U.S.

ChinaEconomicandSecurity ReviewCommissionStaffResearchReport
April5,2012

IndigenousWeaponsDevelopmentin ChinasMilitaryModernization

PrimaryAuthor: AmyChang,USCCResearchFellow forMilitary&NationalSecurityAffairs

EditorandContributingAuthor: JohnDotson,USCCResearchCoordinator

 Disclaimer: ThisreportistheproductofprofessionalresearchperformedbystaffoftheU.S.ChinaEconomic and SecurityReviewCommission,and waspreparedattherequestoftheCommissiontosupportits deliberations.PostingofthereporttotheCommission'swebsiteisintendedtopromotegreaterpublic understandingoftheissuesaddressedbytheCommissioninitsongoingassessmentofU.S.China economicrelationsandtheirimplicationsforU.S.security,asmandatedbyPublicLaw106398and PublicLaw1087.However,itdoesnotnecessarilyimplyanendorsementbytheCommission,any individualCommissioner,ortheCommissionsotherprofessionalstaff,oftheviewsorconclusions expressedinthisstaffresearchreport.

CoverPhotos: Topleft:AviewoftheundercarriageofaPLAAirForceJ20fighterduringitsmaidentestflight,Jan.11, 2011.Source:CACJ20,JanesAlltheWorldsAircraft,entrydatedJan.28,2011. Bottomright:AYuanclasssubmarinemooredpierside.Source:JeffreyLewis,YuanClassSubmarine, ArmsControlWonk.com,entrydatedJune10,2005. http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/639/yuanclasssubmarine

TableofContents

TableofContents GlossaryofAcronyms ExecutiveSummary Introduction Section1:TheYuanClassSubmarine Section2:TheAntiSatellite(ASAT)MissileSystem Section3:TheAntiShipBallisticMissile(ASBM) Section4:TheJ20Fighter Conclusions Appendix:ControversiesRegardingCompetingAnalysison ChineseMilitaryDevelopments 1 2 3 6 8 14 21 29 35 37

GlossaryofAcronyms
A2/AD ABM AIP ASAT ASBM C4ISR CCP CSS5 DF21D DIA DoD FY1C IOC INF J20 LTG MaRV MFA MRBM NATO ONI PLA PLAN PRC R&D S&T SS AntiAccess/AreaDenial AntiBallisticMissile AirIndependentPropulsion AntiSatellite AntiShipBallisticMissile Command,Control,Communications,Computer,Intelligence,Surveillance,and Reconnaissance ChineseCommunistParty NATOdesignatorforDF21mediumrangeballisticmissile Dongfeng21D U.S.DefenseIntelligenceAgency U.S.DepartmentofDefense VariantofChinasFengyun1SeriesSunsynchronousOrbitWeatherSatellite InitialOperationalCapability IntermediateRangeNuclearForcesTreaty Jian20FighterAircraft(alsoknownasXXJandJXX) LieutenantGeneral ManeuverableReentryVehicle MinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeoplesRepublicofChina MediumrangeBallisticMissile NorthAmericanTreatyOrganization OfficeofNavalIntelligence PeoplesLiberationArmy PeoplesLiberationArmyNavy PeoplesRepublicofChina ResearchandDevelopment ScienceandTechnology AttackSubmarine

ExecutiveSummary
TherapideconomicgrowthofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(PRC)since1979hasenabledthecountry toimplementanextensivemilitarymodernizationprogram.Sincethemid1990s,Chinasmilitary reformshaveacceleratedanddefensespendinghassteadilyincreased.InChinas2008whitepaperon defense,Chinaprojectedthatitwouldlayasolidfoundationforthedevelopmentofnationaldefense andthearmedforcesby2010,accomplishmajormechanizationandmakemajorprogressin informatization*by2020,andreachmodernizationofitsnationaldefenseandarmedforcesbythe middleofthecentury.1 Chinasprocessofmodernizingitsarmedforceshasinvolvedthedevelopmentofindigenouslydesigned weaponssystemssomeofwhichappearedtoundergoaprocessofdevelopment,procurement, and/ordeploymentthatoutpacedtheestimatesofU.S.andotherforeignobservers.Thispaper specificallyfocusesonfourkeyweaponsplatformsthathavebeendiscussedassurprisedevelopments toU.S.analysts**: Type039A/B/041(Yuanclass)dieselelectricattacksubmarine SC19antisatellite(ASAT)system Dongfeng21D(DF21D/CSS5)antishipballisticmissile(ASBM) Jian20(J20)stealthfighteraircraft2 KeyFindings Basedonthefourcasestudiescoveredinthisreport,therearenouniversaltrendsinpubliclyreported U.S.governmentanalysisonthedevelopmentofindigenousChineseweaponsystems.Evidencebroadly suggeststhatU.S.analystsdidnotexpecttheemergenceofthePLANavysYuanclasssubmarinewhen theclasswasunveiledin2004,muchlessthatthisclasscouldpotentiallybeutilizingairindependent propulsion(AIP)systems.Ontheotherhand,U.S.officialswerekeenlyawareofChineseantisatellite (ASAT)weaponsdevelopment,andreportsshowthatU.S.officialswerealsoawareofpotentialASAT testingactivityin2007,3althoughitispossiblethattheexacttimingofthetestwasunexpected. However,whileU.S.governmentanalystsaccuratelyanticipatedseveraldevelopments,suchasthe emergenceofChinasSC19ASATsystem,Chinasselectivetransparencyorstrategicdeceptionthat assertedoppositiontothedevelopmentofspaceweaponsmayhavemisledforeignobserversoutside ofmilitaryandintelligencechannels. Therehavebeen,however,identifiablecasesofmiscalculationregardingU.S.assessmentsonthe developmentspeedofChineseindigenousweaponssystems.WhileU.S.intelligencesources
*Informatizationistheintegrationofinformationtechnologyandcommunicationsnetworksintomilitarystrategyand weaponssystems.Formoreonthetopic,seeOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:Militaryand SecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoplesRepublicofChina2010(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2010),p.3. **Asusedinthisreport,thetermU.S.analystsreferstothebroaderChinawatchingcommunity,includingacademics, journalists,andU.S.governmentanalysts.Unlessspecificallynoted,itdoesnotrefersolelytoU.S.governmentanalysts. 1 InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,ChinasNationalDefensein2008. http://www.china.org.cn/government/whitepaper/node_7060059.htm. 2 ThenameChengduJian20maynotbethefinalnameoftheaircraft;suchinformationhasyettobereleasedand confirmed. 3 CraigCovault,ChineseTestAntiSatelliteWeapon,AviationWeek,January17,2007. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xml.

 acknowledgedthedevelopmentofalandbasedantishipballisticmissile(ASBM)in2008,academicand governmentsourceshavebothindicatedthattheUnitedStatesunderestimatedthespeedofChinas ASBMdevelopment.U.S.DepartmentofDefense(DoD)officialshaveassessedthattheASBMreached initialoperationalcapability(IOC)inDecember2010,andofficialChinesemediaandTaiwanesesources havereportedthattheASBMisnowfielddeployedwithPLAmissileunits.4Chinasfifthgeneration fighter,theJ20,wasoriginallyprojectedtobeginprototypetestingin2012;however,theUnitedStates alsounderestimatedthespeedofitsdevelopment,astheaircraftmadeitsfirstpublicizedflightin January2011.5 ParticularchallengestoaccuratepredictiveassessmentsonindigenousChinesemilitarydevelopments include: Informationdenialand/ordeception:6ThePRCexercisessecrecyovermanyaspectsofits militaryaffairs,andinsomeinstancesputsforthfalseormisleadinginformation.Thelackof transparencyinthePRCsmilitarymodernizationhasbeenafrequentcomplaintofU.S.defense officialsinrecentyears. UnderestimationofchangesinChinasdefenseindustrialsector:Onceviewedasabloatedand scleroticindustrialsectorincapableofadaptation,inthepastdecadethePRCdefenseindustry hasoutperformedtheexpectationsofitscritics.Whileitstillfacesmanyproblems,theChinese defenseindustryisfarmorecapableofproducingmodernweaponsplatformsthanwouldhave beenthecaseinthe1980sor1990s. DifficultyinunderstandingthePRCnationalsecuritydecisionmakingprocess:Thedecision makingprocessesoftheChinesegovernmentareopaque,particularlyinregardstomilitary policyandnationalsecurityissues.Thepublicemergenceand/ortestingofsomeindigenousPRC weaponsplatformshasalsorevealedapparentproblemsofpoorbureaucraticcoordination,and thepossibilityofacivilmilitarydivideatthetoplevelsofChinesepolicymaking. UnderestimationofBeijingsthreatperceptions:Manyanalystsinmedia,academia,andthe governmentmayhavefailedtofullyappreciatetheextenttowhichtheChineseleadership viewstheUnitedStatesasafundamentalthreattoChinassecurity.Thesethreatperceptions havebeeninflamedbyanumberofeventsinrecentyears,toincludethe1996TaiwanStraits Crisisandtheaccidental1999bombingofthePRCEmbassyAnnexinBelgradebyU.S.aircraft.
ZhangHanandHuangJingjing,Newmissilereadyby2015,PeoplesDailyOnline,February18,2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90786/7292006.html;RichChang,ChinaaimsnewmissiletypesatTaiwan, NSB(NationalSecurityBureau)says,TaipeiTimesOnline,March17,2011. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/03/17/2003498376. 5 JanesAlltheWorldsAircraft,CACJ20,(Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,January28, 2011). 6 AsdefinedbyauthorsRoyGodsonandJamesWirtz,DenialandDeception(D&D)isatermoftenusedtodescribea combinationofinformationobjectivesthatanationundertakestoachieveitsobjectives.Denialreferstotheattempttoblock informationthatcouldbeusedbyanopponenttolearnsometruth.Deception,bycontrast,referstoanationsefforttocause anadversarytobelievesomethingthatisnottrue.RoyGodsonandJamesWirtz,StrategicDenialandDeception:theTwenty FirstCenturyChallenge(Piscataway,NJ:TransactionPublishers,2009),pp.12.InanontherecordDepartmentofDefense briefingforthepressinOctober2001,thetermsdenialanddeceptionweredefinedasfollows:Denialisattemptstodeny youradversarykeyinformationeitheraboutyourmilitaryforces,yourleadership,thestatusofyourcountry,theeffectofthe adversary'scampaignonyourcountry,onitsinfrastructure,etcetera,etceteraDeceptionisslightlydifferentifyoulookat denialaswhatwewouldcallhidingthereal,deceptionisshowingthefake.SeeBackgroundBriefingonEnemyDenialand Deception,OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefense(PublicAffairs)October24,2001. http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2162.
4

 Chinasincreasedinvestmentsinscienceandtechnology:Chinasintensiveeffortsoverthepast twodecadestostimulateitsindigenouscapabilitiesforscientificresearchanddevelopment (R&D)whetherthroughscienceeducation,statefundingforresearch,seekingtechnology transfersfromforeigncompanies,orindustrialespionagehavesignificantlyincreasedits abilitytoproducemoreadvancedweaponssystems.Furthermore,Chinasincreasingknowledge ofdualusetechnologies(i.e.,thosewithbothcommercialandmilitaryapplications)inareas suchaselectronicshasalsoofferedsignificantcrossoverbenefitstothedefenseindustrial sector. Inadequatecapabilitiesforand/orattentiontotheexploitationofopensourceChinese languagematerials:SomeofthepastflawsinanalysisonChinasweaponsprogramcouldhave beenpartiallycorrectedbyincreasedattentiontoopensourcematerials,particularlyinregards toacademictechnicaljournalsandrelatedpublications.Increasedattentiontothemessagesin authoritativePRCmediaandpoliticalsciencepublicationswouldalsohaveimproved understandingoftheworldviewoftheChineseleadership.

ThetrendsofpastdecadesarenolongerareliableguidetotheperformanceofChinasdefense industries.Furthermore,U.S.observersshouldnottakeatfacevaluestatementsfromtheChinese governmentonmilitarypolicy,astheycouldeitherbedeceptive,orsimplyissuedbyagencies(e.g.,the PRCMinistryofForeignAffairs)thathavenorealsayovermilitarymatters.Basedonthetrends identifiedinthispaper,U.S.analystsandpolicymakersshouldexpecttoseecontinuedadvancementsin theabilityofthePRCtoproducemodernweaponsplatforms,andanattendantincreaseinthe operationalcapabilitiesofthePeoplesLiberationArmy.

Introduction
ThePeoplesRepublicofChinas(PRC)militarymodernizationeffortsacceleratedinthemid1990s largelyduetothe199596TaiwanStraitcrisisandtheU.S.deploymentoftwoaircraftcarrierstothe vicinityofTaiwan,whichunderscoredChinasinabilitytocounterU.S.militarypower.Inresponse,the ChineseleadershipdemandedthedevelopmentofmilitaryoptionsforTaiwanscenarios,whichincluded meanstopreventU.S.interventionintheeventofacrossstraitconflict.7 JudgingfromthepublicstatementsofU.S.officialsandreportsfromU.S.governmentagencies,the modernizationandadvancementofChinesemilitaryweaponssystemsoverthepastdecadehave consistentlydevelopedfasterthanbothU.S.officialsandanalystsoutsideofgovernmentexpected.U.S. officialsandanalystshaveexpressedsurpriseatthespeedwithwhichChinawasabletodevelop indigenousmilitarytechnologyorweaponssystems.ViceAdmiralDavidDorsett,headofU.S.Navy Intelligencefrom20082011,hasstatedinreferencetoChinasASBMprogramthattheUnitedStates [has]beenprettyconsistentinunderestimatingthedeliveryandIOCofChinesetechnology,weapon systems.Theyveenteredoperationalcapabilityquicker[thanexpected].8U.S.SecretaryofDefense RobertGatesacknowledgedinJanuary2011thatU.S.governmentintelligenceanalystshavesometimes underestimatedthepaceofChinasmilitarymodernization.9 Overthepastdecade,editionsoftheDepartmentofDefensesAnnualReporttoCongress:Military PowerofthePeople'sRepublicofChina(hereafterreferredtoastheDoDannualreport)havedescribed Chinasrapidpushtowardselfsufficiencyinweaponsprocurement,aidedsignificantlyinrecentyearsby Russianconventionalweapontechnologytransfersandsales.10AsaresultofChinasmodernization drive,thecountryhasmadesignificantprogressindevelopingitsownindigenousweaponssystems. Throughoutthemid1990sandtheearly2000s,Chinaacquiredmostofitscomplexmodernweapons systemsthroughimportsfromRussiaandIsrael.11Atthesametime,the1991GulfWarandthe199596 TaiwanStraitCrisisspurredChinesedevelopmentandtestingofadvancedweaponssystemsasapartof itsmilitarymodernizationprogramanditsdrivetodevelopgreatercapabilitiestoconductasuccessful activedefensestrategy.12Bythemid2000s,Chinahadbeguntofieldindigenousweaponsand hardware,aidedinpartbycrossoverknowledgefromtheChinesecivilianindustryandthebroader globaleconomy.13
7

RobertS.Ross,The19951996TaiwanStraitConfrontation:Coercion,Credibility,andUseofForce,InternationalSecurity, vol.25,no.2(2000). 8 TranscriptofDefenseWritersGrouproundtablewithViceAdmiralDavidJ.Dorsett,deputychiefofNavalOperationsfor InformationDominance,January5,2011. 9 JohnPomfret,DefenseSecretaryGates:U.S.underestimatedpartsofChina'smilitarymodernization,WashingtonPost, January9,2011.http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2011/01/09/AR2011010901068.html. 10 Asonesuchexample,seeOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:AnnualReportontheMilitaryPower ofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2004),p.32. 11 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:TheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2005 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2005),p.23. 12 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(Washington,DC: U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2003),pp.1819;andOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:TheMilitary PowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2005(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2005),p.15. 13 FordiscussionofthewaysinwhichtechnologytransferandexpertisegainedbyChinesecivilianmanufacturingcompanies havecarriedoverintothemilitaryrealm,seeJamesMulvenonandRebeccaSammTyrolerCooper,ChinasDefenseIndustryon thePathofReform(reportproducedbyDefenseGroup,Inc.,onbehalfoftheU.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReview Commission,October2009).http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/DGIReportonPRCDefenseIndustry FinalVersion_10Nov2009.pdf;andMicahSpringut,StephenSchlaikjer,andDavidChen,ChinasProgramforScienceand

 In2004,ChinapubliclyrevealeditsindigenouslydesigneddieselelectricYuanclasssubmarine,avessel whoseexistencewasreportedlyunknownuntilleakedphotosemergedontheChineseInternet.14On January11,2007,thePeoplesRepublicofChinasuccessfullytestedanASATmissilethatdestroyed ChinasownFengyun1C(FY1C)weathersatellite.InDecember2010,thecommanderoftheU.S.Pacific Command,AdmiralRobertWillard,announcedthatChinasDongfeng21D(DF21D/CSS5)ASBMhad reachedinitialoperationalcapacity,suggestingarapidadvancementinChinascommandofmissileand guidancetechnologyoverthepastdecade.15Inearly2011,leakedphotosandtestflightfootageof Chinasprototypefifthgenerationstealthfighter,theJian20(J20),inspiredadeeperinvestigationby U.S.analystsandmediaforinformationonthespecificfeaturesandcapabilitiesoftheaircraft.16 ThroughexaminationofthedevelopmentofthefourmajorChinesemilitaryplatformsandsystems listedbelow,thisreportaimstodelineatebothtrendsandpatternsinChinesePeoplesLiberationArmy militarymodernization,aswellasinU.S.assessmentsandpredictionsconcerningChinesemilitary development: Type039A/B/041(Yuanclass)dieselelectricattacksubmarine SC19antisatellite(ASAT)system Dongfeng21D(DF21D/CSS5)antishipballisticmissile ChengduJian20(J20)stealthfighteraircraft Thisreportexamineseachofthesepurportedsurprisemilitarydevelopmentsindetail,andseeksto provideaclearerpictureastowhetherornotU.S.officialsandanalystshavedemonstratedapatternof underestimatingthespeedanddepthofChinesemilitarydevelopment. Thecollectionofdataforthisstudyhasreliedsolelyonopensources,primarilyfromofficialgovernment documents(e.g.,DepartmentofDefenseannualreports,Congressionaltestimonies,Chinese governmentwhitepapers),aswellasinformationdrawnfromreputablemediaorscholarlysources.No efforthasbeenmadetocheckthisdataoranalysisagainstmaterialskeptwithinclassifiedchannels.The reportassumesinformationandconclusionscontainedwithinofficialpublicdocumentsandstatements bygovernmentagencies(suchastheDoD)tobeauthoritative.

