Moral Relativity and Fairness

In "Morality is a Culturally Conditioned Response" Jesse Prinz provides a clear and succinct defense of moral relativism. Such an account is advantageous, not just to those who share his opinion, but as well to those wishing insight into the requisites of cogent disagreement. One alternative account he criticizes in some detail is the idea that morality can have an objective rational foundation. It happens I think a pretty good case can be made for that idea -- so I will use Prinz's account as a map of obstacles that need be overcome to render that alternative plausible. I'll finish with a sketch of what a rational morality might look like. Prinz begins with the observation that "[m]orals vary dramatically across time and place." Indeed, it is undeniable that cultural mores and moral beliefs have varied considerably. He reasons: "If morality were objective, shouldn't we see greater consensus?" This is a provocative question, but in the absence of any way to measure degree of consensus, and without any idea of the degree of consensus objective morality requires, there's no way to answer it. And it can be turned on its head. It has been widely observed that one can find some variant of the Golden Rule in practically every major culture and religion throughout human history. If morality were entirely relative, shouldn't we expect less consensus? But his subsequent contrast of moral with scientific judgments is on much solider ground: "When scientific errors are identified, corrections are made. By contrast morals do not track differences in observation ...." This is undeniably the case. With scientific claims there is an experiential and experimental road to agreement. You believe that the Moon is made of green cheese? If so, let us go there (like Wallace and Gromit) and see. Much has been made of the fact that with theoretical matters -- even, for example, that the Earth goes around the Sun and not vice versa -- the role of observation can be rather more recondite. Nonetheless, eventually consensus is thereby attained. Not so with morality: "Western slavery did not end because of new scientific observations ...." Prinz concludes: "Moral variation is best explained by assuming that morality, unlike science, is not based on reason or observation." It should be apparent that, if this is true, the case for moral relativism has been made. If there is no reason for preferring one moral judgment to any other, then (rationally) every judgment is equally legitimate. But, in a very crucial respect, his conclusion has exceeded his argument. Science is not the only legitimate form of reasoning: Prinz has overlooked logic and mathematics. It is generally accepted that these, too, are not based upon observation. Rather, claims like "2 + 2 = 4" and "P implies P" are thought to have a purely conceptual warrant: a kind of rational self-evidence. Their legitimacy is, if anything, presupposed by observation and not based on it. So the possibility Prinz fails to address in his account is: Might morality be akin to logic and mathematics; might it have a similar kind of conceptually evident, observation-independent basis? Instead, he moves on to a hypothesis which, to be sure, could render the above speculation moot: that moral values, and values in general, consist of something inherently unreasonable, viz. "emotional attitudes." He cites a variety of psychological research in support: Children begin to learn values when they are very young, before they can reason effectively. ... [W]e decide whether something is wrong by introspecting by our feelings:
Dr. Gerald Hull "Moral Relativity and Fairness"

if an action makes us feel bad, we conclude it is wrong. ... [P]eople's moral judgments can be shifted by simply altering their emotional states. ... [P]eople make moral judgments even when they cannot provide any justification for them. These findings make it clear that persons' moral judgments can lack rational justification or be affected by irrational factors. But it does not follow that they are inherently unreasonable: for the same can be said of factual (scientific) judgments. Children learn facts about the world when they are young, and before they can reason effectively. We (often enough!) decide whether something is true by introspecting how we feel about it. People's factual judgments can be shifted by simply altering their emotional states, as any demagogue can attest. And a person may hold many a scientific belief -- for example, that nothing can travel faster than the speed of light, or that water is made up of hydrogen and oxygen -- without having the least comprehension of what justifies it. From the mere fact that someone's judgment is irrationally based it doesn't follow it could not in principle be rationally based. Prinz concludes with the case of the psychopath: If morals are emotionally based, then people who lack strong emotions should be blind to the moral domain. This prediction is borne out by psychopaths, who, it turns out, suffer from profound emotional deficits. It might seem the success of this prediction substantiates his hypothesis, but left unmentioned is the possibility a rationally based morality might make the same prediction. Consider a mathematical example. What makes "2 + 2 = 4" true is a matter of pure mathematics: for example, its derivability from the axioms of arithmetic. But whether a given person comprehends that truth and derivability is an entirely separate matter; they would need, at the very least, a capability for mathematical reasoning. Analogously, the fact that an emotionally damaged individual lacks a capacity for moral judgment does not show morality is not in itself a rational matter. For what is required for the truth of "X is moral" may be distinct from what is needed -for example, sympathetic emotions -- for someone to actually appreciate and abide by that truth. To this point the discussion has been negative. We have overlept Prinz's obstacles -- he has not ruled out the possibility that moral judgments, like logical and mathematical judgments, have a non-observational, conceptual basis. But what might that possibility might look like? Instead of morality in general, let's focus more specifically on fairness. It may be debated how much of morality this captures. Nonetheless, it seems fair to say that fairness captures a fair amount; the reader can judge whether it is enough. Why concentrate on fairness? It is attractive because of two mutually reinforcing characteristics: (1) it is relatively simple to define, and (2) it is relatively easy to discern. First, one can give it a pretty concise definition, to wit: a judgment is unfair if it unreasonably discounts the interests of any affected individual. And second, far from being vague or equivocal, this definition applies quite clearly in a great many cases. For example, it is obviously unfair for a woman to be paid less than a man for product that is indistinguishable in quantity and quality, all other things being equal. That is, we can assume that she's no less interested in payment than the man. Of course, sometimes other things are unequal: perhaps other aspects of her employment are deficient, or whatever. But factual claims are also capable of being invalidated by further discoveries -- maybe
Dr. Gerald Hull "Moral Relativity and Fairness"

