Regional Guide to International Conflict and Management from 1945 to 2003

Jacob Bercovitch and Judith Fretter

University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand

Good Offices and Shuttle Diplomacyp22 Good offices is a passive form of mediation and is often described as a diplomatic method of conflict management (see Figure 1). This strategy does not accord third parties the full range of active mediation techniques. The mediator acts as a facilitator or go-between but does not persuade or press disputants to reach a resolution (Yarrow 1978). The third party here can only offer a channel o communications, relay information (shuttle diplomacy), or arrange facilities and meeting places for the disputants. By strict definition, the use of good offices does not allow third parties to offer suggestions for the terms of settlement. By providing a neutral ground for the negotiation or by offering to carry messages between the disputants, the third party displays a friendly desire to promote a settlement without getting involved in the issues at stake (Bennett 1988). Although not listed in Article 33 of the UN Charter with the other seven methods of conflict management, good offices is a traditional mediation strategy and is frequently used in conjunction with all of the other nonbinding diplomatic strategies. The Good Offices Committee was an early mode of UN field operations and intervened only in the Netherlands/Dutch East IndiesIndonesian independence dispute of late 1945 to November 1949 (Critchley 1994). Subsequent mediation committees have engaged in other strategies besides the use of good offices. Fetherston describes this possible exchange and flexibility between strategies as a potential of complementarity (Fetherston 1993). Indeed, the potential for complementarity is substantial. Good offices has the hallmarks of

diplomacy, and it is not unusual for a good offices role to expand into broader mediation roles in subsequent contacts. Mediator initiative and adaptability are imperative given the evolving nature of conflicts. A mediators experience has been seen as a significant determinant of mediation success (Carnevale and Pegnetter 1985; Kolb 1983, 1985). Expertise, experience, flexibility, a favorable disputant/ mediator background, diplomatic skill, credibility of the office and the individual, personality, knowledge of the conflict and disputants, a level of impartiality, and well-developed interpersonal skills all help to establish a level of trust and confidence and can increase mediation success. The secretary-generals use of good offices as an effective stand-alone strategy exemplifies the importance of many of these factors. This mediation strategy relies a great deal on the disputants perception of the secretarygeneral, both as an individual and as a representative of the organization, although the position is more visible as a highest level interaction amongst state officials (Tunnicliff 1984; Skjelsbk 1991). It is also evident, however, that competency in the role as secretary-general depends on the person who holds the office and that individuals particular operational style (Skjelsbk and Fermann 1996). Organizational representatives have experienced mixed success when using shuttle diplomacy. During the Namibian independence struggle, the UN secretarygeneral acted as a go-between in negotiations during November 1984. Secretary-General Javier Prez de Cullar received letters and proposals from both South Africa and Angola, although neither party accepted the others proposals. The UNs mediation attempts in the Yom Kippur War (October 1973), aided greatly by the shuttle diplomacy of Henry Kissinger, the U.S. secretary of state, were on the whole very successful. UNEF II provided logistical and technical assistance throughout the conflict, acting as a buffer zone and an observer team, as well as a facilitator in troop redeployment. Shuttle diplomacy is not always beneficial to the resolution of a conflict. Shuttle diplomacy by the OSCE-initiated Minsk Group inadvertently eliminated much of the implied legitimacy that the involvement of the United States and Russia lent to the groups mediation attempts. During the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, the OSCE brought together the Minsk Group comprising high-level representatives from Armenia, Azerbaijan, Finland,

France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Switzerland, Turkey, and the United States. Nagorno-Karabakh representatives attended the meetings as an interested third party. The membership of the Minsk Group altered after 1992 but the main actors, Armenia, Azerbaijan, France, Russia, Turkey, and the United States, continued to function within the group. The changing membership of the Minsk Group has been cited as one of the problems faced by the OSCE. With each changeand there were four rotations of chairmanshipthe dynamics of the mediatordisputant relationship also changed. Evidence of the problem can be seen in the marginalized role of the United States in the Minsk Group after 1993 (Ellingwood 1997). Marginalizing such an important actor decreased the perceived legitimacy of the group and undoubtedly affected its mediation efforts. The successful use of good offices, shuttle diplomacy, and mediation strategies in general frequently rests on the timing of intervention. Regional organizations are better positioned to provide timely intervention and can often persist with simple mediation strategies in conflicts where the logistics of travel would hinder immediate UN preventive diplomacy. For example, the AU established an ad hoc commission as a mechanism to provide good offices to the disputants during a border conflict between Algeria and Morocco. The provision of good offices over a long duration allowed the AU to successfully resolve the border conflict between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 and eventually restore diplomatic relations between the disputants (Merrills 1991). Regional organization timeliness is exemplified in two conflicts. The AUs secretary-general, Eteki Mboumosa, made one timely mediation in a territorial conflict between Uganda and Kenya. President Idi Amin of Uganda had appealed to both the UN and AU secretaries-general to initiate an investigatory mission to assess the situation, stating that Uganda was prepared to take further action if it was not resolved. The parties indicated their willingness to resolve their conflict and resume normal relations prior to making a final settlement under the guidance of the AU secretary-general. Same day action by the OAS quelled a border conflict between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. On October 15, 1977, Gauzalo Facio, Costa Ricas foreign minister, protested to the government of Nicaragua about incursions into Costa

Rican territory and airspace. The same day, an OAS team mediated between the parties in Nicaragua and achieved a full settlement, with OAS observers being stationed along the border as a precautionary measure. After this intervention, the conflict abated. Like most mediation strategies, good offices and shuttle diplomacy can be implemented speedily and may prevent a complete break down in disputant dialogue.