The Uses of History in Sociology: Reflections on Some Recent Tendencies Author(s): John H.

Goldthorpe Reviewed work(s): Source: The British Journal of Sociology, Vol. 42, No. 2 (Jun., 1991), pp. 211-230 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The London School of Economics and Political Science Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/590368 . Accessed: 24/04/2012 02:17
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John H. Goldthorpe

The uses of historyin sociology: reflectionson some recenttendencies*

ABS I RAC I

This paperquestionsthe now widelyheld view that no meaningful distinctionsare to be drawnbetweenthe disciplinesof historyand sociology.It is argued thatone - highlyconsequential difference concerns the nature of the evidence on which historians and sociologiststypicallyrely or, more precisely,the way in which this evidence comes into being. This argument is developed and illustrated with reference to various examples of sociologists resorting to historical research and the difficulties they have encountered; and further in the context of a critique of 'grand haveso far failedto provide whosepractitioners sociology' historical basis. theirworkwithany adequatemethodological

To take up again the questionof the uses of historyin sociologymay well appear regressive. For to do so implies, of course, making a historyand sociologywhich would now be widely distinctionbetween regarded as untenable. Thus, for example, Philip Abrams, in his has Sociology, advanced the arguhighly influentialbook, Historical are and alwayshave been the ment that since 'historyand sociology of of samething',anydiscussion the relationship one to the other must and Abramsin turn quotes Giddensto the effect that be misguided; 'There simply are no logical or even methodologicaldistinctions ' conceived'. betweenthe socialsciencesand history- appropriately Abrams is indeed aware, the position he adopts is in sharp As contrast with that which would have been most common among sociologists two decades or so previously. At this earlier time, sociologists were for the most part anxious to differentiate their concernsfrom those of historians.For example,much use was made disciplines. and of the distinctionbetween 'idiographic' 'nomothetic' throughthe historianssought to particularise Historywasidiographic:
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descriptionof singular, unique phenomena. Sociology was nomothetic:sociologistssought to generalzse through formulatingtheories thatappliedto categoriesof phenomena.2 However,all thiswasin the period before the British sociologicalcommunity (anticipatingSir KeithJoseph) itsnerveoverthe ideaof 'social lost science' before,that is, the so-called'reaction againstpositivism' the late 1960sand 1970s of createda new mood in which politicalradicalism went togetherwith intellectual conservatism. My firstcontributionto the debateon 'historyand sociology'dates back to this prelapsariantime, and was in fact a crztzque the of idiographic-nomothetic distinction.3 remarkswere not especially My well received by either historiansor sociologists,and this present contribution may,I fear,provesimilarly uncongenial. whatI would For now think importantis that attempts,such as that of Abramsand Giddens, to present history and sociology as being one and indistinguishable shouldbe stronglyresisted.4 To avoid,if possible,beingmisunderstood, me stressthatI do not let seek here to re-establish idiographic-nomothetic the distinction, at or least not as one of principle. I do not believe, for example, that sociologistscan ever hope to producetheoriesthat are of an entirely transhistorical kind; nor that historianscan ever hope to produce descriptions thatare free of generalideasaboutsocialaction,process and structure.However,good groundsdo stillremainfor refusingto accept the position that any distinctiondrawn between historyand sociologymustbe meaningless. To begin with, I would argue that the idiographic-nomothetic distinctionis still pertinent if taken as one not of principlebut of emphasts. Historians - quiterightly regardit asimportant dates do that and places should be attached to the arguments they advance as preciselyas possible;as E. P. Thompson has aptly remarked,'the discipline history abovealla discipline context'3 Sociologists no of is of . less rightly- believethatthey are achievingsomethingif the time and spaceco-ordinates over whichtheirargumentsapplycan be widened. And fromthisone use of historyin sociologyis immediately suggested. Historymay serve as, so to speak,a 'residualcategory'for sociology, markingthe point at whichsociologists, invoking'history', in thereby curb their impulse to generalise or, in other words, to explain sociologically, accepttheroleof thespecific of thecontingentas and and framing- thatis, as providingboth the settingandthe limits- of their own analyses.fi However,it is not on such issuesthatI wishhere to concentrate. My aim is ratherto focus attentionon anothermajordifferencebetween historyand sociologywhich has, I believe,been much neglectedbut whichcarriesfar-reaching implications sociological for practice.This differenceconcernsthe natureof the evidencethatthe twodisciplines useor, moreprecisely, wayin whichthisevidencecomesintobeing.7 the

Theusesof htstoty sociology in As a traineehistorianat UniversityCollegeLondon in the 1950s,1 underwent a standardcatechismon method, which began with the question:whatis a historical fact?The answerthathad to be givenwas: a historical is an inferencefrom the relics.This answerstruckme fact then - and stillstrikesme - as the best thatcan be given, and as one of considerable significance. Whatthe answerunderlinesis the obvious, but stillhighlyconsequential, point thatwe can only knowthe paston the basisof whathas physically survivedfrom the past:that is, on the basisof the relics- or of what may be alternatively describedas the residues,depositsor traces- of the past.8 These relicsare of verydifferent kinds They may,for example,be simply natural remains, such as bones or excrement; or again, artefacts, suchas tools,weapons,buildingsor worksof art.But of most general importanceare what one might call 'objectifiedcommunications': thatis, communications some writtenform and, especially, in 'documents' all kinds.Whatevertheir nature,it is these relics,and of only these relics,thatare the sourceof our knowledgeaboutthe past Statements aboutthe past- historical 'facts' are inferencesfrom the relics,and can have no other basis.In short:no relics,no history. So far as the practiceof historyis concerned,there are two points about relics that it seems importantto recognise:first, they areJinite andssecond, they are incomplete. relicsthat exist arejust a limited The selectionof all that could have survived- a sample,so to speak,of a totaluniverseof relics,where, however,neitherthe propertiesof the universenor of the sampleare,or canbe, known.9 relicsof a given The period may diminish,by being physically destroyed,but they cannot
increase.

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It is trueof coursethatnot all the relicsthatexist at anyone timeare known about. Historianshave alwaysthe possibilityof discovering 'new' relics of adding to the known stock: and it is indeed an importantof their metier do so. It is also true that from any set of to relics,the inferencesthatcan be madeare infinite.The 'facts'thatthe relicsyield will tend to increasewith the questionsthat historiansput to them and, in turn,withthe rangeof the problemstheyaddressand with the developmentof their techniquesof inquiry.However,none of thisaltersthe situationthatthe relicsthemselves,in a physical sense - whatis there be discoveredand interrogated are finiteand are, to to repeat, a selection,and probablyonly a quite smalland unrepresentativeselection,of all that could have survived.It must therefore be the case that limitationson the possibilitiesof historicalknowledge exist simply because it is knowledge of the past- because it is knowledgedependent on relics.There are thingsaboutthe past that never can be known simplybecausethe relics that would have been essentialto knowingthem did not in factsurvive. Historians, we may then say, are concerned with Jindingtheir evidence from among a stock of relics. In contrast-and this is the

