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TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.

16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES This page is intentionally left blank . Rev-0 -2June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES Rev-0 -3June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES REVISION CONTROL SHEET Rev. No. & Date Description Of Revision Revised By Reviewed By Approved By Rev-0 -4June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES This page is intentionally left blank. Rev-0 -5June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES INDEX SL. NO. DESCRIPTION PAGE NO. 1.0 OBJECTIVE 7 2.0 PROBABLE CAUSES OF EVENT 7 3.0 SYSTEM STATUS AND ASSUMPTIONS 7 4.0 EVENT DESCRIPTION 8 5.0 EVENT IDENTIFICATION (SYMPTOM CHECK LIST) 10 6.0 EFFECTS ON THE STATION 12 7.0 MITIGATING SYSTEMS REQUIRED 12 8.0 EVENT PROGRESSION AND OPERATING PROCEDURE 14 9.0 OPERATOR ACTION FLOW CHART 22 10.0 EVENT TERMINATION CHECK LIST 25 11.0 REFERENCES 25 12.0 ANNEXURE 25 13.0 APPENDICES 25 14.0 EVALUATION 25 Rev-0 -6June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES This page is intentionally left blank. Rev-0 -7June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES 1.0 OBJECTIVE: This EOP covers actions to be taken following failure of coolant channel end fit ting assembly concurrent with ejection of fuel bundles. This implies complete failure of end fitting with ejection of seal plug, shield plug and thirteen bundles from th e affected channel. Purpose of this procedure is to a) Bring the station to safe shutdown condition with adequate subcriticality margin. b) Monitor the performance of mitigating systems and ensure their availability. c) Maintain core cooling and keep PHT system in reflooded condition. d) Minimise release of radioactivity to environment. 2.0 PROBABLE CAUSES OF EVENT: Failure of coolant channel with ejection of fuel bundles can occur into one of t he F/M vaults due to one of the following reasons: 1. Seal plug failure. 2. Complete failure of end fitting assembly. 3. Accidental unclamping of fuelling machine head during fuelling operation. This is most serious accident involving fuel handling system. The fuelling machine and their control system incorporate several checks and mechanical interlocks to prevent such a scenario. (Section-5.10.1 of Ref. 1). 3.0 SYSTEM STATUS AND ASSUMPTIONS: The event can occur in any one of the following states. 1. Normal operating condition. 2. When PHT system is in the process of hot pressurization/shutdown condition: For the purpose of this EOP, it is assumed that this event occurs under normal operating condition. Under hot pressurization /shutdown condition temperature of

fuel elements and therefore radioactivity level will be much less than those in the operating condition. Thus, accident scenario will be enveloped by normal operati ng condition. In some situation of end fitting failure viz. hot pressurization state at lower PHT temperature, pump room high pressure signal may not generate. If affected channe l was recently refuelled, high activity signal may also not generate and containme nt will not get boxed up, the event will be identified as blind LOCA and manual act ions Rev-0 -8June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES will have to be initiated to handle the event as per blind LOCA handling procedu re covered under small break LOCA EOP-2.2.7 (Ref. 2). 4.0 EVENT DESCRIPTION : Following the event an opening of diameter equivalent to pressure tube ID i.e. 103.4mm (5% of double ended RIH break) occur in the PHT system. The flow is likely to be controlled by the size of feeder pipe and pipe fittings. Coolant di scharge occurs with initial discharge rate of 170 kg/sec., which subsequently reduces to lower value due to voiding and pressure reduction at end fitting. PHT pressure starts decreasing. The reduction in PHT pressure is compensated by large flow from pressurizer and pressurizer heaters get switched on to control the PHT pressure. On sensing fall in pressurizer level, PHT inventory control system enhances the PHT feed flow through feed valve and reduces the bleed flow. PHT pressure control system is not able to maintain PHT pressure at normal operating value resulting in reactor trip on PHT pressure low. Large discharge from pressurizer initiates pressurizer low level signal as a backup for reactor trip. Pump room high pressure signal will also ge nerate which initiates crash cool down, SDS-2 actuation, light water injection conditio ning signal and containment box up. PHT storage tank low level signal will also be available as backup reactor trip signal and will also provide PHT fast cool down as a backup cooldown mode. Various other symptoms indicating LOCA namely floor beetle alarm, increase in fe ed flow and decrease in bleed flow, standby F/M vault coolers start on high tempera ture (550C) in F/M vault and stack loss monitor will be available. The event will be confirmed based on high radiation field in F/M vault, RB exhaust duct monitor an d high activity through stack on RADAS and also through CCTV. On pump room high pressure signal, containment gets boxed up and crash cooling gets initiated. Sensing PHT pressure less than 55 kg/cm2(g), pressurizer and bot h loops get isolated. Thus, effect of LOCA gets limited to only one loop. Sensing further reduction in PHT pressure to 40 kg/cm2(g), ECCS gets triggered, ECCS val ves get lined up in all header injection mode, light water injection gets initiated and also feed & bleed system gets isolated as conditioning signal on pump room high press ure is also available. Simultaneously, two long-term ECCS recirculation pumps starts