TechnologyModernization:ImplicationsforAmericanCompetitiveness(reportproducedbyCENTRATechnologiesonbehalfof theU.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,April2011). http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2011/USCC_REPORT_China%27s_Program_forScience_and_Technology_Modernization.p df. 14 BillGertz,ChinaSubBuildup,InsidetheRing,December1,2006.http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring120106.html. 15 AndrewEricksonandGabeCollins,ChinaDeploysWorldsFirstLongRange,LandBasedCarrierKiller:DF21DAntiShip BallisticMissile(ASBM)ReachesInitialOperationalCapability(IOC),ChinaSignPost(),no.14(December26,2010); AndrewErickson,ChinaTestingAntiShipBallisticMissile(ASBM);U.S.PreparingAccordinglyUpdatedWithLatestAnalysis& Sources.",http://www.andrewerickson.com/2010/12/chinatestingantishipballisticmissileasbm/. 16 ViceAdmiralJackDorsett,directorofNavalIntelligenceandDeputyChiefofNavalOperationsforInformationDominance, hassaid,Still,thelackoftransparencyintowhatthey'redoing,thelackofopenness,remainsaconcernforus,and,Iam intriguedbythedevelopmentsIamquiteinterestedinthequantitiesanddifferenttypesoftechnologythathavebeen developedthatweeitherdidn'texpectorweunderestimated.KarenParrish,NavyIntelChiefDiscussesChinasMilitary Advances,AmericanForcesPressService,January6,2011.http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62346.

Section1:TheType039A/B/041(YuanClass)Submarine
TheYuanclassdieselpoweredattacksubmarine17wasfirstpubliclynotedinJuly2004,whena photographofthecompletedsubmarineemergedontheChineseInternet.18In2005,theU.S. DepartmentofDefenseacknowledgedtheadditionofanewdieselsubmarinetoChinasfleet.19There arecurrentlyfourYuanhullsinactiveservice,withafifthhullundergoingprecommissioningseatrials andexpectedtoenterservicein2012.20 SignificantDates 2003 NoacknowledgmentintheDoDannualreportofYuanclasssubmarinedevelopment,thoughit notedageneralChinesePLANavy(PLAN)focusonimprovingsubmarinetechnology.Thereport forecastedafleetconsistingofMing,Song,andKiloattacksubmarine(SS)classsubmarinesby 2010.21 2004 InJuly,ChinalaunchesitsfirstnewYuanclasssubmarine. 2004 FirstpublicreferencetoYuanclasssubmarineinU.S.sources. 2004 DoDnotesthatPRCsubmarinesblendwesternandindigenousfeaturesandhaveseveral featuresthatpointtoamajorshiftindieselsubmarinedesignphilosophy.22 2006 FirstYuanclasssubmarineestimatedtohaveenteredservice. 2007 SecondandthirdYuanclasssubmarinelaunched. 2008 FourthYuanclasssubmarinelaunched. 2009 SecondandthirdYuanclasssubmarinesenterservice.U.S.intelligencereportsthatYuan submarinesmayhaveairindependentpropulsion(AIP)capability.23 2010 FourthYuanclasssubmarineentersservice,thefourthofwhichisapotentialredesignof previousversionsandincorporatesKiloclassfeaturesandAIPtechnology. 2010 ChinaStateShipbuildingCorporationdisplaysAIPtechnology.24 2011 FifthYuansubmarinedelivered,conductingseatrialsinShanghai.25 2011 Projecteddateforserialproduction.26
17

Thereisdisagreementamonganalystsontheproperdesignationofthissubmarine.Forabriefdiscussiononthetopic,see RonaldORourke,ChinasNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilitiesBackgroundandIssuesforCongress, (Washington,DC:CRS[CongressionalResearchService]ReportRL33153,December23,2010,p.10. 18 LyleGoldsteinandWilliamMurray,Chinaemergesasamaritimepower,JanesIntelligenceReview(Englewood,CO:IHS Jane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,October1,2004). 19 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:TheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2005 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2005),p.33. 20 RonaldORourke,ChinasNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilitiesBackgroundandIssuesforCongress, (Washington,DC:CRS[CongressionalResearchService]ReportRL33153,July22,2011,p.24. 21 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(Washington,DC: U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2003),p.26. 22 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina(Washington,DC: U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2004),p.40. 23 OfficeofNavalIntelligence,ThePeoplesLiberationArmyNavy:AModernNavywithChineseCharacteristics(Suitland,MD: OfficeofNavalIntelligence,August2009),p.23;OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPower ofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2009(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2009),p.49. 24 AndreiChangandJohnWu,ChinaIntroducesAIPTechnology,KanwaDefenceReview,December18,2010. 25 Feng,ActivitiesaroundChineseshipyards,InformationDissemination,February5,2011. http://www.informationdissemination.net/2011/02/activitiesaroundchineseshipyards.html. 26 Jane'sFightingShips,Yuanclass(Type041),SubmarinesPatrolsubmarines,China,(Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense& SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,February11,2011).

 TheHistoryandDevelopmentofYuanClassSubmarines Priortodesigningandimplementingdomesticsubmarines,Chinaimportedamajorityofitssubmarine technologyfromRussia.Thefirstindigenousdieselsubmarine,theMingclass,wasfirstlaunchedin 1971;itwasbasedontheSovietRomeoclasssubmarine.Theseconddomesticallydesignedsubmarine, theSongclass,wasfirstlaunchedin1994.ChinaalsoboughtRussiandesignedKiloclasssubmarines throughoutthe1990sand2000s.TheYuanclasssubmarines(Figure1)sharecharacteristicsofboth RussianKiloclassandChineseindigenoussubmarines(e.g.,Songclass)27andarearmedsimilarlytothe SongclassSS.28

Figure1:APLANavyYuanclasssubmarinemooredpierside. Source:YuanClass(Type041),JanesFightingShips,entrydatedFeb.11,2011.

In2008,DoDassessedtheYuanclasssubmarinetobeinfullproductionandthatitwouldbeready forserviceby2010.29Between2005and2010,theDoDPLAannualreportshowedanetincreaseof fourdieselsubmarines,whicharelikelycomprisedofamixbetweennewYuan,Song,andKiloclass submarines.30Overthepastdecade,Chinahaspaidconsiderableattentiontoenhancingitssubmarine fleet.Asofthe2009DoDreport,Chinahadover60submarinesinservice(seeFigure2).31Series productionoftheYuanclasssubmarineisexpected,andsomeanalystspredictthattwentyof[the] class[will]bebuilt.32

Jane'sUnderwaterWarfareSystems,Type041(Yuanclass)(China),SubmarinesSubmarineandsubmersibledesigns (Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,August26,2010);andLyleGoldsteinandWilliam Murray,ChinaEmergesasaMaritimePower,JanesIntelligenceReview(Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&Security Intelligence&Analysis,October1,2004). 28 U.S.DepartmentofDefense,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoples RepublicofChina2010(Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice),p.5. 29 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2008 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2008),p.4. 30 Indeterminingthenewdieselsubmarines,theauthorcrossreferenceddatafromthe20052010DoDannualreportsand launchdatesofnewChinesesubmarinesfrom2005to2010,asprovidedbyJanes. 31 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina 2009(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2009),p.49. 32 RonaldORourke,ChinasNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilitiesBackgroundandIssuesforCongress (Washington,DC:CRSReportRL33153,April16,2010).
27


Figure2:IncreaseinmodernnavalvesselswithinthePLANavyin2000,2004,2008,and2009. Numbersforsubmarines(aggregateforbothnuclearanddieselelectricpropulsion)areshown inthesecondcolumnfromleft.

Source:OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,2010ReporttoCongress.

ThecurrentnumberofYuansubmarinesinserviceisnotconfirmed,althoughasofthiswritingthereare atleastfourcommissionedsubmarinesinservice(seeTable1,below).
Table1:ActivelyCommissionedYuanClassSubmarineHulls

Number 330 331 332 333

Builders WuhanShipyard WuhanShipyard WuhanShipyard WuhanShipyard

Launched May13,2004 August31,2007 November2007 April2008

Commissioned 2006 2009 2009 2010

The2006DoDannualreportarguedthattheacquisitionanddevelopmentofnewsubmarines illustrate[d]theimportancethePLAisplacingonunderseawarfareinitspursuitofseadenial.33The 2008reportreiteratedthisconcern,arguingthattheincreasedpresenceofadvancedsubmarines reflect[s]Beijingsdesiretoprotectandadvanceitsmaritimeinterestsuptoandbeyondthesecond islandchain.34ManymembersoftheU.S.CongresshavealsoexpressedconcernregardingChinas modernizationofitssubmarinefleet,includingSenatorJimWebb(VA)andRepresentativeDuncan Hunter(CA52ndDist.).35

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongressMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina 2006(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2006),p.26. 34 ThesecondislandchainconsistsoftheislandsextendingsouthandeastfromJapan,toandbeyondGuaminthewestern PacificOcean.OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina 2008(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2008),p.29. 35 SenateCommitteeonForeignRelations,SubcommitteeonEastAsianandPacificAffairs,HearingonMaritimeDisputesand th SovereigntyIssuesinEastAsia,111 Cong.,1stsess.,July15,2009;andHouseofRepresentatives,CommitteeonWaysand
33

Source:JanesFightingShips, Yuanclass(Type041)(Englewood,CO: IHSJane's: Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis, February11,2011).

10

 InMarch2007,JanesNavyInternationalreportedthattheYuanclasssubmarinehullswererumoredto haveairindependentpropulsion(AIP)capability.AIPcapabilityallowsadieselpropulsionsubmarineto remainsubmergedforuptoseveralweeks,decreasingitschancesofdetection.36In2009,boththe OfficeofNavalIntelligence(ONI)aswellasthe2009DoDannualreportonChinaspeculatedthatthe YuanclasscouldbeequippedwithanAIPsystem.37ThefullextentofAIPsystemintegrationintothe Yuanclasssubmarinefleetisunknown.However,ChinaShipbuilding&OffshoreCo.Ltd.'srecently brokereddealwithPakistanjointlytodesignandbuildsixAIPequippedsubmarinesalludestoChinas proficiencyinAIPcapability.38 By2007,itbecameclearthatDoDandotheragencieswerepayingincreasedattentiontoChinas submarinefleetandparticularlytotheincreaseinattacksubmarinesinthePLANsorderofbattle.The DoDreportonChinasmilitaryfromthatyearalsonotedthatChinahadbecomecapableofserial productionofmoderndieselelectricsubmarines.39

FactorsAffectingAnalysisontheDevelopmentoftheYuanClassSubmarine
Challenge#1:ChineseEffortsatInformationDenial TheextentofthesurprisefactorinthelaunchoftheYuansubmarineclassissubjecttodebate.In 2004,BillGertzofTheWashingtonTimesassertedthatU.S.intelligencewascaughtoffguardbythe developmentoftheYuanclasssubmarine.40JanesUnderwaterWarfareSystemspositedthatthe emergenceoftheYuansubmarinecameasasurprisetoWesternintelligenceanalysts.41Chinese mediaalsoallegedthattheU.S.governmentunderestimatedthedevelopmentofthesubmarine.42 CriticshavenotedthatChineseopensourcematerialsfeatureddiscussionanddebatesonthe developmentofnewdieselsubmarinesandtechnologiessuchasAIP,43andthatanalystswhotracked
Means,SubcommitteeonTrade,HearingonLegislationRelatedtoTradeWithChina,2August2007,110thCong.,1stsess., August2,2007. 36 Jane'sUnderwaterWarfareSystems,Type041(Yuanclass)(China),SubmarinesSubmarineandsubmersibledesigns (Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,August26,2010);HeFan,ForeignMedia:Two'Yuan' ClassSubmarinesToEnterServiceinNextTwoYears:MilitaryExperts:CombiningRussianandEuropeanAdvancedTechnology, ComprehensiveCombatEffectivenessEnhanced,WenWeiPoOnline(Chinese),October12,2010.OSCID: CPP20101012787016. 37 OfficeofNavalIntelligence,ThePeoplesLiberationArmyNavy:AModernNavywithChineseCharacteristics(Suitland,MD: OfficeofNavalIntelligence,August2009),p.23;OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPower ofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2009(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2009),p.49. 38 UsmanAnsari,PakistaninDealToBuyChineseSubs:Report,DefenseNews,March14,2011. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5950214&c=FEA&s=CVS. 39 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2007 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2007),p.27. 40 BillGertz,ChineseProduceNewTypeofSub,WashingtonTimes,July16,2004, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2004/jul/16/200407161231348152r. 41 Jane'sUnderwaterWarfareSystems,Type041(Yuanclass)(China),SubmarinesSubmarineandsubmersibledesigns, (Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,August26,2010). 42 NiEryan,ThePointoftheMilitaryistoPreventViolenceUnconfirmedReportsConveyRealInformation,HongKongWen WeiPoOnline(Chinese),January10,2011.OSCID:CPP20110110787012. 43 JeffreyLewis,YuanClassSubmarine,ArmsControlWonk,June10,2005. http://lewis.armscontrolwonk.com/archive/639/yuanclasssubmarine.

