The Historiography of the Peruvian Guerrilla Movement, 1960-1965 Author(s): Leon G.

Campbell Reviewed work(s): Source: Latin American Research Review, Vol. 8, No. 1 (Spring, 1973), pp. 45-70 Published by: The Latin American Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2502695 . Accessed: 05/02/2012 17:54
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THE

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, 1960-1965

Leon G. Campbell,Universityof California, Riverside

PERU HAS A DURABLE TRADITION OF PEASANT

REBELLION,

MOST RECENTLY

DE-

scribedby Jose MatosMar (1967) and OscarCornblit(1970), which datesfar back to the eighteenthcenturymovementsled by JuanSantosAtahuallpaand Jose' Gabriel TuipacAmaru. Twentieth centuryguerrilla leaders have tried to identify with this traditionby echoing their predecessors' concernfor the Indians'right to work their own land and to be free from exploitation.They have namedtheir fronts for Tupac Amaru, Pumacahua, Pachacutec,and other native revolutionaries an earlier era, of and they have proposedfundamental changesin Peruviansociety,notablyagrarian reform, in a consciouseffortto completea strugglethat has gone on for more than two centuries secureland and dignityfor campesinos. to To date, however, the guerrillas' efforts to convince the Peruviancampesino that they sharehis aspirationsto own the land have failed for a varietyof reasons. The suggestion of the late SebastianSalazarBondy (1962) that the Andes might become another SierraMaestratoday seems hardly justified. In May 1963, Hugo Blanco,a peasantleaderwho had led a seriesof highly successfulland invasionsnear Cuzco after 1960, was jailed by the Peruvian government. After less than four months of activity,guerrillabands operatingin the highlands outside of Cuzco and Ayacuchowere defeated in 1965 by the efficientPeruvianmilitary.The deaths in 1967 of the surviving Peruvianguerrilla leaders with Ernesto "Che" Guevarain Bolivia robbedthe Peruvianmovementof both symbolicand actualleadership,and opened to question whether the guerrilla tactics successfully employed by Fidel Castroin Cubawereapplicable the restof LatinAmerica. to In Peru, where as late as 1963, .1 per cent of the populationcontrolledover 60 per cent of the land undercultivation,the profound desireof the ruralpeasantry to own the land which they work appearedto be the most certainmeans of securing mass supportfor any revolutionary endeavor.The most successfulexpositionof this thesis was made by Blanco, a Trotskyitelabor organizerfrom Cuzco,who mobilized an estimated300,000 peasantsin the Laresand La Convencionvalleys,locatedninety miles north of Cuzco,duringthe period 1959-1963, in land invasionswhich overran nearly three hundred haciendas. Because most of these lands were unoccupied, guerrillawarfareplayed a negligible role in these invasions.Nor did the movement spreadthroughoutPeru becauseof the isolated nature of the region and the rapid recognition by the government of the peasants' de facto ownership of the lands which they had seized. Nevertheless,the earlysuccessesof Blancohad a galvanizing effectupon the Peruviannew left as well as on intellectuals worldwide.By 1965, two separate guerrillaorganizations, Movimientode Izquierda the Revolucionaria (MIR) 45

Latin American Research Review and the EjercitoNacional de Liberacion(ELN) had entered the mountainsin an revoattemptto capitalizeupon Blanco'ssuccessesand to createthere a Castro-type lution. Although there well may be additionalexplanations,four reasonshelp to explain the rapid defeat of the Peruvianguerrillasin 1965. First, a severe ideological crisis split the Peruvianleft during the period following World War II, a crisisexacerbated the successesof Castroand the Sino-Sovietrupture.This split prevented by the guerrillasin Peru from securingcritical support from the left, especiallyfrom the progressivebourgeoisie in the cities on whom they had counted heavily. Secondly, the guerrillaswere hamperedby a lack of adequateplanning, which resulted in their failure to securethe supportof the peasantry. Rushing into actionhurriedly after the captureof Blanco and the accessionof the reformistgovernmentof President FernandoBelaiunde Terry in 1964, the guerrillasremainedseparatedfrom the peasantryby an immenseculturaland linguistic barrierwhich they never were able to surmount.The mutual mistrustthus engenderedbetween the two groups prevented effective cooperation and hindered military activity. Third, the Peruvian guerrillasdisplayedconfusion aboutthe exact natureof the societywhich they were of attacking,as well as misunderstanding the Cubanand Chinesemodels for guerrilla warfarewhich they professedto follow. Finally, political events conspiredto isolate the guerrillas.The interventionof an institutionalmilitary junta in the summerof 1962 had acted to prevent a returnof the old order and permittedthe election of politics BelaTunde following year. The belief of many Peruviansthat Bela'unde's the representedan emerging new order was reinforced by the passage of a moderate agrarianreform bill which may have considerablyeased peasant discontent and therebypreventedthe subjectiveconditions favorableto a guerrilla war from materializingbetween 1963 and 1965. The Peruvianmilitaryeffectivelycapitalizedon these conditions to quickly defeat the guerrilla bands that year. In 1968 the army by acted decisively to prevent their reappearance overthrowingBelauinde,whose government that datehad failed to producethe new orderto which it was pledged. by large coastal reformbill which expropriated In 1970 the passageof a majoragrarian sugar propertiesas well as lands in the sierra seemed likely to reduce further the chancesfor the successfulresumptionof guerrillawarfarein ruralPeru. The purpose of this paper is to identify some of the best writing about the Peruvianguerrillasdone in the last decadeand to point out what seem to be significant historiographical developmentswithin certain related areas. Because of the proliferationof publishedmaterialson a subjectof this nature,articleswith such a focus are necessarilysomewhat dated upon publication.No claim of completeness is made. On the subject of Latin American guerrillasin general, or those in Peru in therehas been no lack of scholarlyattention.Writings varywidely in both particular, materials of and however,becauseof the difficulty assembling scholarship orientation, on such an elusive subject.One interestedin the Peruviannew left might profitably begin by consulting Ronald H. Chilcote's (1970) comprehensivebibliographyon 46

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965

the LatinAmericanleft duringthe presentcentury,which containseight hundredentrieson Perualone. The collectionalso offersa brief precison leftist activitiesin each In areaand a listing of pertinentjournalsto help the interestedresearcher. addition, Vera B. Lamberg's (1970) bibliographyof Castroiteguerrillas in Latin America during the last decade is useful as a continentalsurvey of the subject, although it works. neglectsseveralimportant accountsof LatinAmericanguerrillamovements secondary Among the standard during the present century, those published by Luis Mercier Vega (1969), the Paris-based editorof Aportes, and by political scientistJamesPetras (1968) depend heavily upon published sources of varying reliability. The best treatmentof the subjectby far is RichardGott's GuerrillaMovementsin Latin America (1971), a detailedaccountof the movementwhich employsa wide varietyof publishedsources in a scholarlyand readablefashion. An additionalstrengthof Gott's work lies in its refusal to moralizeupon the subject.The authorresists indicting the guerrillasfor failing to bring aboutthe revolution,noting that their immediateobjective,which he feels was achieved, was simply to create the conditions out of which a revolution might occur later. Gott also suggests that the internationalrepercussionsof the Latin Americanguerrillashave been more importantthan supposed, and have inthe elsewherethroughout world. fluencedrevolutionary developments To understandthe land invasions and guerrillawar which took place in Peru situationwhich between 1960 and 1965, one must firsttake into accountthe agrarian helped to provoke the confrontations.Sociologist Hector Martinez's Bibliografia listing indigena andina peruana,1900-1968 (1968), a two-volumebibliographical of the majorworks in Spanishon the subject,offers a logical startingpoint for the investigatorsearchingfor the roots of these agrarianproblems.Older monographic studies on the Peruvianagrariansituationby sociologist Thomas Ford (1955) and Mexican agriculturaleconomistEdmundo Flores (1950), have been recently augmented by studies of the Peruvianhaciendamade by Mario C. Vasquez (1961), Julio Cotler (1970), Matos Mar (1970), and Martinez (1970) himself, all of which help to explain the evolution and developmentof the great estate and its obstacleto agricultural progress. laborsystemas a primary assessmentto date of the land reform issue in Peru Perhapsthe best-balanced and its relationshipto the social and economicdevelopmentof the countryhas been de issued by the Comite Interamericano Desarrollo Agricola (CIDA) in 1966, a team of OAS expertswho addressedthemselvesto the principaltechnical,financial, institutional,and other obstaclesto a successfulprogramof land reform.Assembled in the wake of the guerrillauprisingsof 1965, the reportis an unflatteringand objective analysis of both Peruvian efforts and failures to reform the agrariansysof tem, compiled by a varietyof commentators all political persuasions.The CIDA findings have been admirablyreported upon by Petras and Robert LaPorte, Jr. reformissue in LatinAmericaand the the (1971), whose work summarizes agrarian United States' response to it in recent years. Luis Dongo Denegri's (1971) twovolume surveyof the agrarianmeasurestaken by the Peruvianmilitary since 1968 47