Goldthorpe H. John haveopen to thema possibility I wantto stress- sociologists sociologistscan, and often difference historians.While they largely thatis denied to injust the samewayas historians, are on what they draw relicsas evidence, do, evidence. This is of course basis in addition generate can, They are producing,as a when they engage in 'fieldwork'. before."' it is, I would And doing dzd materialst)zat not exist evidencein the form of inferences, for evidence,ratherthan ratherthanevidence such argue, generated thatis 'invented' - in otherwords,evidence the mainempiricalfoundationsof relics is discovered- thatconstitutes that sociology. modern in the way in which reason for this difference immediate The into being is obvious: sociological evidence comes can alsowork 'in the and historical while sociologists of work historians 'in the past', immediate reasonliesthe difference behindthis tie their However, to present'. do to: sociologists not seek to testthe that emphasis I earlierreferred so muchas coordinates to specifictimeand space a sociologistdevelops a theory arguments rhus, if of extent their generality. industrial societies,it willbe only sensible to apply,say,to all intended of this theory throughresearch the to begin examination all at events than in past industrialsocieties; in contemporaryrather of evidence conducted whichpermitsthe generation throughresearch hence and upon relics. than rather imposinga reliance would wish to maintain, a major here, as I If, then, there is as forms of disciplined The between history and sociologyhistoryin sociology? difference uses of have whatfollowsfrom it for the inquiry, enough. Becausesociologists is, implication I believe,clear evidence- over and abovethat main own not of that possibility producingtheirposition advantage should be the of are they in a should relicsexploiting of away.In other words, sociologistsrather, thrown or lightly do so, disregarded turnto history:theyshould readilyand unthinkinglyin full awarenessof the limitationsthat not with good reasonsand only misunderstood. will they therebyface. in somedangerof being HereagainI am, I suspect, that I do not in any wayseek to suggest add me Let thereforeat once disciplineto history:rather, in somesensea 'superior' historyis - since,as will sociologyis that outjust how difficult Iam concernedto bringthat some sociologistshave clearlyfailed to lateremerge, I believeI supposethatgeneratedevidence,in contrast this. appreciate Nor do I am well awarethat it as the form of relics,is unproblematic. completeness well to that in viewedas regardsits be respects always critically too must that in these latter and validity,and indeed processesof generation. as its reliability the preciselyfrom specialproblemsresult to emphasiseare the very real advantages wish availableevidenceis However,what I do the natureand extent of thatare gained where mere accidents of physical survival;where, so not restricted by the of evidencecanbe 'designed' as to meetthe moreover,the collection
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specificrequirements the inquiryin hand; and where questionsof 215 of the quality of evidence can alwaysbe addressed, as they arise, by generatingyet furtherevidence throughwhich to check and test the original. "
II

To develop these arguments,I now turn to particular cases.To begin with,it maybe helpfulif I give an exampleof whatI wouldregardas a mistaken one mightsay,perverse- recourseto historyon the partof a sociologist.I takehere KaiErikson's book,Wayward Puritarzs, whichis a study of social deviance within the seventeenth-century Puritan communityof Massachussets Bay. In his Preface,Eriksonstateshis aimsclearly.He beginswithcertain hypotheses about social deviance drawn from a Durkheimianposition, and he aimsto examinetwo hypothesesin particular: first,that some amountof devianceis functionalfor a community helpingit to in define its moral and social boundaries,and thus in preserving its stability;and second, that, because of this functionality,deviance within any communitywill tend to be at a fairly constantlevel over time.Eriksonthen proposesto takeMassachussets as a case-study. Bay 'The purposeof the followingstudy',he writes is to use the Puritancommunityas a setting in which to examine several ideas about deviant behaviour. In this sense the subject matterof the book is primarilysociological,even though the data found in mostof its pagesare historical. . . And, he goes on The data presentedhere have notbeen gatheredin order to throw new light on the Puritancommunityin New Englandbut to add something to our understandingof deviantbehaviourin general, and thus the Puritanexperience in America has been treated in these pagesas an exampleof humanlife everywhere.'2 Judged in the light of this statement,Wayward Puritans I would is, argue, a failure - and indeed a necessaryfailure - because of its reliance on historicalmaterials.The hypothesesthat Eriksonstarts from are not seriouslyexamined, and could not be, simply because Eriksondoes not havethe evidenceneeded for thisamongthe relicsat his disposal. Thus, as regards the first hypothesis, on the functionality of deviance, Erikson draws largely on court records, indicating the responseof the authoritiesto antinomianism, Quakerism alleged and witchcraft.But he has little evidenceof how thecommunity large,as at distinct from the authorities,reacted to such deviance or, for that

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In other words,he has no to matter,its treatmentby the authorities. in consequenceof the basis adequate on whichto determinewhether, a strongerdefinitionof the he deviancerefersto, therewas,or wasnot, So far as popularperof and moral socialboundaries the community. is withoutmeansof access. are and ceptions evaluations concerned,he on the constantlevelof in Likewise, treatingthe secondhypothesis, which,for wellEriksonhasto relyon officialcrimestatistics,the actuallevel deviance, of reasons,giveonlya veryuncertainindication by a varietyof known trend social deviance,and are influencedin their devianceworkingin of of factors.However,unlikethe sociologist other detail the society, Eriksoncannot investigatein any contemporary were constituted,nor through which the official statistics processes provide alternativeestihe can collect data of his own which could survey'. matesas, say,throughsome form of 'victim are not ones that To be sure, the hypothesesthatEriksonaddresses given that they But, be would easilytested under any circumstances. level of generality, from a theory that pretendsto a very high derive should impose upon is there all the more reason to ask why Erikson from choosing a historical the himself limitationsthat must followpossibilityof being able to Why should he deny himself the case. and underconditionsin his generate own evidence,to hisown design, bestbe grappledwith? could and problemsof reliability validity which is concernedwitha theorythat who sociologist,I wouldmaintain, Any for it is, in in the presentshouldso testit, in the firstplace; ': can be tested mostrigorously. in probability, thiswaythatit can be tested wherethe recourseof all cases I wouldnow liketo moveon to consider appearto have the good reasonswhich,I to sociologists historywould my aim is to illusmaintained,shouldalwaysbe present.Here are actedupon earlier they whatsuch reasonsmightbe, but also- when trate - the difficultiesthatmaybe expected. need to turnto hisone Sociologists, mightthink,willmostobviously However,it should be torywhere their interestslie in socialchange. is, to the relicsthereof that keptin mindthata recourseto the past- or, interestsmaybe pursued: whichsuch - is not the only meansthrough waysof studycohortor panelstudies,for example,are all life-course, been, collected thatis, or has ing socialchangeon the basisof evidence are compelledinto historiI wouldargue, in the present.Sociologists, with socialchange that is in cal researchonly where their concernis not oversomeanalytically defined:thatis, withchange facthistorically life-cycle'or 'two generspecifiedlength of time - such as, say, 'the timethathasdates(even ations' butwithchangeovera periodof past a particular place. Soto if not very preciseones) and that is related concernwithsuch historiciologistshave a legitimate,and necessary, earliersuggested,they have callydefined socialchange because as I space their theoriesand hyand wish to know how widelyover time pothesesmightapply.14

