Joint Ventures Around the Globe from 1990-2000:

Forms, Types, Industries, Countries and Ownership Patterns

Sviatoslav A. Moskalev*(a)
Adelphi University

R. Bruce Swensen*
Adelphi University

Abstract:
Joint ventures (JVs) and alliances are important forms of inter-organizational cooperation because
they allow firms to achieve complex mutual tasks, otherwise impossible using simple arm’s-
length contracts, but without actually acquiring one another. In light of recent trends in
globalization, this feature of JVs and alliances is vital to multi-national corporations (MNCs).
These firms have complex operations, making simple arm’s-length contracts insufficient. MNCs
are also very large, so that mergers and acquisitions and takeovers are extremely expensive. In
this paper, we describe global trends in JVs and alliances for the period 1990 to 2000, utilizing
the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database. We survey existing theoretical and empirical
literature on JVs and alliances, and provide a detailed description of the world of JVs and
alliances as depicted by this database. We report a number of interesting facts regarding the
forms and types of JVs and alliances, their industry and geographic distribution, and patterns of
ownership.

(*)
Assistant and Associate Professors of Finance, respectively, at Adelphi University.
(a)
Corresponding author: moskalev@adelphi.edu; Phone: (516)-877-4417; Fax: (516)-877-4607. Mailing
address: School of Business, Adelphi University, 1 South Avenue, Garden City, NY 11530. This paper is
based on my dissertation work done at the University of Georgia.
We are grateful to Kenneth Gaver, William Lastrapes, Jeffrey Netter, Annette Poulsen, Anand Srinivasan
and the anonymous referee for valuable comments. Milind Shah provided excellent research assistance.
All errors are ours alone.
Introduction
Companies cooperate with one another because they believe that the cooperation can be
beneficial to them. Generally speaking, inter-organizational cooperation can take three forms: (a)
simple contracts1 ; (b) mergers and acquisitions (M&As) and takeovers; (c) joint ventures (JVs)
and alliances. The forms of cooperation have different consequences for the autonomy of the
parties post closing. Consequently, the parties choose their desired form of cooperation based, at
least in part, on the amount of autonomy they are willing to surrender.
The most basic form of inter-organizational cooperation is the simple contract. Examples
include customer-supplier contracts, service contracts, and distribution contracts, as well as many
others. While simple contracts can be incomple te (e.g., Hart 1995; Aghion and Tirole (1997);
Hart and Moore (1999)), their dominant feature, relative to other forms of inter-organizational
cooperation, is that they typically do not require transfer of assets and control so that the parties to
the contract remain autonomous.
M&As and takeovers are the most sophisticated forms of inter-organizational
cooperation. By definition, they entail transfer of assets and control, result ing in significant
change in the autonomy of at least one of the parties. The finance literature generally proposes
synergy (e.g., Berkovitch and Narayanan (1993)), agency (e.g., Amihud and Lev (1981); Jensen
(1986); Shleifer and Vishny (1989)), and hubris (e.g., Roll (1986)) as primary motives for M&As
and takeovers.
JVs and alliances are intermediate forms of inter-organizational cooperation. JVs are
separate business entities established by the partners in order to achieve a mutual task. The
partners agree on the allocation of ownership of the JV, as well as its cash flows, based on
negotiated terms that generally reflect the amount of assets and capital each contributed.
Alliances are similar to JVs, but do not involve creation of a separate business entity. They do
involve contribution of assets and capital, but the mutual task is achieved inside the partners’
respective firms, not inside a stand-alone JV company.
Because JVs and alliances involve contribution of assets and capital, they are more
complex forms of inter-organizational cooperation than simple arm’s-length contracts. Since
partners maintain their autonomy in JVs and alliances, this form of inter-organizational
cooperation is distinct from M&As and takeovers. One of the advantages of JVs and alliances is
that they allow participants to preserve their organizational autonomy while realizing the benefits
of coordinated activities (e.g., Kogut (1991)). In light of the recent trend in globalization (see

1
They are sometimes referred to as commercial contracts.

2
e.g., World Bank (2002)), it is important to study JVs and alliances because they allow multi-
national corporations (MNCs) to perform complex mutual tasks, otherwise impossible with
simple arm’s-lengths contracts, without acquiring one another. This feature is especially
important to MNCs because their sophisticated operations often make simple arm’s-length
contracts insufficient, but their substantial assets make M&As and takeovers very expensive.
This paper describes global trends in JVs and alliances for the period 1990 to 2000,
utilizing the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Alliances/Joint Ventures database. We survey
theoretical and empirical literature on JVs and alliances, and provide a detailed description of the
world of JVs and alliances as depicted by the SDC database. Our results highlight a number of
noteworthy observations related to the forms and types of JVs and alliances, their industry and
geographic distribution, and patterns of ownership.
First, we establish that JVs and alliances are flexible inter-organizational cooperative
mechanisms that allow multiple domestic and foreign partners to form business entities which
operate in single or multiple countries. While some deals include as many as twenty partners,
others have operations in as many as eighteen countries. For international cooperation, firms use
JVs more frequently than alliances; for domestic cooperation, alliances are more common. Data
on the dollar size of JVs and alliances is rarely disclosed, making qualitative judgments difficult.
Based on the relatively small number of transactions (about 7% of the dataset) that disclose dollar
size, it appears that JVs are somewhat smaller than alliances. The paper also confirms a
previously observed contraction in the frequency of JVs and alliances around the globe after
1995, which is commonly attributed to liberalization of foreign investment regimes in various
host countries (e.g., UNCTAD (2000); Desai, Foley and Hines (2004)).
Second, the data reveal strong industry clustering of JVs and alliances. More than half of
the transactions in the dataset occurred in only ten industries, many of which are technologically
intensive. Interestingly, in almost all industries in the “top-ten” list, the percentage of deals
performed via strategic alliances is high, suggesting that alliances stand at the core of global
cooperative activity. Additionally, we find that, when partners come from different industries
they are more likely to establish an alliance than an independent JV firm, possibly because it is
less expensive to dissolve an alliance if the project fails.
Third, we study the types of JVs and alliances, which are classified by the SDC dataset
as: licensing, technology, exploration, manufacturing, marketing, R&D, and supply and
equipment manufacturing/value-added reseller. Since JVs and alliances often belong to mult iple
categories, we observe the correlations among these types. Additionally, we identify the
industries in which the various types of JVs and alliances occur most frequently. For example,

3
we show that exploration-agreement JVs have the highest industry clustering, with over 95% in
the mining and the oil and gas industries. The frequency of transactions with cross-border
participants in technology-agreement JVs is higher than in R&D-agreement JVs, indicating that
foreign partners are more likely to receive, than to jointly develop, new technology.
Fourth, we find substantial country clustering in the geographic distribution of JVs and
alliances. Of 179 countries around the globe, only seven countries accounted for 63.4% of global
JVs and alliances. In addition, we provide evidence on the geographic distribution of the various
types of JVs and alliances.
Lastly, we study ownership patterns in JVs and alliances. We present evidence on the
amount of partners’ equity stakes in JVs and alliances, and the frequency of equal ownership.
Our results corroborate existing evidence (e.g., Hauswald and Hege (2004)) that partners in JVs
and alliances have a preference for equal ownership , and we extend the literature by showing that
this phenomenon holds internationally and for multiple -partner JVs and alliances.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we review the theoretical and empirical
literature on JVs and alliances. Second, we discuss the data. Third, we present our results.
Lastly, we conclude and propose avenues for future research.

Review of the Theoretical Literature on JVs

The transactions costs theory (TCT) and the property rights theory (PRT) establish the
theoretical framework for understanding JVs. The TCT, developed by Klein, Crawford and
Alchian (1978), and others, emphasizes that, as assets become more specific, potential gains from
opportunistic behavior by trading partners increase. Further, contracting costs typically increase
more than the costs of vertical integration so that vertical integration is more likely than
contracting. Oxley (1997), in her study of the relationship between appropriability hazards and
governance, finds strong support for the TCT. She first develops a market-hierarchy continuum
of alliances, and then demonstrates empirically that, as appropriability hazards increase, more
hierarchical alliances are chosen.
The property rights theory (PRT) developed by Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and
Moore (1990), and others, is based on two types of contractual rights: specific rights and residual
rights. A contract can identify the specific rights that one party will have over another party’s
assets. Alternatively, it may be optimal for one party to purchase residual rights of control, that
is, all rights except those specified in the contract. In the PRT framework, joint ownership is
suboptimal because of the lack of incentives resulting from the sharing of residual control rights.
Whinston (2002) provides a careful summary of the differences between the two theories and

4
shows that the PRT’s predictions differ in important ways from those of the TCT, and that the
existing empirical evidence that is supportive of the TCT sheds little light on the empirical
relevance of the PRT. Cai (2003) extends the TCT to situations where parties can choose both
the type and level of investment. He shows that the PRT results are obtained when specific and
general investments are complementary but, when specific and general investments are
substitutes, joint ownership provides incentives to make specific investments, and can therefore
be an optimal structure.
Moral hazard issues that arise in cooperative efforts are common in JVs. Holmstrom
(1982) showed that a capitalistic firm has an advantage over a partnership in resolving the free-
rider problem in teams because ownership and labor are partly separated. Legros and Matthews
(1993) build on Holmstrom’s work and show that, for some types of partnerships, a sharing rule
exists that can elicit an efficient set of actions. These include partnerships in which partners’
actions are perfect complements (Leontief partnerships) or where one partner is not able to affect
output. They show that efficiency can be approximated to any desired degree and that free-riding
causes inefficiency only to the extent that either the partners’ liability is limited or partners’
wealth is bounded. Vislie (1994) provides similar results, concluding that, when inputs are strict
complements (Leontief technology) free-riding can be avoided.
In the theoretical literature, optimal ownership allocation has been modeled extensively
on JVs. The results indicate that, as a consequence of various partner characteristics, optimal
ownership allocation should be asymmetric . Darrough and Stoughton (1989) analyze the impact
of private information on profit-sharing arrangements negotiated by partners in JVs. Chemla,
Habib and Ljungqvist (2004), and Bhattacharyya and Lafontaine (1989) study the effect of
incentive requirements on ownership allocation in JVs. Belleflamme and Bloch (2000) identify
the parent’s resource costs as the primary determinant of the allocation of ownership in JVs.
Hauswald and Hege (2004) find that, regardless of parents’ attributes, the higher the potential for
unilateral value extraction, the more parents prefer equal shareholdings (50-50 equity allocation).
Bai, Tao and Wu (2004) , in their study of two hundred Chinese JVs with foreign partners,
demonstrate both less clustering of JVs at 50-50 ownership than do Hauswald and Hege (2004),
as well as increased joint control as the severity of the expropriation problem increases. They
also document that the foreign partner’s control rights and revenue share increase with the
number of tasks assigned to the foreign partner and the technological sophistication of the
industry, but they decrease with the need for marketing.

5
Review of the Empirical Literature on Domestic JVs
Empirical literature on domestic JVs is limited. One strand of this literature analyzes the
reaction of stock price to announcements of formation of alliances and JVs. The other addresses
issues related to allocation of control in strategic alliances between pharmaceutical and
biotechnology research companies.
A number of event studies document positive and significant announcement returns
related to formation of domestic strategic alliances and JVs. In their investigation of 136
domestic JVs between 1972 and 1979, McConnell and Nantell (1985) find significant wealth
gains from JVs. Since returns to stockholders are comparable to those resulting from mergers,
the authors conclude that their results are supportive of the hypothesis that synergy is the source
of gain from corporate combinations. Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin (1997) report similar
results in their study of 345 strategic non-equit y alliances over the period 1983-1992.
Johnson and Houston (2000) study returns generated by 119 domestic JVs, distinguishing
between horizontal and vertical transactions. They find that horizontal JVs produce synergistic
wealth gains that are shared by the parties to the JV, while vertical JVs create significantly
positive mean excess return only for suppliers. The authors conclude that vertical JVs are used
when the potential for hold-up problems is substantial and as a financing alternative for suppliers.
Allen and Phillips (2000) examine the relationship between long-term block ownership
by corporations and changes in target firms’ stock prices, investment policies and profitability.
They find the largest significant increases in targets’ performance when corporate block
ownership is accompanied by alliances, JVs, and other product market relationships between
purchasing and target firms. Mohanram and Nanda (1998) report significant positive abnormal
returns around announcement date for a sample of 253 domestic JVs announced between 1986
and 1993. Further, they find a tendency for JV announcements to be made when parent
performance, measured by stock price and accounting data, is deteriorating.
Event studies of domestic JVs have received some attention in the real estate literature.
Ravichandran and Sa-Aadu (1988) find a statistically significant positive two-day announcement
period return for a sample of real-estate JVs over the period 1972-1983. Further, they identify
three characteristics of real estate markets that apparently contribute to the significant abnormal
returns: information asymmetry, technical expertise in real property management, and the
signaling effect of anchor tenants for commercial properties.
Elayan (1993) reports results supportive of both the synergy effect and the hypothesis
that informational asymmetries provide opportunities for real estate firms to earn greater returns
from joint ventures. He finds a positive, statistically significant announcement effect for all real

6
estate JVs in his sample, and a statistically significant difference in excess returns between real
estate and non-real estate firms. The former result is consistent with the synergy hypothesis and
the latter is consistent with the informational asymmetries hypothesis. In contrast, a study by
Corgel and Rogers (1987) does not provide evidence of synergies in real estate JVs. Their
analysis of twenty-four JVs over the period 1979-1985 indicates no significant announcement
effect for real estate development JVs.
The second strand of empirical literature on domestic JVs investigates the allocation of
control in strategic alliance agreements, often between pharmaceutical and biotechnology
research companies. Lerner and Merges (1998) examine the determinants of control rights in
biotechnology alliances between R&D firms and larger firms with substantial financial resources
and find that increased control rights are allocated to R&D firms as their financial resources
increase. Lerner, Shane and Tsai (2003) study two hundred alliance agreements between
biotechnology firms during the period 1980-1995. They find that, when external equity financing
is readily available, alliance agreements tend to assign greater control rights to the R&D firm;
such alliances are more successful.
In a related work, Robinson (2005) develops a model that predicts firms will prefer
alliances over internal projects when the risk of the alliance activity is greater than the risk of the
firm’s primary activities. In support of his model, he finds that alliances tend to occur in risky,
high-tech industries, and when industries have different risk characteristics. Elfenbein and Lerner
(2003) analyze alliances involving Internet portals between 1995 and 1999 to determine the
extent to which contract theory explains the division of ownership and the allocation of control
rights. They find that, consistent with incomplete-contract theories, ownership was assigned to
the party whose effort was most critical to project success, and the allocation of control rights was
sensitive to the parties’ relative bargaining power.

Review of the Empirical Literature on International JVs

Empirical studies of international JVs (IJVs) find that multinational firms establish IJVs
in a manner consistent with the predictions of the TCT. Beamish and Banks (1987) demonstrate
empirically that, under certain circumstances, JVs in developing countries can be preferable to
wholly-owned subsidiaries as a mode for foreign investment. Asiedu and Esfahani (2001) use a
dataset of subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals to show that foreign equity share increases with the
contribution of multinationals’ assets to the surplus created by FDI projects, and decreases with
the contribution of local assets. Gatignon and Anderson (1988) support the TCT as well and find
that parents seek a higher level of ownership in affiliates that make greater use of proprietary

7
assets. Hennart (1991) reports that the results of his empirical study of the factors that determine
the degree of ownership by Japanese manufacturing firms in their American subsidiaries is
consistent with the TCT and with the determinants of ownership choices made by U.S firms; that
is, Japanese manufacturing investors form JVs in order to combine intermedia te inputs that have
high transaction costs. Ramachandran (1993) studies the transfer of technology from developed
countries to firms in India and shows that 100%-owned subsidiaries of foreign multinationals
receive more resources than do Indian-owned firms or subsidiaries partially-owned by foreign
multinationals.
The issue of resource complementarity has been empirically studied in the context of
IJVs. Balakrishan and Koza (1993) view the joint venture as an alternative to merger or
acquisition when information asymmetry about the target firm’s assets results in high transaction
costs for M&As. They theorize that the joint venture is an efficient mechanism for pooling
complementary assets when the parents come from dissimilar businesses. Their theory is
supported by an event study of 64 JV announcements, which demonstrates that, in general, joint
ventures create value, with abnormal returns that are significantly larger when the parents operate
in businesses with technological and managerial differences. Furthermore, abnormal returns to
acquirers and targets involved in M&As were greater when acquirer and target firms are in
similar businesses. Blomstrom and Zejan (1991), using data from Swedish multinationals, find
that firms with limited foreign production experience and diversified product lines are most likely
to choose minority ventures. Gomes-Casseres (1989) utilizes data from subsidiaries of 180 U.S.
multinationals and demonstrates that, in selecting ownership structure, multinationals choose JVs
with host-country firms rather than wholly-owned subsidiaries if the local firm’s assets
complement those of the multinational.
An additional issue that has received attention in the IJV literature is the impact of
government policy on foreign ownership of domestic firms. Gomes-Casseres (1990) studies the
conditions under which firms facing significant government restrictions on foreign ownership
choose to completely forego foreign investment. His results suggest that firms’ decisions whether
to forego investing depend on the characteristics of both the acquiring firm and the proposed
subsidiary, such as firm size and the intra-system sales of the subsidiary. Franko (1989) analyzed
the increased frequency of minority and 50-50 joint ventures among U.S industrial multinationals
operating in developing countries during the 1970s. He concluded that the observed trend in
manufacturing and mining was a consequence of government policies designed to restrict control
by foreign investors and promote shared ownership with local firms. Contractor (1990) used
Commerce Department data on U.S. firms with foreign affiliates to study the effect of the

8
subsequent liberalization of these restrictions during the 1980s. These policy changes led to
small but consistent decreases in 50-50 and minority affiliates. Henisz (2000) and Gatignon and
Anderson (1988) show that, in host countries with substantial political risk, multinationals can
reduce their risk exposure by partnering with local firms. However, as political risk increases, so
does the risk that the local firm will exploit the political system at the expense of the
multinational firm. Desai, Foley and Hines (2004) study the determinants of partial ownership of
foreign affiliates by U.S. multinationals and the decreased use of joint ventures since the 1980s.
They show that 100% ownership is most frequent when firms coordinate international production
and benefit from technology transfers and worldwide tax planning. Liberalized ownership
restrictions and joint venture tax penalties imposed in 1986 led U.S. multinationals to increase use
of 100% ownership and to increase intrafirm trade and transfer of technology.
Finally, we note that a number of event studies have demonstrated that markets view IJVs
as value enhancing. Numerous papers (e.g., Lummer and McConnell (1990) , Lee and Wyatt
(1990) , Chen, Hu, and Shieh (1991) , Etebari (1993) , Crutchley, Guo, and Hansen (1991),
Janakiraman, Lambda and McKeon (1999), Prather and Min (1998), Gleason, Lee and Mathur
(2002), Irwanto, Vetter and Wingender (1999), He, Myer and Webb (1997)) document positive
and significant abnormal returns associated with IJV announcements.

