1 General Notes on the Sin of Angels [May 19, 2009: addition; when one thinks of all that needs

discussion here, such as God and the permission of evil; how he is author of all that is positive and actual in any act, but 5is not the origin of the privation in the moral act, etc., this could monopolize the discussion. I think I should confine myself to what is proper to the angelic sin discussion.] I am looking at ST 1.63. Clearly one must consider (1) the very possibility of such sin; (2) nature of the sin (pride, first of all, and envy secondly; (3) desire to be like God, 10how? Subsequent articles make it clear that the whole discussion starts with the angel having grace, and all having merited with respect to beatitude. It is in the second moment that some choose to turn towards themselves, while others turn towards God. (63.5.ad 4) (also a. 6.ad 4). The psychology is described and should be brought out. 15 One thing I would like to get at is the sort of knowledge they had of supernatural beatitude before they made their choice to order themselves towards their own good, not considering the rule from on high. 20The psychology of the sin is brought out, too, by the consideration of the lower angels as following the higher in sin: cf. 8.ad 2. Let us look at this text. The objector is arguing against the idea that the sin of the first, i.e. highest, angel was a cause of the sin of the others. The objection runs: the first sin of the angel can only be pride, as was said above. Pride, however, 25 seeks to excel. Now, it is more repugnant to excellence that someone be subjected to an inferior than to a superior; and thus it does not seem that the demons sinned in this way, viz. that they wished to be subject to some one of the highest angels rather than to God. But it is thus that the sin of one angel would have been the cause of sin for others, viz. if it led them to being subject to itself. Therefore, it does not seem 30 that the sin of the first angel was a cause of sinning for the others.1 And the reply: To the second it is to be said that the proud person (PP), other things being equal, does rather prefer to be subject to a superior than to an inferior. However, if one attains to some excellence when subject to the inferior that cannot be had 35 under the superior, then PP will rather choose to be subject to the inferior rather than to the superior. Thus, therefore, it was not against the pride of the demons that they willed to be subject to the inferior, consenting to his primacy: wishing to have him as prince and leader so that they might attain by natural power to their own

ST 1.63.8.obj. 2: Praeterea, primum peccatum Angeli non potest esse nisi superbia, ut supra dictum est. Sed superbia excellentiam quaerit. Magis autem excellentiae repugnat quod aliquis inferiori subdatur, 5 quam superiori, et sic non videtur quod Daemones peccaverint per hoc quod voluerunt subesse alicui superiorum Angelorum, potius quam deo. Sic autem peccatum unius Angeli fuisset aliis causa peccandi, si eos ad hoc induxisset ut sibi subiicerentur. Non ergo videtur quod peccatum primi Angeli fuerit causa peccandi aliis.

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 1

4/16/2012

2 ultimate beatitude, especially since according to the order of nature they were then already subject to the supreme angel.2 [We see well that the good thing they opt for is their own natural beatitude. They are created in that beatitude.] 5 [We have to be clear that the whole discussion supposes angels as having grace and as called to supernatural beatitude. Let us look at the article on the possibility of sin in the angels. 63.1. Here the foundational point is that any creature is capable of an operation or 10movement that lacks its proper order. The word peccatum here, translated as sin, is so general as to apply to mere natural things that lack cognition, and to the operation of the artist or technician as such, and to the operation of the moral agent, the agent possessing free choice. Thus, we read: I answer that it is to be said that the angel and any rational creature whatsoever, if it 15 be considered merely as to its own nature, can sin, and to whatever creature it belongs that it cannot sin, this it has from a gift of grace, not from the condition of its nature. The reason for this is that to sin is nothing else but to recede from the rightness of the act which [the act] ought to have; [this is so] whether one takes sin as in natural things or in artificial things or in morals. Now, only that act 20 whose rule is the very power of the agent [itself] is altogether immune from receding from rectitude: for if the hand of the craftsman were the very rule of the cutting, the craftsman could never cut the wood other than rightly, but if the rightness of the incision is from another rule, then it happens that the incision be right and not right. Now, the divine will alone is the rule of its own act, because it is 25 not ordered towards a higher end. Every will of any creature has rightness in its own act only inasmuch as it is regulated by the divine will, to which the ultimate end pertains; just as any will of an inferior ought to be regulated in keeping with the will of the superior: for example, the will of the soldier in accord with the will of the leader of the army. Thus, therefore, in the divine will alone there cannot be sin; 30 in the will of any creature there can be sin, as regards the condition of its own nature.3
2