Theusesof histotyin sociology

One illustration whatI have in mind here is providedby Michael of Anderson's book, Family Structurein Nineteenth CenturyLancashire. Anderson is concerned with the hypothesis that in the process of industrialisation, pre-existingforms of 'extended'familyand kinship relationsare disrupted.Specifically, is interestedin whetheror not he this hypothesis holds good in the British case - that of the 'first industrial nation'. Thus, to pursue this issue, Anderson aims to examinejust whatwashappeningto kinshiprelationsin Britainat the time when, and in the placewhere, the 'take-ofFinto industrialism is classicallylocated. In contrast,then, with Erikson,Anderson has a quiteclearrationalefor turningto historical research. A second illustration is provided by Gordon Marshall'sbook, Presbyteries Profits.Marshall concernedwith the 'Weberthesis'and is that a connection exists between the secular ethic of ascetic Protestantismand 'thespiritof capitalism'. the long-standing In debateon this thesis, the case of Scotlandhas severaltimes been suggestedas a criticalone, in that, in the earlymodern period, Scotlandhad a great deal of asceticProtestantism that is, Calvinism yet showedlittlein the wayof capitalist development.Marshall's is then to re-examine aim the Scottishcase for the periodfrom around 1560 down to the Act of Union of 1707. Marshall points out that Weber himself always emphasisedthathis argumenton the roleof the Protestant ethicin the emergenceof moderncapitalism intendedto applyonlyto theearly was stages of this process:once a predominantly capitalisteconomy was established, own exigencies- in the workplace market- would its and themselvescompel behaviourgenerallyconsistentwith the 'spiritof capitalism' withoutneed of help from religion.Again,then, Marshall, likeAnderson,hasobviouslygood groundsfor his recourseto history. Now before proceedingfurther, I should makeit clear that I have the highest regard for the two studies to which I havejust referred. Both makesignalcontributions the questionstheyaddress;and, for to me, they standas leadingexamplesof how in fact historical sociology should be conceivedand conducted.I say this becauseI wantnow to go on to emphasisethe severelimitations whichthe analyses both to of authorsaresubject: becauseof theirdeficiencies sociologists, not as but simplybecauseof the fact that they were forced into using historical evidence- forced into a relianceon relics- ratherthan being able to generatetheirown evidencewithina contemporary society. The relics on which Anderson chiefly relies are the original enumerators' booksfor the censusesof 1841, 1851 and 1861. On this basis,he can reconstruct householdcompositionaccordingto age, sex and kinship relations,and he can also to some extent examine the residential propinquity kin.But thisstillleaveshima long wayshort of of adequateevidenceon the partactually playedby kinshipin the lives of the people he is studyingand on the meaningsof kinshipfor them. He attemptsto fill out the essentiallydemographicdata that he has

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H. Goldthorpe John acby materialfrom contemporary the from enumerators'bookshaveat bestto be categorised 'casual as But counts.thesewould,I fear, gossipor travellers' tales.Titles such and at empiricism' worstas local on its Borders,A V^sit Lancashirein to and Walks as in SouthLancashire Sketches the flavour. give 1862, December and Lancashire about the problemhe faces. 'It is Anderson in fact entirely frank 'thatjust because interaction of course be stressed',he writes, indication that kinship was must kin with occurred it is no necessaryimpossiblein any preciseway is quite The important. real test, whichexamine the extent to which kinship work, would be to historical in relationalcontacts(and the reasons given was preferenceover other to whichcontactswithkinfulfilled this for preference),and the extent if kin did not provide which were not adequately met functions '9 them'. perhapsbestbe broughtout if Thepoint I wantto makehere would kinshipwithone carriedout studyof were one to compareAnderson's say, for example, Claud Fischer's us contemporarysociety - let in relationsin present-daySan of study kinshipand of other 'primary' conclusioncouldbe that 'fi The only To whichit Francisco,DwellAmongFriends. the rangeandqualityof dataon it can latter the is greatlysuperiorin and refinementof the analyses and draws, in turn in the rigour not thatFischer a bettersociologist is And offer. thispointis, of course, enormousadvantageover AnderAndersonbut that he has an on than owndataratherthanhavingto rely in son beingableto generatehis be extant. relics the whatever mighthappento that he has problemsessentially one Turningto Marshall, finds of Marshall's main concernsis that as same those of Anderson.One understood - following the position should be correctlySamuelsonand other critics; Weber's of vulgarisations Robertson,Tawney, mainpoints.First,Weberwas makestwo in this respectMarshall and economic with officialCalvinistdoctrineon for the so not much concerned believingCalvinist of beinga as activity with the consequences life - consequences which the of everyday conduct thesis individual's words,Weber's mightnot even fullyrealise.In other individual but subsultureand psychology. wasultimatelynot about theology that the Protestantethic was a was Secondly,Weber's argument cause of the emergence of modern not a sufficient but necessary, factorsalso- suchas access 'material' therewerenecessary capitalism; of the availability capitaland to physicalresourcesand to markets, creditetc. the Weber thesis, it is not Thus, Marshallargues, in evaluating betweentheology,on overtassociation enoughto looksimplyfor some of capitalistenterpriseon the the one hand, and the development It is evidence that believing subtle. other. What is requiredis more world-view, their acceptanceof a Calvinist on Calvinists, accountof disciplinedway, to oriented to work in a regular, were distinctively
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pursue economic gain rationally,and to accumulaterather than to 219 consume extravagantly- so that, if other conditionswere also met, capitalist enterprisewouldthen flourish. Marshall's positionhere is, I believe,entirelysound.But it leadshim to problems of evidence that he can in fact never satisfactorily overcome- despite his diligencein searchingout new sourcesand his ingenuityis using knownones. And the basicdifficultyis that relics from which inferences can systematicallybe made about the orientationsto workand to moneyof earlymodernScotsare very few and far between. In other words,whatis cruciallylacking-just as it was lackingfor Andersonand indeed for Erikson-is materialfromwhichinferences mightbe made, with some assuranceof representativeness, aboutthe patterns soczal of action areof interestwithinparticular that collectivities. As Clubb has observed, the data from which historianswork only rarelyallowaccessto the subjective orientations actorsenmasse, of and inferencesmade in this respectfrom actualbehaviourtend alwaysto be question-begging. And Marshall, shouldbe said,likeAnderson, 17 it sees the difficultyclearlyenough. He acknowledges it maywellbe that that 'the kindof datarequiredin order to establishthe ethos in which seventeenth-century Scottishbusiness enterpriseswere run simply does not exist'- or, at least, not in sufficientquantityto allowone to test empiricallywhether Calvinismdid indeed have the effect on mundaneconductthatWeberascribedto it.lS
III