in recirculation mode. When PHT system pressure falls below shut off head of longterm recirculation pumps, it starts injecting water to PHT system. ECCS injectio n refills the core and fuel clads get completely quenched. Finally, a quasi-steady state is reached in which the injected water is able to remove decay heat on long term ba sis. Thus, operation of ECCS ensures that there is no fuel failure in the reactor cor e except in the affected channel. For the PHT system, situation will be similar to that o f small break LOCA (EOP No. 2.2.7) with coolant discharging from the open end fitting in to F/M vault. The event will result in ejection of fuel bundles from the affected channel in t he F/M vault and/or pressure relief chamber (Ref. 3). Removal of stored heat and decay heat Rev-0 -9June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES from these bundles may occur by the discharging water falling on or near the bun dles or through splashing water droplets together with F/M vault coolers. Considering the worst case of ejection of most affected fuel bundle in pressure relief chamber, fuel temperature in ejected bundles will rise and heat transfer from fuel bundles wil l occur by natural convection and radiation to air and surrounding structure which will restrict the maximum fuel temperature to 1400C (Section-5.10.1 of Ref. 1). The sheath may fail, if it had not failed earlier on mechanical impact and gap inventory will b e released into containment atmosphere. The release to the containment could conta in about 12550 Ci of I131 and 17810 Ci of noble gases which could result in : Ground level release of I-131 Ground level release of Noble Gases Stack level release of I-131 Stack level release of Noble Gases : : : : 0.152 Ci 82.6 Ci 0.133 Ci 1480 Ci Doses : Thyroid Whole body : 0.024 mSv : 0.0076 mSv which are much below the reference dose limits for accident condition. Containment related isolation will occur on high gamma activity in ventilation exhaust duct or on pump room high pressure signal. The effect on healthy loop (intact loop) due to end fitting failure in another ( broken) loop is restricted to initial few minutes and is negligible. However, as the int act loop and the pressurizer gets isolated from the broken loop on PHT low pressure i.e. below 55 kg/cm2(g), further pressure reduction in intact loop is gradual which is caus ed by rate of cooling in secondary side. Sufficient core flow is maintained in the cor e of the intact loop which keep the fuel sheath temperature well quenched. Although it is an

all Header ECCS Injection Scheme, but due to isolation of healthy loop, ECCS injection from H2O accumulators in healthy loop is restricted to shrinkage requirement only. After loop isolation in healthy loop, decay heat removal is th rough SGs. Operator should ensure sufficient inventory in SGs (through ABFPs) and opening of ASDVs. Based upon differential pressure across headers, coolant temperature in both the loops, trend in COT, beetle alarm, F/M vault temperature/pressure, CCTV and radiation field, operator will be able to identif y end fitting failure. Once operator is sure about loop and location of end fitting fa ilure, existing all header ECCS injection mode can be converted to selective header injection mode in later period (as used in 220 MWe PHWRs). In this scheme, water should be injected in both the RIHs of broken loop only. Containment related engineered safety features and building coolers reduces the containment pressure, activity and F/M vault temperature. Primary Containment Cleanup (PCC) System removes radioactivity from the RB atmosphere. Secondary containment cleanup and purge system maintains negative pressure in between Inne r Containment wall (ICW) and Outer Containment Wall (OCW) and thus minimize Rev-0 -10June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES ground level radioactivity release. Finally, Primary Containment Controlled Discharge (PCCD) System can be started to depressurize the RB atmosphere as per EOP 2.7.4 and action will be initiated for removal of fuel bundles from F/M vaul t and decontamination of F/M vault. For control room habitability survival ventilation system is provided in control room which supplies air flow through activated charcoal filters. During accident cond ition survival ventilation system is to be started within half-an-hour after LOCA and normal ventilation system is to be isolated from air handling unit by operating damper manually. In some situation of end fitting failure viz., hot pressurization state at lower PHT temperature, pump room high pressure signal may not generate. If affected channe l was recently refueled high activity signal may also not generate and containment will not get boxed up, the event will be identified as blind LOCA and manual actions will have to be initiated to handle the event as per blind LOCA handling procedure covered under LOCA EOP-2.2.7. 5.0 EVENT IDENTIFICATION : 5.1 Symptom i) Storage tank pretrip alarm (AN-631) . ii) PHT pressure very low < 92 kg/cm2(g) (AN-421) . iii) Pressurizer level low (AN-509) . iv) Pump room pressure very high (AN-416 & 406) . v) SDS-1 channel D/E/F tripped (AN-412/417/423) . vi) SDS-2 channel G/H/J tripped (AN-401/402/403) . vii) F/M vault flooded Beetle window annunciation (AN-316) . viii) F/M vault temperature high (AN-209) . ix) Standby F/M vault coolers start on auto (Indication on panel no. 6610-PL-2) . x) PHT pressure approaching loop isolation pressure (AN-220) . xi) Pressurizer isolation valve closed (AN-528) . xii) LOCA signal exists (AN-221) .