Data
The data in this study are from the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum Alliances/Joint
Ventures database, which attempts to collect all worldwide JV transactions from SEC filings and
its international counterparts, trade publications, wires and other news sources. SDC covers the
period 1985 to the present, and is updated daily. This study is conducted for the period 1990
through 2000.
The SDC database reports 79,212 transactions announced between 1990 and 2000, of
which 61,431 transactions were completed. We impose a number of sample selection restrictions
on these data. First, we delete deals that do not have both a “completed/signed” status and a
completion date between 1990 and 2000. Second, we delete deals with “NUMP” fie ld (alliance
number of participants) set to 1. We consider such deals to be errors since a partnership requires
at least two partic ipants. Third, we delete deals with “PSTAKE“ field (Alliance JV Total
Ownership by Participant) set to more than 100 percent for any of the first four participants. We
also consider such deals to be errors, since a participant can not have more than 100 percent
ownership. We are left with 60,446 transactions.

9
Results
Summary Statistics for Joint Ventures
Table 1 shows basic summary statistics. The frequency of JV deals is summarized in
Panel A of Table 1. In total, there were 60,446 JV transactions around the globe during the 1990-
2000 period, of which 58.72% had cross-border participants and 37.48% had domestic
participants only. SDC defines JVs with cross-border participants as deals where participants’
ultimate parents are not from the same nation. Domestic JVs are deals with all participants from
the same nation. This distinction is significant because domestic JVs represent internal business
activity in a given country, while JVs with cross-border participants represent international
business cooperation. Additionally, 5,839 multi-regional JVs (9.66% of the total) occurred
during this period; these are defined by SDC as deals with activities in more than one nation.
They are created primarily to serve multiple countries, so it is not surprising that 96.35% (5,626
of 5,839) of multi-regional JVs have cross-border participants2 .
While the SDC database accurately identifies the occurrence of JV deals, its description
of their dollar size is poor. Panel A of Table 1 shows that only 7.42% of all JVs (4,484 of
60,446) disclosed their estimated capitalization3 and another 7.42% disclosed their estimated
cost4 . This low rate of reporting is a consequence of the fact that companies typically do not view
JVs as major corporate restructurings, and thus are not obligated to report their size. Among
those that disclose the dollar amount, some have motivations that can create selection bias. Thus,
results derived from SDC’s capitalization and cost data should be viewed with caution.
Additionally, most firms that disclose information on the dollar size of JVs report either estimated
capitalization or estimated cost, but not both. According to SDC, only 402 JV deals (0.67%)
disclosed both items. We believe that companies are reluctant to report both items in order to
avoid disclosing the portion of the JV that is financed by debt. By disclosing either the equity
portion (i.e., estimated capitalization) or total assets (i.e., estimated cost), companies avoid
disclos ing the amount of debt used to finance the deal.
Panel B of Table 1 describes the number of participants in JVs. The vast majority of JV
deals (87.02%) are comprised of two partners, and a fairly sizable number are established by
three partners (9.07%). While two- and three-partner JVs are the most frequent, a small number
of transactions have as many as twenty participants. We confirm these results by analyzing

2
In order to avoid additional complexity, we do not to distinguish between JVs with cross-border
participants that are located in the country of one of the participants versus those located in a third country
(i.e., an American and a Mexican partner establishing a JV in Mexico versus Canada).
3
"Estimated Capitalization" is defined by SDC as the JV’s assets minus debt.
4
"Estimated Cost" is the overall amount participants expect to spend on the JV.

10
separately JVs with cross-border participants, multi-regional JVs and domestic JVs. The results
are similar, with a slightly greater tendency towards two-partner JVs among domestic JVs.
Panel C of Table 1, which reports the number of countries in which JVs operate, indicates
that 85.0% of JVs intend to operate in only one country, and 8.2% in two countries, while the
remaining deals cover as many as eighteen countries. Compared with the full sample , JVs with
cross-border participants have a somewhat greater tendency to serve two countries (12.7% versus
8.2%), primarily because they are comprised of international participants and have a broader
geographic scope. Multi-regional JVs operate primarily in two countries (90.68%), with some
transactions serving three countries (5.69%). Virtually all domestic JVs serve only one (i.e.,
domestic) country (99.93%), with a small number of unique cases serving more than one country.
Panel D of Table 1 describes the forms utilized in cooperative activities: strategic
alliances versus independent JV firms. SDC defines a strategic alliance as “a cooperative
business activity, formed by two or more separate organizations for strategic purposes, which
does NOT create an independent business entity, but allocates ownership, operational
responsibilities, and financial risks and rewards to each member, while preserving each member's
separate identity/autonomy.” An independent JV firm is: “a cooperative business activity, formed
by two or more separate organizations for strategic purposes, which creates an INDEPENDENT
business entity, and allocates ownership, operational responsibilities, and financial risks and
rewards to each member, while preserving each member's separate identity/autonomy. The new
entity can either be newly formed or a combination of pre-existing units and/or divisions of the
members.”
The distinction between these forms is significant because of the differential
consequences for the real economy. A strategic alliance benefits the real economy by allow ing
partners to cooperate in flexible and inexpensive ways. Since no new stand-alone business entity
is created in a strategic alliance, transaction costs are lower, allow ing more funds to be committed
to investment projects, as compared to similar initiatives executed by independent JV companies.
Although strategic alliances are inexpensive to establish, they are less likely to grow and to
accumulate new assets than are independent JV firms. The growth of strategic alliances is
impeded by the fact that they are embedded inside the assets of the parents’ companies. Hence,
the real economy benefits from independent JVs because they grow and accumulate new assets
more quickly than do similar strategic alliances.
Panel D of Table 1 shows that 56.5% of JVs are set up as strategic alliances and 43.5% as
independent JV firms. For JVs with cross-border participants, the relationship is reversed: most
are formed as independent JV firms (53.6%) and a minority as strategic alliances (46.4%). We

11
believe this latter result is a consequence of the greater difficulty inherent in coordinating
strategic alliances with partners from different countries. This argument is supported by the data
for domestic JVs: 69.2% are formed as strategic alliances and only 30.8% as independent JV
firms. Strategic alliances are common among multi-regional JVs (64.8%), primarily because it is
more expensive to achieve multi-regional access by establishing independent JV firms in different
countries.
Panel E of Table 1 shows the dollar size of JVs. The estimated capitalization of the
median JV in the dataset is 8 million US dollars and the median estimated cost is 30 million US
dollars. These medians are substantially less than the respective means (79.07 and 264.56 million
US dollars), implying that some JV transactions are very large 5 . On the other hand, the mean and
median estimated capitalization and cost of JVs with cross-border participants, multi-regional JVs
and domestic JVs are similar6 . Strategic alliances are substantially larger than independent JV
firms. The mean and median capitalization for strategic alliances are 138.6 and 20 million US
dollars, respectively, but only 76.4 and 7.6 million US dollars, respectively, for independent JV
companies. Similar differentials are observed for estimated cost (308.4 and 25.1 million US
dollars versus 253.3 and 30 million US dollars, respectively). The finding that strategic alliances
are larger than independent JV firms supports the argument that firms commit more funds to
investment projects in strategic alliances than in independent JV firms because the former entities
have lower transaction costs.
Table 2 reports the frequency and size of JVs annually, from 1990 through 2000. The
primary finding, also apparent in Graph 1, is that frequency of JVs contracted after 1995. The
number of JVs increased steadily from 1990 through 1995, but then fell sharply in 1996. The
reduced propensity of MNCs to use JVs can be attributed to a number of factors, including the
liberalization of foreign investment regimes in various host countries (e.g., World Investment
Report (2001); Desai, Foley and Hines (2003)).

5
We manually verified that, for all transactions reporting estimated capitalization and cost, the CAPEST
and COST fields (estimated capitalization and cost, respectively) are equal to the data in the synopsis of the
deal (SYN field). We found that SDC often confused thousands with millions (i.e., inserted size figures in
thousands rather than in millions).
6
The mean estimated cost of multi-regional JVs is substantially larger than that of the full sample (452.44
versus 264.56 million of US dollars). Since this result is based on only 292 observations, it may be biased
by a few observations with very large values.

12
Distribution of JVs by Industry
In this section, we discuss the industry distribution of JV deals around the globe. Tables
3 through 5 present evidence regarding the frequency, size and form of JVs by industry in which
they were established.
Table 3 ranks all industries, defined by SDC original industry classification, according to
the number of JV deals between 1990 and 2000. We find more than half of all JV deals clustered
in only ten industries, with the largest number of JV deals in business services7 (13.6% of all JV
deals), followed by the prepackaged software industry (8.2%). The remaining “top-ten”
industries are: wholesale trade of durable and non-durable goods (6.7% and 2.9%, respectively),
drugs (5.3%), electronic and electrical equipment (4.6%), investment and commodity firms
(3.9%)8 , chemicals and allied products (3.4%), telecommunications (3.0%), and communications
equipment (2.9%).
With the exception of the wholesale trade of durable and non-durable goods, business
services, and investment firms, the “top-ten” industries are technologically intensive. These are
typically riskier industries, so that JVs often become the preferred form of organizational
cooperation because they allow the partners greater ability to reduce risk. Compared with arm’s-
length contracting, for example, the risk is lower in JVs because partners share the costs,
technologies and know-how, reduc ing uncertainties related to development and employment of
the risky project. On the other hand, compared with M&As, risk is lower in JVs because they do

7
SDC defines the business services industry very broadly. The SIC codes used by SDC are : 7322-
Adjustment and collection services; 7323-Credit reporting services; 7331-Direct mail advertising services;
7334-Photocopying and duplicating services; 7335-Commercial photography; 7336-Commercial art and
graphic design; 7338-Secretarial and court reporting services; 7342-Disinfecting and pest control devices;
7349-Building cleaning and maintenance services; 7352-Medical equipment rental and leasing; 7353-
Heavy construction equipment rental and leasing; 7359-Equipment rental and leasing; 7361-Employment
agencies; 7363-Help supply services; 7369-Personnel supply services; 7371-Computer programming
services; 7373-Computer integrated systems design; 7374-Data processing services; 7375-Information
retrieval services; 7376-Computer facilities management services; 7377-Computer rental and leasing;
7378-Computer maintenance and repair; 7379-Computer related services; 7381-Detective, guard, and
armored car services; 7382-Security systems services; 7383-News syndicates; 7384-Photofinishing
laboratories; 7389-Business services; 8711-Engineering services; 8712-Architectural services; 8713-
Surveying services; 8721-Accounting, auditing, and bookkeeping services; 8731- Commercial physical and
biological research; 8732-Commercial nonphysical research; 8733-Noncommercial research organizations;
8734-Testing laboratories; 8741-Management services; 8742-Management consulting services; 8743-
Public relations services; 8744-Facilities support management services; 8748-Business consulting services.
8
The SIC codes used by SDC for the investment and commodity firms industry are: 6722-Management
investment offices, open-end; 6732-Educational, religious, and charitable trusts; 6733-Trusts, exc.
educational, religious, & charitable; 6792-Oil royalty traders; 6794-Patent owners and lessors; 6799-
Investors; 6211-Security brokers, dealers, and flotation companies; 6221-Commodity contracts brokers and
dealers; 6231-Security and commodity exchanges; 6282-Investment advice; 6289-Security and commodity
services; 6726-Investment offices; 619B-Special purpose finance company; 6798-Real estate investment
trusts.

13
not require permanent transfer of assets and control (i.e., the parents’ respective companies stay
intact), and, furthermore, if the project proves unsuccessful, the parents can quickly and
inexpensively dissolve the JV.
The results are confirmed for JVs with cross-border participants, multi-regional JVs and
domestic JVs. The frequency rankings within each of the three sub-groups are similar to that of
the full sample . The only substantial difference is found in the top two industries among
domestic JVs (business services and prepackaged software), which exhibit a somewhat greater
concentration of deals compared to the full sample . Together, these two industries accounted for
30.5% of all domestic JV deals, which is more than in the full sample (21.8%), in the sub-group
of JVs with cross-border participants (15.8%), and among multi-regional JVs (15.7%). It is
possible that this concentration is related to country clustering. We revisit this issue later in the
paper in our discussion of the distribution of JVs by country in which they are established.
Table 4 reports mean and median capitalization and cost of JVs by industry. In the full
sample, the industries with the highest mean estimated capitalization are aerospace and aircraft
(466.6 million US dollars), oil and gas (359.5 million US dollars), and telecommunications
(202.3 million US dollars). The same result holds for mean estimated cost, with the exception
that the telecommunications industry (399.2 million US dollars) is replaced by the paper and
allied products industry (729.9 million US dollars). Within the “top-ten,” telecommunications
has the highest mean estimated capitalization (202.3 million US dollars), followed by the
communications equipment (124.3 million US dollars) and the chemicals and allied products
industries (76.2 million US dollars). Similar results hold for estimated cost, with the business
services industry reporting the second highest mean (237.5 million US dollars).
Although these statistics should be viewed with caution, since they are based on a small
subset of the database, it appears that the largest JV deals are in the aerospace and aircraft, oil and
gas, telecommunications, paper and allied products, and chemicals and allied products industries.
Since these industries are very capital intensive, firms in these industries often use JVs as a form
of cooperation because JVs do not require acquisition of each other’s assets (i.e., to perform
M&A), which would otherwise be very expensive given the substantia l size of these firms.
Having ranked by mean and median estimated capitalization and cost for JVs with cross-
border participants, multi-regional JVs and domestic JVs, we are able to identify other industries
with large JV transactions. First, the motion picture and production industry has the third highest
mean estimated capitalization (218.4 million of US dollars) among JVs with cross-border
participants. Second, the rubber and miscellaneous plastic products industry has the highest mean
estimated capitalization (486.0 million US dollars) for multi-regional JVs. Third, the credit

14
institutions industry has the largest mean estimated cost (907.3 million US dollars) and the
electric, gas and water distribution industry has the third largest mean estimated cost (599.5
million US dollars) for domestic JVs. Although these results are somewhat interesting, we do not
have sufficient information regarding the dollar size of JVs to draw meaningful conclusions from
our observations.
Table 5 presents evidence on the relationship between the two forms of JVs (strategic
alliances versus independent JV firms) and the industries in which they occur. The business
services, prepackaged software, and wholesale trade of durable goods industries accounted for the
most strategic alliances, with 17.8%, 13.0% and 9.0% of all deals, respectively. Among
independent JV firms, the industries with the highest concentration of deals were business
services, chemical and allied products, and transportation equipment (8.1%, 5.5% and 4.7%,
respectively).
Noteworthy differences in the industry distribution of strategic alliances and independent
JV firms are revealed in Table 5. For example, the prepackaged software industry accounted for
13% of all strategic alliances but only 2.0% of all independent JV firms. Similarly , the drug
industry experienced 7.9% of all strategic alliances but only 1.8% of all independent JV firms.
These substantial differences suggest that strategic alliances and independent JV firms serve
inherently different purposes in certain industries. It is important that we improve our
understanding of the factors that influence companies in certain industries to prefer strategic
alliances over independent JV firms, and thus more research is needed in this area.
We also investigate the forms of JVs that are the most frequent in each industry9 . We
find that strategic alliances are most frequent in the prepackaged software industry, where 89.5%
of all transactions were executed as strategic alliances. Interestingly, for almost all industries in
the “top-ten” list (with the exception of chemicals and allied products) the percentage of deals
performed via strategic alliances is high (54.6% and above). This result , along with our earlier
finding that the industries in the “top-ten” list account for the majority of global JV activity,
suggests that strategic alliances stand at the core of this activity, while independent JV firms
represent more specialized cases.
Next, we investigate the form and industry of JVs having the highest percentage of cross-
border participants. JVs with cross-border participants are economically important because they
facilitate transfer and sharing of important tangible and intangible assets among partners from

9
Between strategic alliances and independent JVs, the percents (%) within an industry sum to 1 (i.e., the
sum of columns (e) and (i) is equal to 1).