Let me at this point recapitulate.I have argued that history and sociology differ perhaps most consequentially the nature of the in evidence on which they rely, and that this difference has major implications the use of historyin sociology.I havepresenteda case for of what, from this standpoint,mustbe seen as a perverserecourseto history on the part of a sociologist;and I have now discussed two furthercaseswhere,in contrast,sucha recoursewasjustifiable, indeed necessary, giventhe issuesaddressed,butwhere,none the less,serious difficultiesarisebecauseof the inadequacyof the relicsas a basisfor treatingthese issues. To end with,however,I wouldlike to moveon from theseinstances of sociologistsresorting to history in the pursuit of quite specific problemsto consider-with my initialargumentstillin mind- a whole genreof sociology which is in fact dependent uponhistory its very in conception. I refer here to a kindof historical sociologyclearlydifferent to that representedby the workof Andersonor Marshall, which and has two main distinguishing features. First, it resorts to history because it addressesvery large themes, which typicallyinvolve the

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processesor patternsor the out tracing of long-term'developmental' wide range of historicalsocietiesor of making comparisonsacrossa And secondly,it is basedlargelyor entirelynot on civilisations. even from relics but rather on 'history'in the sense of what inferences but on have historians written- or, in other words, not on primary sources. or secondary, yet morederivative, of The idea that sociologistsmight proceed by taking the results main empiricalresource in developing research as their historical and generalisations theoriesis not of coursea new one. wide-ranging commonplace.Its plainest exwas in fact a nineteenth-century It wrote was pression perhaps providedby HerbertSpencerwhen he a vast for that, him, sociology stood to works of history 'much as standsrelated to the heaps of stones and bricksaround it', building is can furtherthat'thehighestofficewhichthe historian dischargea and for of that so narratingthe lives of nations,as to furnishmaterials Sociology.'ls Comparative of the Fromthe end of the nineteenthcentury,this understanding criticism between historyand sociologymet with severe relationship rather rapidlylost support. Historianshad indeed never taken and to kindly the idea that they should serve as some kind of intellectual in and under-labourers; sociologistsbecame increasinglyinterested in more However, theirown methodsof datacollection.2" developing a notablerevivalof whatmightbe called'grandhistorical times, recent of has sociology' occurred.This was led by the appearancein 1966 and Democracy, and of Organs Dictatorship The Moore's Social Barrington in the USA by the subsequentworkof Immanuel thenconsolidated Perry and Wallerstein Theda Skospol,and in this countryby that of Mann and Michael Anderson,with other authorssuch as John Hall the followingin the wake.2lWhatI would now wish to argue is that all the difficulties practiceof these authors does in fact raise again in inherent in Spencer'sprogramme,and that the use of history in a far more sociologyas exemplifiedin their work is problematic way fundamental than in anyof the studiesearlierconsidered. their The authorsin questionwouldcertainlynot wishto represent rather position in terms similar to those of Spencer. They would are one and indivisible; inclineto the idea that historyand sociology wish de and,insteadof viewinghistorians hautenbas,theywouldsurely the None as equal partners.22 to include them in thejoint enterprise less, the fact remainsthat grand historicalsociologyin its twentiethcentury form, just as in its nineteenth, takes secondary historical the sources as its evidential basis, and must therefore encounter exthat are entailed - even though its methodologicaldifficulties even ponents have thus far shown little readiness to address, or them. acknowledge, of The root of their predicamentis richly ironical. The revival expression of the grand historical sociology can be seen as one

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'reaction against positivism'within the sociologicalcommunity to which I referred at the start; and yet its practitioners' own mod2ls operandi- the use they seek to make of secondarysources - must depend upon what is an essentiallypositivistic conceptionof histortography- to which they would, I suspect, be reluctantto give any explicitsupport. The catechismthat I was put through as an undergraduatehad a clearobjective.It wasto prompta rejectionof the view thatthe pastor at leastcertainwell-documented aspectsof the past, such as 'high' politics- could in principlebe reconstructed, by fact, so that the fact distinctionbetweenhistoryin the sense of whatactuallyhappenedin the pastand historyin the senseof whatis writtenaboutthe pastmight be elided. Againstthis 'positivist' conceptionof historiography as it wasindeed labelled23 it wasurged upon us that historical factscould not be cognitivelyestablishedas a collectionof well-defineditems or entities, each independent of the rest, which, when taken together, wouldthen dictatea specificand definitiveversionof the past.Rather, historical factsshouldbe recognisedas no more than'inferencesfrom the relics';and inferences which had alwaysto be weighted, so to speak,accordingto the securityof their grounding,whichwereoften interdependent- that is, stood or fell together- and which were of course at all timesopen to restatement,whetherradically through or the mostsubtlechangesof nuance. Now, to repeat, I very much doubt if grand historicalsociologists would wish to take up the defence of positivisthistoriographyas againstthislatterview.But it is difficultto see how,inpractice, can they avoid assumingan essentially positivist position. For even if the proceduresthey follow in producingtheir sociologydo not actually requirethe elisionof the two sensesof history,they stillcannotafford to recognisea too indeterminate relationbetweenthem. Grand historical sociologists have to treat the facts, or indeed concatenations factsor entire'accounts', theyfind in secondary of that sourcesas if thew relativelydiscreteand stableentitiesthat can be were 'excerpted'and then brought together in order that some larger design may be realised. In anti-positivistvein, Carl Becker has expressly warned that historicalfacts should not be thought of as possessing'solidity','definiteshape'or 'clearpersistentoutline',and that it is thereforeespeciallyinaptto liken them to buildingmaterials of any kind.24 the very proceduresof grand historical But sociologists push them back,willy-nilly, Spencer'sidea of using the stones and to bricks of history to construct the great sociologicaledifice - and constructionalmetaphorsdo indeed reappear. Thus, for example, one finds Skospol remarking that 'primaryresearch'- which the comparativist neitherthe time nor (allof) the appropriate 'has skillsto do' - 'necessarily constitutes,in large amounts,the foundationupon whichcomparative studiesare built'.25

