turn around and buy even more guns at cheaper prices from their various sources. If we try to buy their guns at the general market price, there is little likelihood they would hand them in (Ball 1996). A method reportedly being used is offering places in state universities in the United States in exchange for weapons, but this is not practicable for large numbers of weapons. The reality is that an effective way of removing weapons has not yet been found. It may be a circuitous route, but at the very least, there is a need to create the conditions in which individual soldiers can feel safe even if they give up their weapons, and have confidence that by doing this, they can build new and better lives for themselves. 5-2 Legal Systems Next, the framework of the nation has to be built. A constitution as well as electoral, administrative, civil and criminal laws have to be established, while work has to be started on framing laws covering economic and social matters. Experts from the country concerned should play a central role in this process as much as possible to ensure local input and help develop their skills and capabilities. Developed countries have a tendency to push their own national model as the ideal, but in the worst case, the new laws and regulations (for example, the constitution and administrative laws) could become a mishmash of British, American, French, German and Japanese laws. Throughout, the country concerned must itself play the core role, and the legal structures and institutions must be as consistent as possible. This also applies to economies in transition, but with countries just emerging from a conflict, the state itself is extremely weak, so consideration for this point is especially important. 5-3 Elections Elections are essential for the post-conflict government to gain legitimacy in the eyes of the international community. Japan is quite familiar with this process through Cambodia (Akashi 1995) and, more recently, East Timor. Elections have been considered to be a means of nation-wide reconciliation (Ball 1996) but, as in the case of East Timor, they can also have exactly the opposite effect and actually exacerbate the conflict. Elections require not just the establishment of electoral systems, but registration of eligible voters, public education and the like as well. These
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functions have to a degree started to become a part of classic development cooperation. It is also an area in which NGOs are quite active. In fact, it could be said that without NGO participation, voter registration and public education could not be accomplished. However, holding elections in countries lacking democratic foundations, and having the results of those elections accepted by all the sides, is a formidable task. Elections may well involve impropriety, and the extent of that impropriety will determine the extent to which the results of the elections will gain legitimacy. Consideration must be given to the losing side so that they will abide by the people's decision, but for this, what is acceptable to both winners and losers will differ from case to case. That said, though, is it possible to draw out some general lessons that can apply across the board? The Lessons Learned Unit, established in the UN in the mid-1990s, is dealing with this question, but can we expect the unit to produce some form of a basis for guidelines? 5-4 Human Rights Resistance against the suppression of human rights by development authoritarianism is often a root cause of conflict. This is why every effort has to be made to ensure that human rights are fully protected after the conflict has been resolved. The following are key points to achieving this: Establishing a truth commission Institution-building within the government Institution-building outside the government (1) Truth Commission A truth commission is usually set up to investigate the causes of the conflict, and heal the nation's psychological wounds. This mechanism has its supporters, but it also has its critics. Many people believe this only serves to so aggravate the wounds already felt that it is best avoided in the interest of national unity; whereas supporters maintain that identifying human rights violations and seeking justice through a truth commission is an important premise for national reconciliation. Despite the numerous cases to date, no detailed research on them has been done (Chicuecue 1998). Judgements on truth commissions need to be made on a case-by-case basis according to the circumstances of the conflict and the national character, but generally, this mechanism is quite useful. There
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are, however, many questions that have to be looked into; for example, who should be included in the commission, how should it be run and what authority should it be given. One definite aspect is that the chairperson of the commission must be a person of high moral standing and authority. Without this, there is every possibility that the commission will in fact have a negative effect. When the commission is established, donor countries must remain in the background. The commission, however, costs money, and aid will normally be necessary. How donors should be involved in this is another question that needs to be examined. (2) Institution-building within the Government The most important point is to establish practical and effective laws and systems for controlling the actions of the military. What is needed is not just civilian control, but a mechanism for real control of the military. In developing countries the military is often the best organized body, and achieving this aim can be quite difficult. In a country riven by conflict, often the only clearly defined organizations are the government and anti-government military forces. In El Salvador a human rights bureau was established under the terms of the peace agreement (Ball 1996), and similar bodies need to be set up in other cases as well. (3) Institution-building outside the Government A strong sense of human rights by the people is fundamental to the security of human rights, but cultivating this takes time. A strong democratic system is also crucial, but this, too, takes time. In the short term, however, the presence of a number of private-sector human rights groups can be effective. Such groups were established with UN support in Cambodia (Akashi 1995), and they have played an important role in their own way. 5-5 Strengthening Civil Society Post-conflict society is usually in a state of complete exhaustion. If the task of revitalizing that society is directed entirely by the government, the government can tend to head toward being a dictatorial regime, and this could sow the seeds of a new conflict. Post-conflict society needs to be formed into a pluralistic society, but one that is not divided into tribal or ethnic groups. Strengthening the civil society is absolutely essential for this. Strengthening
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NGOs, residents' groups, youth groups and women's groups is necessary for creating a pluralistic civil society. External support from international NGOs is important, and ODA can be viewed as a supplement to this. The World Bank and UN agencies also play a pivotal role. In particular, the World Bank can play a key part when the country concerned is being encouraged to adopt policies allowing NGO activities. The UN agencies are able to carry out a certain level of activities through local offices even when the policies of the government concerned are not positive toward NGO activities. When the government starts to view NGO activities in a more positive light, bilateral aid agencies and international NGOs will be able to fulfill a more constructive role. Efforts to strengthen the civil society in the country concerned through the cooperative work of international NGOs and bilateral and multilateral aid agencies can pave the way for subsequent peace-building measures.

6. Building Peace
Overcoming the various problems that arise immediately after a conflict does not automatically mean that the ground is set for the normal development processes to begin. There are still many scars left by the conflict. These must be addressed as a part of the development effort. (1) Clearing Landmines Although the Treaty to Ban Antipersonnel Landmines has been concluded, there is still a massive number of landmines that have yet to be cleared, and this task is expected to take more than 100 years. And considering rebel forces are quite likely to regard the treaty obligations as not being applicable to them, landmines will probably continue to be used. They are extremely cheap, and while originally they were designed as a defensive weapon, their improved killing power has also seen them used in an offensive role, and they tend to be popular with anti-government forces. Landmines must be cleared before farming and the transport of people and goods can be resumed safely. Landmine clearance has the following three aspects: clearance work itself, transfer of clearance technology and public education. 1) First, it is the experts who must begin clearing the mines. This can be carried out by private companies or by military experts. There are also occasions when NGOs that have the necessary expertise perform this work. The
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division of roles among these three groups is not always clearly defined, and their work is often coordinated on each occasion. Therefore, some form of guidelines need to be drawn up. 2) Along with the actual clearance, the skills needed to clear landmines must be passed on to the local people. These skills consist of specifying where landmines are laid, drawing up minefield maps and removing mine detonators. There is also a need to consider spelling out the benefits in learning these skills through economic incentives. 3) At the same time a public education campaign about the danger of landmines is also important. While the primary objective of this is to enable the people to avoid that danger, the secondary objective is to gain their cooperation, as many of the local residents know where landmines are located. (2) Soldiers' Reintegration into Society Provisions for the return of soldiers to society are normally contained in the peace agreement. This occurred in Angola, Cambodia, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Haiti, Liberia, Mozambique, Namibia and Nicaragua (Ball 1996). Details include cash payments, vocational training, counseling and education. This would seem reasonable, but it is in fact a major hurdle. People in donor countries are often very reluctant to offer aid to civil war combatants because of the atrocities they have committed and the destruction they have inflicted on their own country's infrastructure. Aid agencies are also somewhat reluctant. This hurdle has to be overcome. Next, the soldiers' expectations about returning to society tend to be too high. Their superiors often exaggerate about the benefits of a peaceful society as an incentive for them to leave military service after years of fighting. And because the opportunities for education and promotion are closed to rebel forces, these expectations tend to be overinflated. Next is the problem of child soldiers. They know nothing other than war, so they are being thrown back into society with a disadvantage. In addition to the psychological problem of being separated from their parents, they will also be separated from their comrades in the anti-government forces, who have become their second family. This psychological instability, coupled with a lack of knowledge about community life, makes the integration of these child soldiers back into society extremely difficult.

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(3) Socioeconomic Reconstruction Apart from restoring road networks, water and electricity services and the like, in most cases rebuilding social organizations and rehabilitating the work force are also major issues confronting a country following conflict. The first task is to rebuild the education and health and medical care systems. Training of teachers, doctors and nurses is also necessary. It is especially important to link this reconstruction work with future development efforts, as is empirically proven. To the donor community, this is close to traditional development cooperation, and it is relatively simple to carry them out. (4) Need for Emergency Planning An emergency plan is essential for the above-mentioned reconstruction work to be implemented smoothly. Individual items of work are quite politically delicate, and without a consistent framework, they tend to be caught up in the highly charged political process. The plan must be prepared promptly and implemented immediately. It cannot be handled in the same way as development cooperation plans which normally take 3-5 years to prepare. Two critical points about the emergency plan are that it must be neutral, and it must be easy to implement. The role played by aid agencies and multinational organizations, especially the UN and World Bank, is important for maintaining neutrality. Rebuilding a devastated country requires a knowledge of the local people's sentiments and society that is more detailed than would normally be necessary, and from this point, the developing countries should be major players rather than just participants when drawing up the emergency plan. However, in a highly politicized post-conflict society, local skilled experts who are neutral and have a high standing throughout the society are extremely hard to find. The requirement for neutrality brings with it many difficulties. The requirement that the plan must be easy to implement is especially important when the country is still in a state of chaos, but this, too, has its difficulties. The ease with which a plan can be implemented varies greatly, depending on the availability of suitable personnel, and in a post-conflict society suitably skilled people are quite scarce. One realistic option is to view individual projects as a step in the social integration of the fighters and soldiers. This will not cover a large number of fields, but at least they are the best prepared group that can be put to immediate use.
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(5) Financial Flexibility One of the conditions for implementing an emergency plan is making financial management more flexible. One area where emergency plans differ from well-prepared development cooperation projects is that emergency plans often have to be implemented quickly in line with the situation. In a highly politicized and unstable situation, various unexpected circumstances will emerge. Emergency disaster aid is normally given a considerable amount of financial flexibility, and in post-conflict aid there is a need to provide a higher degree of financial flexibility, but in return for tighter project evaluation and accountability. (6) Conflict Resolution Mechanism Often there are two problems with executing a peace agreement. One is that difficult points are frequently avoided in the quest to achieve a peace agreement. While in many cases this may be the right course to take politically, the implementation of such an agreement is full of obstacles. The second is that peace agreements lay down what must be done, but they often fail to say how it should be done (Ball 1996). This is one factor contributing to the overinflated expectations of the people concerned at the implementation stage. Various mechanisms have been tried in an effort to deal with these problems, but we are still at the trial and error stage with as yet no "right" way. However, the things that have to be done are gradually becoming clear. One is to create an environment of deeper mutual understanding in which the two sides make an effort to cover the gaps in the agreement so that the two problems mentioned above do not occur. An effective way of achieving this is to form technical working groups as a means of deepening the mutual trust among the specialists. Another is to establish a mechanism for resolving problems as they occur. Official commissions or monitoring organizations have been formed, but as yet, there is still no successful mechanism for this. A failure to resolve problems that may emerge can easily plunge the country back into conflict and the vicious cycle of killing. There are many examples of this. Consultative bodies that include multilateral organizations may at times be effective for this; while at other times, mediation mechanisms centering on the civil society and including NGOs may have some success. Future research into this aspect is particularly important.
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7. Construction of International Cooperation Systems and International Development


The theme of "conflict and development" suggests a strong link between international cooperation systems and international development. How the international community can cooperate is a decisive factor in any of the stages of conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building. That is, when the international community exists under a power-based system, such as a hegemonic system or a balanced-power system, conflicts in fragile developing countries may expand rapidly. In contrast, when it exists under a cooperative system, the international development factor comes into play in all stages of prevention, resolution and peace building. The factors of conflict are, therefore, easy to confine. Ten years have passed since the end of the Cold War, and the international community contains a mixture of hegemony, balance of power and cooperation factors. The dynamics of globalization are pushing these factors along. As discussed in Agenda for International Development 1998 and 1999, globalization is made up of the two processes of market-based globalization and politico-economic globalization. Market globalization propels companies and nations into competition that produces "winners" and "losers." Generated in the "losers" are the factors for conflict, such as expanding poverty, intensifying tribal disputes, and against this background increasing illegal activities, while the "winners" may cause conflict by seeking to secure resources under more advantageous conditions. On the other hand, politico-economic globalization mobilizes the civil society and multilateral and bilateral aid agencies to confront the issues of poverty and environmental preservation. Strengthening the cooperative links among these players is an essential requisite for conflict prevention, conflict resolution and peace building. The theme of "conflict and development" is therefore also a question of strengthening politico-economic globalization, and through it, building the international community as a cooperative system. In other words, it is a question of how to enhance the cooperation among NGOs, multilateral and bilateral aid agencies, and governments of developing countries. Challenges presented by conflict can play an important role in rebuilding the overall international community system through international development. If we consider that the aim of international development is to expand freedom, as suggested by A. Sen (1999), we can say that the aim is also to build an international community
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system that is not just a system of relations among nations, but one that encompasses individual freedom as well (Takahashi 1999b). Building an international cooperative system that embraces relations among nations and individual freedom should, through international development, become the way to deal with conflict. Central to this is the strengthening of politicoeconomic globalization. At the same time, considering the theme of individual freedom, there is a need to view "cooperative international system and international development" in relation to the massive wave of democratization sweeping across the world. Certainly, under a stable democratic system, internal and international conflicts are not likely to erupt, but the most important basis of this is freedom of the individual. And the situation nowadays is that new and still fragile democracies are expanding dramatically. The lessons of Japan, Germany and Italy in the first half of the 20th century have taught us how insecure new and fragile democracies can be. Similar situations can be seen extensively in both economies in transition and developing countries. The international community system must be made into a cooperative system, which cannot emerge naturally, but needs to be fostered carefully. At the same time, development cooperation that enhances the social base of developing countries and economies in transition must become a requisite within the international community in relation to conflict. From this perspective as well, the strengthening of politico-economic globalization is becoming a central issue facing the global community. References
Akashi, Yasushi. 1995. Nintai to Kibou: Kambojia no 560 nichi [Perseverance and aspiration: 560 days of Cambodia]. Asahi Newspapers. Ball, Nicole. 1996. Making Peace Work: The Role of the International Development Community. Washington D.C.: Overseas Development Council. Chicuecue, N.M. 1998. "Reconciliation: the role of truth commissions and alternative ways of healing." In D. Eade (ed.), From Conflict to Peace in a Changing World: Social Reconstruction in Times of Transition. An Oxfam Working Paper. Oxford: Oxfam. Haass, R. 1996. "Using Force: Lessons and Choices for U.S. Foreign Policy." In Chester A. Crocker and Fen Osler Hampson (eds.), Managing Global Chaos. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press. Isaacs, H. 1975. Idols of the Tribe. Mass.: MIT Press. 37

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Jongman, Albert J. and Alex P. Schmid. 1998. Prevention and Management of Violent Conflicts. Utrecht: European Platform for Conflict Prevention and Transformation. Kajita, Takamichi. 1988. Esunishiti to Shakai Hendou [Ethnicity and social change]. Tokyo: Yushindo. Kita, Etsuko. 2000. "Fukugo Saigai" [Complex emergency]. FASID News (New Year 2000). Tokyo: FASID. Kozai, Shigeru. 1991. Kokuren no Heiwa Iji Katsudo [PKO of the United Nations]. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Mandel, R. 1999. Deadly Transfers and the Global Play Ground: Transnational Security Threats in a Disorderly World. Conn.: Praeger. Marks, John and Eran Fraenkel. 1997. "Working to Prevent Conflict in the New Nation of Macedonia." Negotiation Journal (Summer1997). Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University. O'Brien, C.C. 1998. Memoir: My Life and Themes. Dublin: Poolbeg Press. Otunu, O. 1998. "Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict." A report to the 53rd session of the United Nations General Assembly. PeaceNet, Institute for Dispute Resolution. 1999: Vol. 3. Khon Koen University, Thailand. Rodrik, D. 1999. The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work. Washington, D.C.: Overseas Development Council. Rupesinghe, Kumar. 1998. An Introductory Guide to Preventive Diplomacy. Translated by Kayoko Tatsumi. Tokyo: Daiamondo-sha. Rupesinghe, Kumar and Michiko Kuroda, eds. 1994. Early Warning and Conflict Resolution. Translated by Yasuhiko Yoshida. Tokyo: Three-A Network. Sano, Makoto. 1998. Kaihatsu no Regyurashion [Regulacin of development]. Tokyo: Shinhyoron-sha. Sato, Nobuo. 1989. Nagorno-Karabakh (in Japanese). Tokyo: Tairyu-sha. Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Takahashi, Kazuo. 1998. Agenda for International Development: 1998. Tokyo: FASID. ______. 1999a. Agenda for International Development: 1999. Tokyo: FASID. ______. 1999b. "Mizu Funsou no Seiki" [Century of conflicts over water]. Front (June 1999). ______. 2000. Globalization and International Development. FASID-IDRI Occasional Paper no. 19. Takeuchi, Shinichi. 1999. "1990 nendai Afurika no Funsou - sono Tokushitsu to Youin" 38

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[Conflicts in Africa in the 1990s - Its characteristics and factors]. World Trend (March 1999). Tokyo: Institute of Developing Economies. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1998. Overcoming Human Poverty: UNDP Poverty Report 1998. New York: UNDP. Uppsala University. 1999. States in Armed Conflict 1999. Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Report no. 49. Yamauchi, Masayuki. 1991. Soren, Chuutou no Minzoku Mondai [Ethnic problems in Soviet Union and Middle East]. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha. Zacher, M.W. 1970. Dag Hammarskjold's United Nations. New York: Columbia University Press.

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CHAPTER II

ASEAN: COPING WITH MARGINALIZATION 1


NG Chee Yuen

1. Introduction
Since the financial crisis first started on 2 July 1997 in Thailand, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) had been tested on all fronts during the remaining three years of the millennium. First and foremost, on the economic front some critics have pointed to its failure to respond effectively to the regional economic crisis. Others have noted the disarray among member countries, reflected by their diametrically opposing policies. And yet others have even questioned the sustainability of the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) process in the light of the devastation caused by the crisis. On the political front, news prints had a field day reporting on the fallingout between Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir and his deputy Anwar Ibrahim, and the subsequent criticisms by both presidents of the Philippines and Indonesia on the Malaysian Government's treatment of Anwar. There were even hints that both Indonesian President Habibie and Philippines President Estrada might boycott the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in Kuala Lumpur in November 1998. Likewise, there was increasing political-economic
1

The author wishes to express his sincere thanks and appreciation for the excellent comments and suggestions by Kazuo Takahashi, Charla Griffy-Brown and Kim Beng Phar.

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friction between Singapore and its next-door neighbors, Malaysia and Indonesia. As described by P.K. Wong, "Diplomatic relations between the two countries have steadily worsened over a series of eventsMalaysia's strong objections to remarks by Singapore's Senior Minister (SM) Lee Kuan Yew; the raising of levy on cargo trucks from Johor to Singapore to discourage Malaysian exporters from using the port of Singapore; alleged re-negation by Malaysia over the Point of Agreement for the redevelopment of Malayan Railways in Singapore and the subsequent issue over the relocation of the customs check-point of the Malayan Railways in Singapore; the suspension of Singapore's CLOB (Central Limit Order Booking System) operation; the publication of SM Lee's memoir that contains unfavourable accounts of certain past United Malay National Organization (UMNO) leaders; and most recently, Malaysia's withdrawal of its airspace for use by Singapore's Armed Forces and the Malaysian pull-out from a recent military exercise under the Five Power Defence Agreement (FPDA)."2 In addition, there was also the Malaysian Government's accusation that the Singapore Government deliberately caused capital flights from Malaysia by offering high interest rates for ringgit deposits in Singapore-based banks. With regard to Indonesia-Singapore relations, John Funston aptly noted that they "were affected by Senior Minister Lee's February 1998 criticism of B.J. Habibie's possible appointment as Vice-President. In a memorable retort, President Habibie told the Asian Wall Street Journal in August that Singapore was 'just a little red dot on the map'."3 Indonesia's relations with Singapore, however, have improved significantly with the newly elected government of Abdurrahman Wahid. Meanwhile, on the social front, increased poverty and economic-social dislocation proved to be fertile grounds for the growth of Islamic fundamentalismthereby also increasing alignment with neighboring countries. The crisis in Indonesia, for instance, has shown that Islamic sentiments could be easily aroused, leading to riots and killings of thousands of Christians and Indonesians of Chinese ethnic origin. Increasingly, the calls and pressure for secession and the establishment of separate Islamic states have grown louder and wider. Likewise, the bashing and jailing of Anwar Ibrahim in Malaysia
See P.K. Wong, "Singapore's Strategic Positioning for a Stronger Regional Hub Role after the Regional Economic Recovery," in C.Y. Ng and Charla Griffy-Brown, eds., Trends and Issues in East Asia 1999 (Tokyo: FASID, 1999), p. 150. 3 See John Funston, "Challenges Facing ASEAN in a More Complex Age," in Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 2 (Singapore: ISEAS, August 1999), p. 206.
2

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have led to the polarization of the Malay majority, resulting in the fall of another state, Terengganu, to the Islamic Party called PAS. In this regard, K. Takahashi succinctly noted, "There now exists a structure of conflict between Islam and the overseas Chinese population, as well as with Singapore and China."4 What are the major causes of these disruptions and discontinuity of economic development? Many reasons have been cited and propounded. However, this author will continue to maintain what he has said before in other articles that the major cause is the failure of ASEAN governments to bridge the ever-widening gap between the type of economic institutions required to compete in the global market and the socio-political institutions that are always lagging behind in an era of rapid globalization.5 The original five founding members of ASEAN, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Singapore, have had continuous economic development for three decades or more when these countries opened their economies and locked themselves into the global system. In other words, the process of globalization had indeed brought economic growth, prosperity, peace and dramatic economic development in these countries. However, it was not without costs. There were a number of crises but none that were insurmountable. The latest economic crisis, however, was the most devastating and prolonged. This discontinuity has shaken the ASEAN economies to the very core and caused serious pains and hardships to millions. Crises are inevitable and expected, but the main concern facing ASEAN countries is how to ensure that crises of this dimension are not repeated and are better managed. For, if such crises are not well managed, there is a high possibility that some of these countries may be marginalized and get entangled in a downward spiral that may keep them in the poverty trap of underdevelopment. The real issue for these trading economies is not whether they should remain or opt out of the globalization process. There is no alternative but to remain locked into the global system. The real issue is how to cope with the globalization process by building commensurate institutions at an appropriate pace and avoiding marginalization.
4 See K. Takahashi, "The Rapid Development of Globalization," in K. Takahashi, ed., Agenda for International Development 1999 (Tokyo: FASID, 1999), p. 14. 5 See C.Y. Ng , "Economic Trends and Issues in East Asia," in C.Y. Ng and C. Griffy-Brown, eds., Trends and Issues in East Asia 1999 (Tokyo: FASID, 1999); C.Y. Ng, "Harnessing Globalization: the East Asian Experience," in Agenda for International Development 1999, op. cit.; and C.Y. Ng and C. Griffy-Brown, "Introduction," in C.Y.Ng and C.Griffy-Brown, eds., Trends and Issues in East Asia 2000 (Tokyo: FASID, 2000).

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The process of globalization has been significantly accelerated by advances in telecommunications technology and the increasing processing power of new generations of interconnected computers. The wealth of nations is increasingly determined by their access to information and knowledge management in the academic, public and private sectors. Therefore, firms striving to compete in the global marketplace are forced to adopt international standards set by the strongest players in order to remain viable. Countries that cannot keep up with this pace of change or are unwilling to abide by the principles established by the market leaders are increasingly being marginalized with the possibility of regressing into conflict-ridden poverty states. Even for those developing states that are locked into the global grid, some sections of their population do not have access to the necessary technology, education or skills to exploit the new opportunities. These people will then also be marginalized and suffer all the consequences of isolation and poverty entrapment. This exercise, therefore, deals with the issue of coping with marginalization at two levels in the ASEAN member states. At the regional level, the expansion of ASEAN to ten member states that include moderately integrated economies (MIEs), such as Vietnam, and under-integrated economies (UIEs), such as Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, is seen as facilitating their integration into the regional system with eventual integration into the global grid. The chapter, therefore, looks at both the positive and negative aspects of this twostep approach in coping with marginalization. For instance, their inclusion into ASEAN may hamper the pace and degree of integration of more highly integrated economies (HIEs) such as Singapore, Thailand and Malaysia. On the other hand, the new members may gain experience under the "protective" umbrella of ASEAN, which may increase their prospects of faster integration into the global economic system without the dangers of disruptive crises arising from inadequate capacities and capabilities both at the national and institutional levels. In addition to economic impacts at this level, there are also security issues arising as well. At the domestic national front, the problems of coping with marginalization of sections of the population, although resting solely within the jurisdiction of national governments, are inevitably affected by policies at the regional and global levels. Opening up the economy even at the regional level redefines the relationship between the state and the private sector. The state is no longer able to behave according to its whims and fancies without imposing
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a great cost to its economy and likewise political cost in terms of credibility to its electorate or to the national stakeholders. Realizing this, however, does not in any way negate the problems associated with upgrading these societies to be compatible with the 21st century globalized world. These and other issues related to the relevance and usefulness of ASEAN in coping with marginalization will be discussed in this chapter.

2. Understanding ASEAN
ASEAN's image has indeed taken a beating in recent years. And it is no surprise that its relevance is once again under question. Such doubts are not new and they have been raised off and on since ASEAN's inception on 8 August 1967. The achievements of the European Union (EU) have often been used as yardsticks to measure ASEAN's performance. This author feels that there is a gross lack of understanding of the ASEAN process. ASEAN and the EU are two entirely different institutions. It is therefore inappropriate to compare the two. To fully appreciate ASEAN, we must fully comprehend the history and changing environment of Southeast Asia in the 20th century. Only then can we differentiate the reality and images of ASEAN. 2-1 Historical Background Southeast Asia in the 1960s was classified as one of the most turbulent regions in the world. Indonesia went through a bloody transition from Sukarno to Suharto in the mid-1960s, when more than half a million people were reported massacred. The French were defeated in Dien Bien Phu and the United States quickly became involved in the Vietnam War. The time of direct involvement of the United States is difficult to pin down, but by 1962, there were some 50 American military advisors, and by 1967, there were half a million American troops in Vietnam. The British announced their East of Suez policy in the mid-1960s and started to withdraw from the region. In China, 1966 was the beginning of the Cultural Revolution in which the Red Guards reigned supreme. The domino theory was in vogue and Southeast Asian states with serious problems of unemployment, underdevelopment, dire poverty and internal insurgency were predicted to fall like dominoes under the influence of communism. Singapore achieved independence, or more accurately was kicked out of Malaysia, in 1965 after being part of Malaysia for two traumatic years, and
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was seriously under threat to becoming a communist state. Malaysia itself was under Emergency Law with widespread insurgency. It was no better in the Philippines, Thailand, Burma (now Myanmar) and the Indochinese states. Furthermore, these countries had serious security concerns given their limited military capabilities, mostly geared toward meeting internal threats. Insecurity was also engendered by geographical factors. Singapore was just too small. The archipelagos of Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines were geographically too fragmented, and Thailand was too close to conflict areas and sources of security threats. Under such circumstances, ASEAN was conceived and established in 1967. The prevailing thinking then was that poverty was the breeding ground for insurgency and the growing influence of communism. Therefore, to counteract and contain the expansion of communism in the region, the most effective strategy was to eradicate poverty. However, given their diversity, differences and the circumstances faced, it is difficult to imagine that these Southeast Asian states could on their own initiative establish such an organization. The vision, determination, political will, resources, knowhow and determination were just not there. A good illustration of the difficult Southeast Asian environment is found in the establishment of the Asian Development Bank (ADB), an initiative of Japan in collaboration with the United States.6 Who could have imagined that setting up a regional bank to provide scarce financial resources would face difficulties from the recipients of such assistance? Even at the conceptualization stage and despite the then popular trend toward the establishment of regional banks, Japan had to move cautiously for fear of being accused of having imperialist design. The proposal to set up a regional bank did not come directly from Japan. Instead, Japanese officials, influential bankers and others quietly planted the idea of a regional bank in the minds of Southeast Asian leaders. After which, Japan waited patiently for them to take the initiative of proposing such an institution. The proposal for a regional bank eventually came from the Working Group of Experts on Regional Economic Cooperation meeting in Bangkok in September 1963. This proposal was adopted by the First Ministerial Conference
6

Many past observers had attributed the establishment of the ADB to the initiatives taken by the Ecnomic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE) (in the person of U Nyun) and the United States (in the person of Eugene Black). What was not widely publicized was the crucial role played by a group headed by Takeshi Watanabe, a senior official in the Japanese Ministry of Finance, who subsequently was elected as the first president of the ADB on 24 November 1966.

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on Asian Economic Cooperation held in Manila in December 1963. Over the next couple of years, before its final acceptance, there were heated debates and discussions on the role of the bank, membership criteria, voting power distributions and other issues such as the site for the ADB headquarters. These debates were seldom focused or based on the objective of welfare enhancement or optimization, but rather on national interests and politics. For instance, Burma did not join as a member initially on the grounds that its neutrality would be violated by the exclusion of countries such as China, North Korea and North Vietnam. On the other hand, Iran, which participated actively in the various committees and conferences, refused to be a member after losing its quest to site ADB's headquarters in Teheran. Most puzzling was the initial lack of enthusiasm by the United States as it wanted to marshal regional cooperation in developing the Mekong delta as a "counter-offensive" against insurgencies in South Vietnam. The United States had to be convinced of the necessity of a second line of defense in neighboring countries such as Thailand and Malaysia. 2-2 Diversity and the Potential for Conflict ASEAN in 1967 and ASEAN now is characterized by its great diversity. As shown in Table II.1, in terms of geographic size, it ranges from the tiny city-state of Singapore at 648 sq km to gigantic Indonesia comprising more than 13,750 islands at 1,919,443 sq km. The 1998 estimate of the population of Brunei was 0.3 million compared to approximately 204 million in Indonesia. The levels of economic development and economic structures are also far ranging from the basically service economy of Singapore to the agricultural economies of the Indochinese states and Myanmar. GDP per capita in 1998 ranged from around US$300 in Myanmar and the Indochinese states to US$26,375 in Singapore. The disparity in the number of telephones per 1,000 people was even wider, ranging from 2 to 5 in Cambodia, Myanmar and Laos to 543 in Singapore. This is a good indication of their level of development and their readiness to participate in the information and knowledge age.

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Table II.1
GDP2 Per Capita Telephones Land Area1 Population2 (sq km) (million) (US$ billion) GDP3 (US$) per 1,0004 Indonesia 1,919,443 203.7 94.2 462 25 Malaysia 330,434 22.2 72.5 3,266 195 Thailand 514,000 61.1 111.3 1,822 80 Philippines 300,000 75.1 65.1 867 29 Brunei 5,765 0.3 2.85 9,032 n.a. Singapore 648 3.2 84.4 26,375 543 Vietnam 330,000 76.5 25.9 339 21 Lao PDR 236,800 5.0 1.6 320 5 Myanmar 678,675 44.4 12.8 288 5 Cambodia 181,040 10.7 3.0 280 2
Sources:
1

3 4

Data for 1996ISEAS, Regional Outlook: Southeast Asia 1999-2000 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1999): Table A. Data for 1998 (mid-year estimates) http://www.worldbank.org/data/countrydata/countrydata.html Calculated using GDP and population. Data for 1997World Bank, World Development Indicators (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 1999) Table 5.10. Data for 1995 calculated using data in 1.