15
different countries. Examples of these assets are technologies, management practices, accounting
procedures and governance standards.
Overall, 50.4% of strategic alliances have cross-border participants, with the highest
percentage of strategic alliances with cross-border participants in the air transportation and
shipping industry. Of 271 transactions in that industry, 229 (84.5%) had cross-border
participants. The two industries with the highest concentration of JV transactions (i.e., business
services and prepackaged software) were among the industries with the lowest ratios of strategic
alliances with cross-border participants. Of 6,077 and 4,435 strategic alliances in the business
services and prepackaged software industries, respectively, only 2,443 (40.2%) and 1,552 (35%)
transactions had cross-border participants.
The frequency of transactions with cross-border participants in independent JV firms is
higher than it is for strategic alliances. For the average industry, 71.1% of independent JV firms
were established by cross-border participants, as compared with only 50.4% of strategic alliances.
Of 42 independent JV deals in the tobacco products industry, 41 (97.6%) transactions had cross-
border participants, the highest ratio for this sub-group. Similarly for strategic alliances, the
business services and prepackaged software industries account for some of the lowest frequencies
of deals with cross-border participants (40.2% and 35.0%, respectively).
An important observation derived from Table 5 is the correlation of 0.694 between the
percentage of deals with cross-border participants in strategic alliances and in independent JV
firms. This moderately high correlation is indicative of a tendency for industries to have a
substantial percentage of deals with cross-border participants in both strategic alliances and
independent JV firms. On the other hand, there are also industries in which strategic alliances
and independent JV firms have different participation of cross-border partners. For example, why
is it that 82.9% of independent JV firms in the textile and apparel products industry have cross-
border participants and only 37.3% of strategic alliances in this industry have cross-border
participants? Similar large differences are observed in the retail trade of general merchandise and
apparel industry, the leather and leather products industry, and even in the communications
equipment industry, which is on the “top-ten” list. Answers to such questions require further
investigation of the complex motivations that lead domestic and foreign partners to choose
strategic alliances versus independent JV firms.
Lastly, we study the industry distribution of heterogeneous JVs, which we define as
transactions where the participants come from different industries (i.e., at least one participant in
the JV is from an industry different from the other partners). These JVs are important because
they represent intra-industry cooperation, and facilitate creation of new technologies, products

16
and services. While the distribution of heterogeneous JVs by industry is similar to that of the full
sample 10 , the findings regarding the within-industry frequency of heterogeneous JVs are quite
interesting.
Our results indicate that, for the average industry, 80.1% of JVs are heterogeneous,
pointing to substantial intra-industry cooperation in JVs. For most industries in the “top-ten” list,
the percentage of heterogeneous JVs is high, with the greatest frequency (98.0%) in the wholesale
trade of durable goods industry. While similar results are observed for many industries outside
the “top-ten” list, a few industries have relatively low ratios of heterogeneous JVs. The three
industries with the lowest frequency are mining, legal services, and air transportation and
shipping, with heterogeneous JVs accounting for 40.4%, 45.2% and 47.2%, respectively, of all
JVs. Surprisingly, for the drug industry, which is on the “top-ten” list, only 64.3% of JVs are
heterogeneous, which is less than the percentage for many other industries on this list.
We do not have a good explanation as to why the frequency of heterogeneous JVs is low
in some industries. Clearly, because the operations of the mining and legal services industries are
unique, firms in these industries exhibit little cooperation with firms from other industries.
However, it is not clear why only 64.3% of drug industry JVs are heterogeneous, especially in
light of the fact that that this is a broad, consumer-oriented, research-intensive industry.
We also attempt to understand the frequency of the forms of JVs (strategic alliances
versus independent JV firms) among heterogeneous transactions. After sub-dividing
heterogeneous JVs into the two forms 11 , we find a 59.5% correlation between the frequency of
heterogeneous JVs and the usage of strategic alliances. This result implies that, when partners
from different industries cooperate, they are more likely to do so via strategic alliances. It is
possible that, when partners are unfamiliar with each other’s operations, the probability of project
failure is increased. Subsequently, they might prefer strategic alliances to independent JV firms
because the cost of dissolution is much less for the former than for the latter.

Distribution of JVs by Type

The SDC database classifies JVs into eight types of agreements: licensing, technology,
exploration, manufacturing, marketing, R&D, supply, and equipment manufacturing/ value-added
reseller. In this section of the paper, we describe the industry distribution of JVs by these types.

10
The correlation coefficient between the distribution of heterogeneous JVs and all JVs (full sample) by
industry is 99% (i.e., the correlation between columns (l) and (b) is equal to 0.990).
11
The sum of the percentages (within heterogeneous JVs) of strategic alliances and independent JV firms
equals the overall frequency of heterogeneous JVs (i.e., the sum of columns (n) and (o) is equal to column
(m)).

17
 According to the SDC, licensing-agreement JVs arise “when one partner grants an
exclusive, simple or cross licensing agreement to another partner.” Technology-agreement JVs
are created “when an existing or new technology is transferred from one partner to another.”
Exploration-agreement JVs arise “in order to explore natural resources, such as oil, gas or
minerals.” Manufacturing, marketing, and R&D-agreement JVs are deals “which are based on
some kind of manufacturing, marketing or R&D agreement among the partners.” Supply-
agreement JVs are deals in which “one or more participants supply materials to other participants
who then use the materials to create finished products.” Lastly, equipment-manufacturing/value-
added reseller-agreement JVs are deals where “the original manufacturer supplies a product to
create and add value to a final product, usually computer equipment or software.”
Panel A of Table 6 reports the frequency of the different types of JVs in the dataset.
Marketing-agreement JVs are most frequent (28.4% of all deals), followed by manufacturing-
(22.8%), technology- (18.6%), R&D- (16.7%) and licensing-agreement JVs (15.5%). The three
most infrequent types are exploration, supply and equipment manufacturing agreements, with
only 3.1%, 2.8% and 1.5% of all deals, respectively. We note that these frequencies are inflated
(i.e., sum to more than 100%) because any given JV can belong to more than one type.
In order to better understand which JVs can be of multiple types, we report the
correlation matrix for the different types of JVs (Panel B of Table 6) and make several
observations. First, the data indicate that, when firms collaborate in the areas of technology,
R&D, manufacturing or marketing, they often use licenses (48.7% of licensing-agreement JVs are
also technology agreements, 33.3% are marketing agreements, 21.2% are R&D agreements, and
19.6% are manufacturing agreements). Second, technology-agreement JVs are often used in
conjunction with R&D agreements, marketing agreements and manufacturing agreements (42.1%
of all technology-agreement JVs are also classified as R&D agreements, 35% as marketing
agreements, and 24.1% as manufacturing agreements), indicating that, when firms share
technology they often collaborate on development and marketing as well. Third, manufacturing
and marketing activities in JVs are often combined (31.2% of all manufacturing-agreement JVs
are also classified as marketing-agreement JVs); this is analogous to the supply and equipment
manufacturing activities which also have a high correlation (28.5% of all supply-agreement JVs
are also classified as equipment manufacturing/value-added reseller-agreement JVs). Lastly, due
to their distinctive nature, exploration-agreement JVs rarely involve other activities, which can be
seen from the low correlations with other types of JVs.
The last panel of Table 6 (Panel C) reports the dollar size of estimated capitalization and
cost for various types of JVs. The results indicate that exploration-agreement JVs have the

18
highest mean for both estimated capitalization and cost (220 and 709.3 million US dollars,
respectively), primarily because of a number of very large exploration deals established by
multinational energy companies and host governments. Marketing-agreement JVs have the
lowest mean estimated capitalization (24.7 million US dollars), and are among those with the
lowest mean estimated cost (94.1 million of US dollars), probably because they require the least
commitment of real assets. The size of manufacturing-agreement JVs, whose mean estimated
capitalization and cost are 57.7 and 165.5 million US dollars, respectively , is probably the most
meaningful in the dataset because these are based on the largest number of observations. Lastly,
technology-agreement JVs and R&D-agreement JVs are similar in size. This is likely a
consequence of the fact that they are somewhat highly correlated since they represent similar
fundamental activit ies.
Next, we provide evidence on the relationship between the type of JV and the industry in
which they occur. Table 7 shows the distribution of JVs by type and industry, and documents the
existence of industry clustering. In addition, we report the amount of cross-border activity as
related to type-industry dynamics.
Of the eight types of JVs, exploration agreements exhibit the highest degree of industry
clustering, as one would expect. Two industries, oil and gas together with mining, account for
95.1% of all exploration-agreement JVs. This high degree of industry clustering is not surprising,
given the unique nature of natural resource exploration. Of 804 exploration-agreement JVs in the
oil and gas industry and 969 in the mining industry, 73.3% and 57.2% of transactions,
respectively, had cross-border participants. The higher than average (56.7%) ratio of transactions
with cross-border participants in the oil and gas industry can possibly be attributed to its extended
chain of activities. The fact that operations are functionally separated (extraction, refining,
distribution) allows for extensive participation by cross-border partners.
Technology-agreement JVs and R&D-agreement JVs display similar industry
distributions. The correlation coefficient here is 0.965, which is not surprising given that they
deal with two aspects of technology, either transferring or developing technology.
The results in Table 7 confirm this argument and indicate that technologically intensive
industries account for the bulk of technology- and R&D-agreement JVs. The prepackaged
software industry experienced the most transactions (18.5% and 18.0% of all deals in each group,
respectively), followed by the drug (15.3% and 17.5%), business services (10.3% and 16.6%) and
the electronic and electrical equipment (9.2% and 8.6%) industries. Two industries outside the
“top-ten” list that have relatively high percentages of technology and R&D agreements are the
computer and office equipment and the measuring, medical and photo equipment industries (with

19
5.0% and 4.0% of all technology agreements and 5.5% and 4.6% of all technology and R&D
agreements, respectively).
Interestingly, for the average industry, the frequency of transactions with cross-border
participants within technology-agreement JVs is higher than within R&D-agreement JVs (63.5%
versus 49.5%). This comparison indicates that foreign partners are more likely to receive new
technology (in technology-agreement JVs, technology is transferred from one partner to another)
than to develop it (in R&D-agreement JVs, partners jointly develop technology). The relatively
low correlation coefficient (0.352) provides additional support for this argument.
Manufacturing-agreement JVs exhibit a somewhat lower degree of industry clustering
than do other types of JVs. The industries in the “top-ten” list account for only 40.4% of all
manufacturing-agreement JVs, which is much lower than in other sub-groups 12 . The two
industries in the “top-ten” list that account for the largest percentage of manufacturing-
agreements JVs are the electronic and electrical equipment and the chemicals and allied products
industries, with 11.3% and 11.4% of all manufacturing-agreement JVs, respectively. Due to their
broad appeal, manufacturing-agreement JVs cluster in a number of industries outside the “top-
ten” which do not experience many other types of JVs. These industries are: transportation
equipment (9.7%), machinery (6.2%), metal and metal products (6.8%), food and kindred
products (6.4%). Additionally, manufacturing-agreement JVs have the highest frequency of
transactions with cross-border participants. One of the likely explanations is that, in order to
reduce costs, MNCs often outsource production to host countries with less expensive labor;
consequently, 70.7% of manufacturing-agreement JVs have cross-border participants.
Licensing- and marketing-agreement JVs have similar industry distributions. The
correlation between these two types of agreements is 0.622, indicating a tendency towards similar
industry clustering. The industries with the highest concentration of licensing agreements are
prepackaged software, drugs, and investments and commodity firms (with 16.6%, 15.2% and
12.5% of all licensing agreements, respectively). Marketing agreements cluster in wholesale
trade of durable goods (19.7% of all marketing agreements), business services (10.7%),
prepackaged software (9.0%) and wholesale trade of non durable goods (8.3%). Outside the
“top-ten” list, both types of JVs cluster in the computer and office equipment industry (3.4% and
3.4% of all licensing and marketing agreements, respectively), and the measuring, medical and
photo equipment industry (3.7% and 2.9%, respectively). Additionally, the frequency of JVs with

12
The cumulative percentages of transactions for industries in the “top-ten” list in other sub-groups, which
we do not report in Table 7, are: licensing-agreement JVs (75.1%), technology-agreement JVs (77.8%),
marketing-agreement JVs (68.5%), R&D-agreement JVs (75.3%), supply-agreement JVs (62.8%) and
equipment manufacturing-agreement JVs (74.6%).

20
cross-border participants within licensing-agreement JVs is similar to that within marketing-
agreement JVs (53.5% versus 60.9%).
Lastly, the industry distribution of supply-agreement JVs closely resembles that of
equipment manufacturing-agreement JVs; the correlation coefficient is 0.912. Both types of
agreements are heavily concentrated in the wholesale trade of durable goods industry (18.1% and
30.1% of all supply and equipment manufacturing agreements, respectively) and the prepackaged
software industry (10.3% and 18.3%, respectively). Outside the “top-ten” industries, computer
and office equipment accounted for 7.8% of all supply agreements and 11.2% of all equipment
manufacturing agreements.
Our results document that equipment manufacturing-agreement JVs are heavily
concentrated in the wholesale trade of durable goods industry (30.1% of all deals). According to
the SDC, these JVs are “transactions in which the original manufacturer supplies a product to
create and add value to a final product, and they should be common in the computer equipment
and software industries.” While our results confirm this observation, we also document the fact
that equipment manufacturing-agreement JVs are frequent in the trade of durable goods industry.
This finding may have significance for researchers studying the intricate relationships among
participants in supplier-manufacturer-customer chains.

Distribution of JVs by Country

In this section, we describe the geographic distribution of JVs. Table 8 presents evidence
on the distribution of JVs by form and country of operations. Table 9 describes the distribution
by type and country of operations. Table 8 documents the existence of substantial country
clustering in the distribution of JVs. Of 179 different countries around the globe, the following
seven accounted for 63.4% of all JV transactions: the United States, in which 38.0% of all JVs
were established13 , China (6.9%), Japan (6.6%), the United Kingdom (4.1%), Canada (3.0%),
Australia (2.8%) and Germany (2.2%).
Separate analysis of JVs with cross-border participants and domestic JVs14 , indicates that
JVs with cross-border participants have substantially lower country clustering than do domestic
JVs. The “top-seven” countries account for only 51.8% of all JVs with cross-border participants,
compared to 85.9% of all domestic JVs. The United States and China are the primary source of
this difference. The former experienced only 20.9% of JVs with cross-border participants, but

13
The results are based on the first nation of the JV’s operations (i.e., 38.0% of all JVs listed the United
States as the first country of operations).
14
We do not sort multi-regional JVs by country because by definition they operate in multiple locations.

21
67.1% of domestic JVs. The latter experienced 10.5% of JVs with cross-border participants and
only 1.8% of domestic JVs. These noteworthy differences can be attributed to differences in the
economic development of the two nations.
The United States plays a dominant role in the global distribution of domestic JVs
because of its active domestic cooperative market. The enormous size of its capital markets
combined with stable politic al and legal environments make it relatively easy for domestic firms
to cooperate. Consequently, 67.1% of domestic JVs occurred in the United States.
On the other hand, relative to other countries, the United States generates a much smaller
number of JVs with cross-border participants. While it still has a leading position (20.9% of all
JVs with cross-border participants were established in the United States), other countries, such as
China and Japan, have narrowed the gap, generating 10.5% and 7.8% of all JVs with cross-border
participants, respectively. This result might be informative to researchers analyzing the behavior
of MNCs who seek to better understand the factors affecting economic globalization.
Additional results in Table 8 indicate that strategic alliances have much stronger country
clustering than do independent JV firms. The “top-seven” countries generated 72.9% of strategic
alliances and 51.1% of independent JV firms. The United States alone accounted for more than
half of all strategic alliances (52.8%), followed by Japan (7.8%) and Canada (3.5%). The United
States accounted for only 18.7% of independent JV firms, followed by China (13.7%) and Japan
(5.1%). Some countries outside the “top-seven” accounted for a relatively large number of
independent JV firms, including India (3.6%) and Malaysia (3.3%).
The difference between the United States and China in terms of the frequency of strategic
alliances and independent JVs can again be attributed to differences in economic development.
China is very much foreign-production oriented15 , has substantial state involvement, and imposes
significant restrictions on foreign investment. As a consequence, foreign MNCs are forced to use
independent JV firms as a primary mode of entry into China. It seems reasonable to assume that
the Chinese government forces MNCs to use independent JV firms for entering China in order to
enhance development of Chinese infrastructure.
The United States accounted for more than half of all strategic alliances for the same
reason that it accounted for more than two-thirds of all domestic JVs: these strategic alliances are
driven by the very active cooperative market in the United States. Our results, which are not
reported in Table 8, indicate that, of 18,028 strategic alliances in the United States, 12,503
(69.35%) were comprised solely of domestic partners.

15
Our results, which are not reported in Table 8, indicate that, of 3,606 independent JV firms established in
China, 3,249 transactions (90.15%) had cross-border participants.

22
 Table 9 reports the distribution of various types of JVs by country of operations.
Analysis of this distribution can improve our understanding of host countries’ specializations
regarding these types of activities. Two primary conclusions are apparent from an examination of
Table 9. First, the United States is the leader in almost all types of JVs16 , which is not surprising
given the size of the U.S. economy. Second, JVs with cross-border participants are less frequent
in the United States than in other countries. This result is pr imarily driven by the high level of
domestic cooperative activity in the United States. Consequently, the frequency of JVs with
cross-border participants is lower in the United States.
Our observations of each type of JV reveal that the United States generated 62.3% of all
licensing agreements, followed by Japan (6.2%), Canada (3.3%) and the United Kingdom (2.7%).
Only 32.2% of licensing-agreement JVs established in the United States had cross-border
participants. In Japan, Canada and the United Kingdom, licensing-agreement JVs had much
higher ratios of cross-border participants (93.3%, 71.1% and 76.3%, respectively).
Technology- and R&D-agreement JVs exhibit similar country clustering. The United
States generated the majority of these transactions (57.9% and 58.1%, respectively) , followed by
Japan (8.3% and 8.5%, respectively), China (3.9% and 1.9%, respectively) and the United
Kingdom (2.7% and 2.7%, respectively). China accounted for a somewhat greater number of
technology-agreement JVs (3.9%) than R&D-agreement JVs (1.9%), probably because the former
are more production oriented than the latter.
The only category for which the United States is not the leading country is exploration-
agreement JVs. Australia generated the largest share (14.8% of all transactions), followed by the
United States (14.4%), Canada (13.2%) and the Russian Federation (4.1%). The participation of
cross-border partners in these agreements is somewhat low (38.8%, 41.0% and 42.5% for the top
three countries, respectively), which points to the existence of substantial domestic cooperative
activity. At the same time, the frequency of cross-border participants in exploration-agreement
JVs in the Russian Federation was quite high (89.6%). This is probably a consequence of the fact
that Russian domestic firms were not very active between 1990 and 2000, so that most
exploration activity was generated through foreign cooperation. Interestingly and unfortunately,
none of the natural resource-rich countries of Africa and Latin America are high on this list,
likely a consequence of foreign investment restrictions and political instability.
Manufacturing-agreement JVs are concentrated in the United States (24.3% of all
transactions), China (17.5%), Japan (6.1%) and India (3.9%). Given that the United States and
Japan are economically developed countries, it is not surprising to find them at the top of this list.