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However,I would then wish to respondthat the constructions that result are likely to be dangerouslyunsound. In particular,I would argue that in grand historical sociologythe links,thatare claimed,or supposed, between evidence and argumenttend to be both tenuo2ls and arbitrary a quiteunacceptable to degree. As regards the first charge, it is, I would suggest, instructiveto considersome fairlyspecificargumentadvancedby a grandhistorical sociologist,and to note the 'authorities' are invokedas providing that its factualbasis;then, to work back from these citations- through perhaps other intermediatesources that are involved - until one comesto directreferencesto relicsof some kind.What,I believe,one will typicallyfind is that the trailis longer and harderto follow than one might have expected, and that, not infrequently,it reaches no verysatisfactory end. For example, in SocialOrigzns Dictatorship Democracy, of and Moore spends several pages reviewingaspectsof Englisheconomic history over the late medievaland earlymodernperiods,and then concludes as follows: In the lightof thisgeneralbackground therewouldseem to be little reason to question the thesis that commercially minded elements among the landed upper classes,and to a lesserextent among the yeomen,were among the mainforcesopposingthe Kingand royal attempts to preserve the old order, and therefore an important cause,though not the only one, thatproducedthe CivilWar.26 However,if one actuallyexaminesthe sourcesthat Moorecites,both before and after this passage,the groundingof his argumentis very far fromapparent.Indeed, it is quiteunclearjustwhatis the evidence, at the levelof relics,in the lightof whichtherewouldbe 'littlereasonto question'the thesisthat Mooreadvances.In the 'authorities' referred to-the main ones are Tawney'sAgrarian Problems the Sixteenth of Century, essay on 'The Rise of the Gentry'and Campbell'sThe his English Yeoman there is in fact remarkably little'evidence' bearingin anydirectwayon the cruciallinkthatMooreseeksto establish between economicpositionand political action.2' And suchas thereis cannotbe regardedas evidencein the sense that relicsthemselvesare evidence or, for that matter,the data of a socialsurveyare evidence. Rather, whatone hasare seriesof inferences,often complexand indeedoften quite speculative,which are drawn from relics that are manifestly incomplete,almost certainlyunrepresentative, and in variousother waysproblematic as the authorsin questionare very well aware.In other words,such'facts' are here available as cannotbe understoodas separate, well-defined'modules',easily carried off for sociological construction purposes,butwouldbe betterregardedsimplyas strands in heavilytangled,yet stilloften ratherweakskeinsof interpretation. In effect, then, what grand historicalsociologistsseem to me to be

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generally doing is not developing an argument on the basis of evidence - in the manner of 'primary' historians or again of sociologists working on their 'own' research data - but rather, engagingin interpretation is of, at least,a second-order that kind:that is, in interpretationof interpretationsof, perhaps, interpretations. And in consequence,I would maintain,the connectionbetween the claimstheymakeaboutthe pastand relicsthatcouldconceivably serve as warrantfor theseclaimsis often - as in the passagefromMoorethat I havequoted-quite impossibly loose. Following practices are the that here illustrated,historymust indeed become, in Froude'swords, 'a child'sbox of letterswithwhichwe can spell an wordwe please'.28 As regards my second charge, that of arbitrariness, idea of the historiography a matterof inferencesfrom relicsthatare finiteand as incomplete is again directly relevant. It follows from this that historiansworkingon the same topic, and indeed on the same relics, may quite reasonablycome to quite different conclusions- as of coursetheymayfor other reasonstoo. But it furtherfollowsthatthere maybe littleor no possibility theirdifferencesever beingresolvedof becausethe relicsthatwould be necessaryto settlethe disputedissues simplydo not exist. Forgrand historical sociologists, then raisesa this majorproblem:where historiansdisagree,and may have perhapsto remainin disagreement, whichsecondary accountshouldbe accepted? By whatcriteriashould the grand historical sociologistopt for one of two,or more,conflictinginterpretations? Thus, to return to Mooreand his treatmentof the economicand social origins of the EnglishCivilWar, the questionone may ask is: why, on this notoriouslycontroversial matter,and one plagued by a lack of relevantevidence, does Moorechoose largelyto follow what has come to be thought of (not altogether fairly) as the 'Tawney' interpretationrather than any of its rivals?By the time Moore was writing, it should be said, the idea that the 'rising',commercially orientedgentrywerekeyactorsin the parliamentary oppositionto the King and his defeat in the Civil War was in fact fast losing ground among English historians, both to interpretationsthat gave the leading role to other socio-economicgroupings and, more importantly,to ones that questionedwhetherpoliticalallegiancein the Civil Warperiodhad anycloseassociation allwitheconomicpositionand at
interest.29

The answerto the questionI haveposed is, I believe,as obviousas it is unsatisfactory. Moore favoursthe interpretation that fits best with his overall thesis of the 'three routes to modernity';in other words, that which allowsthe EnglishCivilWarto be seen as an instanceof a successful'bourgeoisrevolution'. However,he stillfailsto presentany serious case for this choice. Supportive sources simply receive accolades,such as 'excellentanalysis' 'unsurpassed or account',while less congenialones are disparagedas 'conservative historiography'.3"

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JohnH. Goldthorpe

This clearly will not do. But if mere tendentiousnessis not the solution,whatis?In the end, of course,any rationalwayof evaluating a secondarysource must involve some judgment on the inferences made from the primarysources- thatis, fromthe relics.But once this is recognised, the methodologicalbind in which grand historical sociologists find themselvesbecomesonly more apparent.Their large designsmean,they tell us, thatthey cannotthemselvesbe expectedto workdirectlyfrom the relicsbut must rely on the studiesof specialist authorities. However, they are then either forced into positivistic assumptionsconcerningthe 'hardness'and 'solidity' and also the 'transportability' of the evidence that these workscan yield; or, if they accept that what these sources provide is no more than rival complexes of inference and interpretation,then they must explain how they propose to choose among them without knowledge the of primarysources.l Since I have been so criticalof the methodological basisof grand historical sociology, I should, before finishing, consider what its exponentshavethemselveshad to sayon the matter.In fact,as I have already implied, they have said remarkablylittle. Methodological issuestend to raised,if at all,in the earlypagesof theirbooks,butthen only to be dealt with in a quite perfunctory- and unconvincingmanner.' However, there is one statement by Skospol, from the concludingchapterof the collectionshe edited, Vision Method ancS in Historical Sociology, whichis of interestin severalrespects. Skospolwritesas follows Becausewide-ranging comparisons so often crucialfor analytic are historical sociologists, theyare morelikelyto use secondarysources of evidence than those who apply models to, or develop interpretations of, single cases.... From the point of view of historical sociology, . . . a dogmaticinsistenceon redoing primaryresearch for every investigation would be disastrous; would rule out most it comparative-historical research. If a topic is too big for purely primaryresearch- andif excellentstudiesby specialists already are available some profusion- secondarysourcesare appropriate in as the basic source of evidence for a given study. Using them is not different from survey analystsreworkingthe results of previous surveysratherthanaskingall questionsanew . . . I would note, firstof all, aboutthis passagehow clearlyit showsthe pressurethat bearson grand historicalsociologiststo move towards the positivistic, Spencerianprogramme-'excellent'historical studies by specialists be 'thebasicsourceof evidence'for the wide-ranging can sociologist. And alsorevealingis the referenceto 'redoingthe primary research' as if it were apparentthatthe sameresultas before would necessarily emerge. Secondly,I would point out that Skospol is quite mistakenin the