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 thediscourseinthesesourcesshouldnothavebeensurprised.The2002DoDannualreportimpliedthe intelligencecommunitysawarenessoftheincorporationofAIPonnewersubmarines.44Thus,another surpriseasidefromthesuddenappearanceofthisnewclassofshipmayhavebeenthepaceof developmentorextentofmodificationsonexistingsubmarinetechnologythatwentintothedesignof theYuan. OpensourcereportingontheYuanclasssubmarineprogramcontinuestobelimited.AlackofChinese governmentandmilitarytransparencyisaprimaryreasontheUnitedStatescouldnotaccuratelypredict andexpectthedevelopmentoftheYuansubmarine.OfficialPRCstatementsontheforcestructureand operationsofChinassubmarineforcesarescarce,andreferencesarevague.Thedevelopmentofthe Yuanclasssubmarinemayhaveremainedsecretduetothefactthatitwasbuiltcompletely undergroundinasecretChineseproductionfacilitythatincludedundergroundwaterwaystoaport, althoughtheU.S.governmenthasnotconfirmedthis.45ThesecrecysurroundingtheYuanprogramis thereforeagoodexampleofthedenialpartofwhattheU.S.governmenttermsdenialand deception:theefforttokeepnationalsecurityrelatedinformationhiddenfrompotentialadversaries.46 Challenge#2:ChangesintheCapabilitiesofthePRCDefenseIndustrialSector AnotherchallengetoaccurateanalysisoftheYuansubmarineprogrammayhavebeenan underestimationoftheextentofchangesintheChinesedefenseindustryinthe1990sandearly2000s, andtherebyoftheemergingabilityofthePRCtoproducemoreadvancedindigenousweaponssystems. EarliercommentaryintheUnitedStatestendedtolookaskanceonthePRCdefenseindustryasa scleroticsectorpoorlycapableofreformingitself.Oneexampleofsuchthinkingmaybeseenina2001 articlefromU.S.NewsandWorldReport,whichstatedthat China,withadecrepitindustrialbaseandariskaversesocialistbureaucracy,facesevenmore difficultythanadvancednationsindevelopinghightechweaponry[and]Beijing'sCommunist leadershipappearsfarmoreconcernedaboutthreatsfrominsideChinathanaboutextendingits militaryreach.Chinaalsofacesamountingfinancialcrunch.Whileitseconomyisgrowingrapidly, theChinesegovernmentstillsupportsnumerousSovietstyle,staterunbusinesses,whichmostly losemoneyMeanwhile,Chinesetroopsappeartobeminorleaguerscomparedwiththeir Americancounterparts.47 Thereareanumberofreasonswhytheseassumptionswereformedandprovedresistanttochange.In manycases,predictionsofcontinuitybasedonpastobservablephenomenaprovetobeaccurate.The PRCdefenseindustrysawlittlesubstantiveadvancementinthe1980sandearly1990s;continuedlackof progressandreformwasthemostobviousassumptiontomake.However,paradigmshiftscananddo occurcatchingevenexpertsbysurpriseandbothindividualsandinstitutionsarereluctantto backtrackonissuesoncetheyhavestatedanopinion.48
44

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2002(Washington, DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2002),p.21 45 BillGertz,ChinaSubBuildup,InsidetheRing,December1,2006.http://www.gertzfile.com/gertzfile/ring120106.html;Bill Gertz,CommercialPhotosShowChineseNukeBuildup,WashingtonTimes,February16,2006. http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2006/feb/16/200602160202117960r/. 46 Fordefinitionsofthetermsdenialanddeception,seefootnote#6. 47 RichardJ.NewmanandKevinWhitelaw,China:HowBigaThreat?U.S.News&WorldReport,July23,2001. 48 AsnotedbylongtimeDefenseIntelligenceAgencyanalystCynthiaGrabo,thereisaninherentgreatreluctanceonthepartof manyindividualsandprobablymostbureaucraticorganizationstosticktheirnecksoutonproblemswhicharenew, controversial,andaboveallwhichcouldbebadnewsforhigherofficialsandthepolicymaker.Theeffectofthesefactorsand

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 ResearchworkperformedfortheCommissionin2009byDefenseGroup,Inc.detailedthesignificant improvementsobservableinmanyPRCdefenseindustrialsectorsfollowingreformsinstitutedinthe late1990s.ItalsodescribedthecrossoverbenefitsthatChinasdefenseindustrygainedfromthe expansionofexportmanufacturingincivilianproducts: Therelativeprogressofanindividualdefenseindustrialsectorappearstobebestexplainedbyits relativeintegrationintotheglobalizedproductionandR&Dchain,whichprovidesaccesstothe latestproductionandmanufacturingtechnologiesandknowhowthegreatestprogressappears tohavebeenmadeintheshipbuildinganddefenseelectronicssectors,bothofwhichhave benefitedgreatlyfromChinascurrentpositionasaleadingproducerofcommercialshipsand informationtechnologies.49 Theforcesofglobalizedmarkets,tiedtotheChinesegovernmentspoliciestoreformthedefense industrialsectorandtodrawinthebestofforeignmanufacturingknowhow,havedramaticallychanged thecapabilitiesofthePRCtoproduceitsownadvancedindigenousweaponsplatforms.Thesefactors maynothavebeencleartooutsideanalystsinthe1990s,butbythemiddleofthe2000stheywere beginningtobearfruit.ThesechangesarenowclearlyrecognizedbyanalystswiththeU.S.Department ofDefense: Sincethelate1990s,Chinasstateowneddefenseanddefenserelatedcompanieshaveundergone abroadbasedtransformation.Beijingcontinuestoimproveitsbusinesspractices,streamline bureaucracy,broadenincentivesforitsfactoryworkers,shortendevelopmentaltimelines,improve qualitycontrol,andincreaseoveralldefenseindustrialproductioncapacity.50 AlthoughmanyproblemsremainintheChinesedefenseindustry,51ithasmovedawayfromthe hideboundbureaucraticstructuresofthe1970sand1980s.Althoughtheindustryremainsfirmlyunder statecontrol,52structuralreformandtechnologicaladvancementshavemadeitfarmorecapableof producingmodernweaponsplatformsthanwouldhavebeenthecasetwodecadesago.

possiblyothers,individuallyandcollectively,canbetoretardtheanalysisandacceptanceofdataintheintelligencesystemby weeks,monthsandsometimesevenyears.CynthiaGrabo,AnticipatingSurprise:AnalysisforStrategicWarning(Washington, DC:JointMilitaryIntelligenceCollegeCenterforStrategicIntelligenceResearch,December2002),p.45. 49 JamesMulvenonandRebeccaSammTyrolerCooper,ChinasDefenseIndustryonthePathofReform(reportpreparedon behalfoftheU.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission)DefenseGroup,Inc.(October2009),p.4. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/DGIReportonPRCDefenseIndustryFinalVersion_10Nov2009.pdf. 50 MilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoplesRepublicofChina2011(Arlington,VA:U.S.DepartmentofDefense, 2011),pp.4142. 51 RobertKarniol,ChinaDefenseIndustryFacesHomemadeEngineTroubles,TheStraitsTimes(Singapore),July20,2011. 52 ThearmamentsindustryisoneofseveneconomicsectorsidentifiedasstrategicbytheChinesegovernment,meaningthat thegovernmentintendstoretainmorethan50percentcontrolofthecompaniesinthatsector.SeeU.S.ChinaEconomicand SecurityReviewCommission,AnnualReporttoCongress2007(Washington,DC:GovernmentPrintingOffice,2007),p.39.

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Section2:TheAntiSatellite(ASAT)WeaponSystem(SC19)
OnJanuary11,2007,Chinasuccessfullytestedadirectascentantisatellite(ASAT)weapon,destroying oneofitsownweathersatellites,theFY1C,approximately530milesaboveEarth.53Thetest,which producedhistorysgreatestsingleinstanceofhumancreatedspacedebris,provokedU.S.and internationalconcernaboutspaceenvironmentalsafetyandfurtherraisedquestionsregardingthe implicationsofthetestforthevulnerabilityofU.S.satellitesystemstoadversarialattacks. TheU.S.GovernmentcalledonChinatoexplainitsactionsonJanuary15,althoughChinadidnot publiclyacknowledgethetestuntilJanuary23.Then,ChinasForeignMinistrystatedthatthetestwas notdirectedatanyothercountryandthatChinahadnointentionofpursuingtheweaponizationof space.54Whilethislanguageisconsistentwithpreviouspublicofficialstatementssuchasthose containedwithinthePRCsdefensewhitepapers,thetestincitedfurthercontroversywhenChinafailed toprovideexplanationstointernationalquestionsregardingitsintentionsfortheASATprogram55a refusalthathascontinuedtothisday. SignificantDates 1998 DoDreportstoCongressthatChinaisacquiringforeigntechnologiesthatcouldbeusedto developanASATcapability.56 2003 DoDreportsonChinasASATambitionsandtheinevitabilityofspacebasedmissiledefenses. ThereportisunclearonChinasassessedASATcapabilitybutprojectsthatanASATsystemwill befieldedin20052010.57 2004 DoDassessedthatChinaisonitswaytoattainingASATcapability,withtestingestimatedto begininthenearfuture.58 2007 OnJanuary11,ChinaconductssuccessfulASATweapontestonFY1Cweathersatellite. 2007 OnJanuary15,U.S.officialspubliclymentionChinasASATtest. 2007 Followingearlierevasivestatements,onJanuary23ChinasForeignMinistrymakesa proformapublicstatementacknowledgingtheASATtest,statingthat[t]histestwasnot directedatanycountryanddoesnotconstituteathreattoanycountry.59 2010 OnJanuary11,ChinalaunchesSC19missiletodestroyCSSX11mediumrangeballisticmissile (MRBM)inspace.60
53

FormoredetailsontheASATtest,seeShirleyKan,ChinasAntiSatelliteWeaponTest(Washington,DC:CRSReportRS22652, April23,2007).FormoreonChinasspaceprogramandmilitaryspacestrategy,seetheforthcomingtranscriptfortheU.S. ChinaEconomicandSecurityCommissionsMay11,2011,hearing,ChinasSpaceAdvances.Seeaswellastheforthcoming reportonChinasspaceprogramproducedonbehalfoftheCommissionbytheProject2049Institute,expectedtobereleased inautumn2011. 54 JosephKahn,ChinaShowsAssertivenessinWeaponsTest,NewYorkTimes,January20,2007. http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/20/world/asia/20china.html. 55 TimRossandHollyWatt,WikiLeaks:USvsChinainbattleoftheantisatellitespaceweapons,Telegraph(London),February 2,2011. 56 ReporttoCongresspursuanttoSection1226oftheFiscalYear1998NationalDefenseAuthorizationAct,FutureMilitary CapabilitiesandStrategyofthePeople'sRepublicofChina(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,November1998). 57 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2003 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2003),p.9. 58 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2004(Washington, DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2004),p.42. 59 JamesMulvenon,RogueWarriors:APuzzledLookattheChineseASATTest,ChinaLeadershipMonitor,no.20(Winter 2007). 60 HollyWatt,WikiLeaks:timelineofthespacerace,Telegraph(London),February2,2011.

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 HistoryandDevelopmentofASATCapability Chinasrapidlydevelopingaerospacecapabilitysignifiesacriticalshiftinthemilitaryandstrategic environmentinU.S.Chinaandinternationalrelations.ChineseR&DonfundamentalASATtechnologies canbetracedtothe1960s.61OpensourceevidencesuggeststhatpreliminaryresearchonASAT technologies(e.g.,groundbaseddirectedenergylasers,terminalguidancesystems,andsatellite jamming)beganinthe1980s62andthatthePLAhasbeendevelopingASATweaponsasanational prioritysinceatleasttheearly1990s.63ThereisalsoevidencethatChineseresearchershaveespoused thesystematicstudyandanalysisofmilitarysatellitesinorderbettertotakecountermeasure techniquesagainstsatellitereconnaissance.64

Figure3:ArtistsConceptionofChinasAntiSatelliteTest

Source:Discover,SpaceJunk:HowtoCleanUptheSpaceAge'sMess." In1998,theSecretaryofDefenseWilliamCohenmadeapublicreferencetoChinasdevelopmentof ASATweapons;65however,someanalystsstillexpresseddoubts.66Asoftheearly2000s,many subscribedtotheskepticalargumentofdefensejournalistTheresaHitchensthat Thereislittleevidencetodatethatanyothercountrypossessesboththematuretechnologyand theintentiontoseriouslythreatenAmericanmilitaryorcommercialoperationsinspaceandeven lessevidenceofseriouspursuitofactualspacebasedweaponsbypotentiallyhostileactors.There areseveretechnicalbarriersandhighcoststoovercomeforallbutthemostrudimentaryASAT capabilities,especiallyfordevelopmentofonorbitweapons.Itfurtherremainsunclearwhat politicaldriversoutsideofAmericandevelopmentofspacebasedweaponrywouldforce Americancompetitors,intheneartomediumtermtoseriouslypursuesuchtechnology.67
61

FederationofAmericanScientists,ChineseAntiSatellite[ASAT]Capabilities,June23,2000. http://www.fas.org/spp/guide/china/military/asat/. 62 MarkStokes,China'sStrategicModernization:ImplicationsfortheUnitedStates,September1999,pp.118121. 63 IanEaston,TheGreatGameinSpace:ChinasEvolvingASATWeaponsProgramsandTheirImplicationsforFutureU.S. Strategy"(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,2009),p.2. 64 QueWenyanandYangBo,RadarCountermeasureTechniquesAgainstSatelliteReconnaissance,XiandaiLeida,February1, 2004.OSCID:CPP20041202000209. 65 U.S.DepartmentofDefense,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,FutureMilitaryCapabilitiesandStrategyofthePeoples RepublicofChina(Washington,DC:DepartmentofDefense,1998). 66 ShirleyKan,ChinasAntiSatelliteWeaponTest(Washington,DC:CRSReportRL22652,April23,2007),p.2. 67 TheresaHitchens,MonstersandShadows:LeftUnchecked,AmericanFearsRegardingSpaceAssetsWillDrive Weaponization,DisarmamentForum,no.1(2003):22.

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 TherehavealsobeendebatesonthedevelopmentandpotentialdualuseofChinasspaceprogram, includingwhetheritwouldbeusedtoboostnationalprestigeortoreinforcethePLAsspacewarfare strategy.68Suchastrategycouldbesummarizedascreatingandmaintainingafavorablesecurity environmentthroughcredibledeterrenceand,intheeventofactualmilitaryconflict,theabilityto conductmodern,hightechjointcampaignsinvolvingoperationsinouterspace.69Indeed,atthetime, ChinawasbelievedtolackanumberofcapabilitiesthatwouldberequiredforaviableASATprogram, leadinganalystsoutsideofgovernmenttoconcludethatBeijingsultimatecommitmenttodeveloping ASATweaponsremainsambiguous.70 Chinasrepeatedcallsforpeacefuluseofspaceandexpressedconcernsregardingspacedebris indicatedoppositiontocounterspaceandspacedeterrenceprograms;however,Chinesetechnical papersandthe2007ASATtestprovedthatitsintentionswereotherwise.71The2007ASATtest, therefore,wasapoliticalsurprisetothosewhoacceptedthePRCsofficialpositionatfacevalue,butit wasnotunexpectedbytheU.S.intelligenceandpolicycommunity.TheASATtestbroughttopublic attentionthefactthatChinacouldexecutecapabilitiesthatundermineorcomplicateU.S.accessto spaceintheeventofaconflict. However,U.S.governmentanalystsweretrackingChineseASATdevelopmentatleastasearlyas2003: theDepartmentofDefensesannualreportonChinesemilitarypowerforthatyearacknowledgedthat ChinawasdevelopingandplannedtofieldadirectascentASATsystem.72SubsequentDoDannual reportshavenotedChinascapabilitytodestroyordisablesatellitesbylaunchingaballisticmissileor spacelaunchvehiclearmedwithanuclearweapon.73The2006reportdescribedChinaaspursuingan offensiveantisatellitesystemandgroundbasedASATweaponssystems.74BetweenSeptember2004 andJanuary2007,ChinaconductedatotaloffourdirectascentASATtests,allofwhichwereknownto U.S.analysts.75 DoDannualreportsreleasedafterthe2007ASATtestindicatedanincreasedfocusonthepossibilityof futureChinesetests,aswellasonthemilitaryandcounterspaceapplicationsofASATtechnology.76
68

PhillipSaundersetal.,China'sSpaceCapabilitiesandtheStrategicLogicofAntiSatelliteWeapons,July22,2002. http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020722.htm. 69 ForadiscussionofChinasspacestrategy,seeOfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicof China(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2007),p.21;M.TaylorFravel,TheEvolutionofChinasMilitaryStrategy, inChinasRevolutioninDoctrinalAffairs:EmergingTrendsintheOperationalArtoftheChinesePeoplesLiberationArmy,eds. JamesMulvenonandDavidFinkelstein(Alexandria,VA:TheCNACorporation,2005),pp.9697;DeanCheng,Zhanyixueand JointCampaigns,inChinasRevolutioninDoctrinalAffairs:EmergingTrendsintheOperationalArtoftheChinesePeoples LiberationArmy,eds.JamesMulvenonandDavidFinkelstein(Alexandria,VA:TheCNACorporation,2005),pp.109110;and AshleyJ.Tellis,ChinasMilitarySpaceStrategy,Survival49,no.3(2007):4172. 70 PhillipSaundersetal.,China'sSpaceCapabilitiesandtheStrategicLogicofAntiSatelliteWeapons,July22,2002. http://cns.miis.edu/stories/020722.htm. 71 EricC.AndersonandJeffreyG.Engstrom,ChinasUseofPerceptionManagementandStrategicDeception(Washington,DC: U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,November2009),p.44. 72 U.S.DepartmentofDefense,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublic ofChina2003(Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2003),p.36. 73 U.S.DepartmentofDefense,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoples RepublicofChina2006(Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2006),p.36. 74 U.S.DepartmentofDefense,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoples RepublicofChina2006(Washington,DC:US.GovernmentPrintingOffice),p.35. 75 AshleyJ.Tellis,ChinasMilitarySpaceStrategy,Survival49,no.3(2007):4172. 76 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2008(Washington,DC:U.S.Department ofDefense,2008),pp.2021;OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2008

