Aderonke .O. Elesho* INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS : ISSUES RELATED TO THEIR POWERS AND ACCOUNTABILITY.

INTRODUCTION
With the magnitude in number and size of international organizations (IOs) it sometimes seem that states have been displaced from the centre stage of international law. However, the nature of International law and its organization has not changed much from that of the 1900s where British colonies who did not have control over their own country were accepted as sovereign state and allowed representations in the Peace Conferences. There have been series of definitions of IOs, which sometimes has complicated the perspective of readers rather than help understand them. However, it seems that some groundnurm has been accepted as constituting the basis for been an IO and because of their inability to legislate over a population in a defined territory and its voluntary membership, is said to have a quasi-governmental status. In considering the role of IOs in global governance, this work will consider the theories of establishment of IOs, which would give an insight to the role of IOs as actors in international law. How powers are granted to IOs, how IOs exercise the powers granted to them, the effect of the powers granted to IOs, instances where IOs have acted in excess of the express powers granted to them, how IOs can be held accountable and the problems related to the much sought after accountability of IOs. Finally, this work will do an analysis of the Economic Community of West African States in the light of the foregoing discussion.

* Legal Practitioner and LL.M Student, University of Hull (2011).

ABBREVIATIONS

ECOWAS - The Economic Community of West African States ECOMOG - ECOWAS Monitoring Group MDA - Mutual Defence Assistance Protocol ICJ - International Court of Justice ICSID - International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes ILA International Law Association ILO - International Labour Organization IMF - International Monetary Fund IO International Organization NATO - North Atlantic Treaty Organization PCIJ - Permanent Court of International Justice UN United Nations WHO - World Health Organisation WTO - World Trade Organisation (WTO

NATURE AND ROLE OF IOs

With the terrible destruction and loss of life, which left Europe in ruins, it was believed that an international organization must be established to avert war in future and all this led to the Paris Peace Conference of 19191 which led to different conferences and consequently to the establishment of different IOs. IOs are states creation, they are subjects of international law and are established for purposes of facilitating relations amongst states such as creating an avenue for treaty making, settling disputes and generally fostering good governance. There has been ceaseless argument that IOs developed as a response to international intercourse rather than to the ideological ideal of the notion of world/global governance2. It will be preposterous to state that IOs developed from intercourse between states as there were other issues which transcend territory and needed co-operation amongst states that necessitated the establishment of IOs. For an organisation to constitute an IO, it must have the following characteristics:

Its members must be created by either states and/or other international organisations; It must be established by a treaty or other resolutions adopted in an international conference; It must possess international legal personality3.

Anand, R.P. (2010) The formation of international organizations and India: a historical study, Leiden Journal of International Law, 23(1), 5-21. 2 Phillipe, S.Q.C and Klein, P. (2009) Bowetts Law of International Institutions, (6th edn) London, Sweet & Maxwell. 3 Article 2(a) of the International Law Commissions Draft Articles on The Responsibility of International Organizations, (2009, ) Report of the ILC on the work of its 57th Session, UN Doc A/64/10, p.43.

For a proper perspective of IOs, recourse must be had to the theories of establishment and role of IOs within the international legal order. There are different schools of thought, which seek to explain IOs:

Realist this theory develops in part from Thomas Hobbes4, realist believe that the only important actor in international law is state and also that IOs cannot affect state behaviour and even rebut the assumption that IOs have changed international law. Realists contend that there is no move towards global governance as the world is in a place of perpetual anarchy5. To the realist, even though the interest of states propel international law nevertheless, the interest of some states such as the U.S or those of the UN Security Council permanent members are more important than others.

Rationalism view IOs as changing and challenging the sovereignty of states, that IOs exist independently of states and that IOs can govern and or regulate state behaviour. Functionalism directly challenges the notion of state sovereignty. This school of thought places emphasis on the rule of law as embodied in the constituent treaty of IOs6.

Functionalism to functionalist, states are primary actors of international law and IOs are viewed as agents of states who have incorporated them for the purpose of facilitating relations amongst states. The functionalist approach recognises that for some tasks, the government of a state is not competent to meet the challenge 7. The relationship between states and IOs can be terminated at will.