16
Except for exploration-agreement JVs.

23
On the other hand, the substantial number of these agreements in China and India adds to the
growing evidence on outsourcing of production from expens ive- to cheap-labor countries. The
degree of foreign participation in manufacturing-agreement JVs is quite high. In the United
States, 44.0% of manufacturing-agreement JVs had cross-border participants, the highest ratio for
any type of JV in the U.S. In China and India , almost all manufacturing-agreement JVs had
cross-border participants (92.4% and 90.7% of the transactions , respectively), which is solely a
consequence of the outsourcing phenomenon. In Japan, 71.3% of manufacturing-agreement JVs
had cross-border participants, indicating that, while foreigners play a substantial role in Japanese
manufacturing-agreement JVs, some domestic firms there continue to cooperate with each other
for production reasons.
Further investigation of this issue reveals that 50.4% 17 of 240 Japanese manufacturing-
agreement JVs that did not have cross-border participants (i.e., 28.7% of 835 manufacturing-
agreement JVs) were established in technologically advanced industries. That is, 53 (22.1% of
240) transactions were established in the chemicals and allied products industry, 45 (18.8%) in
the electronic and electrical equipment industry and 23 (9.6%) in the transportation equipment
industry. We see that domestic Japanese manufacturing-agreement JVs cluster in high-tech
industries, possibly as a consequence of these firms’ unwillingness to share technology with
foreigners, which is partially an artifact of the Keiretsu system. This result might have
importance for researchers who study industrial organization of the Japanese economy.
Marketing-, supply- and equipment manufacturing-agreement JVs cluster in the United
States, Japan and China, but otherwise, the frequency of transactions is fairly uniform. An
important observation is the rarity of equipment manufacturing-agreement JVs established in
China; these JVs are classified by the SDC as deals where an original manufacturer supplies a
product to create and add value to a final product, usually computer equipment or software.
Given that China generated 3.4% of worldwide supply agreements, one might expect a similar
frequency of equipment manufacturing agreements there. However, according to the SDC, only
three such transactions were signed in China, which raises the question as to whether this
represents a recording error or a fundamental feature of the Chinese economy.

Ownership Patterns in JVs

The last section of the paper addresses patterns of ownership in JVs. Table 10 shows the
mean and median percentage partners’ equity stake in JVs, as well as the frequency of equal
ownership. The results are reported for two-, three-, four- and five-participant JVs, and

17
We do not report these results in Table 9.

24
confirmed for JVs with cross-border participants, multi-regional JVs and domestic JVs.
Examination of these data reveals that partners of lower count have lower equity stake in the JV;
that is, on average, the second partner has less equity ownership than the first, the third partner
has less ownership than the second and so on. The SDC does not assign any meaning to the order
in which partners in the JV are listed18 , so these results are apparently related to the fact that the
media list the partners in order of relative importance within the JV. This observation might be
important to researchers who seek to understand the “acquirer-target” dynamics in JVs.
The most important finding from Table 10 is the strong preference for equal ownership
among JV partners. The empirical evidence shows that, in 71.0% of two-partner JVs, the owners
have equal stakes (i.e., both have 50% ownership). Given that two-partner JVs represent 87.02%
of global JV activity (see Panel B of Table 1), it is clear that that equal ownership is the dominant
form of control. For three-, four- and five-partner JVs, the frequency of transactions with equal
stakes is also relatively high (36.1%, 40.9% and 37.8% of all transactions, respectively), but
significantly less than for two-partner JVs. There may be two reasons for these results. First, as
the number of partners increases beyond two, it becomes increasingly difficult for partners to
agree on equal stakes. Second, in deals with numerous partners, it becomes increasingly unlikely
that each partner contributes equal assets to the JV. Consequently, it is reasonable to find that, as
the number of participant in the JV increases, the probability that they have equal stakes
decreases. We confirm these findings by looking separately at JVs with cross-border participants,
multi-regional JVs and domestic JVs.
Similar results have been previously reported by Hauswald and Hege (2004), who used
the SDC data to analyze two-partner American JVs. They conclude that equal ownership is
common in JVs because it prevents dominant partners from expropriating small participants. Our
results extend the ir findings by show ing that an analogous phenomenon holds internationally and
for multiple -partner JVs.

Summary and Future Research

This paper describes a global trend in JVs and alliances for the period 1990 to 2000,
utilizing the Thomson Financial SDC Platinum database. We survey the existing theoretical and
empirical literature on JVs and alliances, and provide a detailed description of the world of JVs
and alliances as depicted by the SDC database. Our results reveal that JVs and alliances are
flexible inter-organizational cooperative mechanisms, come in a variety of types, have strong

18
It is very likely that the SDC inserts the data on partners in the way it appears in the news
announcements.

25
industry and country clustering, and the partners in these deals have a clear preference for equal
ownership.
While the theoretical research continues to develop a better understanding of the structure
of various organizational forms, more work is needed in addressing the dynamic relationship
among these forms. In particular, under what conditions do firms choose one form of cooperation
and then extend it to a more complex form, or sometimes extend to a simple form. For example,
when do JVs and alliances lead to M&As and takeovers, and vise versa? When do firms start with
arm’s-length contracts, then continue to JVs and alliances, and then to M&As and takeovers?
These questions are very important and, if answered, could improve on our understanding of the
factors that affect the evolution of firms’ organizational structure.

26
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Joint Ventures
Panel A - Frequency of Joint Ventures (JVs)
N (%)
All JVs 60446 100%
with disclosed Estimated Capitalization 4484 7.42%
with disclosed Estimated Cost 4487 7.42%
with disclosed both Estimated Capitalization and Cost 402 0.67%
JVs w/ Cross-Border Participants 35495 58.72%
Multi-regional JVs 5839 9.66%
JVs w/ Cross-Border Participants & Multi-regional 5626 9.31%
Domestic JVs 22658 37.48%

Panel B - Number of Participants in JVs

All JVs JVs w/ Cross-Border Multi-regional JVs Domestic JVs
participants: N % N % N % N %
2 52597 87.02% 29626 83.47% 5152 88.23% 20793 91.77%
3 5484 9.07% 4071 11.47% 469 8.03% 1325 5.85%
4 1406 2.33% 1069 3.01% 123 2.11% 319 1.41%
5 529 0.88% 417 1.17% 56 0.96% 108 0.48%
>5 (max=20) 426 0.70% 312 0.88% 39 0.67% 113 0.50%
Total 60442 100.00% 35495 100.00% 5839 100.00% 22658 100.00%

Panel C - Number of Countries where JVs will Operate

All JVs JVs w/ Cross-Border Multi-regional JVs Domestic JVs
countries: N % N % N % N %
1 51400 85.0% 28578 80.5% _- _-_ 22642 99.93%
2 4930 8.2% 4508 12.7% 5295 90.68% 11 0.05%
3 356 0.6% 319 0.9% 332 5.69% 2 0.01%
4 103 0.2% 92 0.3% 99 1.70% 3 0.01%
>4 (max=18) 115 0.2% 100 0.3% 113 1.94% 0 0.00%
Missing Country 3538 5.9% 1898 5.3% 0 0.00% 0 0.00%
Total 60442 100.00% 35495 100.00% 5839 100.00% 22658 100.00%

Panel D - Form of JVs

All JVs JVs w/ Cross-Border Multi-regional JVs Domestic JVs
Form N % N % N % N %
Strategic Alliance 34161 56.5% 16460 46.4% 3784 64.8% 15687 69.2%
Independent JV firm 26271 43.5% 19035 53.6% 2055 35.2% 6971 30.8%
Total 60442 100.00% 35495 100.00% 5839 100.00% 22658 100.00%

Panel E - Dollar Size of JVs

(data are in US$ Mil) Mean Median N
All Joint Ventures
Estimated Capitalization of JV 79.07 8 4484
Estimated Cost of JV 264.56 30 4487
JVs w/ Cross-Border Participants
Estimated Capitalization of JV 81.85 8.6 3560
Estimated Cost of JV 278.70 30 3327
Multi-regional JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 88.10 9.75 388
Estimated Cost of JV 452.44 57.5 292
Domestic JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 69.74 5.6 882
Estimated Cost of JV 233.63 28.45 1096
Strategic Alliance
Estimated Capitalization of JV 138.6 20 196
Estimated Cost of JV 308.4 25.1 922
Independent JV firm
Estimated Capitalization of JV 76.4 7.6 4287
Estimated Cost of JV 253.3 30 3563

31
Table 2
Frequency and Size of Joint Ventures by Year
All JVs JVs w/ Cross-Border Participants
Est. Capitalization Estimated Cost Est. Capitalization Estimated Cost
Year N Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs N Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs
1990 3034 228.1 20.0 210 269.1 41.3 67 2012 263.8 17.3 163 296.1 42.0 53
1991 5193 91.1 8.8 529 181.7 34.5 236 3367 87.1 8.4 442 220.1 48.5 177
1992 5208 75.8 9.0 338 222.8 33.6 225 2945 82.3 8.9 278 215.9 52.8 167
1993 6139 90.1 10.0 711 295.4 27.7 443 3816 75.5 10.0 582 336.4 30.0 346
1994 7527 41.8 6.0 792 236.2 22.0 1005 4758 45.3 7.1 667 224.6 22.0 774
1995 8044 40.9 6.6 636 233.6 30.0 1101 5070 42.8 6.5 529 232.7 30.0 854
1996 4296 70.0 7.7 252 246.1 30.0 397 2608 79.2 7.8 214 253.1 30.0 287
1997 5540 106.5 10.0 385 304.5 50.0 363 3076 117.9 10.0 309 370.9 57.8 255
1998 4910 96.4 13.2 229 556.9 49.2 244 2635 111.5 20.0 157 690.2 54.6 176
1999 5043 86.6 5.0 160 306.4 51.3 224 2486 76.7 6.5 108 270.0 50.0 119
2000 5512 61.9 3.2 242 207.5 30.7 182 2722 100.1 4.7 111 225.0 46.8 119
Total 60446 79.1 8.0 4484 264.6 30.0 4487 35495 81.9 8.6 3560 278.7 30.0 3327

Multi-Regional JVs Domestic JVs

Est. Capitalization Estimated Cost Est. Capitalization Estimated Cost
Year N Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs N Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs
1990 121 198.6 30.0 6 340.4 269.3 4 411 106.3 28.3 44 275.3 45.2 8
1991 260 161.1 9.1 20 382.0 200.0 15 821 117.3 15.2 81 111.4 47.6 31
1992 1244 47.7 4.5 99 264.4 100.0 48 2132 50.0 10.0 54 246.8 11.3 56
1993 869 73.8 6.5 87 813.0 37.0 35 2186 167.9 10.0 118 151.8 10.1 92
1994 843 47.2 5.2 26 333.3 50.0 51 2700 23.6 3.0 125 281.7 25.5 225
1995 662 62.3 4.3 23 432.3 63.5 48 2901 32.4 6.8 105 239.4 32.0 241
1996 279 52.0 23.7 12 126.1 23.5 21 1629 18.0 7.7 38 231.4 33.0 107
1997 503 153.1 16.5 64 698.3 50.5 38 2378 57.3 4.1 68 148.6 30.9 100
1998 492 108.0 26.8 46 572.1 283.5 24 2215 65.8 7.0 69 212.0 25.2 68
1999 325 17.5 17.5 2 566.0 47.5 4 2530 109.2 3.3 51 347.7 52.5 105
2000 241 180.1 3.3 3 235.3 107.6 4 2755 29.2 2.0 129 174.5 21.0 63
Total 5839 88.1 9.8 388 452.4 57.5 292 22658 69.7 5.6 882 233.6 28.5 1096