Latin American Research Review outlines the responsesmade to severalof the CIDA proposals.The more polemical treatmentsof the land reform issue in Peru by leftist authorsRicardo Letts Colmenares (1964) and CarlosMalpica (1963; 1968) are useful for an understanding of the mainspringof guerrilladiscontent,althoughthey are designed more to incite than to inform. Both explain the need for summary,uncompensated expropriation of these landholdsbut fail to go beyondthis position to the more fundamentalquestions of way andmeans,as well as economicconsequences. As Leon Trotskyonce observed,the fundamentalpremiseof a revolutionmust be that the existing social situation in a country should have become obsolete in termsof its abilityto resolvethe urgentproblemsof development.To date, therehas been little in the way of consensusregardingthe exact natureof Peruviansocietyor of the abilities of that society to meet national needs and aspirations.Moreover, changing conditions since 1968 have served only to furtherconfuse the issue. The Marxist interpretation Peruvianreality is lucidly explained by RicardoMartinez of de la Torre (1948). SociologistFrancoisBourricaud(1967) has long assertedthat an oligarchyof powerful privatecitizens ruled in Peru, using the political structure largelyto servetheir own interests.In the recentpast, Bourricaud creditedurbanhas izationand industrialization with a "cholification" Peruviansocietyand a breakup of of the old patron-clientrelationships,both of which have helped to erode this oligarchicaldomination.Studies by sociologist James L. Payne (1965), and political scientists RichardH. Stephens (1971) and Carlos Alberto Astiz (1969) have refined Bourricaud's thesis. Payne'sstudy of labor and politics in Peru has attempted to explain the Peruvianpolitical system without resorting to an oligarchicalconstruct,which he finds simplistic. Instead,he views political power in Peru as being widely held and focused in the president, who presides over a system in which violence is both highly structuredand quite predictable.Astiz has extended the analysisstill furtherby identifyingboth the compositionand political behaviorof the majorpressuregroups and power elites within the Peruviansystem. The objective nature of Peruviansociety or politics is perhaps of less importance to this paper than the knowledge that the guerrillaleadershipacceptedPeru as being feudal and predicated their theories regarding the correct conduct of a guerrillawar on this assumption. This belief, which has been best expressedby MIR leader Luis de la Puente (1965), helps to explain the lack of supportand even opposition which the guerrillasencountered amongthe traditionalPeruvianleft, which argued that Peru had to first enter a mature capitalistphase before the subjective conditions favoring revolution would become present. The confusion, dissension, and eventual defeat which ensued in 1965 did little to reconcilethe argument.Survivors of the guerrillastruggleinsist upon the abandonment this obsoleteversion of of Peruvian society and seek a clarificationof its true nature in order that future movementsmay act in accordwith them, while membersof the traditionalleft feel vindicatedin theirjudgmentof Peruvianreality. Not sincethe yeastydaysof the indigenistamovementin Peruduringthe 1920's, which producedleaderssuch as Jose CarlosMariateguiand Victor Rau6l Haya de la 48

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, i960-I965

Torre, has a charismatic man of the massesrisen in Peru to equal Hugo Blanco. A nativeof Cuzcoand a graduateof the Universityof La Plata in Argentina,where he studied under the TrotskyiteHugo Bressano, Blanco returnedto Cuzco in 1958, where he becameactive in the peasantunions, which were affiliatedwith the Federacion Nacional de CampesinosPeruanos(FENECAP). A naturalleader and fluent in Quechua, Blanco was also a member of the TrotskyitePartido Obrero Revolutionario (POR). This party became internationalin 1961 with the creation by Bressano of the Frente IzquierdaRevolucionaria(FIR), a broad union of leftist organizations solidaritywith peasantfederationsin Brazil and Guatemala,which in advocatedland seizuresand preacheda Communistideology to the peasantry. Further research into the exact internationalorientation of Blanco and his movement seems warranted.Writing under the pseudonym of Nahuel Moreno (1962), Bressanohas describedthe creationin Peru of the FIR and of the divisions which arose between the leadershipin Lima and its field commanders the Cuzco in region. Gonzalo AiniCastillo (1967), whose accountof the FIR and its activitiesis the most detailed and complete, explains, among other events, the series of bank robberiesconductedin Lima by the FIR to securefunds for the Blanco movement. The fact that the robberiesfailed, combined with the internal divisions between Blanco and the FIR leadership,may have combined to reorient the former from an organizerto an activist,perhapshasteninghis defeat as well as that of his movement. There are several accountsof Blanco and his movement,ranging from Salazar Bondy's (1965) short treatment of its leadership, to journalistic accounts by J. Guillermo Guevara (1959) and Hugo Neira (1964; 1968), all of which fail to go much beyond chronologicalsummationto the more complex social implications of the movement itself. In addition, there are accounts in the Trotskyite organs Obreroy Campesino(1960) and Voz Obrero (1960), containingsome interesting views by the party faithful. Finally, Blanco (1964) has left a short accountof his goals and activitiesas of his jailing in 1963. The single-volumetreatmentof Blanco by Villanueva (1967), however, remainsthe standardof inquiryon this fascinating individual,while Mario Malpica's (1967) overview of the guerrillayears appends severalof Blanco'smore importantstatementsof policy. The International Socialist Review (1965) has reprintedseveralof Blanco'slettersto variousassociates,which help to explainhis program aspirations. and No doubt because of Blanco's successes,several importantstudies of peasant organizationsin Peru have been undertakenin recent years. These range from a rather superficialTrotskyiteaccountby Adolfo Gilly (1963) to the more mature writings of sociologistAnibal Quijano (1965: 1967; 1968) who has consideredthe position of the peasantry within the entire scheme of Peruviansociety and has concluded that mobilization of the peasant is a prerequisitefor economic and social development.Other perceptivecommentators the subjectof Peruvianclass strucon ture and the peasants'role within it have been political sociologistsCotler (1967), and Felipe Portocarrero(1969) of the Andean SeminarSeries of the Instituto de 49

Latin American Research Review Estudios Americanos in Lima. These authors, and also Quijano and Bourricaud (1967), view the bourgeoisiein Peru, which remainsdependentupon and reflective of the upper classes, as the chief problem which permits internal colonialismand oligarchicaldominationto persist. Studiestouchingupon the LatinAmericanpeasantand his mentality,suchas that edited by HenryA. Landsberger (1969), examinedcholo leadershipand the peasant as revolutionary. Although most authorsseem to acceptthe peasantas a potentially explosive force, they seem to agree that he must be guided and led by dissatisfied cholos such as Blanco, who possessesthe requisite revolutionary skills and political acumento combateffectivelythe existing sociopoliticalsystem.The defeat of Blanco is accordingly explainedmore in termsof union rivalriesand other externalpolitical factors than by any questioning of the revolutionaryorientationof the peasantry itself. Both sociologist Wesley W. Craig, Jr. (1966; 1967) and English historian Eric J. Hobsbawm(1969) have studiedthe complex dynamicsof the La Convencion uprisings and seemingly conclude that it was an atypical situation. Because of a scarcityof labor in the region, landownersgrantedland to the workersand encouraged them to raise coffee, from which they derivedconsiderable income. Hobsbawm has noted that these unusualpreconditionsproduceda situationin which the peasants were more desirousof securingeconomicbenefitsthan anythingelse, and were willing to live within a neo-feudal environmentto secure such gains. The extraordinary prosperityof the peasantsduringthe early1950's threatenedthe traditional master-peasant social relationshipsand forced the landowners to withdraw many rights in an effort to reimposethe old social system.The result: a rapid spreadof peasantleagues which providedBlanco with a readyvehide for mobilization. Hobsbawmwarns of the atypicalityof La Convencionand of the dangersin isolating economic analysisfrom its social and historicalcontext and suggests that the time has come to test the La Convencionexperiencein other regions.As a beginning, one might profitably apply Landsberger's (1969) fifteen hypothesesregarding peasantmovementsto La Convencionand other regions in Peru. Finally, as Cotler and Portocarrerro (1969) demonstrate, there seem to be substantial variationsin the orientationof peasantorganizations throughoutPeru,especiallybetweenthose on the coast and in the sierra,as well as differencesin the responsesmade towardthem by forces-sufficient variations landowners,governmentofficials,and even international to hinder facile generalizations about the peasants'organizational and revolutionary capacities.Moreover,in light of Blanco's failures, may not future mass leadership come from the massesthemselves,as political sociologistsMagali Sarfattiand Arlene Bergman (1969) imply? To understandthe two-yearlapse following the defeat of Blanco in 1963 and the appearance 1965 of guerrillabands in the Peruvianhighlands, one must be in awareof the deep division that occurredwithin the Peruvianleft after World War II, and which continuedafter the CubanRevolution.During these yearsa crisis of legitimacy occurredwithin Peru's bourgeois reform parties, notably the Alianza 50

