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The Serpent and the King: The Dutch-Arakanese Relationship

by Stephan Van Galen


D.G.E. Hall, the eminent historian of Southeast Asia, in his ‘’Studies in Dutch relations with
Arakan’’, was the first to point out the importance of the Dutch language sources for a study
on the history of Arakan. Hall pieced together a preliminary overview of the Dutch-Arakanese
relationship on the basis of the published Daghregisters or diaries of Batavia. In his history of
Southeast Asia Hall even based his description of 17th century Arakan almost entirely on the
Daghregister and further source publications: the Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum
and De Jonge’’s Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie.
The scope of Halls description of the Arakanese-Dutch relationship could however only be
limited because of the nature of these source publications.
A recent article by Prof. Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Slaves and tyrants: Dutch tribulations in
seventeenth-century Mrauk-U further highlights the need for a structured overview of the
Arakanese-Dutch relationship. In this article Subrahmanyam has sketched the built-up of a
proto-colonial discourse around the disastrous 1649 embassy of the Dutch ambassador
Hensbroeck to the Arakanese court. The daghregister of this embassy, which ended in
outright-armed conflict, has been used by Subrahmanyam to characterize the relationship
between ‘’European’’ and ‘’Southeast Asian’’.
In this paper I will describe Arakanese-Dutch relations from 1608, when the first contacts
were established, until the end of the era of systematic contacts in 168 when the Dutch factory
in Arakan was closed. This description will not only be an attempt at providing a first
structured overview of the relationship, it will also aim to provide a basis for further research.
I will begin with a short overview of the available sources for a study of the Arakanese-Dutch
relationship and continue with a tentative periodisation, which I will illustrate with some
occurrences from these periods that can be seen as characteristic for these phases in the
relationship.
This paper is based on a re-examination of the Source publications used by Hall and study of
unpublished source materials from the VOC archives.
The published sources can be divided in four groups, that is:
First the Daghregister of Batavia, which covers in its published form the period from 1624 to
1682.4
Secondly the Corpus Diplomaticum Neerlando-Indicum which is a compilation of what might
be called the treaties between the United East India Company and various Asian rulers, this
publication covers the period from 1596 to 1799.5
Thirdly De Jonge’’s formidable Opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie, being a
somewhat haphazard but still useful compilation of primary documents from the VOC archive
covering the period 1595 to 1811.6
And finally the Generale Missiven van Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden aan Heeren XVII der
Verenidge Oost-Indische Compagnie being the letters sent by the Governor-General and
Council from Batavia to the Board of the VOC in the Netherlands, this last publication covers
the period 1610 to 1750.7
The archival material from the VOC archives at the Hague used for this paper can be roughly
divided into three categories.8 The missiven, or reports sent by the head of the Dutch factory
in Arakan to the Governor and Council in Batavia constitute the first category, The
daghregistersinstructies to new factors the third. held by the factors of the Company the
second, and The
Although we have access to only a few examples of the daghregisters they are of primary
importance because they consist of day-to -day observations of VOC employees on trade and
politics. They provide verbatim reproductions of conversations between VOC employees and
Court officials and observations on Arakanese culture. Originally there must have been a
continuous collections of these daghregisters for Arakan and even for Chittagong, but the
majority of the Arakan diaries and all the Chittagong diaries have supposedly been destroyed
during the early years of the nineteenth century on orders of the then Governor-General
Herman Daendels.9 The available daghregisters at the Algemeen Rijksarchief at the Hague
have survived because they were sent to the Heeren XVII in the Netherlands to serve as
background information for the Generale Missiven or the copies of the missiven sent from
Arakan to Batavia.