Graph 1
Yearly Frequency of JV Deals
9000
All JVs
8000

7000

6000
Number of Deals

JVs w/ Cross-
5000 Border
Participants
4000

3000 Multi-Regional
JVs
2000

1000 Domestic
JVs
0
1990

1991

1992

1993

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

32
Table 3
Frequency of Joint Ventures by Industry
JVs w/ Cross-Border
All JVs Multi-Regional JVs Domestic JVs
Participants
Industry of JV N % Cum % N % Cum % N % Cum % N % Cum %
Business Services 8205 13.6% 13.6% 3740 10.5% 10.5% 564 9.7% 9.7% 4308 19.0% 19.0%
Prepackaged Software 4953 8.2% 21.8% 1852 5.2% 15.8% 353 6.0% 15.7% 2608 11.5% 30.5%
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 4026 6.7% 28.4% 2259 6.4% 22.1% 485 8.3% 24.0% 1566 6.9% 37.4%
Drugs 3201 5.3% 33.7% 1824 5.1% 27.3% 491 8.4% 32.4% 1155 5.1% 42.5%
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 2785 4.6% 38.3% 1859 5.2% 32.5% 399 6.8% 39.3% 805 3.6% 46.1%
Investment & Commodity Firms/Dealers/Exch. 2375 3.9% 42.3% 1362 3.8% 36.3% 156 2.7% 41.9% 989 4.4% 50.5%
Chemicals and Allied Products 2050 3.4% 45.7% 1571 4.4% 40.8% 251 4.3% 46.2% 437 1.9% 52.4%
Telecommunications 1811 3.0% 48.6% 1129 3.2% 43.9% 185 3.2% 49.4% 632 2.8% 55.2%
Communications Equipment 1783 2.9% 51.6% 1059 3.0% 46.9% 233 4.0% 53.4% 590 2.6% 57.8%
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 1748 2.9% 54.5% 1142 3.2% 50.1% 228 3.9% 57.3% 568 2.5% 60.3%
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 1586 2.6% 1142 3.2% 126 2.2% 427 1.9%
Transportation Equipment 1579 2.6% 1287 3.6% 174 3.0% 275 1.2%
Computer and Office Equipment 1484 2.5% 788 2.2% 168 2.9% 519 2.3%
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 1340 2.2% 728 2.1% 177 3.0% 525 2.3%
Mining 1318 2.2% 774 2.2% 43 0.7% 540 2.4%
Machinery 1258 2.1% 962 2.7% 148 2.5% 267 1.2%
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers 1224 2.0% 656 1.8% 39 0.7% 559 2.5%
Metal and Metal Products 1181 2.0% 923 2.6% 117 2.0% 234 1.0%
Construction Firms 1126 1.9% 785 2.2% 83 1.4% 330 1.5%
Food and Kindred Products 1071 1.8% 844 2.4% 85 1.5% 218 1.0%
Transportation and Shipping (except air) 1062 1.8% 753 2.1% 164 2.8% 286 1.3%
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 978 1.6% 624 1.8% 71 1.2% 354 1.6%
Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations 798 1.3% 434 1.2% 66 1.1% 349 1.5%
Insurance 765 1.3% 417 1.2% 45 0.8% 343 1.5%
Motion Picture Production and Distribution 575 1.0% 300 0.8% 48 0.8% 259 1.1%
Air Transportation and Shipping 523 0.9% 437 1.2% 150 2.6% 83 0.4%
Textile and Apparel Products 469 0.8% 308 0.9% 44 0.8% 153 0.7%
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 462 0.8% 368 1.0% 37 0.6% 84 0.4%
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 441 0.7% 237 0.7% 24 0.4% 195 0.9%
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Services 441 0.7% 240 0.7% 26 0.4% 190 0.8%
Credit Institutions 423 0.7% 227 0.6% 35 0.6% 191 0.8%
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 417 0.7% 321 0.9% 40 0.7% 86 0.4%
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 397 0.7% 282 0.8% 40 0.7% 112 0.5%
Health Services 393 0.7% 105 0.3% 17 0.3% 286 1.3%
Hotels and Casinos 381 0.6% 258 0.7% 23 0.4% 117 0.5%
Amusement and Recreation Services 341 0.6% 174 0.5% 18 0.3% 161 0.7%
Aerospace and Aircraft 332 0.5% 257 0.7% 75 1.3% 67 0.3%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 321 0.5% 164 0.5% 19 0.3% 145 0.6%
Paper and Allied Products 275 0.5% 196 0.6% 16 0.3% 77 0.3%
Advertising Services 248 0.4% 135 0.4% 21 0.4% 107 0.5%
Public Administration 236 0.4% 112 0.3% 50 0.9% 121 0.5%
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 234 0.4% 151 0.4% 20 0.3% 75 0.3%
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 225 0.4% 145 0.4% 20 0.3% 73 0.3%
Sanitary Services 224 0.4% 118 0.3% 21 0.4% 100 0.4%
Soaps, Cosmetics and Personal-Care Products 193 0.3% 148 0.4% 19 0.3% 41 0.2%
Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures 182 0.3% 132 0.4% 18 0.3% 46 0.2%
Retail Trade-Home Furnishings 154 0.3% 91 0.3% 13 0.2% 58 0.3%
Retail Trade-General Merchandise & Apparel 149 0.2% 94 0.3% 13 0.2% 51 0.2%
Educational Services 128 0.2% 53 0.1% 5 0.1% 74 0.3%
Repair Services 123 0.2% 90 0.3% 12 0.2% 31 0.1%
Retail Trade-Food Stores 118 0.2% 92 0.3% 16 0.3% 26 0.1%
Other Financial 102 0.2% 51 0.1% 6 0.1% 50 0.2%
Leather and Leather Products 74 0.1% 46 0.1% 6 0.1% 25 0.1%
Miscellaneous Services 72 0.1% 35 0.1% 2 0.0% 35 0.2%
Tobacco Products 55 0.1% 51 0.1% 15 0.3% 4 0.0%
Holding Companies, Except Banks 35 0.1% 25 0.1% 6 0.1% 9 0.0%
Social Services 34 0.1% 9 0.0% 5 0.1% 23 0.1%
Legal Services 31 0.1% 21 0.1% 5 0.1% 10 0.0%
Personal Services 20 0.0% 9 0.0% 1 0.0% 11 0.0%
Savings and Loans, Mutual Savings Banks 8 0.0% 4 0.0% 1 0.0% 4 0.0%
No Industry Classification & Non-classifiable 1903 3.1% 1095 3.1% 101 1.7% 594 2.6%
Total 60446 100% 35495 100% 5839 100% 22658 100%
33
Table 4
Size of Joint Ventures by Industry
All JVs JVs w/ Cross-Border Participants Multi-Regional JVs Domestic JVs
(Data are in US$ Mil) Estimated Capitalization Estimated Cost Estimated Capitalization Estimated Cost Estimated Capitalization Estimated Cost Estimated Capitalization Estimated Cost
Industry of JV Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs Mean Median N obs
Business Services 41.9 2.4 275 237.5 24.4 232 41.0 2.1 176 268.1 26.1 135 98.0 4.0 13 1354.1 47.8 17 43.6 2.8 99 197.6 18.0 95
Prepackaged Software 14.6 2.0 69 61.2 7.0 68 16.3 1.8 47 27.8 5.3 30 10.2 1.0 7 34.4 34.4 2 10.5 2.2 21 102.7 11.0 32
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 13.1 1.5 188 192.5 11.0 80 12.4 1.5 153 183.9 8.0 48 10.5 0.8 18 64.0 27.8 4 17.2 1.8 33 232.0 24.7 28
Drugs 47.9 10.0 85 28.3 15.8 165 51.9 10.0 63 29.3 17.1 112 307.6 8.4 10 44.6 30.0 25 9.4 5.8 20 27.7 20.0 49
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 59.4 9.0 279 211.7 25.0 237 68.6 9.0 231 174.0 26.9 194 81.5 13.8 22 247.8 63.5 14 15.6 8.2 46 410.6 16.8 40
Investment & Commodity Firms/Dealers/Exch. 54.8 10.1 141 114.4 42.5 69 48.7 10.1 112 106.4 31.3 42 57.4 22.9 16 294.0 200.0 6 78.2 12.9 29 126.7 45.7 27
Chemicals and Allied Products 76.2 7.9 272 140.1 44.5 310 53.3 8.1 230 143.8 46.4 263 96.1 14.0 31 182.0 118.7 22 216.8 6.2 39 117.6 33.0 43
Telecommunications 202.3 12.5 103 399.2 61.7 140 212.1 12.5 85 418.5 60.0 107 70.8 15.0 13 666.5 508.1 12 166.7 3.5 15 346.1 100.0 32
Communications Equipment 124.3 10.0 111 235.1 20.0 111 102.9 10.0 98 258.2 20.1 90 177.3 18.8 10 256.9 86.4 17 285.1 6.3 13 178.4 45.5 15
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 62.8 2.5 106 108.4 15.0 67 82.2 2.0 76 124.8 20.2 50 7.6 1.2 9 13.6 13.4 6 13.9 3.0 29 62.7 3.8 16
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 359.5 40.0 126 1075.7 117.0 249 395.6 42.0 100 1148.3 225.0 200 318.8 28.5 9 1895.8 450.0 24 227.9 40.0 25 810.0 44.0 47
Transportation Equipment 80.5 12.0 278 191.1 27.3 218 84.5 12.5 246 205.8 29.2 200 99.1 10.4 33 199.0 67.5 12 61.1 12.1 26 27.4 17.4 18
Computer and Office Equipment 23.5 5.0 68 178.9 15.0 50 17.5 4.8 47 150.7 19.0 31 8.7 3.9 10 38.8 38.8 2 35.6 6.5 19 321.2 10.0 13
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 27.8 4.9 58 127.9 5.6 63 30.7 4.8 49 137.4 6.0 43 72.7 10.0 7 18.5 18.5 4 13.1 8.0 8 124.9 3.0 17
Mining 79.4 8.8 104 112.8 8.0 200 103.1 11.1 70 154.1 15.0 120 2.8 2.7 3 305.7 45.0 8 31.6 6.7 33 50.8 3.0 80
Machinery 52.0 6.0 177 56.8 20.0 112 53.0 6.0 148 61.3 20.0 92 113.8 5.3 10 92.4 65.0 10 46.9 6.8 29 36.2 15.6 20
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers 94.2 19.7 164 256.8 63.8 330 93.0 20.4 122 183.8 60.0 203 211.8 31.6 5 86.5 99.1 4 97.7 7.6 42 378.4 76.2 125
Metal and Metal Products 56.0 10.0 231 214.5 30.0 186 56.8 10.8 200 192.9 30.0 154 84.1 6.0 25 410.8 170.2 8 50.3 5.0 27 338.3 35.0 29
Construction Firms 167.4 15.0 118 525.3 87.0 253 179.1 15.0 97 647.2 99.0 181 288.3 38.0 11 463.4 84.3 18 113.1 12.5 21 225.1 78.0 69
Food and Kindred Products 48.5 10.7 163 49.7 16.8 177 52.5 11.9 145 44.5 17.7 154 10.1 6.0 7 12.1 13.5 5 17.3 10.4 17 87.8 10.2 22
Transportation and Shipping (except air) 35.8 3.8 110 190.2 19.5 91 32.5 3.0 93 220.5 19.5 71 16.6 5.1 18 108.5 18.0 7 54.0 14.5 17 82.9 17.5 20
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 165.5 36.3 101 610.8 180.0 222 207.9 46.0 66 614.5 200.0 167 90.1 30.0 6 818.0 458.0 13 85.7 29.0 35 599.5 138.0 55
Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations 155.9 30.0 49 204.3 51.7 58 185.7 21.1 28 258.2 122.5 30 75.0 75.0 2 376.3 251.8 4 117.1 30.0 20 146.5 30.0 28
Insurance 105.1 11.4 90 34.5 16.0 15 102.6 10.9 70 25.6 16.0 13 22.2 25.0 3 11.4 11.4 2 114.0 19.4 20 92.2 92.2 2
Motion Picture Production and Distribution 178.6 23.1 26 53.8 30.0 33 218.4 23.1 18 72.4 60.0 20 176.7 60.0 3 86.0 86.0 2 89.3 26.8 8 25.2 9.3 13
Air Transportation and Shipping 62.0 11.0 37 240.9 70.0 25 69.3 11.0 28 258.4 76.0 23 100.0 100.0 1 613.8 475.0 4 39.1 9.4 9 39.7 39.7 2
Textile and Apparel Products 15.5 4.7 96 44.1 15.6 52 16.9 4.6 83 34.4 15.0 42 56.1 5.6 12 27.5 27.5 2 5.5 3.8 10 85.1 35.0 10
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 39.3 11.4 103 95.8 41.3 88 43.1 12.3 88 98.9 43.5 79 66.7 33.3 7 102.3 100.0 7 17.0 9.8 15 83.9 100.0 7
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 25.6 2.2 36 285.7 110.0 17 28.2 1.8 23 361.4 70.0 12 1.4 0.3 3 111.5 111.5 1 22.8 4.2 12 102.0 123.8 4
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Services 76.0 9.6 16 82.5 30.0 13 92.4 12.0 13 115.4 68.0 9 293.5 293.5 2 . . . 4.9 4.7 3 8.5 9.0 4
Credit Institutions 27.0 5.5 45 523.7 100.0 9 23.6 5.0 34 331.9 98.6 6 5.8 5.7 6 . . . 37.7 16.2 11 907.3 100.0 3
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 55.4 5.5 67 64.3 20.4 59 63.5 6.0 57 67.0 21.1 50 486.0 486.0 2 85.4 70.2 4 9.2 3.0 10 41.1 17.4 8
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 37.0 16.2 83 25.8 10.0 11 29.5 15.0 73 25.8 10.0 11 37.3 40.0 6 100.0 100.0 1 91.2 23.2 10 . . .
Health Services 15.4 6.5 20 61.1 23.4 20 21.4 22.5 9 31.4 26.1 11 50.0 50.0 1 0.4 0.4 1 10.6 3.3 11 97.5 20.0 9
Hotels and Casinos 70.2 40.0 43 106.8 43.9 80 55.9 20.0 33 106.7 37.5 60 60.2 46.7 4 100.0 100.0 1 122.3 54.3 9 97.2 70.0 19
Amusement and Recreation Services 64.1 12.1 26 165.0 50.0 35 86.5 12.1 18 108.9 40.0 21 . . . 8.0 8.0 1 13.8 12.0 8 241.4 73.5 13
Aerospace and Aircraft 466.6 45.0 22 698.2 200.0 33 509.3 45.0 20 739.2 148.0 24 3.2 1.0 3 1068.4 412.0 3 77.4 77.4 1 589.1 380.0 9
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 44.4 2.8 12 4.1 1.4 10 48.4 3.5 11 4.5 1.4 9 . . . 8.0 8.0 1 0.7 0.7 1 0.5 0.5 1
Paper and Allied Products 151.9 10.0 52 729.9 48.5 34 186.1 11.0 42 956.3 45.0 23 2.6 2.6 2 . . . 8.6 1.2 9 256.7 77.7 11
Advertising Services 13.4 0.6 22 53.5 5.0 8 16.7 0.4 17 41.2 32.0 4 23.1 4.5 4 . . . 2.2 0.9 5 65.9 3.8 4
Public Administration 22.6 3.0 5 121.1 60.4 6 36.0 15.0 3 156.4 149.1 4 90.0 90.0 1 327.0 327.0 1 2.5 2.5 2 50.4 50.4 2
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 31.7 4.3 33 33.5 10.3 32 34.7 5.0 23 42.6 12.4 23 26.9 3.3 4 . . . 24.8 0.7 10 10.1 3.3 9
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 144.3 2.0 21 518.3 8.6 12 166.0 2.0 18 609.1 7.6 10 3.3 3.3 2 0.0 0.0 1 14.0 1.9 3 64.8 64.8 2
Sanitary Services 13.3 7.9 8 40.7 11.0 22 0.2 0.2 2 57.9 12.5 14 . . . 2.0 2.0 2 17.7 16.3 6 12.1 6.0 7

34
Soaps, Cosmetics and Personal-Care Products 9.8 7.4 29 24.6 15.1 28 10.0 7.4 23 23.1 15.6 24 13.5 13.5 2 52.8 52.8 2 9.0 6.7 6 9.3 12.0 3
Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures 26.6 3.0 37 43.6 25.0 21 31.3 3.0 31 51.5 25.0 15 63.3 2.0 5 . . . 3.2 3.5 5 23.8 15.8 6
Retail Trade-Home Furnishings 12.1 2.9 5 15.4 15.4 1 18.9 6.0 3 15.4 15.4 1 6.0 6.0 1 . . . 1.8 1.8 2 . . .
Retail Trade-General Merchandise & Apparel 41.4 5.5 16 55.3 26.3 12 44.1 6.0 15 32.5 18.7 8 5.0 5.0 1 259.0 259.0 1 1.2 1.2 1 48.2 31.5 3
Educational Services 2.0 0.7 5 31.6 3.6 5 0.4 0.4 1 2.2 2.0 3 . . . 2.0 2.0 1 2.5 0.8 4 75.6 75.6 2
Repair Services 3.3 1.2 18 116.2 1.7 7 2.6 1.1 14 135.3 2.7 6 6.2 6.2 1 1.0 1.0 1 5.5 5.6 4 1.7 1.7 1
Retail Trade-Food Stores 7.9 3.4 14 85.4 19.0 11 7.9 3.4 14 98.6 19.0 9 21.4 21.4 2 500.0 500.0 1 . . . 25.9 25.9 2
Other Financial 9.8 9.6 4 . . . 9.8 9.6 4 . . . 11.3 11.3 2 . . . . . . . . .
Leather and Leather Products 34.4 8.0 8 36.0 10.0 8 34.4 8.0 8 36.0 10.0 8 0.3 0.3 1 . . . . . . . . .
Miscellaneous Services 12.3 4.4 7 1.5 1.5 1 11.9 4.2 6 1.5 1.5 1 . . . . . . 15.2 15.2 1 . . .
Tobacco Products 37.4 35.0 7 89.6 52.5 12 37.4 35.0 7 89.6 52.5 12 48.7 47.5 4 200.0 200.0 1 . . . . . .
Holding Companies, Except Banks 48.1 4.0 7 9.0 1.5 3 67.2 76.0 5 13.3 13.3 2 100.0 100.0 1 . . . 0.1 0.1 2 0.4 0.4 1
Social Services 4.5 4.5 1 10.0 10.0 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.5 4.5 1 10.0 10.0 1
Legal Services 0.3 0.3 1 . . . 0.3 0.3 1 . . . 0.3 0.3 1 . . . . . . . . .
Personal Services 3.4 0.8 3 12.0 12.0 2 4.8 4.8 2 . . . . . . . . . 0.8 0.8 1 12.0 12.0 2
Savings and Loans, Mutual Savings Banks 70.0 70.0 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70.0 70.0 2 . . .
No Industry Classification & Non-classifiable 158.0 7.4 81 251.4 30.0 73 114.0 6 61 284.2 31 53 144.3 10.8 6 133.3 39 7 340.0 10 17 175.2 32.3 16

35
Table 5
Frequency of Joint Ventures by Form
All JVs (Full
Strategic Alliances Independent JV Firms Heterogeneous JVs
sample)
% JVs w/ % JVs w/ Strategic Independent
% of % within cross- % of % within cross- % of % within Alliances (% JV firms (%
Industry of JV N % N N N
all industry border all industry border all industry within within
partic. partic. industry) industry)
column (a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o)
Business Services 8205 13.6% 6077 17.8% 74.1% 40.2% 2128 8.1% 25.9% 60.9% 7211 14.7% 87.9% 64.9% 23.0%
Prepackaged Software 4953 8.2% 4435 13.0% 89.5% 35.0% 516 2.0% 10.4% 57.4% 4312 8.8% 87.1% 77.5% 9.5%
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 4026 6.7% 3082 9.0% 76.6% 51.3% 944 3.6% 23.4% 71.9% 3945 8.1% 98.0% 75.5% 22.5%
Drugs 3201 5.3% 2714 7.9% 84.8% 54.1% 486 1.8% 15.2% 73.5% 2057 4.2% 64.3% 54.3% 10.0%
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 2785 4.6% 1643 4.8% 59.0% 57.0% 1142 4.3% 41.0% 80.7% 2186 4.5% 78.5% 46.5% 32.0%
Investment & Commodity Firms/Dealers/Exch. 2375 3.9% 1592 4.7% 67.0% 51.5% 783 3.0% 33.0% 69.2% 2040 4.2% 85.9% 62.5% 23.4%
Chemicals and Allied Products 2050 3.4% 615 1.8% 30.0% 64.9% 1435 5.5% 70.0% 81.7% 1539 3.1% 75.1% 23.4% 51.7%
Telecommunications 1811 3.0% 989 2.9% 54.6% 51.5% 822 3.1% 45.4% 75.4% 1374 2.8% 75.9% 41.4% 34.5%
Communications Equipment 1783 2.9% 1180 3.5% 66.2% 47.0% 601 2.3% 33.7% 83.9% 1637 3.3% 91.8% 61.2% 30.5%
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 1748 2.9% 1123 3.3% 64.2% 59.7% 624 2.4% 35.7% 75.6% 1704 3.5% 97.5% 63.4% 34.0%
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 1586 2.6% 406 1.2% 25.6% 61.8% 1179 4.5% 74.3% 75.6% 874 1.8% 55.1% 11.9% 43.2%
Transportation Equipment 1579 2.6% 336 1.0% 21.3% 69.9% 1243 4.7% 78.7% 84.6% 1121 2.3% 71.0% 13.3% 57.7%
Computer and Office Equipment 1484 2.5% 1218 3.6% 82.1% 49.0% 266 1.0% 17.9% 71.8% 1297 2.6% 87.4% 71.4% 16.0%
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 1340 2.2% 946 2.8% 70.6% 46.2% 394 1.5% 29.4% 73.9% 1096 2.2% 81.8% 56.8% 25.0%
Mining 1318 2.2% 389 1.1% 29.5% 48.6% 928 3.5% 70.4% 62.9% 532 1.1% 40.4% 9.6% 30.6%
Machinery 1258 2.1% 465 1.4% 37.0% 66.5% 792 3.0% 63.0% 82.4% 1066 2.2% 84.7% 31.9% 52.8%
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers 1224 2.0% 272 0.8% 22.2% 37.1% 952 3.6% 77.8% 58.3% 1017 2.1% 83.1% 18.8% 64.3%
Metal and Metal Products 1181 2.0% 252 0.7% 21.3% 64.7% 929 3.5% 78.7% 81.8% 929 1.9% 78.7% 17.7% 61.0%
Construction Firms 1126 1.9% 290 0.8% 25.8% 63.1% 836 3.2% 74.2% 72.0% 961 2.0% 85.3% 22.5% 62.9%
Food and Kindred Products 1071 1.8% 233 0.7% 21.8% 60.1% 838 3.2% 78.2% 84.0% 621 1.3% 58.0% 9.5% 48.5%
Transportation and Shipping (except air) 1062 1.8% 257 0.8% 24.2% 58.0% 805 3.1% 75.8% 75.0% 648 1.3% 61.0% 14.3% 46.7%
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 978 1.6% 221 0.6% 22.6% 57.5% 757 2.9% 77.4% 65.7% 768 1.6% 78.5% 16.3% 62.3%
Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations 798 1.3% 331 1.0% 41.5% 47.1% 467 1.8% 58.5% 59.5% 630 1.3% 78.9% 32.5% 46.5%
Insurance 765 1.3% 296 0.9% 38.7% 35.8% 468 1.8% 61.2% 66.2% 483 1.0% 63.1% 23.3% 39.9%
Motion Picture Production and Distribution 575 1.0% 262 0.8% 45.6% 45.8% 313 1.2% 54.4% 57.5% 443 0.9% 77.0% 36.0% 41.0%
Air Transportation and Shipping 523 0.9% 271 0.8% 51.8% 84.5% 252 1.0% 48.2% 82.5% 247 0.5% 47.2% 13.6% 33.7%
Textile and Apparel Products 469 0.8% 177 0.5% 37.7% 37.3% 292 1.1% 62.3% 82.9% 348 0.7% 74.2% 27.1% 47.1%
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 462 0.8% 79 0.2% 17.1% 53.2% 383 1.5% 82.9% 85.1% 363 0.7% 78.6% 14.5% 64.1%
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 441 0.7% 194 0.6% 44.0% 45.4% 247 0.9% 56.0% 60.3% 427 0.9% 96.8% 42.0% 54.9%
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Services 441 0.7% 215 0.6% 48.8% 43.3% 225 0.9% 51.0% 64.9% 266 0.5% 60.3% 32.2% 27.9%
Credit Institutions 423 0.7% 227 0.7% 53.7% 41.9% 195 0.7% 46.1% 67.2% 404 0.8% 95.5% 51.3% 44.0%
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 417 0.7% 114 0.3% 27.3% 63.2% 302 1.1% 72.4% 82.1% 368 0.8% 88.2% 25.2% 62.8%
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 397 0.7% 136 0.4% 34.3% 55.9% 261 1.0% 65.7% 78.9% 235 0.5% 59.2% 20.4% 38.8%
Health Services 393 0.7% 177 0.5% 45.0% 23.7% 216 0.8% 55.0% 29.2% 256 0.5% 65.1% 30.8% 34.4%
Hotels and Casinos 381 0.6% 70 0.2% 18.4% 58.6% 311 1.2% 81.6% 69.8% 319 0.7% 83.7% 14.4% 69.3%
Amusement and Recreation Services 341 0.6% 114 0.3% 33.4% 45.6% 227 0.9% 66.6% 53.7% 295 0.6% 86.5% 27.3% 59.2%
Aerospace and Aircraft 332 0.5% 121 0.4% 36.4% 66.9% 211 0.8% 63.6% 83.4% 244 0.5% 73.5% 24.4% 49.1%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 321 0.5% 213 0.6% 66.4% 39.4% 108 0.4% 33.6% 74.1% 294 0.6% 91.6% 60.1% 31.5%
Paper and Allied Products 275 0.5% 49 0.1% 17.8% 49.0% 226 0.9% 82.2% 76.1% 211 0.4% 76.7% 12.7% 64.0%
Advertising Services 248 0.4% 93 0.3% 37.5% 37.6% 155 0.6% 62.5% 64.5% 172 0.4% 69.4% 32.3% 37.1%
Public Administration 236 0.4% 180 0.5% 76.3% 40.0% 56 0.2% 23.7% 71.4% 234 0.5% 99.2% 76.3% 22.9%
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 234 0.4% 66 0.2% 28.2% 56.1% 168 0.6% 71.8% 67.9% 215 0.4% 91.9% 28.2% 63.7%
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 225 0.4% 75 0.2% 33.3% 52.0% 150 0.6% 66.7% 70.7% 178 0.4% 79.1% 26.7% 52.4%
Sanitary Services 224 0.4% 65 0.2% 29.0% 50.8% 159 0.6% 71.0% 53.5% 205 0.4% 91.5% 27.2% 64.3%
Soaps, Cosmetics and Personal-Care Products 193 0.3% 59 0.2% 30.6% 52.5% 134 0.5% 69.4% 87.3% 158 0.3% 81.9% 25.4% 56.5%
Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures 182 0.3% 27 0.1% 14.8% 63.0% 155 0.6% 85.2% 74.2% 143 0.3% 78.6% 11.0% 67.6%
Retail Trade-Home Furnishings 154 0.3% 96 0.3% 62.3% 55.2% 58 0.2% 37.7% 65.5% 149 0.3% 96.8% 62.3% 34.4%
Retail Trade-General Merchandise & Apparel 149 0.2% 54 0.2% 36.2% 37.0% 95 0.4% 63.8% 77.9% 129 0.3% 86.6% 33.6% 53.0%
Educational Services 128 0.2% 78 0.2% 60.9% 32.1% 50 0.2% 39.1% 56.0% 110 0.2% 85.9% 52.3% 33.6%
Repair Services 123 0.2% 39 0.1% 31.7% 48.7% 84 0.3% 68.3% 84.5% 114 0.2% 92.7% 28.5% 64.2%
Retail Trade-Food Stores 118 0.2% 31 0.1% 26.3% 61.3% 87 0.3% 73.7% 83.9% 104 0.2% 88.1% 22.9% 65.3%
Other Financial 102 0.2% 70 0.2% 68.6% 42.9% 32 0.1% 31.4% 65.6% 97 0.2% 95.1% 65.7% 29.4%
Leather and Leather Products 74 0.1% 34 0.1% 45.9% 41.2% 40 0.2% 54.1% 80.0% 60 0.1% 81.1% 36.5% 44.6%
Miscellaneous Services 72 0.1% 36 0.1% 50.0% 38.9% 36 0.1% 50.0% 58.3% 69 0.1% 95.8% 47.2% 48.6%
Tobacco Products 55 0.1% 13 0.0% 23.6% 76.9% 42 0.2% 76.4% 97.6% 32 0.1% 58.2% 16.4% 41.8%
Holding Companies, Except Banks 35 0.1% 5 0.0% 14.3% 60.0% 30 0.1% 85.7% 73.3% 35 0.1% 100.0% 14.3% 85.7%
Social Services 34 0.1% 20 0.1% 58.8% 20.0% 14 0.1% 41.2% 35.7% 29 0.1% 85.3% 50.0% 35.3%