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965

Americana(APRA), founded in Mexico in 1924 by Haya PopularRevolucionaria appealand earlysuccesses de la Torre.Good evidenceexists thatBlanco'scharismatic to contributed this growing rift within the Peruvianleft. in mobilizing the peasantry Although Blanco'smovementfailed to spread,it servedto convinceyoungerleftists that the traditionalAPRA and the Partido ComunistaPeruana (PCP) were invanguardcalled for earlierby "Che" adequatevehicles to serve as the revolutionary Guevara (1963) and by the FrenchMarxistRegis Debray (1967), both of whom model" for guerrilla warfare as a revolutionary strongly advocateda "countryside alternative. exists, much of it polemicalin both tone and approach, A vast body of literature Earlycommentators on the subjectsof the politicaland ideologicalbasesof Aprismo,. such as Harry Kantor (1953) viewed the movement as largely a nationalisticand personalisticextension of Haya himself, while others, including Alfredo Hernandez Urbina (1956), Hernando Aguirre Gamo (1962) and historian FredrickB. Pike (1964), have stressedthe more negativeaspectsof its development,includinga subversive, neo-Marxist orientation. In addition, Bourricaud (1966) has dealt with reformideologyin a changingworld. APRA'spragmatic signs, however,that some of the morepolemicalwork on There are encouraging APRA is being replacedby serious and detachedhistorical analysesof the movesurveyedthe political literatureof Peru ment. In 1957, Eugenio Chang-Rodriguez from Gonzalez Prada and Mariateguito Haya de la Torre in an effort to establish continuities between the indigenistas and Apristas. More recently, Peter Klaren (1970) has completed a study of the origins of Aprismo in the Department of La Libertad,in which he carefully chartsthe developmentof a modern economic structure producedby competitionamong local and foreign sugar elites during the early part of the twentieth century.These changes, he contends, producedan economic and political situation beneficialto the fledgling APRA party, and were far more pivotal in determiningits growth than the depressionof 1929, which is frequentlycreditedwith widening Aprismo'spopularity.ThomasM. Davies, Jr. (1971) has surveyedthe Aprista'sfundamentallymoderatestanceon the subjectof indigenismo, and alludes to the defections in the 1960's of many youthful partymembers, several of whom later becameguerrillas.It would be interestingto know how the Aprista dissidentsand guerrillasattemptedto identify with these early proponents of the indigenistaideology and to what extent the officialpartyposition on the Indianinfluencedtheirdefection. Much of the pessimism with which the guerrillas regardedAPRA stemmed from the ideological shifts of Haya de la Torre prior to to the period 1948-1956, when the party was proscribed from participatingin Peruvianpolitics and Haya remaineda virtualcaptive in the Colombianembassybuilding in Lima. During this period, APRA divided into two groups, fundamentallyopposed to each other, one concernedwith the basic transformationof Peru along lines suggested earlier by Haya;the other,which now includedHayahimself, obsessedwith the idea of obtainthat of ing the presidencyregardless the politicalaccommodations might be necessary 51

Latin American Research Review to attain that goal. By 1956, the split was essentiallycomplete,when Haya entered into an unholy convivienciawith ex-dictator Manuel de Odria, the candidateof the right. Although the presidentialelectionsof 1962 were overturnedby the armythat summerin protest againstsuch an arrangement, split remainsto weakenAprista the politics. we Although the fact of the Apristaruptureis well established, know little about the way in which APRA functioned during its underground period, 1948-1956, or the facts which might help us understandwhy dissidentswere driven out and ultimatelyorganizedinto partiesadvocatingguerrillawarfare.For example, GrantHiliker (1971), a careerforeign service officerwho has recentlymade a study of the APRA and its limitations as a mass party, suggests that many of Haya's policies frictionwithin the organiwere resistedat lower partylevels, indicatingconsiderable zation itself. Villanueva's (1956) dassic account of the APRA split indicts the Apristahigh commandfor its failure to supportreformistelementswithin the party. ManuelSeoane, Includedin his studyis a letter to Hayafrom his second-in-command, which franklydiscussesthe Apristasplit, and refers to an attemptedaccommodation betweenHayaand JuanPeronin Argentinaduringthis period. Suchdisclosures indicate that many key features of APRA's evolution remain unknown to researchers. Insofar as the split ultimatelyhelped producea vacuumin the left and a guerrilla movement,it is an important subject,deservingfurtherresearch. One of the more significantdefectorsfrom the APRA in the wake of the Cuban Revolutionwas De la Puente,who laterbecamethe founderof the MIR and its foremost guerrillaleader.De la Puente was a native of Trujillo and a relativeof Haya's who had been exiled from Peru by Odria in 1948 for his part in the abortiveattack by APRA reformelementson the Callaogarrison.De la Puente'searlyyearsand his exile in Mexico are describedin some detail by Malpica (1967), although exactly what contactshe had with Castroiteor Bolivian groups then training there are unknown. Presumably Bolivian Revolutionmade a great impact on De la Puente, the who was jailed by Odria in 1954 for attemptingto foment a similar revolutionin Peru. Following his releasefrom jail, De la Puente returnedto Trujillo and took a reformwas laterpublished law degree. His doctoralthesis on the subjectof agrarian as La reformadel agro peruano (1966). Basic to his ideas was the acceptanceof Peru as a semi-feudalareawhere effectiveland reformwas indispensible.There was no indication at this date, however, that he consideredmass mobilization of the or meansof securingsuch reforms. peasantry guerrillawarfareas an acceptable It would seem that the Cubansuccessesplayed an importantrole in catalyzing De la Puente's discontentwith traditionalAprista politics. In 1960, four months after the Cuban revolution'striumph,he representedthe Peruvianleft at the First National AgrarianReform Forum in Havana, arguing there strongly in favor of to and APRA, by summary expropriation socialism.Although he purported represent the following year, De la Puente had led a group of dissidentsout of the partyand had formed Apra Rebelde. Centralto the new party'sviews was an extensive programof agrarian reform,set out in the MIR'sManifestoof Chiclayo(1963a), which 52

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965

was referredto as a second Declarationof Havana. Initially, Apra Rebelde sought to proceed through legal channels to secure agrarianreforms, with Malpica, the party'snational deputy in congress,presentingthe Manifesto to that body for consideration.But considerableharrassment, including an unrelated jail sentence, led De la Puente in June 1962, to drop the Apristaaffiliationand to createthe MIR, in line with actionstakenearlierby the dissidentsfrom Venezuela'sAccion Democratica Party (AD). This date marksthe severanceof MIR from traditionalparty politics and its swing towardguerrillaactivityas the primary meansto achieveits goals. Presumablythe MIR was spurredinto action by events which took place in Peru barelya month after its founding. On July 18, 1962, a reformistmilitarycoup cheatedHayaand the APRA once again from securingthe presidencyby overturning the electionsof that yearwhich Haya had apparently won. The transferof power to by Belauinde electionsa yearlaterbegana periodof moderatecapitalistreformismand renewed recognition of peasantproblems. Severalpilot land reform projectswere passed to ease the peasant discontent agitated by Blanco, who was capturedand jailed in May 1963. Although the new left had been awareof the opportunities presentedby Blanco'suprisings,the lack of internalunity within the left had precluded any effective action, although the peasant activism did accelerate mobilizationprocedureswithin the leftist groups. In October 1962, De la Puente travelledto Quillabamba meet with Blanco to in a conferencethat containsas manyunresolvedquestionsas that held more than a centuryearlierbetween Simon Bolivar and Jose de San Martin. Although it is not clearwhat sort of aid the fledgling MIR, whose membership was far from united on the subjectof guerrillawarfare,might have offeredBlanco, no accommodation was reached between the two groups. Whether it was the clash between Marxist and Trotskyiteideologies, Blanco'sdistrustof guerrillacadresoutside of his control, or perhapsBlanco's pragmaticassessmentthat the MIR lacked the capacityto aid his movement,remainsunclearat this time. Neither man seemsto have been a completely free agent in the negotiations, although it would be instructiveto know if Blanco was dissuadedfrom acceptingMIR assistanceby the FIR leadershipin Limawhich had thus far failed to assisthim adequately with whom he had manyfundamental and differences. In Lima's Plaza San Martin on February7, 1964, De la Puente (1966) delivered a fiery speech which defined the reorientation the MIR from an urban, of middle class party to one largely modelled on the Cubanexample, its supportto be derived from an awakenedpeasantryand elements of the progressive,urbanbourgeoisie. The boidyof the speech, which was the collaborativework of severalMIR ideologues,arguedthat the electoralprocessso reveredby APRA had failed to make the basic changes in the agrarianstructure Peru set out in the Manifesto of Chiof clayo, and that only "a new form of struggle"was capableof effectingthese changes. Not only did the correct subjectiveconditions for the conduct of a guerrilla war exist in Peru, De la Puente argued: they were perhaps superiorto those that had existedearlierin Cuba. 53