ST 1.63.8.ad 2:

Ad secundum dicendum quod superbus, ceteris paribus, magis vult subesse superiori quam inferiori. Sed si aliquam excellentiam consequatur sub inferiori, quam sub superiori consequi non possit, magis eligit inferiori subesse quam superiori. Sic igitur non fuit contra superbiam Daemonum quod subesse inferiori voluerunt, in eius principatum consentientes; ad hoc eum principem et ducem habere volentes, ut virtute naturali suam ultimam beatitudinem consequerentur; praesertim quia supremo Angelo naturae ordine etiam tunc subiecti erant.

103 ST 1.63.1: Respondeo dicendum quod tam Angelus quam quaecumque creatura rationalis, si in sua sola natura consideretur, potest peccare, et cuicumque creaturae hoc convenit ut peccare non possit, hoc habet ex dono gratiae, non ex conditione naturae. Cuius ratio est, quia peccare nihil est aliud quam declinare a rectitudine actus quam debet habere; sive accipiatur peccatum in naturalibus, 15 sive in artificialibus, sive in moralibus. Solum autem illum actum a rectitudine declinare non contingit, cuius regula est ipsa virtus agentis. Si enim manus artificis esset ipsa regula incisionis, nunquam posset artifex nisi recte lignum incidere, sed si rectitudo incisionis sit ab alia regula, contingit incisionem esse rectam et non rectam. Divina autem voluntas sola est regula sui actus,

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 2

4/16/2012

3 The objections and replies are very important. The first refers to Aristotles teaching that the bad can only exist where there is potency in a thing. The reply focuses our attention on the realm of intellect: in the angels there is no potency towards natural being. Nevertheless there is 5 potency in them in function of the intellective part, as regards its being turned towards this or towards that. And on this account the bad can be in them.4 A second objection notes that there can be nothing bad in the celestial bodies according to the philosophers, and angels are more perfect still (digniores). The answer is that such bodies have only natural operation, whereas the angels have the action of the 10free judgment or choice. The third objection argues on the basis that the angels have in them a natural love for God, and no one sins in loving God. The reply here is crucial: To the third it is to be said that it is natural for the angel that it be turned towards God with a movement of love, inasmuch as [God] is the principle of natural being. 15 However, that it be turned towards him inasmuch as he is the object of SUPERnatural beatitude stems from gratuitous love, from which [the angel] can be turned away in sinning.5 We see how essential to the doctrine of angelic sin is the existence of the SUPERnatural order. We are in the domain of revelation. 20 However, it is by far the 4th objection and reply that fills in the picture of the angelic sinning. The objection itself is as follows: Furthermore, appetite is only for the good or the apparent good. However, in the angels there cannot be the apparent good that is not the true good, because in them either error is altogether impossible, or at any rate cannot precede the fault. 25 Therefore, the angels cannot have appetite save for that which is truly a good. Now, no one sins by having appetite for that which is truly good. Therefore, the angel does not sin in its use of appetite.6 Here the reply is actually longer than the body of the article:
quia non ad superiorem finem ordinatur. Omnis autem voluntas cuiuslibet creaturae rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi secundum quod regulatur a voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus finis, sicut quaelibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem superioris, ut voluntas 5 militis secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate divina peccatum esse non potest, in qualibet autem voluntate creaturae potest esse peccatum, secundum conditionem suae naturae. 4 ST 1.63.1.ad 1: Ad primum ergo dicendum quod in Angelis non est potentia ad esse naturale. Est tamen in eis 10 potentia secundum intellectivam partem, ad hoc quod convertantur in hoc vel in illud. Et quantum ad hoc, potest in eis esse malum. 5 ST 1.63.1.ad 3:

15
6

Ad tertium dicendum quod naturale est Angelo quod convertatur motu dilectionis in deum, secundum quod est principium naturalis esse. Sed quod convertatur in ipsum secundum quod est obiectum beatitudinis supernaturalis, hoc est ex amore gratuito, a quo averti potuit peccando.