36
Legal Services 31 0.1% 16 0.0% 51.6% 50.0% 15 0.1% 48.4% 86.7% 14 0.0% 45.2% 16.1% 29.0%
Personal Services 20 0.0% 9 0.0% 45.0% 33.3% 11 0.0% 55.0% 54.5% 19 0.0% 95.0% 45.0% 50.0%
Savings and Loans, Mutual Savings Banks 8 0.0% 5 0.0% 62.5% 40.0% 3 0.0% 37.5% 66.7% 7 0.0% 87.5% 62.5% 25.0%
No Industry Classification & Non-classifiable 1903 3.1% 1309 3.8% 68.8% 52.0% 593 2.3% 31.2% 69.8% 1903 3.9% 100.0% 68.8% 31.1%
Total 60446 100% 34161 100% 26271 100% 48944 100%
Average 50.4% 71.1% 80.1%
(f)-(j) (b)-(l) (m)-(n)
Correlation 0.694 0.990 0.595

37
Table 6
Summary Statistics for Frequency and Size of Joint Ventures by Type
Panel A - Frequency of JVs by Type
N (%)
All JVs 60446 100%
Licensing Agreement JVs 9352 15.5%
Technology Agreement JVs 11241 18.6%
Exploration Agreement JVs 1865 3.1%
Manufacturing Agreement JVs 13780 22.8%
Marketing Agreement JVs 17183 28.4%
R&D Agreement JVs 10104 16.7%
Supply Agreement JVs 1721 2.8%
Equipment Manufacturing/Value Added Reseller Agreement JVs 887 1.5%

Panel B - Correlation Across Types

Licensing Technology Exploration Manufacturing Marketing R&D Supply Equipment
Licensing 9352
Technology 4551 (48.7%) 11241
Exploration 18 (0.2%) 24 (0.2%) 1865
Manufacturing 1830 (19.6%) 2706 (24.1%) 47 (2.5%) 13780
Marketing 3118 (33.3%) 3932 (35.0%) 41 (2.2%) 4300 (31.2%) 17183
R&D 1987 (21.2%) 4732 (42.1%) 41 (2.2) 1614 (11.7%) 3533 (20.6%) 10104
Supply 255 (2.7%) 406 (3.6%) 8 (0.4%) 389 (2.8%) 768 (4.5%) 329 (3.3%) 1721
Equipment 146 (1.6%) 329 (2.9%) 4 (0.2%) 146 (1.1%) 564 (3.3%) 140 (1.4%) 491 (28.5%) 887

Panel C - Size of JVs by Type

Mean Median N obs
All JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 79.1 8 4484
Estimated Cost of JV 264.6 30 4487
Licensing Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 59.9 5 60
Estimated Cost of JV 87.2 10 205
Technology Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 52.1 7.6 400
Estimated Cost of JV 205.0 20 573
Exploration Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 220.0 11.0 133
Estimated Cost of JV 709.3 14.0 277
Manufacturing Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 57.7 8.3 2057
Estimated Cost of JV 165.5 25.0 1781
Marketing Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 24.7 4.6 980
Estimated Cost of JV 94.1 18.0 682
R&D Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 71.7 7.3 230
Estimated Cost of JV 205.7 16.4 407
Supply Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 53.7 10.3 66
Estimated Cost of JV 398.1 28.9 126
Equipment Manufacturing/Value Added Reseller Agreement JVs
Estimated Capitalization of JV 187.8 17.5 16
Estimated Cost of JV 81.1 5.0 15

38
Table 7
Frequency of Joint Ventures by Industry and Type
Licensing Agreement Technology Agreement Exploration Agreement Manufacturing Marketing Agreement R&D Agreement Supply Agreement Equipment
% JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/
% JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/
% of cross- % of cross- % of % of % of % of cross- % of cross- % of
N N N cross-border N cross-border N cross-border N N N cross-border
Industry all border all border all all all all border all border all
participants participants participants participants
participants participants participants participants
column (a) (b) (c ) (d) (e) (f) (g) (h) (i) (j) (k) (l) (m) (n) (o) (p)
Business Services 662 7.1% 40.0% 1162 10.3% 46.7% 6 0.3% 66.7% 256 1.9% 55.1% 1839 10.7% 46.2% 1678 16.6% 47.1% 79 4.6% 58.2% 80 9.0% 40.0%
Prepackaged Software 1555 16.6% 35.0% 2082 18.5% 40.6% 2 0.1% 0.0% 264 1.9% 42.8% 1548 9.0% 36.6% 1818 18.0% 35.0% 178 10.3% 30.9% 162 18.3% 25.9%
Wholesale Trade-Durable Goods 475 5.1% 51.8% 618 5.5% 59.5% 3 0.2% 66.7% 228 1.7% 62.3% 3383 19.7% 55.6% 255 2.5% 41.2% 312 18.1% 50.0% 267 30.1% 47.9%
Drugs 1423 15.2% 52.1% 1717 15.3% 61.2% . . . 863 6.3% 67.8% 1312 7.6% 65.2% 1765 17.5% 51.6% 110 6.4% 57.3% 13 1.5% 46.2%
Electronic and Electrical Equipment 627 6.7% 56.8% 1037 9.2% 69.8% . . . 1559 11.3% 74.2% 757 4.4% 69.0% 868 8.6% 56.2% 127 7.4% 66.1% 39 4.4% 66.7%
Investment & Commodity Firms/Dealers 1172 12.5% 51.3% 216 1.9% 59.3% 4 0.2% 75.0% 122 0.9% 46.7% 204 1.2% 54.9% 72 0.7% 43.1% 4 0.2% 25.0% 18 2.0% 38.9%
Chemicals and Allied Products 254 2.7% 67.7% 518 4.6% 73.9% 8 0.4% 37.5% 1572 11.4% 79.9% 475 2.8% 74.3% 280 2.8% 55.0% 56 3.3% 73.2% 3 0.3% 100.0%
Telecommunications 129 1.4% 49.6% 431 3.8% 68.7% . . . 70 0.5% 71.4% 275 1.6% 44.7% 151 1.5% 55.6% 44 2.6% 59.1% 15 1.7% 33.3%
Communications Equipment 303 3.2% 42.9% 703 6.3% 62.0% . . . 499 3.6% 77.6% 549 3.2% 57.4% 614 6.1% 48.2% 111 6.4% 56.8% 63 7.1% 49.2%
Wholesale Trade-Nondurable Goods 424 4.5% 54.5% 260 2.3% 68.1% 5 0.3% 40.0% 138 1.0% 65.2% 1423 8.3% 66.1% 104 1.0% 60.6% 59 3.4% 47.5% 2 0.2% 100.0%
Oil and Gas; Petroleum Refining 31 0.3% 77.4% 48 0.4% 66.7% 804 43.1% 73.3% 238 1.7% 82.8% 102 0.6% 72.5% 53 0.5% 49.1% 30 1.7% 66.7% 2 0.2% 100.0%
Transportation Equipment 64 0.7% 75.0% 119 1.1% 78.2% . . . 1343 9.7% 84.1% 309 1.8% 82.5% 158 1.6% 60.8% 40 2.3% 85.0% 8 0.9% 75.0%
Computer and Office Equipment 321 3.4% 46.1% 559 5.0% 60.1% . . . 409 3.0% 68.0% 580 3.4% 54.8% 552 5.5% 44.0% 135 7.8% 56.3% 99 11.2% 57.6%
Measuring, Medical, Photo Equipment; Clocks 343 3.7% 42.3% 453 4.0% 57.0% 1 0.1% 0.0% 540 3.9% 61.9% 499 2.9% 60.3% 469 4.6% 43.5% 64 3.7% 50.0% 22 2.5% 81.8%
Mining 9 0.1% 66.7% 10 0.1% 90.0% 969 52.0% 57.2% 39 0.3% 82.1% 25 0.1% 84.0% 17 0.2% 64.7% 2 0.1% 100.0% 3 0.3% 66.7%
Machinery 128 1.4% 72.7% 218 1.9% 77.1% 9 0.5% 44.4% 860 6.2% 84.1% 331 1.9% 78.9% 225 2.2% 52.9% 53 3.1% 75.5% 13 1.5% 61.5%
Real Estate; Mortgage Bankers and Brokers 3 0.0% . 6 0.1% 66.7% 1 0.1% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 34 0.2% 55.9% 3 0.0% 66.7% 1 0.1% 100.0% 3 0.3% 66.7%
Metal and Metal Products 80 0.9% 63.8% 146 1.3% 78.1% 8 0.4% 75.0% 942 6.8% 80.7% 195 1.1% 74.9% 108 1.1% 55.6% 25 1.5% 92.0% 8 0.9% 87.5%
Construction Firms 10 0.1% 60.0% 21 0.2% 71.4% 6 0.3% 83.3% 75 0.5% 82.7% 29 0.2% 72.4% 14 0.1% 42.9% 15 0.9% 66.7% 3 0.3% 66.7%
Food and Kindred Products 88 0.9% 58.0% 31 0.3% 61.3% 1 0.1% 100.0% 883 6.4% 81.0% 373 2.2% 76.1% 43 0.4% 39.5% 13 0.8% 69.2% 4 0.5% 75.0%
Transportation and Shipping (except air) 9 0.1% 55.6% 9 0.1% 77.8% 3 0.2% 33.3% 12 0.1% 83.3% 71 0.4% 62.0% 5 0.0% 60.0% 12 0.7% 75.0% 4 0.5% 75.0%
Electric, Gas, and Water Distribution 13 0.1% 53.8% 57 0.5% 70.2% 15 0.8% 80.0% 29 0.2% 65.5% 81 0.5% 58.0% 33 0.3% 57.6% 34 2.0% 55.9% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Radio and Television Broadcasting Stations 47 0.5% 53.2% 80 0.7% 47.5% . . . 6 0.0% 33.3% 90 0.5% 43.3% 39 0.4% 33.3% 5 0.3% 80.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Insurance 9 0.1% 55.6% 7 0.1% 28.6% . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 123 0.7% 40.7% 8 0.1% 50.0% 2 0.1% 0.0% 2 0.2% 0.0%
Motion Picture Production and Distribution 67 0.7% 52.2% 17 0.2% 35.3% . . . 23 0.2% 52.2% 152 0.9% 54.6% 23 0.2% 52.2% 2 0.1% 0.0% . . .
Air Transportation and Shipping 2 0.0% 100.0% 10 0.1% 90.0% . . . 7 0.1% 85.7% 94 0.5% 85.1% 6 0.1% 100.0% 3 0.2% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Textile and Apparel Products 114 1.2% 28.9% 20 0.2% 50.0% . . . 393 2.9% 70.5% 161 0.9% 60.2% 23 0.2% 47.8% 5 0.3% 40.0% 6 0.7% 66.7%
Stone, Clay, Glass, and Concrete Products 27 0.3% 33.3% 33 0.3% 69.7% 3 0.2% 100.0% 400 2.9% 82.5% 90 0.5% 71.1% 23 0.2% 39.1% 11 0.6% 90.9% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Miscellaneous Retail Trade 28 0.3% 42.9% 11 0.1% 54.5% . . . 17 0.1% 58.8% 224 1.3% 62.5% 3 0.0% 66.7% 9 0.5% 77.8% 1 0.1% 0.0%
Printing, Publishing, and Allied Services 46 0.5% 39.1% 13 0.1% 30.8% . . . 46 0.3% 60.9% 78 0.5% 55.1% 15 0.1% 53.3% 1 0.1% 0.0% 2 0.2% 0.0%
Credit Institutions 14 0.1% 64.3% 15 0.1% 40.0% . . . 2 0.0% 50.0% 67 0.4% 43.3% 7 0.1% 42.9% 1 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0%
Rubber and Miscellaneous Plastic Products 44 0.5% 65.9% 67 0.6% 80.6% . . . 342 2.5% 78.7% 98 0.6% 73.5% 39 0.4% 64.1% 8 0.5% 75.0% 2 0.2% 100.0%
Commercial Banks, Bank Holding Companies 7 0.1% 28.6% 10 0.1% 20.0% . . . . . . 19 0.1% 68.4% 5 0.0% 40.0% . . . . . .
Health Services 18 0.2% 44.4% 22 0.2% 54.5% 1 0.1% 0.0% 13 0.1% 46.2% 31 0.2% 25.8% 21 0.2% 23.8% 8 0.5% 50.0% 3 0.3% 100.0%
Hotels and Casinos 13 0.1% 76.9% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.0% . 14 0.1% 42.9% 5 0.0% 60.0% . . . . . .
Amusement and Recreation Services 29 0.3% 44.8% 15 0.1% 53.3% . . . 9 0.1% 33.3% 37 0.2% 54.1% 9 0.1% 33.3% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Aerospace and Aircraft 13 0.1% 69.2% 60 0.5% 80.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 213 1.5% 81.7% 48 0.3% 81.3% 87 0.9% 72.4% 11 0.6% 63.6% 3 0.3% 100.0%
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 140 1.5% 33.6% 24 0.2% 41.7% . . . 218 1.6% 55.5% 124 0.7% 44.4% 40 0.4% 40.0% 7 0.4% 85.7% 2 0.2% 50.0%
Paper and Allied Products 20 0.2% 40.0% 14 0.1% 57.1% . . . 224 1.6% 73.2% 52 0.3% 63.5% 9 0.1% 77.8% 3 0.2% 33.3% . . .
Advertising Services 3 0.0% 33.3% 3 0.0% 66.7% . . . 2 0.0% 50.0% 118 0.7% 56.8% 6 0.1% 50.0% . . . 2 0.2% 100.0%
Public Administration 125 1.3% 39.2% 6 0.1% 66.7% 1 0.1% 0.0% 17 0.1% 47.1% 53 0.3% 49.1% 9 0.1% 55.6% 2 0.1% 50.0% 1 0.1% 0.0%