Liberalist co-operation exists between states not only through formal mechanisms but also through informal mechanisms. Liberalist view it that states join IOs for the purpose of preserving their powers and maybe democracy as may be inferred from some states joining human rights group.

Constructivism IOs create a forum for states to relate amongst each other and above all, IOs may obtain their own dynamics and structure which renders them independent

Hobbes, T. (1952) Leviathan, Caredon Press, Oxford at 186 as taken from White, N.D. (2005) The Law of International Orgaizations (2nd edn), Manchester University Press, U.K p. 4. 5 Alvarez, J. (2006) International Organizations as Law Makers, Oxford University Press, New York. 6 White, N.D. (2005) The Law of International Orgaizations (2nd edn), Manchester University Press, U.K p. 8-9. 7 See note 6 above

of members. To constructivist IOs have influenced international law and they have likewise become major players8.

Radicalism - the school of radicalism believes that as IOs stand, they give legitimacy to the rich and powerful states in their oppression of weaker states. Each IO has its own political/legal order, though the political order dominates9.

LEGAL PERSONALITY OF IOs

This is a known requirement for every IO and it is noteworthy that there exist IOs that the constituent treaties establishing them does not provide for this personality. However, the ICJ in its Reparation for injuries10 opinion stated that the UN had the legal standing to sue even though the treaty establishing the UN did not make such provisions. The court based its decision on the will of the members and whether international personality is necessary for the IO to achieve its objectives. The endowment of IOs with legal personality makes IOs responsible for their acts, though liability of members to third parties may also arise11. The constituent treaties of IOs usually provide for the IOs contractual capacity in the legal system of member states and for the immunities for IO and this immunities estops accountability as the professional negligence of the staffs of an IO are protected by immunity12.

POWERS OF IOs
The position of states being central in the international legal order is dim as states have consistently empowered IOs to act in their stead in the international community. However, this does not mean that states have been supplanted in the international legal order13. The powers
8 9

See note 5 above p. 43-45 See note 5 above 10 Reparation for Injuries suffered in the Service of the United Nations, ICJ Rep. 1949 11 Shaw, M.N. (1997) International Law (4th edn) Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, P.921 12 Abeyratne, R. (2005) Professional negligence of the international civil service and immunities of international organisations in national courts, Professional Negligence, 21(2), 103-113 13 Cassese, S. (2004-2005) Administrative Law without the State - The Challenge of Global Regulation 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics PP. 663-694.

conferred on IOs may be executive, legislative and judicial powers, exclusive and shared powers, express and/or implied powers. Powers are expressly conferred on international organizations in their constituent instruments14. The constituent treaties of an IO usually come with loopholes, as the drafters cannot think of every possible contingency, therefore, IOs must be allowed implied powers that are not explicitly granted but are needed by necessary implications. The constituent treaties of IOs is no longer the sole legal basis of their activities, and in order to find legal solutions to the questions raised by the existence and activities of IOs, recourse must be made to customary international law or general principles of law. However, the need to resort to outside norms does not necessarily deny IOs the power to establish new rules for their members as far as they are authorized to do so by their statutes 15. It is also trite that states always have the pressing need to exert some form of control over the organization and keep the powers of the IO within its legal parameters. Where an IO acts without authority, it may give rise to the following problems: (a). Rendering the treaty void ab initio as the organisation never had the power to conclude the act; (b). Members may or may not ratify the act thereby rendering the treaty voidable at the instance of members. The PCIJ in its earlier decisions regarding the ILO regarded the powers of the ILO as strictly a matter of interpretation of treaties however, in the 1920s, the Court realised that the powers of IOs and specifically the ILO at that time was not limited to the interpretation of treaty. Even where IOs have only the power to make recommendations, based on some other Convention, member states may be under an obligation to comply with the non-binding decisions of some IOs16. While IOs like the United Nations through the Security Council resolutions 1373 and 1540 have made some form of laws to prevent and fight global terrorism, the legitimacy to do so is still very much contested17. DECISION MAKING POWERS IOs are usually given the powers to take decisions over the sphere of their activity which may relate to the internal running of the IO itself or regulating the acts of members or third parties such as the decisions of the WHO where it set standards for pharmaceutical products 18. IOs may make non-binding recommendations and for states in order not to be bound by the binding
14