xiii) Feed isolation valve closed (AN-534) . xiv) Bleed isolation valve closed (AN-535) . xv) Channel flow very low (AN-425) . xvi) ECC system annunciation : a) ECCS rupture disc ruptured (AN-230) . b) ECCS accumulator TK-1 and TK-2 level low (AN-223/224 & COIS No. 10763, 10764, 10765). c) 3335 TK-3 pressure low (AN-225 & COIS No. 10766, 10767, 10768). d) ECCS recirculation flow established. 1) MV-55closed (Indication on 6620-PL-4). 2) Sufficient flow in flow indicator FI-16 on 6610-PL-2. xvii) PHT storage tank level very low (AN-428). Rev-0 -11June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES xviii) ASDVs open (AN-532) . xix) RB containment isolated (AN-204) . xx) Primary containment vent exhaust activity very high (AN-203) . xxi) High radiation field in F/M vault on RADAS in one of the F/M Vault. xxii) RB ventilation duct activity high on RADAS. xxiii) Iodine release rate through RB stack high on RADAS. xxiv) Initiation of crash cooldown (AN-525) . 5.2 Check List 1. Monitor radiation signal and level in different locations in RB like F/M vault, Pump Room etc on RADAS. 2. Monitor stack activity on RADAS. 3. Check radiation field in S/D and accident area monitors on RADAS. 4. Check floor beetle alarm/annunciation for identification of location of the break. 5. Check rise in pump room pressure (AN-416, COIS-2527, 2528). 6. Check increase in feed flow (COIS No. 368) and decrease in bleed flows (COIS No. 335). 7. Drop in PHT pressure (Average outlet header pressure) Channel D/E/F COIS No. 236/238 (North) & 237/239 (South). 8. Dip in PHT pressure on recorder North side 6631-PR-1&3, South side 6631PR2&4. 9. Check fall in pressurizer level (on COIS-371, 63336-LI-49, LI-59, LR-5) 10. F/M vault pressure abnormal (COIS No. 2501, 2502, 5835, 5841). 11. Startup of standby F/M vault coolers in affected F/M vault (Identification on panel no. 6610-PL-2). 12. Observe stack loss monitor. 13. Observe CCTV located in F/M vault for identification of location. 14. Check temperature in Pump Room (COIS No. 2515), FM Vaults (COIS No. 2503 to 2514). 15. Initiation of ECCS long-term recirculation system injection (AN-228, 229).

16. Check pump room high pressure (COIS-2527, 2528). 17. Check : i) rate of PHT temperature reduction ii) rate of PHT depressurization iii) rate of rise in pump room pressure 18. Check system status table (SST) for containment isolation on COIS. 19. ECCS recirculation flow established. i) MV-55 closed (Indication on 6620-PL-4) . ii) Sufficient flow on flow indicator FI-16 on 6610-PL-2. 20. a) Check pressurizer isolated (AN-528) . b) Check feed and bleed isolated (AN-534, 535) . 21. Check whether PCPs trip on electrical fault. 22. Check rate of fall in storage tank. 23. Check moderator temperature. Rev-0 -12June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES 6.0 EFFECTS ON STATION : The station is equipped with various engineered safety features to cope with thi s type of accident. Reactor trip, crash cooldown, pressurizer/loop isolation and ECCS actuation will occur on auto. Long-term ECCS recirculation system will keep the core reflooded and will remove stored heat and decay heat effectively. Containme nt and its engineered safety features will maintain the radioactivity release to th e environment within permissible limits. Under postulated endfitting failure, fuel bundles may hit the floor with high speed which may cause mechanical damage to fuel bundles and even to fuel pencils, resulting in high radiation field inside Reactor Building in particular affected F/M vault. Spilled water from break will maintai n water height on F/M vault floor as drain pipe connecting F/M vault to suppressio n pool is at 150mm from floor level (more than fuel bundle dia) which together wit h F/M coolers will provide long-term cooling to fuel bundles. Unit will be under l ong shutdown following this postulated event and affected F/M vault will be highly contaminated. For restarting the unit following work has to be done. i. Fallen fuel fragments should be collected in flasks and should be sent to SFSB. ii. Repair work should be started when radiation field reduces to low value. iii. Complete PHT system has to be defuelled. iv. Complete PHT system has to be drained and dried. v. Remaining part of end fitting has to be removed. vi. New end fitting has to be placed. vii. Weldings should be radiographed, if done. viii. Fresh D2O should be filled to PHT system. ix. Core should be refueled. x. Starting procedure should be followed. xi. Suppression pool water has to be replaced with demineralised water. xii.