This brings us to the bulk of the material, the missiven. As I just mentioned copies of the
missiven sent from Arakan to Batavia were annually forwarded to the Netherlands to provide
the Board of the VOC with the necessary information for their policy decisions. These letters
refer in the first place to the commercial situation in Arakan and the results of VOC’’s
investments in the Arakanese markets. They provide information on the market structure, give
analyses of market forces and describe the other players on the market. But this is only part of
the information contained in these letters. They also provide us with a synopsis of the
information contained in the daghregister, they give an overview of the situation at the
Arakanese court and if necessary they sketch Arakans relations with its neighbours-especially
when these might impair the Companies trade in Arakan. The instructies lastly contain the
instructions sent fro Batavia or the early seventeenth century from the Choromandel coast to
factors going out to Arakan. As one might expect the first of these provide the best
information on the Arakanese situation while the latter say more about the objectives of the
Company itself.
As a last remark on the sources, I want to add that in some respect the following discussion
will be limited because I have not been in the position yet to conduct a systematic research in
the original resolutions and the uitgaande brieven van Gouverneur-Generaal en Raden. This
paper thus leaves aside the directions send from Batavia to the factors in Arakan. This should
however not present a substantial hindrance as a thorough reading of the missiven from
Arakan and the published sources gives us a good impression of the content of the instructions
sent to Arakan by the Dutch directors at Batavia.
After this lengthy digression to the source materials I will now come to a provisional
periodisation of the Dutch-Arakanese relationship. A first analysis of the materials collected
from the VOC archives at the Hague suggests that we may divide the period under
consideration into three phases.
The first phase in the Dutch-Arakanese relationship can probably be best described as one
during which both parties shared a common enemy and as a result there was room for military
cooperation. I suggest that this was the case from 1608 to 1620.
The second phase can be best described as being dominated by a growing economic
interdependence of the Arakanese court of Batavia. This was the period from 1625 to 1647.
The last phase of systematic contact runs from 165 to 1682 when it might be argued the
interests of both parties slowly diverged.
I. 1608-1620
The first contacts between the Dutch and the Arakanese took place in 1608 when the Dutch
arrived in Arakan to investigate trading possibilities in the bay of Bengal.10 They arrived in
Arakan just after Mong Razagri had returned from an abortive expedition to lower Burma
against Philip de Brito. The Arakanese king seemed determined to find new allies in his battle
with the Portuguese. The king was faced not only with a hostile Portuguese community on his
Eastern, but also on his Western flank. Here Sebastiao Gopcalves Tibau was well under way
in becoming a potentially bigger embarrassment of the Arakanese king then de Brito already
was.11 Mong Razagri was well aware of Dutch successes in their battles with the
Portuguese.12 After the Arakanese king had sent an embassy to the Dutch in Masulipatnam in
1610 to enquire whether any support was still forthcoming, it was decided by the Dutch
Company to send Jacob Dirksz. Kortenhoef to Arakan, not with any definite promises on
military cooperation but to inform the Arakanese of the possibilities and limitations of any
cooperation.1 As you can see on the sheet Kortenhoef was followed by several other
employees, not because the trade with Arakan was extremely profitable, but mainly to keep
the Company informed about events in the area and to provide a base for VOC ships cruising
for Portuguese prizes.14 To understand this situation we have to take into consideration that at
this movement trade meant also war for the VOC, moreover, it was reckoned that with a few
good prizes the Company could more than defray its operating costs in the Bay of Bengal
area.15 It is in this light that we have to look at the events of 1615 which I have selected as
exemplary for this phase.
In 1615 a large fleet from Goa to assist Tibau in his conflict with Mong Khamoung, the
successor to Mong Razagri. The importance of the ensuing naval battles between the
Portuguese on the one hand and the Arakanese and the Dutch on the other having hitherto
been misinterpreted or not well understand.16
Arthur Phayre in his history of Burma comments on this event as ‘’There happened to be
lying there some Dutch vessels, and they joined the Arakanese flotilla to resist the
[Portuguese] attack.17 Also in G.E. Harvey’’s history of Burma and in Hall’’s history of
Southeast Asia it has remained an open question just why the Dutch ships had arrived in
Arakan at such a critical juncture.18
Reading the accounts as presented by these authors one might be lead to believe that the
sudden arrival of the Dutch on the scene came as much as a surprise to the Arakanese as to the
Portuguese. There are however three important considerations that contradict this view.