With the exception of Thailand, all were newly independent states, which still had strong economic links with their former colonial rulers. Given similar climate and terrain, these were mainly agricultural economies that were competitive rather than complementary to each otherwith the possible exception of Singapore, a city-state, performing entrept functions. The only common features shared by all five founding members were probably poverty, high unemployment, internal insurgency and a strong resentment of communism. The last factor was probably crucial in forging a common front. Diversity, the potential for conflict and the impact of external forces have been, and continue to be, the defining features of the region. The region has witnessed the rise and fall of many empires and dynasties since recorded historyFunan, Pagan, Ayuthia, Angkor, Champa, Annam, Tongking, Srivijaya, Majapahit, Mataram, Malacca and other lesser entities. There have been, and continue to be, endless struggles for population, trade and territory between rival centers. With regard to religion, in maritime ASEAN, the Philippines is predominantly Catholic with pockets of Muslims in Mindanao. Malaysia and Indonesia may be termed as predominantly Muslim with sizeable Christian and Buddhist minorities. Singapore may be classified as being under
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the influence of Taoism/Confucianism mixed with Buddhism, with an increasing number of Christians. Confucian orthodoxy is still prevalent in Vietnam, although Marxism remains the official doctrine. The rest of Continental Southeast Asia remains the bastion of Theravada Buddhism. These religious and philosophical differences were further entrenched by the advent of colonialism. Colonial boundaries drawn in London, Paris, The Hague, Lisbon and Madrid imposed an unnatural political grid on existing ethnic, linguistic and religious matters. This imposition of artificial boundaries planted the seeds of future conflicts. For a short period, the Japanese also occupied the whole region. The defeat of Japan and the end of World War II led to a confusing and complex period in the history of Southeast Asia. The fight for independence was combined with the rise of insurgencies, subversion, separatist movements and religious and racial conflicts. In the context of the ideological superpower rivalries of the Cold War, these conflicts assumed an even more profound character. Local conflicts became regional conflicts that had a bearing on the global balance of power. The fall of Saigon, for example, was more than simply the unification of Vietnam. It was perceived as part of a global communist expansion. In Southeast Asia many states were indeed like dominoes teetering on the brink of collapse. 2-3 Impact of External Forces Fortunately, U.S. interest in the region had increasingly grown since its involvement in the Korean War. As the United States geared itself for greater involvement in the Vietnam War, and with the larger aim of containing the spread of communism in general and China in particular, the United States realized that it had to be holistic in its approach to be effective. With this in mind the United States, in collaboration with Japan, actively encouraged the establishment of such an organization and helped nurture ASEAN. It is too much of a coincidence that the ADB was also established in 1967. It is also no coincidence that the ADB is located in Manila and the fact that since its inception, the president of this regional bank has always been a Japanese national closely associated with the Japanese Ministry of Finance. Since World War II Japan has shown great interest and involvement in the development of ASEAN countries, with the loss of its traditional "lifeline" China. This is significantly reflected in the sustained concentration of Japanese official development assistance (ODA), investment and trade in the ASEAN
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region since the 1960s. It is also not unusual to observe that new Prime Ministers of Japan would have the region at the top of their travel agenda. And quite a few have started their premiership with an aid doctrine for the region. For instance, Japan in 1977 under then Prime Minister Takeo Fukuda pledged 5 billion yen for the establishment of the ASEAN Cultural Fund. Nakasone, in September 1986, pledged US$2 billion of Japan's surplus funds as aid to ASEANfor the promotion of private sector development under the ASEANJapan Development Fund. Therefore, it is no surprise to observe active Japanese involvement in the resolution of the Cambodian issue. It is increasingly observed that Japan is taking the view that its own well-being, prosperity and destiny are inextricably tied to those of the ASEAN economies. However, foremost in the initial stages was U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War. Although the American electorate viewed the Vietnam War very negatively, ASEAN countries were thankful for U.S. involvement as it bought valuable time for them to put their house in order. The significant U.S. presence in the region not only brought about political stability that contributed to rapid increases in direct foreign investments, but also financial resources for development in the form of U.S. procurement expenditure and rest and recreation (R&R) expenditure. Unfortunately, these feelings have seldom been voiced. Instead, the United States has often been criticized for its condescending behavior. This seems odd but it is not irrational, as we shall see later.

3. Relevance of ASEAN
Given that these were newly independent states trying to establish nationhood with rising nationalism, territorial disputes, competitive rather than complementary economies, and North-South rather than South-South trade relations, as well as the differences in religion and ethnic compositions both within and without, it is not surprising that these countries were suspicious and careful in their relationships. Consequently, since ASEAN's inception in 1967 right up to 1975, this regional grouping indeed was seen as nothing more than a "talk shop." There is a great deal of truth in this perception. However, as the saying goes, Rome was not built in a day. Time is an essential ingredient needed for the nurturing of confidence and understanding. The Bangkok Declaration of 1967 defined the official objectives as the promotion of economic, social and cultural development of Southeast Asia and the maintenance of regional peace and political stability. In reality, however,
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during the first decade of ASEAN's existence, its main focus centered on security in order to preserve peace and counter communism in the region. This focus on security was well reflected by the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM) of foreign ministers as the highest decision-making body of ASEAN. The Meeting of ASEAN Heads of Government, which started only in 1976, superseded the AMM. However, as noted by Parrenas, "there was no regular meeting set for the Heads of Government until the Singapore Declaration of 1992, when such formal meetings were set every three years, thus enlarging the role of national leaders in shaping ASEAN's future development."7 Although economic cooperation was neglected during the first decade, it cannot be denied that ASEAN has served well as an important political vehicle to diffuse differencesbe they over territorial issues or otherwise. Regular meetings among political and bureaucratic elite within the ASEAN framework offered opportunities to discuss issues outside the official concerns of ASEAN, such as common internal and external security problems. The very fact that there were no open conflicts among the member states was sufficient testimony of its political usefulness. ASEAN really got its act together after the fall of Saigon on 1 April 1975 and the subsequent invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam in December 1978. The appearance of a real external threat at its doorsteps, a common enemy, created the political glue for substantive cooperation. This threat spurred ASEAN to a higher level of cooperation through not only an agreement to establish the ASEAN Secretariat in 1976 but also upgrading from AMM to Heads of Government as the highest decision-making body. The first ASEAN Summit was held in Bali, Indonesia, in February 1976, and the Secretariat sited in Jakarta. Thus, it was near to a decade since its inception that a Summit was held and a Secretariat established. By comparison APEC, which was established in 1989, took only four years to do boththe Seattle Leaders' Meeting was held in 1993 and the APEC Secretariat was established in Singapore in the same year. Likewise, indications of economic cooperation only came about a decade later. The Third ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in January 1977 approved the draft on Preferential Trading Arrangements (PTA). However,
7

See J.C. Parrenas, "The Future of ASEAN," in Chan Heng Chee, ed., The New Asia-Pacific Order (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997), p.190.

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the PTA was a big flop as the coverage was limited and where there was agreement to reduce tariffs, it was in areas that were not of major concern or little traded in the region. Schemes such as the ASEAN Industrial Joint Venture and Brand to Brand Complementation, among others, were not effective and were a total waste of time and energy. The number of ASEAN meetings started to grow exponentially, stretching the manpower resources of all member countries. Meanwhile, with seconded personnel, usually from the foreign ministries, the Secretariat was little more than a conducive conduit in organizing meetings and performing postal services. Most of the decisions and activities were decided in the ASEAN affairs unit of the foreign ministries. Nevertheless, the seed for deeper economic cooperation was planted and ASEAN did serve as a useful platform for political discussions, as noted earlier. As an integral part of the strategy to promote greater economic cooperation, ASEAN Inter-Parliamentary Organization (AIPO) was formed on 2 September 1977 by the Parliaments of the five founding countries and its membership has now been expanded to include the new members of ASEAN. A study by Suthiphand Chirathivat et al. has just been completed to review "... past ASEAN economic achievements and outlines potential problems and policy implications for ASEAN legal commitments while concurrently examining the consistency of its institutional framework. The major emphasis is on the need for AIPO to pay greater attention to legal harmonization and co-ordination so that the success of the future ASEAN integration process is guaranteed."8 Economic cooperation could be classified as dismal until the region was hit by the 1985/86 recession. It was a blessing in disguise and significantly changed the attitudes of the ASEAN member states. Increasingly, member states found that they had to be ruled by the head and not the heart. Even Singapore realized that its meritocratic bureaucracy was not infallible and could make serious mistakes. A high-powered Economic Committee was established to look into the economic structure of Singapore and chart a new course for sustained economic development. Likewise, similar exercises were undertaken in the other member states. Malaysia and Thailand in particular started to open up their economies with an export-led orientation. They started to liberalize and deregulate their economies, following the footsteps of Singapore.
8

See Suthiphand Chirathivat et al., "ASEAN Prospects for Regional Integration and the Implications for the ASEAN Legislative and Institutional Framework," in ASEAN Economic Bulletin 16, no. 1 (April 1999): 29. For a detailed listing of the aims and purposes of AIPO, see p. 28.

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Even Indonesia and the Philippines followed but at a later date. With liberalization, deregulation and increasing cross-border investments, private economic cooperation started to emerge to exploit the economic advantages among geographically close peripheries of neighboring ASEAN countries.9 There was definitely a quantum change in attitude, giving greater preference to economic rationality. Who could have, for instance, thought of the possibility of official endorsement of the Southern Growth Triangle (SIJORI) in 1989? Since independence, Singapore has been the whipping boy of Malaysia and Indonesia. One of the fastest ways to score political points in Malaysia was to bash Singapore and it was similarly the case in Indonesia. Singapore was the parasite that exploited their natural resources and became prosperous in the process. Both countries, in particular Malaysia, were actively enacting regulations to bypass Singapore's port through the development of their own ports. Incurring a higher cost to their producers and consumers did not matter, but despite their enormous efforts, both countries were frustrated, as the task required more than just diverting resources to this area. The range of destinations and the frequency of freight needed to be built up slowly over time. Yet, suddenly both countries allowed their periphery to gravitate toward another pole, which happened to be Singapore. Effectively, that was what SIJORI was all about. This required not only maturity and confidence but also a quantum change in attitude. The greater openness of these economies, coupled with their closer integration into the global economic system, constrained the actions of the state in a positive way. Players could no longer implement policies that went against the market without incurring heavy costs that were detrimental to their own economy. The political cost through loss of credibility might even be higher as mistakes showed up very quickly with the pressure for greater transparency and advances in communications, particularly the Internet over which the state had little control. This constraint on the role of the state, we argue, is a positive development, as the state is forced to act rationally. Given the positive experiences of greater openness, one after the other, member states started to liberalize and deregulate at a faster pace.
9

For a detailed discussion of growth triangles or growth areas that can be regarded as building blocks for the ASEAN-wide cooperation and integration processes, see chapter on "Co-operation Within a Narrow Framework: Growth Triangles in ASEAN," in ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Co-operation: Transition and Transformation (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997a).

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The external environment, meanwhile, was also undergoing significant changes in the late 1980s and the early 1990s. The collapse of the Berlin Wall, disintegration of the Soviet Union, rapid economic growth in China, and the globalization of trade and business necessitated the reformulation of political, security and economic equations at both the regional and global levels. In 1989, as we have noted earlier, APEC was established with the cooperation of ASEAN. However, despite ASEAN members' active involvement in the establishment of APEC, there was concomitant apprehension that ASEAN could possibly be marginalized by this new institution. This fear, coupled with the changing international political and economic situations, again took ASEAN to a higher level of cooperation. The Singapore Summit of 1992 was indeed a significant event for ASEAN. At this Summit, ASEAN leaders declared that "ASEAN shall move towards a higher plane of political and economic cooperation to secure peace and prosperity."10 The concrete actions taken in this Summit include the following: 1) restructuring the ASEAN Secretariat, where professionals are openly recruited and the Secretariat given a more active role; 2) widening ASEAN to encompass all ten Southeast Asian countries as envisaged by the founding fathers; 3) deepening ASEAN through the actualization of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) by implementing the Common Effective Preferential Tariff (CEPT) scheme; 4) establishing the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) to engage nonmembers in political and security dialogue; and 5) establishing the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) to strengthen the third side of its economic and political triangle.

4. Economic Crisis
Just when ASEAN had gained sufficient confidence and maturity in implementing the above-stated measures in response to changing internal and external environments, which gave it a more consequential say on the structure and dynamics of the region, a devastating economic crisis struck the whole region. Starting as a financial crisis in Thailand in July 1997, it soon spilled
10

See ASEAN Secretariat, The ASEAN at 30 (Jakarta, 1998), p. 44.

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over not only to the real sector but also the social and political arenas. In Thailand, where it started, then Prime Minister Chavalit Yongchaiyut was forced out of office. More important for ASEAN, Suharto, who was president of Indonesia for 32 years, was also forced out of office by riots with ethnic undertones that have cost more than a thousand lives. As Acharya noted, "ASEAN's problems were compounded by the perception of a leadership vacuum. The fall from power of Soeharto in Indonesia deprived ASEAN of a senior statesman who had for long provided it with a measure of leadership and stability. This may be difficult to replace."11 The causes and costs of the crisis have been well debated and documented. Of interest in this chapter is its impact on ASEAN. More specifically, this chapter looks at the globalization and marginalization processes and how ASEAN and its constituent members are dealing or coping with these processes. There are indeed indications that showed that the worst is over. Stock market prices have increased significantly with Singapore experiencing record highs and other markets recovering from past losses. Significant reforms have taken place, particularly in the worst hit countries such as Indonesia and Thailand. However, the institutional gaps between economic institutions necessary to deal with the global market and the socio-political institutions are still dangerously wide. Ethnic and religious conflicts seriously make the task of reforms, particularly in the case of Indonesia, much more difficult, not to mention secessionist pressures from multiple corners of the archipelago. Furthermore, as noted by Parrenas, "Ethnic tensions have an international dimension that affect relations among Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. The issue of separatism has a bearing on a wide geographical area stretching from the Thai-Myanmar border to the Southern Philippines. Religious fundamentalism may affect intra-ASEAN relations in so far as Islam is the majority or plurality in three member countries and of a minority in another three."12 Meanwhile in Indonesia, the ensuing instability has slowed not only new capital inflows but also the repatriation of significant capital resources owned by Indonesians of Chinese ethnic origin, which is crucial for Indonesia's recovery. For Singapore, which is well prepared to compete in the information
11

See A. Acharya and J.D.K. Boutin, "East Asia's Regional Order after the Economic Crisis," in C.Y. Ng and Charla Griffy-Brown, eds., Trends and Issues in East Asia 2000 (Tokyo: FASID, 2000). 12 See Parrenas, op. cit., p. 188.

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technology (IT) age, it is zooming ahead with further liberalization and deregulation. Malaysia, on the other hand, has resorted to capital controls as its way of dealing with the crisis, but it is also slowly relaxing such controls, although not much has been achieved in terms of reforming the financial sector. Thailand has initiated significant reforms not only in the financial sector but also in politics. There is a definite trend toward greater democratization with the new Constitution and the Thai economy is fast improving. Meanwhile, for those countries that were least affected by the crisis, not because they were better attuned to the new global economics or that they had better managed their economy but mainly because they were less integrated into the global system, little reforms of any significance have taken place. The military regimes of Myanmar and Cambodia as well as the communist parties of Vietnam and Laos are bent on maintaining control for their own survival. Under such diverse responses, not to mention the inherent diversities mentioned earlier, how would they affect the image and effectiveness of ASEAN and what sorts of impact will ASEAN have on these economies?

5. Expansion to ASEAN-10
ASEAN has achieved its full complement of ten members comprising all the countries geographically defined as Southeast Asia. Vietnam joined ASEAN in July 1995, followed by Myanmar and Laos in July 1997 and finally by Cambodia in April 1999although there may possibly be an 11th member with East Timor gaining independence. This expansion of ASEAN has indeed increased the diversity even further. We now have economies ranging from command to mixed and capitalistic economies. Accidentally or intentionally, the widening process is ASEAN's way of coping with marginalization, which it terms as constructive engagement. In this regard, the inclusion of Myanmar and Cambodia is instructive. Myanmar's membership was strongly opposed by both the United States and EU because of the military regime's failure to relinquish power to the democratically elected government of Aung San Suu Kyi and the issue of human rights. Nevertheless, ASEAN went ahead in accepting Myanmar as a member on the grounds of constructive engagement. On top of having a different perception on human rights as compared to the West, ASEAN also practices the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of member countries. ASEAN believes that embargo and isolation are questionable as an effective means to induce
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SLORC13 to democratize, given the history of Myanmar's self-imposed isolation for decades. Furthermore, it will lead to the classic case of hurting most those you were supposed to help. Whereas, in the case of constructive engagement, through fostering greater interdependence, nonconformance will impose enormous costs on the military regime. Consequently, it will provide pressure for better governance and thereby contribute to stability in Myanmar and the region. However, in no small way, objections to Myanmar's membership were significantly reduced and support from Japan significantly increased by the apprehension of Myanmar's increasing dependence on China. Whatever the pros and cons of Myanmar's inclusion, it has become a fact and ASEAN has effectively dealt with its dialogue partners, particularly the EU notwithstanding several meetings between ASEAN and the EU have been aborted. The basic arguments for the inclusion of Cambodia were similar to those of Myanmar, although its membership was delayed until 30 April 1999 after Hun Sen had been "democratically" elected. However, unlike Myanmar, there was consensus on how to deal with Cambodia. ASEAN has been a key player in Cambodia since the 1970s, forcing Vietnam's withdrawal from Cambodia in 1989 and contributing to the Paris Agreement. ASEAN cannot ignore internal developments in Cambodia, which can destabilize regional security. However, unlike Myanmar, which depended significantly on China's support, Cambodia depends heavily on foreign aid by developed countries and political support from Vietnam, which also happens to be its historical enemy. With nearly half the national budget dependent on foreign aid, the withdrawal of such assistance by its three major donorsnamely, Japan, the United States and Germany will surely see the collapse of the Cambodian economy. This leverage has made the issue of Cambodia's membership much easier to handle. The point we wish to make in this chapter is that countries such as Vietnam, Myanmar, Laos and Cambodia, left on their own, would have great difficulties in making the necessary reforms and eventually get integrated into the global system. There is a high probability that they will be marginalized with the gap growing even wider. Their integration into ASEAN not only forces the pace of change but also concomitantly facilitate, assist and direct the nature of change. As a start, the Indochinese states will be forced to learn English, as it is the
13

The State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC) has since changed its name to State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) in an attempt to give the military regime a better image.

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medium of communication in ASEAN. This greater focus on the English language will not only facilitate greater effectiveness in ASEAN activities but more importantly the spillover effect into the wider population will improve their access to information and participation in the IT revolution, which is crucial for their sustained economic development and integration into the global system. In all these countries, there is indeed a discernible trend toward the learning of the English language and the use of the computer. Furthermore, under the umbrella of ASEAN, these countries could better receive foreign aid, particularly funds for human resource development and capacity building from donors such as Japan, the United States and other developed countries and from international development institutions. Skilled human resources are extremely scarce in these countries and participation in ASEAN activities alone has stretched them to the limit. The gap between these countries and the founding members is indeed very wide. Not to mention that even among the older members there is also a wide gap. For instance, while the whole city-state of Singapore is wired up by fiber optic cables with more than one in two persons having a telephone, the number of telephones in both Indonesia and the Philippines is less than 30 per 1,000, as noted in Table II.1. Of course the disparity is even greater with Myanmar and the Indochinese states. There is indeed a vast and significant amount of catching-up required by these countries. Partly as a consequence of the observed negative impact during the economic crisis and partly as a result of the wide gap that exists, which is generating rapid changes that are painful, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia have begun to organize themselves as a distinct bloc within ASEAN to resist or slow institutional changes which would strengthen ASEAN's role. As Acharya noted, "Recently, the leaders of these countries met in Vientiane for an unofficial summit, leading to the speculation that ASEAN was in danger of splintering."14 The widening of ASEAN was supposed to expand the ASEAN market and give it greater political leverage in both the regional and global environments. However, the economic crisis highlighted how poorly ASEAN was situated to address the effects of the crisis, given its own origins as a "soft" regional institution. To date, cooperative efforts have been promoted through the strategy of consensus. ASEAN is necessarily not structured and things move very
14

See Acharya and Boutin, op. cit.

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slowly and in an ad hoc manner. ASEAN has often been criticized for its weak structure but it is precisely because of this looseness that has enabled ASEAN to survive this long. As Parrenas observed, "ASEAN thus remains an international (as opposed to supranational) organization, where the institutions at the ASEAN level do not exercise any power autonomously of the governments of member states. The decision-making process within ASEAN has been always based on consensus among the political leaderships of the member states, and not on processes formally agreed upon. Controversies are avoided, and disagreements are discussed without being brought to a vote until member states find a solution that is at least not objectionable to any of them."15 However, the crisis required quick and decisive cooperative action, which ASEAN was not able to deliver. ASEAN's initial response was limited to a consideration of establishing contingency funding arrangements to be used in future crises of this nature, and even then only as a supplement to measures sponsored by the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Only later did ASEAN articulate a common ASEAN position in reforming the international financial architecture. It also considered instituting surveillance measures useful in terms of identifying impending economic downturns. This resulted in the establishment of the ASEAN Surveillance Process (ASP) in October 1998. However, these and other initiatives had little effect in addressing the causes of the crisis and arresting its course. Consequently, there have been increasing calls to dilute the principle of noninterference in member states. Of course in the past and up till the present, circumvention of this principle has been undertaken with innocuous terminology such as "constructive intervention," "flexible engagement" or "enhanced interaction," but the current call is more direct. It necessitates greater openness within ASEAN and the need to directly criticize each other's domestic policies and practices if they threatened regional order. The Philippines and Thailand have been the strongest advocates of diluting the principle of noninterference in the domestic affairs of member states. While useful and important in an organization comprising disparate states that range from monarchy to mixed and command economies at different levels of development and with different sizes and military strength, this principle ought to be discarded in order to move ASEAN cooperation to a higher plane. On the other hand, Myanmar and Vietnam had deep reservations about the idea, which threatened their
15

See Parrenas, op. cit., p. 191.

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regimes' security. Meanwhile, both Malaysia and Singapore pointed out that revising such a time-honoured principle was both unnecessary and counterproductive and might lead to the unraveling of ASEAN itself. In this regard, Acharya noted, "The internal challenge to the 'ASEAN way' could lead to the emergence of distinct factions differentiated along haves and have-nots, democratic and authoritarian, and reformist and non-reformist lines."16 It is still not clear whether the widening of ASEAN will strengthen or weaken this institution. However, should ASEAN successfully integrate these transitional economies into the ASEAN grid and subsequently into the global grid, it necessarily implies greater openness in these economies. This openness will redefine the relationship of these states with their societies. There will also be pressure for democratization and better governance with greater accountability, responsibility and transparency. The demonstration and spillover effects will significantly assist these economies in coping with the widening institutional gaps that continuously threaten to marginalize these states. On the domestic fronts, a great deal will be dependent on what the national governments do, but ASEAN membership will generally induce positive changes as failure to do so will be very costly in both economic and political terms. Despite the expansion of ASEAN, there is an increasing view that ASEAN by itself may not be sufficient to deal with the global changes. Traditionally, ASEAN has relied heavily on external help, be it in the establishment of the ARF, the promotion of ASEAN economic cooperation or social and cultural exchanges. It can be easily deduced that ASEAN acting alone could never have solved the crisis without the support of the developed countries and the international institutions. More fundamentally, maritime ASEAN states, which depend heavily on trade, need to have a global reach. Furthermore, the new international order is characterized by the dominance of one superpower, the United States. As in the immediate post-World War II period, we have a country that dominates in all the dimensions of power. Increasingly, it is observed that the United States is taking action unilaterally and subjecting other countries to its laws, practices, values and norms. This is not a healthy situation and there is indeed a need to check the excesses of the United States. ASEAN by itself will not be able to have the global reach or act as a counterweight to the United States. It has to cooperate with a larger group.
16

See Acharya and Boutin, op. cit.

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A reevaluation of the global environment shows that the time is now ripe for the reemergence of the East Asia concept. Notwithstanding the East Asia economic crisis, after decades of economic growth, the region has become one of the three key economic areas of the world. It commands two-fifths of the world's population, a combined GDP of approximately US$7.75 trillion and a sizeable percentage of the world's trade. Japan is on the verge of recovery after nearly a decade of economic doldrums. The Miyazawa Initiative that was introduced in 1998 has helped Japan preserve this area of economic influence. Meanwhile, another important regional player, China, has experienced rapid and sustained economic growth for nearly two decades, and it is fast modernizing its military and economic structures that will have farreaching implications not only for the region but also the world. Even ASEAN was able to take the initiative of launching the ARF, albeit with support from all the major players. All these indicate that indigenous players have progressively become more consequential in the structure and dynamics of East Asia. Although historical enmities still run deep in the East Asian region, economic necessity has forged closer economic integration of these economies. The logic of greater integration between ASEAN and its northeastern neighbors has been reinforced by the perception of the global market that East Asia is one region. The Third ASEAN Informal Summit held in Manila from 27 to 28 November 1999 between ASEAN and its northeastern neighbors, plus the occasion for a separate summit for China, Japan and South Korea, is increasingly seen as the de facto actualization of an East Asia grouping. The agreement by the ten ASEAN countries plus these three northeastern neighbors to cooperate in areas of trade, investment, monetary and financial coordination, technology transfer and scientific exchanges is indeed an event of considerable significance. An East Asia grouping is clearly in the formation and it points to a newly assertive East Asia that may possibly contribute to checking the United States.

6. Deepening of ASEAN
To ensure its relevance and as a response to the possibility of being marginalized, ASEAN also started to deepen itself by initiating AFTA through the CEPT scheme and the restructuring of the ASEAN Secretariat. Professionals who draw up position papers and perform other more constructive activities now man the new Secretariat. As for AFTA, it can be said without reservations
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that it is more comprehensive than the earlier PTA and has progressed toward its actualization more concretely. As noted by Parrenas, "The decision to establish AFTA in the Singapore Summit of 1992 marks an important milestone in ASEAN's development. This brought the field of economic cooperation directly into focus in ASEAN by the member countries, and signified for the first time the acceptance of economic integration as a goal, with all the risks and adjustment consequences for domestic industries. Also for the first time, ASEAN committed itself to a significant specific goal with a definite time frame (a free trade area in fifteen years)."17 Once again, it was external forces that spurred ASEAN to a higher level of cooperation. Undeniably, the external pressure must be sufficiently strong to become more important than the domestic opposition from protected economic sectors and bureaucracies that have stalled the progress of economic cooperation. The fast development of APEC, for instance, has induced ASEAN to reduce its time frame to fully actualize AFTA from 2008 to 2003 for the ASEAN-6. Grace periods have been given to the new members with the deadline for Vietnam fixed at 2006, that of Myanmar and Laos at 2008 and Cambodia at 2010. For the present, 98 percent of the traded goods are included in the list, which will have 5 to 0 percent of tariffs by the year 2003 (excluding the new members). Meanwhile, the ASEAN Secretariat is working on the inclusion of unprocessed agriculture and services, and they will more or less follow the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. Again, many observers are still skeptical of AFTA. According to some observers, if Singapore's entrept trade and mineral oil were removed, intraASEAN trade would be no more than 4 to 5 percent of total trade. Why then the necessity for AFTA? The real impetus came from the significant redirection of foreign investment to China since the mid-1980s. Foreign direct investment (FDI) and the accompanying transfer of technology and managerial knowhow is one of the, if not the, major locomotive engines for sustained economic growth in the ASEAN region. Any threat to the flow of FDI is therefore alarming to the ASEAN countries. Thus, for the short to medium terms, the establishment of AFTA, which not only provides a much larger market but also a greater possibility for division of labor, will defend the region as an important site for FDI. In the longer term, with continued economic growth and thereby higher levels of income, intra-ASEAN trade will take its due expansionary course.
17

See Parrenas, op. cit., p. 193.

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Even in the short to medium terms, as Parrenas noted, " recent trends suggest that enterprises are responding positively to the signals of AFTA; trade in CEPT products posted a growth rate of 43.8 percent in 1994, which led to an increase of the share of intra-ASEAN trade in ASEAN's total trade from 18.5 percent in 1993 to 20.0 percent in 1994."18 Meanwhile, ASEAN economic integration will also be facilitated to the extent that the larger and rapidly growing AFTA market will attract foreign investors, who play an important role in the integration of the ASEAN economies. This strategy is supported by recent efforts. At the Fifth ASEAN Summit in Bangkok in 1995, the leaders agreed to set up an ASEAN Investment Area (AIA) and to work toward the elaboration of this concept. Concomitant on this occasion, ASEAN revised its industrial cooperation programs with the implementation of the ASEAN Industrial Cooperation (AICO). Furthermore, at the Second Informal Summit at the end of 1997, focus was given to ASEAN Economic Area (AEA) with focus on the 2020 Vision.19 There are, however, a number of technical barriers for goods traded across ASEAN members, which may hamper ASEAN trade liberalization at the national level. As a start, there are differences in laws and regulations among ASEAN members that not only negatively affect trade but also investment cooperation. These laws and regulations have to be ironed out for consistency and standardization, which is extremely difficult given the vested interests, not to mention the lack of skilled human resources or expertise to carry out the tedious exercises. The harmonization of tariff nomenclature among the more developed older members at the beginning of AFTA, which was a purely technical exercise, took an enormous amount of time and energy. Now with the inclusion of the new members, transaction costs have increased exponentially. This does not even take into account the observed attempt by the new members to form a group to resist or retard the pace of change. The real test of ASEAN economic cooperation came with the crisis. The international market seems to perceive ASEAN countries as a group, but the members acted individually. While Malaysia implemented capital controls,
18

Ibid., p. 204. The 2020 Vision was approved at the December 1997 Informal Summit. In this Vision ASEAN leaders pledged themselves to establish "caring societies" in which "all people enjoy equitable access to opportunities for total human development regardless of gender, race, religion, language, or social and cultural background."
19

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which effectively amounted to opting out of the global system, Singapore went ahead with further liberalization and deregulation. On the other hand, Indonesia simply could not handle the situation by itself and seemed to be imploding with civil and religious strives and secessionist movements. There were no contingency plans or mechanisms to deal with the crisis promptly and indeed ASEAN seemed to be in disarray. Once again, foreign help in the form of IMF and Japan were needed to rescue these countries from total collapse. There are, however, silver linings in an otherwise gloomy environment. Ironically, the economic crisis did provide a more conducive situation for economic integration in ASEAN. IMF conditionalities have forced Indonesia and Thailand to cut tariffs, reform their banking laws and implement other measures that would ensure more open economies. With Indonesia and Thailand as major players of ASEAN, the liberalization of their relatively closed economies has kept AFTA on track. In addition, as a show of confidence, the meeting of ASEAN trade ministers in October 1998 agreed to speed up AFTA and approved plans for an AIA. Subsequently, at the Hanoi Summit in December 1998, the leaders committed themselves to speeding up AFTA by 12 months for the ASEAN-6, additional investment incentives to December 2000 and expediting implementation of the AIA. Attention was also given to providing a region-wide social welfare net to deal with increasing poverty resulting from the crisis. In this regard, a task force was established, coupled with an ASEAN Action Plan on Social Safety Nets. The professed objectives are to assist in analyzing the nature of social problems, plan remedies, and coordinate with international aid agencies and dialogue partners in the delivering of aid. These were implemented specifically with an eye on Indonesia, which is central to the future of ASEAN. ASEAN's move toward providing a region-wide social security net is an important development with regard to coping with marginalization as highlighted by the economic crisis. Unfortunately, such efforts could only be sustained with the assistance of dialogue partners. Although such actions deal with the symptom rather than the cause, it can be considered as a start to dealing with the real cause, which is the divide or gap between states and within states of those that are well prepared for globalization and those that are marginalized. Dialogue partners, particularly Japan, had in the past and at present assisted ASEAN in capacity building and provided other forms of assistance.20 With the expansion of ASEAN to include the transitional economies of Myanmar
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and the Indochinese states, coupled with the new external politico-economic environment, a great deal more cooperative assistance is needed from the dialogue partners. In this regard Japan, as the largest and most important donor of ODA, is providing substantial resources, bilaterally and multilaterally through the ADB, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and other international institutions for capacity building to better integrate these new members into the ASEAN process. However, the nature and quality of such assistance may have to change significantly, given the new economic environment. Particularly, such assistance should focus on dealing with the issue of coping with marginalization. Falling prices of personal computers and rapid advances in communication technology have provided the conditions for an Internet takeoff and ecommerce. For instance, it was reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review: "According to International Data Corp., the internet-user population in Asia minus Japan was expected to rise to 21.8 million by the end of 1999 from 12.9 million the previous year."21 This clearly indicates the importance of the Internet and the direction of change that is warmly embraced throughout the East Asian region. Most of the young are strongly attracted to the opportunities available in these global information systems. The best and the brightest are moving into IT venture. Internet-related companies are also reported to have accelerated their recruitment drive in advertising, media and consumer-goods industries. The demand for people with technological expertise is increasing rapidly. The more developed members of ASEAN (ASEAN-6) are in a race to build facilities to encourage IT industry and e-commerce in an attempt to avoid
20 Most assistance has been given on a bilateral basis, but a small portion has been given to member countries under the umbrella of ASEAN. Some of these listed by the ASEAN Secretariat include the following: 1) The ASEAN Rural Youth Development Centre, funded by Japan under the Japan-ASEAN Exchange Programme, was established in 1991 to enhance agriculture and rural youth development. 2) The ASEAN Timber Technology Centre, funded by the EU, was established in 1986 to provide services to the timber processing industry in such areas as applied research, training and technical information services. 3) The ASEAN Institute of Forest Management, funded by Canada and ASEAN member countries, was established in 1986 to develop expertise in sustainable forest management. 4) The ASEAN Food Handling Bureau, funded by Australia, was established in 1981 to develop technical and management expertise for consultancy and advisory services. 5) The ASEAN-EC Energy Management Training and Research Centre, funded by the EU and the ASEAN Fund, was established in 1980 to develop innovative methodologies in resource evaluation, production optimization and energy utilization; with due consideration to environment concerns. For a comprehensive listing of these centers and a detailed discussion on the subject, see the chapter on "ASEAN Centres" in ASEAN Secretariat, op. cit., pp. 130-36. 21 See FEER, Asia 2000 Yearbook, p. 10.