ST 1.63.1.obj. 4: Praeterea, appetitus non est nisi boni, vel apparentis boni. Sed in Angelis non potest esse apparens bonum, quod non sit verum bonum, quia in eis vel omnino error esse non potest, vel saltem non 20 potest praecedere culpam. Ergo Angeli non possunt appetere nisi id quod est vere bonum. Sed nullus, appetendo id quod est vere bonum, peccat. Ergo Angelus appetendo non peccat.

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 3

4/16/2012

4 To the fourth it is to be said that sin in the act of the free choice takes place in two ways. In the first way, by the fact that one chooses something bad: as, for example, when a human being sins by choosing adultery, which is in itself 5 something bad. And such a sin always proceeds from some ignorance or error; otherwise that which is bad would not be chosen as a good. Now, the adulterer errs as regards what is particular, choosing this enjoyment of the inordinate act as something good to be done now, because of the inclination of passion or of habituation; even if as regards the universal he does not err, but hangs onto true 10 judgment about the matter. However, sin cannot have occurred in the angel in this way, because there are in the angels no passions by which reason or intellect could be restrained, as is clear from things already seen; nor again could habituation have preceded the first sin, inclining [the angel] towards sinning. In the second way sin occurs by the free judgment choosing something that 15 is in itself a good, but not with the order of the due measure or rule: in such a way that the defect constituting [inducens] the sin is solely on the side of the choice, which does not have the due order, and not on the side of the thing chosen: as, for example, if someone were to choose to pray, not paying attention to the order established by the Church. And such a sin does not presuppose ignorance, but the 20 mere absence of consideration of those things which ought to be considered. And it is in this way that the angel sinned, turning himself through free choice towards his own proper good, without the order towards the rule of the divine will.7 This is to say that the angels sin consists in seeking8 its own already possessed natural beatitude, in such a way that it does not seek the divinely appointed supernatural beatitude. 25 May 19, 2009: there is no doubt that the entire issue of angelic sin is one that belongs to revealed theology rather than natural theology. That is the point of 1.63.1.ad 3: the very possibility of angelic sin involves the relation of the angel to God as to the object of the SUPERnatural beatific vision. The very existence of such a vision, i.e. such a possible
ST 1.63.1.ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod peccatum in actu liberi arbitrii contingit esse dupliciter. Uno modo, ex hoc quod aliquod malum eligitur, sicut homo peccat eligendo adulterium, quod secundum se est 5 malum. Et tale peccatum semper procedit ex aliqua ignorantia vel errore, alioquin id quod est malum, non eligeretur ut bonum. Errat quidem adulter in particulari, eligens hanc delectationem inordinati actus quasi aliquod bonum ad nunc agendum, propter inclinationem passionis aut habitus; etiam si in universali non erret, sed veram de hoc sententiam teneat. Hoc autem modo in Angelo peccatum esse non potuit, quia nec in Angelis sunt passiones, quibus ratio aut intellectus 10 ligetur, ut ex supra dictis patet; nec iterum primum peccatum habitus praecedere potuit ad peccatum inclinans. Alio modo contingit peccare per liberum arbitrium, eligendo aliquid quod secundum se est bonum, sed non cum ordine debitae mensurae aut regulae; ita quod defectus inducens peccatum sit solum ex parte electionis, quae non habet debitum ordinem, non ex parte rei electae; sicut si aliquis eligeret orare, non attendens ad ordinem ab ecclesia institutum. Et 15 huiusmodi peccatum non praeexigit ignorantiam, sed absentiam solum considerationis eorum quae considerari debent. Et hoc modo Angelus peccavit, convertendo se per liberum arbitrium ad proprium bonum, absque ordine ad regulam divinae voluntatis. 8 I had first written preferring, but then wondered if that could be the right word. It suggests a comparison being made, whereas what Thomas has described is something in itself good while simply not 20considering the right order coming from on high; so I just put seeking.
7