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 WhiletheUnitedStateswasawareofChinesetechnologicalandaerospacedevelopment(withpotential applicationtoASATweapons),duetoChinasstatedofficialstanceonouterspace,U.S.decisionmakers maynothavefocusedonASATdevelopmentsascloselyuntilafterthesuccessful2007test.77 In2007,LieutenantGeneral(LTG)MichaelMaples,directoroftheDefenseIntelligenceAgency(DIA) testifiedtoCongressthattheASATtestwouldallowChinatoeventuallydeployanASATsystemthat couldthreatenU.S.satellites.78Later,in2009,LTGMaplesacknowledgedthatChinaisdeveloping systemsandtechnologiestargetingU.S.spacebasednavigation,communication,andintelligence collectioncapabilities.HearguedthatChinawillcontinuetodeploymoreadvancedsatellitesthrough thenextdecade,includingdevelopingjammersandkineticanddirectedenergyweaponsforASAT missions.LTGMaplesalsoindicatedChinasdualuseofcivilianaerospacetechnologiestoimproveits abilitytotrackandidentifysatellitesaprerequisiteforantisatelliteattacks.79Others,suchas LieutenantGeneralWallaceGregson(USMC,ret.),thenAssistantSecretaryofDefenseforAsianand PacificSecurityAffairs,havetestifiedthatthesemovesarejustoneelementofChinasmilitary modernizationeffort[s]todevelopandfielddisruptivemilitarytechnologies.80 WiththegrowingimportanceofspaceassetsforChinasburgeoningmilitaryC4ISRinfrastructure,the possibilityoffutureASATtestsisnotunexpected.However,itwouldelicitgreatinternationalconcern forpotentiallydamagingspacedebrisandhasimmensestrategicimplicationsforU.S.spacecapabilities. TherelianceoftheUnitedStatesonspaceassetsforintelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance; communication;navigation;andpositioningcreatesaparticularvulnerabilitytoattacks,andthusthe potentialconsequencesofanothertestorevenanoffensivestrikearegrave.Itseemslikely,however, thattheUnitedStateswilldevelopitsowndeterrentstoChinasnewfoundcounterspacecapability.81 Inanycase,itnowseemsclearthatChinasintendedapproachistocontinuetodevelopgroundbased kinetickillvehicles(e.g.,theSC19ASAT),aswellaslasersandavarietyofjammersandother electromagneticspectrumdisruptionhardware.Itisalsosimultaneouslyattemptingsometimesin concertwithRussiatolimitthespacepoweroftheUnitedStatesandotherpotentialcompetitor nationsbyrepeatedlyproposingarmscontrolagreementsthatwouldlimittheweaponizationofandan armsraceinouterspacebyrestrictingspacebasedplatforms,butthatwouldnotregulateground basedantispaceplatformcapabilities.82

(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2008),pp.2728;OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryPowerofthe PeoplesRepublicofChina2009(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2009),pp.2527; 77 EricC.AndersonandJeffreyG.Engstrom,ChinasUseofPerceptionManagementandStrategicDeception(Washington,DC: U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,November2009),pp.4445. 78 SenateArmedServicesCommittee,CurrentandProjectedNationalSecurityThreatstotheUnitedStates,MichaelMaples, statementfortherecord,110thCong.,1stsess.,February27,2007. 79 SenateArmedServicesCommittee,HearingonCurrentandFutureWorldwideThreatstotheNationalSecurityoftheUnited States,111thCong.,1stsess.,March10,2009. 80 SenateArmedServicesCommittee,HearingonNominationsBeforetheSenateArmedServicesCommittee,111thCong.,1st sess.,April28,2009. 81 IanEaston,TheGreatGameinSpace:ChinasEvolvingASATWeaponsProgramsandTheirImplicationsforFutureU.S. Strategy(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,2009),p.11. 82 MinistryofForeignAffairsofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,PreventionofanArmsRaceinOuterSpace,PressRelease, April7,2011.http://www.mfa.gov.cn/eng/wjb/zzjg/jks/kjlc/wkdd/t410757.htm.

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FactorsAffectingAnalysisontheDevelopmentoftheAntiSatelliteMissileSystem
Challenge#1:StrategicDeceptionandMisleadingMessages TheU.S.governmentdidnotunderestimateChinaspotentialtofieldASATcapabilities,norwasit caughtoffguardbytheJanuary2007test.However,itispossiblethatwesterncommentatorsoutsideof government(e.g.,Hitchensetal.)mayhavebeenmisledbyChinaspublicstatementsconcerningthe useofweaponsinspace.83Chinasdiplomaticstanceandofficialrhetoric,juxtaposedwithitsreluctance postJanuary2007toengagewiththeUnitedStatesandotherforeigncountriesonaddressingmilitary usesofspace,createdseparatepublicandbehindthescenesstancesonspacemilitarization. Initswhitepapersupuntil2006,Chinaespousedthatouterspaceshouldbeusedexclusivelyfor peacefulpurposesandthatitwasopposedtoanymilitarizationofspace,includingthedevelopmentof antisatelliteweapons.Thepapersemphasizedutilizinganinternationallegalinstrumentinpreventing theweaponizationofspace.84Bythepublicationofits2006whitepaper,however,thelegal instrumentaspectwasnotmentioned,hintingatpossibleASATdevelopment.Bythe2008Defense whitepaper,however,thetermreappeared,whichraisedquestionsamongtheanalyticaland intelligencecommunityaboutthemotivesbehindChinaswordsandactions.85 Whenquestionedbytheinternationalcommunityinearly2007regardingitsASATtest,PRC spokespersonsprovidedcontradictoryresponsesfromdifferentbranchesofitsgovernment(i.e., ForeignMinistryascomparedtothePLA),whichledsomeobserverstospeculatethattheincident revealedeitherariftinpolicycoordination,oranactiveefforttodeceivetherestoftheworldregarding Chinasprogramsforspaceweapons.86 ScholarswhoobserveChinashistoricalandmilitaryphilosophyhaveidentifiedstrategicdeceptionasan oftpracticedtactictomanipulateanopponentsstrategicassessmentprocessandinfluencethe highestmilitaryauthoritiesresponsibleforformulatingstrategicdecisions.87Perceptionmanagement, ontheotherhand,isbroadlydefinedaspresentingmisinformationwiththeintenttoinfluencehow othernationsperceiveChineseinterestsandactions.88Thesecretiveandnontransparentnatureofthe Chinesegovernmentleavesoutsideobserversunsureastowhatextentgovernmentpronouncements onChinasmilitarymodernizationshouldbeacceptedprimafacie.89
83

CraigCovault,ChineseTestAntiSatelliteWeapon,AviationWeek,January17,2007. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=space&id=news/CHI01177.xml;EricC.Andersonand JeffreyG.Engstrom,ChinasUseofPerceptionManagementandStrategicDeception(Washington,DC:U.S.ChinaEconomic andSecurityReviewCommission,November2009). 84 InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,WhitePaperonChinasNationalDefense,1998; InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,WhitePaperonChinasNationalDefense,2000; InformationOfficeoftheStateCouncilofthePeoplesRepublicofChina,WhitePaperonChinasNationalDefense,2004. 85 EricC.AndersonandJeffreyG.Engstrom,ChinasUseofPerceptionManagementandStrategicDeception(Washington,DC: U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,November2009),p.44. 86 JamesMulvenon,RogueWarriors?APuzzledLookattheChineseASATTest,ChinaLeadershipMonitorno.20(April15, 2007):1. 87 YuQiaohua,StrategicDeception[ZhanlueQipian],inChineseMilitaryEncyclopedia,ed.FuQuanyu(Beijing: MilitarySciencePublishingHouse,2002),p.583. 88 EricC.AndersonandJeffreyG.Engstrom,ChinasUseofPerceptionManagementandStrategicDeception(Washington,DC: U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,November2009),pp.78. 89 PhillipC.SaundersandMichaelKiselycznyk,HowTransparentisthePLA?PacificForumCSISPacNetno.30(June15,2010). http://csis.org/files/publication/pac1030.pdf.

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 Theselectivedisseminationofinformationisastrategythatisalsorootedintheinstitutionalculture andaccustomedpracticesoftheChineseCommunistParty,whichhasadeeplyingrainedtendency towardsecretivenessandalonghistoryofproactivelyusinginformationtopromotethepartys objectiveswhilesuppressinginformationdeemedharmfultoitsinterests.90Theopaquenatureof todaysChinesegovernmentandmilitaryoftenmakesitdifficulttoascertaintrendsandbreakthroughs onmilitarytechnologyandhardwaredevelopment.Chinarestrictsmostmilitaryanddefenserelated informationfromthepublic,andmanyaspectsofChinasnationalsecuritypolicy,includingits motivations,intentions,anddecisionmakingprocesses,remainsecret.91 Challenge#2:PoorPolicyCoordinationandaChineseCivilMilitaryDivide? Historically,thePLAhasexercisedconsiderableinfluenceintheCCP,andwhilethecivilianleadership technicallyhascontroloverthePLA,therelationshipbetweenPLAcommandersandthecivilian leadershipiscomplex.92SomeanalystshavearguedthatgapsinU.S.knowledgeofChinesemilitary developmentsresultinpartfrompoorpolicycoordinationbetweencivilianandmilitaryofficialsin Chinascentralleadership,thoughthetrueextentofsuchacivilmilitarydivideisdifficultto determine.93 TheJanuary2007ASATtestprovidesaprimeexampleofpoorbureaucraticcoordination.Chinas MinistryofForeignAffairs(MFA)took12daystopubliclyconfirmtheevent,asubstantiallylongtime giventheinternationalresponseandconcernpromptedbytheASATtest.Thisprovokedwidespread speculationthattheMFAwasnotinformedofthelaunchbeforehand.94Inasimilarfashion,President HuJintaosexpressedsurpriseattheJ20testflightduringSecretaryofDefenseGatesvisittoBeijingon January11,2011,alsoledsomeanalyststoposittheexistenceofacivilmilitarydivide(seepages33 34).95Whilesomeanalystsandscholarshavesuggestedthatthecivilianleadershipmayhavebeen unawareoftheASATandJ20tests,othersourcesindicatethatthedecisiontotesttheASATweapon wascarefullydeliberatedbetweenthecivilianandmilitaryleadership.96 Otheranalysts,suchasNanLioftheU.S.NavalWarCollege,havearguedthattheprolongedsilence afterthe2007ASATtestwasacalculatedactintendedtoaggravatethesenseofuncertaintyforChinas opponents,thusenhancingthedeterrenteffect.97Dr.LimaintainsthatpostDengleaders(i.e.,Jiang
90

U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,2009AnnualReporttoCongress(Washington,DC:U.S.Government PrintingOffice,November2009),p.297. 91 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:TheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2005, (Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2005),p.7. 92 SusanShirk,DomesticThreats,Chap.3inChina:FragileSuperpower(NewYork,NY:OxfordUniversityPress,2007),pp.70 72. 93 U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,HearingonChinasNarrativesRegardingNationalSecurityPolicy, writtentestimonyofAndrewScobell,March10,2011 94 JamesMulvenon,RogueWarriors?APuzzledLookattheChineseASATTest,ChinaLeadershipMonitor20(April15,2007): 1. 95 JimGaramone,Gates:ChineseTakingStrategicDialogueProposalSeriously(Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense, January11,2011).http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62397;andU.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReview Commission,HearingonChinasNarrativesRegardingNationalSecurityPolicy,writtentestimonyofAndrewScobell,March10, 2011. 96 GregoryKulackiandJeffreyLewis,UnderstandingChinasASATTest,UnionofConcernedScientists,October31,2008. http://www.ucsusa.org/nuclear_weapons_and_global_security/international_information/us_china_relations/understanding chinasasat.html. 97 NanLi,ChineseCivilMilitaryRelationsinthePostDengEra:ImplicationsforCrisisManagementandNavalModernization, U.S.NavalWarCollegeChinaMaritimeStudies4(January2010):24.

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 ZeminandHuJintao)intentionallycreatedaseparationbetweencivilandmilitaryrealms,confiningthe PLAtomilitarytechnicaltasksandexternallyorientedmissions.98Dr.Liarguesthatthedoctrinalshift resultedinabarrierbetweenthePLAanddomesticpoliticsandthattheresultingcivilmilitary bifurcationcomplicatedinteragencycooperation,especiallyinmanagingbothdomesticandforeign policycrises(suchastheresponsetothe2007ASATtest).99Opensourcereportinglendsitselfto validatealloftheabovetheories,buttheextentofacivilianmilitarydivideinpolicycoordination remainsunclear. Challenge#3:UnderestimationofBeijingsThreatPerceptions PRCbehaviorsurroundingtheASATprogramcouldalsobemotivatedbyperceptionsofthethreatthe UnitedStatesposestoChina.SincetheUnitedStatesistheleadingmilitarypowerinspacecombat, ChineseanalyststendtoviewtheUnitedStatesasahostileactorthreateningothercountriescivilian andmilitaryspaceassetsthroughitsinsistenceonmaintainingspacedominance,thusdrivingan internationalspaceracewhereChinaisforcedtorespondbydevelopingitsownspacedeterrents.100 Alternatively,Chinamayhavebeenmotivatedtointensifydevelopmentofmilitaryapplicationsfor spacewhenU.S.policymakersopposedanymeasurestocurtailspacedevelopmentactivityandPAROS (PreventionofanArmsRaceinOuterSpace).101ChineseanalystshavearguedthatChina,feeling threatenedbytheU.S.stanceonspaceandPAROS,mayhavefeltcompelledtoaddressthepotential securityriskswithdevelopmentofASATsystems.102 (ForfurtherdiscussionofPRCthreatperceptionsinthecontextofthedevelopmentofanantiship ballisticmissile,seepages2628ofthisreport.)

98

NanLi,ChineseCivilMilitaryRelationsinthePostDengEra:ImplicationsforCrisisManagementandNavalModernization, U.S.NavalWarCollegeChinaMaritimeStudies4(January2010):5,12. 99 NanLi,ChineseCivilMilitaryRelationsinthePostDengEra:ImplicationsforCrisisManagementandNavalModernization, U.S.NavalWarCollegeChinaMaritimeStudies4(January2010):40. 100 ZhangHui,"SpaceWeaponizationandSpaceSecurity:AChinesePerspective,"ChinaSecurityno.2(2006):2436. 101 NTI,China'sAttitudeTowardOuterSpaceWeapons.http://www.nti.org/db/china/spacepos.htm;andPeterB.deSelding, "ChinaUrgesU.N.BanOnSpaceWeaponry,"SpaceNews,March22,1999,pp.1,19. 102 ShixiuBao,DeterrenceRevisited:OuterSpace,ChinaSecurityno.5(2007).

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Section3:TheAntiShipBallisticMissile(ASBM)(DF21D/CSS5)
Chinesenavalmodernizationeffortsincludingantishipballisticmissiledevelopment,amongthe numerousprojectsandweaponsacquisitionprogramsbeganinthe1990s.Conventionalballistic missiletechnologyhasdevelopedatremarkablespeed.TheDongFeng21(DF21)mediumrange ballisticmissile,forinstance,hasseveralvariants.103ThedevelopmentoftheDF21Dvariant(aground basedASBM)isreportedlyfittedwithamaneuverablereentryvehicle(MaRV),hasGPSandactive radarbasedterminalguidance,andtheabilitytostrike1,500to2,000kilometersawayfromChinas shores. SignificantDates 2002 December19,successfultestflightoftheterminallyguidedDF21CMRBM.104 2003 FirstmentionoftheCSS5MRBMinDoDannualreport.105 2004 TheScienceofSecondArtilleryCampaignsbookdetailspotentialoperationalusesforanASBM. 2006 TheOfficeofNavalIntelligencereferencesChinasinterestindevelopinganASBM.106 2008 TheDefenseIntelligenceAgencyacknowledgesChinasdevelopmentofanASBM. 2008 FirstmentionoftheASBMinDoDannualreport.107 2009 DF21Dvariantconstructed,initialoperationalcapabilityestimatedat2012.108 2010 OnAugust3,privatesectoranalystsestimatetheinitialoperationalcapability(IOC)ofanASBM tobeawaysoff.109 2010 InDecember,AdmiralWillard(Commander,U.S.PacificCommand)announcesthatChinas ASBMhasreachedIOC. 2011 OnFebruary18,ChinesemediareportsthattheASBMisalreadydeployedinthearmy.110 2011 GeneralChenBingde(Director,PLAGeneralStaffDept.)publiclyconfirmsthattheASBMisin development.111 TheHistoryandDevelopmentoftheASBM TheoriginoftheDF21missiledatesto1965,whenthenChinesePremierZhouEnlaiproposedthe developmentofsolidpropellantrockettechnology.112By1975,developmentofalandbasedMRBM
103

MarkStokes,ChinasEvolvingConventionalStrategicStrikeCapability(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,September14, 2009). 104 MarkStokes,ChinasEvolvingConventionalStrategicStrikeCapability(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,September14, 2009). 105 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2003(Washington, DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2003),p.29. 106 U.S.DepartmentoftheNavy,SeapowerQuestionsontheChineseSubmarineForce(Washington,DC:OfficeofNaval Intelligence,December20,2006). 107 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2008 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2008),pp.I,2. 108 MarkStokes,ChinasEvolvingConventionalStrategicStrikeCapability(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,September14, 2009),p.3. 109 MarkStokesandTiffanyMa,SecondArtilleryAntiShipBallisticMissileBrigadeFacilitiesUnderConstructionin Guangdong?,AsiaEye,August3,2010. 110 ZhangHanandHuangJingjing,Newmissilereadyby2015,PeoplesDailyOnline,February18,2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90786/7292006.html. 111 EmbassyofthePeoplesRepublicofChinaintheUnitedStatesofAmerica, 21D[Chen Bingde:Dongfeng21DDaodanHaiZaiYanjiuZhong],July11,2011,http://www.chinaembassy.org/chn/zmgx/t838436.htm 112 SinoDefence,DongFeng21(CSS5)MediumRangeBallisticMissile,June4,2010. http://www.sinodefence.com/strategic/missile/df21.asp.