Firstly it has to be remembered that the main objective of the Portuguese expedition was to
assert control over the Arakanese country trade and to keep the Dutch Company out of the
coast waters of lower Burma. The Portuguese were well aware of the presence of two Dutch
ships in Arakan and were actively seeking a naval engagement.19
Secondly, as we have seen, the Dutch presence in Arakan was not only aimed at commerce
but also centred around military objectives, namely to secure access to the trade of the Bay of
Bengal. The Dutch ships in Arakan had permission to assist the Arakanese in their conflict
with Portuguese.20
And thirdly, the Arakanese not only counted on an attack from Tibau, no they had even
requested and obtained Dutch support for an offensive action against Tibau.21
The arrival of the Portuguese fleet at the mouth of the Kaladan River on the rd of October
1615 could therefore not have been a total surprise to the Arakanese-Dutch alliance.22
A full scale attack finally came on the 15th of October1, leaving the allies more than a week
to prepare for battle, the Portuguese commander had lost the element of surprise and was
driven of the river by the combined Arakanese-Dutch forces.24 The Portuguese armada under
Dom Francisco de Menezes consequently set sail to unite with Tibau’’s forces and they
planned a second attack at Mrauk-U.25 This attack came on the 18th of November when the
combined Portuguese forces appeared in the Kaladan river once again. This time the Allies
were even more prepared. They had constructed six batteries on the Eastern bank of the river
and arranged their ships in a line, surrounded with a stockade in the shallow part of the river.
After a heavy cannonade from both sides the Allies broke their line and chased the Portuguese
with the tide from the river.26Directly following this victory Mong Khamoung forces were
attacked on the island of Cheduba by a Burmese force, a conflict that ended in a stand-off
after which the Burmese were forced to retreat.27 Having thus secured his position in Arakan
Mong Khamoung invited the Dutch to join him in an attack on what was left of Tibau’’s
forces on Sundiva, this attack took place in January 1616. The Allies were again successful
and after a 2-day battle Tibau was driven of the island.28
As we have seen the stationing of the two Dutch vessels in Arakan had been a conscious
move of the Dutch and the Arakanese, totally in accordance with the objectives of both
parties. It was not a mere lucky coincidence. These victories however didn’’t mean that
Arakan now controlled the Bengal’’s coastal trade, as late as 1625 the Portuguese were able to
disrupt the Arakan trade to a considerable extent. Moreover the control of the restored
Toungoo dynasty over Lower Burma meant that also the direct trade with Ava had come to a
standstill.29 Mong Khamoung control over the area from Chittagong to Cape Negrais was
still constantly being questioned and tested.
Because of this instability Arakan had lost its commercial and military value to the VOC,
which accordingly withdrew its personal from Mrauk-U in 1620.0
(To be continued)
I. 162-1647
The second phase of the Arakanese-Dutch relationship started in 162 when Hendrick
Lambrechts arrived at the court of the new king Thiri Thudhamma. The latter offered
Lambrechts a large supply of slaves and a stone factory building, to be built on account of the
king. After Jan Pietersz Goens ruthless expedition to Banda in 1622 this was welcome news
in Batavia.1 Slaves would however not be the only incentive the VOC had to pursue the
Arakan trade. After 1628 the wars with Mataram meant that the Company had no access to
Javanese rice, this combined with the fact that plantations on Banda could not produce enough
rice for their own subsistence meant that the VOC had to look elsewhere for its rice. Siam and
Arakan where two obvious places to look for rice imports.2
In the years from 162 to 161 the Company was busy trying to establish a permanent factory in
Arakan, when this did not meet with success the Arakan trade was left from 161 to 165 to the
Batavian free-burgher.