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 4

4/16/2012

5 ultimate end for a creature is an object of supernatural faith for any created intellect (ST 1.1.1; see Sent. 4.10.4D: Credo autem quod omnia quae sunt fidei, sunt supra naturalem cognitionem Angelorum, sicut supra rationem naturalem hominum; et ideo mysteria fidei 5 dicuntur esse abscondita a saeculis in Deo, ut dicitur Eph. 3. [I believe that all those things which belong to faith are beyond the knowledge that is natural for the angels, just as it is beyond the natural reason of human beings; and therefore the mysteries of faith are said to have been hidden through the ages in God, as is said in Ephesians 3.9.] 10And cf. especially ST 2-2.5.1. Thus, the picture of the angel as open to a first sin is a picture of an angel living already in supernatural faith, beyond its own actual vision of reality. Obviously, its natural knowledge of God is far beyond what can be attributed to a human being, but the supernatural is to it, too, a hidden realm. 15 The angels, all of them, are seen as freely choosing, in a first moment, a supernatural subjection to God, so that they actually merit eternal beatitude. It is in a second moment that the sinning angels are posing a block to such a move into beatitude. Cf. 1.63.6.ad 4. Article 6 asks whether there was any delay [mora] between the creation and the fall of the angels. The fourth objection runs: 20 Furthermore, it was a different instant in which the devil sinned from the instant in which he was created. Now, between any two instants there occurs an intermediate time. Therefore, there was some delay between his creation and his fall.9 And Thomas replies: To the fourth it is to be said that [the premise] between any two instants there is an 25 intermediate time is true inasmuch as time is continuous, as is proved in Physics 6 [231b9]; cf. also 4 [219a13]. However, in the angels, who are not subject to celestial movement, which is primarily measured by the continuum of time, time is taken as the very succession of operations of the intellect or also of the affection. Thus, therefore, the first instant for the angels is understood to correspond to the 30 operation of the angelic mind by which it turns itself towards itself through the evening knowledge, because in the first day is commemorated the evening but not the morning. And this operation was good in all. But from this operation some [angels] through morning knowledge were turned towards the praise of the Word [of God], whereas some [angels], remaining within themselves, became night, 35 swelling with pride, as Augustine says in Commentary on the Text of Genesis 4. And thus the first operation was common to all, but in the second they are distinguished. And so in the first instant all were good, but in the second the good were distinguished from the bad.10
9

ST 1.63.6.obj. 4:

5
10

Praeterea, aliud instans fuit in quo diabolus peccavit, ab instanti in quo creatus fuit. Sed inter quaelibet duo instantia cadit tempus medium. Ergo aliqua mora fuit inter creationem eius et lapsum.

ST 1.63.6.ad 4: Ad quartum dicendum quod inter quaelibet duo instantia esse tempus medium, habet veritatem inquantum tempus est continuum, ut probatur in VI physic.. Sed in Angelis, qui non sunt subiecti caelesti motui, qui primo per tempus continuum mensuratur, tempus accipitur pro ipsa successione 10 operationum intellectus, vel etiam affectus. Sic igitur instans primum in Angelis intelligitur