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analogyshe seeksto drawwithsurvey-based research.The 'secondary analysis' surveydatato whichshe refersis different from the grand of historicalsociologist'suse of secondarysources, preciselybecause it doesentail going back to the 'relics':that is, at least to the original data-tapes perhapsalsoto the originalquestionnaires interview and or schedules. And it is then these materialsthat serve the secondary analystas evidence - not the interpretations the originalanalyst, of whichmaybe, and indeed often are, disputed.Thus, a closerparallel would be betweenthe secondaryanalystof surveysand the historian who againworksthroughand reinterprets bodyof sourcematerials a discoveredand initiallyanalysedby a predecessor. Thirdly,I wouldremarkthatbywayof providinga rationalefor the methodologyof grand historicalsociology,Skospolhas little at all to offer. Apart from her - mistaken- tu quoque argumentdirected at surveyresearchers, she in factsaysis thatit wouldbe 'disastrous' all for grand historical sociologistsif they were to be forcedbackto primary sources- whichis scarcely wayof convincingsceptics. a What is actuallyof greatest interest is what Skospol goes on to acknowledge the paragraph in thatimmediately followsthe one from which I quoted: namely, that 'it remains true that comparative historicalsociologistshave not so far worked out clear, consensual rules and procedures for the valid use of secondary sources as evidence'and further that in this respect 'varyinghistoriographical interpretations'is one obvious problem to be addressed. 'Certain principles',Skospol believes, 'are likely to emerge as such rules are developed'.But, one must conclude, so far at least, grand historical sociologyis not significantlyrule-governed;its practitioners enjoy a delightfulfreedomto play'pick-and-mix' history's in sweetshop.34
IV

To sum up, then, I have argued that the view that history and sociology'areand alwayshave been the samething'is mistakenanddangerously- misleading. Sociology must, it is true, always be a historicaldiscipline;sociologistscan never 'escape'from history.It is thereforehighlydesirablethat they should be historically aware- by which I mean, aware of the historicalsettings and limits that their analyseswill necessarilypossess,even if they may never be precisely determined. But history and sociology can, and should, still be regarded as significantly different intellectualenterprises.A crucial sourceof the difference,I havesoughtto show,liesin the natureof the evidencethat the two disciplinesuse - in the fact that historianshave for the mostpartto relyon evidencethattheycandiscoverin the relics of the past,whilesociologists have the considerable privilegeof being ableto generateevidencein the present.

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H. John Goldthorpe

As regards,then, the use of historyin sociology,whatI havesought give or stressis that sociologistsshould not underestimate, readily is to having evidehce that the up, advantagesthat they can gain from made', whereas historians have usually to 'cut their coats 'tailor into to according their cloth'. Where sociologists are compelledhave their inquiries,then, I research,by the very logic of historical they suggested, mustbe readyfor a harderlife- for researchtypically line'.35 as conducted, one historianhas put it, 'belowthe data poverty new but also to accept must not only learn new techniques They thosethatcomefromrealisingthatissuesof in frustrations;particular, interestare, and will probablyremain,beyondtheir cognitive crucial Historicalsociologistssuch as Anderson and Marshallhave reach. well; and much of what they can in turn teach us stems from learnt to tojustwhatmannerof inferencesthe relicsavailable sensitivity their In contrast,grand historicalsociologists and cannot, sustain. them, major seemto me to have, so far at least, shied away from the traded poses, and to have challengesthat historiography intellectual openly on implicitly a conceptionof it that I doubt if they wouldwish and do meet the challengesbefore them, defend. Until, then, they to must a provide coherent methodologyfor their work, the question pastof remain howfarthisdoes possessa realbasisin the relicsof the of merelyan illusoryone in a scattering footnotes. or 1990) February (I)ateaccepted:
JohnH.Goldthorpe NuffieldCollege Oxford

NOIES

* This paper is basedon the text of the T. H. MarshallMemorialLecture, of givenat the University Southampton, 4, May 1989.Versionsof the paperwere at alsogiven at seminars the Universities and of Oxford,Exeterand Stockholm, I benefited greatly from comments by participantsFurtherthanksare due to Klas Amark, Robert Erikson, Stephen O'Brienand,especially, Mennell,Patrick and GordonMarshall LuciaZedner.

Oxford,Oxford UniversityPress, 1946, exampleof its pp. 165-83. An interesting use in the periodreferredto in the text, yet withthe aim of differentiating at the sametime showingthe complementarity of historyand sociology,is R. Bierstedt, of BntishJournal and 'Toynbee Sociology', 10, no. 2 (June 1959), vol. Sociolofy, pp. 99104. 3. J. H. (,oldthorpe,'The Relevance of History to Sociology', Cambndge no. Opinion, 28, 1962,pp. 26-9. 4. (learly, mypositionhasin importHistoncal SociologR, 1. P. Abrams, changedsincethe timeof my Bath, Open Books, 1980, p. x; A. antrespects liketo in Problems SocialTheory, earlierpaper- as a result,I would Central Giddens, think, of my having had much more 1979,p. 230. London,Macmillan, first- or second2. The distinctionoriginatesin the experience, whether societiesboth past into Ger- hand,of research in Methodenstreit nineteenth-century both historyand For man universities. a brief discussion, and present.However, orientations of and the typical TheIdeaof Histoty, sociology, see R. G. (ollingwood,

in Theusesof htstory sociology

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their practitioners,have also changed. and Method,London, Allen and Unwin, or Today, interdisciplinary, rather a- 1950, was our main text and is now enthusiasmwould seem to unduly neglected. Also influentialwas disciplinary, me to havegone muchtoo far, at leaston Collingwood, The Idea of Histowy,esthe the sociologicalside. And I find it of pecially Epilegomena. Our 9. Cf. M. Murphey, Knowledge interestthat a similarview has also been Bobbs taken from the side of history by a of the HistoncalPast, Indianapolis, who is by no Merrill,1973;J. M. Clubb,'The "New" distinguishedpractitioner see to meansunsympathetic sociology: L. QuantitativeHistory:Social Science or in and Stone,'History the SocialSciencesin Old Winein New Bottles?' J. M. Clubb and the TwentiethCentury' 'The Revival and K. Scheuch, eds., Histoncal Social on of Narrative:Reflections a New Old Re.search,Stuttgart, Klett-Cotta, 1980, Revisited, pp. 13-24. History'in The Past and Pre.sent 10. The one instanceof which I am London,Routledge,1987. generlikewise 5. Quotedin Stone,'Historyand the awarein whichhistorians Social Sciences in the Twentieth (en- ate theirevidenceis whentheyengagein 'oral'history.Here too, though,it maybe tury',p. 31. 6. This use of historyis thatwhich I noted that problemsof survival,and in are have in fact been most concernedin my turn of representativeness, of large socialmobility. importance. ownworkon comparative 11. Anotherway of putting much of for programme a comparative The classic is macro-sociology that set by A. Prze- this is to say,as does Clubb('The "New" worski and H. Teune, The Logic of QuantitativeHistory', p. 20) that 'The ComparativeSocial Inquity, New York, source materialsupon which historians Wiley, 1970, which has as its ideal must rely are virtually by definition of objective'the replacement the names "processproduced"'and that they are, In moreover, 'the residual processof nationswiththe namesof variables'. so far as, in explaining cross-national produced data that have survived the varlatlonIn soclal structureor process ravagesof time'. Clubb notes that hishaveat theirdisposal (e.g. in mobilityrates and patterns),the toriansoccasionally sociologistis forced into invokinginsti- data that were collectedfor socialscienand tutionalor culturalfeatures,or indeed tificpurposes, thatthisis likelyto be a events, as specific features of national more common situationfor future hishistories,then pro tanto the Przeworski- torians.However,he then rightlycomTeune programme must fall short of ments that '. . . we can also imaginethat in realisation.(f. R. Erikson and J. H. historians the futurewill regardthese in Goldthorpe, 'Commonalityand Vari- data as no less process-produced this ation in Social Fluidity in Industrial case by the processof socialresearchas in practiced the mid-twentieth Nations.PartI: A Modelfor Evaluating archaically the "FJH Hypothesis";Part II: The century- and will bemoanthe fact that Model of Core SocialFluidityApplied', the wrongdatawerecollected,the wrong Review,vol. 3, nos. 1 questions asked, and that underlying EuropeanSociological werenotbetter and 1987,pp. 5F assumptions methods and2, MayandSeptember, documented.' 77, 145-66. Puritans,New Wayward 12. K.Erikson, 7. For pertinentbut brief comments in by previousauthors,see T. H. Marshall, York,Wiley,1966,pp. vii-iii,emphasis 'Sociology the RoadAhead'in Sociology Orlgmal. intentions London, Heinemann, 13. SkospoltreatsErikson's at the Cro.s.sroads, of 1963, p. 38 esp.; and C. Bell and H. as being 'characteristic historicalsoNewby, 'Narcissism or Reflexivity in ciologistswho apply general models to Modern Sociology', Polish Sociological history'. See 'Emerging Agendas and Recurrent Strategies in Historical SoBulletin,no. 1 1981,pp. 5-19. 8. I was myself put through the ciology'in T. Skospol, (ed.), Vi.sionand Cambridge, catechismby G. J. Renier,a remarkable Methodin HistoncalSociology, teacher,whose book Histoty: its Purpose Cambridge University Press, 1984,
(J.
. . . . . . . .

