Chapter 6

Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market
Riccardo Gatto* and Leonello Tronti**

1.

THE RECESSION AND THE LABOUR MARKET

The global recession appears to have had less severe effects on public finances in Italy than in other European countries. In 2008 and 2009 the budget deficit averaged 4.0% of GDP, against 5.7% in France, 7.8% in Spain, 9.6% in the United Kingdom and 10.2% in Ireland. However, the impact on economic growth has been far greater (Figure 1). In the same two-year period, Italian GDP fell by 6.3%, nearly twice the 3.6% decline in the euro area. In addition, prices continued to rise faster in Italy than in the rest of Europe (2.2% annually against 1.8% for the euro area). However, considering the sharp fall in output, the impact of the recession on the labour market was relatively modest. Total employment continued to grow through the first quarter of 2008, even though GDP had already begun to contract (Figure 2). Employment growth peaked in that quarter at 1.9% over the same quarter of 2007. Job growth then slowed, giving way to a contraction in the fourth quarter. Year on year, the number of persons employed actually grew appreciably in 2008, against a 1% fall in GDP. Then, in 2009, employment fell sharply, with 339,000 fewer people in work, but again the related job loss (1.6%) was much
* ** ISTAT, Rome, Italy. Roma Tre University, Italy.

Roger Blanpain, William Bromwich, Olga Rymkevich & Iacopo Senatori (eds), Labour Markets, Industrial Relations and Human Resources Management, pp. 99115. 2012 Kluwer Law International BV, The Netherlands.

Ireland

Finland

Japan

Italy

Denmark Sweden

United Kingdom

EU (27 countries) Germany

Euro area (16 countries) Spain

United States Portugal France

Netherlands Belgium

Austria

Greece

Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti

0.0
1.8 2.4 2.0 1.7 1.0 0.6

2.0
3.7 3.7 5.6 5.5 5.1 3.6 2.8 2.6 2.6

4.0

6.0

8.0

7.1

6.4

6.3

10.0

12.0

11.1

Source: Eurostat

Norway

100

Figure 1. The impact of the international crisis on GDP in selected countries (Percentage changes 2009/2007)

Figure 2. Italy: Employment and unemployment I/2006-III/2010

2,200 2,100 Employment 2,000 1,900 1,800 1,700 Unemployment 1,600 1,500 1,400
I 2007 II III IV I II III 2008 IV I II III 2009 IV I II 2010 III

23,600

23,500

23,400

23,300

23,200

Employment (000)

23,000

22,900

22,800

22,700

II

III

IV

1,300

2006

Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market

Source: ISTAT, Labour Force Survey

Unemployment (000)

23,100

101

Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti less than the huge fall in output (5.1%). Firms made ample use of income support programmes, and the number of hours of short-time working soared. The hardest hit sector was manufacturing, where the impact of the decline in exports was strongest. The fall was nationwide, about half of it occurring in the North. In the service sector, by contrast, while self-employment decreased significantly, there was a marginal increase in wage employment in northern and central Italy. Overall, job losses were relatively limited in central Italy and substantial in the North, and especially in the South. The drop in employment was particularly steep for men, while job losses among women were less pronounced, though still significant in relative terms. The self-employed (craftsmen and small businessmen in services and manufacturing) and the weakest segments of the labour force (fixed-term employees and freelancers) were the hardest hit, while core staff workers were less affected. The pattern for unemployment has essentially been the mirror image of employment, though with significant differences in timing (Figure 2). The number of job seekers reached a low of 1.5 million in the second quarter of 2007 and then rose steadily, as the pace of new job creation slowed. Between the second quarter of 2007 and the same quarter of 2010, the number of job seekers rose by 614,000, while between the employment peak in the first quarter of 2008 and the third quarter of 2010, the number of persons in work fell in a similar way, by 607,000. Overall, the labour force remained relatively stable, albeit with some cyclical adjustment and a substantial shift from employment to unemployment. Most of the additional unemployment concerned men, though it was significant among women as well. Job seekers were concentrated in the North and among those made redundant. There was a much less pronounced increase in unemployment in central Italy and especially in the South. The average unemployment rate rose from 6.7% in 2008 to 7.8% in 2009, reaching 8.4% in the first half of 2010. The increase was particularly sharp among young people aged 15-24, and was greatest among young women in the South. The impact of the recession on unemployment was far less severe in Italy than in many other countries. Figure 3 shows that for every percentage point of GDP lost, the unemployment rate grew only 0.3 points in Italy, against 0.5 in United Kingdom and France, 0.7 in Ireland and 1.2 in Greece. Had the Italian unemployment rate reacted to the decline in GDP in the same way as the average of the euro area, its increase would have been 3.3 points and not 1.7. The reason for this less severe impact may be traced to both institutional factors and behaviours of businesses and workers. Employers made use of subsidised short-time working schemes on a large scale, together with a certain amount of labour hoarding, whereas workers responded with discouragement and inactivity.