Downgraded suppression pool D2O should be sent to D2O upgradation plant. Other means of handling the suppression pool water should be explored. 7.0 MITIGATING SYSTEMS REQUIRED: a) Reactor protective systems (SDS-1, SDS-2) . b) Emergency Core Cooling System. c) Containment isolation systems. d) Pressure suppression pool system. e) RB depressurization system (Reactor Building Coolers and Primary Containment Control Discharge system) . f) PC cleanup system. g) Accident activity monitoring system and RADAS. h) Secondary containment cleanup and purge system. i) Emergency electric supply system. Rev-0 -13June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES j) Compressed air system. k) PHT pressure control systems. l) PHT inventory control system. m) Moderator System. n) SGPC/ASDVs/SRVs. o) Environment Monitoring System. p) SG feed water system. q) Process water system. r) End shield cooling system. s) Calandria vault cooling system. t) S/D cooling system. u) Pressurizer & loop isolation valves v) Fire water system as backup feed water for SGs and endshield system. Rev-0 -14June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES 8.0 EVENT PROGRESSION AND OPERATING PROCEDURE (END FITTING FAILURE ASSUMED IN NORTH F/M VAULT) (Ref. 4, 5) : S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks 1. 0 Sec. Ejection of seal plug and shield plug of an end fitting on North F/M vault leading to ejection of 13 fuel bundles. 1. Initial PHT discharge rate of around 170 kg/sec which will reduce to lower value, due to pressure reduction and voiding at break point location (end fitting). 2. 0 to 2 min. 1.a) PHT pressure drops. b) (i) Pressurizer heaters get switched ON one after another bank (ii) Pressurizer level starts falling. c) (i) Bleed valves close (ii) Feed valves open to control pressurizer level. d) Level fall in PHT storage tank. 2) Reactor trip on : i) PHT pr. low [92 kg/cm2(g)] ii) Pump room highpressure (0.018 kg/cm2). iii) Pressurizer low level (1.635 m) 3) 13 fuel bundles from affected channel are ejected on to F/M vault floor and/or in pressure relief chamber.

1.a) Dip in PHT pr. On recorder (North-6331-PR1& 3) (South-6331-PR2& 4). b.i) Heater power on 6610-PL-5 (ii) Level fall in pressurizer on 63336-LI-49, LI-59, LR-5 c.i) Bleed valve position. ii) Feed valve position and current of the running PHT feed pump. d) Observe level on 63333-LR-7&8. 2.a) SDS-1 tripped AN412/ 417/423. b) SDS-2 tripped AN401/ 402/403. 3.a) F/M vault beetle alarm AN-316. b) High field in FM vault on RADAS. c) High field in RB ventilation duct (monitor on RADAS). d) High activity through 3. Identify the event as end fitting failure. 1. Sensing fall in PHT pressure, pressurizer heaters gets switched on one bank after another. Sensing fall in pressurizer level feed valve opens fully and bleed valve closes. 2. PHT storage tank very low level and pressurizer low level signal also act as backup trip signal. 3. Decay heat and stored heat removal from ejected fuel bundle onto F/M vault floor will partially occur by discharging water falling on or near the bundle. Buildup of

Rev-0 -15June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks stack on RADAS. e) High field in North/south passage of 100 m EL, RB adjacent to affected F/M vault ( read by area monitor) water level on the floor will assist in arresting temperature rise of the bundle. Fuel bundle ejected on to pressure relief chamber will experience sharp temperature rise. F/M vault coolers will assist in removing heat. 3. 2 min to 10 min. 1) Standby F/M vault coolers start on Auto. 2.a) PHT storage tank level falling fast. b) PHT storage tank pretrip alarm. 3.a) PHT pressure reaches 55 kg/cm2(g). b) Both loops alongwith pressurizer get isolated sensing PHT pressure in any RIH <55 kg/cm2(g). c) Feed and bleed isolated sensing PHT pressure in any RIH <40 kg/cm2(g) with pump room high pressure signal as conditioning signal. 1.a) Check 7312-F-1 to 8 and 7312-F-13 to