Amersinghe, C.F. (2005) Principle of Institutional Law of International Organizations, (2nd edn), Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 2005, pg. 46. 15 Hafner, G. (2003) Can International Organizations be Controlled ?Accountability and Responsibility, American Society of International Law Proceedings, 2-5 16 Article 25 of the UN Charter 17 Stefan, K. (2010) Effective Law-Making in Times of Global Crisis - A Role for International Organizations, Goettingen Journal of International Law, Vol 2. No. 1.

decisions of IOs have to make reservations to those decisions19. The decision making process of IOs are evidence of the role which IOs play in International law and the influence they have on the sovereign powers of states. Some IOs reach decisions on the basis of unanimous decisions, while some by consensus, yet some by majority vote. The decision making powers of IOs does include their law making powers as IOs are usually empowered to make laws, rules for the general administration of the IO.

TREATY MAKING POWERS Under the 1969 Vienna Convention, IOs where not recognized as parties who could enter treaties. However, in recent times the power of IOs to enter treaties is no longer in contention as the 1986 Vienna Convention recognises this though it is yet to be ratified. IOs as a subject of international law is capable of forming an IO so it may be proper to say that the right to enter a treaty is derived under customary international law IMPLIED POWERS The doctrine of implied powers is based on the rule of effectiveness. Implied powers can flow from two instances (a.) from the rule of interpretation which ensures that treaty provisions are interpreted in ways as to guarantee their full effect of that treaty as was evidenced in the PCIJ advisory opinion of 1928 20. (b.) from grant of express powers, which is limited to those necessary for exercise of powers expressly granted which reasoning is found in the dissenting opinion of Justice Green Hackworth in the PCIJs advisory opinion of the Reparation for Injuries. The limitation to the doctrine of implied powers are21:

the recourse to the implied powers concerned must be necessary or essential for the organization to perform its function; the exercise of implied powers must not undermine the existence of certain explicit powers in the area concerned;

18

Akande, D. (2010) International Organizations in Evans, M.D (edn), International Law (3rd edn), Oxford University Press, New York. p.265. 19 Art. 22 WHO Constitution 20 On Interpretation of the Greco-Turkish Agreement as taken from Klabbers, J. (2009) An introduction to International Institutional Law, (2nd edn) New York, Cambridge p. 69 21 Rama-Montaldo, M. (n.d) Implied Powers of the United Nations, Lawyers Club India, Available at http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/mobile/articles/display_article_list_mobile.asp? article_id=2718 Accessed on January 10, 2011.

the use of implied powers may not violate fundamental rules and principles of international law; Implied powers may not change the distribution of functions within an organization.

According to Campbell, the exercise of implied powers would have to be such that it would not substantially encroach on, detract from and/or nullify other powers22.

ATTRIBUTED POWERS IOs have only the powers which has been specifically attributed to them and can only do those things for which they are empowered to do in their constituent document. This doctrine is based on the rationale that powers not expressly given are withheld intentionally therefore those powers must be protected by IOs exercising only powers that have been expressly granted23.

ACCOUNTABILITY

It is essential that whenever states transfer powers to IOs, there is an obligation on those states to ensure that there are legal safeguards in place and the powers are granted on the basis of effective control mechanism. Accountability under international law should serve as a precondition for imposing responsibility under international law on IOs and accountability strives to attribute power to responsibility for actions. It is necessary in every level of governance that there should be constraints on powers in order to avoid the abuses of power. Accountability issues can exist in two (2) forms: whether IOs can be accountable for not achieving their objectives, whether IOs can be accountable for their acts and how it can be ensured that IOs do not abuse power. This work would examine the latter.

