P O LITICS: 2005 VO L 25(2), 8088

Social Inclusion: A Philosophical Anthropology1

Dermot OReilly
University of Bristol

In this article the theoretical conations associated with the concept of social exclusion are disaggregated into a number of competing versions in terms of their social scientic and normative bases. The types of policy, analysis and critique that are engendered by these conceptions of exclusion are examined for their underlying social scientic methodology. The disjunction between positive, interpretative and critical approaches to social exclusion can only satisfactorily be broached by a methodology utilising a critical realist framework. This framework requires the integration of a theorised dialectical linkage between inclusion and exclusion. The necessary conceptual prerequisites are outlined for modelling inclusion and exclusion in a substantive, contextually sensitive manner that enables critical assessment.

Social exclusion has become one of the dominant terms in discussing social problems, but a large part of its dominance comes from its having a variety of different analytical and moral connotations. The contested nature of social exclusion as a concept is frequently acknowledged but seldom constructively addressed. The purpose of this article is to analyse the current impasse in the use of the concept of social exclusion that results from the conicting meanings attributed to it, and to outline how this impasse may be overcome. This is enabled by analysing the differing analytical and moral discourses that refer to and make use of the concept of social exclusion. The fundamental problem is that the analytically coherent paradigms of social exclusion are predicated on moral paradigms of inclusion, which results in a disjunction between implicit positive conceptions of inclusion, the boundary pregured by the concept of exclusion, the interpretative contexts that mediate between the positive and the corresponding boundaries, and the critical orientations to these interpretative contexts. These differential epistemological and ontological orientations are claried by analysing the different orientations in terms of social science methodology. The potential use of the concept of exclusion as a meaningful descriptive, analytical and critical term requires a critical realist approach to interpreting particular cases of, or concerns with, exclusion. This development of an analytical paradigm needs to be based on the dialectical relationship between inclusion and exclusion. In turn, the specication of this dialectical relationship needs to draw on a phenomenological interpretation of social interactions and value orientations. This interpretation utilises the approaches to social exclusion previously discussed and broader social theory to identify the three primary axes of inclusion and exclusion.
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Paradigms and discourses