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being marginalized and catch up with the West. At the national level, for instance, Singapore has already wired the city with high-speed cables and offered accommodation and other facilities to IT investors. It was also reported that 30 percent of the Singapore population is online. Across the causeway Malaysia, not to be left behind, has started phase one of its hi-tech capital, Cyberjaya, in the middle of its sprawling Multimedia Super Corridor project near Kuala Lumpur. Even trouble-mired Indonesia is trying to set up a cybercity near Jakarta. However, very little is being done at the transitional economies. If this situation is not corrected soon, then the gap between this group of transitional economies and the ASEAN-6 will get even wider. Not to mention the gap between these transitional economies and United States or Europe. These transitional states would certainly like to be on the bandwagon, but they have neither the resources nor the technical know-how. Thus, this is one important area where Japan could assist most effectively and benefit from such assistance, given that ASEAN is the production base of Japan and together the member countries constitute one of the few major centers for electronic production. Synergistic partnership between Japan and ASEAN can only improve their competitiveness vis--vis North America and the EU. At the same time, careful planning will concomitantly help reduce the possibility of the transitional economies from being marginalized. Nevertheless, in coping with the widening divide within a country, the bulk of the effort can only come from the national government. In this regard, most of these transitional economies have grossly underperformed. For instance, the government of Myanmar has deliberately stalled change to ensure survival of the regime. Despite the fact that Myanmar is far behind in human resource development, as reported in the Far Eastern Economic Review (13 January 2000), the military regime has since 1996 closed all institutions of higher learning to prevent students from organizing political parties. This clearly indicates how repressive and destructive a government can be to its own economy for the sake of its own survival.

7. ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)


With the end of the Cold War, which possibly implies reduced U.S. commitment in the region; China's initiation of armed clashes with Vietnam in the Spratlys and unresolved territorial disputes among ASEAN members and with China in the South China Sea; coupled with the resolution of the Cambodian
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issue, which meant the loss of a common enemy; ASEAN launched the ARF, to the surprise of its critics. In so doing, ASEAN members effectively supplemented their traditional unilateral or bilateral approach in addressing their security concerns by engaging in multilateral dialogues on security issues. The shift also augments the members' preference for a balance of power approach and demonstrates ASEAN's ability to adapt to new circumstances. In a way, ASEAN's position was aided by the fact that no great power or grouping in the region was acceptable to all in taking the initiative of forging such a multilateral security institution. This initiative not only reduced the possibility of being marginalized but also provided ASEAN with a more consequential say on security measures concerning the region and an active hand in shaping its future. The establishment of the ARF has indeed enhanced the relevance of ASEAN. In just a few years, the number of dialogue partners has increased to 21, with India becoming a full member in 1995. The long waiting list is a good indication of the relevance and importance of the ARF. Among the dialogue partners are the major players not only in the East Asian region but the world and these include the United States, EU and Japan. The big question remains whether the ARF can be the center of the Asia-Pacific security multilateralism. That is, can the ARF promote dialogue and confidence-building measures (CBMs) that would be able to influence the three major relationships of United States-China, United States-Japan and China-Japan that are likely to determine the security environment in the region. ARF workshops on CBMs, peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy have been conducted in Canberra (November 1994), Brunei (March 1995) and Seoul (May 1995) respectively. According to Buszynski,22 ASEAN's immediate aims in the ARF were defined in terms of three main tasks: the exchange of nonclassified military information; the publications of defense white papers; and military exchanges and visits. The ARF is a very young forum. However, in the absence of alternatives, the relevance and importance of the ARF are not in doubt. Within a few short years, the ARF has achieved a great deal but more needs to be done. China remains as ASEAN's most important concern. However, the testing of missiles along the Taiwan Strait by the Chinese, which induced the U.S. response of sending two aircraft carriers to the scene, and ASEAN's quiet
22

See Leszek Buszynski, "Southeast Asia: Trends, Development and Challenges," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1996 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1996), p. 11.

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response showed the limitations of the ARF. The perception seems to be that should any conflict between the United States and China over Taiwan take place, ASEAN would likely "sit it out," citing that its interests are not directly involved. ASEAN's response, however, would be significantly different concerning territories in the South China Sea where there are overlapping claims involving ASEAN members. For instance, soon after the Mischief Reef incident, ASEAN senior officials met in Singapore and issued a joint statement on 18 March 1995 urging restraint. The apprehension on the part of China that ASEAN has the ability to internationalize this issue and thereby get Japan or the United States involved is a modest demonstration of ASEAN's influence over China's action. In this regard, the United States-Japan Security Alliance remains the most vital relationship for the stability of the region. Strong support from Japan and the United States has contributed significantly toward the influence of ASEAN on China. Positive developments include China's offer at the dialogue meeting at Huangshan (Anhui Province) to frame a code of conduct governing ties with ASEAN and assurances that China is prepared to settle the South China Sea issues according to international law. On the ASEAN home front, it is also comforting to note that Malaysia and Singapore, and Malaysia and Indonesia have agreed to settle conflicting territorial claims at the International Court of Justice at The Hague. These developments have contributed positively to the unity and effectiveness of ASEAN. To this effect, ASEAN has been strategically enhanced with the inclusion of Myanmar, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, coupled with continued efforts to "draw in, in a balanced way, outside powers to reinforce the regional order; at the present this objective turns on balancing China by holding out amicable engagement in return for opting not to tackle the Southeast Asians one by one."23 Sino-American relationship is likely to define the state of the region over the next couple of decades. This relationship is being tested by a number of issues and trends, which, if not managed well, may bring dire consequences to the whole region. With a Republican Congress sympathetic to Taiwan, increasing trade friction and continued violation of human rights in China, the United States is likely to increasingly view China as a hostile state. This is despite the Clinton Administration's continued emphasis on an "engagement"
23

See James Clad, "Regionalism in Southeast Asia: A Bridge Too Far?," in Southeast Asian Affairs 1997 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997), p. 12

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policy with the objective to bring China into the so-called "world community." On the Chinese side, there remains continued skepticism by many senior officials who perceive U.S. actions as "containment" rather than "engagement." Meanwhile, the U.S. security umbrella and market remain vital for the region. The United States is the only superpower that has effective control over the sea-lanes and mineral oil resources, not to mention sophisticated weaponry unmatched by any other country. However, many countries find its self-righteousness and practice of passing moral judgement on others difficult to stomach. While the United States tried to legislate the conduct of others, on its part, the United States has been unwilling to pay its dues at the United Nations and acted unilaterally without due concern for the rest of the world. Furthermore, the United States seems to be giving increasing attention to Latin American states. Mexico is a member of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and other Latin American states may soon join, following Clinton's tour of the region in October 1997. However, has ASEAN a viable alternative? The China-Japan relationship, although potentially important, has not reached the stage where political and security equations for the region can be reformulated in a significant sort of way. Can Japan compensate for the uncertainties with regard to the U.S. position in the region? Nevertheless, there is a growing need to manage the United States, which is a superpower in all the dimensions of power. It is not healthy to leave it unchecked, as it may lead to even more serious excesses. The current thinking is that an East Asia grouping as an option is increasingly gathering momentum. This is supported by the separate summit attended by China, Japan and South Korea after the ASEAN Informal Summit of 1999, as discussed earlier. This group has met for the third time and this annual meeting has been virtually institutionalized. An East Asia grouping is clearly in the formation and it points to a newly assertive East Asia in the 21st century. Undoubtedly, the success of the ARF was in no small measure due to the backing of extra-regional powers such as the United States, Japan and the EU. This situation once again indicates that the relevance and effectiveness of the ARF are premised on its acceptance by the major powers. Consequently, changing external environment, both politically and economically, necessitates greater engagement with powers such as Japan and China.

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8. Emergence of New Leaders


ASEAN has experienced leadership changes in the past without serious disruption to the ASEAN process. However, the present change is significantly different from the past. On top of generational change, the departure of Suharto, the only remaining founding head of government, is notably disruptive, as he had long been a stabilizing influence. The situation is further exacerbated by the dire situation in Indonesia. President Abdurrahman Wahid will be too preoccupied with internal problems to assume leadership in ASEAN the way Suharto did. In addition, he was reported to be in ill health and should he depart, most observers have doubts about the experience and capability of Vice-President Megawati.

9. Concluding Remarks
ASEAN was not born out of the vision of enlightened leader(s) but out of sheer necessity in a difficult and problematic environment. Throughout its 30odd years of existence it has evolved through rational reactions to the dictates of internal and external pressures. The financial crisis in 1997, which marked ASEAN's 30th birthday, that later culminated into a social, political and economic crisis over the last three years of the millennium, is the final test of adulthood. Notwithstanding the devastation caused by this crisis, such crises can be viewed as a rallying point, a raison d'tre, for enhanced cooperation. ASEAN may yet emerge with greater independence and maturity to act in a proactive rather than a reactive manner. Should ASEAN succeed in consolidating itself and be part of a larger East Asia regional grouping, it will have a greater reach and say and cope much more effectively with the dangers of marginalization. References
Acharya, A. and J.D.K. Boutin. 2000. "East Asia's Regional Order after the Economic Crisis." In C.Y. Ng and Charla Griffy-Brown (eds.), Trends and Issues in East Asia 2000. Tokyo: FASID. ASEAN Secretariat. 1997a. "Co-operation Within a Narrow Framework: Growth Triangles in ASEAN." In ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Co-operation: Transition and Transformation. Singapore: ISEAS. _______. 1997b. "ASEAN Centres." In ASEAN Secretariat, ASEAN Economic Cooperation: Transition and Transformation. Singapore: ISEAS. 69

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_______. 1998. The ASEAN at 30. Jakarta. Buszynski, Leszek. 1996. "Southeast Asia: Trends, Development and Challenges." In Southeast Asian Affairs 1996. Singapore: ISEAS. Chirathivat, Suthiphand et al. 1999. "ASEAN Prospects for Regional Integration and the Implications for the ASEAN Legislative and Institutional Framework." In ASEAN Economic Bulletin 16, no. 1 (April 1999): 28-50. Clad, James. 1997. "Regionalism in Southeast Asia: A Bridge Too Far?" In Southeast Asian Affairs 1997. pp. 3-14. Singapore: ISEAS. Far Eastern Economic Review (FEER), Asia 2000 Yearbook. Funston, John. 1999. "Challenges Facing ASEAN in a More Complex Age." In Contemporary Southeast Asia 21, no. 2., pp. 205-19. Singapore: ISEAS. ISEAS. 1999. Regimal Outlook: Southeast Asia 1999-2000. Singapore: ISEAS. Ng, C.Y. 1999a. "Economic Trends and Issues in East Asia." In C.Y. Ng and C. Griffy-Brown (eds.), Trends and Issues in East Asia 1999. Tokyo: FASID. _______. 1999b. "Harnessing Globalization: the East Asian Experience." In Agenda for International Development 1999, pp. 65-108. Tokyo: FASID. Ng, C.Y. and C. Griffy-Brown. 2000. "Introduction." In Trends and Issues in East Asia 2000. Tokyo: FASID. Parrenas, J.C. 1997. "The Future of ASEAN." In Chan Heng Chee (ed.), The New Asia-Pacific Order. pp. 186-219. Singapore: ISEAS. Takahashi, K. 1999. "The Rapid Development of Globalization." In K. Takahashi (ed.), Agenda for International Development 1999. Tokyo: FASID. Wong, P.K. 1999. "Singapore's Strategic Positioning for a Stronger Regional Hub Role after the Regional Economic Recovery." In C.Y. Ng and Charla Griffy-Brown (eds.), Trends and Issues in East Asia 1999, pp. 147-59. Tokyo: FASID. World Bank. 1999. World Development Indicators. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.

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CHAPTER III

NGOs AND CIVIL SOCIETY: BEYOND SECTOR ANALYSIS AND FANATICISM


SUZUKI Naoki

Introduction
This chapter explores ways of increasing our understanding of the activities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by analyzing the issues that NGOs face with regard to the concept of "civil society" (which is once again in vogue), from two perspectives: (1) mainstream theories generated by research on NGOs; and (2) fanaticism, one of the root causes of today's international conflicts, which tends nonetheless to be dismissed as a minor issue. In terms of theory, the chapter looks at how sector analysis being carried out by U.S. research institutions affects the credentials of NGOs as members of civil society. In terms of fanaticism, the danger of citizens' activities becoming an obstacle to the formation/strengthening of civil society in cases where the goal becomes politicized and is rigidly pursued at any costeven by resorting to means or actions that contradict the goal itselfis discussed. No organizations, not even NGOs, are completely immune to the danger that, regardless of their goals, they can have a negative rather than positive impact on civil society if they fail to give due consideration to their methods and simply pursue their goals blindly. This chapter examines the roles that NGOs should play in building civil society and discusses an approach to identifying factors that are essential for these
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roles. First, however, it is useful to examine the meaning of civil society from the point of view of NGOs.

1. Civil Society
The end of the Cold War gave rise to strident calls for the formation, through democratization movements, of "civil societies" in Eastern Europe. At the same time, academics from such diverse fields as politics, economics, sociology, history and anthropology began studying "civil society," and this work was not limited to experts on Eastern European countries. Almost daily reporting on "civil society" by the mass media established it as a familiar term in public discourse. The general public, for their part, began to form high expectations of "civil society" as a symbol of a more equal and peaceful community because of the term's citizen-friendly tone and its connotations of apparent independence from the governmentthough they lacked a clear understanding of the historical background and the political, economic and social implications of the term. Against this backdrop, NGOs, which are involved in various citizens' movements and international development activities throughout the world, have become a focus of attention and a major force in efforts to realize these expectations. In reality, however, the "civil society" concept remains vague and poorly understood. While the history of the civil society formation process in Western Europe and North America is characterized by bloody struggles against kings or colonial rulers, there have been relatively few studies that analyze "civil society" by taking into consideration this oppositional aspect of confronting and challenging governments, and that provide concrete direction for NGO activities from that perspective. Instead, emphasis tends to be placed on a government-NGO or state-NGO partnership. Indeed, against the backdrop of independence movements and antigovernment movements that are pressing for change in various parts of the world, NGO research will not be realistic and convincing unless it tackles political, economic, social, cultural, ideological and other confrontations/clashes in strife-torn areas, instead of just emphasizing a friendly partnership with the government or state. 1-1 Civil Society as Goal of International Development In terms of an international development goal, "civil society" is bound up with the notion of "good governance." In response to criticism of aid activities
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that pay little regard to organizations and institutions, "good governance" has become a trendy term since the second half of the 1980s, not only among government aid organizations but also among NGOs. Indeed, the policy approach geared toward improving a recipient country government's ability to rule by focusing its functionality rather than its sovereignty was a godsend for the policy planners of donor country governments who were on the lookout for a policy breakthrough in the face of both aid fatigue and the need to redefine foreign aid in a post-Cold War world. Many NGOs welcomed the good governance concept as well. Having come under increasing scrutiny for their problems and limitations, and having been called upon to justify their existence as service providersthough not to the same degree as government aid organizations implementing big projectsNGOs have accepted "good governance" as a theoretical basis of the new focuses of their activity, such as participatory development and institution building. Since the early 1990s, there has been a surge in interest in civil society, as democratization movements and breakaway/independence movements gain momentum in post-Cold War Eastern Europe. As the collapse of the Soviet Bloc loosened the iron grip of Eastern European governments/states, people vocalized their desire for democratization. And as the corrupt state of these governments became clear to the masses, the importance of a policy agenda of strengthening "civil society" to achieve good governance increased. Meanwhile, the move to pursue "civil society" as a stepping stone to "good governance" in Eastern Europe has been applied to international development generally and has given rise to the notion that the achievement of good governance in recipient countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and other regions requires the formation of a civil society there. For government aid organizations, therefore, "civil society" has become an effective and efficient tool to achieve "good governance" in recipient countries, while NGOs have welcomed "civil society" as a harbinger of the arrival of a citizens' era in place of the era of government/state-led development. Since 1990, interest in civil society has grown among academics; this is quite obvious from the huge number of books and papers written on the subject. Now "civil society" has been added to the host of catchwords around which development theories are built catchwords such as "sustainable development," "participatory development," "good governance," "democratization assistance," "institution building" and "capacity building." This new emphasis on "civil society" is set to greatly
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affect the viewpoints and activities of international development practitioners and academics. 1-2 Definition and Historical Background Although "civil society" has become a major theme in development, there is no consensus regarding its definition. Nor is there likely to be, as it can have a wide spectrum of meanings depending on which aspects one emphasizes or ignores according to one's own stance or perspective.1 Clayton (July 1997) has put forward the following definition of civil society, which has been more or less accepted by the general public and NGO practitioners: "a collection of various organizational forms that are independent of both the government and the market and that act as a counterbalance to them." Central to this definition is the notion of independence from both the government and the market. Thus, NGOs can be members of civil society only as long as they remain true to their names"non-governmental organizations"by staying at arm's length from governments; and as long as they reject the market principle of pursuing profit as the goal of their activities. In reality, however, a question arises concerning the extent to which NGOs can remain independent of governments or markets as they engage in their activities, and this is the same question that may be asked about civil society more generally. It is therefore a little premature to put NGOs in the same league as civil society without first establishing their actual state. As has been mentioned, "civil society" is a term that has (again) become fashionable in the wake of the end of the Cold War. Historically, however, it developed as part of citizens' revolutionary movements mounted against aristocrats in Western Europe and North America to obtain civil rights by overthrowing repressive absolutist rule and feudalistic land ownership. Although the civil society formation process was not uniform among Western countries,2 its driving force was always the bourgeoisie. Therefore, while one aspect of civil society is a modern society that is formed by autonomous individuals based on freedom and equality, another aspect is a bourgeois society of which
1

Examples based on a civil rights perspective include Janoski (1998) and Beiner (1995); those based on a democratic perspective include Fine and Rai (1997). Other studies include Keane (1998), which looks at the history of the relationship between civil society and the state, and Cohen and Arato (1992), which is a major work analyzing civil society within a political ideology framework. 2 Symbolic events that shaped the developmental path of civil society include the Puritan Revolution (1640), the French Revolution (1789) and the independence of the United States from the United Kingdom (1776).

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merchants and industrialists (members of the citizen class) gradually took control through the accumulation of capital. The concept of "citizen" also underwent transformation, from a concept associated with political society involving power relationships in the 17th century and the first half of the 18th century, to one linked to a private domain in the 19th century via the adoption of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen and other events. This was also a process in which society became separate from the state.3 An observation of civil society based on an understanding of the diverse movements that led to the establishment of civil societies and the transformation of the "citizen" concept through these movements reminds us that the indiscriminate use of this term must be avoided. Bearing in mind these various concepts that have historically been associated with civil society (e.g., freedom and equality, the relationship between the bourgeoisie and other citizens, the separation of state and society), let us now look at the environment in which NGO research is undertaken, and at the problem of fanaticism.

2. The NGO Research Environment: Research Institutions in the U.S.


In recent years, the expression "third sector" has often been used as a synonym for "civil society," and the issue of the successes and failures of the third sector has attracted attention from academics and practitioners.4 The "third sector" is commonly used to refer collectively to various organizations that do not belong to either the state or the marketnon-profit organizations (NPOs) ranging from political groups and labor unions to schools, hospitals, activity circles and academic associations. Indeed, this use of the term "third sector" is so widespread that the third sector is sometimes referred to as the NPO sector. How to position NGOs with regard to the sector that encompasses the three like concepts of "civil society," "third sector" and "NPOs" is a practical question that can influence NGO activities. The scenario that sees NGOs identifying themselves with civil society and striving to improve it through their activities is a little too simplistic, and is a far cry from the historical
3

For details, see Cohen and Arato (c1992). For the historic civil society development process that covers religious as well as state dimensions, see Colas (1997). 4 One example is a research association called the Association for Research on Non-profit Organizations and Voluntary Action (ARNOVA).

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background of civil society, which is characterized by the struggle of citizens for civil rights in Western Europe and North America. Thus, it is useful to examine the meaning of "civil society" and the significance and implications of conducting NGO research by analyzing the relationship to NGO research of theories that center on "civil society," "third sector" and "NPOs."5 This can be done by considering several case studies of U.S. research and educational institutions that are major NPO research centers and have a strong influence over other countries. The origin of NPO activities in the United States can be traced back to the days preceding the founding of the nation.6 NPO research in the U.S., therefore, has a long history. Given that the term "NGO" came into general use only in the second half of the 1940s, and research focusing solely on NGOs has flourished only in the last twenty years, it may be justifiable for established NPO research institutions to classify NGOs as a subset of NPOs by focusing on the non-profit aspect of the former. From the viewpoint of looking at NGOs in terms of international development and international relations, however, NGO research conducted by NPO research institutions, whose main research subjects are domestic NPOs, can be inconsistent. The equation of NGOs with NPOs, an approach adopted by many research institutions in the United States, is a result of attaching greater importance to the "non-profit" common denominator than to differences in the geographic locations of activity sites, i.e., domestic vs. overseas. One advantage of including NGOs in NPO research is that there is a wealth
5

The term "NGO" was first used by the United Nations in the second half of the 1940s, in the aftermath of World War II, and has since entered common usage to refer to international development assistance organizations that are not affiliated with a government. However, activities undertaken by organizations we call "NGOs" today date back long before the United Nations coined the term. According to Eggins (1967), early examples include: les Soeurs de la Congregation de Notre-Dame, established in 1653 in Montreal; the Royal Society and the National Adult School Union, established in England in 1660 and 1798, respectively, as educational/missionary organizations aimed at Asian and African people; the American Medical Association, a non-affiliated aid organization established in 1847; and Save the Children (today's SCF-UK), which, established in 1919, is still an active, front-line organization. Since their naming by the United Nations, NGOs have grown under its wings and have become key players in development aid. The vigor of NGO research over the past twenty years. which has paralleled the rapid growth of NGOs particularly since the early 1990s, is reflected in the number of papers written on the subject. While quite a few recent studies have examined the relationship between the United Nations and NGOs, Chiang (1981) had already recognized the importance of the subject by the second half of the 1970s. He analyzed the UN-NGO relationship from a viewpoint of the roles, functions and identity of NGOs, and stressed the importance of the role of NGOs to monitor UN activities as independent observers, while warning against the possibility of NGOs becoming UN implementation agencies due to their dependence on the UN for funding and status. 6 Hall (1992) names Harvard College, established in 1636, as the oldest American NPO, and analyzes the long history of NPOs and the problems they face, noting a proliferation of NPOs since the 1960s.

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of past research results that can be used to understand the problems faced by NGOs as non-profit organizations. Although the aspect of NGOs that is most visible to the general public is their field activities, fundraising is one of the most important issues for NGO practitioners and researchers. The nature and quality of NGO activities are greatly influenced by how and from where funds are procured. In addition to the fundraising activities that take place at project sites, discussions with and education of donors are also important. While a number of studies have been undertaken on this subject in recent years,7 NGO research can learn a lot from NPO research, which has long experience in this field.8 One disadvantage associated with including NGO research in NPO research is the strong likelihood that doing so will lead NGO activities to be treated as a domestic issue. In particular, in cases where funds are raised domestically, accountability to donors may be given precedence over respect for the wishes of the local residents at the activity sites. Another disadvantage is the consequent exclusion of local NGOs based in regions such as Asia, Africa and South America, 9 which are starting to play an important role in international development. Development research, including NGO research, is sometimes criticized as resulting merely in the researchers' self-satisfaction rather than in substantive contributions to real activities.10 Although limited examples of NGO research undertaken in the United States cannot provide a complete picture of diverse international and numerous local NGOs, an overview of NPO/NGO research directions at Yale, Harvard and Johns Hopkins Universities sheds some light on the effects of including research on NGO activities in NPO research.

Examples of research on NGO fundraising include Antrobus (1987), Bennett and Gibbs (1996), Edwards and Hulme (1996), Fowler (1992) and Smillie (1994). 8 One lesson that NGO research can learn from NPO research concerns the unique characteristics of NPOs that result from their differences from government organizations and private businesses. Milofsky (1988) elucidates NPOs' structural problems, centering on an analysis of fund flow and allocations, and on the differences between NPOs and government organizations/private-sector for-profit organizations, using community organizations as typical examples of NPOs. 9 Although NGOs are very diverse, they can be divided roughly into local and international NGOs. A host of attempts to classify them into more detailed categories were made in the second half of the 1980s and the first half of the 1990s. These include Carroll (1992), Clark (1991), Fisher (1993), Korten (1990) and PACT (1989). 10 Apart from criticisms aimed at development research for its failure to contribute to improvements in the situation in Asia, Africa and South America (Edwards 1989, 1993), there are more fundamental criticisms targeted at the kind of "development" that has been pursued to date (Rahnema, 1997 and Sachs, 1996).

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2-1 Program on Non-Profit Organizations (PONPO), Yale University The tradition of treating the NGO sector as a domestic concern may not necessarily be intentional. For example, the enormous effort being put into NGO research by PONPO at Yale University is beneficial for both NPO research and NGO research, in that the analysis of various issues associated with being not-for-profit can be applied to NGO research, while development problems encountered in other countries, and tasks arising from activities designed to address them, can be examined in the light of problems faced by domestic NPOs. However, it is easy to see that NPOs that have developed primarily through social welfare activities can find themselves in conflict with the state over division of roles, because of their involvement in the public sector, which encompasses hospitals, schools, welfare agencies and the like. In a country like the United States, which has a long tradition of liberalism, the idea of "small government" that advocates a reduction in the burden on citizens by reducing taxes, as well as raising the question of whether the government is providing services efficiently and effectively, has considerable influence on the society. Therefore, in areas where a move toward "small government" may result in deterioration in the quality of service, both the government and citizens hold great expectations regarding the role of NPOs. As a result, NPOs often become government subcontractors that faithfully implement government programs in accordance with government policy, thus playing the role of pseudogovernment agencies.11 Such an arrangement, however, has completely different meanings, depending on whether the activity site is domestic or overseas. If it is domestic, NGO activities can be assessed using the same criteria as welfare services the government provides to its citizens, and NGOs can be easily accepted by the general public as organizations designed to serve the people (themselves). In this case, the possibility of NGOs becoming government subcontractors is less of a problem, even though an argument over the usefulness of the activities or the quality of service may still arise. In most cases, NPOs have been involved in domestic activities: their recipients reside within the country, and the flow of their funds remains within the country. Therefore, even if donors and recipients differ, NPOs' existence can be justified by applying a tax-like
11

Wolch (1990).

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principle. In the case of activities undertaken overseas, however, support by the general public is not so readily forthcoming. That is, as recipients are located outside the country, the relationship between donors and recipients tends to become more remote. This requires a new raison d'tre for NPOs, other than being government subcontractors, which in turn necessitates elucidation of the logic of development and assistance. Regarding the logic of development, it is possible to trace the origin of today's development framework back to President Harry S. Truman's 1949 inaugural address, which set the foundation for development on the basis of positivism and modernization theory (although it may go even farther back to a monistic modernization development theory based on Saint-Simon's positivism, which was prevalent in the first half of the 19th century12). President Truman divided the world into "developed" and "underdeveloped" regions according to their levels of modernization, and proclaimed a need for development in "underdeveloped" regions.13 Overnight, two billion people became the residents of "underdeveloped" regions, and modernization and development efforts that targeted these people were launched. Rather than being driven by a genuine concern for the modernization of the two billion people, however, it is more reasonable to think that this stance resulted from the United States' pursuit of national interests14 against the backdrop of U.S.-Soviet rivalry over the establishment of a post-war world order (not to mention the problematic
12 For details about the history of theories that identify development with modernization, see Cowen and Shenton (1996) and Rist (1997). 13 The Human Development Report published by the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) lies along these modernization lines. The human development index makes it possible to rank countries using a linear formula based on the three parameters of life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate plus the overall school attendance rate for elementary, secondary and higher education, and per capita GDP. For details, see UNDP (1999). This one-dimensional ranking approach has been criticized for its limitations in quantifying cultural, social, political, religious and other factors. In response to these criticisms, the UNDP has been working to develop new indices. There is also an argument in support of the index which points out that its usefulness lies in providing a common criterion for international comparison rather than giving an overall picture of the state of a country. 14 What constitutes the "national interest" is not so clear-cut. Countries define their national interests independently through their internal processes. Setting aside the fact that these processes are sometimes flawed and that the "national interest" is in many cases no more than a compromise reached by various factions within the government and bureaucracy (which is very different from people's intentions), a rather liberal stance of taking action in consideration of other countries' interests is tenuous in the context of increasingly fluid post-Cold War international relations. This makes the constructionist approach to national interests, which boils down to constant redefining of national interests through interaction with other countries, all the more important. This approach allows national interests to be perceived as something open-ended and dynamic, rather than as self-contained domestic goals. For details, see Finnemore (1996).

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aspects of this hegemonist attitude and the nature of such "modernization" itself). President Truman characterized Asia, Africa and Latin America as "underdeveloped" regions, and tried to let U.S. intentions and commitment be known to other countries (particularly the Soviet Union) through development aid to countries in these regions. Thus, the welfare of "underdeveloped" countries emerged as a matter of concern for the United States, and assistance to "underdeveloped" countries came to be defined as central to the national interest.15 From the perspective of pursuing national interests through international assistance, it makes sense to include NGO research as part of NPO research, which mainly addresses domestic issues. However, in the case of university research institutions, like PONPO, however, it is probably reading too much into it to suggest that the institution has intentionally embraced this perspective; it would be more reasonable to conclude that it justifies its incorporation of NGO research as an extension of its NPO research on the grounds of the shared "non-profit" nature of NPOs and NGOs. Nevertheless, it is important to note that treating NGOs as NPOs will link NGO research to "national interests" more easily. 2-2 Hauser Center for Non-profit Organizations, Harvard University Though more accidental than intentional, characterizing NGOs as a class of NPOs has made it difficult to free NGOs from the development theories that have emerged over the past fifty years concerning domestic issues and national interests. Though not exactly the same as state/government organizations, American NPOs are in many ways similar to government agencies. The similarities extend to their modes of operation in, for example, fundraising, information disclosure, and the scope and methods of their activities. If NGOs are subsumed into this resemblance between government organizations and NPOs, they will be shackled by official development aid forever. The dynamics of subsuming NGOs within NPOs are symbolized by the
15 This is clearer from the strategic framework of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). In its report on a strategic framework and performance indicators (1995), USAID explains its development strategy based on the following four national interests: (1) promotion of U.S. economic activity; (2) avoidance of humanitarian and other crises; (3) advancement of peace and stability; and (4) protection of U.S. citizens from global dangers. The most fundamental factor defining the raison d'tre of USAID is U.S. national interests, and USAID's strategy gives its foreign assistance programs a strong tone of being devised for the United States of America rather than for recipient country governments or residents, as is clear from the report.

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activities of Harvard's John F. Kennedy School of Government. Recently, the school established the Harvard University Hauser Center for Nonprofit Organizations, and has been conducting NPO/NGO research, education and practitioner training in the context of public and diplomatic policiesthus underscoring the importance of NPO/NGO research to political science and particularly to public policy. The center's interests include, among other things, the definition of the NPO sector, its contribution to society, the relationship between public policy and the social contributions NPOs make, the roles of NGOs in the context of international politics and economics, structural differences in NPOs between countries, the roles NPOs should play in the politico-economic development of developing countries, and techniques for NGOs to employ in contributing to democratization in various countries. As a matter of course, this closely parallels USAID's approach in defining its missions, assigning meaning to its activities and deciding on its activity areas based mainly on national interests.16 Obviously, national policies must take national interests into consideration. However, if NPOs/NGOs emerge as organizations that promote national interests in terms of pursuing gains for the nation as a whole, if government policy planners study such NPOs/NGOs, and if prospective practitioners who will join NPOs/NGOs in the future are educated in this kind of environment, a question will arise over the independence of NPOs/NGOs from the government/state. While a few former international NGO practitioners work for the center as instructors and carry out research, education and practitioner engagement, the key issue for NGOs will be whether this can bring new perspectives or theories to the center's government/state-oriented NPO/NGO research. For its part, the government finds it desirable to embrace "small government" by delegating to NPOs/NGOs those services that they can provide, thereby minimizing the pressure on government resources. The role that the Hauser Center is expected to play, therefore, is to carry out research geared toward achieving this goal as effectively and efficiently as possible. At any rate, whereas the government desires that NPOs/NGOs function as its implementing agents wherever possible, as members of civil societywhich is independent of the governmentNPOs/NGOs are expected to play the role of a watchdog that keeps an eye on the government and the market. Although this contradiction in
16

USAID (1995).

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stances and viewpoints creates tension between the government and NPOs/ NGOs, it remains to be seen to what degree the kind of NPO/NGO research already entrenched at the Kennedy School can remain independent from the government. 2-3 Institute for Policy Studies, Johns Hopkins University Another mecca of NPO research is the Institute for Policy Studies at Johns Hopkins University. This institute characterizes NPOs as the third sector, and analyzes, through information gathering on a global scale, such topics as the relationship between the NPO sector and the government, the contributing factors to this sector's organizational successes and failures, and the sector's characteristics and properties.17 In this work, NGO research is considered part of NPO research. This approach draws from organizational theory the viewpoint of population ecology,18 which analyzes the relationship between organizational environments and organizational successes and failures. While this viewpoint helps us to understand the survivability of NPOs with regard to their relationship with the environments (political, economic, social, cultural, etc.) in which they operate, it runs the risk of encouraging NPOs to focus too much on survivability and consequently to choose their activities based on the ease with which they can be implemented in a given social situation. Moreover, a theory that analyzes NPOs as a sector provides a handy platform for government policy planners to utilize NPOs/NGOs as government field agencies. 2-4 Civil Society Credentials of NGO Research The conclusions about NGO research that emerge from the observations above are not definitive, as they derive only from brief case studies of three university research institutions located in eastern states in the United States. Nevertheless, they are useful for understanding the characteristics and meanings of the environment in which NGO research is conducted today. First, let us start with sector analysis. Based on a narrow focus on their
17 NPO/NGO research based on NPO sector research, pioneered by Anheier and Salamon in the 1990s (Anheier 1990, 1998; Anheier and Salamon 1999; Gidron, Kramer and Salamon 1992; Salamon 1999; Salamon and Anheier 1996, 1997; Salamon and Toepler 1999), is now becoming mainstream. 18 Scott (1992) breaks down organizational analysis into three levels. "Ecological level" refers to analysis of organizations as a group, as in the case of the NPO sector analysis; "structural level" refers to analysis of interaction between organizational forms and society; and "sociopsychological level" refers to analysis of individuals in organizations.