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 5

4/16/2012

6 We should say something about the morning and evening knowledge, and the signification of night here. We should also stress that the angels who fall actually merit in the first act, but block the effect of that merit in the second act. (Note that all these acts of the angels are acts of free choice.) 5 In a. 5 the query is whether the devil was bad in the first moment of his creation. The answer is that he was good [Notice that the morning knowledge is had only by the blessed angels.] 10I look at 2-2.162.6, on pride, and a. 6 is n.b. as finding pride the gravest sin in kind, because its essence involves contempt for God. Note: Et ideo averti a Deo et eius praeceptis, quod est quasi consequens in aliis peccatis, per se ad superbiam pertinet, cuius actus est Dei contemptus. Et quia id quod est per se, semper est potius eo quod est per aliud, consequens est quod superbia sit 15 gravissimum peccatorum secundum suum genus, quia excedit in aversione, quae formaliter complet peccatum. 2-2.163.2 nb as comparing man and angel as to first sin, what they have in common and what was special to the angel. 20 I should reread 1.63.2 etc. [Notice that we can never avoid the general problem of divine operation and divine permission of sin.] 1.60.5.ad 5: on loving God as common good naturally more than oneself and yet also 25hating God as the author of particular effect that run counter to the will of the angel (this is possible because when not having the beatific vision, they know God as the author of particular effects.) Cf. 2-2.34.1 on hating God: Sunt autem quidam effectus Dei qui repugnant inordinatae voluntati, sicut inflictio 30 poenae; et etiam cohibitio peccatorum per legem divinam, quae repugnat voluntati depravatae per peccatum. Et quantum ad considerationem talium effectuum, ab aliquibus Deus odio haberi potest, inquantum scilicet apprehenditur peccatorum prohibitor et poenarum inflictor. 35Reading 1.63.1, it occurs to me that the ultimate end is what God provides as the ultimate end (as in 1.1.1 it is something beyond human rational knowledge). We read (1.63.1): Omnis autem voluntas cuiuslibet creaturae rectitudinem in suo actu non habet, nisi secundum quod regulatur a voluntate divina, ad quam pertinet ultimus finis, sicut quaelibet voluntas inferioris debet regulari secundum voluntatem superioris, ut 40 voluntas militis secundum voluntatem ducis exercitus. Sic igitur in sola voluntate
respondere operationi mentis angelicae, qua se in seipsam convertit per vespertinam cognitionem, quia in primo die commemoratur vespere, sed non mane. Et haec quidem operatio in omnibus bona fuit. Sed ab hac operatione quidam per matutinam cognitionem ad laudem verbi sunt conversi, quidam vero, in seipsis remanentes, facti sunt nox, per superbiam intumescentes, ut Augustinus dicit, IV super Gen. Ad litt.. Et sic prima operatio fuit omnibus communis; sed in secunda sunt discreti. Et ideo in primo instanti omnes fuerunt boni; sed in secundo fuerunt boni a malis distincti.

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 6

4/16/2012

7 divina peccatum esse non potest, in qualibet autem voluntate creaturae potest esse peccatum, secundum conditionem suae naturae. Look at 2-2.5.1: The idea is that the angels before confirmation or fall did not have the beatific 5vision, and this is what is primary in faith. In comparison to the immensity of the divine light, the angels and man had a natural obscurity which constitutes the unseeing character of faith. They hear about beatitude but still eye has not seen etc. A. 2 here is also of interest for the good affection of the will moving the intellectual assent to the faith, even the unformed faith of humans (as distinct from the faith 10in the demons that lacks the good affection. Rereading 1.63.1 at the ad 4, I think that the non-consideration of the rule or measure regarding a good thing is nnnbbb. One could even see this in the person who is drinking beer, a good thing, and knows the need for limit, but fails to consider it. The measure is absent in the choice, not an ignorance of what the measure is. 15[Can such non-consideration be inculpable? In humans, yes, but in the angel it is perhaps one with the very act of the sin.] 1.63.2, on the necessity that the nature of the first sin be one of superbia: In spiritualibus autem bonis non potest esse peccatum dum aliquis ad ea afficitur, nisi per hoc quod in tali affectu superioris regula non servatur. Et hoc est peccatum 20 superbiae, non subdi superiori in eo quo debet. Unde peccatum primum Angeli non potest esse aliud quam superbia. We are speaking of sin as something involving the appetite, the affection, of the one who acts. The angels are spiritual creatures, and the things that appeal to them must thus be spiritual goods. There is nothing wrong with the pursuit of spiritual goods, unless in the 25pursuit of such good the rule of the superior is not maintained. It is that ontological hierarchy that must be considered. Thus, the first of angelic sins must be not being subject to the superior in the way that is due. And this is the definition of the sin of pride. There is one other sort of sin which follows upon the first: that of envy. Thus we read: 30 Sed consequenter potuit in eis esse etiam invidia. Eiusdem enim rationis est quod affectus tendat in aliquid appetendum, et quod renitatur opposito. Invidus autem ex hoc de bono alterius dolet, inquantum bonum alterius aestimat sui boni impedimentum. Non autem bonum alterius poterat aestimari impedimentum boni affectati per Angelum malum, nisi inquantum affectavit excellentiam singularem, 35 quae quidem singularitas per alterius excellentiam cessat. Et ideo post peccatum superbiae consecutum est in Angelo peccante malum invidiae, secundum quod de bono hominis doluit; et etiam de excellentia divina, secundum quod eo deus contra voluntatem ipsius diaboli utitur in gloriam divinam. [But consequently envy can also be in them. For it pertains to the same situation 40 that the affection tend appetitively towards something and that it leans in the opposite direction. Now the envious person for this reason grieves about the good of another, viz. inasmuch as he judges that the good of the other is an impediment to his own good. Now, the good of another cannot be adjudged to be an impediment to the good affected by the bad angel save inasmuch as he had affection for singular 45 excellence, which singularity is eliminated by the excellence of someone else. And therefore after the sin of pride there followed in the sinning angel the evil of envy,