39
Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishing 18 0.2% 55.6% 18 0.2% 55.6% . . . 62 0.4% 80.6% 43 0.3% 69.8% 38 0.4% 47.4% 7 0.4% 42.9% . . .
Retail Trade-Eating and Drinking Places 24 0.3% 75.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 8 0.1% 62.5% 44 0.3% 52.3% . . . 5 0.3% 80.0% . . .
Sanitary Services 21 0.2% 42.9% 30 0.3% 50.0% . . . 15 0.1% 80.0% 29 0.2% 48.3% 18 0.2% 66.7% 8 0.5% 50.0% . . .
Soaps, Cosmetics and Personal-Care Products 33 0.4% 45.5% 19 0.2% 68.4% . . . 146 1.1% 86.3% 83 0.5% 72.3% 20 0.2% 70.0% 4 0.2% 50.0% 1 0.1% 0.0%
Wood Products, Furniture, and Fixtures 8 0.1% 25.0% 7 0.1% 85.7% 1 0.1% 100.0% 156 1.1% 72.4% 40 0.2% 67.5% 5 0.0% 60.0% 4 0.2% 75.0% 1 0.1% 0.0%
Retail Trade-Home Furnishings 11 0.1% 45.5% 5 0.0% 40.0% . . . 8 0.1% 50.0% 76 0.4% 61.8% 3 0.0% 0.0% 7 0.4% 71.4% 3 0.3% 33.3%
Retail Trade-General Merchandise & Apparel 28 0.3% 35.7% 3 0.0% 66.7% . . . 12 0.1% 50.0% 104 0.6% 66.3% 2 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . .
Educational Services 2 0.0% 50.0% 6 0.1% . . . . . . . 4 0.0% 25.0% 6 0.1% 50.0% 1 0.1% 0.0% . . .
Repair Services 3 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 10 0.1% 70.0% 18 0.1% 66.7% 7 0.1% 42.9% 1 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Retail Trade-Food Stores 7 0.1% 71.4% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 7 0.1% 100.0% 69 0.4% 84.1% 3 0.0% 33.3% 2 0.1% 50.0% . . .
Other Financial 6 0.1% 16.7% 10 0.1% 40.0% . . . 1 0.0% . 11 0.1% 54.5% 3 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 0.0%
Leather and Leather Products 24 0.3% 33.3% 7 0.1% 42.9% . . . 67 0.5% 65.7% 29 0.2% 65.5% 2 0.0% 0.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0%
Miscellaneous Services . . . . . . 2 0.1% 0.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 19 0.1% 31.6% 5 0.0% 20.0% . . . . . .
Tobacco Products 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 49 0.4% 95.9% 13 0.1% 92.3% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Holding Companies, Except Banks . . . 2 0.0% 50.0% . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . .
Social Services . . . 1 0.0% . . . . . . . 7 0.0% . . . . . . . . . .
Legal Services . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Personal Services 3 0.0% 66.7% 2 0.0% 50.0% . . . 2 0.0% . 7 0.0% 42.9% . . . . . . . . .
Savings and Loans, Mutual Savings Banks 1 0.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
No Industry Classification & Non-classifiable 273 2.9% 61.2% 278 2.5% 77.3% 11 0.6% 72.7% 356 2.6% 75.8% 516 3.0% 63.6% 328 3.2% 47.9% 97 5.6% 54.6% 19 2.1% 57.9%
Total 9352 100% 11241 100% 1865 100% 13780 100% 17183 100% 10104 100% 1721 100% 887 100%
Average 53.5% 63.5% 56.7% 70.7% 60.9% 49.5% 62.7% 57.4%
(a)-(i) (c)-(k) (d)-(l) (m)-(o)
Correlation 0.622 0.965 0.352 0.912

40
Table 8
Frequency of Joint Ventures by Country
JVs w/ Cross-Border
All JVs Domestic JVs Strategic Alliances Independent JV Firms
Participants
1st Nation of the JV's operations N % Cum % N % Cum % N % Cum % N % of all Cum % N % of all Cum %
United States of America 22941 38.0% 38.0% 7402 20.9% 20.9% 15196 67.1% 67.1% 18028 52.8% 52.8% 4913 18.7% 18.7%
China 4141 6.9% 44.8% 3710 10.5% 31.3% 407 1.8% 68.9% 535 1.6% 54.3% 3606 13.7% 32.4%
Japan 4006 6.6% 51.4% 2756 7.8% 39.1% 1204 5.3% 74.2% 2674 7.8% 62.2% 1332 5.1% 37.5%
United Kingdom 2459 4.1% 55.5% 1564 4.4% 43.5% 856 3.8% 78.0% 1172 3.4% 65.6% 1287 4.9% 42.4%
Canada 1820 3.0% 58.5% 1077 3.0% 46.5% 728 3.2% 81.2% 1194 3.5% 69.1% 626 2.4% 44.8%
Australia 1678 2.8% 61.3% 996 2.8% 49.3% 664 2.9% 84.1% 790 2.3% 71.4% 888 3.4% 48.2%
Germany 1305 2.2% 63.4% 887 2.5% 51.8% 405 1.8% 85.9% 527 1.5% 72.9% 778 3.0% 51.1%
India 1245 2.1% 1095 3.1% 147 0.6% 300 0.9% 945 3.6%
Malaysia 1023 1.7% 677 1.9% 342 1.5% 157 0.5% 866 3.3%
France 856 1.4% 658 1.9% 179 0.8% 355 1.0% 501 1.9%
Thailand 731 1.2% 620 1.7% 108 0.5% 91 0.3% 640 2.4%
Singapore 695 1.1% 506 1.4% 181 0.8% 148 0.4% 547 2.1%
Russian Federation 689 1.1% 629 1.8% 56 0.2% 137 0.4% 552 2.1%
Indonesia 669 1.1% 586 1.7% 79 0.3% 101 0.3% 568 2.2%
South Korea 617 1.0% 539 1.5% 75 0.3% 284 0.8% 333 1.3%
Vietnam 551 0.9% 497 1.4% 51 0.2% 51 0.1% 500 1.9%
Italy 528 0.9% 394 1.1% 129 0.6% 231 0.7% 297 1.1%
Hong Kong 475 0.8% 384 1.1% 84 0.4% 141 0.4% 334 1.3%
Mexico 470 0.8% 397 1.1% 63 0.3% 159 0.5% 311 1.2%
Philippines 466 0.8% 379 1.1% 85 0.4% 90 0.3% 376 1.4%
Netherlands 400 0.7% 291 0.8% 100 0.4% 163 0.5% 237 0.9%
Taiwan 379 0.6% 323 0.9% 54 0.2% 154 0.5% 225 0.9%
Brazil 365 0.6% 308 0.9% 55 0.2% 106 0.3% 259 1.0%
Spain 344 0.6% 256 0.7% 81 0.4% 130 0.4% 214 0.8%
Poland 302 0.5% 279 0.8% 21 0.1% 58 0.2% 244 0.9%
Hungary 282 0.5% 254 0.7% 27 0.1% 32 0.1% 250 1.0%
South Africa 276 0.5% 211 0.6% 65 0.3% 80 0.2% 196 0.7%
Soviet Union 256 0.4% 250 0.7% 6 0.0% 8 0.0% 248 0.9%
Czechoslovakia 253 0.4% 243 0.7% 9 0.0% 38 0.1% 215 0.8%
Sweden 239 0.4% 180 0.5% 53 0.2% 114 0.3% 125 0.5%
Switzerland 223 0.4% 152 0.4% 68 0.3% 106 0.3% 117 0.4%
Belgium 176 0.3% 133 0.4% 40 0.2% 57 0.2% 119 0.5%
Argentina 168 0.3% 140 0.4% 26 0.1% 56 0.2% 112 0.4%
New Zealand 168 0.3% 121 0.3% 46 0.2% 51 0.1% 117 0.4%
Israel 157 0.3% 130 0.4% 25 0.1% 74 0.2% 83 0.3%
Saudi Arabia 154 0.3% 142 0.4% 12 0.1% 34 0.1% 120 0.5%
Republic of Ireland 137 0.2% 113 0.3% 21 0.1% 51 0.1% 86 0.3%
Chile 136 0.2% 114 0.3% 21 0.1% 40 0.1% 96 0.4%
Turkey 129 0.2% 115 0.3% 14 0.1% 21 0.1% 108 0.4%
Finland 121 0.2% 85 0.2% 35 0.2% 48 0.1% 73 0.3%
Norway 119 0.2% 89 0.3% 29 0.1% 68 0.2% 51 0.2%
Venezuela 114 0.2% 98 0.3% 16 0.1% 21 0.1% 93 0.4%
Pakistan 91 0.2% 79 0.2% 10 0.0% 12 0.0% 79 0.3%
Portugal 89 0.1% 70 0.2% 19 0.1% 30 0.1% 59 0.2%
Romania 87 0.1% 82 0.2% 4 0.0% 13 0.0% 74 0.3%
Austria 85 0.1% 67 0.2% 17 0.1% 29 0.1% 56 0.2%
Kazakhstan 84 0.1% 79 0.2% 4 0.0% 7 0.0% 77 0.3%
Uzbekistan 83 0.1% 73 0.2% 7 0.0% 7 0.0% 76 0.3%
Ukraine 78 0.1% 72 0.2% 5 0.0% 10 0.0% 68 0.3%
Denmark 74 0.1% 54 0.2% 19 0.1% 32 0.1% 42 0.2%
Egypt 60 0.1% 55 0.2% 5 0.0% 8 0.0% 52 0.2%
United Arab Emirates 60 0.1% 54 0.2% 6 0.0% 16 0.0% 44 0.2%
Myanmar (Burma) 58 0.1% 55 0.2% 3 0.0% 5 0.0% 53 0.2%
Peru 56 0.1% 45 0.1% 10 0.0% 17 0.0% 39 0.1%
Colombia 54 0.1% 45 0.1% 9 0.0% 11 0.0% 43 0.2%
Greece 54 0.1% 39 0.1% 13 0.1% 11 0.0% 43 0.2%
Bulgaria 52 0.1% 48 0.1% 2 0.0% 10 0.0% 42 0.2%
Cuba 51 0.1% 46 0.1% 5 0.0% 4 0.0% 47 0.2%
Czech Republic 51 0.1% 44 0.1% 7 0.0% 14 0.0% 37 0.1%
Sri Lanka 49 0.1% 45 0.1% 4 0.0% 6 0.0% 43 0.2%
Iran 41 0.1% 38 0.1% 3 0.0% 11 0.0% 30 0.1%

41
Cambodia 40 0.1% 37 0.1% 3 0.0% 3 0.0% 37 0.1%
Azerbaijan 37 0.1% 34 0.1% 1 0.0% 10 0.0% 27 0.1%
Slovak Republic 35 0.1% 32 0.1% 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 34 0.1%
Algeria 34 0.1% 31 0.1% 3 0.0% 8 0.0% 26 0.1%
Estonia 32 0.1% 30 0.1% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 30 0.1%
Yugoslavia 32 0.1% 31 0.1% . . 5 0.0% 27 0.1%
Nigeria 31 0.1% 30 0.1% . . 13 0.0% 18 0.1%
Papua New Guinea 31 0.1% 23 0.1% 8 0.0% 2 0.0% 29 0.1%
Bermuda 30 0.0% 24 0.1% 6 0.0% 7 0.0% 23 0.1%
Zimbabwe 30 0.0% 24 0.1% 6 0.0% 4 0.0% 26 0.1%
Bahrain 27 0.0% 25 0.1% 2 0.0% 6 0.0% 21 0.1%
Bolivia 26 0.0% 22 0.1% 4 0.0% 3 0.0% 23 0.1%
Laos 26 0.0% 24 0.1% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 26 0.1%
Lithuania 26 0.0% 25 0.1% 1 0.0% 5 0.0% 21 0.1%
Luxembourg 26 0.0% 23 0.1% 3 0.0% 9 0.0% 17 0.1%
Tanzania 26 0.0% 25 0.1% 1 0.0% 6 0.0% 20 0.1%
Albania 24 0.0% 23 0.1% 1 0.0% 4 0.0% 20 0.1%
Morocco 24 0.0% 21 0.1% 3 0.0% 3 0.0% 21 0.1%
Oman 23 0.0% 19 0.1% 4 0.0% 9 0.0% 14 0.1%
Bangladesh 22 0.0% 20 0.1% 2 0.0% 7 0.0% 15 0.1%
East Germany 21 0.0% 21 0.1% . . 1 0.0% 20 0.1%
Qatar 21 0.0% 19 0.1% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 20 0.1%
Tunisia 19 0.0% 18 0.1% 1 0.0% 3 0.0% 16 0.1%
North Korea 18 0.0% 14 0.0% 4 0.0% 5 0.0% 13 0.0%
Ecuador 17 0.0% 15 0.0% 1 0.0% 5 0.0% 12 0.0%
Ghana 17 0.0% 13 0.0% 3 0.0% 2 0.0% 15 0.1%
Latvia 17 0.0% 15 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 16 0.1%
Trinidad and Tobago 17 0.0% 17 0.0% . . 5 0.0% 12 0.0%
Croatia 16 0.0% 16 0.0% . . 5 0.0% 11 0.0%
Kuwait 16 0.0% 14 0.0% 2 0.0% 6 0.0% 10 0.0%
Kyrgyzstan 16 0.0% 14 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 15 0.1%
Mongolia 16 0.0% 14 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 14 0.1%
Jordan 15 0.0% 14 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 13 0.0%
Mozambique 15 0.0% 14 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0% 12 0.0%
Belarus 13 0.0% 10 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 11 0.0%
Brunei 12 0.0% 10 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 11 0.0%
Dominican Republic 12 0.0% 7 0.0% 5 0.0% 3 0.0% 9 0.0%
Georgia 12 0.0% 10 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 10 0.0%
Jamaica 12 0.0% 11 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 10 0.0%
Abu Dhabi 11 0.0% 10 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 11 0.0%
Turkmenistan 11 0.0% 10 0.0% 1 0.0% 4 0.0% 7 0.0%
Yemen 11 0.0% 10 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 9 0.0%
Netherlands Antilles 10 0.0% 8 0.0% 2 0.0% 7 0.0% 3 0.0%
Cayman Islands 9 0.0% 9 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 8 0.0%
Costa Rica 9 0.0% 8 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0% 6 0.0%
Guyana 9 0.0% 7 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0% 6 0.0%
Lebanon 9 0.0% 8 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 7 0.0%
Syria 9 0.0% 9 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 9 0.0%
Uruguay 9 0.0% 7 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 7 0.0%
Angola 8 0.0% 7 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 7 0.0%
Armenia 8 0.0% 8 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 7 0.0%
Guatemala 8 0.0% 5 0.0% 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 7 0.0%
Iraq 8 0.0% 7 0.0% 1 0.0% 5 0.0% 3 0.0%
Panama 8 0.0% 8 0.0% . . 2 0.0% 6 0.0%
British Virgin Islands (UK) 7 0.0% 5 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 6 0.0%
Cyprus 7 0.0% 5 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 5 0.0%
Mali 7 0.0% 7 0.0% . . 2 0.0% 5 0.0%
Moldova 7 0.0% 6 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 6 0.0%
Nepal 7 0.0% 7 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 7 0.0%
Uganda 7 0.0% 5 0.0% 2 0.0% 0 0.0% 7 0.0%
Zambia 7 0.0% 5 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 6 0.0%
Bahamas 6 0.0% 6 0.0% . . 2 0.0% 4 0.0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 6 0.0% 5 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 5 0.0%
Mauritania 6 0.0% 5 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0% 3 0.0%
Mauritius 6 0.0% 5 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 4 0.0%
Monaco 6 0.0% 6 0.0% . . 2 0.0% 4 0.0%

42
Namibia 6 0.0% 6 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 5 0.0%
Republic of Congo 6 0.0% 5 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0% 3 0.0%
Sudan 6 0.0% 6 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 5 0.0%
Tajikistan 6 0.0% 6 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 6 0.0%
Barbados 5 0.0% 4 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0%
Botswana 5 0.0% 4 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0%
Ethiopia 5 0.0% 4 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 4 0.0%
Gabon 5 0.0% 3 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0%
Iceland 5 0.0% 5 0.0% . . 3 0.0% 2 0.0%
Ivory Coast 5 0.0% 4 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 4 0.0%
Libya 5 0.0% 5 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 4 0.0%
Macau 5 0.0% 5 0.0% . . 2 0.0% 3 0.0%
Malta 5 0.0% 5 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 4 0.0%
Puerto Rico 5 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0% 4 0.0% 1 0.0%
Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) 5 0.0% 5 0.0% . . 2 0.0% 3 0.0%
Belize 4 0.0% 4 0.0% . . 3 0.0% 1 0.0%
Cameroon 4 0.0% 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0%
El Salvador 4 0.0% 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0%
Greenland 4 0.0% 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 4 0.0%
Guinea 4 0.0% 4 0.0% . . 3 0.0% 1 0.0%
Honduras 4 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0%
Madagascar 4 0.0% 4 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 3 0.0%
Nicaragua 4 0.0% 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 3 0.0%
Paraguay 4 0.0% 4 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 3 0.0%
Slovenia 4 0.0% 3 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 3 0.0%
Afghanistan 3 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0%
Aruba 3 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.0%
Kenya 3 0.0% 2 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.0%
Malawi 3 0.0% 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 0 0.0% 3 0.0%
Surinam 3 0.0% 3 0.0% . . 2 0.0% 1 0.0%
Zaire 3 0.0% 3 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 2 0.0%
Fiji 2 0.0% 2 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
Niger 2 0.0% 2 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 1 0.0%
Solomon Islands 2 0.0% 2 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 2 0.0%
Antigua 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Cape Verde 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 0 0.0%
Chad 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Equatorial Guinea 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
French Polynesia 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 0 0.0%
Gibraltar 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Grenada 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 0 0.0%
Lesotho 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Liberia 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Macedonia 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Martinque 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 0 0.0%
Rwanda 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Sao Tome and Principe 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Seychelles 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Sierra Leone 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
Somalia 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
St Lucia 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 1 0.0% 0 0.0%
Swaziland 1 0.0% 1 0.0% . . 0 0.0% 1 0.0%
No Country Classification,
5665 9.4% 3514 9.9% 503 2.2% 4972 14.6% 679 2.6%
Supranational & Non-
60446 100% 35495 100% 22658 100% 34161 100% 26271 100%