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 designatedasDF21wasunderway.Severalvariantshavesincebeenconstructed,eachwithnewer capabilities,increasedrange,andhigherpayload. In2008,areferencetoadevelopmentalChineseASBMfirstappearedintheDoDannualreport, althoughnoprojectionsweremaderegardingitscapabilityorpredictedIOC.113The2009DoDannual reportacknowledgedthedevelopmentofanASBM,itsbasiccharacteristics,andtheimpactitcould haveonU.S.forces.The2010report,however,omittedpreviouslymentionedinformationonthe missile.AlthoughitisclearthatU.S.governmentanalystswereawareofChinesedevelopmentofASBM technology,therewerenoofficial,unclassifiedprojectionsforthedevelopmentoftheweaponssystem. However,byDecember2010AdmiralWillardstatedthatChinasASBMhadreachedIOC.OnJanuary5, 2011,ViceAdmiralDorsett,DeputyChiefofNavalOperationsforInformationDominance,alsostated thattheASBMhadreachedIOC.114OnFebruary18,2011,ChinesemediareportedthattheASBMis alreadydeployedinthearmy,thoughthisclaimhasyettobeconfirmedbyChineseorU.S.government officials.115OnMarch17,2011,TaiwanesemediareportedthatNationalSecurityBureauDirectorTsai DershengclaimedthePLAhadalreadyfieldedtheASBM,butChineseNationalistParty(KMT)Legislator LinYufangexpresseddoubtsovertheassertion.116WhilethereisnotyetanyU.S.confirmation regardingthefielddeploymentoftheASBM,ChiefofNavalOperationsAdmiralGaryRougheadstatedin aJanuary14,2011,interviewthat[i]twouldnotsurprisemethatinthenextcoupleofyearsthatthe capabilitywillbeinplay.117 AlandbasedASBMequippedwithmaneuverablereentryvehiclesisdesignedtohitmobilesurfaceships suchasaircraftcarriers(aconceptualflightpathisillustratedinFigure4).Asaircraftcarriersarea centerpieceofU.S.navaloperations,U.S.analystsandofficialsunderstandthistobeaparticularly disruptivethreat:theU.S.Navyhasneverfacedtheprospectofballisticmissilescapableofeffectively hittingmobiletargetsatsea.118 ChinahastestedtheDF21Dmissilesystemoverlandbutnotoverwateragainstmaneuvering targets.119Nevertheless,Chinahasextensivelyresearchedterminalguidancetechnologies,possiblyto includetheguidanceemployedbytheU.S.PershingIItheaterballisticmissilewithamaneuverable reentryvehicle.120

113

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2008 (Washington,DC:U.S.DepartmentofDefense,2008),p.2. 114 TranscriptofDefenseWritersGrouproundtablewithViceAdmiralDavidJ.Dorsett,deputychiefofNavalOperationsfor InformationDominance,January5,2011. 115 ZhangHanandHuangJingjing,Newmissilereadyby2015,PeoplesDailyOnline,February18,2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90786/7292006.html. 116 RichChang,ChinaaimsnewmissiletypesatTaiwan,NSBsays,TaipeiTimesOnline,March17,2011. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2011/03/17/2003498376. 117 RonaldORourke,ChinasNavalModernization:ImplicationsforU.S.NavyCapabilitiesBackgroundandIssuesforCongress (Washington,DC:CongressionalResearchService,CRSReportRL33153,February3,2011),p.65. 118 SenateCommitteeonForeignRelations,SubcommitteeonEastAsianandPacificAffairs,HearingonMaritimeDisputesand SovereigntyIssuesinEastAsia,111thCong.,1stsess.,July15,2009. 119 TranscriptofDefenseWritersGrouproundtablewithViceAdmiralDavidJ.Dorsett,deputychiefofNavalOperationsfor InformationDominance,January5,2011. 120 FanHangmu,SatelliteMissileAttack:ExploringaModelforAntiShipBallisticMissileCombatOperations,ModernShips (XiandaiJianchuan)(November2010):3033.OSCID:CPP20110118318001;foranalysisonChineseASBMliterature,see AndrewEricksonandDavidYang,"UsingtheLandtoControltheSea?ChineseAnalystsConsidertheAntiShipBallisticMissile," NavalWarCollegeReview,vol.62,no.4(Autumn2009):5386.

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Figure4:TheFlightPathofaDF21DMissile

Source:OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublic ofChina2009,AnnualReporttoCongress,p.21. Assomeexpertshaveprojected,itcouldbeyearsbeforeanASBMreachesfulloperationalcapability.In termsofprojectionsforfieldingtheASBM,aSeptember2009reportbyMarkStokesonChinasASBM programestimatedthat: Theinitialphaseoftheprogramwasintendedtohavearudimentary1,500to2,000kilometer rangeASBMcapabilitybytheendofthe11thFiveYearPlanin2010. Asecondphasewouldseektoextendthesecapabilitiesouttoarangeof3,000kilometersand enhanceaerodynamicmaneuveringcapabilitiesbytheconclusionofthe12thFiveYearPlanin 2015. Athirdphasewouldfocusonextendingconventionalprecisionstrikecapabilityoutto8,000 kilometers(intercontinental)beforetheendofthe13thFiveYearPlanin2020. Afinalphasewouldinvolveglobalprecisionstrikecapabilitybytheconclusionofthe14thFive YearPlanin2025.121 Asidefromthemissile,numerousdocumentsindicatesignificantdevelopmentsregardinginfrastructure andsupportsystemsfortheASBMprogram.ThisincludesthecompletionofaDF21Drocketmotor facilityin2009,andthelaunchingofcoorbitalelectricintelligencesatellitesandremotesensing satellitesthatcouldbeusedtoprovideimageryofChinasmaritimeperipheryandsupportlongrange precisionstrikes.122
MarkStokes,ChinasEvolvingConventionalStrategicStrikeCapability(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,September14, 2009),p.10. 122 U.S.DepartmentofDefense,OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,MilitaryandSecurityDevelopmentsInvolvingthePeoples RepublicofChina2010(Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice),p.2;MarkStokes,ChinasEvolvingConventional StrategicStrikeCapability(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,September14,2009),p.3;AndrewErickson,SatellitesSupport GrowingPLAMaritimeMonitoringandTargetingCapabilities,ChinaBrief11,no.3(February10,2011). http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=37490.;IanEaston,ChinasSecretCoorbitalSatellites:
121

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 WhilereachingIOCisasignificantachievement,sourcessuggestthatobstaclesremainfortheASBMto beviableagainstdeployednavaltargets.TheASBMmustbeintegratedwithC4ISRsystems,aprocess thatcouldtakeyears.123Additionally,theASBMhasyettobetestedonaseabasedmobiletarget. Nevertheless,theDeputyChiefofNavalOperationsnotedinJanuary2011thatChinamaypossessnon spacebasedISR[that]couldprovidethenecessaryinformationtosupportDF21Demployment.124 UnderestimatingtheSpeedofChinasASBMDevelopment U.S.monitoringofASBMdevelopmentlikelyincreasedwiththe2004publicationofthePLASecond Artillery125book,ScienceofSecondArtilleryCampaigns,whichdescribedtheASBMasanassassins maceagainstaircraftcarriers.126TheincreasedattentiononChinasASBMprogramfoundinU.S. governmentpapersbeginningin2009suggestsamoresustainedU.S.intelligencefocusonASBM development,whichcorrelateswithconcurrentreportsthatChinasASBMwasnearingoperational capability.InMarch2009,DIApredictedthatnewChineseballisticmissileswouldbecomeoperational, thoughitdidnotspecificallymentiontheASBM.127InNovember2009,ScottBray,SeniorIntelligence OfficerforChinaattheOfficeofNavalIntelligence,statedthatASBMdevelopmenthasprogressedata remarkablerate.Inalittlemorethanadecade,ChinahastakentheASBMprogramfromtheconceptual phasetonearinganoperationalcapability.128 UnclassifiedU.S.governmentstatementsindicatethattheU.S.intelligencecommunityhasbeenclearly awareofthedevelopmentofaChineseASBMsinceatleastearlyinthepastdecade.129Accordingtothe scholarAndrewErickson,
TheQuietSurgeinSpace,Project2049:AsiaEye,November9,2010.http://blog.project2049.net/2010/11/chinassecretco orbitalsatellites.html.;andIanEastonandMarkStokes,ChinasElectronicIntelligence(ELINT)SatelliteDevelopments: ImplicationsforU.S.AirandNavalOperations(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,February23,2011). 123 PehShingHuei,ChinaFlexesWeaponsMuscles,StraitsTimesOnline,January14,2011.OSCDocument#: SEP20110114026001. 124 AndrewErickson:"ChinaHasSpaceBased&NonSpaceBasedC2+ISRcapableofprovidingthetargetinginformation necessarytoemploytheDF21DAntiShipBallisticMissile(ASBM).http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/01/deputychiefof navaloperationsforinformationdominancen2n6chinahasspacebasednonspacebasedc2isr%E2%80%9Ccapableof providingthetargetinginformationnecessarytoemploythedf/. 125 TheSecondArtillery(DiErPaoBing)isthebranchofthePLAthatcontrolsChinasmissileforces,intermsofboth conventionalmissilesandChinasstrategicnuclearforces. 126 GabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,ChinaDeploysWorldsFirstLongRange,LandBasedCarrierKiller:DF21DAntiShip BallisticMissile(ASBM)ReachesInitialOperationalCapability(IOC),"ChinaSignPost(),no.14(December26,2010). Forafullerexplanationofthesignificanceoftheassassinsmaceconcept,seeJasonBruzdzinski,DemystifyingShashoujian: ChinasAssassinsMaceConcept,inCivilMilitaryChangeInChina:Elites,Institutes,andIdeasAfterthe16thPartyCongress, eds.AndrewScobellandLarryWortzel(Carlisle,PA:U.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute,September2004),pp. 309364. 127 SenateArmedServicesCommittee,Statement:AnnualThreatAssessment,111thCong,,1stsess.,March10,2009. http://www.dia.mil/publicaffairs/testimonies/20090310.html. 128 AndrewS.Erickson,BallisticTrajectoryChinadevelopsnewantishipmissile,JanesIntelligenceReview(Englewood,CO: IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,January4,2010). 129 SenateArmedServicesCommittee,HearingtoreceivetestimonyonU.S.PacificCommand,U.S.StrategicCommand,andU.S. ForcesKoreainreviewoftheDefenseAuthorizationRequestforFiscalYear2011andtheFutureYearsDefenseProgram,,111th Cong.,2ndsess.,March26,2010;HouseCommitteeonArmedServices,HearingonFY2011NationalDefenseAuthorization th BudgetRequestsfromtheU.S.PacificCommandandU.S.ForcesKorea,,111 Cong.,2ndsess.,March25,2010;andRichard Scott,USbelievesChinaispoisedtofieldballisticantishipmissile,JanesInternationalDefenceReview(Englewood,CO:IHS Jane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,March2,2010).

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 [TheOfficeofNavalIntelligence]firstdiscussedChineseinterestinASBMdevelopmentpubliclyin 2004;theDepartmentofDefensein2005.A2006unclassifiedassessmentbyONIstatedthat Chinaisequippingtheaterballisticmissileswithmaneuveringreentryvehicles(MaRVs)with radarorIR[infrared]seekerstoprovidetheaccuracynecessarytoattackashipatsea.130 WhileawareofChinasASBMdevelopment,U.S.intelligenceofficialshaveadmittedtounderestimating thespeedatwhichtheASBMprogramhasdeveloped.Inaddressingthedevelopment,ViceAdmiral Dorsetthassaidthat[w]evebeenonthemarkonanawfullotofourassessmentsbutthere[havealso] beenahandfulofthingswehaveunderestimated.131Somecommentatorssuggestthatopensource analysesfailedtoforeseetheASBMreachIOC,althoughitshouldhavebeenapparentgivenbroader trendsinChineseaerospacedevelopment.132ItcanbearguedthatmanyU.S.decisionmakerssimplydid notconceivethatthecenterpieceofU.S.navalsupremacy,theaircraftcarrier,couldbechallengedand heldatrisk.ThedevelopmentoftheASBMwilllikelyencouragearethinkingofU.S.navalstrategyasthe ASBMbecomesintegratedintoChinasarmedforcesandpresentsaseriousthreattothedeployednaval forcesoftheUnitedStatesanditsalliesinthewesternPacific.

FactorsAffectingAnalysisontheDevelopmentoftheAntiShipBallisticMissile
Challenge#1:IncreasedInvestmentinScientificResearch&DevelopmentandDualUseTechnologies Overthepastdecade,investmentinChinesemilitaryR&Dhassubstantiallyincreased(seeTable2),and ChinacurrentlyrankssecondonlytotheUnitedStatesinoverallmilitaryexpendituresworldwide(to includemilitaryR&D133).134Thisupsurgeinmilitaryexpenditureoverthepastdecadeaccountsinpart fortheincreasedspeedobservedbetweenthedevelopmentandfielddeploymentofindigenously designedmilitaryhardwareandsupportsystems.Inadditiontostateinvestmentsinscientificresearch, thereissubstantialprivatesectorinvestmentandcivilianuniversityinvolvementintheresearchand developmentofnewmilitaryhardware.135ProPRCmediaoutletshaveassertedthatChinahasthe supportofacomplete,uninterruptedcapitalchain,andithastheconsiderablesupportoftalented

130

AndrewErickson,ChinasAntiShipBallisticMissile(ASBM)ReachesEquivalentofInitialOperationalCapability(IOC) WhereItsGoingandWhatItMeans,February8,2011.http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/02/china%E2%80%99santi shipballisticmissileasbmreachesequivalentof%E2%80%9Cinitialoperationalcapability%E2%80%9Dioc%E2%80%94where it%E2%80%99sgoingandwhatitmeans/. 131 KarenParrish,NavyIntelChiefDiscussesChinasMilitaryAdvances,AmericanForcesPressService,January6,2011. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62346. 132 AndrewErickson,ChinasAntiShipBallisticMissile(ASBM)ReachesEquivalentofInitialOperationalCapability(IOC) WhereItsGoingandWhatItMeans,February8,2011http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/02/china%E2%80%99santi shipballisticmissileasbmreachesequivalentof%E2%80%9Cinitialoperationalcapability%E2%80%9Dioc%E2%80%94where it%E2%80%99sgoingandwhatitmeans/. 133 TheStockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitutes(SIPRI)definitionofmilitaryexpenditureshouldincludemilitaryR&D, butduetothenontransparentnatureofChinesedefenseexpenditureandtheoverlapbetweendefenseandothersectorsof government,trueexpenditurefiguresareunattainable(forthefulllistofwhatisincludedinSIPRIsmilitaryexpenditure calculations,pleaseseehttp://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/sources_methods/definitions). 134 StockholmInternationalPeaceResearchInstitute,The15MajorSpenderCountriesin2009(Table), http://www.sipri.org/research/armaments/milex/resultoutput/milex_15. 135 ForadetaileddiscussionofChinasnationallevelscienceprogramsandstatesupportsforscientificresearch,seeMicah Springut,StephenSchlaikjer,andDavidChen,ChinasProgramforScienceandTechnologyModernization:Implicationsfor AmericanCompetitiveness(reportpreparedbyCENTRATechnology,Inc.,onbehalfoftheU.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurity ReviewCommission,April2011).

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 scienceandtechnologypersonnel;achievinghighspeeddevelopmentisquitenormal.136However,the dearthofU.S.understandingof(ortheunderutilizationinstudying)Chineseopensourcematerialsand ChineseR&DpracticesmayhavecontributedtoU.S.underestimationofChinesemilitarydevelopment. InFebruary2001,thenPresidentJiangZemincreatedthe998StateSecurityProject[alsoknownasthe AssassinsMace(/shashoujian)program137]to[enhance]theinnovationinadvancednational defensetechnology,stressingthedevelopmentofmilitary/civiliandualusetechnologyandmasteringas quicklyaspossiblethenewshashoujianneededtosafeguardournationalsovereigntyandsecurity.138It isthroughdualuseprogramssuchastheshashoujianprogramthatChinahassuccessfullyexploited relevanttechnologiesforapplicationinitsdefensesector. U.S.policymakersfocusonobservingandtrackingthetransferofdualusetechnologiestoChinais insufficient.Indeed,U.S.ChinajointventuresandChineseintegrationwiththeglobalproductionand R&Dchainhave,throughthetransferoftechnology,knowhow,andcapital,facilitateddramatic improvementsinChinesedefenseindustrialproductionandPLAmodernizationsincethe1990sand warrantU.S.attention.139Particularlyrelevantindustriesincludethenuclear,missiles,shipbuilding,and defenseelectronicssectors.ThecombinationofstatefundedR&Dprogramsandprivateindustry commercialtechnologieshasacceleratedtheadvancementofChinasmilitary.140
Table2:OfficialDefenseExpenditureBudget,People'sRepublicofChina,20002009

YEAR RMB US$b (2008) %GDP

2000 180 31.2 1.8

2001 223 38.4 2

2002 256 44.4 2.1

2003 283 48.5 2.1

2004 322 53.1 2

2005 364 59 2

2006 431 68.8 2

2007 511 77.9 2

2008 599 86.2 2

2009 686 98.8 2

RMB=renminbi(Chinesecurrency);GDP=grossdomesticproduct
Source:AdaptedfromSIPRIMilitaryExpenditureDatabase.http://milexdata.sipri.org/.