22

Campbell, A.I.L. (1983) The Limits of the Powers of International Organizations, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.32, No.2. pp. 523-533. 23 Klabbers, J. (2009) An introduction to International Institutional Law, (2nd edn) New York, Cambridge

The issue of states been accountable under international law for acts perpetrated under the veil of IO is important in order to determine responsibility and accountability. There has been cooperation between the US and British governments with other countries such as Morocco, Egypt, Afghanistan whose legal system has more tolerance for torture and other forms of human rights issue, to transfer suspects to those states for detainment, questioning and torture as such acts cannot be perpetrated within the U.S and British territory. It is therefore apparent that all organizations and governments are capable of wrongdoing, and to render IOs less susceptible to malfeasance, both member states and the IOs must be held accountable where the situation warrants. The Court in Matthews v United Kingdom24 stated that: [T]he Convention does not exclude the transfer of competences to international organisations provided that Convention rights continue to be secured. Member States' responsibility therefore continues even after such a transfer. Where an IO or its organ delegates part of its responsibility to member states, for that act to be attributable to the IO, delegation must be limited, so that the act must be compatible with the IO thereby only operational command must have been delegated 25. The determining factor of who is responsible for the act of an IO lies on whose directive the IO was acting or to whom the acts can be directly attributed to. In recent times, there has been demand for the accountability of IOs, as evidenced in the accusation of mismanagement in the Oil-for Food Programme, claims of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers in the Democratic Republic of Congo and also for the acts of NATO in Yugoslavia26. Accountability of IOs require new and pragmatic approaches which is not based on the existing legal system and structures and they include the following27:

Hierarchical accountability - structures should be established within IOs such as it exists in the UN Secretariat;

24 25

(1999) 28 European Human Rights Review. 361 Lock, T. (2010) Beyond Bosphorus: the European Court of Human Rights' case law on the responsibility of member states of international organisations under the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Law Review, 10(3), 529-545 26 Villiani, U. The Security Councils Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional Organizations. Available at www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/villani_6.pdf Accessed on January 9th, 2011. 27 Grant, R.W. and Keohane, R.O. (2005) Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, American Political Science Review Vol. 99, No. 1

Supervisory accountability IOs should subject to supervision by states and/or courts. This is evidenced by state participation on the executive boards of the World Bank and IMF;

Fiscal accountability funding agencies or members who fund the IO should be able to demand for reports and ultimately sanction the IO by the unilateral withholding of dues;

Legal accountability - third parties such as courts or other bodies are given decision making powers, such as arbitral tribunals set up under the ICSID and the WTO dispute settlement mechanism;

Political accountability this refers to a process whereby an organ within the IO accounts for its actions to a separate organ, body, individual or even the membership. Such as it is evidenced in the UK legislative process, where the acts of the executive is subject to review by the parliament28.

Political accountability of the organs toward members constituent may also serve as restraint, limiting of IOs power in the constituent treaty and accountability through voting behaviour can be ensured29. Chesterman suggests that there should be legal accountability, which presumes that the holding of power to a specific standard is a form of accountability. It is not to be forgotten that the standard of exercising power itself is contested and that there exist a disparaging difference between IOs and states, as IOs who make rules on behalf of states are not affected by the rules30. IOs must be accountable to impartial legal authority, susceptible to public criticism and transparency must exist31. The notion of accountability is good however because IOs transcend borders, it might be difficult for there to be an effective regime between different states as the requirement of law is quite different and how a mechanism of accountability will work in Sierra-Leone does not guarantee that same will work in Germany. Where IOs are mandated to be transparent in decision making and also make information available to pressure groups or civil societies, this may hamper the growth and efficiency of the IO as the civil societies may mount pressure and consistently subvert the operations of the IO.
28 29

See note 6 above p. 192. Reinisch, A. (2001) Securing the Accountability of International Organizations, Global Governance 7, 131-149. 30 Chesterman, S. (2008) Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global Administrative Law, Global Governance, 14 p.39 31 Parish, M. (2010) An Essay on the Accountability of International Organizations, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2.