Latin American Research Review Clearly,by this prodamationthe MIR hoped to inherit the fervor and loyalty which had been given to Blanco earlier.But it is unclearwhat positive steps were takento securesuch support,althoughMIR began to set up its own guerrillaunits to replacethe union militia on which Blanco had depended.De la Puente arguedthat the guerrillaswere fully capableof retainingboth political and militarycontrol of the movement as the Cubanshad done, without the necessityof reservingthis for Leninist-type urbanparties.Out of this he believedwould emergeGuevara's "party in embryo"which would ultimately spread and unify the entire Peruvianleft. For a varietyof reasons,both ideologicalandtactical,none of this was to occur. In July 1964, the MIR establisheda series of fronts in the Departmentsof Cuzco and Junin, while anotherwas planned for Piura, to the north. De la Puente set up his base on the remoteMesa Pelada,a high plateauoverlookingthe Urubamba River north of the ancient Inca citadel of Machu Picchu. Not long thereafter,the MIR issued a "Revolutionary Proclamation" directedboth at the Bela'unde government and the Peruvian left, whose support they were trying to enlist. Mercado (1967), the movement's chief biographer, noted thatthis tacticflatlycontradicted has the Cubanemphasisupon secrecyand allowedthe militaryto begin counterinsurgency operations. Next, the MIR settled into a series of immobile securityzones ratherthan employing the mobile, flexible focos advocatedby Guevaraas staging bases for surprise attacks.Laterthe PeruvianArmywas easilyable to penetratethese zones, which becamedeath traps. As Americo Pumaruna(1966), a pseudonymused by Ricardo Letts Colmenares,a Peruvianactivistauthor,asserts,there is some uncertaintyas to whetherDe la Puentemisunderstood Cubanguerrillamodel from the beginning, the or, as ELN chieftan Hector Bejar (1969; 1970) believes, he tried to adopt it to fit Peruvianconditions. Colombianguerrillashad somewhatearlier been successful in employing staticbases, although by 1965 the Cubanfoco had largelysupplanted this model. 'Whatever case, it amountedto a serious mistake which helped to the bring aboutthe guerrillas'demisemore rapidlythan otherwisemight have occurred. Perhapsthe most serious flaw in the preparations made by the MIR members was their inability to overcomethe culturaland linguistic barrierswhich separated them from the peasantry.Control over the countryside,which Guevara,following Mao, had analogizedto the sea in which the guerrillaswam as a fish, was never establishedby either MIR or ELN. Robbedof such peasantsupport,the guerrillasfell prey to well-equippedcounterinsurgency forces. Although Mao had warnedthat one did not issue invitationsto participatein a revolutionas one might send invitations to a tea, the lesson had apparentlybeen lost on the MIR guerrillas.Norman Gall (1967) notes that the MIR attemptedto accomplishin four months what the Vietnamesehad taken over two yearsto achieveamongthe mountaintribesmenof their countryfollowing World War II, namely,to win loyaltyand support.Possibly,social and economicconditionsin Peruforceda courseof actionupon the MIR which varied from the optimal situationwhich might have allowed them to emulatemore closely the Cubanexample.Whateverthe case, in 1968, Leo Huberman Paul M. Sweezy and 54

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challengedDebrayto defend his thesis by explaining the defeat of the MIR, which, has to this writer'sknowledge,has never been done. If, as Pumaruna asserted,"the sign of Fidelismo presidedover the Peruvianguerrillastruggle from the outset," it would be instructiveto know the exactrelationshipbetweenthe two movements. The question remains:why did Castrofail to aid Blanco, whose control over the peasantrywas well-established,while assisting the MIR, which lacked this support, consideredcriticalby the Cubantheorists.Gott (1967) believes that Castro's reluctanceto aid Blanco stemmedless from the latter'sTrotskyiteorientationthan from the fact that Castrolackedany personalknowledgeof and contactwith Blanco, such as he enjoyed with De la Puente. On the other hand, Silvestre Conduruna (1966), a pseudonymousrepresentative VanguardiaRevolucionaria(VR), anof were conother Peruvianleftist organization,claims that ideological considerations trolling in the relationship between the two men, because Blanco's position on guerrillawarfare repudiatedmany aspectsof the Cuban struggle which Castrowas attemptingto export throughoutLatinAmerica.Consideringthe fact that Cubawas gravitatingfurther into the Soviet orbit after 1961, while the MIR had much admirationfor the Chinese,whom they consideredas Third World allies, it would be given to the MIR interestingto know more of the natureand extent of the assistance by Cuba,and whethersuch aid was grantedwith the adviceand consentof the Soviet Union. Moreover,one might considerthe Cubanposition in this regardsince 1967, was when the Organizacion Latino-Americana la Solidaridad(OLAS) Conference de held in Havana in an effort to coordinateLatin Americanguerrilla activities on a continentalbasis. Becausenewsmen were barredby the armyfrom the battlefieldsin 1965, the accountswhich we possess of the fighting that took place betweenthe guerrillasand the militaryin Peru are generallybasedupon secondhandinformationand thus vary widely in accuracy.Among the better accountsare those by correspondentNeira (1965), who coveredBlanco's land seizures, and Mercado's (1967) biographyof the revolutionarydecade, 1955-1965. In addition, Marcel Niedergang (1965), Henry Raymont (1965), Gall (1967), Gilly (1965), and Francisco Monclova (1966), have brieflyreportedon the war from the field. Although it representsthe official version of the events of 1965, the account by the PeruvianMinisterio de Guerra (1966), a detailed geographicaldescriptionof the battle zones, containing remainsthe best sinpersonnellists and captured photographsof the revolutionaries, gle accountof the struggle.If it has a flaw, it lies in the military'srefusalto statethe true numberof casualtiessuffered,or to offer informationon tactics,which reportedly included the use of napalm and United States advisors,and inadvertently,reto sulted in the killing of manypeasants.Besides, the reportattributes the guerrillas a higher degree of operationalefficiencythan actually existed. Although we have no dear understanding the role played by the United Statesin the struggle,Chapof lin's (1968) article explains the postponementof the Peruvianrevolution in military terms, namely by the use of helicopters, napalm, infra-redphotography,and 55

Latin American Research Review other technological innovations developed between 1959 and 1965, which gave that Belaiunde advantagesin the field of counterinsurgency Batista never possessed. In 1962, the ELN broke away from the Partido ComunistaPeruano (PCP) in much the sameway and for some of the same reasonsthat the MIR had defected exist thanmight from the APRA. To date,far fewer studiesof PeruvianCommunism be, other than a Trotskyiteaccountby Ismael Fri'asin the official organ Obreroy Campesino(1963), and an officialversion issued by the ComiteEjecutivoNacional group. Ernst Halde la Frente de Liberacion Nacional (FLN), anotherbreakaway perin (1967), a longtime Sinologist,has attemptedto explain Peking'srole in Latin American Communism,a subject which has also been recently explored by Cecil Johnson (1969). The weaknesscommonto these treatmentsis their failure to focus upon LatinAmerica,includingPeru, or to offer specificson the causesof the internal rifts in the LatinAmericanleft parties,which varygreatly.Most of our currentinformation derives from Sino-Cubanrelations, about which we know something. Can the samebe saidfor Sino-Peruvian affairs? as The fact that the guerrillasconceivedof their organizations partiesin embryo, and rejectedpolitical and military control by the PCP, would seem to explain the Morelatter's intransigencetoward the former, regardlessof other considerations. over, guerrillaactivitiesinvariablyseem to have led to repressionof PCP activities in the cities. The articleby PeruvianCommunistCesarLevano (1966), written in the wake of the MIR defeat, presentsthe reasonsfor PCP rejectionof such activities. Yet, notwithstandingthe above, the internalcleavageswithin the PCP and the serious difficultiesit was having in attractingyounger members suggest that some agreementmight have been reachedbetweenthe two groupshad certainfactorsbeen present. Exactlywhat these preconditionsmight have been and why they could not be realizedmight be of greatinterestto studentsof traditionalleftist political organizationswho seek to know moreaboutleftist partyrelationships with guerrillagroups. It would also be interestingto learnwhetherthe PCP position was reachedafter consultationwith the Russiansor Chineseand what the positions of those powersmight have been on the Peruviansituation.In a perceptivearticleon CubanCommunism, Daniel Tretiak (1970) makes the point that the Chinese Communists,like their Russian counterparts,generally withheld support for guerrillas unless they were unusually well-organized and willing to adhere to both the teaching and tactics of Mao, who presumably never consideredas a model by the Peruvians.He sugwas gests also that Cubansupportfor guerrillaventuresmateriallydeclined after 1967, for a variety of reasons, not the least of which was the appearanceof nationalist regimes such as the PerLvianmilitarygovernmentwhich took power in 1968, with which Fidel seeks better diplomaticrelationships.Cubanaid to Peru in the wake of favorablepronouncethe 1970 earthquake as underlinesthis reorientation do Castro's mentsaboutthe presentPeruviangovernment. In September1965, the ELN moved into action in an area near La Mar, Ayacucho, midwaybetweenthe two fronts then being mannedby the MIR. It is a testiof monialto the hastyand ill-plannedcharacter the Peruvianguerrillafield operations 56

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965

that their activitieswere completely uncoordinated,although the two groups were no more than a ten-daymarchapartfrom each other. By October,De la Puentehad been killed in battle at Mesa Pelada.Bejar,the ELN chief, was capturedin December,bringingthe "Yearof the Guerrilla" Peruto a close. in Because of a remarkably frank accountof the emergenceand activities of the ELN by Bejar (1967; 1970), we are able to reconstruct genesis of the Peruvian the guerrillamovementmuch more clearly.Bejar alludes to, although he refrainsfrom detailing, the fundamentalsplits with the Peruvianleft after 1962, which he contends prevented any agreementsfrom being reachedbetween the two guerrilla organizations.Becauseboth guerrillagroups were productsof the intransigence which had long existed in Peru between the APRA and the PCP, differencesbetween the guerrilla organizationswere themselves difficult to surmount. Organizational distinctionsbetween the two existed, with the MIR asserting that the revolution should be led by their party, which was well established,while the less organized ELN proposed to create the party out of the revolution. Neither group was willing to subordinateitself to the other's leadership.Thus when the MIR went into action on its own, the ELN was forced into activityaheadof schedule.Bejar indicts the MIR leadershipfor their intransigence and lack of cooperation which he claims largely determinedthe disastrous eventstakingplace in 1965. Although undoubtedly these views reflect the biases and bitternessbetween the guerillas, Bejar's account remainsthe clearestand frankestreportwe possess of the partyproblemswhich contributedfully as much as the armyto the guerrillas'demisein Peru. Besides the internal configurationof the guerrilla experience, a number of nagging questions remain to be answered regardingthe support which the guerrillas received from the progressivebourgeoisiein Peru, notably Catholic radicals, students, intellectuals, and the labor unions. RAND Corporationanalyst Luigi Einaudi,R. L. Maullin, A. C. Stepan,and M. Fleet's 1969 surveyof the changing CatholicChurch,for example, notes the presencein Peru of several radicalpriests, such as FatherSalomonBolo Hidalgo, leaderof the leftist FLN, and the JesuitFather RomeoLuna-Victoria (1966), who has writtena manualon revolutionary theoryand practice, which the author-priestfinds fully consistent with Catholic doctrine. It would be of interestto know what the relationshipwas between these men and the guerrillas, and to what degree the experiencesof 1965 helped to turn the church towardsupportingthe military'sland reformand other social welfare measures. The new support which the military has drawn from the ChristianDemocraticParty (CD) emphasizesthe quandryin which these Catholicradicalsin Peru find themselves today. Questions also remainconcerningthe role played by studentsand intellectuals during the yearsunder consideration. example, in 1963, the gifted young PeruFor vian poet JavierHeraudwas killed at PuertoMaldonadoin AmazonianPeru while working for Blanco. As a young memberof the Lima elite group, Heraud'sparticipation raisesthe questionof bourgeoisinvolvement.It is notablethat both the MIR and the ELN have claimedHeraudas a true revolutionary hero, with the latternam57