228
364. p. Therecanof coursebe littlevalue such a procedure unless there are in that groundsfor believing the independent But havesome validity. is should models inany event be noted that Erikson is himself clear that his concern is (see text)'to examine several ideas about behaviour' for which he does deviant appearto claimanypriorvalidity. not 14. It mayalsobe arguedthatsociolorecourseto history have gists a legitimate their concernis with phenomena where suchas revolutions, major economic mass panicsor crazesetc., which crises, but only happenratherinfrequently not are in any event more amenable to . . . m . Investlgatlon retrospectt 1an as t 1ey I occur. am not fully convincedby this but, argument for presentpurposes,it is to notnecessary contestit. Nor do I take uphere a concernwithhistorydisplayed bysome sociologiststhat I would most that regardas illegitimate: is, a certainly so history as,it is with concern 'theorising' hoped,to securea cognitivegraspon its 'movement'or 'logic'. I have written of elsewhereon the persistence critically such historicism:see e.g. J. H. (Joldthorpe,'Theoriesof IndustrialSociety', vol. 12, de Europeenne.s Sociologte, Archive.s no. 2, 1971, pp.26>88, and 'Intellectualsand the WorkingClassin Modern Britain', Fuller Memorial Bequest of University Essex,1979. Lecture, 15. M. Anderson,Family Structurein Cambridge, Lancashire, Centuty Nineteenth Press,1971,p. 62. University (,ambridge To 16. C. Fischer, DwellAmongFnends, Press,1982. ChicagoUniversity Chicago, History', Quantitative 17. 'The "New" p.20. and Presbyterie.s Progits, 18. Marshall, Oxford, Oxford UniversityPress, 1980, p.35. Lon19. H.Spencer,AnAutobiography, and Williams Norgate,1904,vol. 2, don, on p.185 and E.s.say.s Education,London, Dent,1861,newed. l911, p. 29. 20. Anearlybutcogent,and,I suspect, on attack Spencerby a highlyinfluential, historianwas F. M. Maitpre-eminent Papers, Collected land, 'The Body Politic', CamH. A. L. Fisher),Cambridge, (ed. Press, 1911. Note also bridgeUniversity of critique the lastphaseof Collingwood's
(J.

H. John Goldthorpe
that historiography, 'scissors-and-paste' whose approach the of 'pigeon-holers', 'Very was: well:let us put togetherall the that facts are knownto historians,look patternsin them, and then extrapofor latethese patterns into a theory of history.' The Idea of Histoty, universal side, the 263-6. On the sociological pp. nineteenthand early twentiethcenlate saw turies of course the beginningsin of Britain samplesurveymethodsand a interestin other meansof data growing of Cf. collection. S. and B. Webb,Methods Study, London,LondonSchoolof Social Economics,1932. 21. B. Moores The Social Origins of and Dictator.ship Democracy,HarmondsThe Penguin,1966;I. Wallerstein, worth, 3 WorldSy.stem, vols., New York, Modern Press, 1974, 1980, 1989; T. Academic SkospolsState.s and Social Revolutions, Press, University Cambridge Cambridge, from Pas.sage.s Antiquity P. 1979; Anderson, LondonsNew Left Books, toFeudali.sm, State, of 1974 and Lineage.s the Ab.soluti.st New Left Books, 1974;J. Hall, London, Power.sand Libertie.s,Harmondsworth, of Penguin,1985; M. Mann,The Source.s (,ambridge, Cambridge Social Power, University Press, 1986. It might be argued that this 'new wave' of grand was sociology in factled byS. N. historical of study, The PoliticalSy.stem.s Eisenstadt's NewYork,FreePress,1963.But Empire.s, wouldseemto have influence Eisenstadt's been clearlyless than that of Moorechiefly, I suspect, because his highly academic structural functionalismaccorded far less well with the prevailing mood of the later 1960s than did the marxi.santtone and explicitly 'radical' work. of commitment Moore's 22. Thus, for example, in the collection of essaysedited by Skospol, Vision considerSociology in and Method Historical ation is given to the work of historians suchas MarcBloch,(harles Tillyand E. P. Thompsonalongsidethat of authors such as Eisenstadt,Moore, Wallerstein and Anderson. Admirersof Bloch, in mightwell be led to ask 'Que particular,
galere2' diableallait-ilfairedanscette The Idea of Histoty,pp. 126-33. Then, as later (cf. E. H. (,arr, What i.s apparently

23. See, for example, Collingwood,

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Histowy?,LondonMacmillan,1961,ch.1), in of expositors suchpositivism the classic