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Figure 3. How much did the unemployment rate respond to the fall in GDP? Selected countries, years 2008-2009 (Elasticity in percentage points of the unemployment rate to GDP)

0.5
0.1

0.2 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2

0.0
0.6 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4

0.5

1.0 Italy France Austria Poland Japan Sweden Denmark Belgium

0.7

Finland

Portugal

Ireland

3.5

3.5

Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market

103

Source: Eurostat

Spain

4.0

United States

Euro area (16 countries)

3.0

Greece

EU (27 countries)

2.5

Norway

United Kingdom

Netherlands

2.0

1.8

Germany

1.5

1.2

1.0

Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti 2. SHORT-TIME WORKING AND LABOUR HOARDING

An important aspect to consider in assessing the impact of the recession on unemployment is labour hoarding, i.e. the preservation of the employment relationship during a recession by employers who reckon the cost of dismissal and subsequent rehiring is greater than that of keeping the worker on. A choice of this kind is all the more likely in the case of skilled workers and those for whom the employer has made a substantial training investment. Labour hoarding is certainly a form of labour underutilization rather than unemployment, as the worker retains their job, even if working hours are reduced, even to zero hours per week. For workers, however, the experience of labour hoarding can be similar to unemployment or, at least, a clear signal of a strong increase in the probability of losing their job. This explains why some analysts would like labour hoarding to be included in the unemployment rate or, at least, in some other official measure of workers distress. Since 1945, Italy has had a public incentive for labour hoarding in the form of a social insurance programme (the Cassa integrazione guadagni or wage guarantee fund), providing short-time working benefits, and other European countries have introduced similar schemes.1 This programme sustains firms in economic difficulty or undergoing restructuring, maintaining employees on reduced working time or even on zero hours, and providing income support. It thus makes it more advantageous for the employer to retain staff during a recession and, at the same time, gives workers greater job and income stability, softening the social and economic repercussions of recessions and mitigating potential industrial conflict. In recent years, and especially with the onset of recession, the Italian Government has extended the range of eligible beneficiaries, as well as the term of benefits, by means of exemptions for workers lacking national insurance contributions. This has certainly eased the economic and psychological impact of recession for the beneficiaries, but at the same time it has meant reduced utilization of the labour capacity of these individuals. In 2009, the hours of unemployment funded by the programme can be estimated to be equivalent to 300,000 full-time, year-round workers, some 210,000 more than in 2008. For 2010, the estimate2 is about 380,000. The Labour Force Survey provides a further estimate of workers on the programme (those on the zero-hours regime), reported out of work for the whole reference week. These were 58,000 in 2008, 211,000 in 2009, and 182,000 on average for the first three quarters of 2010. Not all firms are eligible for income support during short-time working, even with the new exemptions, and not all the reduced use of labour is supported by
1. 2. For a comparative analysis of programmes for labour redundancy in seven European countries from both the legal and the economic standpoint, see Carabelli and Tronti (1999). The estimate corrects the number of hours of short-time working compensation authorized to firms, provided by the Social Security Institute (INPS), by means of a proxy of the ratio between hours authorized and hours actually paid to beneficiaries.