Challenge#2:UnderestimatingtheThreatPerceptions&PoliticalPrioritiesoftheChineseLeadership TheTaiwanScenarioasaMotivatingFactorforPLAModernization Chinasmilitaryprioritysincetheearlytomid1990shasbeentomaintainastrategicadvantageover Taiwansmilitaryforcesandifitshouldeverfeelcompelledtoinitiatemilitaryoperationsagainst

136

NiEryan,"ThePointoftheMilitaryistoPreventViolenceUnconfirmedReportsConveyRealInformation,HongKong WenWeiPoOnline(Chinese),January10,2011.OSCID:CPP20110110787012. 137 Forafullerexplanationoftheassassinsmaceconcept,seeJasonBruzdzinski,DemystifyingShashoujian:Chinas AssassinsMaceConcept,inCivilMilitaryChangeInChina:Elites,Institutes,andIdeasAfterthe16thPartyCongress,eds. AndrewScobellandLarryWortzel(Carlisle,PA:U.S.ArmyWarCollegeStrategicStudiesInstitute,September2004),pp.309 364. 138 WangCongbiao,StudyingJiangZeminsOnScienceandTechnology,JiefangjunBao,February13,2001. 139 JamesMulvenonandRebeccaSammTyrolerCooper,ChinasDefenseIndustryonthePathofReform(Washington,DC: DefenseGroupIncorporated,October2009),p.4. 140 MarkStokes,ChinasEvolvingConventionalStrategicStrikeCapability(Arlington,VA:Project2049Institute,September14, 2009),p.21.

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 Taiwanindeterringandcounteringanythirdparty(i.e.,U.S.)intervention.141ThisdriverforPLAforce modernizationwasgivenparticularimpetusfollowingtheTaiwanStraitCrisisof1996,whenthePLA brasswashumiliatedbythedispatchofU.S.NavyaircraftcarrierstothevicinityofTaiwaninreactionto PLAsaberrattlingexercises,whichwereintendedtointimidateTaiwanspopulaceinthemidstofisland wideelections. The1996TaiwanStraitcrisiscatalyzedinvestmentinthelongtermmodernizationand professionalizationofChinasarmedforces.IftherehadbeenuncertaintybeforeastowhattheUnited StatesmightdoinaTaiwanscenario,thisseemedtobeaclearstatementthatU.S.forceswould interveneandthatthePLAlackedeffectivecapabilitiestodeterordefeatthem.Evenafterthecrisis subsided,thenCCPparamountleaderJiangZeminwasapparentlyconvincedoftheimminenceof militaryconflictintheStrait,andreportedlyadvocatedacceleratingpreparationsbythePLAfortaking militaryactionagainstTaiwan.142Asaresult,thePLAaccelerateditseffortstoacquirestrikeassets(e.g., modernsubmarines,missiles,3rdand4thgenerationaircraft)thatcouldkeepAmericanforcesatbay.143 Theantishipballisticmissile(ASBM)couldbeespeciallyimportantinachievingthisobjective,asitis developedtotargetU.S.aircraftcarriers.Preliminaryresearchisbelievedtohavebegunshortlyafter the1996TaiwanStraitCrisis.Antisatellite(ASAT)weaponsarealsoapriorityinaTaiwancontingency. SinceTaiwanisthousandsofnauticalmilesfromU.S.shores,theUnitedStateswouldrelyheavilyon satelliteintelligenceandcommunicationsintheeventofanyTaiwanStraitcontingencyoperations,and ASATweaponscoulddegradeand/ordestroyU.S.satelliteandcommand,control,communications, computer,intelligence,surveillance,andreconnaissance(C4ISR)capabilities.ASBMsandASATsarejust twoofawiderangeofantiaccess/areadenial(A2/AD)systemsthatChinahasbeendevelopingsince theTaiwanStraitcrisis. Theincreaseinspendingisalsolikelyfueledbythemotivationtoaddressandbridgethetechnological gapbetweenthePLAandotheradvancedmilitariesintheworld.Whilethedrivingmotivationbehind Chinasincreasedmilitaryexpenditureisdefendingnationalinterestsonthecountrysperiphery,Chinas disputedmaritimeclaimsandsteadilyexpandinginterestsoverseashavepromptedreconsiderationof Chinasmilitarystrategyandvisionbeyondthedefenseofitsterritorialsovereignty,andintopower projectionandinfluencingtheoutcomeofterritorialclaimsalongChinasmaritimeperiphery.InJuly 2009,PeterDutton,professorofStrategicStudiesattheU.S.NavalWarCollege,pointedoutthelong termnatureofChineseresearch,development,andinvestmentinmilitarytechnologiesdesignedto challengeoutsideaccessoutsidenavalaccess,inparticulartoEastAsianwaters.144 TheescalationinrecentyearsofterritorialandresourcetensionsinEastAsia,geopoliticalinstability aroundChinasperipheryincountriessuchasNorthKorea,andanincreasedU.S.presencearound ChinasdeclaredterritorialboundariesmayhavefurtherpromptedChinatopreparetodefendits maritimebordersandclaimsintheeventofmilitaryconflict,thusresultinginincreasedChinese investmentsinmilitarymodernizationandforcebuildup.Suchincreasedtensionscouldpotentially
141

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReporttoCongress:TheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2005 (Washington,DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2005),p.7. 142 RobertL.Suettinger,BeyondTiananmen:ThePoliticsofU.S.ChinaRelations19892000(Washington,DC:Brookings InstitutionPress,2004),p.402;WillyLam,TaiwanissueskeepJianginarmyrole,CNN,November21,2002. http://articles.cnn.com/20021121/world/china.jiang_1_cmccaogangchuantaiwanstrait. 143 DavidShambaugh,ModernizingChinasMilitary(LosAngeles,CA:UniversityofCaliforniaPress,2004),p.4. 144 SenateCommitteeonForeignRelations,SubcommitteeonEastAsianandPacificAffairs,HearingonMaritimeDisputesand th SovereigntyIssuesinEastAsia,111 Cong.,1stsess.,July15,2009.

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 manifestthemselvesinconflictswithJapan(overtheSenkaku/DiaoyutaiIslands)orcountriesinthe SouthChinaSea.ChinamightalsofinditselfinvolvedinmilitaryoperationsontheKoreanPeninsula, whosestabilityisasourceofmajorconcernforBeijing.Thesegeostrategicconcernshavenodoubt influencedChinasrapiddevelopmentofmaritimemilitarycapabilities.

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Section4:TheJ20Fighter(Project718)
ThepublicunveilingoftheChengduJian20prototypefifthgenerationstealthfighterjetonJanuary11, 2011provokedanupsurgeofgovernmentandmediaattentionandspeculation.Accordingtomedia sources,theU.S.governmentwaswellawareofChinasfifthgenerationfighterbutmaynothavefully knownitsstateofdevelopment.AnacademicChinesemilitarypublicationforecastedthatChinawould determinefinaltechnologicalrequirementsby2010,andwillcompletepreparatoryworkforfittingout theJ20by2015.145TheJ20testflightcompelledU.S.SecretaryofDefenseRobertGatestoreassess U.S.intelligenceeffortsonmonitoringthespeedofChinesemilitarydevelopment,sayingChinamaybe somewhatfurtheraheadinthedevelopmentoftheaircraftthanourintelligencehadearlier indicated.146 SignificantDates 1997 XXJ(alsoknownastheJXX)preliminarydesignphase. 1997 ONIreportsthatChinaisworkingonalarge,multirolefighter;predictsXXJtoenterservicein 2015.147 2003 DoDannualreportprojectsthatChinasfocusonfighteraircraftforthenext20yearswillbeF 10andSukhoiupgrades.148 2004 DoDannualreportpredictsthatPLAAirForcewillbeclosertobecomingamodernairforceby 201015.149 2004 TaiwanColonel(Ret.)LoChihChengprojectstheJXX(laterknownastheJ20)willenterservice around2010.150 2005 IndianArmyBrigadierGovindaM.NairpredictstheintroductionoftheJ20by2015.151 2008 InMarch,Chinesemediareportanexpecteddesigncompletionby2015.152 2008 ChineseofficialsandexpertsprojectthattheJ20willbefullyoperationalbetween2017and 2019.153 2009 U.S.SecretaryofDefenseRobertGatespredictsthatChinawillnothaveanyfifthgeneration aircraftbefore2020.154
145

U.S.ArmyAsianStudiesDetachmentIntelligenceInformationReport,ChinaPlanstoDevelopFifthGenerationJetFighter, June9,2008.OSDID:JPP20080610075006.TheChinesemagazinereferredtointhereportisNaval&MerchantShips,or JianchuanZhishi(). 146 WendellMinnick,SinoU.S.TiesBackOnTrack,ButForHowLong?DefenseNews,January17,2011. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5469851&c=FEA&s=CVS. 147 RichardD.FisherJr.,ChinasFifthGenerationAirCombatAmbitions:APreliminaryAssessment,September14,2009. http://www.hudson.org/files/documents/AsianAirpowerFisher.ppt. 148 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2003(Washington, DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2003),p.23. 149 OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2004(Washington, DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2004),pp.2223. 150 LoChihCheng,TheOperationalRequirementsfortheROCAF'sNextGenerationFighters,TaiwanDefenseAffairs, December1,2004.OSCID:CPP20070209312003. 151 GovindaM.Nair,China'sDrivetoGreatPowerStatusandtheEvolutionofFutureAsianSecurityAlignments(Carlisle,PA: U.S.ArmyWarCollege,2005),p.11. 152 China'stacticalandtechnicalrequirementsofthefinalJ20expectedtobecompletedby2010,[ 20 2010 ZhongguoJian20ZuizhongZhanshuJishuYaoqiuYujiJiang2010NianWancheng],Naval&Merchant Ships[ JianchuanZhishi].http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/p/20080314/0739490073.html. 153 JeremyPage,AChineseStealthChallenge?WallStreetJournal,January5,2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703808704576061674166905408.html. 154 RobertGates(speechattheEconomicClubofChicago,July16,2009). http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1369.

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SignificantDates,continued 2010 U.S.officialsprojectJ20willenterservicein20172019.155 2011 January11,J20sfirstpublictestflight. 2011 April17,J20ssecondpublictestflight.156 2011 May5,J20sthirdandfourthpublictestflight.157 2011 May12,J20sfifthpublictestflight.158 2011 May14,J20ssixthpublictestflight.159 2011 August15,J20stwentyseventhpublictestflight.160 2011 December(exactdateunknown),J20ssixtiethpublictestflight.161 2012 February28,PRCmediareportsoncontinuingJ20flighttestingnearChengdu.162

HistoryandDevelopmentoftheJ20 In1997,theU.S.OfficeofNavalIntelligencefirstdesignatedthenameXXJtothedevelopmental fighternowknownastheJ20.163TheChengduAircraftIndustryCorporationandtheShenyangAircraft IndustryCorporation,inconjunctionwithNo.611and601ResearchInstitutes(respectively),competed todesigntheprototypeforthisnextgenerationjet.164Chinareportedlyhasconductedpreliminary researchonfifthgenerationtechnologiessincethelate1990s.165Chinesesourcesstatethatdesign developmentbeganinthe1980s.166ChinesemediareportedthattheJ20completedaircraftprogram definitiondesignby2005andwasinthefinalstateofprogramdefinitionin2008.Thearticle acknowledgedthatunspecifiedtechnicalproblemswiththefighterstillexisted.167 In2004,theDepartmentofDefense'sannualreportpredictedthatby2010,Chinawouldhaveamore robustfleetoffourthgenerationfighters,thoughitmadenoreferencetoanyfifthgenerationfighter
155

JimWolf,NewChinesefighterjetexpectedby2018:U.S.intelligence,Reuters,May21,2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/21/uschinausafighteridUSTRE64K0MY20100521. 156 PeoplesDaily,GlobalTimes:J20'appears'tohavemadesecondflight,April19,2011. http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90001/90776/90786/7354617.html, 157 OSCReport:Photos,VideoClipsShowJ20Third,FourthTestFlightson5May,May5,2011.OSCID:CPP20110505658002. 158 PRCWebsiteClaimsJ20CompletesFifth,SixthTestFlightson12,14May,May17,2011.OSCID:FEA20110518017937. 159 PRCWebsiteClaimsJ20CompletesFifth,SixthTestFlightson12,14May,May17,2011.OSCID:FEA20110518017937. 160 ChinasstealthfighterJ20conducts27thtestflight,Xinhua,August15,2011, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english2010/photo/201108/17/c_131055076.htm. 161 PeoplesDailyOnline[],InternetUsersLeak:Jian20Completes60thTestFlight,ExposeFC1XiaolongArmedAnti shipMissile[20 60 Wangyoubao:Jian20wanchengdi60cishifei, xiaolongguafanjiandaodanpuguang],December14,2011,http://military.people.com.cn/GB/16598038.html. 162 ChinasJ20FighterUnfoldsLandingGearBay,PeoplesDailyOnLine(inEnglish),February28,2012. http://english.people.com.cn/90786/7742528.html. 163 JanesAlltheWorldsAircraft,CACJ20(Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,January28, 2011). 164 RobertHewison,TeethoftheDragon(Englewood,CO:JanesDefence,IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis, January19,2011). 165 ChinasDefenceToday,JXX4thGenerationFighterAircraft.,http://www.sinodefence.com/airforce/fighter/jxx.asp. 166 ChinastacticalandtechnicalrequirementsofthefinalJ20expectedtobecompletedby2010,[ 20 2010 ZhongguoJian20ZuizhongZhanshuJishuYaoqiuYujiJiang2010NianWancheng],Naval&Merchant Ships[ JianchuanZhishi],March14,2008.http://mil.news.sina.com.cn/p/20080314/0739490073.html. 167 "RussianSpecialistUnveilstheMysteryofChinasFifthGenerationFighterAircraft:TheJ20," 20[EZhuanjiaJiemiZhongguoDiwudaiZhanji:Jian20],Naval&MerchantShips[ JianchuanZhishi],March14, 2008.http://plaaf.net/html/53/n23053.html.

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 program.168In2005,aU.S.ArmyWarCollegereportbyIndianArmyBrigadierGovindaM.Nairpredicted theintroductionoffifthgenerationJ20s(thendubbedtheXXJ)by2015.169OnMarch14,2008,there wasaphotopostedinaXinhuaforumtitledJian20:ChinaAcceleratesResearchonFifthGeneration FighterJet,althoughthephotowastakendownsoonthereafter.170

Figure5:ProjectedTimelineofJ20Development

1995 2000 2005 2010 2015 2020 2025 1997: January11,2011: th 20172019: ONIprojects5 generation Firstpublictest Gen.HepredictsJ20to fighteroperationalby2015 flightofJ20 becomemilitaryoperational 2015: LinZuominprojectsR&Dofallkeymodels willbecompleted Source:AdaptedfromGabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,ChinasNewProject718/J20Fighter:Development OutlookandStrategicImplications

Late1990s: XXJadvancedfighter programlaunched

November2009: PLAAFDeputyCommanderGen. HeWeirongsays Chinaisclosetotestingits prototype

April17May14,2011: Fivemorepublictest flightsofJ20

2018:CurrentU.S.intelligence estimatesforwhentheJ20is operational

In2009,GeneralHeWeirong,deputyAirForcechief,remarkedduringaninterviewonChinaCentral Televisionthatafifthgenerationfighterwascurrentlyunderdevelopmentandmaysoonundertake itsfirstflightbeforetestingandfielding.171ThecommentwasinterpretedasaresponsetoDefense SecretaryGatescommentthatChinawouldnotfieldfifthgenerationfightersuntilafter2020.172 GeneralHealsoprojectedthatthenewfighterwouldenterservicebetween2017and2019.173While opensourceanalystshaveforyearsspeculatedtheexistenceofafifthgenerationfighterprogram, therewasnoofficialconfirmationuntilGeneralHescomments.174

168

OfficeoftheSecretaryofDefense,AnnualReportontheMilitaryPowerofthePeoplesRepublicofChina2003(Washington, DC:U.S.GovernmentPrintingOffice,2003),p.23. 169 GovindaM.Nair,China'sDrivetoGreatPowerStatusandtheEvolutionofFutureAsianSecurityAlignments(Carlisle,PA: U.S.ArmyWarCollege,2005),p.11. 170 Xinhua,Jian20:Chinaacceleratesresearchonfifthgenerationjet[20()Jian20: ZhongguoJiakuaiYanzhiDiwudaiZhanji(Zutu)],March14,2008.http://news.xinhuanet.com/forum/2008 03/14/content_7787592.htm. 171 BradleyPerrett,ChinaCloseToTestingNextGenFighter,AviationWeek,November13,2009. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/CHINA111309.xml. 172 SecretaryGateshasalsoaddedthathiscommentmeantthatby2020,therewouldstillbeasignificantdisparityinthe numberofJ20sversusU.S.fifthgenerationaircraft. 173 PeoplesDaily[RenminRibao],AmericasSeriousIntelligenceOmission,ChinasFourthGenerationAircraft ShakesAmericans,[[MeiJinghuDuihuaQingbaoYanzhongLoubao ZhongguoDayunSidaijiZhendaiLaomei],November16,2009. http://military.people.com.cn/GB/8221/72028/76059/76404/10387974.html. 174 BradleyPerrett,ChinaCloseToTestingNextGenFighter,AviationWeek,November13,2009. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/CHINA111309.xml.InOctober2010.