Latin Amzerican Research Review ing a front in his honor. But was he representative anythingor anyoneother than of himself? Were other intellectuals involved? Did the Bolivian Communist Party betrayhim? The degree to which the guerrillaswere able to inherit the fervor and loyaltywhich intellectualsin Peru and worldwidegrantedto Blanco, whom they regardedas a just opponentof tyrannyand oppression,remainsone of the unanswered questionsof 1965. The extent of Peruvianstudentcollaboration with the guerrillas,if any existed, is almost completelyunknown. It may be remembered that in Cuba,provincialuniversitystudentsaided Castrofar more significantly than did their urbancounterparts in Havana.Writing on Peru, RichardPatch (1960) and Einaudi (1968) have explained the growing popularityof Fidelismo in Peruvianuniversitiesafter 1959, noting that anti-Communism never been a dominant political myth in Latin has America.Consideringthat some of these student bodies, such as that in Ayacucho, requireda speakingabilityin Quechuaas a prerequisite admission,their assistance for might have counted greatly in enlisting peasantsupport.Was it ever solicited, and more importantly,received? Finally,what was the exact orientationof the Peruvianlaborunions duringthe period? Many of Blanco'ssupportersin the peasantfederationswere apparently exarmyveteranswho had joined his causeout of frustration with the PCP. Did any of these personsjoin the guerrillaslater on? While most of the unions remainedunder the control of the APRA or PCP, and therefore took a negative view of activities led by guerrilla insurgents,what were the positions of the MIR-dominated Federacion Provincialde los Campesinos(FPC) or of the powerful fisheryunions which fell underthe controlof the VR, a group more sympathetic the guerrillastruggle? to Given the regionaland ideological diversitieswithin Peruviantradeunionism, such questionsmight be pursuedwith fruitful results. One of the more fascinatingvariablesinjected into the revolutionary situations in Peru during the past decadehas been the seizure of power in 1968 by reformist military men whose orientationwas perhaps heavily influencedby the guerrillas. Several times during the present centurythe army had intervenedto prevent the APRA, which it thought to be irresponsibly leftist, from assumingpower. During the period 1948-1968, as the APRA moved steadilyto the right, the militaryin Peru grew increasinglyreform-minded and impatientwith civilian government.In 1968, the militaryagain intervenedto put a stop to the errorsand excessesof the Bela'unde government,defects which, curiouslyenough, had been broughtto light in part by of militaryintelligenceexpertsinvestigatingthe background guerrillaactivities. Therehas been a growing body of writingson the subjectof the presentmilitary governmentof Peru, headed by Division GeneralJose Velasco Alvarado.Historian L. N. McAlister (1970) and RAND analystEinaudi (1969) have dealt with the subjectfrom an essentiallyhistoricalperspectiveto explain the adventof militaryreformism and political reorientation.Luis Valdez Pallette (1971) has sketched the historyof Peruvianmilitaryeducation,notablythat of the Centrode Altos Estudios the Militares (CAEM), which has played an influentialrole by indoctrinating officer 58

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965

corps aboutmattersof social concern.This changingmilitarymentalityhas been examined by Villanueva (1969), while sociologistsCotler (1969a; 1969b) and Bourricaud(1971) have tried to determinehow such a reorientation might affectnational development. Most of the authoritiesagree that the Peruvianmilitarygovernment,which has proclaimed itself "nationalist revolutionary," governinginstitutionally, and is free of dominantand dominatingpersonalitiessuch as characterized interventions,and past that it has a sincere desire to free the nation from the evils of the past. But beyond the fact that the militaryleadersseemto,subscribe some form of capitalistic to reformism ratherthan socialism,there is little agreementaboutwhere they stand. Einaudi (1970; 1971) and Einaudi and Stepan (1971) have produced unusually cogent analysesof recent Peruvianmilitary developments,and they are convinced that it took the guerrillacampaignsof 1965-1966 "to force social theoryout of the schools and into the barracks, therebymakingpolitical immobilismand economicdecline of the late 1960s a matterof urgentmilitaryconcern."This hypothesisseems to be confirmed by the writings of BrigadierGeneral EdgardoMercadoJarrin (1967), the present Minister of Foreign Affairs and heir-apparent the presidency,who has to argued stronglythat civic action and social reform are far more valuabletools than for counterinsurgency preventingfuture guerrillawars. To what degree the orientation of key officerssuch as GeneralJorge FernandezMaldonado,the commander of the PeruvianFourthArmy, which put down the guerrillasand who is at this writing the Ministerof Energyand Mining, was changedby the events of 1965 remainsunclearbut is no doubthighly significant. There are indicationsthat the Peruvianmilitary developed a genuine compassion for the rural populationas a result of having fought againstthe guerrillas,to the extent of giving their coup d'etatthe code name "Plan Inca."The failure of the La Convencionpeasantryto support the guerrillasin the wake of a pilot land reform programin 1963 could not have helped but impressupon the militaryleaders the need for agrarianreform.With the passageof the sweeping agrarianreformbill in 1969, the militaryhas clearlyacted to replacethe guerrillasas the peasants'best hope of securingboth land and dignity. On the coverof the printed bill arepictures of Velasco and TuipacAmaru, the symbol of the 1968 revolution,proclaimingthe the slogan, "Countryman, landownerwill no longer eat the breadof your poverty." The reformbill has expropriated large coastalsugarplantations,bastionsof olithe garchicaldomination.In addition, the militaryhas passed stringentwage and price controls, dissolved Congress, and taken over several foreign-ownedcompanies,inPetroleumCompanyin Talara, cluding StandardOil's subsidiary,the International long a targetof nationalistsof all political persuasions.The fact that these measures all were primarygoals demandedby the MIR in 1964 demonstrates weakened the position in which the new left finds itself today in Peru. The freeing in 1971 of Blanco and the jailed guerrillaleadersindicatesa new confidenceon the part of the the Peruvianmilitarythat its measureshave taken effect. The release demonstrates

59

Latin American Research Review convictionof the armythat it can effectivelycontrolany futurepeasantmovementthat might occur,as well as the belief that none is likely to breakout at the presenttime. The Peruvianguerrilla movement of 1965 never progressedpast the first or strategicdefense stage definedby Guevara.Given the deep splits, outlined by Sergio Bruma (1965), persistingwithin the Peruvianleft today, one might arguethat the guerrilla movement matteredlittle and that further researchon the subject is unnecessary. The presentauthorcontendsratherthat the scope of scholarlyinquirybe broadenedto place the Peruvian guerrilla within proper perspectivein the Latin Americanrevolutionary process.The balanceof this articleis devotedto specificsuggestionsas to how suchresearch analysismight be undertaken. and Much that has been written to date on the subjectof the Peruvianguerrillais incomplete,polemical in tone, and sometimesinaccurate becauseoften based upon second-handjournalisticreporting. Other than Bejar's frank account of the ELN movement, few of the guerrillashave themselveswritten in any systematicfashion about the events of 1965, or, more importantly,about the circumstances which led up to those events. Some of what has been writtenhas had a problem-solvingorientation, such as the studies sponsoredby the Pentagon'sAdvancedResearchProjects Agency (ARPA), whose "ProjectAgile," carriedout during 1964-1965, was designed to evaluatethe capacitiesof both the guerrillasand the militaryto resisteach other. Similarstudies have been carriedout by other organizations, both public and private.This approachhas severe limitationsalso, not the least of which is the proposal of political and military solutions to what seem to this author to be fundamentallysocialand economicproblems. It seems highly desirable that any future studies of the guerrilla be placed within the historicaland sociologicalcontext of the revolutionary process as it has developed in Latin America, a subject wlhichhas been touched upon summarily. Chilcote's (1970) bibliographyhas assembleda wide range of secondarymaterials dealing with the subject, materialsthat demand interpretation. Among those who have devoted attention to this process are Einaudi (1966), whose study of the changingcontextsof revolutionin LatinAmericatracesthe frustrations divisions and within Aprista-typeparties which helped pave the way for the guerrillas.It is the author'scontentionthatthe "veryenunciation" the CubanRevolutionunfavorably of altered conditions for guerrilla warfare throughout Latin American by changing "political conditions at national, regional and internationallevels," which have ultimatelycheckedthe developmentof furtherradicalsocial revolutionsof the Cuban type. Certainlypolitical conditions in Peru since 1968 bear out Einaudi'shypotheses. So many changes have taken place within the agrarianand political structures of the countrysince the military'sassumptionof power that studiesundertaken prior to that date which seek to explain the realities of the situation run serious risk of obsolescence.Petras and LaPorte's(1971) survey of changing agrarianconditions in Peru and Chile pinpoint many of the innovationsundertaken the nationallevel at 60