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The ILA Committee32 proposes that an Ombudsman, inspection panels, international commissions of inquiry should be established, the immunities of IOs should be restrictive and sufficient to avoid undue influence and that remedies must be made available for the breaches of law. The notion of an ombudsman being able to investigate and deal with maladministration may deal with some of the issues of accountability. For there to be true accountability, the structure of accountability required must be more than tribunals or internal mechanisms of control, the mechanism of accountability must be fair and independent of the IO and the staffs of the accountability mechanisms must not be subject to the direct control of the. Where IOs have restrictive immunity, it may result in the IO been made susceptible to all forms of litigation and in a short while paralysing the activities of the IO. However, it has been argued that it is unjust to predicate immunity on administrative reasons33. Accountability to only member states cannot be an effective form of accountability as the poor nations in those IO will lack the capacity to control or hold the IO accountable as it is only the powerful states that will be heard especially for IOs who take decisions by majority vote. In the World Bank, the US, UK, Germany, France, China, Saudi Arabia, China, Russia all have direct representation in the executive board of the bank and thereby having a vote each while other nations are grouped into constituencies with each constituency having one vote. Which has a result of 46 African countries being grouped into two constituencies and therefore having only two votes34. IOs must reflect the interest of all its members and not just a section of their members, there must be an open and more participatory mode of appointing officials and not just at the fancy of some states, there should be transparent rules which are accessible by all stakeholders for measuring the scope of work of the IO.

AN ANALYSIS OF ECOWAS

32 33

2004, 38-39 Pingel-Lenuzza, I and Gaillard, E (2002) International organisations and immunity from jurisdiction: to restrict or to bypass, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 51(1), 115
34

Burall, S. and Neligan, C. (n.d) The Accountability of International Organizations, Global Public Policy Institute Research Paper Series No. 2. Available at www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/IO_Acct_Burall_05012005.

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ECOWAS was established by 16 West African States on May 28, 1975 by a treaty with the ultimate aim of establishing an economic union in West Africa through co-operation amongst member states35. The ECOWAS treaty was revised on July 24, 1993. Articles 25 - 42, 45 - 47, 51, 53 and 54 - 67 of the treaty places an obligation on member states to develop policies that are favourable to members of the community. These provisions seek to regulate the economy of each state and enhance economic integration between member states and even form an economic union in the region. Where member states have laws in their respective states that negates the intent and purposes for which the community was formed or which is contrary to the fundamental principles of the community, those members are enjoined to make new laws and review their position. In accordance with the legal theories, it is evident from the treaty that there elements of the different theories in IOs. The Realist propound that states are the major players in international law, but this does not dispute that IOs are also established for a purpose according to the Functionalist theory. IOs have also become major players in international law according to the Constructivism theory. It is also true that according to the Liberalists, joining an IO may benefit some states more than not joining as smaller states may be protected larger states and according to the Rationalist, IOs are challenging state sovereignty as more states are expected to comply with their obligations under treaties.

ECOWAS has express powers to enter into co-operation agreements36 on behalf of the organization however, what amounts to a co-operation agreement is not defined therefore the Executive Secretary and the Council of ministers is at liberty to determine what would amount to a co-operation agreement. ECOWAS has the powers to regulate the economic spheres of member states activities37 as provided for by Art. 3.2 of the 1993 Revised Treaty. The Authority is empowered by Art.9 to reach decisions unanimously, by consensus and two-third majority vote depending on the subject matter. Decision making by majority and weighted vote tend to deprive states of their sovereign will and power by allowing the will of some other states over that of other states and also compromises state equality. Under the treaty 38, where a member fails to honour its obligation under the treaty, the Authority of the Heads of State may impose sanctions on that state.

35 36 37 38

Art. 3. 1 of Ecowas Treaty of 1975 Art. 79. ECOWAS Treaty, 1993. Art. 80. Art. 77.

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In the exercise of its powers to create an economic union amongst member states, an ECOWAS passport was established and it is the travelling passport of nationals of the member states and it allows for the free movement of persons within the community. Pursuant to its powers under the MDA Protocol of 1981 ECOMOG was constituted to end the lawlessness and war in Liberia in 1990 and subsequently Sierra-Leone in 1998. The ECOMOG believe that it was an attempt by Nigeria to fulfill its political, economic, and military leadership ambitions as an aspiring hegemon in West Africa39. A major problem that berserk ECOMOG was state interference in the command of the troops40. The success of the operation has proved its critics wrong and the troops was able to return the states to normalcy. Under the MDA for ECOMOG force to intervene in the conflict of a state, there must be an agreement between all the military groups, but this was not reached before the ECOMOG troops invaded Sierra-Leone. This is an instance where ECOWAS implied its powers to still send troops in the absence of an agreement been reached by all parties to the armed conflict. In exercise of its powers 41, the Authority suspended the membership of Guinea, Niger and Cote divoire for reasons of Coup dtat and election.