Repeated embassies (1627 and 164) sent by the Arakanese to Batavia confirmed the
importance they attached to more durable trading relations and the settlement of a permanent
factory in Mrauk-U.4 That this was also felt in Batavia proves the resolution of the Governor-
General and Council taken in July 164, when it was decided to ‘’embrace’’ the trade of
Bengal, Pegu and Arakan.5 With the arrival of Adam van der Mandere in 165 the contacts
between the Dutch and the Arakanese became more permanent.6 During this period we can
discern a growing economic interdependence of the Arakanese court and Batavia. Rice
exports from Arakan to Batavia increased as a result of the stability brought by the reign of
Thiri Thudhamma and his successors. The Arakanese economy in this period rapidly grew
and trading relations between Arakan and Atjeh, Chronomandel and Tenasserim became more
intense.
The daghregisters of Van der Mandere’’s successor, Arent van der Helm presented a good
picture of the state of the Arakanese-Dutch relationship. Van der Helm appears almost daily at
the court of Narabadigri where he discusses freely with the nobility of Arakan on all matters
of state. His good relations with the Portuguese and the King’’s treasurer at Court was on the
one hand the result of the large contribution made by the VOC to the Arakanese economy,
and on the other a side effect of the potential military power he had at his disposal with the
frequent arrival of large ships from Batavia and occasionally Choromandel. From the
daghregisters kept by Van der Helm we can conclude that his sudden departure from Arakan
in 1647 was closely related to the change in Government in the last months of 1645. It seems
that the Dutch factor had been an active opponent of the accession to the throne of the new
king Thado Mong Tara. It is in this light that we should view the embassy of Jacob
Hensbroeck in 1650. Hensbroeck hostile reception at the Arakanese court was in my view
directly related to Van der Helms efforts to block Thado Mong Tara pretensions to the crown.
The new king did in fact not disguise the fact that he was much disturbed that Van der helm
had behaved in such a way as if he was part of the Arakanese elite.
I. 165-1682
During the third and last phase the growth of the VOC’’s trade in Bengal and its diminishing
dependence on Arakanese slaves and rice meant that the interest of the Arakanese and the
Dutch slowly diverged.
In 165 the contacts between Arakan and Batavia were renewed by an embassy under John
Goessens.40 Goessens was able to negotiate a new contact with the young king
Sandathudhamma Raza, who had been on the throne for less than a year when the embassy
arrived.
A striking example of this new situation was the- often romanticized- episode of Shah
Shuja.42 The VOC’’s growing dependence on its Bengal trade meant that it could not remain
obvious to threats from the Mughal subahdar of Bengal. The VOC therefore discontinued its
activities in Arakan in 1666 and even sent a small naval squadron to Bengal in aid of the
Mughal conquest of Chittagong.4 Arakan had become only a cheap market for rice, but rice
was also to be had at other places in the Bay of Bengal. Slaves on the other hand were during
this period also available from a variety of sources. The only reason for the VOC to continue
its factory in Arakan the rice market showed signs of collapse and the internal situation in
Arakan became more and more unstable the VOC in 1682 decide to discontinue its operations
in Arakan. Thus ended the era of systematic contacts between the Dutch and Arakan. As I
have pointed out the nature of the Arakanese-Dutch relationship underwent several changes
over time. While it started out as a military alliance to ensure that Portuguese dominance of
the high seas be broken, it developed slowly to a more commercial relationship.
From the beginning of the 1620’’s a substantial trade in rice and slaves developed between
Arakan and Batavia. Although it is difficult to assess the impact of this large-scale trade on
the Arakanese economy it seems that trade in Arakan was growing rapidly during this period.
It is therefore extremely difficult to construct a seventeenth century crisis for Arakan.
Especially if we take into account the large building programmes initiated by king
Narabadigri in the latter part of the century and add to this the extensive patronage of the arts,
which made Arakan a cultural center of importance in the region one can only be left to
conclude that from the mid 1620’’s the Arakanese economy went through a period of growth
and expansion.
Only after the conquest of Chittagong a gradual decline set in when not only the Dutch
Company left Arakan, other merchants did the same, and so the rice market and other markets
collapsed.

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