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which seem to have reducedrevolutionary discontentand further discreditthe guerrillas'contentionthatPeruis a dying, feudalistic,sociopolitical system. In anotherprovocativemonograph,Colombiansociologist Orlando Fals Borda (1968) has discussedchanging revolutionarydevelopmentsin that country since independence,with emphasison the socializationprocessas a key factor explaining guerrillaactivity.The authorseemsto,suggestthat the appearance guerrillabands of might be considerednot as a manifestationof social decay,but ratheras an indication of the vitality of efforts being made by traditionalsocieties to reform themselves; efforts which force a frustratednew left into self-defeating schemes. The analysis seemsto be borneout in the caseof Peru. Such studies are importantbecausethey stressthe varietiesof the revolutionary processthroughoutLatin Americaand seek to explain this phenomenon.Although it is true that since the CubanRevolution no guerrillamovementhas been able to seize national power, several have never sought such ends. In Peru, although the movementfailed, its psychologicalpresenceproved to be a constantworry and embarrassment the weak Belaiundeadministration, to and perhaps hastened the military's assumptionof the reins of government.It still remainsto be demonstrated, given the proper leadership,goal structure,social base, and relationshipswith the traditionalpolitical parties,whether a guerrillaband in Peru or elsewherein Latin Americacan duplicatethe Cubanexperienceand seize control of the nationalgovernment.To answersuch a question,both Einaudiand Fals Borda suggest the need for a fuller understanding the present realitiesof Latin Americansocietieswhich of seek to avertguerrillawars. To borrowa phrasefrom Trotsky,who made reference to the difficultyof identifying the correctsubjectiveconditionsneeded for a revolution, are both guerrillasand social scientistsguilty of confusing the second month of pregnancy the ninth? for BarringtonMoore's (1966) challengingwork on the social origins of dictatorship and democracystands as an invitation to undertakefurther researchon the Indian peasant in Peru. Although there are several excellent studies by anthropologists such as Henry F. Dobyns (1964) on peasantcommunities,as well as political analysesof these communities,such as the work of EdwardDew (1969), few psychologists have successfullyplumbed the depths of the peasantmentality,nor have historiansaddressedthemselvesto the criticalissue of the peasant as revolutionary. Progress along these lines, however, is not altogether lacking. F. LaMond Tullis (1970) has used a varietyof sophisticated quantification techniquesin his case study natureof the Manof the MantaroValley of centralPeru. Analyzing the structural taroValley villages and the ties which have developedamongthese villages and their Tullis has attemptedto explain the Mantaropeasants'failure to join the inhabitants, revolution during the period 1962-1966, and why some villages were more likely than others to develop a revolutionary orientation.Insofar as the work helps to exa plain the peasantas activist,it constitutes valuablepioneeringeffort. Future studies of the PeruvianIndian might do well to concentrate upon what sort of landholding he desires-private freehold or communal-collectivistic owner61

Latin American Research Review ship. Both the guerrillasand others have referredto the peasant'straditionalbouractivity,yet the Indians'failure geois mentalityas a deterrentto future revolutionary to respond to the incentives affordedby fee-simple forms of ownership and their fatalistic outlook towards life in general indicate a mentalitywhich by definition hardlyseemsto fit the bourgeoispattern. leader like Blanco, it would be valGiven the presenceof anothercharismatic uable to know if the Indian is bound by biases and other culturalobstades which activity.While Bejar, in are so pronouncedas to precludeany future revolutionary inherentin organizhis accountof the Ayacuchofront, acknowledgedthe difficulties ing peasantsupport,he denied that the ELN's failureswere causedby a lack of revolutionaryorientationamong the peasantry,insteadblaming the defeat upon the lack of organizationamong the guerrillasthemselves. To date, the explanation of the Peruvianfailure has been couchedlargely in termsof the difficultgeographicalconditions of the sierraor the technologicalexpertise of the armed forces, neither of which, it may be observed,was a hindranceto Castroin Cuba.It is clearlytime that we look more deeply into the Peruviandisaster,especiallythe peasants'role in it. For example, it would be most helpful to know why the Peruvianpeasant to date in activitiesas has his counterpart the Caribbean. has not respondedto revolutionary or The question of whether the peasantis "revolutionizable" even if his immediate world (Gemeinschaft) can be unitedto the largerworld of nationalinterests(Gesellthe schaft) has implicationswhich exceed in importance subjectof guerrillawarfare alone. Furtherinquiry into the guerrilla movement might begin with more detailed examinationof its leadership.as well as its cadre. Other than a few eulogies by trustedlieutenants,we have no good biographicalstudiesof the Peruvianguerrillas. For example, other than a brief piece by Jorge Turner (1968) practicallynothing is known of Juan Pablo Chang, or "El Chino," the most importantELN member ApparentlyChangwas a trustedconfidantof Guevara, to survivethe 1965 massacre. whose influencehad at one time convincedGuevarato considerPeru as the site for his movement.Although Chang died with Guevarain Bolivia, we have no information about the series of decisionswhich resultedin the change to Bolivia as the site for the guerrillawar, nor of the guerrillas'plans to carrythe struggle into Peru at a later date. Where was the Peruvianfront to be located, and how was it to be organized? Perceptive monographicstudies of the guerrilla leaders, such as Richard Maullin's (1968) treatmentof the Colombianguerrillachief Dumar Aljure, could do much to bring the Bolivian and Peruvianguerrillaexperiences,which are parallel in so manyways,into closerfocus. Certainlywe need to know much more than we presentlydo about the whole spectrumof leftist ideology in Peru from the time of Mariateguionward,as well as of the presentstructure the Peruvianleft. As Bejarhas noted,the guerrillaideology of and programsreflecta transitionof the traditionalleft in Peru from old concepts towardnew ones, with all the confusionwhich such a shift entails. For example,the MIR is apparentlylukewarmin its supportof Gonzalo FernandezGasco, a guerrilla 62

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965

leaderholding out in the north in 1972. APRA Deputy Andre'sTownsend (1965) of has attemptedto explain the dilemmathat the appearance the guerrillasposed for the traditionalleft, yet the defeat of the formerin 1965 has not solved the problems posed these traditionalgroups, but has merelypostponedthem. Today, with the advent of militaryreformismin Peru,both the APRA and the PCP areconfrontedwith the hard choice of supportingor opposing the militaryprogram,a quandrywhich threatenstheir very political survival.How might these parties respond to a wellorganizedand potentiallyeffectivemass movement,using guerrillatactics,arisingto in modernizer" Peru?To challengethe hegemonyof the militaryas a "revolutionary by date, only an unpublisheddoctoraldissertation RicardoV. LunaMendoza (1962) tools for futurestudiesof the and the recentstudyby Astfz (1969) serveas analytical Peruvianleft, which is in a constantlychanging state. More work is needed on the structureand leadership,as well as the self-perceptionsof Peruvianleftists today. Although it seems certain that the Peruvianmilitary will remain a force for whetherin controlof the governmentor not, there social controland modernization, is little we can say with certaintyaboutthe internalmechanicsof the presentgovernment or of its future orientation.Do PresidentVelasco and his cabinetshapepolicy, or, as Bourricaud (1970), suggests, do they simply implement the recommendations of the twelve-man Comite de Oficiales Asesores del Presidente (COAP), a legislative officers,educatedat the CAEM,who recommend body of Marxist-oriented measuresand serve as a coordinatingbody to harmonizethe varioussectorsof public administration? Will the Peruvian"revolutionfrom above"continuealong its present lines, seek to mobilize the masseson its behalf, or, as Einaudi (1971) suggests, may a conservativereactionbe producedwithin the militaryas the result of bureaucraticinertia and resourcescarcity?While the answersto such questions are uncertain, much dependsupon who actuallyexercisespower and the ways in which they conceptualizeits use. Einaudicontendsthat the militaryintellectualswho today are guiding the internalrevolutionin Peru developedtheir ideasnot simplyfrom CAEM made by students,intellectextbooksbut out of a deep compassionfor the sacrifices tuals, and guerrillasin 1965. Obviously, the institutionaldevelopmentof the militarywould be sorelytested by any forcible removalof this group from power. Nowhere is the confusion regardingthe exact orientationof the Peruvianmiliof thanin the statement the leadersof the Peruvian tarygovernmentmorepronounced new left, many of whom were formerguerrillas.Upon his release from jail in December 1970, Blanco (1971) admittedthat the initiation of capitalistreformismin changedthe politicalsituationfrom what it had been Peru since 1968 had materially earlier.Yet the government'srefusal to permit him to resumehis organizingactivities has resultedin Blanco'sexile to Mexico, wherehe sharplycriticizesthe Peruvian generals. Bejar (1970) also announcedupon his release from prison that he had becomeconvincedthat change within the systemcould be achievedpeacefully.Unlike his counterpart, Bejartodayis a key officerof the SistemaNacional de Apoyo a la MovilizacionSocial (SINAMOS), a governmentorganizationaimed at neutralizing the Aprista and Trotskyiteleadershipin the newly-formedsugar cooperativesand 63