There are at least six broad traditions of discussing social exclusion, which can be compared rstly in terms of their theoretical paradigms and secondly in terms of the moral discourses associated with them. The multidimensional concept of exclusion (Geddes and Benington, 2001) broadens out from the notion of material poverty to include various conditions such as health and educational deprivations, geographical disadvantage and particular disadvantages such as ethnic discrimination and physical or mental disabilities. These concerns could still be labelled as material bases of exclusion, but sometimes the multidimensional concept is used to include different aspects of exclusion such as from nancial services or from political participation (see Room, 1995; Whelan and Whelan, 1995; Burchardt et al., 1999; Percy-Smith, 2000). This theoretical paradigm neatly echoes the governments denition of social exclusion as a shorthand term for what can happen when people or areas suffer from a combination of linked problems such as unemployment, poor skills, low incomes, poor housing, high crime environments, bad health and family breakdown (Social Exclusion Unit, 2001, p. 10). The multidimensional approach to exclusion is navely heuristic and tautological in that it identies social problems and then labels them as aspects of exclusion. It is not guided by any particular social science paradigm or theorisation of what either exclusion or inclusion is. Its lack of theoretical rigour, however, means that the absence of a strong ideological orientation allows a relatively open approach to identifying exclusion, even if its symptoms and conditions are not systematically understood. Hilary Silver (1994) identies four traditions of understanding exclusion a naturalistic organic approach and three social science paradigms. Ruth Levitas (1998), in comparison, concentrates on the moral discourses surrounding the three social science paradigms, so these two perspectives will be discussed together. The organic tradition is based on a naturalistic conception of the organic integration of subsidiary units or communities (such as families or regions) that make up society. Exclusion then occurs as a result of not tting into the natural order of things. The moral understanding underpinning such an approach is identity-laden and dualistic, where the denition of self-identity is rst formulated in opposition to those considered as outsiders or as profane (Cohen, 1989). In such cases an identity of inclusion is dependent on there being an excluded other. The moral discourses associated with this approach emphasise the natural rightness of the established community, examples being traditional conservatism or the Catholic Church. The rst of Silvers social scientic paradigms is that of specialisation, which sees exclusion as associated with barriers to individual freedom. According to its neoliberal economic analysis, joblessness is a rational, self-interested reaction to the work disincentives in welfare politics (Silver, 1994, pp. 554555). According to this discourse, therefore, the only forms of exclusion with which the state should be concerned are those caused by discrimination. The moral discourse aligned with the specialisation paradigm is that of the underclass and dependency theories. These
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neoconservative ideas are not a necessary logical corollary of neoliberal economic ideas, but in practice they are symbiotic. The moral underclass discourse stresses the moral and cultural character of the poor themselves (Levitas, 1998). The monopoly paradigm focuses its analysis on the structure of the economy. Groups that are able to assert a monopoly on the means of production receive rents that perpetuate their unequal economic position. The economic inequality that results is the cause of exclusion. This paradigm has two versions, one that stresses the hierarchical nature of production, which is associated with Fordism, and a later version that stresses the relations between the economic centre and its peripheries, associated with post-Fordism. The second of these versions stresses the resultant deskilling and proletarianisation of previously secure workers, which David Byrne (1999) sees as the creation of a new reserve army of labour in insecure, part-time and lowly paid jobs. The redistributionist moral discourse that accompanies the monopoly paradigm pregures inclusion in terms of citizenship rights which would promote equality (Levitas, 1998). The utilisation of a discourse of rights as a tool for social change has been challenged by the responsibilities discourse of neoconservative parties and commentators, while the monopoly paradigm implies that a restructuring of the economy is necessary to change the unequal distributions within society to which current social rights are only a palliative. The third social scientic paradigm of exclusion, and its original source, is that of solidarity from the tradition of French republicanism. This tradition values a cohesive society based on the fundamental equality of citizens in an external, moral and normative social order, so that exclusion is understood as a rupture of this social bond and a failure of the republican state (Silver, 1994). In contrast to the monopoly and specialisation paradigms, the moral discourse of social integration that is associated with French republicanism is internal to its analysis of exclusion, whereas the neoconservative and citizenship discourses are external to their analytical counterparts. Levitas argues that the social integration discourse focuses narrowly upon integration as participation in paid work. There is evidence for this interpretation from both the EUs emphasis on workers rather than people in European law, and in Labours various New Deals to increase employment. As Paul Spicker (cited in Atkinson and Davoudi, 2000) points out, however, there are two variants of the social integrationist discourse: the one Levitas identies as a new Durkheimian hegemony that justies differences between groups, and a more republican version that identies solidarity as transcending individual, class, ethnic and regional interests, which Levitas fails to take account of. Post-modernist accounts of exclusion are a further school of thought, that, as one would expect, eschews an overarching moral position. Whereas the previous traditions have a common tendency to be reduced to a concern with paid work as the primary means of inclusion (Yepez Del Castillo, 1994), a post-modern perspective would argue that not only is work reduced in terms of time, but, with the erosion of the work ethic, also as a means of providing identity. The current dening aspect of exclusion is as much exclusion from commodity consumption as from production. The result is a growth of segmented identities and social divisions on ethnic, sexual or local lines (Geddes and Benington, 2001, p. 23).
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Methodology and exclusion