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 TherearesignsthattheprogressiontowardfieldingtheJ20isontrack.In2011alone,Chinapublicly testedtheJ20sixtytimes.175
Figure6:UndercarriageviewofaJ20fighterinflight.

Source:JanesAlltheWorldsAircraft, CACJ20(Englewood,CO:IHS Jane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,January28,2011).

Currently,thereisneitherconfirmationnordenialfromeithertheU.S.orChinesegovernmentofthe exactnatureandstatusofmanyoftheJ20sfeaturesandperformanceparametersincludingits reputedstealthfactorthoughreportsofChinasdevelopingstealthmaterialfortheprototypeJXX haveappearedinonlineChineseforumssince2006.176Russianmediasourceshaveexpresseddoubts aboutitsstealthcapabilities,asChinalackscertainkeycomponentsfordesigningafifthgeneration fighter,suchasanindigenouslydesignedengineandonboardradar.177SomeU.S.analystshavealso voicedreservationsaboutdesignchallengeswiththeJ20toincludeChinasassesseddifficultieswith thedesignandproductionofhighperformancejetenginesfurtheraddingthatantistealth technologiesareprogressingrapidlyandmayalreadybeanoperationalcapability.178Otherdoubts thathavebeenraisedfocusonmaterials,engines,avionicsandelectronics,personnel,andtraining.The J20smustbeadequatelycoveredwithmaterialsthatdiffuseheatandhelpreduceradarsignature,and thesemustbemaintainedconstantlytopreservetheirstealthcharacteristics.179

FactorsAffectingAnalysisontheDevelopmentoftheJ20

PeoplesDailyOnline[],InternetUsersLeak:Jian20Completes60thTestFlight,ExposeFC1XiaolongArmedAnti shipMissile[20 60 Wangyoubao:Jian20wanchengdi60cishifei, xiaolongguafanjiandaodanpuguang],December14,2011,http://military.people.com.cn/GB/16598038.html. 176 Highlights:PRCMilitaryForums921Aug06.OSCID:CPP20060911436001. 177 MoscowArgumentyNedeliOnline,ChineseStealthMoreInvisibleThanAnyOtherStealthAircraft,January14,2010. OSCID:CEP20100120349010. 178 DavidA.Fulghumetal.,StealthyChineseJ20Vulnerable,AviationWeek,January18,2011. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/awst/2011/01/17/AW_01_17_2011_p20 281824.xml. 179 GabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,ChinasNewProject718/J20Fighter:DevelopmentOutlookandStrategicImplications, ChinaSignPost(),no.18(January17,2011).http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/01/j20fighterdevelopment outlookstrategicimplications/.
175

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 Challenge#1:UnderestimatingthePaceofDevelopmentsinChinasAviationSector Despitemediaattentionandspeculation,U.S.governmentanalystswerenotsurprisedbytheunveiling oftheJ20:U.S.intelligencehadreportedlybeenfollowingthedevelopmentoftheaircraftsincethe mid1990s.Nonetheless,inpublicstatementsU.S.governmentofficialshavebeenunclearaboutthe timelineforwhentheJ20willbecomefullyoperational,180especiallyasinitialestimatesforprototype testingwereoffbyafewyears.181 ViceAdmiralDorsetthasindicatedthatU.S.estimatesonJ20developmentweretooconservative, sayingthatwhiletheJ20isnotasurprise.Wehavebeenprettyconsistentinunderestimatingthe deliveryandIOCofChinesetechnology,weaponsystems.Theyveenteredoperationalcapabilityquicker [thanexpected].182InMay2010testimonybeforetheSenate,WayneUlman,headoftheU.S.National AirandSpaceIntelligenceCenter,assessedthattheJ20willbedeployedaround2018.183Another expert,TaiMingCheung,predictedinearly2011thatitwilllikelytakeanotherfiveto10yearsbefore theaircraftisreadyforserialproduction.184Consideringtheincreasingpaceofandfundingavailable forChinesemilitarymodernization,U.S.officialswouldlikelynotbesurprisediftheJ20enters operationalcapabilityearlierthancurrentprojections.185 Challenge#2:AChineseCivilMilitaryDivide?OrUnclearStrategicCommunication? AccordingtoanunnamedseniorDoDofficialwidelycitedinthemedia,WhenSecretaryGatesraised thequestionoftheJ20inthe[January2011]meetingwithPresidentHuitwasclearthatnoneofthe [Chinese]civiliansintheroomhadbeeninformed.186Encouragedbysuchcomments,thefirstpublic testflightoftheJ20aircraftpromptedwidespreadmediaspeculationthatthePLAplannedtheeventto sendamessagetoU.S.officials,withoutcoordinatingwiththeCCPcivilianleadership.187Thisrevived manyofthequestionsregardingbureaucraticstovepiping,aswellasconjecturesaboutaroguePLA, thathadfollowedinthewakeoftheJanuary2007ASATlaunch.
180

ViceAdmiralDorsettsaidinabriefingthatitsnotclearwhen[theJ20]willbefullytestedandoperational.KarenParrish, NavyIntelChiefDiscussesChinasMilitaryAdvances,AmericanForcesPressService,January6,2011. http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=62346. 181 SourcesprojectedtheJ20wouldmakeitsmaidenflightin2012,butaccordingtoJanes,Morethanoneanonymous ChinesesourcehasclaimedthattheJ20hadbeenflying'fornearlyayear'bythetimeofitsunveiling.Formoreinformation, seeJanesAlltheWorldsAircraft,CACJ20(Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,January 28,2011). 182 TranscriptofDefenseWritersGrouproundtablewithViceAdmiralDavidJ.Dorsett,DeputyChiefofNavalOperationsfor InformationDominance,January5,2011. 183 JimWolf,RPTNewChinesefighterjetexpectedby2018:USIntel,Reuters,May21,2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/21/chinausafighteridUSN2117451920100521. 184 WendellMinnick,SinoU.S.TiesBackOnTrack,ButForHowLong?DefenseNews,January17,2011. http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=5469851&c=FEA&s=CVS. 185 JeremyPage,ChinaStealthJetLeakViewedasIntentional,WallStreetJournal,January8,2011. http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704055204576067514151124434.html;andJimWolf,RPTNewChinese fighterjetexpectedby2018:USIntel,Reuters,May21,2010.http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/21/chinausafighter idUSN2117451920100521. 186 KathrinHilleandDanielDombey,StealthtestflightovershadowsGatestrip 187 Asonesuchexample,seePeterMartin,InChina,IstheGunBeginningtoCommandtheParty?TheGuardian(UK),January 13,2011.http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/jan/13/chinahujintaotestflightmilitary.

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 GiventheextenttowhichChinasleadershipoverseesmilitaryandtechnologydevelopments,itis unlikelythatPresidentHuwasunawareoftheJ20test.188ThestrongestevidenceforthisisthatVice PresidentXiJinpingandPolitburoStandingCommitteememberWuBangguoappearedattheJ20test flightsiteinChengduonJanuary10,2011,suggestingthatthecivilianleadershipwaslikelyawareofthe J20testingplannedforthefollowingday.189Whilethereisnoclearanswertothetrueextentof coordinationandinformationsharingbetweenthecivilandmilitaryleadership,analysisofChinese handlingoftheJ20testflightraisesdoubtsaboutBeijingscapacitytomanagesuccessfullyits ascendanceasagreatpowerandraisesaquestionastowhetheracivilmilitarygapexistsinChinas peacefulrise.190 Ifthetestflightwasintendedasaformofstrategiccommunication,themessagemayhavebeen deterrentinnature:i.e.,thatChinaisdevelopingadvancedweaponsofitsown,andshouldnotbetaken lightlybyforeignmilitaryforces.191However,thisisspeculative,anditisunknownwhethertheJ20 flightrepresentedstrategiccommunicationatall,orifitwassimplyaroutineeventthathappenedto coincidewithamajordiplomaticvisit.Thiscaseprovidesanotherexampleofthechallengesposedto outsideobserversbytheChinesemilitaryslackoftransparency,andbytheopaquenatureofthe governmentsdecisionmakingprocesses. BeijingsselectivetransparencyregardingJ20developmentshasledtowidespreadspeculation regardingthefuturedevelopmentandimplicationsoftheaircraft.192Dr.Ericksonarguesthatthe publicizedtestingresemble[d]amutedstrategiccommunicationtodisplaytheprogressofChinas militarymodernization.193ToassuageU.S.concernsabouttherapidpaceofChinasmilitary modernization,thePentagonhascommunicatedthemessagethattheJ20scapabilitiesshouldnotbe overhypedoroverstated.PentagonspokesmanGeoffMorrellhasemphasizedthattheUnitedStates doesnotknowthetrueextentofJ20developmentandhasurgedeverybodytoslowdownalittlebit onourcharacterizationsoftheJ20atthispoint.194Nevertheless,thedisseminationofinformationon thedevelopmentstatusoftheJ20haspromptedtheUnitedStatestoreassessitsmilitarystrategyand forcepostureintheWesternPacificinordertomaintainmilitarysuperiorityoverpotential adversaries.195 Conclusions
RichardD.Fisher,Jr.,StealthyProgress:SpotlightFallsonChinasAirpowerAmbitions,JanesIntelligenceReview (Englewood,CO:IHSJane's:Defense&SecurityIntelligence&Analysis,February1,2011). 189 GabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,ChinasNewProject718/J20Fighter:DevelopmentOutlookandStrategicImplications, ChinaSignPost(),18(January17,2011).http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/01/j20fighterdevelopment outlookstrategicimplications/. 190 U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,HearingonChinasNarrativesRegardingNationalSecurityPolicy, testimonyofMarkStokes;U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,HearingonChinasNarrativesRegarding NationalSecurityPolicy,writtentestimonyofAndrewScobell,March10,2011;andAndrewScobell,IsThereaCivilMilitary GapinChinasPeacefulRise?Parameters39:2(Summer2009):422. 191 U.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission,HearingonChinasNarrativesRegardingNationalSecurityPolicy, writtentestimonyofAndrewScobell,March10,2011. 192 GabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,ChinasNewProject718/J20Fighter:DevelopmentOutlookandStrategicImplications, ChinaSignPost(),no.18(January17,2011).http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/01/j20fighterdevelopment outlookstrategicimplications/. 193 GabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,ChinasNewProject718/J20Fighter:DevelopmentOutlookandStrategicImplications, ChinaSignPost(),no.18(January17,2011).http://www.andrewerickson.com/2011/01/j20fighterdevelopment outlookstrategicimplications/. 194 U.S.DepartmentofDefense:OfficeoftheAssistantSecretaryofDefense(PublicAffairs,)DODNewsBriefingwithGeoff MorrellfromthePentagon,"January26,2011.http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4758. 195 ChosunIlbo,ChineseWeaponsAdvancesPromptUSRethinkofStanceTowardChina'sCapability,January13,2011.
188

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 Basedonopensourceresearchonthefourcasescoveredinthisreport,therearenouniversaltrendsin thesuccessofU.S.governmentestimatesonthedevelopmentofindigenousChineseweapons. Particularconsiderationsforeachofthesecasestudiesare: TheavailableevidencesuggeststhattheUnitedStatesdidnotexpectthedevelopmentofthe YuanclasssubmarinesmuchlessthattheChineseNavyhadpotentiallyacquiredandinstalled AIPsystemsinitsnewersubmarines. AlthoughtheUnitedStateswaskeenlyawareofChineseASATdevelopment,exactdetailsofthe January2007testmayhavebeenunexpected.Additionally,theseeminglackofcoordination amongPRCgovernmentagenciesinregardstothelaunchhighlightedgapsinU.S.understanding ofthePRCsdecisionmakingprocessesfornationalsecurityissues. TheUnitedStatesapparentlyunderestimatedthespeedofdevelopmentoftheantishipballistic missile,whichreportedlyreachedIOCinDecember2010. TheUnitedStatesalsomayhaveunderestimatedthespeedofdevelopmentofChinasfifth generationfighterjet,theJ20,althoughthetrueextentoftheaircraftscapabilitiesremain unclear. AnimmediateconcernfortheUnitedStatesinvolvesChinasupcomingleadershiptransitionin2012. TheUnitedStatesmustunderstandthepoliticalleaningsofChinasfifthgenerationleadersandconsider anypotentialchangesinmilitaryandpoliticalpolicy.Forexample,oneexpertonPRCleadershippolitics hasstatedthatXiJinpingisakeensupporteroffunnelingmorenationalresourcestowardmilitary modernization.196UnderstandingtheprocessesofChinesecivilianandmilitaryleadershipdecision making,andtherhetorictheyuseinbothinternalpolicydebatesandofficialexplanationsoffinished policytodomesticandforeignaudiences,isessentialtoavoidfuturelapsesintheanticipationand understandingofChinesemilitarydevelopments.AsChinacontinuestoexpandeconomically,politically, technologically,andmilitarily,iftheUnitedStatesandotheralliedpowersfailtoforecastoratleast anticipatethesedevelopments,thefuturebalanceofpowerintheAsiaPacificregionmaybe significantlyimpacted. ThereisacleartrendthatChinaismodernizingitsmilitaryforcesbothtodefenditsbordersandto assertitsgrowingpresenceintheregion.197Nevertheless,itisimportanttoconsiderseveralfactorsthat mayinfluenceU.S.analysisonChineseindigenousmilitaryandtechnicaldevelopments: ChinasselectivetransparencystrategymayinhibitU.S.decisionmakersunderstandingofthe truestateofChinasmilitarydevelopment,aswellasitsstrategicintentions.Toaddressthis concern,theUnitedStateshasmadeitaprioritytomonitorChinesemilitarydevelopment,198 butgapsinunderstandingremain. PotentiallypoorpolicycoordinationbetweenthePRCscivilianandmilitaryleadershipmayalso complicateeffortstoanalyzeChinasnationalsecuritypolicydecisionmakingprocessesandthe courseofPRCmilitarymodernization.

196 197

WillyLam,TheMilitaryManeuversofXiJinping,WallStreetJournal,January26,2011. XinhuaNewsService(inEnglish),ChinaWillAchieveModernizationofMilitaryandDefense:DM),December29,2010. http://english.cri.cn/6909/2010/12/29/2742s612494.htm. 198 JointChiefsofStaff,TheNationalMilitaryStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica2011. http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/201102/020811084800_2011_NMS__08_FEB_2011.pdf.

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 IncreasedmilitaryexpenditurescatalyzedbyhypotheticalTaiwanscenarios,conflicting territorialclaims,andgeopoliticalcompetitionintheAsiaPacificregioncontributetothespeed ofprocurement,developmentand,ultimately,fielddeploymentofmoreadvanced indigenousChineseweaponssystems. UnderstandingthevarietyofR&Dmethods,aswellaswatchingfortrendsinthedevelopment ofdualusetechnologies,willassistU.S.analyststobettergaugeChineseprogressintechnology and/orweaponsdevelopment. ThecurrentdearthofclearedU.S.analystswiththeabilitytoreadChinese,199aswellasthe commitmentofU.S.resourcestoitsengagementsintheMiddleEast,divertsattentionand resourcesawayfromalargerfocusonChinaanalysis.200

Astheupdated2011NationalMilitaryStrategy(amongotherpublicstatementsbyU.S.officials) indicates,U.S.analystscloselymonitorChinesedevelopments.201Accordingtootherpublicstatements byU.S.officialssuchasDefenseSecretaryGates,thereisalsoalargerfocusondevelopingprograms thatcounterChinese(andotherpotentialadversaries)technologicaladvancesintendedtotargetU.S. weaknesses.202LieutenantGeneralWallaceGregson(USMC,ret.),formerAssistantSecretaryofDefense forAsianandPacificSecurityAffairs,hasadvocateddevelopingcapabilitiessuchasmodernintegrated airdefensesystemstodeteranddefeatChinasemergingasymmetriccapabilitiesincyberwarfare,anti satellitewarfare,andantishipweaponry.203 ThedevelopmentofthemostprominentindigenouslydesignedweaponssystemsunveiledbythePLA overthepastdecadecaughtmanyprivateanalystsoffguard,butdidnotsurprisetheU.S.government. However,governmentanalystshaveunderestimatedthespeedatwhichthesesystemsdevelopedand reachedinitialoperatingcapability.ThereisacleartrendinincreasedU.S.governmentfocusontracking Chinesemilitarydevelopments,andanalystsnowappeartobemoreawarethatcontemporaryChinese technologicaldevelopmentsareproceedingataconsiderablyfasterratethanthetimelinesobservedin SovietorPRChistoricalnorms.