Latin American Research Review gaining workers support for governmentthroughoutPeru. Other "leftist opportunists", as Blanco termedthem, include Hugo Neira and FranciscoMoncloa, and are also working for the militaryregime. More needs to be done to explain the cooperation of this group as contrasted with the continuingintrasigenceof Blanco towards the militaryreformers. Leftist opponents of the currentmilitary regime have been highly critical of its recenteconomicpolicies, namelythe contractssigned in 1972 with the Southern Peru CopperCorporation the extractionof copper at Cuajone,and with the Ocfor cidental PetroleumCorporation,allowing them exploratoryrights in the Peruvian Amazon, long thought to be an oil-rich region. Quijano (1971), the Peruviannew left's most cogent spokesmanand himself an exile in Chile, argues that these new concessionsrepresenta betrayalof the revolutionand are in the long run likely to which is likely to benefit the upper classes,producingultimatelya neo-imperialism continue, rather than break, Peru's dependency relationship with the developed world. A short piece by Pumaruna(1971) echoes these sentiments.Both point up of the need for thoughtful analysesof the political and economictrajectory the currentPeruvian military,which remainsuniqueyet unexplained. The field of Peruvianleftist ideology and organizationin general, and of the has guerrillain particular, been lightly spaded to date, and its tilling remainsa hard or chore.It is a field at once sensitiveand subjective.There are scantsystematized objective dataavailableon the subject,nor are therelikely to be any for some time. The principalsinvolved are reluctantto speakof theirpolitical activitiesexceptin private, and even then they condemnrather thanclarify.Further,to studyrevolutionand guerrillas is to analyzeunfinishedhistory. Although the guerrillasof 1965 were annihilated, their followers are presumablyreorientingtowards an urban posture on the of model set out by the Tupamaros Uruguay,aboutwhom we know little. Their chief protagonists,the military,have hardlyremainedstatic during the interveningyears. Peru has alreadyunilaterallyrecognized Cuba in defianceof the sanctionsof the Organizationof AmericanStates (OAS) and has begun closer diplomaticrelationships with the Marxistgovernmentof SalvadorAllende in Chile. One can marvelat the fluidity of the situation under considerationhere, although it constitutesa researcher's nightmare.Nevertheless,a startshould be made, for the subjectsof guerrillas, the societies which produce them, and the military which seek their defeat, are mattersof importanceand deep relevance.The exhortationof De la Puente to his men- "todosal campo" -should be directedto scholarsas well as guerrilleros.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
AGUIRRE GAMIO, HERNANDO

1962 1969

Liquidaci6n historica del Apra y del colonialismo neoliberal. Lima. Pressure Groups and Power Elites in Peruvian Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.
OF DEFENSE

ASMIZ, CARLOS ALBERTO ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY, DEPARTMENT

(ARPA)

1964- Remote Area Conflict (Project Agile)

Reports:

64

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965 A Depth Study of Contemporary Insurgency and Counterinsurgency Operations in Peru, Ecuador and Bolivia. Alexandria, Va. BEJAR,HECTOR 1969 Peru 1965: Apuntes sobre una experiencia guerrillera. 1970 Havana, Cuba. Peru 1965: Notes on a Guerrilla Experience. Tr. by William Rose. N.Y. 1970 Entrevista con Hector Bejar. Tricontinental. 16. BLANCO, HuGo 1964 El camino de nuestra revolucion. Lima. 1971 Hugo Blanco Freed. The Militant. 35: 1. BRUNA,SERGIO 1969 Perui:el papel de la izquierda. Punto Final. June 3. BOURRICAUD, FRANCOIS 1966 Ideologia y desarrollo: el caso del Partido Aprista Peruano. Mexico. 1967 Poder y sociedad en el Peru contemporaneo. Buenos Aires. 1970 Los militares: spor que y para que? Aportes. 16. CASTILLO, GONZALO ANIR 1967 Historia secreta de las guerrillas. Lima. CHANG-RODRIGUEz, EUGENIO 1957 La literatura politica de Gonzalez Prada, Mariategui, y Haya de la Torre. Mexico. CHAPLIN, DAVID 1968 Peru's Postponed Revolution. World Politics. 20: 3. H. CHILCOTE, RONALD 1970 Revolution and Structural Change in Latin America: a Bibliography on Ideology, Development, and the Radical Left, 1930-1965. 2 vol. Stanford, Calif. DE COMITE DE EJEcTIvo NACIONAL LAFRENTE LIBERACION NACIONAL (FLN) 1964 Frente de Liberaci6n Nacional: el FLN, el PCP, y la revoluci6n Peruana. Lima. COMITE DE INTERAMERICANODESARROLLO AGRICOLA (CIDA) 1966 Tenencia de la tierra y desarrollo socio-economico del sector agricola, Perui. Washington, D.C. SILVESTRE CONDURUNA, 1966 Las experiencias de la (ultima etapa de las luchas revolucionarias en el Peru. Lima. HECTOR CORDERO, 1966 Un aniode lucha armada de la revolucion peruana. Bohemia. July 22. OSCAR CORNBLIT, 1970 Levantimientos de masas en Peru y Bolivia durante el siglo dieciocho. Revista Latinoamericana de Sociologia. 6: 1. COTLER, JULIO 1967 Mecanica de la dominacion interna y el cambio social en el Perui.Lima. 1969a Crisis politica y populismo militar en al Per'u.Lima. 1969b El populismo militat como modelo de desarrollo nacional: el caso peruano. Lima. 1970 Traditional Haciendas and Communities in a Context of Political Mobilization in Peru. In: Rodolfo Stavenhagen, ed. Agrarian Problems and Peasant Movements in Latin America. Garden City, N.Y. 1966
COTLER, JULIO AND FELIPE PORTOCARRERRO

1969 1966 1967

Peru: Peasant Organizations. In: Henry Landsberger ed. Latin American Peasant Movements. Ithaca, N.Y. and London. The Peasant Movement of La Convencion, Peru: Dynamics of Rural Labor Organization. Seminar on peasant movements in Latin America, Cornell University. (Mimeographed). Ithaca, N.Y. From Hacienda to Community: An Analysis of Solidarity and Social Change in Peru. Ithaca, N.Y.

CRAIG, WESLEY W., JR.

65

LatinAmericanResearch Review
DAVIES, THOMAS JR. M., 1971 The Indigenismo of the Peruvian Aprista Party: A Reinterpretation. Hispanic American Historical Review. 51: 4. DEBRAY,REGIS 1967 Revolution dans la revolution? Paris. DEW, EDWARD 1969 Politics in the Altiplano: The Dynamics of Change in Rural Peru. Austin, Texas. LuIs DONGODENEGRI, 1971 Compendio agrario: comentario, legislacion, jurisprudencia. 2 vols. Lima. EINAUDI, LuIGI R. 1966 Changing Contexts of Revolution in Latin America. RAND Corporation Memorandum P-3440. Santa Monica, Calif. 1968 Latin American Student Radicalism: A Different Type of Struggle. RAND Corporation Memorandum P-3897. Santa Monica, Calif. 1969 The Peruvian Military: A Summary Political Analysis. RAND Corporation Memorandum 6048-RC. Santa Monica, Calif. 1970 The Military and Progress in the Third World. RAND Corporation Memorandum P-4418. Santa Monica, Calif. 1971 Revolution from Within? Military Rule in Peru Since 1968. RAND Corporation Memorandum P-4676. Santa Monica, Calif. EINAUDI, LuIGI R., R. L. MAULLIN, A. C. STEPAN, AND M. FLEET 1969 Latin American Institutional Development: The Changing Catholic Church. RAND Corporation Memorandum RM-6136-DOS. Santa Monica, Calif.
BINAUDI, LuIGI R., AND ALFRED C. STEPAN III

1971

Latin American Institutional Development: Changing Military Perspectives in Peru and Brazil. RAND Corporation Memorandum R-586-DOS. Santa Monica, Calif. Marginality and Revolution in Latin America, 1809-1969. Studies in Comparative International Development. 6: 4. El problema agraria del Perui.Trimestre Economica. 17. July-Sept. Man and Land in Peru. Gainesville, Fla. Luis de la Puente: To the Measure of Peru. Tricontinental. 4-5: 47-55. Letter From Peru. Commentary. June. Peru's Misfired Guerrilla Campaign. The Reporter. January.

FALS BORDA, ORLANDO

1970

FLORES, EDMUNDO

1950 1955 1968 1964 1967

FoRD,THOMAS
GADEA ACOSTA, RICARDO GALL, NORMAN

GILLY, ADOLFO

1963 Los sindicatos guerrilleros del Peru. Marcha. August. 1965 Guerrillas en el Peru. Arauco. 5. GoTT, RICHARD 1971 Guerrilla Movements in Latin America. Garden City, N.Y.
GUEVARA, ERNESTO

1960 1959 1967 1956

La guerra de guerrillas: un metodo. Caracas, Venezuela. La rebelion de los provincianos. Lima. Peking and the Latin American Communists. China Quarterly. January-March. Los partidos y la crisis del Apra. Lima.