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Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market safety net measures. We can estimate the amount of labour hoarding outside the short-time working compensation programme by means of the Wharton method,3 assuming that interpolation between the cyclical peaks in productivity gives a reliable measure of the labour utilization frontier, so that underemployment can be estimated as the gap between that frontier and current productivity. By this method, whereas this non-supported labour hoarding was equivalent to some 140,000 workers in 2007, in 2008 it rose to 370,000 and in 2009, due to a steady decline in labour productivity, peaked at 960,000 (Figure 4). As productivity recovered, in the first three quarters of 2010, it fell back rapidly, and the figure for the third quarter was 210,000. 3. DISCOURAGED WORKERS

Another important matter to be considered is the phenomenon of discouraged workers, or inactive persons who nevertheless show some interest in the labour market. The labour force survey gathers information on discouraged workers: they are identified, among the inactive population, as those who state that they want to work and would be immediately available to do so. This aggregate therefore represents total available labour. As a rule, these persons are not actively seeking work because they do not believe the market gives them any chance of finding a job. Surprisingly, in times of recession, this group tends to contract, because the perception of higher unemployment leads them to rule out all prospects of employment.4 The data on the present recession confirm this. The number of discouraged workers decreased by 13.3%, between 2008 Q2 and 2009 Q2, from 1,254,000 to 1,465,000;5 then, in the second quarter of 2010 it started to grow again (by 5.5%) together with a slight increase in employment. Discouragement is more common among unemployed women about two-thirds of the total although over the three years the gap between the sexes narrowed. Although accounting for the majority of discouraged workers, the South reported a modest decline. Only oneseventh of the discouraged workers are resident in Central Italy, but their numbers declined more sharply over the period. The smallest change was in the Northeast, where discouragement is not widespread. In Figure 1 the dynamic of the number of discouraged persons is analysed by sex and region. Although in the presence of considerable variability, for all the series the first phase is characterised by an increase, from the first quarter of 2007 until the third quarter of 2008; followed

3. 4. 5.

For a critical presentation, see Taylor (1970). The return to inactivity, however, is the dual behaviour of the attraction mechanism, outlined in the 1960s by Tella (1964), for which the empirical evidence shows a strong correlation to the employment cycle. All the data from the ISTAT labour force survey in this article refer exclusively to the workingage population (15-64).

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106
Labour hoarding (non subsidised) (r.h. scale) Actual employment (l.h. scale) Employment at full capacity utilisation (l.h. scale)

Figure 4. Italy: Non-subsidised labour hoarding I/2007-III/2010 (Thousand full-time equivalents)

25,500 1,200 1,000 800 600 400 200 0

IV I II III 2009 IV I II 2010 III

1,400

Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti

25,000

24,500

24,000

23,500

23,000
IV 2008 I II III

II

III

2007

Source: Authors calculation on ISTAT data (Office of national statistics)

Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market by a fast decreasing phase until the third quarter of 2009 and finally a period of oscillation and relative stability. 4. LABOUR UNDERUTILIZATION

In addition to unemployed workers, if we count as underutilized labour those out of work but receiving short-time benefits, plus discouraged workers, then the number of underutilized persons in the third quarter of 2007 was more than twice the unemployment rate. As the recession advances, however, the number of discouraged workers declines, while the number of zero-hours workers on short-time working increases, with an increase of total labour underutilization from 2,932,000 in the first quarter of 2007 to 3,291,000 in the third quarter of 2010. This broader look at the impact on the labour market of the recession enables us to construct an underutilization rate including short-time working plus discouraged and unemployed workers as the numerator, and labour force plus the discouraged as the denominator. This is an indicator similar to the unemployment rate, but takes into account the broader category of available labour underutilization thus widening the concept of the labour force. This measure is obviously noticeably higher than the official unemployment rate6 (Figure 5). It has been above 11% since the third quarter of 2007, rising by more than 2.7 percentage points from the second quarter of 2007 to the third quarter of 2010. However, it is interesting to note that the difference between the two rates is fairly stable, around five percentage points, due to the declining share of the discouraged offsetting the rise in the number of short-time workers. This indicator is not intended as a substitute for the traditional unemployment rate, but rather as a supplement to it, as it also measures other kinds of mismatch between labour supply and demand: as unemployment is not the only source of distress in the labour market, in order to correctly portray the overall situation, the other sources must also be taken into consideration. The indicator shows that the area of distress in the Italian labour market is about twice the size of official unemployment. It should also be noted that this indicator only includes people who were available but unable to work throughout the period of the survey, and does not include those who worked less than they intended, or other types of distressed workers.

6.