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 7

4/16/2012

8 inasmuch as he grieved concerning the good of the human being; and also concerning the divine excellence, inasmuch as God uses human good against the will of the devil himself for the divine glory. Still, everything turns on the doctrine of pride. 5 Notice that the angels focus on its own goodness involves here the disrespect for the divine. This is hatred of God. Dont forget that the first act is good (and this would be like the first act of freedom doctrine. It is the second act that we must try to envisage, as the change from the first, 10blocking the merit of the first. We should try to envisage the greatness of the angel, as impressing as it must be. This is needed as a sort of ingredient. We should also bring in the other dimensions of the act of pride, such as contempt for God, hatred of God. This in terms of God as author of beatific vision goal for angels, a 15goal known only through faith (not vision yet): this is needed to explain rejection. We should also point out how far from our knowledge the angel is. What we should ask ourselves is what the idea of the angelic act of sin is. Thomas speaks of it as a choice of a good, but a choice undertaken without consideration of the 20right rule, the divine will. How does this tie in with the description of the act of pride as worst, because it is essentially an aversion from God? Cf. 2-2.162.6 I have been tending to stress that the angel is in a realm of faith in respect to the beatific vision. One might ask whether I am not offering a sort of excuse for sin, based on lack of knowledge. It should be kept in mind how great a sin the sin of the angels is. It is 25part of this that the thing they seek, namely an appreciation of their own excellence, is a genuine good, and it is their choosing it not according to the divine order, namely the rule to accept it as a divine gift (I would say), that they go wrong. What is the nature of this leaving the rule out of consideration? It is certainly a matter of free choice. It gets a full description, I would say, in terms of 2-2.162.6 and 30perhaps 1.63.8, where we see the preference for the natural order over the supernatural order (re the lower opting in a way for the supreme angel as leader). In 2-2.162.6 the commutabile bonum that is involved, if we think of the angels sin, is its own excellence; as such, there is nothing wrong with the act. It is the aversion from the incommutabile bonum (present in every mortal sin) that we must focus on. We 35read: Sed ex parte aversionis, superbia habet maximam gravitatem, quia in aliis peccatis homo a deo avertitur vel propter ignorantiam, vel propter infirmitatem, sive propter desiderium cuiuscumque alterius boni; sed superbia habet aversionem a deo ex hoc ipso quod non vult deo et eius regulae subiici. 40Pride has aversion to God by the very fact that it does not want to be subject to God and his rule. And again we read: Et ideo averti a deo et eius praeceptis, quod est quasi consequens in aliis peccatis, per se ad superbiam pertinet, cuius actus est dei contemptus. 45Turning away from God and his precepts, which is in the role of consequence in other sins, pertains essentially to pride, whose act is contempt for God.

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 8

4/16/2012

9 [Notice that the reasons why, once rationally faced, pride is easy to avoid, are reasons given primarily for the human being. However the reason taken from Gods greatness would apply to the angelic case as well. [Notice also this: 5 Nam per hoc ipsum infidelitatis peccatum gravius redditur, si ex superbiae contemptu procedat, quam si ex ignorantia vel infirmitate proveniat. This relates to my point about being careful re angels and their faith. Ignorance and infirmity are not grounds for their infidelity. Better to stick with just what Thomas gives us. 10 Reading on pride in humans makes me think that we should treat the case of the angels as very special.

Lawrence Dewan, o.p.

Page 9

4/16/2012