These models of exclusion and how they are related to their corollary moral discourses can be viewed from the perspective of approaches to the methodology of social science. As has been commonly discussed, there are essentially three types of social science approach: a positivist approach that focuses on objectively observable phenomena, an interpretivist approach that focuses on the subjective or intersubjective meanings attached and attributed to social phenomena, and a critical approach that interprets the processes and features of society in terms of an overall structure of domination or oppression (whether ideological or material). The multidimensional model of exclusion is constructed through the use of positive indicators, which explains its use in the operationalisation of numerous academic (see Burchardt et al., 1999; Richardson and Le Grand, 2002) and policy models (see Social Exclusion Unit, 2001) that utilise various measurable indicators of exclusion. These indicators are operationalised by comparing the positive levels of activity of, or possession by, people, according to certain categories against a dened level of activity or possession that is considered inclusive or socially acceptable. Those that are found to have insufcient levels of activity or possession to meet the dened level in a particular category are classed as excluded in that regard. The problems with a solely positive model of exclusion are twofold. Firstly, on an operational level, these indicators are necessarily conned to those aspects of social life for which accurate data are available. Secondly, on a methodological level, such indicators are always likely to be too generic to account for individual experiences of social exclusion and are unlikely to be able to factor in contextual and relational factors that add to or detract from exclusion. In other words, some types of exclusion are likely to be excluded from view by such models. The organic model is a simple interpretative model, that is, it regards the interpretative models that are used by people in identifying exclusion as unproblematic. This results in contextually bound models of exclusion, and implicit models of inclusion. The problem with the organic approach is that it tends to cast localities or groups in monolithic forms, such that differences within societies are neglected or brushed over. Such models can only be rescued from individualised models of exclusion by the argument that, despite differences within a society or group, the subsidiary units or lifestyles are bound up in and support a dominant culturalsymbolic order that marks inclusion and that functions as the boundary of exclusion. This disallows critical reections on the constitution of such societies, and, as such, has declining relevance to modern societies. The three social scientic paradigms are both interpretative, in having analytical models for identifying and classifying exclusion, and critical, in having a normative basis for criticising the failure of social mechanisms to provide for inclusion. The specialisation paradigm is too narrowly individualist to account for the group dynamics of exclusion, while the monopoly paradigm is too rigidly focused on economic causes of exclusion to recognise fully other means of social differentiation such as gender or ethnicity. The republican/social integrationist model incorporates
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an analytical link between inclusion and exclusion, but leaves undened the specic linkages that could be used in analytical and critical case studies of inclusion and exclusion. In comparison to the lack of a satisfactory analytical stance applicable to eld research from these interpretative paradigms, the critical perspective most commonly associated with the concept of social exclusion takes its lead from work inuenced by Levitas (1998). This work critiques the concept of social exclusion as being essentially hegemonic. This body of work has included interesting and telling discourse analyses of various policy documents and programmes (see Colley and Hodkinson, 2001). Levitas herself recommends the development of a discourse that draws on what she calls the redistributionist discourse, which is concerned with building on such features as social rights. This body of critical work, however, tends to focus on criticism of the ideologies enmeshed within policy documents and programmes and stops short of making constructive recommendations for developing or promoting social inclusion. The concerns with the limitations of each of these social science methodologies are commonly familiar to academics. The major innovation in social science methodology in the last three decades has been the development of the critical realist approach (see Keat and Urry, 1982; Bhaskar, 1986). Critical realism combines elements of these three methodologies in an epistemological and methodological paradigm. This paradigm allows for the empirical testing of interpretative theories as well as critical reection on the underlying features of the empirical and the theoretical issues present in any particular case with a view to human emancipation. Rather than repeat these debates and developments, the overall thrust of the critical realist position will be taken as correct. Applying this approach to a concept such as social exclusion, however, quickly leads to a concern with the highly relational, and therefore interpretative, nature of the concept. In classical sociology, the relationship that constitutes social exclusion is necessarily one of boundaries between those within a group and those without (see Merton, 1968; Parkin, 1979). Logically, meanwhile, the conceptualisation of exclusion must be related to the central features of a conceptualisation of inclusion. Both of these considerations point to the need to examine the binary logic, or the dialectic, between inclusion and exclusion.

Which comes rst: inclusion or exclusion?