20 are running. b) Observe rising trend in pressure and temperature of F/M vault and pump room. 2.a) Observe level on the recorder 63333-LR-7&8. b) AN-631. 3.a.i) PHT pr. On recorder 6331PR1 to 4. ii) PHT pressure approaching loop isolation pressure (AN-220). b) Pressurizer and loop isolation valves 3336-MV-1, 3336MV2, 3336-MV-3 closes AN-528 (LED indication). c) PHT feed and bleed isolation valves 3331-MV-10, 11 and 3332-MV-1, 2 closes (LED indication). 1. Monitor floor beetle alarms and radiation field in FM vault as read by accident area monitor on RADAS for location of affected F/M vault. 2. Monitor CCTV for confirmation of affected F/M vault, identification of leaky channel and location of fuel bundle on the floor of F/M vault and/or pressure relief chamber. 3. Ensure initiation of crash/fast cool down of PHT system. 1. Radiation field in case of ejection of irradiated fuel bundle in F/M vault is expected to be of the order of 1000 R/hr. 2. a) RB high pressure signal will be available for the postulated event.

b) Storage tank low level acts as backup trip signal and also for cooldown. 3. Initiation of feed and bleed isolation occurs when LOCA signal is available. Rev-0 -16June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks 4. Containment box up on high activity signal. 5. On pump room high pressure signal observe following auto actions. a) Reactor trip if not tripped earlier. b) Initiation of crash cool down. c) Containment box up if not occurred earlier on high activity signal. i) Primary containment isolated. ii) Secondary containment isolated. d) Secondary containment cleanup and purge system starts. e) Actuation of ECCS injection whenever PHT pressure falls below 40 kg/cm2(g). 4. Stack activity on RADAS. 5. Observe following a) AN-412, 417, 423 AN-401, 402, 403 b) ASDVs open in crash cooldown mode (AN-525 & 532) c.i) PC exhaust fans (7314-FM-2001 & 2002) tripped and dampers 7314 MV-1 to MV-4 closed. ii) SC exhaust fan (7316-FM-2001) tripped and dampers (7316-MV-1 to 4)

closed. iii) On PC/SC boxup signal, other auto actions as listed in S.No.5 also takes place. d.i) 7316-MV-5, MV-6, MV-9 open. ii) 7316-F-2002 or F2003 starts corresponding MV7 or MV-8 open. e) Auto actions will take place as mentioned in S.No. 4. 4. Start DGs on isolated bus to ensure emergency power supply. 5.a) Declare plant emergency. b) Inform HPU. c) Ask HPU to monitor activities (radiation field/contamination) outside RB/SB and inside RAB, PCB. 4. Automatic containment box up will occur on pump room high pressure signal. OR On high activity signal. 4. 10 min to 15 min. 1) ECCS injection following PHT pressure < 40 kg/cm2(g). 1.i) Vent valves (3335MV73, MV-20 & MV-17) closed. ii) ECCS accumulator pressurizing valves (3335-MV-74, MV-75) open. iii) ECCS accumulators get lined up. 1. If pump room high pressure signal does not generate but end fitting failure is confirmed, based on a) PHT pressure has gradually fallen below 55 kg/cm2 .

b) Reactor tripped. c) Beetle alarms. 1. Blind LOCA is defined as the maximum break discharge in which containment box up signal on pump room high pressure may not get generated. [Appendix-C of Ref. Rev-0 -17June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks 2. ECCS long-term recirculation pumps (two) start on auto and run in recirculation mode after opening of pump suction valve MV-56 and MV-57. iv) ECCS valves 3335MV1 to MV-16 start opening (LED indication). v) ECCS rupture disk ruptured (AN-230). vi) ECCS HX outlet valve 3335-MV148/ 149 opened. vii) 3335-MV-22, 150 closed. viii) H2O accumulator level fall in 3335TK1&2 on COIS 10763, 10764, 10765. ix) N2 accumulator pressure fall in 3335-TK-3 on COIS-10766, 10767, 10768. x) Gradual fall in PHT pressure in RIH (North) on COIS 10751, 10752, 10753 in RIH (South) on COIS 10754, 10755, 10756. xi) ECCS accumulator flow COIS No. 10769. 2. Observe a) Stack loss monitor. b) PHT pressure. in RIH (North) on