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differences from the government and the market, NPOs/NGOs are lumped together as a single sector despite their diversity, and are analyzed in terms of their relationship with the government and the market.19 Emphasis is placed on sector uniformity rather than intra-sector diversity. By comparing countryby-country sector analysis results, subjects such as the effects of different political regimes, institutions, legal systems, etc. on the successes and failures of the sector are analyzed. Although sector analysis is useful for government policy planners when working out a budget for NPO sector subsidies, it is of little use for NPO/NGO field workers. Second, NPO/NGO research at the three institutions discussed here tends to justify the status of NPOs/NGOs as government subcontractors, rather than promoting their independence and equal status with regard to the government. Ideally, NPOs/NGOs should keep an eye on state policies and administrative services as independent observers. However, groups cannot be equated with civil society. They not only rely on government subsidies for funding, but also become targets of public administration studies at research/education levels. Their quasi-parastatal nature does not change even if the government-NPOs/ NGOs relationship is expressed as "partnership." Third, the characterization of NGO activities as domestic activities, which are easily fitted into the framework of government aid policy driven by national interests, tends to lead to a situation in which local residents (the key participants at aid activity sites) are expected to subordinate their values, interests and concerns to the "more important" issue of accountability to the donor country and its government. This logic is far removed from what the role of NGOs should be: contributing to the formation of a civil society in the recipient developing country. Undeniably, a tendency exists among NPO/NGO researchers and practitioners to equate the emergence/growth of the third sector with the formation of a civil society. However, in view of such factors as its inclination to endorse the dependence of NPOs/NGOs on the government, and its characterization of international development as a domestic issue, as well as the limitations of sector analysis itself, NGO research at these three institutions tends to embrace as its framework "civil society for the state as represented by the government," instead of "civil society for citizens."
19 The simplistic "state, market and civil society" tripartite model is easy to visualize, but the reality is not as simple as that. Among the criticisms of this model is Janoski's (1998, Chapter 1).

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Let us now leave the "analysis of civil society" centering on sector analysis, a somewhat inorganic subject, and move on to the more organic and complex subject of "fanaticism."

3. Civil Society and Fanaticism


Various NPOs/NGOs, such as churches, schools, labor unions and cooperative societies, play a role in the civil society formation process, but their contributions cannot be assessed simply in quantitative terms, such as increases in the number of organizations and participants. Indeed, various activities that are independent of the government contribute to the formation of civil society, but care must be taken about fanaticism.20 Amid an accelerating trend of global standardization, groups of people who cling to their local cultures, values, religions, etc. are rising rapidly, as if trying to reverse the tide, and this leads to a potential increase in the number of people who will do anything to achieve their goals.21 In fact, fanaticism is still the cause of many conflicts. After two tragic world wars and a long Cold War, which wreaked havoc in the 20th century, the possibility of a global war breaking out is now considered remote. In contrast, however, local conflicts are still rife, and there is no end to these in sight. At present, there are more than sixty conflicts taking place across the world over territory, race, religion, etc.22 Many of these conflicts are located in regions collectively called the "Third World," which is where the activity sites of many local NGOs and international NGOs are also located. Therefore, regardless of the fields of their activities, most NGOs must always be prepared for the outbreak of conflict or warfare, and therefore must establish guidelines for emergency response measures. It is also important for NGOs to actively explore
For details about civil society and fanaticism, see Colas (1997). Among the works that analyze the tense relationship between global consumerism and local circumstances is Barber (1995). 22 Examples in Asia include: antigovernment movements in the Philippines and Myanmar; an independence struggle mounted by East Timor against Indonesia; a civil war between guerilla factions in Afghanistan; an IndoPakistani conflict over Kashmir; and an ethnic conflict between the Tamils and the Sinhalese in Sri Lanka. Examples in Africa include: antigovernment movements in Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Angola and Algeria; and border disputes between Namibia and South Africa, between Morocco and Western Sahara, between Egypt and Sudan and between Chad and Libya. Examples in the Middle East include: border disputes on the Arabian Peninsula; the Israel-Palestine conflict and the Lebanese civil war. In South America, antigovernment movements in Columbia, Peru and Suriname are well-known. Examples in Eastern Europe include: independence movements in Chechnya, the Dniester, Abkhazia and the Crimea. Western Europe also has hot spots, such as the Basque region (independence movement) and Northern Ireland (religious conflict).
21 20

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the possibility of playing a peace maker role when faced with a tense situation that could lead to conflict. While fanaticism is sometimes characterized as a contemporary problem closely linked to globalization, this is not quite accurate. In fact, as early as the 16th century, Martin Luther and John Calvin were already ringing a warning bell against self-proclaimed prophets, who began destroying civil society through iconoclasm and an open revolt against kings, by calling them "fanatics." In civil society studies, the relationship between civil society and fanaticism is often dismissed as a minor issue. In terms of dualism and symbolism, which form undercurrents in Western political ideologies, however, the impact that fanaticism has had on the civil society formation process should be considered significant. Dualistic concepts, such as the Kingdom of God vs. the earth or civil society vs. the state, harbor a one-or-the-other choice based on the law of the excluded middle, and this can be amplified by the presence of symbols such as words, pictures and icons. Symbols tend to substitute for concepts, and often embody the conflict of opposites, thus bringing out dormant hostility to consciousness. In the context of the conflict of opposites, the concept of the "Kingdom of God" can be perceived as the opposite of "the earth," and can drive people to destroy sacred images as false icons that symbolize God on earth, and to turn hostile to civil society itself as a mere earthly world. While the theoretical system of dualism and symbolism, which have been two key ingredients of political ideologies, mainly in the West, contributes to the exploration of the world by human reason, it also acts, ironically enough, as a hotbed of fanaticism. What impact, then, does fanaticism, which results from dualism and symbolism, have on our daily lives and on the civil society formation process? Is there anything NGOs can do about it? Some concrete examples can help us explore these questions. 3-1 Fanaticism: The Internal Contradiction of the "End Justifies the Means" Attitude (1) Violence in the Name of Antiabortion Fanaticism is susceptible to internal contradiction, and becomes a major obstacle to the formation of civil society. A typical example is the antiabortion movement. The antiabortion movement likens abortion to the Nazi extermination of Jews by taking the view that life begins from conception.
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However, some radical antiabortion groups are prepared to do anything to achieve their political goalstopping abortionand often resort to violence (including murder).23 This is an internal contradiction comparable to trying to condemn Nazi genocide by killing people. Despite the obviousness of this internal contradiction, there have been more than 150 reported cases of antiabortion-related arson, bombing and shooting since 1982 in the United States, where abortion has become a major social issue. The people responsible justify their actions by saying that murder committed to oppose abortion is a necessary evil because abortion is murder and therefore cannot be tolerated. Our main concern here is not to argue that abortion is right or wrong. Rather, the issue is the logical contradiction of using "murder" as a means to condemn "murder." The abortion issue has divided the community into antiabortion (prolife) and pro-abortion (pro-choice) camps, and has developed into a major social problem as antiabortion activists resort to violent tactics. The danger of fanatics lies with their preparedness to use any means to achieve their goals, whatever these goals may be. As this example illustrates, isolating the means to an end from the end itself often exposes a contradiction in which the means can be seen to violate the end. (2) Dispute over Development vs. the Environment Social tension over development and the environment often develops into a dispute between development supporters and environmental conservationists. Such a dispute would be harmless if it were a mock dispute taking place in a classroom. In real life, however, a dispute between people with opposing interests can become quite hostile, as what is at stake is their livelihood, although in the end it is often difficult to say who has actually gained (in terms of either individual or group interest). Indeed, development projects such as the nuclear fuel reprocessing plant in Rokkasho Village, Aomori Prefecture, and airstrip construction on Ishigaki Island, Okinawa Prefecture often divide the community into supporters and opponents of development, and leave a deep scar in the community, regardless of the outcome. Antidevelopment movements by fanatical environmentalists often tear up the fabric of the local social environment. (Of course, this is not to say that development supporters are always right.) Thus, development is another area where people often become
23 Of course, not all antiabortion movements are violent. Groups that oppose both abortion and violence can be described as more pro-life than antiabortion.

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so passionate that they are prepared do anything to achieve their goal, whether they are pro-development or antidevelopment. At the initial stage of a project, divisive elements may not be so visible, and the community remains more or less intact. However, once the issue becomes clear, along with potential gains and losses at the individual level, the division of the community into those who support the project and those who oppose it begins, and the attitudes of the opposing camps gradually become fanatic. People more easily fall into the trap of fanaticism and lose a sense of perspective in terms of what means to use to achieve the goal when the issue can be expressed symbolically in terms of the conflict of opposites, e.g., development vs. conservation or Protestantism vs. Catholicism. While there is a need to address concrete problems, such as global warming, desertification, ethnic conflicts, antigovernment movements and nuclear power plant construction, by formulating concrete solutions, efforts also need to be made to alleviate antagonism between opposing parties in the meantime by paying due attention to human relations. What roles can NGOs play in situations where delicate human relations form part of the problem? In the case of an environmental NGO which has joined the struggle of community residents opposing a development project, a clear antigovernment stance can be taken as long as the only target of the struggle is the government. However, more often than not, communities divide as some residents join the government in support of a project, and others oppose the government and the project it supports. This situation generally results in a deep schism in the community, regardless of whether or not the project goes ahead. This schism is of course a big setback for civil society. The degree of community division often depends on the level of passion that the people involved exhibit. If this passion reaches fanatical levels, the opposing camps may descend into a fullblown confrontation, where people are prepared to take any measures to achieve their goal. If this happens, civil society will suffer a huge setback, as the fabric of the local social environment will be destroyed, even if the local natural environment is saved from destruction. (3) Beyond Fanaticism Let us now consider the story of Jose, who was a student leader in the Philippines in the 1970s, when the Marcos regime was becoming increasingly dictatorial. Jose played a central role in an antigovernment movement without
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becoming fanatical. With a country like the Philippines, which has had to endure a string of colonial rulers throughout much of its history, it is impossible to talk about civil society without paying due attention to popular resistance movements.24 Jose was born into a poor family in Mindanao as the youngest of six children. Now aged around forty and working as a local government official, he is a very kind and friendly man who looks remarkably younger than his age. It is hard to imagine that this is the same person who led a brave fight against government injustice as the chairman of a students' self-government association. He grew up under the strong influence of his eldest brother, who was studying liberation theology at a Catholic theological school and who taught him about repression, national heroes, justice, freedom, etc. Being a bright student, Jose became a central figure in the student movement while still in high school and gave addresses on justice and freedom wherever possible. After winning a scholarship, he went on to university, and continued to be active as the chairman of the students' self-government association. Because of his family background, he has a strong sense of justice, and once sympathized with communism, which advocated equality. However, he turned down the invitation to join the Communist Party, citing his Catholic religious conviction. In reality, however, religion appears to have been only half the reason, the other half being his concern that party membership would prevent him from forming relationships with people from diverse backgrounds, as he had managed to do up to that point. While he was the chairman of the students' self-government association at his university, a whole spectrum of people, ranging from Communist Party
24 In the second half of the 14th century, the Islamic religion arrived in the Philippines and spread across the southern region of the country. Subsequently, the Philippines endured a series of colonial rulers, starting with the Spanish in the 16th century, followed by the U.S. in the 20th century. After the outbreak of the Pacific War in the 1940s, the Philippines was thrown under Japanese occupation. Reflecting the historical formation process of Filipino society, Filipino culture is characterized by regional diversity, with Catholics, Moslems and minority mountain tribes forming their own cultural spheres. In addition, each of these cultural spheres features regional variations. This diversity played a part in popular resistance movements against foreign rule, which took various forms. Following Japan's pullout, anti-American nationalism rose in the 1950s among the local Establishment elite, who resented economic domination by the United States. This developed into a militant cultural movement involving students, intellectuals and workers in the 1960s. In September 1972, then President Ferdinand Marcos declared martial law amid an intensifying popular anti-Establishment movement, which was a result of widespread dissatisfaction against land distribution, inflation, unemployment and other economic problems. For details about Filipino history, see Constantino (1975) and Constantino and Constantino (1978). For a beginner's guide, see Agoncillo (1974).

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members to government military personnel, visited him with a view to recruiting him. On those occasions, he took time to engage in dialogue with people with diverse standpoints and opinions, including those quite different from his, and built up a network of contacts. He appears to have had constant visitors, due to his skill in talking to people as friends, regardless of their backgrounds including those who would find it impossible to participate in dialogues with other members of the students' self-government association without becoming too emotional. Because of his extraordinarily wide network of contacts, he was often criticized by both antigovernment activists and government supporters, and he recalls this as a particularly painful experience. However, this was by no means an indication of lack of decisiveness on Jose's part. On the contrary, he had a clear point of view on, and original ideas about, Filipino politics, which he made public through articles and speeches. In short, while voicing his unmistakable messages of resistance against the Marcos regime, Jose still managed to freely engage in dialogue with a diverse array of people, including those from the government military, the rebel army and the Communist Party, despite differences in standpoints. Without becoming fanatical in his pursuit of his goal of political reform, he treated all people around him with courtesy and civility, regardless of differences in beliefs, values or political position. Through these dialogues, Jose learned about stances and views that were different from his, and engaged in open-door, free-spirited activities, instead of becoming fanatical by succumbing to a dichotomous way of thinking. One factor that helped prevent him from becoming fanatical was his respect for other people as individuals even as he voiced strong criticism of the unjust social system.

4. Conclusion
This chapter has examined the roles of NGOs in civil society from the perspective of an NGO research framework called sector analysis, and from the perspective of fanaticism. These two perspectives highlight the tasks that need to be borne in mind by NGOs when engaging in activities in civil society. NGO research theories produced by U.S. research institutions, at first glance, give NGO practitioners great hope concerning the prosperity of the third sector and the arrival of an era of NGOs. Beneath the surface, however, there is a thinly-veiled mechanism of promoting the growth of the sector within a government-centered framework. Even when this is not intentional, the
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government longs for the growth of the sector as long as it functions as a supplier of governmental field organizations. Therefore, if civil society is to be truly independent of the government/state, criticism of such a framework should arise from within the sector. In this regard, the meaning of "being independent" is also important. "Being independent" does not mean "severing all ties with the government/state." What is needed here is to relate to the government as an arm's-length equal partner, through an understanding of the limitations of dualistic thinking, which only sees two extremes: subcontracting, or severing all ties. The pursuit of a cozy relationship with the government by taking cover behind the word "partnership," which has been in vogue in recent years, will doubtless undermine NPO/NGO independence. To understand the preciousness of independence, it is sufficient to recall the amount of blood that had to be spilled in the civil society formation process in Europe. However, the reality is that some organizations that are legitimized and depoliticized by established research institutions thrive on government endorsement and enjoy the elevated social status it confers, while smaller organizations that are outside this elitist group carry on with independent activities despite being faced with chronic financial difficulties. In the future, sector-level research will need to listen to these small independent organizations, which have until now been left out in the cold, and learn from their practical experiences. Another important issue is NGOs' roles with regard to civil society when faced with a threat of fanaticism. Unlike sector-level arguments, fanaticism revolves around individual actions, but it could nevertheless have dire consequences. By nature, fanaticism is destructive and harbors the potential of driving civil society into conflict, as it is prepared to do anything to achieve its goal (which may be social justice, environmental conservation or something else). Be it racial discrimination, religious conflict or an antigovernment movement, passion often divides the community into opposing camps, and the stubbornness of each side only increases the schism and tension. If this reaches fanatical levels, an open attack on the other side becomes inevitable. The dualism and symbolism of Western political ideologies are useful philosophical tools to establish and express one's standpoint, but they are incapable of bridging the gap between different standpoints. Narrowing and bridging this gap is an important task in maintaining and strengthening civil society. When faced with a dichotomous situation, which
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promotes fanaticism, can NGOs not provide a third perspective? From the viewpoint of strengthening civil society, it is desirable that NGOs maintain an outsider's stance of neutrality between opposing camps, and strive to heal the division in the community by providing a new perspective while at the same time working with community residents to find a concrete solution to the problem. In this regard, there is a need to evaluate whether the solution is worth pursuing despite the obvious risk of further dividing the community. It does not make sense to seek an all-out solution to a problem that is of minor importance, as this process threatens to destroy the local community's social fabric. It is therefore all the more important to proactively and thoroughly assess the likely impact of putting a particular issue on the local community's agenda. Since NGOs are rational organizations25 established with clear activities, goals and missions, the justification of their existence depends on their performance in achieving their goals. As they need to achieve their goals using limited resources, efficiency and effectiveness are important factors. This very characteristic of NGOs points to their natural susceptibility to fanaticism. The real test of NGOs is whether they can find a dynamic and organic balance between the ends and means based on a clear understanding of the threat of fanaticism; and, by strengthening the community through this dynamism, seek solutions to the concrete problems it faces. The history of civil society is packed with struggles, shifts in private and political domains, and delicate but tense standoffs between the state and society. Today, hopes are that NGOs can avoid the trap of fanaticism that results from dualism and symbolism by using their built-in diversity and flexibility to provide new perspectives. This means transcending the dichotomous goals and techniques that lurk beneath fanaticism's extreme attitude that "the ends justify the means." References
Agoncillo, Teodoro A. 1974. Introduction to Filipino History. Quezon City: Garotech Publishing.

25

Scott (1992) classifies organizations as rational organizations (established to achieve certain goals) and natural organizations (for which survival itself is the main goal, e.g., families and communities).

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Anheier, Helmut K. 1990. "Themes in International Research on the Nonprofit Sector." Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 19:371-391. Anheier, Helmut K. and Lester M. Salamon. 1999. "The Rise of Nongovernmental Organisations: Towards a Comparative Theory." in American Sociological Association. Chicago. Anheier, Helmut. 1998. The Nonprofit Sector in the Developing World: A Comparative Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Antrobus, Peggy. 1987. "Funding for NGOs: Issues and Options." World Development 15:95-102. Barber, Benjamin. 1995. Jihad vs. McWorld: How Globalism and Tribalism Are Reshaping the World. New York: Ballantine Books. Beiner, Ronald. 1995. "Theorizing Citizenship." Albany: State University of New York Press. Bennett, Jon and Sara Gibbs. 1996. NGO Funding Strategies: An Introduction for Southern and Eastern NGOs. Oxford: INTRAC Publications. Carroll, Thomas F. 1992. Intermediary NGOs: The Supporting Link in Grassroots Development. West Hartford, CT.: Kumarian Press. Chiang, Pei-Heng. 1981. Non-Governmental Organizations at the United Nations: Identity, Role, and Function. New York: Praeger. Clark, John. 1991. Democratizing Development: The Role of Voluntary Organizations. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press. Clayton, Andrew. 1996. "NGOs, Civil Society and the State: Building Democracy in Transitional Societies." in INTRAC NGO Management and Policy Series No. 5. Oxford: An INTRAC Publication. Cohen, Jean L. and Andrew Arato. c1992. Civil Society and Political Theory. Cambridge: The MIT Press. Colas, Dominique. 1997. Civil Society and Fanaticism. Translated by Jacobs, Amy. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Constantino, Renato and Letizia R. Constantino. 1978. The Philippines: The Continuing Past. Quezon City, Manila: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies. Constantino, Renato. 1975. The Philippines: A Past Revisited (Pre-Spanish-1941). Quezon City, Manila: The Foundation for Nationalist Studies. Cowen, Michael and Robert W. Shenton. 1996. Doctrines of Development. London: Routledge. Edwards, Michael and David Hulme. 1996. "Too Close for Comfort? The Impact of Official Aid on Nongovernmental Organizations." World Development 24:96192

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973. Edwards, Michael. 1989. "The Irrelevance of Development Studies." Third World Quarterly 11:116-135. Edwards, Michael. 1993. "How Relevant is Development Studies?" in Beyond Impasse: New Directions in Development Theories, edited by F. J. Schuurman: Zed Books. Eggins, Edwin. 1967. Development Aid of Non-Governmental Non-Profit Organization. Paris: OECD-ICVA. Fine, Robert and Shirin Rai. 1997. "Civil Society: Democratic Perspectives." London: Frank Cass. Finnemore, Martha. 1996. National Interests in International Society. Ithaca: Cornell University Press. Fisher, Julie. 1993. The Road from Rio: Sustainable Development and the NonGovernmental Movement in the Third World. Westport, Connecticut: Praeger. Fowler, Alan. 1992. "Distant Obligations: Speculations on NGO Funding and the Global Market." Review of Afrian Political Economy 55:9-29. Gidron, Benjamin, Ralph Kramer, and Lester Salamon. 1992. "Government and the Third Sector: Emerging Relationships in Welfare States." San Francisco: JosseyBass Publishers. Hall, Peter Dobkin. 1992. "Inventing the Nonprofit Sector" and Other Essays on Philanthropy, Voluntarism, and Nonprofit Organizations. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. Janoski, Thomas. 1998. Citizenship and Civil Society: A Framework of Rights & Obligations in Liberal, Traditional, and Social Democratic Regimes. New York: Cambridge University Press. Keane, John. 1998. Civil Society: Old Images, New Visions. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Korten, David C. 1990. Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda. West Hartford, Connecticut: Kumarian Press. Milofsky, Carl. 1988. "Community Organizations: Studies in Resource Mobilization and Exchange." New York: Oxford University Press. PACT. 1989. Asian Linkages: NGO Collaboration in The 1990s: A Five-Country Study. New York: Private Agencies Collaborating Together. Rahnema, Majid and Victoria Bawtree. 1997. "The Post-Development Reader." London: Zed Books. Rist, Gilbert. 1997. The History of Development: From Western Origins to Global 93

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Faith. London & New York: Zed Books. Sachs, Wolfgang. 1996. "The Development Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power." edited by W. Sachs. London: Zed Books. Salamon, Lester M. and Helmut K. Anheier. 1996. The Emerging Nonprofit Sector: An Overview. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Salamon, Lester and Helmut Anheier. 1997. Defining the Nonprofit Sector: A CrossNational Analysis. Manchester: Manchester University Press. Salamon, Lester and Stefan Toepler. 1999. "The Influence of the Legal Environment on the Development of the Nonprofit Sector." in ARNOVA. Washington, D.C. Salamon, Lester. 1999. America's Nonprofit Sector: A Primer. New York: Foundation Center. Scott, Richard W. 1992. Organizations: Rational, Natural, and Open Systems. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall. Simma, Bruno. 1994. The Charter of the United Nations: A Commentary. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Smillie, Ian. 1994. "Changing Partners: Northern NGOs, Northern Governments." Voluntas 5:155-192. UNDP. 1999. Human Development Report 1999. New York: Oxford University Press. USAID (United States Agency for International Development). 1995. "The Agency's Strategic Framework and Indicators 1995-1996." Washington, D.C. Wolch, Jennifer R. 1990. The Shadow State: Government and Voluntary Sector in Transition. New York: The Foundation Center.

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A NEW STRATEGY FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS


Roles of Global Civil Society in the 21st Century: A Case Study of Peace Building and the Global Environment
TANIMURA Mitsuhiro

Introduction
With the arrival of the 21st century market-driven globalization has picked up speed, and a serious distortion has appeared in international society. In its Human Development Report 1999, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) frames the problem as a lack of consideration for human rights, justice, human security, environmental protection and poverty alleviation in the current process of globalization. Certainly, global integration is forging ahead in many sectors, but vast numbers of people are being left out and marginalized in the process. There is now an urgent need to join forces and pool accumulated knowledge by a global community which should include among its objectives the strengthening of safety-net measures against the excesses of the current process of globalization. With regard to these global issues, this chapter investigates the roles of global civil society, the key player in development in the 21st century, from the perspective of global public goods. In particular it focuses on a hitherto neglected area, peace building and the global environment. After outlining the above concepts of 21st century global civil society and global public goods, the chapter addresses the relatively new issue of peace building and the
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environment, which can no longer be overlooked in the field of international development cooperation. Further, it goes on to discuss knowledge and expertise built up in Japan through the experience of reconstruction and rehabilitation after the Great Hanshin Earthquake and subsequent research projects. What this devastating earthquake shook was the very basis of life for millions of people, including the socially disadvantaged. The initiatives which grew out of the trial and error of reconstruction go beyond the framework of developed and developing nations, based on what should be globally shared values. Moreover, after the earthquake the ideals of Japanese architecture and environmental planning were reexamined and Life Cycle Assessment (LCA) technology made rapid progress. In the last section the chapter takes a fresh look at the knowledge acquired by Japan and the international community regarding peace building and the environment, and discusses the work to be done to develop international standards on social safety nets, a key theme in Japan today. Finally, from the perspective of peace and the environment, guiding principles of Japan's international cooperation, the chapter suggests a 21st century civil society initiative for peace building and environmental preservationestablishment of a Carbon Compensation Mechanism (CCM) using LCA technologyas a concrete measure for coexistence of the global community.

1. The Emerging 21st Century Global Civil Society: The Shape of Things to Come
In the 21st century, supported by the rapid development of information technology, the global network of civil society is likely to multiply and deepen still further. In this section I sketch the probable form this community will take and outline the new meanings of leadership and knowledge. Lastly, I discuss the notion of global public goods and other central concepts for international civil society in the 21st century. 1-1 21st Century Civil Society: Possibilities and Problems (1) From a Community Based on Force of Convention to a Community Based on Free Choice Hitherto the great majority of communities have been more or less rigid organizations held together by balance of power among the constituent members, and formed in one way or another by force of convention. However,
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organizational structures of the future will probably be of a quite different character. In the 21st century members who make up a community will choose to join each organization based on their own free will, without pressure from others, and selecting from a range of options (Goldsmith 1999). Personal identity, too, will be described by what one is to the society in which one is involved (Wiesel 1999). Even in religious and cultural communities, membership will become more fluid, making it difficult to maintain absolute organizational stability. Particularly in groups based on highly specialized interests, membership will be selected by global rather than local considerations (Goldsmith 1999). However, rather than engendering diversity, this global network of communities based on free choice is apt to foster uniformity and isolated value judgements. It may promote a narrow-mindedness which, rather than fostering development of long-term values, fuels only a search for short-term stimulation (Goldsmith 1999). Moreover, as is widely noted of late, accessor lack of itto this global network is likely to produce a huge gap in information and knowledge (World Bank 1999; UNDP 1999). (2) Changing Concepts of Leadership and Knowledge This new form of community is likely to appear in all areas of global civil society as the 21st century progresses. What, then, are the necessary characteristics of leadership for this sort of voluntary community? Certainly, something quite different from traditional leadership is required. Below we review a number of key suggestions regarding leaders chosen to manage groups based on free choice (Fujimoto 1999; Goldsmith 1999; Salamon 1999). Community creation and sharing of valuesThe leader arranges opportunities for members to participate in the building of the group's vision. Nonauthoritarian methods to define the organization's directionThe leader stimulates creativity and innovation by eliciting chance discovery through interaction among group members. Achievement of clear objectivesIf the organization does not achieve the results expected by its members, many are likely to leave. High level of transparency and accountabilityIt is essential to establish and implement a management style which is trusted by third parties as well as community members.
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Expansion of each individual's potentialIt is important that each group member has opportunities to realize his/her own personal growth through the altruistic activities of the community. The concept of knowledge itself, as a basis for the "knowledge society" of the 21st century, is also now being reconsidered. Conventional approaches to knowledge have focused on deep investigation of parts or elements. In contrast, the current trend is toward increasing emphasis on comprehensive understanding, and the boundaries of traditional academic disciplines have lost their meaning. Once an end in itself, knowledge is now seen as a means to achieve some sort of result. That which used to be called "knowledge" is now merely "information." "Information" only becomes "knowledge" when it leads to some outcome in society. There is now a need for initiatives to marshal information not only within but also among specialist fields, to achieve results in a broad range of social problems (Drucker 1999). This redefinition of knowledge coincides with the above image of leadership and represents an important perspective in the emerging global civil society. 1-2 Basic Concepts for Development of the 21st Century Global Civil Society As global interdependence accelerates, notions of "commons" and "public goods" have both expanded to a worldwide scale, becoming "global commons" and "global public goods." These two concepts are now beginning to gain attention as guiding principles for the 21st century. In any case, there is now an urgent need to construct social rules whereby "Nobody wins unless everyone wins." In this regard, "global commons" and "global public goods" will become extremely important concepts in the emerging worldwide civil society (Henderson 1999; Yabutani 1999; and others). The UNDP defines the new concept of "global public goods" as comprising both of the following: (1) final goods, or outcomes which bring benefits to all nations, people and generations, such as the environment, peace and cultural heritage; and (2) intermediate goods, such as international institutions, organizations and infrastructure indispensable to providing final global public goods.1 Further, global public goods can be categorized along the lines of policy issues, into natural goods (such as the ozone layer and global climactic change), stock goods (such as knowledge, standards, cultural heritage and the
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Internet) and flow goods (such as peace, health and financial stability). Already work has begun to develop practical applications of the concept of global public goods to address issues in international society (Kaul et al. 1999). In the same way, recognizing the importance of provision of global-level public goods, the World Bank is mapping out a plan for a "Knowledge Bank" to gather and apply knowledge on development issues.

2. Peace Building and the Environment as a New Theme in International Development Cooperation
Among the many issues of 21st century global civil society, this section turns the spotlight on peace building and the global environment, an extremely important theme in international development cooperation, and reviews the main points of discussion to date. After outlining post-Cold War conflicts and efforts at peace building, it looks at the environmental damage caused by conflicts and environmental considerations for emergency humanitarian assistance in housing and infrastructure. 2-1 Post-Cold War Conflicts and Efforts at Peace Building Of the 60-odd major armed conflicts which broke out in the ten-year period from 1989, a mere three occurred between nations; the remainder were all fought within national boundaries (UNDP 1999). High-tech weapons and inexpensive light firearms have changed the shape of war. Often with no clear line between enemies and allies, soldiers and civilians, today's armed confrontations produce a huge number of victims, and deal a devastating blow to former socioeconomic bases and political systems (Donowaki 1999; Takada 1999; and others). One estimation puts the figure for civilians killed in World War I at 5 percent of the total casualties. In today's conflicts the figure is close to 80 percent (Brown, S. 1999). Conflict in the post-Cold War world threatens not the nation-state, but rather the human security of each individual (Suto 1997). (1) Underlying Causes of Conflict Ethnicity and religion are often used as political tools to stir up conflict. Through the process of conflict, this fabrication becomes reality, and widens
1

In the 21st century civil society may use the concept of global public goods in its various activities, but the framework of global civil society can also be seen as one of the intermediate global public goods in itself.