The common and shared focus of the above models on exclusion, on those outside the boundary, results in their conceptions of inclusion being implicit and unproblematised. Only if the question of what constitutes inclusion is addressed can the question of what constitutes exclusion be posed. Each question is mutually dependent on the other. A critical realist approach to exclusion, therefore, must rstly factor in the dialectical relationship between inclusion and exclusion. Secondly, it must draw upon an abstract philosophical anthropology. The language of inclusion and exclusion implies a binary logic, that one is either included or excluded. The use of the concept of exclusion, however, commonly recognises that people are included or excluded in relation to some variable. The
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question of inclusion, therefore, is best conceptualised as a sort of sliding scale rather than as a binary function, so that inclusion and exclusion are the extreme poles of a continuum of relations of inclusion/exclusion. There are, however, numerous variables that can be considered of importance in terms of inclusion and exclusion, and as all of these are potentially complex continua, a fully comprehensive model of inclusion and exclusion would need to be incredibly detailed. This does not imply that inclusion and exclusion cannot be modelled; rather, it is a recognition that an all-encompassing analytical model of inclusion and exclusion would be too cumbersome to be useful. The use of any model of inclusion and exclusion is primarily critical in nature, that is, it can be used to analyse what the case actually is, make judgements as to what the case should be, and outline how the ideal case can be developed constructively. For this reason the modelling of relations of inclusion and exclusion needs to address the contextual features in any particular case to be investigated. The modelling of these relations in a critical realist manner would entail being interpretatively attuned to the most salient features relevant to inclusion and exclusion in the case at hand, but would also enable comparison between different cases through the identication of pertinent categories. This would thereby enable both the critique of existing relations of exclusion, and the specication of means by which inclusion could be developed. Acknowledging that there is no satisfactory encompassing model of inclusion and exclusion that would enable the comparison and analysis of every social fraction or situation, there are, however, three features to be drawn from a philosophical anthropology that are constitutively related to social inclusion and exclusion. The rst of these features is that of material social interactions. This feature is variously treated by work on poverty, deprivation and aspects of the multidimensional concept of exclusion, and is related to the material resources that enable human relationships. Much of the work on this feature of social interaction is historically and temporally specic; however, Len Doyal and Ian Gough (1991) construct an abstract model of human need that allows for critical comparisons of the particular need satisers accessible by, and conditions available to, people. Such a model articulates the material social conditions that can be used to substantiate how this feature of social inclusion and exclusion could be modelled in a critical realist approach. The second feature that is constitutively related to social inclusion and exclusion is the question of individual value orientations as compared to the society in which they are resident. One aspect of this feature is whether individuals are enabled, through the material resources available to them, to be interpersonally autonomous (see Doyal and Gough, 1991; Held, 1994); in other words, that they are not adversely included in relationships of domination or dependence (see Wood, 1999). A second and more far-reaching aspect of this is whether individuals are free to pursue their own ethical ends within society. This necessarily entails comparing such ethical ends to those sanctioned or tolerated in their society in terms of inclusion, or comparing them to the ethical values prohibited in their society in terms of exclusion. This feature of inclusion and exclusion is thus concerned with the integration or accommodation of different ethical ends into the
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cultural framework of the society in question, particularly its legal and institutional frameworks. The third constitutive feature of social inclusion and exclusion is the question of group value relations in society. The groups in question can either be identied by some inherent characteristic, be that racial, biological or national (leaving aside the question of how inherent these characteristics are), or they can be identied in terms of their own moral or behavioural ascription. This question of inter-group dynamics, sometimes described as identity politics, or as the struggle for recognition (see Honneth, 1995), marks the third fundamental dimension of social inclusion and exclusion. This third feature of inclusion, of the group, is clearly related to the second feature, of individual value orientations. The relation of the individual to the group is a question beyond the scope of this article. It is, however, clear from the history of social movements that group claims have been the vehicle for increased individual autonomy and social change. Hartley Dean (2003 and 2004) argues that rights, if utilised as individual claims, are of limited critical use, but that they can be conceptualised and utilised as claims made in a process of negotiation of co-responsibility. The differentiated presence or non-existence of this involvement by groups in the negotiation of co-responsibility in society is the marker of the third feature of inclusion and exclusion.

What does a philosophical anthropology of inclusion and exclusion add?

We have seen the limitations of the various analytical paradigms and moral discourses variously associated with the concept of social exclusion. They variously involve incomplete descriptions of the causes or features of exclusion and either imply prescriptive notions of inclusion, or remain focused on the ideological deconstruction of policies without proffering substantive recommendations. By analysing the failings of these paradigms in terms of social science methodology I have claimed that a critical realist approach to social inclusion and exclusion can be developed retaining empirical, interpretative and critical relevance. I have also outlined the three constitutive elements of social inclusion and exclusion that I argue are most relevant in either actual empirical investigations of exclusion, or in analysing and developing policies or programmes of inclusion. The question of what this philosophical anthropology of social inclusion and exclusion adds to the debate on exclusion is best answered through an example. Finn Bowring (2000), while agreeing with much of Levitass analysis, criticises the redistributionist discourse for regarding social deprivation as shame-inducing exclusion from social norms, and concludes that it is precisely the development of norms and ideals outside of economic and cultural capitalism that should be utilised to develop a more inclusive, sustainable and equal society. It is not my intention to analyse Bowrings conclusion, but to indicate how the philosophical anthropology outlined above could be used to decide whether the argument that leads to his conclusion is substantiated or refuted by evidence. Firstly, this would involve comparing how well the two alternative models (in this case capitalism and socialist-ecologism) would facilitate the material resources and processes for producing and distributing need-satisers to people. Secondly, it would involve exploring to what degree
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the two models enable or restrict personal autonomy and foster various compatible ethical orientations, and, thirdly, to what extent differing groups are involved in negotiating co-responsibility within these alternative models of society. The model of inclusion and exclusion proffered does not prejudge such an investigation. Moreover, the model enables the ethical and group orientations involved to be used to substantiate the interpretation, and possible critical appraisal, of the situation. These reections and analyses are therefore intended to clarify thinking about social exclusion, particularly in terms of the relation between inclusion and exclusion. Furthermore, they are intended as an argument for a more contextually sensitive and appropriate use of empirical data related to the three axes of inclusion and exclusion; for analysing exclusion, critiquing policy, and, hopefully, developing programmes of inclusion.

Note
1 The author would like to thank Hartley Dean, Katie Germer and two anonymous referees for their comments and feedback on earlier versions of the article.

References
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