ECOWAS possesses international legal personality and the required legal capacity which it requires to contract in member states42. It is worrisome that this domestic legal capacity to contract in states is not extended to the territory of non-member states. Which therefore means that non-member states have the discretion to either recognise the legal capacity of ECOWAS to contract within their territory or not to recognise its capacity. Also, IOs do have diplomatic, administrative and legal immunities from the domestic legal system such that their acts cannot be questioned which in itself removes accountability from the IO. Article 83 also provides for immunities to be accorded to ECOWAS in accordance with the Convention on Privileges and Immunities. The treaty provides for dispute settlement mechanisms and accountability of organs and members of the community by establishing the ECOWAS Court and empowering it
39

Adebajo, A. (2002) 'Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa Lynne Rienner, Colorado, p.4. 40 Khobe, M.M. (2000) The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000 Available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no44/ecomog.html Accesssed on January 10, 2010. 41 Art. 45 of the ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance 42 Art. 88.

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to give binding rulings and advisory opinions43. The powers granted to members, organs and the Authority by the foregoing provisions serves as a form of accountability as all the stakeholders involved in ECOWAS has the right to institute an action against one another. This ensures that each arm of the IO stays within the legal parameters of its powers. For there to be more accountability there has to be agencies which review the act of member states as they are the supreme authority and they may authorise acts that may call for global concerns. However, subjecting the decisions of the Authority to review may not be tenable under international law as this might amount to undermining state sovereignty. The concept of global governance recognizes the importance of international institutions, highlights the relevance of actors such as states, IOs and individuals44. The number of international organizations in the world has increased dramatically in the last century as they increased their terrain from postal standards regulations to post conflict nation-building, weapons proliferation, national economic policies, climate change, trade, labour standards, public health, and transnational terrorism to deal with issues that transcend the capacity of states to manage. The role of IOs cannot be over-estimated as evidenced in Rwanda and Srebrenica as they are an integral part of the international legal order and in the absence of a world government IOs endeavour to bridge the gap and provide an avenue to common problems. In the exercise of their powers IOs may exceed the mandate given to them either by implying powers or by violating their Rules/abusing power. However, to a lay a claim that IOs have taken on too much power is an aberration as it is clear that whenever IOs exercise powers it is for the furtherance of member states interest and that of the international community. If the WHO had sought to use implied powers to regulate nuclear weapons without asking for the Advisory opinion of the ICJ, the regulation of nuclear weapons would not affected any actor in the international community and it would have been for the consensual good of the international community. Therefore, the rationale for determining whether IOs have taken on too much power should be pegged on whether the exercise of powers have resulted in the breach of its rules/powers and/or affected any actor in international law.

CONCLUSION
43 44

Art. 7(3) (g), 10 and Art. 76 Miller, R. and Zumbansen, P. (2008) Review of Developments in German, European and International Jurisprudence, (ed) German Law Journal Available at http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/FullIssues/Vol_09_No_11.pdf Accessed on December 29, 2010. Vol. 09 No. 11 Pages 1375-2080

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If fundamental principles of governance are incorporated into the running of IOs such as transparency, good governance, democracy, freedom of the ombudsman and tribunals set up by IOs, sound management of finances and the overall principles of human rights are respected above all. Then the debate of whether IOs have taken on too much power might not be in contention as all actors of international law and the nationals of their member states are protected. Inasmuch as IOs are state creations, it must be ensured that states are accountable under international law and IOs are themselves protected, so states do not abuse their use in international law.

BIBLIOGRAPHY INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS/INSTRUMENTS

1. 2.

ECOWAS TREATY International Law Commissions Draft Articles on The Responsibility of International Organizations, (2009), Report of the ILC on the work of its 57 th Session, UN Doc A/64/10, p.43.

3. 4.

UN Charter. WHO Constitution.

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CASE LAW
1.