A similar rate is calculated and disseminated quarterly by the Bank of Italy in its Bollettino Economico. For the construction details of their rate of available unutilized labour, see Brandolini, Cipollone and Viviano (2006).

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Unemployment and labour underutilization rate (%)

108
7.0 6.0 5.0 4.0 3.0 2.0 1.0 0.0 Differences ILO unemployment rate Labour underutilization rate Differences (percentage pts)

Figure 5. Italy: Unemployment rate by ILO definition and labour underutilization rate I/2007-III/2010 (Percentage ratios of the labour force; the underutilization rate comprises, in addition to the ILO unemployed, the discouraged and workers on zero-hours short-time working)

15.0

12.5

Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti

10.0

7.5

5.0

2.5

Source: Authors calculations on ISTAT labour force survey data

Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market 5. INACTIVITY

The fact that during periods of recession there is a fall in the number of discouraged workers shows how fine the distinction is between discouragement and inactivity. Recessions have a strong impact on the labour supply decisions of individuals. The positioning of actors in the labour market is not a choice that is stable and defined once and for all, but the result of flows between one condition and the other of individuals who modify their choices on the basis of market conditions. Such a complex phenomenon generates relationships between aggregates that are not always univocal. By way of example, the relationship between unemployment and inactivity over the last few years has changed from positive to negative and vice versa a number of times. In Figure 6 the Italian unemployment rate is plotted against the inactivity rate to show how the relationship changes over time. In the first period, from the first quarter 2006 to the second quarter 2007, the unemployment rate decreases while the inactivity rate grows, which seems to suggest a drift from unemployment to inactivity. From that point until the second quarter 2008, the unemployment rate slowly increases, while the inactivity rate decreases significantly, reaching its minimum level (36.9%) and suggesting the presence of an opposite outflow from inactivity into unemployment. In the following period, until the third quarter 2010, the unemployment rate continues to grow but the inactivity rate also grows, both reaching levels much higher than the starting ones. In this third case, the flows are from employment to both unemployment and inactivity and, under the effects of the recession, the previous negative relationship between the unemployment rate and the inactivity rate becomes positive. Summarizing, over the period from the first quarter 2008 to the third quarter 2010, the effects of the recession, net of labour hoarding, can be described as follows: the increase in unemployment was 416,000 and it was accompanied by an even larger growth in inactivity (645,000), amounting to a total of 1,061,000 persons affected by the recession (Figure 7). 6. THE LONG WAVE OF LABOUR UNDERUTILIZATION

We have sought to assess the impact of the recession on the Italian labour market analysing both unemployment and other labour underutilization phenomena such as discouragement and labour hoarding. Quantifying all these aspects, we can provide an overview of the current situation. Compared with the pre-recession situation, the official fall in employment was 607,000. However, also taking labour hoarding into account, we estimate that at present the increase in non-utilized employed labour amounts to some 290,000 full-time equivalents on short-time working (of whom 130,000 on zero hours), and 150,000 more full-time equivalents without any public support. As a result, the total fall in utilized employment is estimated to be 1,050,000 full-time equivalents. 109

Unemployment rate

110
2010 Q3 2006 Q1 2007 Q2 37 37.2 37.4 37.6 37.8 38 Inactivity rate

Figure 6. Italy: The unemployment rate versus the inactivity rate I/2007-III/2010 (Seasonally adjusted data, percentage values)

9.0

8.5

8.0

Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti

7.5

7.0

2008 Q2

6.5

6.0

5.5

36.6

36.8

Source: Authors calculations on ISTAT data (Labour force survey)

Figure 7. Italy: Increases in unemployment and inactivity with respect to the first quarter of 2008 II/2008 III/2010 (Seasonally adjusted data, thousands)

1200

1000

Increase in inactivity

800

Increase in unemployment

600

400

200

0 2008Q4 2009Q1

2008Q1

2008Q2

2008Q3

2009Q2

2009Q3

2009Q4

2010Q1

2010Q2

2010Q3

Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market

111

Source: Authors calculations on ISTAT data (Labour force survey)

Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti On the other hand, official unemployment increased by 416,000 and inactivity by 645,000 (even though the number of discouraged workers narrowly defined fell by 170,000). Overall, the Italian labour market now has to address an increase in joblessness broadly conceived, including the underutilization of labour, of about 1,500,000 more than three times the rise in official unemployment. For new entrants, this clearly reduces the chances of gaining access to employment (Table 1). The economy has been showing signs of recovery for some time, but there is no hint of improvement in the labour market. Why is this? In general in Italy the employment cycle lags behind the economic cycle by two or three quarters. This time lag depends on the processes by which economic activity is translated into employment, in a series of measures ranging from adjustments in working hours and overtime to hiring and firing. In a downturn as severe as the present one, it is simply unthinkable that this process can take place relatively quickly. The recovery in employment will inevitably be slow because the return to growth requires the full utilization of labour, through the progressive reduction of labour hoarding. Businesses will not start hiring again until they have made full use of their hoarded labour, so unemployment and inactivity will continue to increase, as those already out of work are joined by new labour market entrants. For this reason, in the next few years the unemployment rate is likely to rise, even if this tendency may be offset by inactivity, associated with reduced employment opportunities, that could exert a downward pressure on official unemployment. Finally, while firms are reorganizing and, hopefully, reabsorbing underutilized labour, for years to come the younger generations coming of age will have trouble finding jobs, and youth unemployment will increase. On the hypothesis that the increase in labour utilization will begin in 2011, and the number of employed persons grows by about 100,000 a year, it can be calculated by means of a standard stock-flow model (Di Laurea, et al., 2007) that the level of employment of 2008 may be reached in not less than four years, and the full absorption of the underutilization long-wave will take at least one year more.7 7. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY SUGGESTIONS

A first look at employment and unemployment shows that, in the Italian case, the effect of the crisis has been fairly modest, certainly less than the drop in output would suggest. But a more considered judgment requires us to take account of the fact that the recession gave rise to a considerable increase in labour hoarding, in some cases subsidised by the wage guarantee fund (Cassa integrazione guadagni). In the third quarter of 2010, with respect to the first quarter of 2008, the increase
7. In the South, however, consistent with the national growth hypothesis, the number of people in work is not expected to grow by more than 35,000 units a year, meaning that a return to the 2008 level of employment may require not less than seven years, and full reabsorption may take up to nine years or more.

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Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market Table 1. Obstacles for new entrants to the Italian labour market
Third layer Inactive: 645,000 New entrants: 500,000 each year Total: 645,000 + 500,000 each year 416,000 Second layer Unemployed: 416,000 First layer Subsidised labour hoarding: 290,000 Unsubsidised labour hoarding: 150,000 Total: 440,000 Employment

in labour hoarding amounted to about 290,000 full-time equivalents on short-time working (of whom 130,000 on zero hours), and 150,000 more full-time equivalents without public support. Equally significant is the effect of the crisis on inactivity. In the same period the number of inactive individuals rose by 645,000, even though the number of discouraged workers narrowly defined fell by 170,000. Our quantitative exercises show that the problems of the Italian labour market, though apparently less critical than those of other European countries, will necessarily persist for a number of years to come, until the economy can reabsorb both the implicit unemployment corresponding to labour hoarding and the additional joblessness created by the 2008-2009 recession. In order to return to the situation of the first quarter 2008, the Italian labour market should reabsorb, in addition to 607,000 employed, 440,000 full-time equivalents currently being hoarded, 416,000 unemployed persons and 645,000 inactive. It is undoubtedly a far more challenging task than the official unemployment rate would suggest. Even if the job haemorrhage is staunched in 2011, even in a scenario of steady growth it would still take at least four more years for this to be accomplished, and in any case not without long lasting negative impacts on young people and labour markets in the South. As a result, the unemployment rate is destined to remain high for years, and possibly to rise further if employment opportunities once again raise the hopes of finding a job on the part of the inactive. It is all the more urgent that Italy moves resolutely and without further delay to a drastic overhaul that can put the economy in a position to handle the challenges of new technologies and global competition. The recession must be used to identify a new industrial development policy aimed at making Italian firms stronger, more flexible and more technologically advanced a policy that can remedy the structural misalignment of prices and wages between Italy and the rest of Europe, which for so long has held back Italian growth.8 For a return
8. On this point see, among others, Tronti (2010).