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into a new hatred (Suto 1997; UNHCR 1997). However, the true causes of conflict lie in structural injustices left over from colonization, the Cold War period and more recently from globalization (Suto 1997; Takada 1999; and others). Since the end of the Cold War, there have also been new "proxy wars," the background of which is confrontation between superpowers over control of natural resources. Despite this, the nations of Europe and North America continually identify the causes of conflict as outside themselves, and discuss only measures for contribution, such as methods of humanitarian intervention for conflict resolution (Toyoshita 1999). The mass media set up an "enemy" and broadcast the story that if this one can just be contained, all problems will be solved (Suto 1999a and b; and others). But the weakness of this logic is revealed when the situation changes, the tables are turned and intervention becomes necessary to protect the enemy's human rights (Yonemoto 1999; Fukui 2000). Since innumerable conflicts are left unattended, it is clear that humanitarian intervention not only lacks consistency, but is the result of highly strategic choices (Ramonet 1999; Fukui 2000). Further, conflict zones throughout the world are also export markets for arms. The majority of these markets are controlled by nations which are permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and China) and Germany. In particular, the United States leads in world weapons sales, and arms-related industries in Europe are dependent on the export of arms in order to earn funds for research and development of next-generation technology (Henderson 1999; Toyoshita 1999). It is hard to say that mechanisms to limit the global arms trade are functioning. Nevertheless, as has been noted by various authors, if global military expenditure could be reduced and some portion of that reduction invested in social and environmental sectors, all countries would gain an opportunity for a big step toward sustainable development (Henderson 1999). (2) Preventive Diplomacy and Peace Building Conflict is not a simple linear process of tension armed conflict conflict resolution reconstruction and rehabilitation. Rather, it is a cycle which is frequently repeated. Since the late 1990s, Canada has been exploring nonviolent means for conflict resolution at all stages from preventive diplomacy to rehabilitation assistance, in the framework of the Canadian Peacebuilding Initiative (Brown, S. 1999). Further, in respect to international development
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assistance, it is working out a theoretical basis for the introduction of Peace and Conflict Impact Assessment (Bush 1998). Inspired by this unique approach to peace and development, there has also been some argument in Japan that rather than limiting discussion to the question of overseas deployment of the Self Defense Forces, Japan should think more flexibly and develop its own methods to uphold the nation's Peace Constitution while responding to the demands of international society (Nikkei, 18 October 1999). Peace, and the mechanisms to achieve it, are clear examples of global public goods (Hamburg et al. 1999). The 21st century global civil society has an extremely large role to play in addressing such problems, which cannot be resolved by governments, international organizations and other such established actors. Already, the international campaign for the abolishment of landmines has demonstrated the potential for new forms of multilevel global solidarity, other than conventional forums such as the United Nations and superpower negotiations (Suto 1997, 1999a). International society intervened directly in the arms trade, one of the very mechanisms which heighten the risk of conflict, calling for a change in the world's priorities (Henderson 1999; Toyoshita 1999). At sites of conflict, citizens' groups are continuing their activities to overcome the bonds of "made-up" ethnic confrontation (Matsuoka 1999). These citizens' groups are now approaching the mass media with demands for ethical and fair reporting (Suto 1997; Ignatieff 1999). 2-2 Destruction of Local and Global Environments Due to Conflict One of the foremost concepts in the environment sector in the 1990s was that of environmental justice. Derived from the American environmental movement's emphasis on social justice, it is now a guiding principle of globally conscious sustainable local development. According to the bio-region theory, which highlights ecological links, an environmental movement which does not address social issues cannot fundamentally ameliorate the current global environmental crisis (Kito 1994, 1999; Murata 1998). Equally, from the standpoint of the environment, human rightsa central concept in peace and development issuesmust be approached with a conceptual framework which goes beyond the conventional anthropocentric outlook (Murata 1998). The destructive actions of conflicts and the accompanying humanitarian interventions are imposing an enormous burden on the global environment. Emission of toxic and global warming gases by the destruction and burning of
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oil wells,2 pollution of the atmosphere and international waterways due to the bombing of oil refineries and chemical factories, deployment of depleted uranium weapons, and disposal at sea of unused weapons all contribute to environmental destruction far beyond the geographical sites of conflicts, further stressing the already weakened global ecology (Kosugi 1999; UNEP 1999; and others). When one considers the negative effect on the local and global environment, justifications such as "bombing for justice" ring hollow indeed (Ramonet 1999). Since the 1970s, the treaty against the use of environmentaltering technology has banned the use of technology which causes serious or long-term change or damage to the environment over a wide area. Nevertheless this ban has not produced any effective scheme to stop environmental destruction (Brown, L. et al. 1999). 2-3 Environmental Concerns Related to Emergency Assistance for Housing and Infrastructure Conflict not only destroys housing and physical infrastructure, but also deals a devastating blow to overall urban management systems (Inukai 1999; Nikkei, 14 July 1999; UNEP 1999; and others). Basic data such as residence records and real estate registration records are completely lost, and administration officials are driven out by opposing forces. Even during the stage of restoration and rehabilitation, from the perspective of the market economy, a return to the pre-conflict management system must be put off, and resolution of land and house ownership issues becomes extremely complex (Suto 1997; International Red Cross 1998). If social order is not maintained, looting and grabbing would reach epidemic proportions (Fukui 2000). In 1999 the temporary housing used in the Great Hanshin Earthquake was sent to Kosovo, and the active involvement of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) was widely reported. However, there is as yet no overall scheme to facilitate immediate action with regard to this sort of issue (Matsuoka 1999; Sugishita 1999). Below I outline two new promising endeavors which may provide ways to resolve some of these issues. The first is an attempt to establish and maintain international standards in emergency humanitarian assistance projects. The
2

According to the World Meteorological Agency, the destruction and burning of oil wells in Kuwait in 1991 caused as much damage to the environment as world automobile emissions, exacerbating global warming (Henderson 1999).

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second is an alternative planning system developed at the front line of international development cooperation in urban infrastructure, including urban disaster prevention planning. (1) International Standardization of Humanitarian Relief: the Sphere Project In 1997 the Sphere Project was launched to better the quality of humanitarian assistance to people affected by disasters and conflicts and to improve the accountability of agencies involved. Its main achievements have been the development of a Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response. Front-line NGO groups, 3 international organizations, 4 the International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and various donor nations5 collaborated in putting together the experiences and lessons gained to date to compile global standards in water supply and sanitation, nutrition, food aid, shelter and site planning and health services. The Sphere Minimum Standards are now being tested in actual humanitarian emergency assistance projects (International Red Cross 1998; Sphere Project 1999). With regard to shelter and site planning, appropriate policy responses are discussed in relation to the following three scenarios (see Appendix IV. 1.): People stay at homeEven if homes are destroyed or damaged, when people stay in or near their homes, local community is maintained, allowing humanitarian assistance to be implemented more effectively. Priority should be given to repair homes owned by disaster victims and facilities used by host families. People are displaced and stay in a host communityWhen the displaced people share the same history or religion as their host community, management may go relatively smoothly. Points requiring special attention are the need for support to the host community and consideration of longterm effects on the local physical and social environment. People are displaced and stay in temporary settlementsFrom the point of
3

InterAction, the European Voluntary Organizations in Cooperation in Emergencies (VOICE), International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) and others formed the core group (Sphere Project 1999). 4 Participating United Nations agencies included the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Program (WFP) and the World Health Organization (WHO) (Sphere Project 1999). 5 Australia, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Ireland, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom and the United States all supported the Sphere Project (Sphere Project 1999).

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view of the disaster victims, the least desirable scenario is to be forced to leave their community and live for an extended period in a temporary settlement. The stay in the particular site is temporary, and at times the site itself has to be relocated. Under these circumstances it is very difficult to maintain local community ties, and implementing humanitarian assistance is extremely challenging. As far as possible, an environmental assessment of the proposed site construction and management should be carried out. (2) An Alternative Planning System from the Front Line of International Development Cooperation Faced with the realities of extremely rapid urbanization, a large informal sector and weak urban administration, those at the front line of international cooperation for urban management in developing countries have gone beyond Western theories of modernization to work out new and more effective planning systems. The following points have been put forward as the framework for an alternative planning system (Hosaka 1994, 1996a and b, 1997; International Red Cross 1998; Ishii 1999): Urban planning linked with the local communityUrban planning is not the creation of long-term comprehensive blueprints, but rather a means for building agreement in a local community, as part of the overall urban management. Development of an open local community and improvement in its decisionmaking abilityIt is important that the local community cultivate systematic openness in relations with the world outside, and that local residents develop community decision-making ability. Process-oriented environment-friendly planningThe focus of planning is on the process of community organization and access to resources. While promoting development that lightens the burden on the environment, it forms the basis for a vibrant urban community. From administration-led community participation to community-led urban planning and developmentIt is essential to think in terms of communityled development, whereby the local government supports the residents' initiatives and entrepreneurial spirit, rather than merely mobilizing the residents and the private sector for increased efficiency in implementing fixed plans.
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The natural process of urbanization is occupation building servicing planning. But modern urban housing planning follows a sequence of planning servicing building occupation. Developed in the face of tough realities in developing countries, the above alternative planning approach instigates new, more mutual relations between the government and local communities to explore the potential of a new sequence: planning occupation building servicing (Hosaka 1994, 1996b). Starting as it does with the local community and housing, the bases for people's lives, this style of planning has much in common with the guidelines of the Sphere Project mentioned above.

3. New Experiences in Japanese Architecture and Urban Planning


The above section looked at the new theme of peace building and the global environment in international development cooperation. Below we turn our attention to Japan's knowledge and technology in related fields. In particular we focus on two recent topics in Japanese architecture and urban planning: restoration and rehabilitation after the Great Hanshin Earthquake; and architecture/urban planning and the environment. 3-1 Lessons from Reconstruction and Rehabilitation after the Great Hanshin Earthquake The Great Hanshin Earthquake of 17 January 1995 destroyed, damaged and burned approximately 130,000 houses in Kobe alone (Narasaki 1996; Miyamoto et al. 1997). The damage was especially severe in the inner city, with its concentration of old, low-rent apartments. For the residents, largely elderly and low-income families, the very foundations of their lives were shaken.6 The earthquake also starkly revealed a long-term problem overcrowded housing in built-up areas of the city (Hirayama 1996; Takada, M. 1996). Throughout the restoration and rehabilitation program, housing was an urgent issue. Working by trial and error, a wide range of actors, including local government agencies, academic organizations, architects and planners, and citizens' groups, endeavored to find acceptable approaches (Kobayashi, I. 1996; Takayose 1999). The main issues and suggestions regarding housing reconstruction and rehabilitation are as follows.
6

Reinforced concrete apartment buildings also collapsed, but these comprised only about 10 percent of the total severely damaged homes (Ito 1995).

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(1) The Collapse of Modern Urban Planning Philosophy After the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923) and World War II, blueprints of ideal cities were drawn up, and restoration and rehabilitation projects were implemented according to the conventional concept of modern urban planning. However, after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, which coincided with a turning point in Japanese economy and society, this growth-oriented concept and method of rehabilitation planning were critically reexamined by both citizens and specialists (Hirayama 1996, 1999; Onishi 1997; and others). As diverse actors collaborated in the post-quake reconstruction, the bureaucrat-led conventional approachuniversal, efficiency-oriented planning and widespread propagandizinggenerated considerable tensions between the citizens and the local government (IFSC 1998). Moreover, initially the government did not hesitate to use techniques of city redevelopment and land adjustment based on the assumption of economic growth, population influx and rising land prices all highly unlikely under the current socioeconomic and demographic conditions (Sumida 1996; Hirayama 1999). The appropriateness of central and local government methods of urban planning and management is being questioned (Hirayama 1999). After the Great Hanshin Earthquake community reconstruction was given a smooth start in parts of the Kobe area by local community groups which had been working with architects and planners on long-term community planning and development since before the earthquake. These projects' distinguishing characteristic was that, rather than government-led community participation, they were led by the residents themselves. The residents worked out their vision of their own community, drew basic plans and then called for the participation and support of the local government (Takamizawa 1997; Inui 1998). Since the earthquake, volunteer groups of academics, architects and planners have continued their support in so-called "blank areas" not designated for government rehabilitation efforts (Kobayashi, I. 1996; and others).7 Through the process of working together on local issues, a new local culture developed, with a new recognition of the importance of broad networks based on social ties of common interests rather than physical neighborhoods (IFSC 1998). Observers noted the community strength fostered by the process of community redevelopmenta strength which could be tapped for disaster prevention in times of emergency. In terms of architecture and urban planning, the experience generated interest in the possibilities of "starting with parts"an approach
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undervalued by modern rationalismrather than creating an initial overall plan (Kawata 1997; Ando 1999). In other words, there was an upsurge in Japan in concepts and practices which share a lot in common with the alternative approach discussed above. (2) Distortions Due to Mass Provision of Temporary Shelters The mass provision of temporary shelters after the Great Hanshin Earthquake (according to the Sphere Project guidelines, the option to be avoided as far as possible) produced various distortions. With this experience in mind, a number of lessons have been suggested for future restoration and rehabilitation planning. Initially, temporary housing was to be provided only to those whose own homes had been destroyed and who were unable to find alternative shelter by their own means. However, in fact it was provided to all applicants, indicating a lack of philosophical basis for housing reconstruction policy (Kobayashi, M. et al. 1997). Moreover, a huge demand for temporary housing was created by the decision to quickly destroy homes at the expense of the government, including those houses which could actually have been repaired for temporary use (Kobayashi, M. et al. 1997; IFSC 1998).8 When the temporary housing was removed, the total 180 billion (approximately 4 million/unit) construction costs were dissipated, leaving no improvement in the stock of urban housing (Kawata 1997). The elderly and low-income households were given priority housing in the shelters. However, it proved very difficult to establish functioning new communities in the temporary housing estates, made up as they were of entirely socially disadvantaged residents displaced from their previous communities and home grounds (Hirayama 1999; Takayose 1999; and others). When the temporary housing was dismantled, these residents were forced to move again, to post-disaster public housing, and again faced with the task of building new communities from scratch. This disregard for community stability was criticized as being a barrier to psychological healing after the trauma of
7

In the United States, in community reconstruction efforts it is accepted that experts play an important intermediary role between the community and the local government. Further, active participation by disaster victims in community planning and development is also said to have a positive effect on their psychological recovery from the trauma of disaster (Kawai 1995). 8 A total of approximately 48,000 units of temporary housing were built just after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, equivalent to the average annual construction figures for the whole of Hyogo Prefecture (where Kobe is located). These were supplied within a period of only three months (Maki et al. 1996).

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the earthquake (Kobayashi, M. et al. 1997; NHK Kobe 1999).9 The Special Research Group of the Architectural Institute of Japan (AIJ) is advocating the creation of a Temporary Repair Program for Disaster-Affected Housing, which will keep down the sudden demand for housing and facilitate the disaster victims' involvement in restoration/rehabilitation efforts in their own communities, using the limited resources of the communities to the greatest possible effect. (See Appendix IV. 2, Recommendation 6.) The limitations of the straight-line approach to temporary housingsafety shelter temporary housing post-disaster public housingbecame clear through the housing reconstruction process after the Great Hanshin Earthquake. One policy-level problem which has been pointed out is the gap in treatment between those earthquake victims who followed this path and received generous assistance, and others who took the path of self-reliant rebuilding and received extremely limited assistance (Yoshii 1996; Hirayama 1996). In fact, many earthquake victims were even less financially stable than those living in temporary housing (Takayose 1999). What was needed was a scheme to support the variety of options taken by the earthquake victims during the process of rebuilding, not only the public temporary shelter option, but also the use of private-sector rental apartments and self-built temporary housing (Hirayama 1996; Kobayashi, M. et al. 1997; and others). In the United States a coupon system has been introduced to provide rent support for disaster victims while at the same time boosting the local economy (Yoshii 1996; Sazanami 1998; and others). The AIJ Special Research Group proposes an even wider ranging Housing Credit System for Disaster Victims. (See Appendix IV. 2, Recommendation 9.) Now, five years after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, there is a problem of mismatch between demand and supply of permanent housing. The sector worst hit by the earthquake was the low-cost rental housing in the inner city. Postearthquake reconstruction has produced many high-cost condominiums for sale, but the supply of rental housing financially accessible to low-income
9

The mass provision of temporary housing left numerous issues unresolved. On the other hand, the communitystyle temporary housing provided for the elderly and disabled in built-up areas, complete with psychological counseling services, was evaluated highly by residents, volunteers and others (IFSC 1998). These shelters represented an entirely new type of integrated housing and social service, with 10-25 individual rooms for privacy, a common space for communal activities and 24-hour service from a "life support advisor" (Sazanami 1998; and others). After the disbanding of the community-style temporary housing, its basic concept was reused in permanent care-cum-apartments, and there are calls for its use on a wider scale, in a more systematic manner (Nikkei A. 1999b).

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groups is extremely limited. On paper, there is now an adequate supply of housing, but there is still no sign of any effective policy to resolve the longstanding housing problem (IFSC 1998; Takayose 1999). Financially burdensome in terms of both construction and maintenance, direct construction of post-disaster public housing has become the main rehousing strategy. Meanwhile, a proposed government scheme to rent and sublet private-sector apartments as public housing (minshakuchin jutaku) fell behind schedule, and has been blamed for the current big shortage of low-income housing (Takayose 1999). Some stakeholders are now calling for an expansion of the scheme to include not only newly built private apartments (as is now the case) but also existing rental housing (IFSC 1998). (3) Environmental Problems of Earthquake Rubble Disposal The limited time offer on publicly funded demolition caused an abnormal boom in demolition, even of repairable housing. Not only did this necessitate a huge supply of temporary housing, it also produced a huge amount of earthquake rubble (Narasaki 1996; IFSC 1998). In Hyogo Prefecture, approximately 20 million metric tons of waste (equivalent to eight years of ordinary garbage) were produced, including about 14.5 million metric tons of construction materials (Tsukaguchi et al. 1999). Moreover, in the process of large-scale demolition and disposal over a short period of time, various serious environmental problems occurred. Air pollution resulted due to toxic materials (including dioxins and asbestos which had been used as a fire retardant) being carelessly disposed of and burnt and from truck exhaust fumes (Narasaki 1996; Nakabayashi 1997). To resolve this sort of environmental problem caused by earthquake rubble disposal, the AIJ Special Research Group advocates the establishment of a Rubble Disposal Credit System. Such a scheme would manage public funds to cover the costs of both emergency repairs to allow temporary use of damaged buildings, as well as demolition and disposal after a number of years. (See Appendix IV. 2, Recommendation 7.) (4) Initiatives for International Networking in the Disaster Prevention Field Since the Great Hanshin Earthquake, Japanese agencies for earthquake response, international cooperation and related fields have reached out to network with similar organizations around the world, and are strengthening projects to improve the disaster prevention ability and preparedness of society
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as a whole. The Japan International Cooperation Agency's (JICA) "Disaster Prevention and Development Assistance" report calls for international cooperation to facilitate sustainable development, which means going beyond emergency assistance to foster a high level of disaster prevention ability and preparedness at the community level. Recently, the United States, China, South Korea, the Philippines, Mexico and Australia announced their intention to participate in academic exchanges with Japan regarding disaster prevention strategies involving powerful earthquakes. They will pursue collaborative research into earthquake-resistant technology and disaster lifeline development, working toward a basic strategy for disaster prevention throughout the AsiaPacific region, to be drawn up in 2001 (Nikkei, 29 November 1999). The next step is to build on this earthquake disaster prevention networking to create a shared pool of knowledge on emergency restoration and rehabilitation, like what the Sphere Project provides to guide responses in humanitarian assistance. Through such a knowledge resource, Japan's valuable lessons in post-disaster rehabilitationsuch as those suggested by the AIJ should be made available and shared as global public goods. 3-2 Global Environment and the Future of Architecture and Urban Planning: Issues and Recommendations In the 1990s, with the global surge of interest in the environment, as well as in the architecture and urban planning fields, consideration for the environment became a serious issue. The experience of the Great Hanshin Earthquake and the subsequent Third Conference of Parties to the UN Convention on Climate Change (COP3) in Kyoto added extra momentum to this trend (Nikkei A. 1999a). In the architecture and urban planning fields, the following efforts have begun in an attempt to reduce the burden on the environment. (1) Architecture, Urban Design and the Environment In Japan, if we take a survival rate of 50 percent (that is, the point at which half of all buildings constructed at the same time are still in use) as the average life span, buildings are actually used on average for only 35 to 40 years in the case of reinforced concrete apartment and office blocks. The main reasons for demolition are urban redevelopment as well as the difficulty in adapting buildings to keep up with socioeconomic change. There are virtually no cases of demolition due to lack of structural durability. However, given the problems
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of waste disposal and the limits on natural resources, this "scrap and build" model of construction is no longer acceptable (Tomosawa 1997). Architects and urban planners are now exploring the possibilities for "sustainable design," reflecting the local society and culture and minimizing the burden on the environment (Hayashi et al. 1997). Moreover, research into the recycling of architectural waste has now produced the new technology needed to support environment-friendly design. For example, a process has now been developed to recycle concrete, initially a serious technical challenge. Research into recycled aggregate concrete has now reached the stage of tests to allow practical application, and The Building Center of Japan has begun work to establish a quality assurance system (Nikkei A. 1999a). (2) Life Cycle Assessment in the Field of Architecture Recently in Japan, LCA and one of its indicators, Life Cycle CO2 (LCCO2), have attracted a lot of attention as part of the general concern for the environment in the field of architecture. LCA allows planners to assess the burden on the environment created at each stage of a building's lifefrom design construction occupation demolition.10 LCCO2 indicates the amount of CO2 (global warming gas) produced by a building at each stage of its life cycle (Ishifuku et al. 1995).11 In 1993, in response to the discussion of LCA by the International Standardization Organization (ISO), the AIJ began developing a methodology for integrated environmental burden assessment. Today, 36 percent of Japan's total CO2 emissions are architecture-related. Architecture and related fields bear a heavy social responsibility (Ishifuku et al. 1995; Nikkei A. 1999a). If no countermeasures are taken and the current method of production is maintained, CO2 emissions will increase by 16 percent by 2010, a far cry from the 6 percent reduction from the 1990 levels decided at COP3. At the end of 1997 the AIJ announced goals of "30 percent cut in
10 To assess the environmental burden of urban infrastructure, LCA methodology is now being developed and adapted to create a framework for Infrastructure Life Cycle Assessment (ILCA). There has been a great deal of research on the environmental burden produced by construction and the use of individual buildings or facilities and of groups of buildings. However, there is as yet no system for integrated environmental impact assessment of a whole area, including the benefits gained from connection between the particular infrastructure facility being assessed and the existing system. It is hoped that such a system will soon be created to allow proposed infrastructure developments to be evaluated not only as individual projects but also at the city level, in relation to the existing urban system and economy (Imura 1998). 11 In addition, a useful indicator of LCCO2* has been developed to calculate various global warming gas emissions in terms of carbon weight of CO2 (Ishifuku et al. 1995).

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Japan's architectural LCCO2, and minimum building life of 100 years." Even if this level is attained, LCCO2 will only be reduced to just 2 percent above the 1990 levels, suggesting that unless the equivalent or more drastic measures are taken, it will be very difficult to meet the 6 percent cut set at COP3 (Nikkei A. 1999a). To address this global issue, the AIJ has announced an action plan that reaches beyond its internal constituency, exploring research collaboration with academic organizations from other fields and lobbying of government agencies. (See Appendix IV. 3.) LCCO2 reduction will become an extremely important factor in urban environmental development in the 21st century, and it is anticipated that sooner or later LCA documents will be basic requirements of architectural planning applications and in tax break schemes (Nikkei A 1999a). In the field of architecture, big design agencies and general construction firms have already succeeded in developing LCA software packages based on their own huge stocks of data. These software packages are now actually in use at the planning stage to calculate how life cycle costs change and how much the environmental burden, including LCCO2, can be reduced by increasing durability, improving efficiency, using recycled energy materials, and so on. However, the contents and details of the software, developed separately by each company, have not been made public, making it impossible for a third party to compare or verify calculations. In response, the AIJ is planning to go public with the LCA software developed at the Institute of Industrial Science, University of Tokyo, as the AIJ LCA subcommittee version. This AIJ LCA software can be used to calculate LCCO2, energy consumption, cost and so on for virtually any type of building, including schools, hospitals and commercial facilities. Further, in order to standardize LCA software, the Building Contractors Society has begun to coordinate the software packages developed by various general construction firms (Nikkei A. 1999a). International standardization of LCA systems is now also happening at a rapid pace, with countries/areas putting together their differing evaluation items and methods to create common frameworks. Internationally acclaimed LCA methods include the Green Building Challenge '98 (GBC '98), proposed by Canada with the participation of 14 nations, including Japan, and BREEAM, devised by a group based in the United Kingdom, along with Hong Kong, Australia and New Zealand. Through the GBC '98 network, Japan is now developing a further refined assessment method, GBC 2000 (Nikkei A. 1999a).
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In the final section of this chapter, I suggest an active adaptation of this technology for global environmental preservation, beyond the field of architecture, in the process of conflict and peace building.

4. The Environment and Peace Building by the 21st Century Global Community
At the beginning of this chapter I discussed the emerging shape of the 21st century global community and related key concepts such as global public goods. Next I looked at peace building and the global environment, a new issue in international development cooperation, turning the spotlight in turn on conflict and peace building, conflict and environmental destruction, emergency physical assistance, and Japanese knowledge and technology in these fields. In this section I consider once again the knowledge built up on peace building and the environment, and identify key issues in the sector. Finally, as one practical proposal, I introduce the idea of a "21st century global citizens' initiative for peace building and the environment." 4-1 A Growing Pool of Knowledge on Global Environment and Peace Building (1) Common Principles and Policies on Post-Disaster/Post-Conflict Restoration and Rehabilitation In the field of emergency humanitarian assistance NGO groups, international organizations, donor governments and other stakeholders have pooled their various knowledge resources to create standard guidelines for intervention, and are now testing their application in actual relief operations. Meanwhile, at the frontline of "Southern" urban development, planners and others have worked out an alternative planning system that goes beyond the limitations of modern city planning thought. As discussed above, the essence of these knowledge bases shows an amazing number of points in common with the conclusions reached by Japanese specialists and people's organizations through the trial and error of rehabilitation efforts in the Hanshin area. All sides emphasize the centrality of local communities and wide interlinkages among them, and the importance of following a process of reconstruction that maintains community links, for example by repairing and reusing damaged homes as much as possible rather than immediately evacuating survivors to temporary shelters (camps). Until now the terms "the South" and "developing nation" have been used for
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the sake of convenience. But with respect to the pooling of knowledge on individual human security, these distinctions lose their meaning. (2) International Standardization by Integrating Knowledge on Social Safety Nets To weave safety nets for people marginalized in the current market-led process of globalization, the global civil society must integrate knowledge from various fields, from conflict resolution to the environment, to share as a global public good. In the field of international development, actors in Japanese development cooperation should not only review the experiences in their respective fields, but also link up with professionals from other specialties to collect sufficient information (conventionally called knowledge in each specialist field) to address global issues, and to spread the word to the international community, including the 21st century global civil society. For example, after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, "community stays"12 were suggested to promote reactivation of local social structures. But the approach could be further refined for use in situations of conflict by people's organizations struggling against ethnic conflict, through intellectual exchange among various specialists. Moreover, sporadic review of the experiences of individual projects may not necessarily be adequate to develop global knowledge. As with the Sphere Project, the global standard for humanitarian relief, a broad range of knowledge must be organized to form the basis for an internationally standardized safety net, freely accessible to all. In other words, it is essential to go beyond the creation of a "knowledge bank" made simply of a collection of experiences within Japan, to prepare the basis for an international standard pool of knowledge on safety nets. 4-2 Role of the 21st Century Global Community in Peace Building and the Environmenta Draft Proposal As discussed above, Canada, Japan and others are working on the international standardization of LCA in the construction field. In the final section of this chapter I make a proposal for an innovative use of this vanguard technology as one information source to resolve global questions on peace building and the environment.
12 A system of local home stays by earthquake victims who have left their communities, to resolve their insecurities and promote their fresh start at life in their former homes (Morisaki 1997).

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4-2-1 Background The destruction that accompanies conflict and conflict interventions is causing alarming damage to global public goods, including the environment. At times, in the name of humanitarian intervention, overwhelming military forces destroy not only military installations, but also public infrastructure without the slightest hesitation. The treaty ban on the use of environmentaltering technology has been powerless against military interventions in the name of justice, and there is no sign of a system capable of controlling the international arms trade. 4-2-2 Carbon Compensation Mechanism for Peace Building and the Global Environment Of the various environmental problems stemming from conflict, here we focus on the environmental burden due to the destruction of buildings. In terms of LCA the mechanism will use the internationally standardized LCA software to estimate the increase in LCCO2 as an indicator of the burden on the environment due to conflict-related lossesfor example, the loss of the use of buildings due to their collapse before the end of their expected structural life and the burden of repair and reconstruction. Next, regardless of the rationale for war, be it "humanitarianism" or "holy war," and regardless of the specific military strategy, compensation 13 corresponding to the burden on the environment will be demanded from the actor directly responsible for the attack on the building. This mechanism will be established internationally as the CCM, identified as one of the intermediate global public goods. It is hoped that with the establishment of the CCM the world will, for the first time, have found an effective means to confront the aggression of modern weapons and the environmental destruction they cause. The system is to be run by an international CCM committee made up of NGOs and their supporters, including international organizations and private firms. Responsible mass media organizations and community networks will collaborate in watching out for destruction of buildings by armed groups involved in conflict, and publicize the corresponding LCCO2 figure in real time via the Internet and other rapid media. The committee will collect the compensation funds, and allocate them to restoration and rehabilitation costs,
13

This is compensation for the increase in global warming gases, to be distinguished from an indemnity for damage to real estate value.

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such as support for refugees of conflict and the construction of rubble-recycling facilities. Further, training courses in the internationally standardized LCA methodology and quality assurance systems for recycled construction materials will be offered to registered CCM staff. Course completers will be awarded internationally recognized certificates, and follow-up courses, including ethics education, will be implemented to ensure professional sustainability. I sincerely hope that the mature global civil society of the 21st century, with the direction of talented leaders, is able to find real solutions to the problems of conflict, problems which have as yet proved beyond the control of states and international organizations. The proposal put forward above is, of course, just a discussion starter to stimulate further brainstorming. With input from a broad range of specialists, the idea can be refined, so that Japan, its development cooperation program based on the principles of peace and the environment, can offer the world concrete measures for coexistence. Acknowledgements
Brainstorming sessions at FASID with specialists from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Institute for Global Environmental Strategies (IGES) were extremely helpful in writing this chapter. I am most grateful for their cooperation. I would also like to express my sincere thanks to FASID interns Seya Sachiyo and Mezawa Hiroyasu, who provided invaluable support to the project by gathering relevant data from the Internet.

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Appendix IV. 1
Shelter Solutions beyond Sticks and Plastic Sheets (excerpts) International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 1998 Strategies in Humanitarian Assistance Three possible scenarios dictate the basic shelter needs of disaster victims. The type of disaster, the number of people involved, the politics surrounding the disaster and the ability of the community to cope with the disaster all determine which scenario people will be forced to follow. Scenario A People stay at home: People who are displaced by natural disasters, such as earthquakes or cyclones, want to stay in or near their homes. Even if their homes are destroyed or damaged, assistance to people "where they are" is much more sustainable and allows normality to be restored more quickly than assistance which encourages people to move away in search of temporary shelter. Aid goes directly into the area where the people live, where they know each other, where social structures can keep going, where life remains as normal as possible. In the extreme emergency phase, people may need temporary lodging in schools, churches or even large tents, but one member of the family will often stay on the family plot to guard the property and land. If the government and aid agencies handle this scenario well, there is a very real possibility that the emergency will be short-lived and normality will quickly return. Scenario B People are displaced and stay in host communities: During civil strife, and after some natural disasters such as extensive flooding, members of whole communities may be forced to flee their homes and the region. Often they will leave most, if not all, of their possessions behind. They are sometimes helped with transport, but more usually move on foot, taking with them only items they can carry and the clothes they wear. In this situation, it is much better if the displaced people are absorbed into a local host community, possibly with family members or people who share historical, religious or other ties. The government and aid agencies have to provide assistance to the entire population according to need, since both the residents and the displaced people
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are, in effect, disaster-affected. Ironically, helping both the displaced people and the host communities is often cheaper in the long run than simply providing for the needs of the victims. Security issues, long-term effects on the environment and the possibilities sharing of shelters, clinics, schools and shops all favor an integrated approach to assistance, and can have lasting positive effects on the host communities even after the disaster victims have returned home. Scenario C People are displaced and stay in clusters: Sometimes, despite the best intentions of aid agencies, displaced people end up in the least preferred scenarioin refugee or displaced people's camps. There are many potential difficulties: the displaced communities may be too large for the local population to absorb; the displaced people may fear persecution and violence from elements within their own or the host communities; and security or political problems may arise. The host governmentor the displaced people themselves or the first aid agency to arrivehas often selected the site of the camp, usually around water and sanitation points. But new, more permanent and suitable sites sometimes need to be set up, leaving the old one as a transit camp, or abandoning it altogether. Ideally camps should be planned and the infrastructure installed before the people are moved there but this rarely happens. If there are no alternative sites for new camps, the initial site may need reorganizing to meet the minimum standards as laid down by the UNHCR or in the new Sphere Project standards.