GUEVARA, J. GUILLERMO HALPERiN, ERNST HERNANDEZ URBINA, ALFREDO

66

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965 HILIKER, GRANT 1971 The Politics of Reform in Peru: The Aprista and other Mass Parties of Latin America. Baltimore, Md. EIuc HOBSBAWM, J. E. 1969 A Case of Neo-Feudalism: La Convencion, Peru. Journal of Latin American Studies. 1: 1. 1971 Peru: the Peculiar "Revolution." The New York Review of Books. 17: 10. HUBERMAN, LEO,ANDPAULM. SWEEZY 1968 Debray: the Strength and the Weakness. In: Regis Debray and the Latin American Revolution. N.Y. INTERNATIONAL SOCIALIST REVIEW 1965 Hugo Blanco Correspondence. 26. CECIL JOHNSON, 1969 Communist China and Latin America, 1959-1967. N.Y. KANTOR, HARRY 1953 The Ideology and Program of the Peruvian Aprista Movement. Berkeley and Los Angeles, Calif. KLAREN, PETER 1970 La formacion de las haciendas azucarerasy los origines del Apra. Lima. VERA B. LAMBERG, 1971 La guerrilla Castrista en America Latina: Bibliografia Selecta, 1960-1970. Foro Internacional. 12: 1. LANDSBERGER, HENRYA. 1969 Latin American Peasant Movements. Ithaca, N.Y. and London. MAGALI ANDARLENE BERGMAN E. LARSON, S., 1969 Social Stratification in Peru. Berkeley. LETTS COLMENARES, RICARDO 1963 Breve resefia contemporanea de la lucha por la reforma agraria. Economia y Agricultura. 1. Dec.-Feb. 1964 Reforma Agraria Peruana: Justificacion Economica y politica. Lima. 1971 Peru: Revolucion Socialista o caricatura de revoluci6on? (Mimeographed). Mexico. LEVANO, CESAR 1966 Lessons of the Guerrilla Struggle in Peru. World Marxist Review. 9: 9. LUNA MENDOZA, V. RICARDO 1962 The Role of the Modern Peruvian Left. (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Princeton Univ. Princeton, N.J. LUNA-VICTORIA, S. ROMEO, J. 19?66 Ciencia y practica de la revolucion. Lima. MAITAN,LIvIo 1965 The Revolt of the Peruvian Campesinos. International Socialist Review. 26. Spring. CARLOS MALPICA, 1963 Guerra o muerte al latifundio: Proyecto de ley de reforma agraria de MIR. Lima. 1968 Los duefios del Perfi. Lima. 1970 El problema de la tierra. Lima. MARIO MALPICA, 1967 Biografia de la revolucion: historia y antologia del pensamiento socialista. Lima. MARTINEZ, HECTOR 1968 Bibliografia indigena andina peruana, 1900-1968. 2 vols. Lima. 1970 Evolucion de la propiedad territorial en el Perfu.Aportes. DE MARTINEZ LATORRE, RICARDO 1948 Apuntes para una interpretacion marxista de la historia social del Per(u.Lima.

67

Research Review LatinAmerican

MATOS MAR, JOSE

1967

Proyecto de estudio de los moviemientos campesinos en el Peru desde fines del siglo XVIII hasta nuestros dias. Lima. La hacienda, la comunidad, y el campesino en el Per6. Lima. The Fall of Dumar Aljure, a Colombian Guerrilla and Bandit. RAND Memorandum 5750-15A. Santa Monica, Calif. Las guerrillas del Peru, el MIR: de la predica ideol6gica a la acci6n armada. Lima. Vida, traici6n y muerte del movimiento aprista. Lima. Politica y la estrategia militar en la guerra contra-subversiva en America Latina. Revista Militar del Per-i. Nov.-Dec. Las guerrillas en America Latina. La tecnica del contra-estado. Buenos Aires. Reportaje al Peru: Guerrilla. El Mundo. Buenos Aires. March 3. Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy: Lord and Peasant in the Making of the Modem World. Boston, Mass.
BRESSANO) (HUGO

MATOS MAR, JOSE, JULIO COTLER,AND GIORGIo ALBERTI

1970 1968

MAULLIN, RICHARD L.

MERCADO, ROGGER

1967 1969 1967

MERCADOJARRIN, GENERAL EDGARDO

MERCIER VEGA, Luis

1969 1966 1966

MOMMIO, EDGARDODA MOORE, BARRINGTON, JR.

MORENO, NAHUEL

1962

La revoluci6n latinoamericana. Lima.

MOVIMIENTODE IZQUIERDAREVOLUCIONARIA(MIR)

1963a Movimiento de Izquierda Revolucionaria: manifiesto de Chiclayo, segunda declaracion de la Habana. Lima. 1963b Bases doctrinarias y programaticas. Lima. 1964 Nuestra posici6n. Lima. 1966 La revoluci6n en el Peru: concepciones y perspectivas. Lima.
NEIRA, HUGO

1964 1968 1970 1965 1971 1966ff. 1962 1966 1961

Cuzco: tierra y muerte. Lima. Los Andes: tierra o muerte. Santiago, Chile. Sindicalismo campesino y complejos agricolas. Peru, 1960-1970. Aportes. 18. Guerre de guerillas au Perou. Le Monde. August, 24-25. Revolutionary Nationalism in Peru. Foreign Affairs. 49: 3. Lima. Lima. Izquierda peruana y guerrillas. Marcha. XXVII: 1290. Fidelismo in Peruvian Universities, I, II. American Universities Field Service. Washington, D.C. Feb.-March. Labor and Politics in Peru: The System of Political Bargaining. New Haven, Conn. Las guerrillas en el Peru y su represion. Lima.

NIEDERGANG,MARCEL

(POR) OBREROY CAMPESINO; ORGANODEL PARTIDOOBREROREVOLUCIONARIO OIGA: REVISTA DE ACTUALIDADES ORTIZ, JAIME PATCH, RICHARD

PAYNE, JAMES L.

1965 1966

PERU. MINISTERIODE GUERRA

68

HISTORIOGRAPHY OF THE PERUVIAN GUERRILLA MOVEMENT, I960-I965 PETRAS, JAMES 1968 Revolution and Guerrilla Movements in Latin America: Venezuela, Guatemala, Colombia and Peru. In: Latin America: Reform or Revolution? James Petras and Maurice Zeitlan, eds. N.Y. PETRAS, JAMES F., AND ROBERTLAPORTE, JR. 1971 Cultivating Revolution: the United States and Agrarian Reform in Latin America. N.Y. PIKE, FREDRICKB. 1964 The Old and the New Apra. Inter-American Economic Affairs. Autumn. 1967 The Modern History of Peru. London.
PUMARUNA, AMERICO (RIcARDo LETTS COLMENARES)

1966 1970

Peru: revolucion, insurreccion, guerrillas. Cuadernos de Ruedo Iberico. 6. El reformismo burgues es pro-imperialista, Cuajone lo demuestra. Vanguardia Revolucionaria. 6: 25-46. The Peruvian Revolution: Concepts and Perspectives. Monthly Review. 17: 6. La reforma del agro peruano. Lima. O., ANIBAL El movimiento campesino del PerCu sus lideres. America Latina. 8: 4. y Contemporary Peasant Movements. In: Elites in Latin America. S. M. Lipset and A. Solari, eds. N.Y. Tendencies in Peruvian Development and Class Structure. In: Latin America: Reform or Revolution? James Petras and Maurice Zeitlin, eds. N.Y. Nationalism and Capitalism in Peru: A Study in Neo-Imperialism. N.Y. Peru: The Campaign against Red Guerrillas. New York Times. Sept. 28. Who They Are. Atlas. 10. Andes and Sierra Maestra. Monthly Review. 14 Peru': su organization campesina. Monthly Review. 24, Aug. Problems of Development in Peru. Joumal of Inter-American Studies. 9: 1. Con las guerrillas o con la ley: deslinde ideologico y enfrentamiento total del Aprismo. Presente. Sept.-Oct. Cuba and the Communist System: the Politics of a Communist Independent, 19671969. Orbis. 3.

PUENTE UCEDA, LuIS DE LA

1965 1966
QuIJANo

1965 1964 1968 1971 1965 1960 1962 1965 1967 1965

RAYMONT, HENRY SALAZARBONDY, SEBASTIAN

TAYLOR, MILTON C. TOWNSEND EZCURRA, ANDRES

TRETIAK, DANIEL

1970

TULLIS, F. LAMOND

Lord and Peasant in Peru: a Paradigm of Political and Social Change. Cambridge, Mass. TURNER,JORGE 1968 Juan Pablo Chang: revolucionario latinoamericano. Tricontinental. 32. Luis VALDEZ PALLETE, 1971 Antecedentes de la nueva orientaci6n de las Fuerzas Armadas en el Perii. Aportes. 1970
19. VASQUEZ, MARIO

1961

Hacienda, peonaje y servidumbre en los Andes peruanos. Lima.

69

Review LatinAmericanResearch
VILLANUEVA, VICTOR

1956 1962 1967 1969

La tragedia de un pueblo y un partido: plaginas para la historia del APRA. 2nd ed. Lima. El Militarismo en Per(i. Lima. Hugo Blanco y la rebelion campesina. Lima. zNueva mentalidad militar en el Per(i? Lima.
(POR) (MIR)

VOZ OBRERO; ORGANO DEL PARTIDO OBRERO REVOLUCIONARIO

1960ff. Lima Voz REBELDE; ORGANO DEL MOVIMIENTO

DE IZQUIERDA REVOLUCIONARIA

1962ff. (Suppressed, 1964-1965).

Lima.

70