199

CentralIntelligenceAgency,CIADirectorCallsforaNationalCommitmenttoLanguageProficiencyatForeignLanguage Summit,PressRelease,December8,2010.https://www.cia.gov/newsinformation/pressreleasesstatements/pressrelease 2010/foreignlanguagesummit.html. 200 ForargumentationthatafocusonterrorismandMiddleEasternissueshasdistractedtheU.S.intelligencecommunityfrom longertermanalysisonotherregionsoftheworld,seeRogerZ.George,ReflectionsonCIAAnalysis:IsItFinished? IntelligenceandNationalSecurity,26:1(2011). 201 TheNationalMilitaryStrategyoftheUnitedStatesofAmerica2011explicitlyandfrequentlymentionsChina. http://www.jcs.mil/content/files/201102/020811084800_2011_NMS__08_FEB_2011.pdf. 202 SecretaryGatesisquotedassaying:Well,weobviouslyhavetobemindfuloftheChinesemilitarymodernization programs,theirantishipcruiseandballisticmissilesthatpotentiallycanputouraircraftcarriersatrisk,newfifthgeneration aircraft.Sotheyhavealotofcapabilitiesthatthey'rebuilding.Butweneedtobemindfulofthat.Weneedtobeinaposition todealwiththosecapabilitiesinthefuture.RobertGates(SecretaryofDefense),televisioninterviewwithJimLehrer,Gates onPentagonCuts,ImplementingDADT,China'sMilitaryBuildup,PBSNewsHour,January6,2011. http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/military/janjune11/gates2_0106.html. 203 SenateCommitteeonArmedServices,HearingonNominationsBeforetheSenateArmedServicesCommittee,111thCong., 1stsess.,April28,2009.

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Appendix:ControversiesRegardingCompetingAnalysis onChineseMilitaryDevelopments
TheapparentdisparityoverthepastdecadebetweenU.S.predictionsandtheactualpaceof developmentinChineseindigenousweaponssystemsraisesquestionsastowhetherflawedunderlying assumptionsmayhaveaffectedanalysisinthisarea,insideoroutsidetheU.S.government.This continuesacontroversyoflongstanding:foroveradecadeU.S.intelligenceandpolicymakingcircles haveseenavigorousdebateregardingboththepaceofPLAmodernization,aswellasthePRCs intentionsregardingthefutureuseofitsarmedforces. Inoneprominentandcontroversialexample,theU.S.HouseofRepresentativesPermanentSelect CommitteeonIntelligenceattachedcommentstotheintelligenceappropriationsbillfortheyear2000 thatexpressedconcernsaboutthequalityofanalysisonChinaemergingfromtheCIA.Specifically,the committeeassertedtheneed tosubjecttheChinaTaiwanIssuesGroupintheCentralIntelligenceAgencysDirectorateof Intelligencetorigorousexternalcompetitiveanalysistoensurethatthiskeyanalyticalcomponent isheldtothehighestanalyticstandardspossible.ThecommitteehasdirectedtheDeputyDirector forIntelligencetoexposeCIAsChinaanalyststocontrarythinkingtochallengetheir suppositionsandanalyticalmethodologiesmoreaggressively,andtoforestallanypossibilityof groupthink.204 Asoneelementofthismandatedrigorousexternalcompetitiveanalysis,acommissionwascreated undertheleadershipofGen.JohnTilelli(U.S.Army,ret.),aformercommanderofU.S.ForcesKorea,to evaluatethequalityofCIAanalysisonChina.ThecommissionsJuly2001reportwasnotmadepublic, butreportedlycriticizedtheCIAforundulyminimizingthepotentialmilitarythreatfromChina.205For theirpart,unnamedintelligenceofficialswerequotedinthepressascriticizingtheexternalreviewson thegroundsthattheywereintimidatingtoagencypersonnel,andriskedpoliticizingtheintelligence process.206 Similarly,controversialexternalanalysisregardingChinasmilitarydevelopmentwasseeninthe2008 reportChinasStrategicModernization,producedbytheStateDepartmentsInternationalSecurity AdvisoryBoard(ISAB).TheISABreportpresentedamorepessimisticpicturethantheofficialviews expressedbytheStateDepartmentitself:Stating,forexample,that[T]heUnitedStatesisviewedas Chinasprincipalstrategicadversary,andthatChinesemilitarymodernizationisproceedingatarate tobeofconcernevenwiththemostbenigninterpretationofChinasmotivation.207
204

ReportTogetherWithAdditionalViews[ToAccompanyH.R.1555]IntelligenceAuthorizationActForFiscalYear2000, U.S.HouseofRepresentativesPermanentSelectCommitteeonIntelligence(106thCong.,1stSess.),May7,1999. http://www.loyola.edu/departments/academics/politicalscience/strategicintelligence/intel/hrpt106130.pdf. 205 WilliamSafire,TheCIAsChinaTilt,NewYorkTimes,July9,2001. 206 RichardJ.NewmanandKevinWhitelaw,China:HowBigaThreat?U.S.News&WorldReport,July23,2001. 207 ChinasStrategicModernization:ReportfromtheISABTaskForce,DepartmentofStateInternationalSecurityAdvisory Board,October2008.http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/china/ISAB2008.pdf.

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 AssumptionsAffectingAnalysisonChina Theunderlyingassumptionsheldbyanalystsarefundamental:Analystswithcontrastingassumptions regardingthenatureandgoalsoftheChinesegovernmentcanexaminethesameevidenceandreach diametricallyopposedconclusions.208Alistofcommonlyheldassumptionsinthelate1990sregarding PLAmodernizationmighthaveincluded: 1. ThatChinasdefenseindustrywouldcontinuetobealowpriorityfordevelopmentrelativeto othereconomicsectors; 2. ThattheChinesedefenseindustrywouldcontinuethepatternsofslowprogress(orlack thereof)observableinthe1980sandearly1990s; 3. ThatChinasdefenseindustrywouldremainhighlydependentonpurchasesofadvancedforeign militarytechnology,withoutthecapacitytoeffectivelyengineer(orreverseengineer)similar equipment; 4. ThatthePRCmaintainsaverydefensive,inwardlookingdefenseposture,whichwouldnot requirethedevelopmentofweaponssystemsintendedforairandnavalpowerprojection; 5. ThatChinesemilitarypersonnelwouldbeincapableofmeasuringuptoU.S.standards;and/or 6. Thatalloftheseconsiderationsarelargelymoottobeginwith,asthegovernmentofthePRC hasabenignroleintheinternationalarenaandwillneitherthreatenitsneighborsorposea challengetoU.S.interests.209 Oneexampleofsuchthinkingmaybeseenina2001articlefromU.S.NewsandWorldReport,which statedthat China,withadecrepitindustrialbaseandariskaversesocialistbureaucracy,facesevenmore difficultythanadvancednationsindevelopinghightechweaponry[and]Beijing'sCommunist leadershipappearsfarmoreconcernedaboutthreatsfrominsideChinathanaboutextendingits militaryreachChinaalsofacesamountingfinancialcrunch[andfurthermore]Chinesetroops appeartobeminorleaguerscomparedwiththeirAmericancounterparts.ManyU.S.experts blamedtheApril[2001]collisionbetweenanEP3surveillanceplaneandaChinesefighterjeton poorskillsbytheChinesepilot.210 Whileparticularpointswithintheseassumptionshaveheldupovertimeforexample,Chinasaviation industrycontinuestofacedifficultiesinproducingmodernaircraftengines211theperspectiveofa decadehasrevealedmanyofthemtobeseriouslyflawed.Themostprominentmistakenassumptions havebeen:
ForadetailedexplorationofthisissueasitrelatestoU.S.Chinapolicy,seeJoshKerbel,ThinkingStraight:CognitiveBiasin theUSDebateaboutChina,StudiesinIntelligence,vol.48no.3,2004. 209 Asanillustrationofthelatterpoint,authorJamesMannhasnotedastrongtrendofopinionwithinU.S.academic,business, andpolicymakingcirclestoemphasizethebenignnatureoftheChinesegovernment,thecommonalityofU.S.Chinainterests, andtheprogressofdemocraticreforminChinaabodyofthoughtthathetermsthesoothingscenario.SeeJamesMann, TheChinaFantasy:HowOurLeadersExplainAwayChineseRepression(NewYork,NY:VikingPenguin,2007),pp.17. 210 RichardJ.NewmanandKevinWhitelaw,China:HowBigaThreat?U.S.News&WorldReport,July23,2001. 211 GabeCollinsandAndrewErickson,JetEngineDevelopmentinChina:IndigenousHighPerformanceTurbofansAre aFinalStepTowardFullyIndependentFighterProduction,ChinaSignPost(),No.39(26June2011). http://www.chinasignpost.com/2011/06/jetenginedevelopmentinchinaindigenoushighperformanceturbofansareafinal steptowardfullyindependentfighterproduction/.
208

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 ThatChinasriskaversesocialistbureaucracycouldnotadaptitselftotheproductionofmore modernweaponssystems:MainstreamanalysisfailedtoanticipatetheadaptabilityofChinas stateownedarmamentscorporations.ItalsofailedtoforeseetheextenttowhichChinasentry intoworldmarkets,andtheattendantexposureofChineseindustriestointernationalbest practicesinmanagementandmanufacturing,helpedtosupportadramaticandsuccessful transformation[ofChinasdefenseindustry]surpassingtheexpectationsofeventhemost forwardleaninganalyst.212 ThatPLApersonnelwouldbeincapableofmatchingthelevelsoftacticalproficiencyandmilitary professionalismdisplayedbyU.S.servicemembers:Whilelevelsoftrainingandprofessional developmentinthePLAcontinuetolagbehindU.S.forcesparticularlyintheseniorenlisted ranksthePLAhasmadeimpressivestridesoverthepastdecadeinraisingstandardsof training,personnelcompensation,anddoctrinaldevelopment.213Itislogicallyunfoundedand arguablyexpressiveofacomplacentsenseofculturalsuperioritytoassumethatPLA personnelareincapableofachievinghigherstandardsofmilitaryprofessionalismrelativetoU.S. forces. ThattheChinesegovernmentwillmaintainaconstrainedforeignpolicyandanentirely defensive,inwardlookingmilitaryposture:Theconventionalwisdomfailedtoappreciatethe senseofthreatthatChinasleadersfeelregardingthecapabilitiesandintentionsofthe hegemonicUnitedStates,andtheimpetusthisprovidestoChinasmilitarymodernization.214 Similarly,italsofailedtopredictthefarmoreassertivebehaviordisplayedbythePRCin pursuingitsterritorialclaimsin20102011,andtheseriousnessofthePRCslongertermintent todisplaceU.S.influenceandpresenceinAsia.

ReconsideringAssumptionsonChina Thereareanumberofreasonsthattheseassumptionswereformed,andwhytheymayhavebeen resistanttochange.Forone,thePRCdefenseindustrysawlittlesubstantiveadvancementinthe1980s andearly1990s.Continuedlackofprogressandreformwasthemostobviousassumptiontomake;and inmany,ifnotmostcases,predictionsofcontinuityinpastobservablephenomenawillprovetobe accurate.However,paradigmshiftscananddooccur,catchingevenexpertsbysurprise.Asnotedby longtimeDefenseIntelligenceAgencyanalystCynthiaGrabo, thereisaninherentgreatreluctanceonthepartofmanyindividualsandprobablymost bureaucraticorganizationstosticktheirnecksoutonproblemswhicharenew,controversial,and aboveallwhichcouldbebadnewsforhigherofficialsandthepolicymaker.Theeffectofthese factorsandpossiblyothers,individuallyandcollectively,canbetoretardtheanalysisand acceptanceofdataintheintelligencesystembyweeks,monthsandsometimesevenyears.215
212

JamesMulvenonandRebeccaSammTyrolerCooper,ChinasDefenseIndustryonthePathofReform(reportpreparedon behalfoftheU.S.ChinaEconomicandSecurityReviewCommission)(Washington,DC:DefenseGroupInc.,October2009),p.4. http://www.uscc.gov/researchpapers/2009/DGIReportonPRCDefenseIndustryFinalVersion_10Nov2009.pdf. 213 FredericVellucciJr.,CollinsAlt,LarryFergusonII,DanielM.HartnettandKennethAllen,TheScienceofPLATraining:Analysis andOverviewofPLATrainingTheory(Alexandria,VA:CNA,2009). 214 ForadiscussionofviewsoftheUnitedStatesheldbyChinasleaders,seeYongDeng,HegemonontheOffensive:Chinese PerspectivesonU.S.GlobalStrategy,PoliticalScienceQuarterly116:3(2001);andMichaelChase,ChineseSuspicionsandUS Intentions,Survival,Volume53Issue3,June2011;and JohnLee,ChinasAmericaObsession,ForeignPolicy.com,May6,2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/05/06/china_s_america_obsession?page=0,0. 215 CynthiaGrabo,AnticipatingSurprise:AnalysisforStrategicWarning(Washington,DC:JointMilitaryIntelligenceCollege CenterforStrategicIntelligenceResearch,December2002),p.45.

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 Secondly,theconventionalwisdomzeitgeistofthelate1990sheldthatliberalizedtradewithChina wouldhelptobringaboutdemocraticreforminChina,aswellasmorepositiverelationswiththeUnited States.AsPresidentClintonwroteinJanuary2000,[WorldTradeOrganizationmembershipwill strengthentheforcesofreforminsideChinaandtherebyimprovetheoddsthatChinawillcontinueand evenaccelerateitsgradualprogresstowardjoiningtherulesbasedcommunityofnations.216Similarly, futureSecretaryofStateCondoleezzaRicestatedin1999thatEconomicliberalization[inChina]is ultimatelygoingtoleadtopoliticalliberalizationthat'sanironlaw[theCommunistPartyis]livingon borrowedtime."217 Infairness,manyofChinasobservabletrendlinesinthe1990sappearedtopointinthedirectionof continuedeconomicreform,withthehopeofattendantpoliticalreform.However,thecourseof Chineseeconomicreformsignificantlyreversedcourseinthe2000s,turningbackinthedirectionof increasedstatecontrolovertheeconomy.218Thedemocraticreformspredictedattheturnofthe centuryhavenotoccurred,andundertheleadershipofCCPGeneralSecretaryHuJintaosince2002the Chinesegovernmenthascrackeddownevenharderondissentandfurthertightenedcontrolsonthe media.219 ParadigmsofthinkingaboutChinathatwereformedinthelate1990shaveprovenveryresistantto change.Expertsinhumancognitionhavenotedthestrongreluctanceofthehumanmindtoreconsider viewsoncetheyareformed,andthestrongtendencyfor datareceivedincrementally[tobe]fiteasilyintoananalystspreviousimage.Thisperceptualbias isreinforcedbyorganizationalpressuresfavoringconsistentinterpretation;oncetheanalystis committedinwriting,boththeanalystandtheorganizationhaveavestedinterestinmaintaining theoriginalassessment.220 Thistendencycanbereinforcedevenfurtherinexpertanalysis:thosewhohavedevotedmanyyears ofstudytoanissuetendtohavefirmlyformedviews,andaremoreresistanttoreconsideringtheir opinionsinlightofnewevidencethanarenewcomerstothesubject.221However,despitesuch psychologicalandinstitutionalreluctancetoreconsiderpreviouslyheldviews,thepatternofthepast decadeindicatesthattheU.S.Chinawatchingcommunitywritlargeingovernment,business,media, academia,andthethinktankcommunityshouldreconsidermuchofthepastconventionalwisdom regardingthefuturecourseofChinasriseingeneral,anditsmilitarymodernizationinspecific.
216

PresidentWilliamClinton,LettertoCongressionalLeadersonPermanentNormalTradeRelationswithChina,January24, 2000;containedwithinPublicPapersofthePresidentsoftheUnitedStates,AdministrationofWilliamJ.Clinton,20002001, Book1,January1toJune26,2000(Washington,DC:OfficeoftheFederalRegister,NationalArchivesandRecords AdministrationStaff,2001),pp.113115. 217 CondoleezzaRice,asquotedinJayNordlinger,StarinWaiting:MeetGeorgeW.sForeignPolicyCzarina,NationalReview, August30,1999.http://old.nationalreview.com/flashback/nordlinger200411170605.asp. 218 DerekScissors,DengUndone:TheCostsofHaltingMarketReforminChina,ForeignAffairs,May/June2009. 219 Astworeferencesamongdozensthatcouldbecited,seeBenjaminJoffeWalt,ChinasLeadersLaunchSmokelessWar AgainstInternetandMediaDissent,TheGuardian(UK),September26,2005;andWillyLam,HusCrackdownonPolitical Dissent,ChinaBrief,Vol.5Issue13,June7,2005.http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=3866. 220 RichardsJ.Heuer,ThePsychologyofIntelligenceAnalysis(Langley,VA:CentralIntelligenceAgencyCenterfortheStudyof Intelligence,1999),p.16. 221 ThistopicisdealtwithindepthinPhilipE.Tetlock,ExpertPoliticalJudgment:HowGoodIsIt?HowCanWeKnow? (Princeton,NJ:PrincetonUniversityPress,2005).

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 Adecadeon,itisnowclearthatmuchoftheconventionalwisdomaboutChinadatingfromtheturnof thecenturyhasproventobedramaticallywrong.Thesepredictiveerrorscarrywiththemserious geopoliticalconsequences.Toavoidbeingsimilarlycaughtoffguardin2022,U.S.analystsshould carefullyreexaminemanyoftheirwidelyheldassumptionsabouttheChinesegovernmentanditspolicy goals.

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