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Appendix IV. 2
Proposals for Rehabilitation of Disaster-Affected Areas and Improvement in Disaster-Prevention Competence: Lessons from the Great Hanshin Earthquake (Second Recommendations) Special Research Group on the Great Hanshin Earthquake, Architectural Institute of Japan (AIJ), January 1997 Introduction The Great Hanshin Earthquake, the largest in post-war Japan, exposed the vulnerability of Japan's cities in the face of earthquakes, and also drew attention to the importance of "disaster-resistant urban development." At the AIJ the disaster provoked extremely serious reflection, and the AIJ has been active in both academic research and support for restoration work since immediately after the earthquake. One of the issues exposed by the disaster was the lack of overall urban disaster-prevention planning and, in particular, the lack of a people-centered, livelihood-centered approach to disaster prevention. The AIJ, comprising professionals and researchers from a wide range of architecture and urban planning-related fields, felt a responsibility to address these problems, from academic and related perspectives. On the basis of this understanding, the AIJ established the Special Research Group on the Great Hanshin Earthquake (henceforth, the Special Research Group). On 19 July 1995 part of the Special Research Group's activities were written up under the title "Improving Disaster Preparedness of Architecture and Urban Infrastructure: Lessons from the Great Hanshin Earthquake (Preliminary Recommendations)," and, after a formal review by the board of directors, were published as the official recommendations of the AIJ. The report puts forward its basic vision of architecture and urban planning, and raises a number of key issues to be addressed. Subsequently, the Special Research Group has established working groups on seven selected issues, and, through the process of disaster restoration and rehabilitation, is vigorously pursuing a range of research activities, including academic studies and open symposia. In the Second Recommendations we limit our observations to the field of urban planning and community development. Building on the Preliminary Recommendations, subsequent research clarified the following urgent and
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important points. 1. Rehabilitation of the Disaster-Affected Area The Great Hanshin Earthquake exposed special characteristics of disasters in highly complex city areas where a large proportion of the population is elderly. In particular, the disaster affected many people who were unable to reconstruct their lives without substantial outside assistance. Further, there has been a serious delay in rehabilitation of housing in the disaster-affected area. Indeed, through the process of housing rehabilitation, it has become clear that new systems and principles of rehabilitation planning must be developed. The following recommendations concern restoration and rehabilitation planning to be addressed in the Hanshin area, with the aim of establishing an integrated, rapidly mobilized system that facilitates smooth recovery from disaster. Recommendation 1: Provision of Diversified Public Assistance Rehabilitation efforts after the unprecedented disaster of the Great Hanshin Earthquake will require a wide range of public and popular assistance. Although self-reliance must be the basis for disaster prevention and for rebuilding lives after the earthquake, there is a limit to individual competence in the face of such a huge calamity. Rehabilitation of the area affected by the Great Hanshin Earthquake is not only the problem of one specific region. Rather, it must be seen as a model of post-disaster rehabilitation from an earthquake that can occur directly below any large Japanese city. As our country is constantly under threat from this type of disaster, we must recognize the Great Hanshin Earthquake as an issue affecting us all. With national solidarity, we must work out a diversified public system of post-disaster restoration and rehabilitation, based on a new view of urban development. Recommendation 2: Detailed Analysis of Damage and Assessments of Rehabilitation To promote disaster-resistant community planning and development, it is essential to carry out detailed analyses and assessments of various aspects of disaster damage"damage assessments." Further, to promote community reconstruction, it is essential to monitor and evaluate the process of urban rehabilitation in terms of safety, urban formation, and so on, through
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"rehabilitation assessments." Assessment findings should be publicized as community planning and development information to guide the process of restoration and rehabilitation. Technology such as Geographical Information Systems (GIS) is effective for use in carrying out assessments. Recommendation 3: Systematic Development of Water and Greenery-Based Disaster-Prevention Infrastructure, and Creation of a Secure Life Space Rehabilitation is also urgently required in areas left out of public assistance and public rehabilitation projects (so-called "blank areas"). For these areas, community reconstruction should move ahead quickly, implementing Kobe City's rehabilitation planning concepts, "water and greenery network" and "secure life space." This systematic development of disaster-prevention infrastructure should be a model for future urban rehabilitation planning. With the consent of the national population, public funds should be actively applied to the development of this infrastructure. Recommendation 4: Integrated Housing Rehabilitation Program As housing reconstruction, the core of rehabilitation work, is a long-term effort, stronger organizational linkage between the public and private sectors is required, to complete an integrated housing rehabilitation program within at least ten years. Such a program must consider the variety of disaster-affected residents and respond to their spatial and qualitative needs, in terms of housing scale, site and structure. To support such a program, it will be necessary to carry out ongoing detailed housing surveys of the disaster-affected areas and to keep an eye on the housing demand and supply trends over a larger area. Thorough preparations must also be made in time for the fast-approaching dismantling of temporary housing. Recommendation 5: Development of New Rehabilitation Methodology for Mixed Residential/Commercial/Industrial Areas One pressing task is the development of new methods of urban rehabilitation, including both housing and commercial facilities in one set, for the mixed residential-commercial-industrial areas affected by the disaster, and particularly for the "blank areas" where rehabilitation is expected to be especially problematic. In promoting the rehabilitation of workplace-proximal housing, priority should be given to the construction of facilities for productive work,
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such as temporary shops, workshops, shared shops and warehouses. Meanwhile, plans should link housing reconstruction and institutional measures for industrial rehabilitation, such as credit and management support. 2. System to Promote Disaster Victims' Swift Return to Normal Life From life in the evacuation centers to emergency temporary housing and emergency repairs to provide temporary living spaces, the main issues related to land use and allocation and to the disaster victims' socioeconomic status include: (1) management of the rehabilitation system (for example, disaster relief laws) and (2) methods of urban rehabilitation planning. Taking into account both the experience of the Great Hanshin Earthquake and other scenarios, the following recommendations aim to foster a system to promote the disaster victims' safety and to support their rapid return to normal life. Recommendation 6: Temporary Repair Program for Disaster-Affected Housing Even if houses are damaged by the disaster, securing temporary accommodation by carrying out quick repairs can contribute greatly to restoration and rehabilitation. A program for temporary repair of disasteraffected housing should be established to promote the fullest possible temporary utilization of disaster-affected housing, by implementing a system of disaster damage evaluation and expanding the limits on subsidies for housing demolition under current disaster relief law. The aims of such a program are to suppress the demand for emergency housing and to encourage disaster victims, as far as possible, to remain in their own neighborhoods, maintaining cultural continuity and promoting community restoration and rehabilitation. To implement such a program, both repair materials and a large number of appropriate specialist workers would be required. Recommendation 7: Rubble Disposal Credit System After the Great Hanshin Earthquake, rubble disposal was paid for by public funds. However, as these public funds were made available for only a short period, they were not applied to buildings such as condominiums which required some time to discuss reconstruction plans, nor to damaged houses repaired for temporary use. This policy resulted in the demolition of buildings which could have been repaired for use as temporary accommodation, and in the loss of local cultural resources. It also created a huge demand for housing. In light of
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this experience, a flexible system should be established to make public funds available even several years after a disaster, when demolition of buildings repaired for temporary use is undertaken. This could be achieved by issuing "rubble disposal credit." Such a system would encourage residents to remain in their homes and contribute to local community rehabilitation, and thus make it possible to combine urban rehabilitation projects and demolition work. Recommendation 8: Emergency Housing System that Promotes Community Rehabilitation In terms of restoration and rehabilitation of the disaster-affected area, it is not necessarily appropriate for victims to evacuate to a distant location. In today's society, disaster victimsstakeholders in community planning and developmentshould remain at the disaster-affected site and participate actively in the rehabilitation efforts. In those seriously hit areas requiring planned rehabilitation, temporary shops and housing have been set up both in and outside the relevant project areas, linked with land readjustment and urban redevelopment. However, in disaster-affected areas where restoration and rehabilitation have been left to individual efforts ("blank areas"), temporary shelters have not necessarily been near to the victims' neighborhoods, and there have been no subsidies for self-reliant restoration of shops, workshops and housing. To facilitate integrated community rehabilitation planning, emergency temporary housing systems must deliberately promote neighborhood reconstruction. To this end, some neighborhood sites must first be acquired, and a wide range of temporary housing should be constructed. Recommendation 9: Housing Credit System for Disaster Victims Disaster victims' housing needs vary according to family composition, occupation, age and health conditions, and the victims' income and economic circumstances also vary widely. After a disaster, housing must be provided fairly to these diverse victims, not only through the construction of public housing, but also through financial support for self-reliant efforts to secure housing toward rehabilitation. A housing credit system should be established, for use by disaster victims when and where they wish, to meet their own housing needs, for example, as a subsidy for rent or other costs of temporary housing.

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Recommendation 10: Establishment of a System to Ensure Human Settlement Standards for Evacuation Shelters and Temporary Housing After the Great Hanshin Earthquake, residence at evacuation shelters and emergency temporary housing continued for an extremely long period. Regarding the emergency temporary housing, in accordance with the Law on Special Measures for Disaster Victims' Rights and Benefits (1996), residence was allowed to extend beyond the usual two-year limit. However, it became quite difficult to maintain acceptable environment and infrastructure for decent life in temporary housing complexes. A related issue is the difficulty of maintaining acceptable living standards in evacuation shelters set up in nonresidential buildings. Considering these problems, a system to ensure human settlement standards for evacuation shelters and temporary housing is urgently needed. 3. System of Immediate Disaster Response and Evacuation In the past various evacuation plans have been put forward for implementation in case of wide-scale earthquake-related fires. However, the Great Hanshin Earthquake exposed the inadequacy of current measures. Below we present recommendations concerning the basic framework for response and evacuation in the case of such a large-scale urban disaster. Recommendation 11: Extensive Evacuation Planning and Establishment of Evacuation Sites for Broad Local Communities At the time of the Great Hanshin Earthquake due to various factors, including favorable weather conditions and the changing composition of the urban areas, the fire spread slowly. It would be very dangerous to see this as representative of earthquake-related fires in contemporary cities. Given adverse weather conditions, raging fires could quickly envelop whole neighborhoods, burning residents to death as they try to evacuate the area by road. To prevent such a disaster, a wide range of life-saving city infrastructure must be developed. Extensive evacuation plans must be worked out and, particularly in large cities, evacuation sites for broad local communities and major evacuation routes must be improved. As a general rule, the open space should be over 10 hectares, or when the surrounding buildings are fire resistant, at least 5 hectares in restrictive larger local communities.

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Recommendation 12: Networks of Neighborhood Disaster-Prevention Centers Immediately after the Great Hanshin Earthquake, victims who had lost their homes took shelter in public facilities such as elementary and junior high schools and in small neighborhood parks. However, the living standards were extremely poor. Building on this lesson, neighborhood disaster prevention was systematized by focusing on the disaster-prevention functions of local public facilities and schools. However, as reallocation of facilities is difficult in builtup areas, there is a need for programs to set up networks of neighborhood disaster-prevention centers, utilizing existing public facilities and designated evacuation routes. In addition, programs are needed to inform management about daily life at the evacuation centers. Recommendation 13: Systems for Managing Disaster-Prevention Open Spaces in Emergency Relief Operations Open spaces are essential to facilitate rapid and appropriate emergency relief. They can be used not only as evacuation sites for broad local communities, but also as centers for storage and action in rescue operations and treatment of the wounded; as gathering points for road construction and relief vehicles, emergency supplies and equipment; and as sites for emergency temporary housing. Systems for managing disaster-prevention open spaces must be established, including registration schemes and rental agreements for use in times of disaster, to facilitate the utilization of private as well as public land. Recommendation 14: Disaster-Prevention Competence and Independence of Emergency Relief Centers Emergency relief facilities (including municipal administration facilities, public facilities such as schools, police department, fire department, hospitals, lifeline support facilities, post offices and broadcasting agencies) must be disaster prepared and able to function independently. Such facilities must be able to withstand and cope with earthquakes and other disasters, in terms of structural and nonstructural preparedness. They should be appropriately located, structurally engineered and reinforced so as not to hinder relief operations, prepared against fire both within and around the facilities, stocked with emergency kits for at least three days' survival in case of disruptions to communications and water/energy supplies, and designed to enable easy escape
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and evacuation. Recommendation 15: Measures to Support Development and Spread of Rapid Response Technology for Disaster Prevention In order to mobilize the initial response mechanisms in local government and other disaster-prevention agencies and to start appropriate relief activities, it is essential to obtain a quick grasp of the disaster situation. To this end, there is an urgent need for the development of rapid response technology for disaster prevention. Such technology should be able to give immediate estimates of the scale of the disaster and the extent of the disaster-affected area, based on the location of the epicenter and magnitude of the earthquake. The technology should combine a system for rapid estimation of disaster scale and a disaster information network which allows information sharing by national, prefectural and municipal governments. As a national-level project, an agency should be established and funds must be provided to support the improvement, spread and utilization of such rapid response technology at local government levels. 4. Disaster Prevention in Densely Built-up Areas of Wooden Construction At the time of the Great Hanshin Earthquake, damage was concentrated in densely built-up areas of wooden construction. It became clear that this type of neighborhood is at high risk. Densely built-up areas of wooden construction are widespread in large Japanese cities, and have a history of destruction in every large earthquake. Social consensus must be developed to support disasterresistant urban planning in such neighborhoods. Based on extremely diverse characteristics in terms of spatial, social and historical contexts, the problems and weaknesses of such areas are also diverse. The urgent challenge is to develop systems for involving local communities and institutions in urban planning, and to carry out disaster-prevention community planning and development while promoting local initiatives and self-reliance. We recommend the following measures for disaster-prevention urban development in densely built-up areas of wooden construction. Recommendation 16: Community Planning and Development System Based on Participation and Self-Governance, and Neighborhood Disaster-Prevention Charts

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In terms of disaster-prevention community planning and development, selfreliant management by the local community is essential. Therefore, financial and legal support must be provided for associations and nonprofit foundations promoting community-led efforts in this field. Further, building on this base, detailed surveys should be carried out at the level of elementary school districts (a common unit for participatory planning and development efforts) to identify weak points and community resources for disaster prevention. Findings should be put together as "neighborhood disaster-prevention charts" to contribute to detailed neighborhood disaster-prevention programs. Recommendation 17: Neighborhood Disaster-Prevention Routes in Densely Built-up Areas of Wooden Construction When fire-resistant buildings are included in built-up areas of primarily wooden construction, they slow the spread of fire. The experience of the Great Hanshin Earthquake demonstrated that even small open areas such as miniparks, car parks, roads and greenery along roads are effective in retarding the spread of fire. Within as well as around densely built-up areas of wooden construction, a network of disaster-prepared parks, public facilities and schools must be developed, to serve the community on a daily basis and for disasterprevention activities in times of emergency. Neighborhood disaster-prevention roads should also be developed, with spaces at least 12 meters in width at 250meter intervals, even within built-up neighborhoods of wooden construction which are far from main roads. These roads should be primarily for pedestrians and used for rescue and restoration operations. Recommendation 18: Improvement of Disaster Preparedness in Existing Wooden Structures It is now clear that there is a substantial stock of wooden buildings which are unable to withstand strong earthquakes, due to aging and structural weakness. To ensure the overall security of urban areas, there is a pressing need to clarify the exact state of such inferior stock, and to work on improvement. First, wooden buildings must be checked for earthquake resistance, and support measures established to promote disaster-proofing renovation and reconstruction of wooden buildings which "do not collapse, do not burn and do not start fires."

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Recommendation 19: Tough Measures to Prevent Reproduction of Densely Built-up Areas of Wooden Construction As inner-city wooden neighborhoods age and deteriorate, new densely builtup mini-developments of wooden construction are being reproduced in urban fringe areas. Moreover, these crowded mini-developments are increasing, and in future they will become a burden on society. Strict regulations and production controls must be enforced to ensure acceptable quality in new urban wooden construction and neighborhood design. Recommendation 20: Establishment of a Law on Integrated Residential Environment in Densely Built-up Areas of Wooden Construction To resolve the problems of densely built-up areas of wooden construction, we have a social responsibility to establish integrated programs for urban renewal, addressing not only disaster-prevention needs, but also housing (for example, joint reconstruction), welfare, local industry and other urban issues. To promote implementation, in addition to community-based improvement of the residential environment, lessons of the Great Hanshin Earthquake and subsequent disaster-prevention urban community planning must be fully utilized by the establishment of a new law on integrated residential environment in densely built-up areas of wooden construction.

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Appendix IV. 3
A Proposal Toward a Sustainable Society: Future Measures in Japanese Architecture Circles to Prevent Global Warming and Reduce Resource Consumption (excerpts) Global Environment Research Group, Architectural Institute of Japan (AIJ), 1998

In July 1997 the AIJ announced its Global Environment Action Plan. In December of the same year, in an official statement, it put forward concrete goals to achieve a sustainable society by preventing global warming and reducing consumption of nonrenewable resources, as follows: "We should aim to reduce life cycle carbon dioxide [global warming gas] emissions from Japanese buildings by 30 percent and to increase their useful life threefold [to over 100 years]." Outline of Proposed Measures We recognize that in the 50-year period since World War II, Japanese architecture-related activities have not paid adequate attention to the issues noted below. To construct a sustainable society, while minimizing buildings' life cycle consumption of resources and energy, we will focus on the following issues: 1) Buildings should be a quality social resource, to be used by more that one generation. They must be planned, designed, constructed, operated and maintained on this principle. 2) Buildings are symbols of local ways of life, culture and industry and are responsible for creating the local landscape. 3) As far as possible, buildings should be made of renewable resources, run on natural energy, and maximize reuse and recycling. Action Plan 1998 To work toward the stated goals, the AIJ will take the following actions:

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1) Publicity and Information Campaigns The AIJ will actively publicize and promote the implementation of promising measures within the field of architecture which play a crucial role in achieving the stated goals. Information campaigns directed toward AIJ's 40,000 members and at universities Appeals to the general public on the issue of building life, and undertaking of publicity campaigns as a regular part of AIJ's work 2) Focused Action within the AIJ Regarding the neglected key issues within the field of architecture, in coordination with relevant groups and committees within the association, the AIJ will carry out further research and development in order to achieve the stated goals. Development of new paradigms of architecture Development of methodology for building desirable social infrastructure through architecture (including the ideal form of architecture as "social stock") 3) Collaborative Interdisciplinary Research Regarding those key issues which require cooperation with other fields, the AIJ will approach relevant institutes and associations to carry out collaborative interdisciplinary research at the institutional level, and produce results worthy of public attention. Research and development of new concepts of rights and responsibilities regarding real estate Research into social systems to maintain building value Development of social systems and measures to expand the appropriate use of wooden architecture 4) Advocacy and Lobbying of the Administration and Relevant Associations With regard to key long-term issues for which results depend mainly on actions in other fields, the AIJ will advocate for measures to be taken in the
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respective fields. Review of architecture-related legislation to extend building life Reform of architecture-related industries to promote extension of building life Promotion of recasting existing buildings as "social stock"

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References
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initiated by the local citizens]. Kobe: IFSC. International Red Cross. 1998. World Disaster Report 1998. New York: Oxford University Press. Inui, Ko. 1998. "Amimejo no Hito no Tsunagari wo Tsukuru" [Networking local community members]. In Ritsumeikan University Research Project on the Great Hanshin Earthquake, Shinsai Fukko no Seisaku Kagaku [Policy science for rehabilitation after the Great Hanshin Earthquake], pp. 113-36. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Inukai, Michiko. 1999. "Futatabi Kokkyosenjo de" [Rethinking the Kosovo conflict on the border]. Sekai, no. 665 (1999): 154-63. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Ishifuku, Akira et al. 1995. "Raifu Saikuru CO2" [Life cycle CO2]. In AIJSpecial Research Group on Global Environment and Architecture, Kenchiku/Chiiki Kankyo/Chikyu Kankyo no Arikata [Architecture, local environment and global environment], pp. 89-108. Tokyo: AIJ. Ishii, Mayako. 1999. "Hinkon kara no Dakkyaku to Hatten eno Michi" [Mulling over poverty alleviation and development]. In Yoichi Kibata et al. (eds.), Gurobarizeshon-ka no Kuto [Struggles under globalization], pp. 45-88. Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten. Ito, Shigeru. 1995. "Motomerareru 'Kowarenai Mokuzo Jutaku' no Kakuho" [Measures to increase required earthquake-resistant wooden houses]. In Shigeru Ito (ed.), Shin Toshi Tanjoron [New thinking to manage metropolises], pp. 14-33. Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo. Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA). 1995. Bousai to Kaihatsu Enjo [Disaster prevention and development assistance]. Tokyo: JICA. Kaul, Inge et al. 1999. "Joron" [Introduction]. "Chikyu Kokyozai wo Teigisuru" [Defining global public goods], "Ketsuron" [Conclusion]. In Inge Kaul et al. (eds.), Chikyu Kokyozai [Global public goods], pp. 9-44, 219-75. Tokyo: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha. Kawai, Masakane. 1995. Hokubei no Machizukuri [Urban planning in the United States and Canada]. Kyoto: Gakugei Shuppansha. Kawata, Yoshiaki. 1997. "Kiki Kanri to Sogo Bosai Sisutemu" [Risk management and comprehensive disaster prevention]. In Kyoto Daigaku Bosai Kenkyujo, Chiiki Bosai Keikaku no Jitsumu [Practice of regional disaster planning], pp. 198220. Tokyo: Kajima Shuppankai. Kito, Shuichi. 1994. "Shiso Choryu no Sandankairon" [A three-stage theory of environment-related philosophy]. In Kankyogaku ga Wakaru [Introduction to 134

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environmental studies], pp. 111-20. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha. ______. 1999. "Kankyo Shiso wa Gurobaru kara Rokaru e Futatabi" [Environmentrelated philosophy recurred from the global to the local]. In Shin-Kankyogaku ga Wakaru [The new edition: Introduction to environmental studies], pp. 9-16. Tokyo: Asahi Shinbunsha. Kobayashi, Ikuo. 1996. "Fukko Shimin Machizukuri no Genjo to Tenbo" [Present situations and prospects of community reconstruction initiated by the local citizens]. In AIJ-GHE, Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai kara Ichinen [One year since the Great Hanshin Earthquake], pp. 101-2. Tokyo: AIJ. Kobayashi, Masami et al. 1997. "Okyu Kasetsu Jutaku" [Temporary shelters]. In Kyoto Daigaku Bosai Kenkyujo, Chiiki Bosai Keikaku no Jitsumu [Practice of regional disaster planning], pp. 165-81. Tokyo: Kajima Shuppankai. Kosugi, Takashi. 1999. "Ima Nihon no Hatasubeki Yakuwari towa" [Japan's vital role in Yugoslavia]. Sekai, no. 664 (1999): 68-71. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Maki, Norio et al. 1996. "Okyu Kasetsu Jutaku no Jittai to Hisaisha Jutaku no Kadai" [The actual conditions of temporary shelters and housing problems of the disaster victims]. In AIJ-GHE, Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai kara Ichinen [One year since the Great Hanshin Earthquake], pp. 91-4. Tokyo: AIJ. Matsuoka, Ichiro. 1999. "Nanmin Enjo 'Saizensen'" [Aid for refugees'The Frontline']. Gaiko Forum (November 1999): 58-61. Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan. Miyamoto, Koichi et al., eds. 1997. "Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai: Saigai Haikibutsu Shori no Genba kara" [The Great Hanshin Earthquake: Issues of earthquake rubble disposal]. Journal of Architecture and Building Science 112, no. 1401 (1997): 32-33. Tokyo: AIJ. Morisaki, Teruyuki. 1997. "Komusutei Shisutemu" [Community stay system]. In AIJGHE, Hisaichi Fukkou ni okeru Kadai [Problems of urban reconstruction in the disaster-affected areas], pp. 11-22. Tokyo: AIJ. Murata, Yasuo. 1998. Ekoroji to Jinken [Ecology and human rights]. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Nakabayashi, Itsuki. 1997. "Fukkyu/Fukkoki no Taio" [Response and activities in the reconstruction and rehabilitation period of the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake]. In AIJ-Urban Disaster Research Group (UD), Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai ga Toikakeru Toshi Bosai Sisutemu no Kadai [Problems in urban disaster management raised from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster], pp. 27-32. Tokyo: AIJ. Narasaki, Masaya. 1996. "Kankyo Kogaku kara mita Hisaigo no Seikatsu Kankyo no 135

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Mondaiten" [Problems of living environment after the disaster in terms of environmental engineering]. In AIJ-Environmental Engineering Research Group, Daishinsai to Kankyo Kogakuteki Shomondai [The Great Hanshin Earthquake and a range of issues on environmental engineering], pp. 27-30. Tokyo: AIJ. NHK Kobe. 1999. KobeKokoro no Fukko [KobePsychological recovery from the trauma of disaster]. Tokyo: NHK Shuppan. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 14 July 1999. "Kokuren, Hatsu no Kosovo Hokokusho" [The first report on Kosovo: The United Nations]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 18 October 1999. "Ajia no Chiiki Funso to Nihon" [Regional conflicts in Asia and Japan]. Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 29 November 1999. "Shinsai soshite Ima" [The earthquake disaster and the present]. Nikkei A. 1999a. "CO2 to Haikibutsu ga Shigoto wo Kaeru" [Building images in a recycle age]. Nikkei Architecture, no. 648 (1999): 34-73. Tokyo: Nikkei BPsha. ______. 1999b. "Fukko Jutaku karano Kyokun" [Lessons from housing reconstruction after the Great Hanshin Earthquake]. Nikkei Architecture, no. 650 (1999): 5465. Tokyo: Nikkei BP-sha. Onishi, Kazuyoshi. 1997. "Chiiki Fukko to Seikatsu Saiken" [Issues on regional restoration and living recovery]. In AIJ-UD, Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai ga Toikakeru Toshi Bosai Sisutemu no Kadai [Problems in urban disaster management raised from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake disaster], pp. 43-52. Tokyo: AIJ. Ramonet, Ignacio. 1999. "Aratana Gurobaru Chitsujo" [New global order]. Sekai, no. 665 (1999): 164-71. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Salamon, Lester M. 1999. NPO Saizensen [Holding the center]. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Sazanami, Hidehiko. 1998. "Okyu Kasetsu Jutaku no Kadai to Tenbo" [Temporary shelters: Problems and prospects]. In Ritsumeikan University Research Project on the Great Hanshin Earthquake, Shinsai Fukko no Seisaku Kagaku [Policy and science for rehabilitation after the Great Hanshin Earthquake], pp. 13855. Tokyo: Yuhikaku. Sphere Project. 1999. "The Sphere Humanitarian Charter and Minimum Standards in Disaster Response." (Rev. ed.). Sugishita, Tsuneo. 1999. "Kosobo Kyuen ni Mukau 'Dainisedai NGO'" [Kosovo humanitarian relief by the second-generation NGOs]. Gaiko Forum (October 136

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1999): 80-81. Tokyo: Toshi Shuppan. Sumida, Masaji. 1996. "Hanshin Daishinsai to Jutaku Fukko Seisaku" [The Great Hanshin Earthquake disaster and housing rehabilitation policy]. In AIJ-AE, Daishinsai IchinenhanJutaku Fukko no Kadai [Eighteen months since the Great Hanshin EarthquakeProblems of housing reconstruction], pp. 87-103. Tokyo: AIJ. Suto, Nobuhiko. 1997. "Reisengo Sekai ni okeru Funso to Funso Kaiketsu no Shudan" [Conflicts in the post-Cold War period and measures for conflict resolution]. In Nobuhiko Suto (ed.), Chiiki Funso no YoboKaiketsu to Enjo [Regional conflict prevention/resolution and development aid], pp. 1-18. Tokyo: FASID. ______. 1999a. "'Kubaku Teishi'-go ga Mondaidearu [Complex problems after the "air-bombing suspension"] Sekai, no. 663 (1999): 152-60. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. ______. 1999b. "Higashi Chimoru" [East Timor]. Sekai, no. 667 (1999): 98-104. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Takada, Kazuo. 1999. "'Minami' no Sekai ni okeru Heiwa to Kaihatsu" [Peace and development in "the South"]. In Yoichi Kibata et al. (eds.), Gurobarizeshonka no Kuto [Struggles under globalization], pp. 95-126. Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten. Takada, Mitsuo. 1996. "Jutaku Fukko to Haujingu Sistemu no Saihen" [Housing reconstruction and reorganization of housing system]. In AIJ-AE, Daishinsai IchinenhanJutaku Fukko no Kadai [Eighteen months since the Great Hanshin Earthquake], pp. 105-11. Tokyo: AIJ. Takamizawa, Minoru. 1997. "Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai wa Toshikeikaku wo Dou Kaeruka" [How will the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake affect the current city planning philosophy?]. Journal of Architecture and Building Science 112, no. 1401 (1997): 63. Tokyo: AIJ. Takayose, Shozo. 1999. Hanshin Daishinsai to Seikatsu Fukko [The Great Hanshin Earthquake and rehabilitation of livelihood bases]. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. Tomosawa, Fuminori. 1997. "Konkurito Kenchiku no Jumyo/Haiki/Sairiyo" [Life expectancy, demolition and reuse of reinforced concrete buildings] Journal of Architecture and Building Science 112, no. 1401 (1997): 21-22. Tokyo: AIJ. Toyoshita, Nobuhiko. 1999. "Chiiki Funso to 'Yobo Gaiko'" [Regional conflicts and "preventive diplomacy"]. In Yoichi Kibata et al. (eds.), Gurobarizeshon- ka no Kuto [Struggles under globalization], pp. 205-41. Tokyo: Otsuki Shoten. Tsukaguchi, Hiroshi et al. 1999. "Shinsai Haikibutsu no Shori" [Disposal activities of earthquake waste]. In Editorial Committee for the Report on the Hanshin-Awaji 137

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Earthquake Disaster, Hanshin-Awaji Daishinsai Chosa Hokoku Kyotsuhen 3 [Report on the Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake Disaster: General issues, Volume 3], pp. 470-88. Tokyo: AIJ. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). 1999. Gurobarizeshon to Ningenkaihatsu [Human Development Report 1999]. Tokyo: Kokusai Kyoryoku Shuppankai. United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP). 1999. "Balkans Task Force Recommends Immediate Environmental Action as Part of Humanitarian Aid." UNEP/United Nations Center for Human Settlements (UNCHS) (Habitat) News Release, 1999/112. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR). 1997. Sekai Nanmin Hakusho 1997/98 [The State of the World's Refugees 1997-98]. Tokyo: Yomiuri Shinbunsha. Wiesel, Elie. 1999. "Musubini" [Afterword]. In Frances Hesselbein et al. (eds.), Mirai Shakai eno Henkaku [The community of the future], pp. 320-22. Tokyo: Forest Shuppan. World Bank. 1999. Sekai Kaihatsu Hokoku 1998/99 [World Development Report 1998/ 99]. Tokyo: Toyo Keizai Shinposha. Yabutani, Ayako. 1999. "'Komonzu no Higeki' no Shintenkai" [A new development of "The Tragedy of Commons"]. In Akihiro Takeichi et al. (eds.), Ningen Kankyo no Sozo [Human environment], pp. 121-31. Tokyo: Keiso Shobo. Yonemoto, Fumiaki. 1999. "Kensho: Kosobo Senso" [Inspection: Kosovo conflict]. Sekai, no. 666 (1999): 154-71. Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten. Yoshii, Hiroaki. 1996. Toshi Bosai [Urban disaster prevention]. Tokyo: Kodansha.

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CHAPTER V

MARGINALIZATION AND POVERTY REDUCTION


A CASE OF GHER FARMING IN RURAL BANGLADESH 1
ITO Sanae

Introduction
The angry street protests that greeted the four-day World Trade Organization (WTO) ministerial conference held in Seattle at the end of November 1999 are still fresh in our memory. These anti-WTO protests reflected concerns over the adverse effects of trade liberalization on the global environment and poverty in developing countries, apart from those on workers' rights in the North. These concerns sound familiar to those of us working for Third World development. Visible through the standoff between the WTO and the antiWTO campaigners is the inseparability of the development agenda, such as the environment and poverty, and the political question of who should set the rules for trade liberalization. In a nutshell, development studies have come closer to the study of political economy amid the accelerating process of globalization. This trend is ultimately linked to the debate over the roles of the "market"
1

This chapter was written based on field work undertaken in Bangladesh during 12-25 November 1999, as part of a preliminary research on "Knowledge for Development," commissioned by Japan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Due to the insufficient period of field work, a more detailed analysis has to wait until a future occasion. I wish to thank Hiromi Takenaka, a FASID intern, Koji Yoshimura of the University of Reading, and the staff of GOLDA Project, CARE International-Bangladesh, for their valuable assistance in this research.

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and the "state" and poses two important questions: Who should govern the process of globalization; and who should take responsibility for the negative impacts of globalization such as environmental destruction and marginalization of the poor in Third World countries? Takahashi (1998, 1999) envisages nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), United Nations (UN) agencies, the World Bank, bilateral aid agencies and developing country governments as major actors for easing the negative impacts of globalization. However, the role of NGOs is not confined to easing the adverse impacts of globalization. Their role in setting the rules of globalization is also increasingly recognized. There is also a view that, in contrast to the expanding role of NGOs, the role of international organizations is in a relative decline. This is due to the fact that the international organizations lack constituencies that would enhance their political clout (Economist, 11 December 1999, p. 19). Another issue that should not be forgotten is that it is not only developing countries which bear the brunt of globalization. Concerns are also growing in developed countries over worsening poverty and unemployment, while markets expand in every corner of the societies and across national borders, making the role of the state increasingly marginal. This is why a debate is raging, especially in Western Europe, over an optimum balance between the market and the social safety net in an ideal welfare state.2 This chapter focuses on the role of NGOs in poverty reduction in one of the poorest countries in the world which are at risk of being marginalized from the process of globalization. I use as an example an approach taken by a development NGO in supporting the poor people's attempts at freshwater prawn3 cultivation in rural Bangladesh. Despite potential danger to the ecosystems, the farming of export-oriented freshwater prawn has become an important industry involving thousands of poor people in rural Bangladesh. The chapter highlights new opportunities the globalized world trade has brought to these poor people, and examines the role of NGOs in solving the dilemma faced by the poor between these opportunities and the suspected environmental degradation. As a case study, the work of GOLDA Project implemented by CARE International-Bangladeshhereinafter referred to as CARE (Bangladesh)will be closely looked at in this chapter. The focus on an NGO
2 3

For details of the debate on globalization and the welfare state, see Esping-Andersen (1999) and Jordan (1996). To be precise, the genus and species of the freshwater prawns are Macrobrachium rosenbergii, commonly known as giant river shrimps. In this chapter they are referred to simply as freshwater prawns.

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is by no means to belittle the important role played by the Bangladesh Government in extension work and regulatory reform affecting aquaculture in general and freshwater prawn cultivation in particular. Section One of this chapter summarizes the main arguments put forward by NGOs and other citizens' groups regarding the negative impacts of the exportoriented shrimp industry sweeping through Asia. Section Two discusses the dilemma faced by the local people between environmental protection and poverty reduction while looking at the process in which freshwater prawn cultivation evolved in the districts of Khulna and Bagerhat in southern Bangladesh. Section Three examines the roles NGOs can play in resolving the above dilemma by analyzing the work of GOLDA project implemented by CARE (Bangladesh) in Khulna and Bagerhat. The concluding section puts forward the argument that NGOs have a role to play in helping local farmers enhance their knowledge base so that they can develop sustainable farming systems.