Matthew v. United Kingdom (1999) 28 European Human Rights Review. 361

BOOKS
1. Adebajo, A. (2002) 'Liberia's Civil War: Nigeria, ECOMOG, and Regional Security in West Africa Lynne Rienner, Colorado, p.4. 2. Akande, D. (2010) International Organizations in Evans, M.D (edn), International Law (3rd edn), Oxford University Press, New York. p.265. 3. Alvarez, J. (2006) International Organizations as Law Makers, Oxford University Press, New York. 4. Amersinghe, C.F. (2005) Principle of Institutional Law of International Organizations, (2nd edn), Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom 2005, pg. 46. 5. Hobbes, T. (1952) Leviathan, Caredon Press, Oxford at 186. 6. Klabbers, J. (2009) An introduction to International Institutional Law, (2nd edn) New York, Cambridge p. 69 7. Phillipe, S.Q.C and Klein, P. (2009) Bowetts Law of International Institutions, (6th edn) London, Sweet & Maxwell. 8. White, N.D. (2005) The Law of International Organizations (2nd edn), Manchester University Press, U.K p. 4. 9. Shaw, M.N. (1997) International Law (4th edn) Cambridge University Press, United Kingdom, P.921

ARTICLES
1.

Anand, R.P. (2010) The formation of international organizations and India: a historical study, Leiden Journal of International Law, 23(1), 5-21. Abeyratne, R. (2005) Professional negligence of the international civil service and immunities of international organisations in national courts, Professional Negligence, 21(2), 103-113.
16

2.

3.

Burall, S. and Neligan, C. (n.d) The Accountability of International Organizations, Global Public Policy Institute Research Paper Series No. 2. Available at www.gppi.net/fileadmin/gppi/IO_Acct_Burall_05012005.

4.

Campbell, A.I.L. (1983) The Limits of the Powers of International Organizations, The International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol.32, No.2. pp. 523-533. Chesterman, S. (2008) Globalization Rules: Accountability, Power, and the Prospects for Global Administrative Law, Global Governance, 14 p.39. Cassese, S. (2004-2005) Administrative Law without the State - The Challenge of Global Regulation 37 New York University Journal of International Law and Politics PP. 663-694.

5.

6.

7.

Grant, R.W. and Keohane, R.O. (2005) Accountability and Abuses of Power in World Politics, American Political Science Review Vol. 99, No. 1. Hafner, G. (2003) Can International Organizations be Controlled ?Accountability and Responsibility, American Society of International Law Proceedings, 2-5. Khobe, M.M. (2000) The Evolution and Conduct of ECOMOG Operations in West Africa, Published in Monograph No 44: Boundaries of Peace Support Operations, February 2000 Available at http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/monographs/no44/ecomog.html Accesssed on January 10, 2010.

8.

9.

10.

Lock, T. (2010) Beyond Bosphorus: the European Court of Human Rights' case law on the responsibility of member states of international organisations under the European Convention on Human Rights, Human Rights Law Review, 10(3), 529-545.

11.

Miller, R. and Zumbansen, P. (2008) Review of Developments in German, European and International Jurisprudence, (ed) German Law Journal Available Accessed at on http://www.germanlawjournal.com/pdfs/FullIssues/Vol_09_No_11.pdf December 29, 2010. Vol. 09 No. 11 Pages 1375-2080.

12.

Parish, M. (2010) An Essay on the Accountability of International Organizations, International Organizations Law Review, Vol. 7, No. 2. Pingel-Lenuzza, I and Gaillard, E (2002) International organisations and immunity from jurisdiction: to restrict or to bypass, International & Comparative Law Quarterly, 51(1), 1-15.

13.

14.

Rama-Montaldo, M. (n.d) Implied Powers of the United Nations, Lawyers Club India, Available http://www.lawyersclubindia.com/mobile/articles/display_article_list_mobile.asp? article_id=2718 Accessed on January 10, 2011.
17

at

15.

Reinisch, A. (2001) Securing the Accountability of International Organizations, Global Governance 7, 131-149. Stefan, K. (2010) Effective Law-Making in Times of Global Crisis - A Role for International Organizations, Goettingen Journal of International Law, Vol 2. No. 1. Villiani, U. The Security Councils Authorization of Enforcement Action by Regional Organizations. Available at www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdfmpunyb/villani_6.pdf Accessed on January 9th, 2011.

16.

17.

18