COIS 10751, 10752, 10753 in RIH (South) on COIS 10754, 10755, 10756. c) PHT temperature. d) Standby F/M vault cooler start. e) Storage tank level very low. f) High radioactivity in F/M vault. Observe the situation as BLIND LOCA Observing the situation as Blind LOCA: Initiate manual actions as per EOP-2.2.7 S.No.4 of event progression and operating procedures. 2. Continue moderator system circulation and its cooling. 3. Check for following: a) End shield cooling pumps are running and process water flow is available to its HXs. b) Calandria vault cooling pumps are running and process water flow is available to its HXs. c) Main BFP/ABFP running. 4. Monitor activities outside RB/SB. 1]. 2. Pump room high pressure signal may not generate in some situations viz. event occurring during PHT system hot pressurization process, failure of end fitting of low flow channel. 3. For Blind LOCA also refer EOP 2.2.7 (Ref. 2). 5. 15 min. to 30 min. 1) Following also get

isolated on pump room high pressure (containment box up signal). a) D2O vapour recovery system: i) V1 area dryer 7312DR1, 2 & 3 stopped 1) Observe event sequence recorder (ESR) system. a.i) Check dampers 7312-DM-30 to 33 are closed. 1.a) Ensure secondary containment cleanup and purge system is working well and secondary containment vacuum is 12-24 mm of H2O 1) Containment box-up may occur on high radio activity also. Rev-0 -18June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks and their dampers closed. ii) Accessible area auxiliary dryer 7314 DR-1 is stopped and their dampers closed. iii) Accessible area auxiliary dryer 7314DR2 stopped and its dampers closed. b) Condensate collection lines isolated c) Active drainage pumps 7172-PM-4,5,6,7 tripped. d) Annulus gas system gas lines are isolated. e) PHT leakage collection system valves 3371-MV-45 & 46 closed. f) PHT purification supply & return line valves 3321-MV-29 & 30 closed. g) F/M vault and service area leakage collection system valves 3491MV1&2 closed. h) Vapour suppression pool water circulation lines isolated. i) Non essential, class-III compressed air system lines isolated. j) Class-IV compressed air system lines isolated. k) Main, emergency and F/M airlock doors are closed and seals are inflated. 2) ECCS long term injection starts when

PHT pr. < Shut off head of ECCS pumps ii) 7314 DM-203 and 204 are closed. iii) 7314-DM-230, 231, 236, 237 closed. b) 7312-MV-209, 210 are closed. c) Check 7172-MV-17, 48, 19, 51 closed (lamp indication) d) Check 3741-MV-1 to 4 closed. (LED indication) (6620-PL-4) e) Check LED indications of MVs in 6610-PL-5. f) Check LED indications of MVs in 6610-PL-5. g) Check LED indications of MVs in CER panel. h) 3433-MV-17, MV18 closed. i) 7513-MV-2263, MV2383, MV-2384, MV-2261 closed. j) 7513-MV-2001, MV2013 closed. 2) a) ECCS flow in long term recirculation line (6610-FI-16 on 6610-PL-2) (COIS No. 10771) b) ECCS pump current. c) PHT pressure. d) PHT temperature. column maintained. b.i) Ensure primary containment exhaust fans are stopped and RB boxed up. ii) Check system status table on COIS for containment isolation. c) Take meteorological data like wind direction, wind velocity and temperature profile. d.i) Check all coolers operating.

ii) Check RB pressure. 2) Survival ventilation system of control room is to be started and normal ventilation system is to be isolated from air handling unit by closing the damper manually. 3) Take metrological data s like wind direction, wind velocities and temperature profile. 4.i) Check all coolers operating. ii) Check RB pressure. 2) For control room habitability survival ventilation system is provided in control room which supplies air flow through activated charcoal filter during accident Rev-0 -19June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks 6. 30 mts. to 1 hour 1. Auto closure of ECCS pump recirculation valve (3335-MV-55) on high flow (>300 m3/hr). 2. Primary pressurizing pump trip on suction pressure low (If feed and bleed not isolated). 3. PCPs will trip following PPP trip. 1a) Check LEDs for 3335-MV-55 on 6620-PL-4. b) Check flow indicator (FI-16 on 6610-PL2). c) CTM 2) AN-508. 3) AN-513 to 516. Monitor radiation fields in accident area monitors in RB. 7. 1 hr to 7 hrs. 1. i) Observe ECCS recirculation flow and pressure in CER panel and CR panel. ii) PHT pressure. iii) PHT temp. broken loop <101C Intact loop <1500C iv) ECCS long term recirculation pumps are running. v) Process water supply in ECCS HX and RB coolers. vi) V1 and V2 pressure.