we are all brains in vats hooked up to computers (a la the Matrix movies). Judgments of fairness appear no more inherently treacherous than scientific judgments. The easy discernibility of fairness is the crux of a popular experiment called the Ultimatum Game. Two individuals jointly receive a prize. However, the relationship is asymmetrical: one has the privilege of dividing it up, and the other the option to accept the offered share or reject (for both) the prize. In a wide range of cultures, however "primitive" or "modern," there is a tendency for the accepter to reject inequitable divisions. People see the unfairness and repudiate it! It's fair to note that this is inexplicable on prevailing norms of rational choice, which hold it's always preferable to accept something rather than nothing. Experiments with dogs and monkeys find a similar intolerance of unfair treatment. For example, as long as two monkeys in full view of one other are both rewarded with cucumber slices, everything is fine. However, should one of the monkeys be rewarded instead with grapes, the other will likely as not refuse the cucumber. It should be evident that, if judgments of fairness can be made even by animals, they are hardly elusive or obscure. Of course, dogs and monkeys do not comprehend the definition of fairness; but they are sensitive to the appearance of arbitrary inequity. They may be incapable of the kind of symbolic reasoning required to grasp a rational morality, but they can see when they're getting a raw deal. But even supposing fairness to be simply definable and easily discernible: that does not show being fair is the most reasonable option. I may want you to be fair to me, but why should you want this? You may indeed want me to be fair to you, but why need you reciprocate? If indeed fairness is morality (or a healthy chunk of it), why be moral? What justification can be given, particularly in situations where selfishness would be much more profitable? It is this: fair judgments alone are rationally defensible. This is as conceptually evident as one might wish -- it is an immediate consequence of the definition of fairness. Any unfair judgment unreasonably slights the interests of some affected individual; consequently, fairness is the only way to avoid a rationally indefensible judgment. (This is not unhealthily restrictive: there are indefinitely numerous ways of being fair.) Some will find a shortcoming in this. That fairness alone is rationally justifiable implies it is the optimal strategy for rational cooperation. That is no small thing. But a person need not be interested in rational cooperation: for example, they may believe (correctly) they can obtain cooperation via the threat of force instead. However, moral rationality is not alone in having this shortcoming. The fact that it would be contrary to reason to ignore a judgment does not, by itself, force anyone to be reasonable about it. One may be uninterested in scientific truth: people regularly disbelieve the existence of evolution or human contributions to global warming, despite scientific consensus. A person may be more concerned with effective persuasion than valid and sound argumentation. And, as any poker player who has ever gone "on tilt" can attest, sometimes the mathematical odds are irrelevant. Regardless, if rational justifiability in morality is a consummation to be wished, then fairness is the only way to go. It provides what Prinz's moral relativism supposes cannot be found: a "wellrecognized standard that can be used to test, confirm or correct when disagreements arise."

Dr. Gerald Hull

"Moral Relativity and Fairness"