229

of with diversities economicinterestand socialclass'.Moorethen tries(pp. 51 1-2) historiographywere taken to be von to rework Brunton and Pennington's statisticsto save what he takes to be Rankeand, in'Britain,LordActon. 24. C. Becker, 'What are Historical Tawney'sthesis against Tawney'sown of (ed.),ThePhilos- abandonment it- but succeedsonlyin in Facts?' H. Meyerhoff, in ophy of Histowy our Time, New York, providinga nice exampleof the ecological fallacy. Doubleday,1955,pp. 12z}37. It might be added here that the 25. T. Skospol,Staks arutSocialRevoltreatmentof the English Civil War by utions,p. xiv. 26. B. Moore,SocialOngins of Dictator- both Wallersteinand Anderson is no more satisfactory. Wallerstein, who p. shipand Democracy, 14. 27. R. H. Tawney,The AgrarianProb- claims that 'contrapuntalcontroversial lem in the Sixteenth Centuty, London, work' is a positive advantage for his vol. World System, Longmans,1912, and 'The Rise of the enterprise(TheModern a HistotyRe- 1, p. 8) reviews widerrangeof literature Gentry,1558-1640',Economic view,vol. 11, no.l, 1941,reprintedwitha than Moore but by an eirenicaltourde E.s.says forcestill ends up where he wantsto be: in 'Postscript' E. M. Carus-Wilson, London, Arnold, i.e. able to claim that the EnglishCivil in Econamic Hi.stowy, 1954; M. Campbell,The English Yeoman, War, though not a direct struggle bePress,1942. tweenclasses,none the lessresultedfrom New Haven,YaleUniversity capitalist of that It mustbe emphasised none of these the formation an agricultural was threestudiesis in factconcernedwiththe classwhichthe old aristocracy forced and in part to merge Civil War in any direct way, and that to accommodate references to it occur only rather inci- with,thusleadingto the earlycreationin (see Englandof a 'nationalbourgeoisie' dentally. 28. J. A. Froude,ShortStudieson Creat esp. pp. 256, 269, 282, 297). It must, vol. London,Longmans,1884, l, however, be pointed out that of the Subjects, cites, at whom Wallerstein 'authorities' p.21. for 29. An essayimportant itscatalytic leastas manywouldrejectthisconclusion effect wasJ. H. Hexter,'Stormover the aswouldacceptit. Anderson,in contrast,refersto only a which initiallyappearedin En(^entry', counter, no. 10 (1958) and then in an very limited number of secondary(or enlargedversionin Hexter'sReapprai.sats tertiary) sources and then, effectively blandlyasall in Histoty,London,Longmans,1961.For disregarding controversy, State, of a more recent critiqueof 'socialchange serts (Lineage.s the Ab.solutist was Absolutism brought of explanations' the English(ivil War- p. 142):'English and particularism but certainly not one that could be to a crisisbyaristocratic dismissed as sociologically unsophis- clannic desperation on its periphery; behindit. Butit and forcesthatlayhistorically Revolution ticated- seeJ. C. D. Clark, Rebellion, Cambridge,(ambridge Uni- was felled at the centre by a commercializedgentry, a capitalistcity, a comversityPress,1986,ch.3 esp. and yeomanry:forces 30. See, for example,Social Originsof moner artisanate pp. arut Dictator.ship Democracy, 6, 14 and pushingbeyondit. Beforeit could reach the Appendix.In the Appendix,'A Note the age of maturity,EnglishAbsolutism on Statisticsand ConservativeHistori- was cut off by a bourgeoisrevolution.' that ography',Mooretakesup the difficulties Oncemore,it mustbe emphasised it of posed for his interpretation the Civil is essentiallythe interpretationof the War by D. Brunton and D. H. Penn- EnglishCivilWaras a 'bourgeoisrevolof ington'sMember.s the Long Parliament, ution' that has been challengedby 'reLondon,Allen and Unwin, 1954,which, visionist' historians over the last two as Moore notes, led Tawney himself to decadesor more. My own judgment would be that the acknowledgethat the division between withinthe revisionistshave indeed succeeded in and Royalists Parliamentarians Long Parliament'had little connection underminingthe supposedevidencefor

230
But, further, I an such interpretation. if therewerea valid doubt would thateven of change 'social explanation' the English relicscouldbe found War, (ivil adequate allow to its validityto be demonstrated. over the ('Storm Hexterremarked What p. 149)aproposthe initialTawGentry', debateis likely Trevor-Roper ver.svs ney remainthe lastword:'And whatsuch to of of mastersthe materials seventeenthforensics and history of historical century prove cannot whentheysettheirmindsto is it,not likelyeverto be proved.' draw themselves 31. Wherehistorians sources,as for example,in secondary on researchor their situating own 'primary' of writing'surveys' a field,issuesof the in quality etc. of sources are availability, discussed. Moreoversin the typically case latter at least, and likewisein the of writing textbooks, authors are not pressure to defend a particular under of but interpretation canpresenta review positions.(^randhistoricalsodifferent in ciologists, contrast, usually cannot they such afford even-handedness; need touse - that is, to choose am(>ngsources as evidence for or secondary thesis.Furthermore, a against particular centralthesesthatare arguedfor by the and such as MooresWallerstein authors are Anderson oneswhichtheythemselves clearlysee as being politicallyhighly so consequential, that questionsof how far their use of secondary sources is and influenced, of whatchecks politically bias onpolitical theywouldbelieveappro. . . . .

H. JohnGoldthorpe
the recognise need for a methodology. for main Their justification grandhistoriwouldseemto be simplythat sociology cal 'the broad view' and is thus a gives it histo complement 'specialists" necessary Moorewrites(SocialOngzts of Thus tory. p. and Dictator.ship Democracw, xi): 'That analysisis no substitutefor comparative of investigation specificcases is detailed But obvious.' he goeson: 'Generali7ations (sic) a are that soundresemble large-scale an extended terrain,such as an of map pilot airplane might use in crossing a Such maps are essential for continent. purposesjust as more detailed certain are maps necessaryfor others.'Moore's inspiresno moreconfidence cartography that Assuming in hishistoriography. than not 'small-scale' 'large abovehe means the map, useful for an a scale', small-scale is dependent for its terrain', 'extended from on accuracy the detailedsurveying up. And likewise,as a it which is built historian and 'cliometric' a 'conventionals together,'the qualityof an written have is interpretation criticallydehistorical on pendent the qualityof the detailsout ofwhichit is spun. Time and againthe events, ot nterpretatlon maJor1lstorlcal sometimesof whole areas, has been of by transformed the correction apparentlytrivialdetails...' See R. W. Fogel andG. R. Elton,WhichRoad to the Past2, Press,1983, NewHaven,YaleUniversity p. 125. It shouldalsobe saidthatthe methodology of grand historicalsociologyhas attracted little attention from writers of concernedwith the methodology the in general.One essay by socialsciences JohanGaltungmaybe noted, thoughits contributionto practicedoes not seem epistemologi large:'Ommakrohistoriens en skisse',NordiskFagog metodologi: konferanse for Historik Metodelaere, Oslo, Universitets-forlaget, Makrohistorie,
. , . . . . .

prlate,

32. See, e.g., Moore,Social Origins of pp. and Dictator.ship Democracy, x-xi; Skocpp. and Social Revolutions, xivpol, State.s from Antiquityto xv; Anderson,Pas.sage.s of p. Feuzlali.sm, 8; Mann,TheSource.s Social Power,pp. vii-viii,3-4, 31-2.

Inevlta

Iy

arlse.

Agen33. T. Skospol,(ed.), 'Emeging in Strategies Historical dasandRecurrent 1979. p. Sociology99 382. 35. (,lubb, 'The "New"Quantitative Skospol,the other authors 34. Unlike p. appear to History', 20. earlier cited do not even