2) ECCS long-term recirculation pumps are running. 1) Check performance of all RB coolers. 2) Trip PCPs. 3) Shutdown cooling pump can be started (ensuring APW availability to S/D HX) to reduce PHT temperature below 1000C, in intact loop of PHT system. 4) Based upon 1) Emergency core cooling in a) broken loop via break discharge, ECCS injection and thermosyphoning. b) intact loop via thermosyphoning. S/D cooling pump may be considered an additional alternative path for long-term cooling. c) After confirming the break as end fitting failure (small break LOCA), ECCS injection mode conversion to selective header injection mode, in which ECCS injection will be diverted to RIHs, will provide effective thermosyphoning. 2. To avoid continuous operation of PCPs at low temperatures with voids at suction, PCPs trip is desired. Rev-0 -20June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks differential pressure across headers, trends in COT, coolant temperature in both loops, injection rate from ECCS long-term recirculation system and beetle alarm operator may/will be able to identify the broken loop and broken side (location). Once operator is sure of loop and location of failed endfitting, existing all header ECCS injection mode can be converted to selective header injection mode as used in 220 MWe PHWR i.e. ECCS injection in both RIHs. 5) Take samples for establishing radiological condition and source term. 6) Check reactor is subcritical with SDS-1 fully IN. SDS-2 has injected full worth of reactivity. If required MLPAS can be injected manually. 8. 7 hrs to 48 hrs

i) Check fan 7315 F1 or F2 and F3 or F4 operation (Control room panel 6610PL2). ii) Damper 1, 2, 4, 5 open (Control room indication). iii)Charcoal filter temperature <80C. 1. Start PCC system. 1. PCC system is operated after 7 hrs. of the accident to prevent charcoal filter overheating. (Ref. TAPP3& 4/DBR/RAS/731 50/01) Rev-0 -21June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES S. No. Time After Failure Event/Operation on AUTO Observation Manual action Remarks 2) Check pressure and temperature in RB. 3) Monitor the charcoal filter temperature. 4) Consult advisory group for the action plan of depressurization and removal of fuel bundles. 2. Due to instrument air leakage RB pressure may increase. 9. After 48 hrs. After consulting advisory committee members and informing Health Physics Unit (HPU) & Environmental Surveillance and Meteorological Laboratory (ESML) depressurise the primary containment through PCCD system (EOP 2.7.4) (PC Pr. <0.48 kg/cm2 (g)). Monitor stack activity discharge. Monitor radiation field in F/M vault. 1) Open damper 7317MV1&4. 2) Check flow. 3) Check RB pressure. 4) Monitor the charcoal filter temperature. 5) Initiate action for removal of fuel bundles from F/M vault and decontamination of

F/M vault in consultation with HPU. 1. Depressurization through PCCD is done if favorable meteorological conditions are prevailing. 2. During depressurization through PCCD, Fission Product Noble Gases (FPNGs) mainly Xe and Kr would get released through stack. Rev-0 -22June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES 9.0 OPERATOR ACTION FLOW CHART Rev-0 -23June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES BA Confirm the event by following : 1. High field radiation in RB exhaust duct monitor on RADAS. 2. High activity through stack. 3. PHT low pressure signal 4. Pressurizer low level 5. Pump room high pressure 6. PHT low flow 7. PHT storage tank pre-trip alarm Confirm the event by following : 1. High field in RB exhaust duct monitor on RADAS 2. High activity through stack. 3. Reactor trip on PHT storage tank or pressurizer level low 4. Standby F/M vault coolers start on auto. 5. Beettle alarms. 6. Whole inventory of storage tank gets depleted Check for following auto action : 1. Reactor trip on low pressure or pump room high pressure signal 2. Pressurizer and both loops isolated on PHT pressure < 55 kg/cm2. 3. Feed and bleed isolated on PHT pressure < 40 kg/cm2(g). 4. ECCS injection valves lined up on PHT pr < 40 kg/cm2(g). 5. ECCS recirculation pumps start on auto and a) suction valves open b) ECCS HX outlet valve 3335-MV-148/149 open 6. Containment boxed up. 7. Crash cool down initiated 8. Secondary Containment cleanup & purge system starts 9. Level & Pressure reduction in ECCS accumulator. Initiate following manual actions : 1. Trip the reactor if not tripped earliar. 2. Create conditioning signal for ECCS (pump room Pr. High/Calandria level high) by three hand switches [ HS-978(D), HS-979(E), HS-980(F) ( 2/3 Logic ) provided in control room 6610-PL-2) 3. Create containment boxup by hand switch [67310-HS-202] on 6610-PL-2. 4. Ensure primary and secondary containment boxup 5. Ensure fast cooldown. 6. Start secondary containment cleanup and purge system. CHECK :