1. The Shrimp Farming Industry in Asia and Its Impacts on the Environment
Shrimp culture is an industry that has made great strides in Asia since the 1980s. One of the contributing factors was the large-scale grants pumped in by multilateral as well as bilateral donors. Although "food security" was given as a rationale for such large-scale grants, most of the harvested shrimps have been exported to the United States, European Union (EU) countries and Japan for luxury consumption. In countries where export-oriented shrimp culture is undertaken, environmental destruction and the exploitation of the poor by large external capital have become major social problems. Against this background, the center of the industry has gradually shifted from economies in East Asia, that is, Taiwan, China, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia, to more impoverished nations like India and Bangladesh (see Table V. 1). Today, global shrimp production amounts to roughly 3 million tons per year, of which 30 percent are cultured shrimps.4 Though not confined to aquaculture, researches on the politics of exportoriented shrimp industry have been done since the 1980s by a group of Japanese researchers. The following quotation from Murai (1992, pp. 5-6) represents a typical view held in such research:
4

For more data, see www.earthsummitwatch.org/shrimp/shrimp_facts/production.html.

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Industrial societies in the First World are trying to control all the natural resources in the world by virtue of their capital and technologies. In the Third World countries which have weak financial and technological bases, land, sea and forest full of resources that should be used for food production to feed their own people are being monopolized by multinational corporations based in the First World If we take the particular case of shrimps, Japanese fishery industry and trading houses are playing a major role in controlling the coastal waters and fishermen in developing countries. In addition, there are other problems such as overexploitation of natural resources and destruction of ecosystems.

Table V. 1 Breakdown of Shrimp Farming in Eastern Hemisphere by Country (1994)


Production Share (%)
Volume of Production (Whole Shrimps, Including Head) (1,000 t/yr)

Farming Area

Volume of Production per Unit Area (kg/ha/yr)

(1,000 ha)

Thailand Indonesia India China Vietnam Bangladesh Philippines Taiwan Others Total

39 17 12 6 9 6 5 4 2 100

225 100 70 35 50 35 30 25 15 585

80 300 80 150 225 110 50 7 15 1,017

2,813 333 875 233 222 318 600 3,571 1,000 575

Sources: NAGA ICLARM Quarterly (1994), p. 30; and Barraclough and Finger-Stich (1994), p. 4.

This view parallels the protests made by NGOs and other citizens' groups in the wake of trade liberalization talks. To elaborate, it has three major arguments.5 Firstly, the shrimp industry, whether dependent on ocean fishing or aquaculture, inevitably leads to the disruption of natural ecosystems. Many of the shrimps that find their way into export channels are grown in the coastal brackish water zones6 in the temperate and tropical regions. But these zones are also home to mangrove forests. Mangrove swamps, which form a buffer zone between land and sea and provide an adequate shade, are an ideal breeding ground for shrimp fry. Large-scale shrimp cultivation and shrimp fry capture
5

For more details on the problems associated with export-oriented shrimp farming in developing countries, see Nijera Kori (1996). 6 A coastal brackish water zone is an area such as an estuary where seawater and fresh water constantly mix. See Tsurumi (1992).

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in these coastal brackish water zones are a major cause for the recent destruction of mangrove swamps, while the construction of roads and dams and the felling of forest resources are also to blame. Secondly, shrimp farming, upon which the industry has increasingly relied to meet export targets, has spread from coastal brackish water zones to inland paddy fields as well as natural ponds and marshes rich with food resources for domestic consumption. This is largely a result of the excessive and uncontrolled fishing of wild shrimps in the ocean and the desolation of mangrove swamps due to shrimp farming at coastal areas. And what it means is that the use of resources for domestic food production in inland areas has been shifted to the cultivation of export-bound freshwater shrimps. This poses a threat to the food security of developing countries. Thirdly, shrimp cultivation often symbolizes the monopolistic control over natural resources by large external capital. This robs the local farmers of their traditional means of livelihood, and threatens to drive them into extreme destitution. Most of the coastal brackish water zones fall under government ownership. But local residents have traditionally used these areas for coastal fishing and for such daily activities as bathing and washing. The governments' approval for turning these areas into large-scale shrimp culture zones has denied them access to the local resources they had previously enjoyed. Moreover, there are instances of land owned by local residents being swallowed up by external capital through lease and purchase, further depriving the local residents of the vital resources they had owned. When locally owned land is sold to large-scale shrimp cultivators, it is frequently the result of saltwater intrusion into the paddy fields from surrounding shrimp farms, which makes it impossible to carry on growing paddy in the fields. These issues sum up the points made by the NGOs and activists protesting the export-oriented shrimp industry in Asia. Against this background, the next section looks at the evolution of freshwater prawn farming in rural Bangladesh. It then discusses the dilemma faced by the development community over environmental protection and poverty reduction.

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2. Shrimps and Prawns in Bangladesh


2-1 Evolution of Freshwater Prawn Farming and Rural Poverty in Bangladesh The shrimp export industry in Bangladesh took off in the early 1980s. Since then, approximately 300,000 acres of land has been converted into exportbound shrimp farming areas. Of this land, 80 percent is concentrated in the coastal area of the Khulna district, with the rest located near the coast line of Cox's Bazar. Such coastal aquaculture is conducted by drawing salt water into farmland by opening dykes erected in the coastal brackish water zones during February and March when the salinity level of river water rises. Cultivated shrimps have been exported mainly to the United States, EU countries and Japan. As the citizens' movement against saltwater shrimp cultivation gathered force, freshwater prawn cultivation undertaken in more inland areas has begun to attract buyers' attention. Traditionally, freshwater prawns have been caught wild in ponds and marshes. It was in the second half of the 1970s when the construction of artificial ponds, locally known as gher, started in a sub-district within the Bagerhat district. Because of its proximity to the Bay of Bengal and poor drainage associated with low-lying swamplands,7 this area had always been prone to silt deposition, floods and salt intrusion, bringing harmful effects on rice cultivation. Things went from bad to worse in 1989, when long-running negotiations with the Indian Government over the volume of water flowing from the Ganges River collapsed, and the water flowing into Bangladesh through the Farakka Barrage in India was reduced. This resulted in the intrusion of salt water from the Bay of Bengal at high tide, damaging crops as well as soil. Attempts were made early on at saltwater prawn farming in inland areas. But most farmers subsequently gave them up as rivers and canals into which salt water was to flow frequently silted up or changed courses. Between the second half of the 1970s and the mid-1980s, pioneering attempts at freshwater prawn farming were made by several local farmers living in the district of Bagerhat.8 These farmers built embankments around low-lying paddy fields and filled them with fresh water. Into these gher were released prawn fry
7 8

Known as beel in Bengali. To be more precise, these farmers are said to have been the residents of the Fakir Hat sub-district of the Bagerhat district.

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purchased from traders. The success of these early attempts was quickly followed by other farmers. Over the last decade, an astonishing number of local farmers, small and larger alike, have entered this industry, transforming a paddy-growing rural landscape once described as "Golden Bengal" into acres and acres of prawn farms (see Table V. 2). This has brought a revolutionary change9 in the local economy. Today local residents proudly refer to their district as the "Kuwait of Bangladesh."10 As the number of gher for fresh water prawn cultivation in Bagerhat District stood at 10,442 in 1994,11 it had grown about one and a half times over just two years. Table V. 2 Shrimp/Prawn Cultivation in Bagerhat District (1996)
Sub-district (Thana) Sadar Rampal Kachua Mongla Chitalmari Mullah Hat Moralganz Fakir Hat Saronkhole Total Saltwater Shrimp Cultivation Number Yields Area (ha) of Gher (kg/ha) 370 5,060 172 1,050 18,000 421 35 435 321 779 9,752 187 20 38 182 750 7,291 80 55 109 90 10 154 90 3,069 40,839 182 Freshwater Prawn Cultivation Number Area Yields of Gher (ha) (kg/ha) 1,460 1,568 617 102 314 375 4,980 1,942 515 3,239 3,188 450 210 252 500 7,408 3,118 550 64 144 202 17,463 10,526 458

Source: Department of Fisheries, Bagerhat.

The rapid growth of freshwater prawn cultivation was welcomed by owners of frozen seafood processing factories in Khulna, the third largest city in Bangladesh and in the close vicinity of Bagerhat. These factories had been saddled with overcapacity with their processing facilities underutilized. As the cultivation of freshwater prawns expanded, the number of days the factories operated rose dramatically throughout the year. This improved employment opportunities among manual day laborers who were mostly poor women in the slums. In 1976 Bangladesh exported a total of 3,800 metric tons12 of prawns and shrimps, and this grew to 31,500 metric tons in just 20 years. Of this total,
9

Kendrick (1994) describes this economic transformation as "Gher Revolution." Kuwait is one of the popular destinations for Bangladeshi migrants to earn a good sum of money. 11 See Rutherford (1994, p. 64). 12 One metric ton = 1,000 kilograms.
10

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approximately 85 percent were cultured, half of them being freshwater prawns. The exports earned US$248 million, equivalent roughly to 3 percent share of the world's total shrimp/prawn exports.13 Bangladesh is one of the poorest countries in the world; its per capita GDP stands at only US$260. In this poor economy shimps/prawns constitute the second largest export industry, recently overtaking the jute industry (see Table V. 3). Table V. 3 Bangladesh: Exports of Principal Commodities (1993-97)
Export Goods Prawns and shrimps Tea Spices Hides and skins, raw Jute, raw Jute yarn Jute products Leather products Ready-made garments Handicrafts Others Total 1993-94 9,105 1,670 6 4 1,896 1,387 10,495 6,111 53,070 157 4,343 98,739 1994-95 11,233 1,314 4 371 3,181 1,890 11,362 7,739 79,140 168 20,568 136,970 1995-96 11,803 1,254 2 2 2,968 2,405 10,360 6,108 90,595 135 18,889 144,521 (In million taka) 1996-97 10,781 1,380 6 3 4,344 2,854 10,531 5,366 114,793 66 21,430 171,554

Source: Foreign Trade Section, BBS.

Income generated by prawn farming in an hectare of land can be several times higher than using the same land for rice growing.14 As discussed earlier, this area is in any case prone to silt deposition, floods and saltwater intrusion, making paddy growing increasingly difficult. Gher for freshwater prawn farming are surrounded by embankments and are thus protected from saltwater invasion. Hence they brought a new economic opportunity to numerous farmers whose land had become unsuitable for growing paddy. When gher became popular in the area, there was concern over the possibility of monopolistic control by external capital over the land, as had already happened in the case of coastal prawn cultivation. However, there is
For more detailed data, see Vannuccini (1999). While medium-grade International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) paddy may fetch approximately 15 taka per kilogram, shrimps can earn as much as 500 taka per kilogram.
14 13

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little sign of this happening after more than a dozen years. Table V. 4 shows the relationship between wealth ranking based on land ownership and the ownership of gher. The data are based on the field research done in a small hamlet in the Fakir Hat sub-district of the Bagerhat district where residents were asked to name the heads of all households and to rank the cards with the names of household heads according to land ownership.15 More detailed interviews were conducted for each group ranked according to land ownership to find out about the households' involvement in gher farming. Table V. 4 Wealth Ranking of Local Households and Their Involvement in Gher Operation
Classification of Households by Size of Land Gher Operation Owned (26 households) [5-10 bigha*] All households own 3 to 4 3 households gher. Two of them have had one or two of their gher leased out, while the third operates all gher on its own. [1-2.5 bigha] All households have their 10 households own gher. Three of them operate extra gher through leasing arrangements. Remarks All three households built their gher 7-8 years ago. One of them is in serious financial trouble due to large loans taken from an agricultural bank and moneylenders.

Sources of funds obtained for gher farming: banks, NGOs (PRISM, BRAC and Proshika), moneylenders, Grameen Bank, BRDB cooperatives, proceeds from livestock sale and advances from prawn traders. [0.26-1 bigha] Three households have The seven households that are not involved 11 households their own gher (one each), in prawn farming earn their living by and also operate leased fishing, peddling of fish and prawns, gher. Apart from these and/or wage labor. These households do three, there is another not have any land, except for the plots on household which operates a which their houses are built. They have no leased-in gher, but does not prospect of raising enough capital to start own one of its own. The prawn farming. The four prawn farmers remaining seven have raised their funds through one or households are not involved more of the financial sources mentioned in prawn farming. earlier. [0] This household owns no The family migrated from Gopalganj about 1 household farm land nor a housing 30 years ago. Family members work as plot. It does not operate a live-in wage laborers at wealthy homes. gher either. Two women in the household earn wages by cracking the shells of mud snails used as prawn feed (daily wages is about 20 taka, that is, about US40 cents). [0] No land and no gher. Emigrated to India four years ago in 1 household destitution. * In the field-work area, 1 bigha is equivalent to about 0.5 acre
15 As the purpose of classification was to divide households roughly into different wealth-ranking groups, precise land size for each household was not asked. The range of land size was asked about for each group after the ranking exercise was done.

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From Table V. 4, it is clear that the threshold for entry into prawn farming is the ownership of cultivable land, however small that might be, which could serve as collateral in borrowing funds. I do not go into details here about problems related to rural finance as I shall discuss it more fully in a later section. While it is not so surprising that poor farmers who do not own any cultivable land cannot embark upon prawn farming, it should be noted that small farmers who own very small plots, from 0.5 to 1.25 acres, have managed to take up prawn farming. We ought to remember that one of the most serious concerns raised by the anti-shrimp farming movement is the social dislocation of local subsistence farmers off the land as the land allegedly gets concentrated into the hands of wealthy absent landowners intent on making profit from largescale shrimp-farming operations. The involvement of landless households in prawn cultivation is clearly less frequent in my research than in Rutherford's which was conducted in three communities in Khulna and Bagerhat districts in 1994 (Rutherford 1994, pp. 45-49). Rutherford's wealth-ranking exercises showed that quite a few landless farmers were in the prawn-farming business. They managed this by taking a three- to four-year lease of land while obtaining funds through proceeds from the sale of livestock and/or borrowing from moneylenders. Although my research results are not conclusive because of its small sample size, it may be assumed that the cases of landless households entering shrimp cultivation decreased as the weight of financial risk borne by them has become widely acknowledged over the last five years. Despite this tendency toward the exclusion of the landless from prawn farming, the industry does seem to invite the participation of a wide spectrum of local farmers, including small farmers. Three reasons can be discerned as to why it has not been taken over by large external capital. Firstly, unlike coastal brackish water zones whose legal ownership falls to the government, inland agricultural plots have clearly demarcated private ownership. This makes it difficult for outsiders to obtain large areas of land at a stroke and convert it into prawn farms. Secondly, large-scale coastal seawater shrimp cultivation by external capital has spawned a major citizens' protest movement. In 1990 landless farmers living in the coastal area of Khulna district rose in revolt against the "prawnlords," who, in their turn, mobilized a local gang. This led to the murder of a local woman, and gave rise to a widespread protest movement involving NGOs,
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the mass media and ordinary citizens. The government was urged to take action, which led to the police arrest of unscrupulous shrimp-farm owners. Since then, legislative measures designed to regulate the industry have been introduced.16 The citizens' movement and the government response prompted by it have heightened the awareness of the local farmers, and have increased the number of farmers who try their hand at prawn farming without surrendering their land to prawn-lords living outside the area. Thirdly, there has been a breakdown in the relationship between absentee prawn-lords and locally hired wage laborers. In the traditional rice economy, wage laborers are often subjected to unreasonably low wages and irregular payment, which naturally brings down their morale. The same thing happened with the prawn economy. If anything, the situation was worse since absentee prawn-lords rarely bothered to inspect the farming sites. Hired prawn-farm laborers, under these circumstances, intentionally neglected their dutieswith some even assisting the theft of prawns. These can be viewed as cases of the weak exercising "everyday forms of resistance" as Scott describes in his Weapons of the Weak (1985). Apart from the wage labor problems, prawn cultivation is fraught with risks, including natural disasters and prawn disease. After repeated financial losses suffered as a result of these risks and labor sabotage, many of the absentee prawn-lords abandoned prawn farming, and concentrated their efforts instead on trading prawns and/or running fishprocessing and export companies, leaving it to the local farmers to operate prawn farms at their own risk. 2-2 Farmers' Knowledge and Its Limitations The above transformation of the rural economy took place in the total absence of external interventions. No development consultant was asked to produce a feasibility study. Nor did the Bangladesh Government take any initiative in ushering in this change. This was a spontaneous economic transformation initiated by the local farmers in one of the poorest countries in the worldpeople generally assumed to be totally marginalized in the process of globalizationin response to the demand of the increasingly integrated world market.
16 A law amendment introduced in 1999 has made the leasing of land for saltwater shrimp cultivation subject to a government license, thus establishing a monitoring system for leasing contracts. It has also made it mandatory for people wishing to start saltwater shrimp farming to obtain consent from all the neighboring landowners, regardless of whether they would use their own land or leased land.

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However, even this spontaneous development is not free from problems. As already mentioned, the most commonly expressed concern is over the adverse impacts of aquaculture on the ecosystems.17 In the absence of conclusive scientific evidence, the jury is still out on the question of whether freshwater prawn cultivation upsets natural ecosystems. Evidence for the suspected linkage is clearer in the case of coastal seawater prawn cultivation, but freshwater prawn cultivation is not immune from criticisms either, due to its reliance, albeit indirect, on the indiscriminate catching of prawn fry and mud snails, the latter used as prawn feed. Apart from the negative impacts on the ecosystems, the transition from a paddy-growing economy to a prawn-farming one is bringing a host of economic, social and institutional changes. For example, the expansion of prawn cultivation has resulted in the conversion of fertile farmland into gher, leading to a sharp fall in local rice and vegetable production. This has then given rise to a shortage of grazing land for livestock, including cattle, sheep and goats, presenting a new challenge of securing livestock feed. The transformation of the rural economy is having a profound impact on traditional agricultural institutions and social relations as well. Rural institutions such as labor contracts, land transactions and property rights are undergoing changes, while the nature of women's productive activity is also being affected with inevitable changes in intra-household gender relations. In the paddy-growing economy, post-harvest operations such as parboiling paddy and drying it in the homestead are typically assigned to women. Prawn cultivation has deprived women of this role, possibly lowering the women's relative status within the household.18 Another social consequence is the increasing disputes between neighbors due to the random construction of gher. During my brief visit to the area I heard stories about a rise in disputes over access to drainage or irrigation channels blocked by neighbors' gher. Collective management of gher among brothers as they inherit them under the Islamic law of equal rights to inheritance among brothers would be another potential problem carried into the future (Kendrick 1994). But the gravest problem of all with the transition to the prawn-farming economy is probably its failure to benefit the landless poor. To start prawn
17 This is the position taken by many citizens' groups and NGOs, including Nijera Kori, the Society for Environment and Human Development (SEHD) and UBINIG. 18 See Kendrick (1994) on shrimp farming's impact on gender relations.

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aquaculture, one needs to raise funds for capital investment, but loans are only available to farmers who have collateral in the form of land, no matter how small it may be. Although a number of successful microfinancial programs targeting at the poor without collateral are in operation in rural Bangladesh, loans disbursed by these programs are not really suitable for productive investment by the poor as I have discussed elsewhere (Ito 1999a and b). Those who have collateral borrow from moneylenders and/or banks to start and operate prawn farms, while landless farmers are losing opportunities for sharecropping or agricultural wage labor that exists in a rice economy. Under the prawn economy they instead take up whatever wage labor that becomes available from prawn cultivation. In earlier periods when paddy fields were being converted to gher, employment opportunities temporarily increased for the landless poor, spurred on by a strong demand for labor in trench excavation, levee construction, etc. However, such employment opportunities are disappearing as most available land has already been converted into gher. Moreover, as small farmers enter prawn farming, guarding prawns at night against theft and other odd jobs associated with aquaculture are increasingly taken up by the small farmers themselves, further reducing wage-labor opportunities for the landless poor. Worse, the booming prawn economy is pushing up prices of goods in the area, undermining the landless poor's purchasing power. Faced with such hardships, some are said to have deserted their villages to work in Khulna town. Despite the limited benefits accruing to the landless poor, gher farming, which evolved from the farmers' knowledge, has brought immediate benefits to a significant number of local farmers, including small ones. Nevertheless, whether a significant impact on poverty reduction can be brought in the long run depends on the sustainability of prawn farming, which is subject to the five risks listed below. The first is the risk of floods and other natural disasters. In 1998 Bangladesh was hit by the worst flood on record, and many farmed prawns were swept out of gher, incurring a considerable financial loss to prawn farmers. The second risk is environmental degradation, which can be prevented by efforts to preserve the natural ecosystems and to develop proper drainage channels for prawn farming. As discussed above, a clear link between freshwater prawn cultivation and environmental destruction has not been established. However, it cannot escape from indirectly affecting the natural ecosystems
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through its heavy reliance on prawn fry and mud snails. The scarcity of prawn fry and mud snails in recent years has cast a cloud over the long-term sustainability of prawn cultivation. The third risk is the more immediate problem of bad harvest due to prawn disease or theft. Prawn disease has in part to do with the excessive catching of prawn fry over the years. Prompted by shortages of home-grown stocks, prawn fry were imported from Thailand and Taiwan in 1996-97. These imported fry suffered epidemic disease in an alien aquatic environment. Prawn theft is the problem closest to home and most pressing for prawn farmers. To fend off thieves who pour chemicals into gher in the middle of the night and run off with prawns that come to the surface, prawn farmers keep their vigil by erecting lookout sheds beside their gher. The fourth risk is the volatility of the international markets and the rules regulating international trade. Cultivated shimps and prawns are gourmet products exported to Western Europe, North America and Japan, so the demand fluctuates widely according to the volatility of the international markets. In 1997 EU countries banned the importation of frozen seafood from Bangladesh, citing poor hygienic standards and inadequate quality control as the reason. The prawn epidemic spread among imported fry was also behind this decision. Besides, the importation of prawn fry conflicts with the rules under the Generalized System of Preferences, which ban importation of production inputs. Export resumed after the adoption by a third of Bangladesh's frozen seafood processing factories of the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP), a set of international standards on the processing of agricultural and fishery products promoted by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), with the support of international organizations such as the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO). There is, however, speculation that similar bans may be used by countries of the North as non-tariff trade barriers designed to protect their own agricultural and fishery industries. The fifth risk is associated with the lack of adequate financial services that cater to the needs of prawn farmers. Small-scale prawn farmers are faced with chronic capital shortages due to constant cash outflows to pay for land leases and to purchase production inputs. They usually borrow from NGOs, local moneylenders and/or banks, or else take credit from prawn traders in the form of advanced payment.19 In the latter case, harvested prawns must be sold to
19

This type of financial advances is called dadon in Bangladesh.

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the traders who provided the credit at a price usually lower than the market rate. Even if the farmers manage to raise the necessary funds, they always bear the risk of financial disaster, while the other four risks may destroy their prospect of a good harvest.

3. NGO Interventions
3-1 Interventions through GOLDA Project As discussed above, freshwater prawn cultivation faces a variety of potential problems, and whether it contributes to poverty reduction in the long term remains to be seen. While there are these unresolved issues surrounding it, it has no doubt become an important local industry. And this industry took off through the local farmers' spontaneous efforts. Thus development professionals are in no position to discourage this rural transformation on account of the farmers' ignorance, as "participatory development" has become the mainstream development ideology of the day. Here of course, there is room for a conflict between farmers' knowledge and "scientific knowledge" brought by outsiders. But the days of romanticizing the farmers' knowledge and holding it as universal wisdom superior to Western scientific knowledge are over in any case.20 The participatory approach of late treats knowledge as something more fluid and multidimensional. Such knowledge is generated from active interaction and negotiation by all parties concerned, farmers and outsiders alike (Arce and Long 1992; Scoons and Thompson 1994). From this perspective, constructive engagement on prawn farming pursued by GOLDA project of CARE (Bangladesh) deserves attention. For it is in clear contrast to negative attitudes taken by many big NGOs which suspect shrimp farming in general to be another vehicle for the rich North to exploit the poor South. In 1996 CARE (Bangladesh) launched a five-year "GOLDA" project,21 funded by the Department for International Development (DFID) in the United Kingdom. The objective of this project is to identify and disseminate knowledge and information useful for sustainable freshwater prawn farming in collaboration with small-scale prawn farmers. Although the project was initiated in the Bagerhat district, in three years it expanded to neighboring
20

This old position is typically seen in Chambers et al. (1989), and is sometimes referred to as "farmer-first perspective" (Scoons and Thompson 1994). 21 For details of the project, see the GOLDA Project brochure produced by CARE (Bangladesh). Golda means "giant river shrimps" in Bengali.

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districts, including the district of Khulna. It aims to reach a total of 15,000 small-scale prawn farmers throughout the project area. To achieve sustainable prawn farming by overcoming the risks and problems discussed in the previous section, GOLDA project implements the following measures: 1) Reduction of production costs by discouraging unnecessary use of production inputs 2) Promotion of organic farming techniques 3) Risk diversification by the promotion of integrated farming systems that combine paddy growing and prawn farming on the same ground 4) Empowering women in the prawn-farming households 5) Improvement of financial management by the prawn-farming households These activities target small-scale prawn farmers who own up to 2 acres of land. In each targeted area, two groups are formed, one consisting of men and the other consisting of their wives. Each group engages in the above activities for a two-year period. Technical skills with which they jointly experiment include a method of producing low-cost home-made feed, the utilization of nursery ponds and the assessment of optimum farming density to improve the survival rates of fingerlings. Double and triple-cropping of paddy in the space created in the middle of gher is also promoted, along with the planting of vegetables and livestock feed on the embankments surrounding the gher. To enhance the women's status within the farming household, they are encouraged to learn how to produce the home-made feed, and to get involved at other stages of farming operations as well. The need to improve the prawn farmers' financial management arises from the fact that the biggest challenge that these farmers face is the financial risk involved in gher farming, as already argued. Although GOLDA project itself does not provide financial services, it helps the prawn farmers to obtain lowinterest loans from microfinance institutions and banks by acting as an intermediary. However, even after the prawn farmers manage to obtain lowinterest loans, the challenge does not end there, as the profit from prawn sales is subject to considerable uncertainties due to the variety of risks explained earlier. Drastic measures such as the introduction of crop insurance would help, as Kendrick (1994) argues, if an adequate institutional framework to overcome the moral hazard involved in such insurance schemes is devised.
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Without such an institutional framework, insurance coverage would reduce the farmers' incentive to do everything possible to prevent damage to prawn production, which would dangerously lower the insurers' stakes. A mechanism for protecting the insurers from excessive liabilities that would result from natural disasters, such as floods affecting all the households in their operational areas, would also need to be worked out. Quite apart from the problems regarding the design of insurance schemes, there is a more fundamental issue of the farmers' deep-seated mistrust of insurance schemes. In order for the farmers to go on paying insurance premiums, they must have enough trust in the management of the insurance schemes. Many farmers have too often been cheated in various forms of financial schemes in the past, and it would not be easy to win back their trust, particularly in financial services involving savings mobilization and insurance premiums. 3-2 Future Challenges Given that the biggest challenge faced by prawn farmers is capital shortage, some farmers express frustration over GOLDA Project's refusal to provide financial services of its own. Another limitation faced by the project is its failure to address the problem of landless farmers, who are being pushed outside the newly emerging prawn economy. Considering the fact that more than half of the rural households in Bangladesh own less than half acre of land and are categorized as "functionally landless," a project targeting prawn farmers owning up to 2 acres of gher has obviously limited effects in terms of poverty outreach. This is not to say that all of the poor households should keep pace with each other in poverty reduction; if some of them take off first and revitalize the rural economy, this would surely bring a long-term benefit to the local community at large. However, the linkage between such a contribution and poverty reduction is still uncertain since reliable data on this are not available at this point in time. A more detailed research is required to look at the impact of this profound economic transformation on the well-being of the landless poor. The research might measure the size of household income and/or consumption.22 But it also needs to look at the impact on the well-being of the poor in a more comprehensive manner, taking into account changes in the political and social environments surrounding them, and their capacity to initiate change in them.23
22 23

On the issue of methodology regarding poverty measurement, see Ito (1999a and b). This capacity may be expressed in terms of "empowerment."

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It would be necessary, for example, to analyze changes in the rural institutions, such as property rights, labor contracts and land transactions, amid the processes of economic transformation. It would also be essential to look at changes in both inter- and intra-household social relations as a result of the same economic transformation. If the spread of gher has really forced landless farmers to desert their villages to find work elsewhere, the measurement of household income within the prawn-farming villages will not reveal the povertyreducing impact on those who are no longer there. Moreover, even if an increase in household income is found to have taken place, it might be accompanied by the deteriorating terms of labor contracts or the unequal resource allocation within the household. If so, it would point to the fact that the bargaining power of some people who are parties to the particular forms of social relations has deteriorated. Household income or expenditure alone would not, therefore, be an adequate measure of changes in the well-being of such people. Another issue related to impact assessment is the inter-generational transfer of any poverty-reduction impact. How the impact of prawn farming on the well-being of the current generation will be passed over to the next generation under the Islamic law of inheritance would be an interesting question worth looking at in future research. The integration of farmers' knowledge with "scientific knowledge" brought by outsiders is ultimately intended to improve the well-being of poor people increasingly marginalized from the process of globalization. To achieve this goal it is to essential to help them develop sustainable livelihoods based on their own choice. The success of this endeavor in the particular context of this study hinges upon the sustainability of freshwater prawn farming. This, in turn, depends crucially on the technical knowledge about organic farming. But it also depends importantly on the knowledge about the rural institutions in which the farming activity is embedded. The role expected of GOLDA Project is to address the more comprehensive objective of poverty reduction by including the landless poor in its activities, and to broaden the range of "knowledge" it provides so that the poor themselves would be empowered to take action against the adverse changes in various rural institutions and social relations that may have resulted from the new prawn economy.

4. Conclusion
The evolution of export-oriented freshwater prawn cultivation in rural
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Bangladesh presents a dilemma to these NGOs which assert that globalization leads to the destruction of the environment and to worsening poverty in Third World countries. Many of the NGOs that take this view envision multinational corporations as winners of the globalization game and the poor in developing countries as losers. They further nurture the image that multinational corporations and the local agent force powerless local people into agricultural regimes which rely heavily on intensive use of harmful production inputs. This would then destroy the traditional, organic production systemthe image goesbased on the farmers' local knowledge and wisdom. This scenario is, of course, unacceptable to development and environmental NGOs, as it clashes head-on with their ideals of participatory development and local people's empowerment. What this chapter has shown is a case in which the local farmers spontaneously launched prawn-farming ventures in response to the demand of the increasingly integrated world market and gave the frail rural economy a shot in the arm. It is true that farmers' knowledge alone is not enough to ensure the sustainability of this rural industry, however. It requires new kinds of knowledge that can be generated through collaboration and interaction between local farmers and development professionals. This poses a dilemma to many NGOs since they have ideological scruples about supporting the export-oriented shrimp/prawn industry, while supporting the local people's initiatives should be seen as part of the participatory approach they espouse. Because of this dilemma, most NGOs, with the exception of CARE (Bangladesh) and a few small local NGOs,24 have so far shied away from active involvement in freshwater prawn culture. The interventions attempted by GOLDA Project of CARE (Bangladesh) are intended to do little more than to minimize the negative impacts of prawn cultivation on the environment and to improve the prospects of sustainable prawn farming. Obviously, such interventions mean indirect support for the prawn-export industry. Given the politics of the industry which clearly mirrors the power imbalance between the North and the South as well as its suspected adverse effects on the environment, NGO support for prawn farming, albeit indirect, may very well stir controversies. However, one needs to think of the likely outcome if no interventions were made. First of all, the farmers would continue to operate at a low productivity
24

PRISM Bangladesh is one of them.

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rate. This would eventually drive many of the farmers out of business with mounting debts. Low-productivity prawn farming is normally accompanied by a great deal of wastage of production inputs. Thus damage to soil quality and the ecosystems would be devastating. One could argue that the accelerated collapse of the industry would force farmers to go back to the traditional paddy farming, thus restoring the local food security. But there is no guarantee that there would be any fertile ground left by that time. One also needs to be reminded of the fact that under the traditional paddygrowing economy, rural poverty in Bangladesh has not seen significant reduction. Since its independence in 1971, the country has been injected with massive foreign aid, but rural poverty remains the single most serious problem plaguing the country to date.25 On the other hand, the cultivation of freshwater prawns, an opportunity presented by the globalization of the economy, has brought a level of income previously unthinkable for local farmers, including those whose land has been damaged by salt intrusion. To ensure that this new economic opportunity will bring long-term benefits to local farmers, NGOs need to take an active part in lobbying for fair rules of globalization. NGOs have another important role to play, however, as argued in this chapter: it is to play the catalyst's role of generating knowledge, together with the local farmers, about sustainable prawn farming, and about effective institutional frameworks and equitable social relations which would help distribute the benefits of the new economy equally across all sections of the community. References
Arce, Alberto and Norman Long. 1992. "The Dynamics of Knowledge: Interfaces between Bureaucrats and Peasants." In Norman Long and Ann Long (eds.), Battlefields of Knowledge: The Interlocking of Theory and Practice in Social Research and Development. London: Routledge. Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics (BBS). 1998. Statistical Pocketbook of Bangladesh 1998. Statistics Division, Ministry of Planning, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh. Barraclough, Solon L. and Andrea Finger-Stich. 1999. "Some Ecological and Social Implications of Commercial Shrimp Farming in Asia." UNRISD Discussion Paper no.74. http://www.unrisd.org/engindex/publ/list/dp/dp74/shrimp3.htm
25

See World Bank (1998).