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Riccardo Gatto and Leonello Tronti to growth there is no other proper adjustment variable than the elimination of the rents of protected firms and industries. The economy needs to enter a new growth path in which higher wages drive domestic demand, and export volumes depend on quality products at competitive prices. To avoid the risk of continuing recourse to flexible labour and wages as the adjustment factors, harking back to a no longer practicable exclusively export-led model, the right course is to build on domestic demand and wages. Unless Italy radically rethinks its development strategy along these lines, it will not be able to reduce unemployment, nor escape the trap of tight public finance and high taxation. In addition to an effective industrial and development policy, however, economic reorganization requires a coherent system of unemployment benefits, income support, workers rights and retraining for marketable skills. The two levers are complementary, as without these programmes the protected industries can never be opened up to competition, innovation and competitiveness. This strategy implies moving the Italian labour protection system in the direction of flexinsurance, providing flexible workers with at least the same social benefit protection as workers on standard contracts, if not more substantial ones (as the European Employment Strategy originally envisaged). If a few more words can be spent on this subject in concluding a paper devoted to measuring the amplitude of the long wave of joblessness, the reform of unemployment benefit programmes requires clarity in terms of the objectives, roles and financial provisions that distinguish public action from that of the social partners. At present, Government action is both too limited excessively selective and arbitrary, undermining the constitutionally guaranteed universality of rights and at the same time too extensive committed to funding programmes that should be mainly if not exclusively the province of bilateral collective agreements between the social partners. The key principles governing the public interest, as far as working people are concerned, are income support for those losing their jobs, regardless of the industry or firm size (as well as income for first-time job seekers, especially relevant in the current and future situation) and programmes for enhancing human capital. The public interest in firms, on the other hand, is to promote competitiveness and flexibility in production and employment, in order to permit continuous adaptation to global competition. From these simple principles it follows that Governments needs to fund unemployment benefits and a minimum income, as well as providing employment services and broad policies for employability aimed both at the employed and at unemployed workers. The social partners have competing aims and objectives. Firms have an interest in retaining skilled workers through the ups and downs of the business cycle and avoiding the opposition of unions to downsizing, job mobility and innovation. Workers have different interests, in particular keeping jobs and incomes during economic downturns. For this reason instruments such as labour hoarding, mobility programmes and outplacement should be the product of managementlabour bargaining and should be funded by joint insurance schemes. Government 114

Facing the Long Wave: the Recession and the Italian Labour Market intervention in this sphere should be limited and always secondary, in support of the primary role of collective agreements. It should also be limited over time, never losing sight of the general objective of competitiveness and the flexibility needed for the economy to respond quickly to the ever changing conditions of competitive markets. The reform of Italys labour market policies thus requires a corresponding enhancement of training policies for employable skills, to be run in conjunction with income support programmes, making explicit the terms of the trade-off. This means government intervention in return for a commitment on the part of workers and employers to contribute, through effort and investment, to the countrys progress. Improved services to boost employment and employability, along the lines of the European flexicurity model, are a necessary but not sufficient condition for reorganizing the economy, committing businesses in all industries to re-engineer the workplace to make for a leaner, more innovative and flexible learning economy. A more rational and efficient system of unemployment benefits needs to be accompanied by a bold new industrial development policy designed to foster economic growth. These are merely two sides of the same coin, and will prove successful only if implemented together. BIBLIOGRAPHY Brandolini A., P. Cipollone and E. Viviano, 2006. Does the ILO Definition Capture All Unemployment?, Journal of the European Economic Association, Vol. 4, No. 1. Carabelli U. and Tronti L. (eds), 1999. Managing Labour Redundancies in Europe, Labour Special Issue, No. 1. Di Laurea D., Gatto R., Gentile M., Righi A., Spizzichino A. and Tronti L., 2006. La previsione della disoccupazione nelle regioni italiane attraverso il modello stock e flussi. Costruzione del database e primi risultati, Rivista di statistica ufficiale, No. 1. Tella A.J, 1964. The relation of labor force to employment, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, April, Vol. 17, No. 3. Taylor J., 1970. Hidden unemployment, hoarded labor, and the Phillips curve, Southern Economic Journal, Vol. XXXVII, No. 1. Tronti L., 2010. The Italian Productivity Slowdown: The Role of the Bargaining Model, International Journal of Manpower, Vol. 31, No. 7.

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