1. F/M vault & pump room coolers ON . 2. Check pumps of following systems are running. i) Moderator. ii) End shield cooling. iii) Calandria vault cooling. 3. Check APW flow to above HXs. 4. Check feed water availability to SGs. 5. Check process water supply in ECCS HXs. 6. Healthy loop together with pressurizer get isolated C Initiate following Manual Actions : 1. Starts DGs 2. Declare plant emergency. 3. Take meteorological data e.g. wind direction, velocity, etc. 4. Monitor radiation field in accident area monitors in RB. 5. Observe high field in 100m passage adjacent to affected F/M vault. 6. Observe CCTV in affected F/M vault. 7. Monitor activity outside RB/SB. 8. Start control room survival ventilation system and isolate normal ventilation system of control room. Rev-0 -24June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES C CHECK 1. PHT Pressure < 10 kg/cm2. 2. PHT temperature falling. 3. Fall in level in ECCS accumulator. 4. Flow in ECCS long term recirculation system. 5. Flow from ECCS accumulator 6. Current Drawn by ECCS long term recirculation pumps. 7. Steam generator pressure. 8. Suppression pool water temperature. 9. F/M vault and pump room coolers are ON . Initiate following Manual Actions 1. Confirm PC/SC isolation/closure of dampers and PC exhaust fans tripping on containment box up signal. 2. Ensure secondary containment vacuum is maintained. 3. Isolate I/A of non essential/non-LOCA loads manually from C/R. 4. Monitor CTM. 5. Monitor pressure in V1 &V2.. Check auto actions for 1. Isolation of ECCS accumulator on a) Low level in accumulator. b) Low pressure in N2 accumulator. 2. Venting of N2 from ECCS accumulator. 3. Closing of ECCS recirculation Valve (MV-55) CHECK 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. PHT pressure & steam generator pressure are PHT temperature <100C. ECCS long term recirculation pumps (2 nos.) Reactor is subcritical with SDS-1 fully in Check V1 & V2 are interconnected. Flow to SGs from BFPs/ABFPs; in case of non very low. are running. and/or SDS-2 injected full worth. availability of these, fire water

should be injected to SGs. CHECK 1. Flow & Charcoal temp. in PCC system. 2. F/M vault & pump room coolers are on. 3. Pressure & temperature in RB. 4. Stable and consistent trend in CTM / COT Observe the following 1.

Reactor is S/D. Sub criticality margin is more than 10 mk 2. PHT system pressure and temperature are low. 3. Channel outlet temperature has no tendency to increase . 4. Containment is boxed up and its engineered safety system are working well Manual Actions 1. After 7 hrs, valve in PCC system to reduce iodine activity. 2. Take sample for establishing radiological condition and source term. 3. Consult advisory group for the action plan of depressurisation and removal of irradiated fuel bundles. 4. After 48 Hrs, PCCD can be valved in for further RB depressurisation through PCCD (also refer EOP 2.7.4). 5. Initiate the action for removal of irradiated fuel bundles from F/M vault and decontamination of F/M vault. END Rev-0 -25June 2004

TAPS-3&4 - EOP FOR FAILURE OF EOP/TAPS-3&4/3.2.16 COOLANT CHANNEL END FITTING CONCURRENT WITH EJECTION OF FUEL BUNDLES 10.0 EVENT TERMINATION CHECK LIST: 1. Reactor is S/D; SDS-1 and SDS-2 actuated. Subcriticality margin is more than 10 mk. 2. ECCS is working in long-term recirculation mode satisfactorily and ECCS accumulators got isolated and vented. 3. Containment is boxed up and its engineered safety systems are working well. Action plan is initiated to depressurize the reactor-building atmosphere through PCCD. 4. PHT system pressure and temperature are low (<1010C) in broken loop. 5. Intact loop is isolated and core cooling is maintained (PHT temperature <1500C) by thermosyphoning. 6. Steam generators are filled and are providing heat sink, through thermosyphoning. 7. Channel Outlet Temperature (COT) has no tendency to increase. 8. Action is being planned for removal of fuel bundles from F/M vault. 11.0 REFERENCES: 1. TAPS-3&4 Safety Report Vol. II. 2. EOP/TAPS-3&4/2.2.7 Emergency operating procedure for failure at any location of any feeder pipe (small break LOCA) . 3. MAPS/3300/OPEC-25/R-0 Medium LOCA. 4. Kaiga-1&2 EOP-3.2.2 5. RAPS-3&4 EOP-3.2.2 12.0 ANNEXURE: NIL. 13.0 APPENDICES : NIL 14.0 EVALUATION : NIL Rev-0 -26June 2004