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CARE International - Bangladesh. Greater Options for Local Development through Aquaculture (GOLDA) Project. Leaflet for the GOLDA Project. Chambers, Robert et al. 1989. To the Hands of the Poor: Water and Trees. London: Intermediate Technology. Economist, The. 11 December 1999. "After Seattle: A Global Disaster." Esping-Andersen, Gosta. 1999. Social Foundations of Postindustrial Economies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Ito, Sanae. 1999a. "The Grameen Bank: Rhetoric and Reality." Unpublished Ph.D. thesis for Sussex University. ______. 1999b. "Guramin Ginko to Hinkonkanwa" [Grameen Bank and poverty reduction]. In Okamoto et al. (eds.), Maikurofainansu Tokuhon: Tojoukoku no Hinkonkanwa to Shoukibokinyu [Microfinance reader: poverty reduction in developing countries and microfinance], pp.125-34. Tokyo: Akashi Shoten. Jordan, Bill. 1996. A Theory of Poverty and Social Exclusion. Cambridge: Policy Press. Kendrick, Anita. 1994. The Gher Revolution: The Social Impacts of Technological Change in Freshwater Prawn Cultivation in Southern Bangladesh. Report prepared for CARE International in Bangladesh with support from the Bangladesh Aquaculture and Fisheries Resource Unit (BAFRU). Murai, Yoshitaka. 1992. "Ebi no Mukou ni Ajia ga Mieru" [Asia that we can see behind shrimps]. In Yoshitaka Murai and Yoshiyuki Tsurumi (eds.), Ebi no Mukou ni Ajia ga Mieru [Asia that we can see behind shrimps]. Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo. Nijera Kori. 1996. Profit by Destruction: International Workshop on Ecology, Politics and Violence of Shrimp Cultivation. Dhaka: Nijera Kori. Rutherford, Stuart. 1994. CARE and Gher: Financing the Small Fry. Report prepared for CARE International in Bangladesh with support from the Bangladesh Aquaculture and Fisheries Resource Unit (BAFRU). Scoons, Ian and John Thompson. 1994. "Knowledge, Power and AgricultureTowards a Theoretical Understanding." In I. Scoon and J. Thompson (eds.), Beyond Farmers' First. London: Intermediate Technology Publications. Scott, James C. 1985. Weapons of the Weak: Everyday Forms of Peasant Resistance. New Haven: Yale University Press. Takahashi, Kazuo. 1998. "Globalization and International Development: Tension between Integration and Marginalization." In K. Takahashi (ed.), Agenda for International Development: 1998. Tokyo: FASID. ______. 1999. "The Rapid Development of Globalization." In K. Takahashi (ed.), Agenda for International Development: 1999Harnessing Globalization. 159

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Tokyo: FASID. Tsurumi, Yoshiyuki. 1992. "Ebi to MangurobuAtarashii Kyouryoku Sisutemu wo Motomete" [Shrimps and mangrovesIn search of a new cooperation system]. In Yoshitaka Murai and Yoshiyuki Tsurumi (eds.) Ebi no Mukou ni Ajia ga Mieru [Asia that we can see behind shrimps], pp. 3-18. Tokyo: Gakuyo Shobo. Vannuccini, Stefania. 1999. The Bangladeshi Shrimp Industry. GLOBEFISH FAO. www/fao/org/fi/globe/blogfish/fishery/globefi/doc/presenta/bangla World Bank. 1998. Bangladesh: From Counting the Poor to Making the Poor Count. Report no.17534-BD.

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CHAPTER VI

CAN WE OVERCOME MARGINALITY ?


UCHIYAMADA Yasushi

1. Dialogue between Postcolonial Studies and Development Studies


Christine Sylvester, a postcolonial feminist who teaches development studies, has posed the important question of why no dialogue exists between development studies and postcolonial studies. Although both focus on the "Third World" as a object of study (though problematising it differently), their frames of reference clash, and no positive dialogue has taken place between them. Marginality is a central theme in postcolonial studies, and marginality studies have emerged from postcolonial studies.1 In discussing marginality as a development agenda, it would be beneficial to learn from the notion as it has been problematised within the field of marginality studies.2 I will therefore explore the contact areas where it is possible for development studies and marginality studies to engage in dialectical relationships.
1

A discussion with Christine Sylvester in November 1999 at ANU concerning the point of contact between postcolonial studies and development studies inspired me to begin thinking about a dialogue between the two. 2 The notion of "postcolonial" has two meanings. One denotes the period following independence from colonial rule. The other is the understanding that various relationships and systems that played crucial functions in the colony continue to exist in both the former colony and in the former suzerain state. In the context of the latter, marginality and subalterns become central themes in postcolonial studies.

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First I must explain the question of whether or not we can overcome marginality. This query originated as an extension of Gayatri Spivak's question: "Can the subaltern speak?" (Spivak 1988a). Some may ask why, in discussing marginality, I do not state the question as a more normative "How can we overcome marginality?". The reason is that if we attempt to find a solution to marginality, we run the risk of overlooking the very mechanism that constitutes it. Accordingly, I will first focus on the process that creates it through a dialogue with the problematique of marginality studies, and on this basis examine the issue of overcoming marginality. The contradiction of the creation of marginality and its elimination in the context of development will be discussed later. In this chapter, I will examine the issue from three different perspectives. The first consists of a dialogue with the question posed by Gayatri Spivak, "Can the subaltern speak?". In her seminal essay, Spivak focuses on the issue of who represents whom, and how it is re-presented. As James Scott, a political scientist strongly influenced by subaltern studies, has shown, this issue is twosided: it is an issue of autonomy and, at the same time, an issue of self-esteem (Scott 1990, pp. xi, 7). Thus, it is ultimately an issue of freedom. In her book The Human Condition, Hannah Arendt, who is once again receiving attention in the midst of heightened awareness of the public domain, claims that freedom was lost in the progress in Western civilization, as a result of a change in the order of the three modes of beinglabor, work and action. In the ancient Greek polis, freedom was of the highest value in the order of actionworklabor, whereas the order of being in contemporary society is laborworkaction, a reversal of the order in ancient Greek polis, with precedence given to consumption and consumption-driven labor (Arendt 1958). As the ancient Greek polis, where the highest mode of being was political action, was premised on a slave system, Arendt's approach can be criticized from a postcolonial perspective as Eurocentric and naively ignorant of the non-freedom of the subalterns. And this is my own criticism. In her analysis, Arendt did not deal with the issue of the subalterns' freedom. In other words, she failed to suggest how we can incorporate the interrelated problems highlighted by the question "Can the subaltern speak?" as an issue within the ever-expanding public domain. Yet, at the same time, the fact that Arendt identified freedom as the ultimate value in the public domain presents potential for the examination of directions in development. There may be some among the readers who think that freedom is not a
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development issue. To those who accept the view of developmental dictatorship as a necessary evil, development today takes priority over freedom tomorrow. As discussed in Amartya Sen's recent work, Development as Freedom, however, it is possible even within development to adopt the stance that freedom is the ultimate value (Sen 1999). Nevertheless, it must be pointed out that Sen's 'freedom' has an affinity with John Stuart Mill's idea of 'liberty,' which justifies despotism in dealing with 'barbarians' until they attain the capacity of the civilized (Mill 1975) [1865].3 The second perspective is developmentalism (hereinafter referred to as development). In this perspective, objectified marginality is seen as the problem to be resolved by the subject promoting development. How is the autonomy and self-esteem of the marginalized object treated in this perspective? And how does the emergence of the modern nation-state and civil society and the expansion of their activities shape the making of marginal subject (not object)? Because the view of marginality within development thinking is uniquely special, we must also examine its trajectory. It is difficult within development clichs to argue marginality primarily as the issues of marginal people's identity, autonomy and self-esteem. Instead, it is typically equated with the issues of 'poverty,' 'welfare,' and 'backwardness.' Does the fact that marginality is presented as 'poverty' or 'backwardness' not indicate that its meaning has been interpreted, transformed and selected according to a specific cosmology? 'Poverty' in the context of development usually means economic poverty, which can be compared using a universal measurement. Moreover, it is commonly expressed as a distance from an absolute poverty line which is determined by an 'objective' standard. Economic poverty, measured by a set of the objectifying criteria, is then transformed into a ranking in league tables such as those typically found at the end of the World Bank's World Development Report and UNDP's Human Development Report. We must ask what has been lost in the process of translating poverty into a comparable form that can be ranked in a league table. In this regard, I would like to discuss the relationship between development and marginality through an examination of Amartya Sen's discussion of the objective evaluation of experts and the subjective evaluation of the parties concerned. Finally, I will take a third perspective (which is not a unified position) that cannot be reduced to either of the first two perspectives so as to discuss marginality from a wider perspective.
3

Here we witness a deep affinity amongst Mill's 'liberty,' developmental despotism and Sen's 'freedom.'

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2. Can the Subaltern Overcome Marginality?


The subaltern studies group under the editorship of Ranjit Guha published the first volume of Subaltern Studies in 1982. The issues addressed were the recognition of the autonomy and the political consciousness of the subalterns who had been systematically under-represented in the mainstream historiography, and the restoration of the subaltern's voice to a central place in an alternative historiography. Subaltern studies, which originated in India, which itself is located at the margin of the modern world, were the forerunner of marginality studies in the field of social history. Subsequently, marginality studies acquired a niche in postcolonial studies which flourished around the same time in Europe, North America and their former colonies. In the following section, I will overview Ranjit Guha's declaration of Subaltern Studies. I will then review how marginality has been redefined in the works of Gayatri Spivak and Dipesh Chakrabarty, central figures in both subaltern studies and postcolonial studies. 2-1 Subaltern Studies Ranjit Guha, the first editor of the Subaltern Studies series, claims that the study of nationalism in India was monopolized for an extended period by elitist historians of British India. The modern history of India, as represented by either British scholars or elite Indian scholars, is one in which a handful of charismatic leaders led the masses in the struggle for independence. In this elitist history, which is both colonial and national, hundreds of millions of people of India had neither political autonomy nor historical visions, and hence, the leadership of capable elites was indispensable. The subaltern studies group points out that such an elitist historical perspective cannot sufficiently represent the world of the ordinary people who possess both autonomy and political consciousness. The aim of the subaltern studies group, expressed in the foreword of the first volume of the series (Guha 1982), is to represent the views of the subalterns which existed parallel to those of the elite. Thus the project aimed at establishing an alternative historiography of India that will allow the representation of the initiatives of the numerous ordinary people who, while interacting with the elite, were in fact not totally dependent upon them but had their own autonomous sphere of action. According to this perspective, overcoming marginality is impossible within the framework of the historical consciousness constructed by the elite because it denies the
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subalterns' capacity as an active subject with sovereignty, depicting them as helpless multitude dependent upon the leadership of elites. Both Western historians and the Indian elites who, while resisting Western domination in the rhetoric of nationalism, in fact shared the modern Western epistemological viewpoint that presented the subalterns as helpless Other without autonomy or agency, and placed themselves above the subalterns, establishing themselves as superior Self (see Stoler and Cooper 1997). The continued existence of the superior Western Self is predicated on the creation of the inferior non-Western Other. Although the backward non-Western Other may attempt to break free from marginality by imitating the West's progressive and canonical Self, in the end the imitation is not only "almost the same but not quite," but also "almost the same but not white" in which the imitator is confronted with a double command consisting of a normative affirmation and an ontological denial that essentially says, "Become like us. Don't become us." (Fanon 1986; Bhabha 1994). Ann Stoler explains, "At issue were the means by which European ... civilization ... would be disseminated without undercutting the criteria by which European claims to privilege were made." (Stoler 1997, p. 202). This problem is related to what Maurice Bloch calls the 'hidden problem.' Bloch claims that when the king of the Merina kingdom in Madagascar performs the role of father to his subjects in the ritual of royal bath, this 'hidden problem' plays an important social and political role. In the royal ritual intended to link kingship with the cycle of renewal, the king blesses his subjects by using the image of a father (the king) blessing his children (the king's subjects) and at the same time, justifies his royal authority. Bloch points out that there is a definitive difference between the relationship of a king and his subjects and that of a father and his children. That is, children can become elders, but the children/subjects will never become kings (Bloch 1989). Jacques Derrida uses the notion of the 'gift of death' to contrast death and violence, the existence of which is central to the Western Christian world but which is at the same time repressed, with outward justice and love (Derrida 1995). Although I will not delve any deeper into this issue here, it must be understood that students of history, anthropology and religion have already pointed out the existence of 'hidden problems' which is central to the issue of marginality, and that precisely because they are hidden and repressed they have social, political and religious significance. The questions which must be asked in development are therefore:
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At what level, amongst many identified levels, do we approach marginality and how will we resolve it? Can development encompass marginality? Is development only capable of handling transformed marginality, such as the manageable and legible economic poverty? Let us now return to the subaltern studies. The subaltern studies project is, as I have argued, a theoretical experiment in restoring the subalterns' voices which were unable to make themselves heard in elitist historiography, as well as the agency of historical change that led to Indian independence to the ordinary people who were depicted as lacking an agency and capable only of following the leaders of the independence movement. Yet, the project of the subaltern studies group is not without problems. Firstly, the a priori premise of the subalterns' political autonomy has to be questioned. What is missing is relational and processual perspectives which will enable us to see the mutually constitutive processual relations between the ruling class and the subalterns (Said 1988, p. viii; Uchiyamada 1999, p. 115). Secondly, there are problems in applying the model of working class under Western industrial revolution to the issue of the consciousness of subalterns under colonial rule. Moreover, the subaltern studies group was unable to offer an adequate explanation of what gives it the authority to speak for the subalterns (Spivak 1988b). I examine these problems below through the works of Spivak (1988a) and Dipesh Chakrabarty (1992). 2-2 Gayatri Spivak Although Gayatri Spivak writes for the Subaltern Studies series, which aims to establish an alternative subaltern historiography, she has gradually come to criticize the strategic essentialism of the project from a nonessentialist standpoint (Spivak 1988a and b; 1993). She challenges the premise that the subalterns possess political autonomy and a social and political consciousness. Spivak poses such questions as who created this premise and to what end. Using the notions of 'epistemic violence' and 'representation,' she asks, "Can the subaltern speak?" As Michel Foucault shows through his 'history of insanity,' the categories of reason and its exact opposite, madness, were objectified in the West during the 17th and 18th centuries. The insane, the shadow of the rational, was created, and was represented and segregated at the levels of epistemology and juridcoadministrative systems. The marginal madman as the shadow of the Western rational Self is separated and reified in society through modern bio-social control
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networks that systematically cover every corner of society (Foucault 1967). Spivak acknowledges Foucault's contribution for elucidating the operation of epistemic violence, but she points out that Foucault overlooks the fact that the creation and reification of the insane by the West at the end of the 18th century was part of the historical process of colonization of the non-West by the West which was then taking place globally. Marginality was epistemologically and politico-economically created not only within modern Western society but also outside it. She further argues that in order for the West to develop its own progressive Self, it needed the backward non-Western Other to act as its mirror.4 Spivak claims that representation is the issue here. This notion has two meanings, one (representation) denoting someone 'speaking for' others, as in politics; and the other (re-presentation) representing something, as in art or philosophy. These two meanings are related but are not identical. The key to understanding the double meanings of representation with reference to 'epistemic violence' is the question "Can the subaltern speak?" The subaltern studies group acts as the spokesperson for the subalterns, expressing their political and social consciousness. The image by which the subaltern experience is re-presented is also important. As discussed above, the subaltern studies project seeks to establish an alternative historiography that rejects the national history of the elitist historiography. The subaltern image used in this project is that of the opposing masses. Yet, such representation does not enable the individual subaltern to speak. 2-3 Dipesh Chakrabarty Dipesh Chakrabarty (1992) is aware of the shortcomings of the early subaltern studies project. Chakrabarty does not directly answer the question of who can represent the subalterns with what image. He does, however, attempt to liberate non-Western historiography which was created through imitating the canonical West (hyper-real West), leading it toward a heterogeneous existence, by provincializing the West. Chakrabarty, who was influenced by postcolonial feminism, challenges the tendency to read Indian history in terms of a lack similar to the way women were represented as a lack. If Western modernization is taken as the canonical standard, then non-Western society and the people residing in it, who lack many of the things found in the West,
4

This debate leads to issues related to the creation of a Third World by development (Escobar 1995).

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will be perceived as a lack. Is the 'Third World' itself a lack? Or is it the canonical representation itself that constitutes the 'Third World' as a lack? Chakrabarty questions the uncritical application of Western knowledge about non-Western society in history. If renowned Western historians write the history of non-Western society without referring to the works of non-Western historians, their reputations would remain unscathed. But, Chakrabarty claims, if non-Western historians write the history of the West without referring to the works of European historians, they would be labeled as outdated. The analysis and conclusive demonstration that this type of attitude originates in Orientalism, however, cannot eliminate the asymmetry of historical consciousness. Academic criticism of Orientalism alone will not eradicate the perception of the non-West as a lack. Chakrabarty argues that it is, therefore, necessary to provincialize the West so as to make it possible for non-West historians to write radically heterogeneous histories of the subalterns. Chakrabarty's question is how Western modernity, which postulated the non-West as a lack, became the universal standard. Life expectancy at birth, adult literacy rate and school enrollment ratio, GDP per capitathese are the four indicators which form the basis for calculating the human development index rankings used in the UNDP's Human Development Report. From the perspective of marginality studies, the question is who select these basic indicators which constitute the basis for ranking UN member nations, according to what criteria? Of course, the countries which rank highest in the league table are the so-called advanced nations of the West, while those which rank at the bottom are sub-Saharan African nations. To attempt to overcome marginality within the system that not only ordains it but reifies it is to engage in the fruitless labor of Sisyphus. To borrow Chakrabarty's terminology, it is therefore necessary to provincialize the system of representation itself. The problem is, however, much more complex. Like the people in the 'First World,' those in the 'Third World' aspire to drive cars, watch videos and live a consumer life-style (Sylvester 1999). In order to realize this dream, they seek to move to better positions which offer higher salaries in the international division of labor. In order to stop reproducing marginality by uncritically adopting the epistemological device that creates marginality discursively, it may be necessary not only to provincialize the canonical human development index framework, but also to create an alternative ranking system by reconsidering the diverse possibilities of the framing themselves instead of beginning with the order in
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the given ranking table. It may then become possible to treat development not as a goal but as a means. If development is a means, what then is the goal? Amartya Sen claims that it is 'well-being.'

3. Marginality in DevelopmentAmartya Sen's Case


Amartya Sen says that as health is the most decisive aspect of human wellbeing, health is the indicator for both human well-being and social development. The question he poses is whether health as an indicator of the degree of human well-being and social development should be objectively evaluated or subjectively assessed (Sen 1996). Sen's argument can be outlined as follows. First, he compared basic social indexes concerning quality of life in the states of Kerala, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh in India. His conclusions showed that average life expectancy in Kerala was higher while that in Bihar and Uttar Pradesh was low. Despite this, however, according to the subjective evaluation of the local people, morbidity among the people in Kerala were much higher than in Bihar or Uttar Pradesh. Sen then compared these results with the selfperceived morbidity in the United States. The United States had the highest life expectancy, followed by Kerala while Bihar and Uttar Pradesh had the lowest. Despite this, however, the self-perceived morbidity was highest for the United States, followed by Kerala, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. Through this simple comparison, Sen concluded: "If we go by self-reported morbidity, we would have to conclude that the USA is the least healthy in this comparison, followed by Kerala, then the rest of India, with the states most backward in education and public health services, such as Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, enjoying the highest levels of health!" (Sen 1996, p. 26). Sen interprets the contradiction found in this simple statistical comparison in the following way. The women in Kerala enjoy a higher level of education and the highest standard of living, and as a result, they are also more politicized and have a higher level of discontent. In contrast, the women of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, who receive inferior education and inferior public health services, have a lower awareness abut their well-being, and therefore they do not feel dissatisfied with their lot. The subjective evaluation made by these women is an indicator of the level of the women's political consciousness, or, conversely, of sexual discrimination. For example, in cases where the women's selfperceived morbidity is low when in fact they reside in areas with a low life expectancy and educational level, then this information is useful for assessing
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the degree of their deprivation. Nevertheless, their subjective evaluation of their well-being is misleading. Therefore, the role of objective evaluation is crucial for understanding women's well-being.5 By comparing the theorization of marginality in marginality studies with that in development, it is clear that the focal issues are very different. As the theorization differs, the solution is likewise different. Sen claims that there is a positive correlation between the level of GNP per capita and health conditions. As health is the most important aspect of human well-being, in Sen's argument, their correlation is such that it could be called causal. He supports this simple argument by a 'slippage' in which health represents well-being. In marginality studies, the central issues are the subalterns' autonomy, self-esteem, sovereignty and voices. These issues cannot be understood within a macro paradigm alone. While understanding their positions within a macro relationship (for example, international division of labor), it is only through micro analysis combined with the former that enables us to understand the mechanism that (re)produces marginality. These issues ultimately converge on the question of freedom. Nevertheless, those issues which have been taking place outside the domain of marginality politics and the development system have begun to influence both the macro relations and micro processes within which marginality takes shape.

4. A Third Perspective for Understanding Marginality


The third perspective consists of decentered and unrelated domains which cannot be reduced to either subaltern or hegemonic positions. This third perspective is not a unified position. Its location can be described only through negativity: it is located outside the hierarchical dichotomies of subject-object, First World-Third World, advanced-backward, core-periphery. Here I introduce three contexts for a heuristic purpose. The first context is the man-made political disaster or so-called 'complex emergency.' It must be asked whether those people who have been depicted as marginal within a structural-functionalist framework would continue to be noticeably marginal within the dynamic context of a complex emergency, and to what extent the static, structural-functionalist model of marginality will be of use in understanding the vulnerability of a group of
5

The contradiction that Sen speaks of arises in his comparison of the "objective standard" that allows comparison and the subjective evaluations of women in America, Kerala, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. The women make subjective evaluations by comparing an ideal as perceived from their social position. The ideal image or the level of wellbeing will change with social change. The 'contradiction' discovered by Sen is contained within his method itself, and does not originate with the subjects he is studying.

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people when it is being questioned during such a situation. In complex emergency people such as the economically poor or those who are of low social status will not necessarily be automatically thrust into a marginal state. Similarly, there may be cases where a political, religious and ethnic identity as well as their combination might make certain groups of people marginal within the emergent context. Nor is this identity itself absolute. The second context is related to the issues of border crossings and shifting boundaries. In the static core-periphery model, marginal people exist at the margins of the system, far removed from the core. Nevertheless, in the contemporary real world situation, our everyday practices are embedded in and interchange with technological innovations, economic productive activities, social reproductive activities and the consumption of goods and images, which take place not within a closed system, but over ever-expanding networks. The core-periphery model, which may be psychologically compatible with the centralist thinking, is incapable of imagining productivity of decentered network effects. Frequent border crossings will inevitably affect the significance and meanings attached to geographical and administrative boundaries. In the end the location of margins, and hence the location of marginality, will inevitably be altered. Marginal beings are no longer confined in what used to be geopolitical margins. It is a well-known fact that the majority of Filipinas working in Japan as Japayukis or Filipinos working as cargo ship crews do not enjoy high social standings in the host society or in the work place. Yet, once in their native barangays or villages, their social standings are considerably higher than those who remain in the barangay. The social standing of the same positioned subject changes as s/he changes locations and roles. To recap the point, marginality in this context is situational, processual and relational. The third context concerns the fundamental contradictions between the dynamics of globalized development and the conditions of its very growth. These contradictions are not only related to the domain of sustainable development but, more importantly, also to sustainable nature. Human civilization has developed through subjugating and exploiting nature and, hence, continuously transformed its own condition of growth and existence. In short, development has been transforming nature into environment. At the same time, the former has been always conditioned by the latter, the condition of its existence. The social evolutionist model of unilinear progression of societies from simple to complex, backward to progress, underdeveloped to developed
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is now being doomed when a moderate social democrat Gro Harlem Bruntland (World Commission on Environment and Development 1987) and a traditional left James O'Connor (O'Connor 1992) pointed out the impossibility of unlimited progress. It is against this background that we have to rethink the salience of the question posed by Spivak's question of "Can the subaltern speak?" and its extension "Can we overcome marginality?" The fundamental problem of sustainable development and sustainable nature forces us to think equitable access to human civilization and nature not only by diversified contemporary people, but also by present as well as future generations. Now Spivak's question has to acquire historical scope so as to include future generations into the picture. Since the dynamics of capitalist development itself causes the transformation of nature into environment and subsequent global environmental destruction, it is logically difficult for development to offer a fundamental solution to this contradiction. It is in this context that post-development as an alternative to development rather than an alternative development has been proposed. How is marginality defined in the context of post-development? A short answer to this question is that there is a tendency to romanticize the marginalized as 'noble savages' in the discourse of post-development. From this perspective, marginality is not a problem to be solved. On the contrary, it is the solution to marginality, viz development is to be blamed. We have yet to be presented with a long answer. Nevertheless, Bruno Latour's notion of 'hybrid' seems to hint at it. Latour asks whether the ozone hole is a discursive construct, a political problem or a natural phenomenon. Epistemologists deconstruct it to discourse, political scientists reduce it to politics and natural scientists who are interested in things-in-themselves reduce it into nature. Latour argues that epistemologists, political scientists and natural scientists tend to reduce the ozone hole to discourse, power and fact respectively. Yet, it is simultaneously discourse, power and real (Latour 1993). Although I have yet to find a long answer to the question, Latourian 'hybrid' can be used as an analogy of the long answer. The question of marginality can be reduced neither to the problem of development, nor to that of post-development. Because marginality is the creation of overdetermined processes, reducing it to either 'poverty' or to 'nobility' will not enable us to overcome marginality as experienced. If we look for a problem which will fit nicely with the package of readymade solutions (such as in the case of the World Bank, (1) economic growth,
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(2) human capital development and (3) safety net), we will teleologically represent and create the problem which justifies the existing institutional arrangements (Hamner, Pyatt and White 1999). For the 'target population' of the poverty-alleviation package, economic poverty is only one aspect that constitutes the complex experience of marginality. Economic poverty, autonomy, self-esteem, human rights, property ownership, social standing, race, gender, inequality, political freedom, to name but only a few, are what constitute the marginality of an individual and a group. Here it seems useful to cite an example of the Untouchables who comprise 15 percent of the entire population of India. The marginality of the Untouchables consists of interrelated but different domains of economic poverty, religious roles (as the recipients of malevolence) and social exclusion. Thus, there are economic, religious and social domains which constitute the marginality of the Untouchables. Therefore, it is impossible to solve the marginality of the Untouchables by reducing it to economic poverty alone, or assuming poverty alleviation solves other aspects of marginality. There are numerous instances where the Untouchables managed to attain economic prosperity only to be persecuted and even killed for achieving economic success which is unsuited to their status in the eyes of higher caste people (Delige 1999). Thus, the marginality of the Untouchables is economically, socially and religiously constituted. Moreover, intra-household difference, gender difference and identity politics complicate the constitution of the marginality of individual Untouchables. We have to bear in mind, therefore, that reducing the overdetermined marginality to a simple problem such as 'poverty' so as to make it fit with the existing packages may potentially cause new marginality. Moreover, identifying a certain target group and labeling it 'poor' will unintentionally harm, rather than improve, its self-esteem, for this very act of labeling reifies and fixes the fluid marginal identity. We have, so far, seen the dangers of reducing and reifying marginality to a simple and manageable one for the purpose of making it fit with the readymade solutions. There is a possibility of this solution unintentionally becoming a cause of new marginality. It is, therefore, crucial first of all to democratize the process of development, and then to create a decentered and open-ended system wherein various social actors are allowed to take part in the process of what Raymond Apthorpe calls 'mutual social learning' (Apthorpe personal communication). Yet, from the point of view of sustainable development and
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sustainable nature, this is still inadequate. The room to accommodate different generations (including future generations) and different populations (including non-human species) has to be secured so as to go beyond the limitations imposed on us by the anthropo-centric and Eurocentric Western humanism and the ahistorical 'developmental present.' To this end, the dialogue between postcolonial studies and development studies is crucial, but not sufficient. We need to explore the following three areas. Firstly, development has to be democratized so as to accommodate the subalterns. Secondly, a system of intergenerational sharing of resources has to be attained. Thirdly, interchange between humans and non-humans has to be accepted so as to take part in the process of sustainable nature. References
Arendt, Hannah. 1958. The Human Condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Bhabha, Homi. 1994. "Of Mimicry and Man: The Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse." In The Location of Culture. London: Routledge. Bloch, Maurice. 1989. Ritual, History, and Power: Selected Papers in Anthropology. London School of Economics monographs on social anthropology. no. 58. London: Athlone Press. Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 1992. "Postcoloniality and the Artifice of History: Who Speaks for 'Indian' Past?" Representations 37 (1992): 1-26. Delige, Robert. 1999. The Untouchables of India. Oxford: Berg. Derrida, Jacques. 1995. The Gift of Death. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Escobar, Arturo. 1995. Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third World. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Fanon, Frantz. 1986. Black Skin, White Masks. 1952; rev. ed. London: Pluto. Foucault, Michel. 1967. Madness and Civilization: A History of Insanity in the Age of Reason. London: Tavistock. Guha, Ranjit. 1982. "On Some Aspects of the Historiography of Colonial India." In R. Guha (ed.), Subaltern Studies I: Writings on South Asian History and Society. Delhi: Oxford University Press. Hamner, Lucia C., Graham Pyatt and Howard White. 1999. "What Do the World Bank's Poverty Assessments Teach Us about Poverty in Sub-Saharan Africa?" Development and Change 30, no. 4 (1994): 795-823. Latour, Bruno. 1993. We Have Never Been Modern. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 174

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Mill, John Stuart. 1975. On Liberty. New York: Norton. O'Connor, James. 1992. "The Second Contradiction of Capitalism." In Tod Benton (ed.), The Greening of Marxism. New York: Guilford Press. Said, Edward W. 1988. "Foreword". In Ranjit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Scott, James C. 1990. Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale University Press. Sen, Amartya. 1996. "Objectivity, Health and Policy." In Monica Das Bupta, Lincoln C. Chen and T. N. Krishnan (eds.), Health, Poverty and Development in India. Delhi: Oxford University Press. ______. 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Knopf. Spivak, Gayatri Chakravorty. 1988a. "Can the Subaltern Speak?" In Cary Nelson and Lawrence Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Urbana: University of Illinois Press. ______. 1988b. "Subaltern Studies: Deconstructing Historiography." In Ranjit Guha and Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak (eds.), Selected Subaltern Studies. Oxford: Oxford University Press. ______. 1993. "In a Word: Interview." In Outside in the Teaching Machine. New York: Routledge. Stoler, Ann Laura. 1997. "Sexual Affronts and Racial Frontiers: European Identities and the Cultural Politics of Exclusion in Colonial Southeast Asia." In Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. Stoler, Ann Laura and Frederick Cooper. 1997. "Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda." In Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (eds.), Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World. Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of California Press. Sylvester, Christine. 1999. "Development Studies and Postcolonial Studies: Disparate Tales of the 'Third World'." Third World Quarterly 20, no. 4 (1999): 703-21. Uchiyamada, Yasushi. 1999. "Two Beautiful Untouchable Women: Processes of Becoming in South India." In Sophie Day, Evthymios Papataxiarchis and Michael Stewart (eds.), Lilies of the Field: Marginal People Who Live for the Moment. Oxford and Boulder: Westview Press. World Commission on Environment and Development. 1987. Our Common Future. New York: Oxford University Press. 175

CONTRIBUTORS
TAKAHASHI Kazuo has been the Director of FASID-IDRI since 1996 when he joined FASID. Educated at the International Christian University, Japan and the Hague Academy of International Law, he received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Columbia University in 1975. From 1976 to 1987, he worked at the Secretary General's Office and Development Co-operation Directorate of OECD. He then joined the Sasakawa Peace Foundation and served as Program Director and special counselor until 1996. He is currently Visiting Professor at Graduate School of Arts and Sciences, the University of Tokyo. NG Chee Yuen has been Chief Researcher of FASID-IDRI since 1997. Before joining FASID, he was with the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), Singapore, as Fellow (1985-90) and Senior Fellow (1991-92 and 1994-96). He was also Director of Economic Cooperation at the ASEAN Secretariat (1993-94). During 1996-97, he was Visiting Senior Researcher at the Center for Management Technology, Singapore National University. He obtained his Ph.D. degree in Economics form LaTrobe University, Melbourne, in 1984. SUZUKI Naoki has been a researcher at FASID-IDRI since 1997. He completed his master's degree in environment science at the University of Tsukuba, and received a Ph.D. in Planning from Cornell University in 1996. He worked as a Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (JOCV) in Malawi (1983-85), and worked with Japan International Volunteer Center (JVC) as a Country Respresentative in Ethiopia (1988-90). TANIMURA Mitsuhiro has been a researcher at FASID-IDRI since 1998. He completed his master's degree in urban and regional planning at University of California, Los Angeles and obtained a Ph.D. in urban engineering from the University of Tokyo in 1994. Before joining FASID, he was Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Development, Nagoya University. ITO Sanae has been a researcher at FASID-IDRI since 1999. She graduated from International Christian University, Japan, and completed her master's

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degree in Sociology at Keio University. She obtained MPhil and Ph.D. in Sociology from Institute of Development Studies at the University of Sussex in 1999. She worked as a Japan Overseas Cooperation Volunteer (1988-90) and as Junior Development Specialist at Japan International Cooperation Agency (JICA) (1991-93). UCHIYAMADA Yasushi has been Senior Researcher at FASID-IDRI since 1995. He completed a master's degree in development studies at the University of Wales, Swansea, and obtained a Ph.D. in Social Anthropology from the University of London (LSE) in 1995. Prior to joining FASID, he worked with the Japan Volunteer Center as a Country Respresentative in Ethiopia (198587).

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