43
Table 9
Frequency of Joint Ventures by Country and Type
Manufacturing Equipment
Licensing Agreement Technology Agreement Exploration Agreement Marketing Agreement R&D Agreement Supply Agreement
Agreement Manufacturing
% JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/ % JVs w/
% of cross- % of cross- % of cross- % of cross- % of cross- % of cross- % of cross- % of cross-
N N N N N N N N
1st Nation of JV's all border all border all border all border all border all border all border all border
operations partic. partic. partic. partic. partic. partic. partic. partic.
USA 5825 62.3% 32.2% 6503 57.9% 38.3% 268 14.4% 41.0% 3347 24.3% 44.0% 7361 42.8% 34.4% 5866 58.1% 33.6% 663 38.5% 36.3% 505 56.9% 33.9%
China 102 1.1% 92.2% 436 3.9% 95.4% 70 3.8% 84.3% 2407 17.5% 92.4% 895 5.2% 92.3% 196 1.9% 92.9% 58 3.4% 86.2% 3 0.3% 100.0%
Japan 578 6.2% 93.3% 929 8.3% 80.1% 3 0.2% 100.0% 835 6.1% 71.3% 1709 9.9% 84.3% 861 8.5% 60.9% 116 6.7% 75.9% 81 9.1% 85.2%
United Kingdom 253 2.7% 76.3% 304 2.7% 77.0% 58 3.1% 79.3% 299 2.2% 80.9% 479 2.8% 69.9% 275 2.7% 72.0% 45 2.6% 77.8% 15 1.7% 86.7%
Canada 304 3.3% 71.1% 290 2.6% 75.5% 247 13.2% 42.5% 243 1.8% 69.1% 365 2.1% 67.7% 183 1.8% 71.6% 34 2.0% 61.8% 22 2.5% 77.3%
Australia 81 0.9% 75.3% 91 0.8% 86.8% 276 14.8% 38.8% 165 1.2% 73.3% 232 1.4% 70.7% 100 1.0% 70.0% 20 1.2% 75.0% 7 0.8% 71.4%
Germany 130 1.4% 89.2% 201 1.8% 87.6% 4 0.2% 50.0% 381 2.8% 71.1% 345 2.0% 68.4% 182 1.8% 76.9% 32 1.9% 81.3% 10 1.1% 100.0%
India 38 0.4% 94.7% 140 1.2% 92.9% 15 0.8% 80.0% 537 3.9% 90.7% 266 1.5% 91.7% 54 0.5% 85.2% 12 0.7% 91.7% 3 0.3% 100.0%
Malaysia 21 0.2% 81.0% 81 0.7% 81.5% 17 0.9% 64.7% 357 2.6% 78.4% 165 1.0% 79.4% 53 0.5% 69.8% 12 0.7% 83.3% 1 0.1% 100.0%
France 80 0.9% 86.3% 151 1.3% 88.7% 1 0.1% 100.0% 221 1.6% 84.2% 229 1.3% 79.0% 140 1.4% 82.9% 17 1.0% 88.2% 4 0.5% 100.0%
Thailand 13 0.1% 84.6% 53 0.5% 84.9% 16 0.9% 93.8% 304 2.2% 91.1% 142 0.8% 85.9% 17 0.2% 88.2% 11 0.6% 72.7% 1 0.1% 0.0%
Singapore 28 0.3% 85.7% 47 0.4% 85.1% 3 0.2% 66.7% 134 1.0% 73.9% 130 0.8% 80.8% 53 0.5% 79.2% 13 0.8% 76.9% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Russian Federation 21 0.2% 90.5% 90 0.8% 90.0% 77 4.1% 89.6% 290 2.1% 91.7% 122 0.7% 92.6% 58 0.6% 84.5% 9 0.5% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Indonesia 16 0.2% 100.0% 40 0.4% 82.5% 61 3.3% 77.0% 266 1.9% 91.4% 81 0.5% 86.4% 9 0.1% 100.0% 5 0.3% 80.0% . . .
South Korea 99 1.1% 90.9% 110 1.0% 95.5% 2 0.1% 50.0% 250 1.8% 91.6% 157 0.9% 89.8% 58 0.6% 86.2% 12 0.7% 100.0% 2 0.2% 100.0%
Vietnam 2 0.0% 100.0% 22 0.2% 90.9% 26 1.4% 84.6% 265 1.9% 89.8% 66 0.4% 86.4% 8 0.1% 62.5% 5 0.3% 100.0% . . .
Italy 45 0.5% 91.1% 71 0.6% 90.1% 4 0.2% 100.0% 137 1.0% 78.8% 125 0.7% 82.4% 43 0.4% 90.7% 14 0.8% 85.7% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Hong Kong 26 0.3% 88.5% 32 0.3% 87.5% 2 0.1% 100.0% 78 0.6% 85.9% 88 0.5% 80.7% 8 0.1% 62.5% 3 0.2% 100.0% 2 0.2% 100.0%
Mexico 23 0.2% 73.9% 32 0.3% 87.5% 39 2.1% 69.2% 129 0.9% 84.5% 96 0.6% 83.3% 2 0.0% 100.0% 7 0.4% 42.9% 3 0.3% 0.0%
Philippines 13 0.1% 76.9% 20 0.2% 85.0% 19 1.0% 57.9% 119 0.9% 90.8% 53 0.3% 96.2% 3 0.0% 100.0% 6 0.3% 83.3% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Netherlands 31 0.3% 93.5% 61 0.5% 82.0% 5 0.3% 100.0% 101 0.7% 74.3% 87 0.5% 77.0% 45 0.4% 77.8% 6 0.3% 83.3% 3 0.3% 100.0%
Taiwan 34 0.4% 88.2% 49 0.4% 93.9% 1 0.1% 100.0% 174 1.3% 88.5% 97 0.6% 87.6% 31 0.3% 87.1% 10 0.6% 100.0% 7 0.8% 100.0%
Brazil 20 0.2% 95.0% 25 0.2% 96.0% 24 1.3% 75.0% 133 1.0% 91.0% 67 0.4% 92.5% 15 0.1% 93.3% 9 0.5% 88.9% 2 0.2% 100.0%
Spain 19 0.2% 89.5% 24 0.2% 87.5% 2 0.1% 100.0% 65 0.5% 86.2% 67 0.4% 85.1% 10 0.1% 80.0% 3 0.2% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Poland 8 0.1% 100.0% 10 0.1% 100.0% 5 0.3% 80.0% 112 0.8% 96.4% 58 0.3% 94.8% 5 0.0% 100.0% 5 0.3% 100.0% . . .
Hungary 11 0.1% 81.8% 13 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 128 0.9% 93.8% 74 0.4% 91.9% 7 0.1% 100.0% 6 0.3% 100.0% . . .
South Africa 15 0.2% 100.0% 16 0.1% 87.5% 26 1.4% 73.1% 79 0.6% 79.7% 73 0.4% 86.3% 6 0.1% 66.7% 3 0.2% 100.0% . . .
Soviet Union 6 0.1% 100.0% 6 0.1% 100.0% 20 1.1% 95.0% 79 0.6% 98.7% 49 0.3% 93.9% 8 0.1% 100.0% 18 1.0% 100.0% . . .
Czechoslovakia 4 0.0% 100.0% 9 0.1% 88.9% 3 0.2% 100.0% 125 0.9% 95.2% 57 0.3% 96.5% 10 0.1% 100.0% 9 0.5% 100.0% . . .
Sweden 25 0.3% 88.0% 51 0.5% 90.2% 4 0.2% 75.0% 58 0.4% 75.9% 51 0.3% 82.4% 39 0.4% 76.9% 5 0.3% 80.0% 2 0.2% 100.0%
Switzerland 26 0.3% 92.3% 35 0.3% 85.7% 1 0.1% 100.0% 51 0.4% 76.5% 70 0.4% 68.6% 32 0.3% 78.1% 3 0.2% 100.0% . . .
Belgium 11 0.1% 72.7% 17 0.2% 82.4% . . . 52 0.4% 90.4% 36 0.2% 77.8% 14 0.1% 78.6% 3 0.2% 66.7% . . .
Argentina 7 0.1% 85.7% 9 0.1% 88.9% 26 1.4% 73.1% 52 0.4% 90.4% 42 0.2% 85.7% 5 0.0% 80.0% 4 0.2% 75.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
New Zealand 9 0.1% 88.9% 4 0.0% 100.0% 11 0.6% 90.9% 21 0.2% 85.7% 24 0.1% 75.0% 8 0.1% 25.0% 2 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Israel 25 0.3% 88.0% 34 0.3% 85.3% 2 0.1% 100.0% 27 0.2% 88.9% 40 0.2% 80.0% 27 0.3% 74.1% 2 0.1% 50.0% . . .
Saudi Arabia 12 0.1% 100.0% 22 0.2% 95.5% 5 0.3% 100.0% 75 0.5% 90.7% 26 0.2% 88.5% 5 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.2% 100.0% . . .
Republic of Ireland 12 0.1% 91.7% 24 0.2% 91.7% 11 0.6% 81.8% 20 0.1% 90.0% 19 0.1% 78.9% 12 0.1% 83.3% 3 0.2% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0%
Chile 4 0.0% 75.0% 4 0.0% 75.0% 30 1.6% 80.0% 27 0.2% 92.6% 13 0.1% 92.3% 1 0.0% 100.0% 5 0.3% 80.0% . . .
Turkey 5 0.1% 80.0% 8 0.1% 100.0% 3 0.2% 100.0% 58 0.4% 93.1% 26 0.2% 96.2% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Finland 3 0.0% 100.0% 14 0.1% 100.0% 3 0.2% 66.7% 38 0.3% 76.3% 29 0.2% 82.8% 13 0.1% 92.3% 3 0.2% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Norway 14 0.1% 92.9% 17 0.2% 94.1% 8 0.4% 50.0% 23 0.2% 82.6% 23 0.1% 87.0% 10 0.1% 90.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Venezuela 2 0.0% 50.0% 7 0.1% 85.7% 25 1.3% 80.0% 39 0.3% 89.7% 11 0.1% 90.9% 2 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.2% 50.0% . . .
Pakistan 2 0.0% 50.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% 10 0.5% 90.0% 28 0.2% 92.9% 7 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0% . . .
Portugal 3 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.1% 100.0% 11 0.1% 81.8% 10 0.1% 70.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Romania 5 0.1% 80.0% 7 0.1% 100.0% 4 0.2% 100.0% 40 0.3% 95.0% 22 0.1% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Austria 2 0.0% 100.0% 5 0.0% 60.0% 1 0.1% . 29 0.2% 86.2% 9 0.1% 66.7% 1 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Kazakhstan 2 0.0% 100.0% 6 0.1% 100.0% 40 2.1% 95.0% 11 0.1% 100.0% 12 0.1% 91.7% 2 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Uzbekistan . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% 14 0.8% 92.9% 40 0.3% 90.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Ukraine 2 0.0% 100.0% 7 0.1% 100.0% 11 0.6% 72.7% 36 0.3% 91.7% 6 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Denmark 11 0.1% 100.0% 11 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 14 0.1% 85.7% 22 0.1% 81.8% 8 0.1% 87.5% 2 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0%
Egypt 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 12 0.6% 91.7% 25 0.2% 96.0% 9 0.1% 88.9% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Unt' Arab Emirates 4 0.0% 50.0% 3 0.0% 33.3% 3 0.2% 100.0% 19 0.1% 89.5% 14 0.1% 85.7% 2 0.0% 50.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Myanmar (Burma) . . . . . . 10 0.5% 100.0% 21 0.2% 100.0% 9 0.1% 88.9% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Peru 2 0.0% 50.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 21 1.1% 61.9% 8 0.1% 100.0% 4 0.0% 75.0% . . . . . . . . .
Colombia 3 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 12 0.6% 75.0% 13 0.1% 84.6% 8 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.0% 75.0% . . . . . .
Greece 2 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.2% 100.0% 8 0.1% 87.5% 8 0.0% 87.5% 4 0.0% 75.0% . . . . . .
Bulgaria 2 0.0% 100.0% 6 0.1% 100.0% 5 0.3% 80.0% 16 0.1% 100.0% 12 0.1% 83.3% 3 0.0% 66.7% . . . . . .
Cuba . . . 3 0.0% 100.0% 8 0.4% 62.5% 15 0.1% 93.3% 6 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Czech Republic 3 0.0% 66.7% 5 0.0% 100.0% . . . 26 0.2% 92.3% 8 0.0% 87.5% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Sri Lanka 1 0.0% 100.0% 5 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 16 0.1% 100.0% 5 0.0% 80.0% . . . 2 0.1% 100.0% . . .

44
Iran 1 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 7 0.4% 71.4% 14 0.1% 100.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Cambodia . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 8 0.1% 87.5% 3 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% . . . . . .
Azerbaijan 1 0.0% . 2 0.0% 100.0% 15 0.8% 93.3% 5 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Slovak Republic 1 0.0% 100.0% 5 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0% 23 0.2% 95.7% 8 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Algeria . . . . . . 10 0.5% 80.0% 13 0.1% 100.0% 6 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Estonia 1 0.0% . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 17 0.1% 94.1% 5 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Yugoslavia 1 0.0% . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 11 0.1% 100.0% 10 0.1% 90.0% . . . . . . . . .
Nigeria 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . 13 0.7% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Papua New Guinea . . . . . . 17 0.9% 76.5% 3 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Bermuda 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 3 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Zimbabwe . . . . . . 10 0.5% 70.0% 10 0.1% 80.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% . . . . . . . . .
Bahrain 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 3 0.2% 66.7% 9 0.1% 88.9% 5 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Bolivia 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 15 0.8% 80.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Laos . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% 5 0.0% 80.0% 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . . . . .
Lithuania 1 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.2% 100.0% 7 0.1% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% . . . 2 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Luxembourg 2 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% . . . 4 0.0% 75.0% 5 0.0% 60.0% . . . . . . . . .
Tanzania . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 12 0.6% 91.7% 4 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Albania . . . . . . 7 0.4% 100.0% 3 0.0% 66.7% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Morocco 1 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0% 7 0.1% 71.4% 5 0.0% 80.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Oman 1 0.0% . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 5 0.0% 80.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0%
Bangladesh . . . . . . 2 0.1% 100.0% 6 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
East Germany . . . . . . . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Qatar . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 12 0.1% 91.7% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Tunisia . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.2% 75.0% 6 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
North Korea 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . 8 0.1% 62.5% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ecuador 1 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% 11 0.6% 90.9% 1 0.0% 0.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% . . . . . . . . .
Ghana . . . . . . 11 0.6% 81.8% 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Latvia . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 6 0.0% 66.7% 4 0.0% 75.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Trinidad and Tobago . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.1% 100.0% 6 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Croatia 3 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 5 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Kuwait 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kyrgyzstan . . . . . . 9 0.5% 88.9% 4 0.0% 75.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Mongolia . . . . . . 6 0.3% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Jordan 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . 10 0.1% 90.0% 3 0.0% 66.7% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Mozambique . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% 6 0.0% 83.3% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Belarus 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 9 0.1% 88.9% 3 0.0% 66.7% . . . . . . . . .
Brunei . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . . . . .
Dominican Republic . . . 1 0.0% . 1 0.1% 0.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% . . . . . . . . .
Georgia 1 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.1% 100.0% 3 0.0% 66.7% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Jamaica 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Abu Dhabi . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Turkmenistan . . . 1 0.0% . 3 0.2% 100.0% 2 0.0% 50.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Yemen . . . . . . 6 0.3% 83.3% 1 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Netherlands Antilles 5 0.1% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Cayman Islands . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 4 0.0% 100.0% 4 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Costa Rica 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 0.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Guyana . . . . . . 4 0.2% 75.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lebanon . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Syria . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 6 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Uruguay . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.0% 66.7% 1 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.1% 50.0% . . .
Angola . . . . . . 2 0.1% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Armenia . . . . . . 2 0.1% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Guatemala . . . . . . 1 0.1% 0.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Iraq . . . . . . 2 0.1% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . 4 0.2% 100.0% . . .
Panama . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brit' Virgin Isl' (UK) . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Cyprus . . . . . . 2 0.1% 100.0% . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Mali . . . . . . 6 0.3% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Moldova . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . . . . .
Nepal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Uganda . . . . . . . . . 4 0.0% 75.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Zambia . . . . . . 1 0.1% 0.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Bahamas . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Bosnia and Herz' . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 4 0.0% 75.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mauritania . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Mauritius . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Monaco 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Namibia 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% 3 0.2% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Republic of Congo . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sudan . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tajikistan . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% 3 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Barbados 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Botswana . . . . . . 2 0.1% 50.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Ethiopia . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Gabon . . . . . . 3 0.2% 66.7% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Iceland . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Ivory Coast . . . . . . 3 0.2% 66.7% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Libya . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Macau . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malta . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Puerto Rico . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Upper Volta . . . . . . 4 0.2% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Belize . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Cameroon . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
El Salvador . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.1% 0.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greenland . . . . . . 3 0.2% 66.7% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Guinea . . . . . . 3 0.2% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Honduras 1 0.0% . . . . 1 0.1% 0.0% 1 0.0% 0.0% 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . . . . .
Madagascar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . .
Nicaragua . . . . . . 2 0.1% 50.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Paraguay . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Slovenia . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 0.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Aruba . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . . . . .
Kenya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Malawi . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . . . . . . . .
Surinam 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Zaire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fiji . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Niger . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Solomon Islands . . . . . . . . . 2 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
Antigua . . . 1 0.0% . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 0.0% . . . . . .
Cape Verde . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Chad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Equatorial Guinea . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
French Polynesia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gibraltar . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grenada 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Lesotho . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Liberia . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Macedonia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Martinque . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . .
Rwanda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sao Tome & Principe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Seychelles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sierra Leone . . . . . . 1 0.1% 100.0% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Somalia . . . . . . . . . 1 0.0% 100.0% 1 0.0% 100.0% . . . . . . . . .
St Lucia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Swaziland . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
No Country Class. &
1266 13.5% 55.1% 1008 9.0% 88.2% 27 1.4% 66.7% 795 5.8% 71.8% 2720 15.8% 57.8% 1575 15.6% 53.8% 482 28.0% 52.3% 203 22.9% 49.3%
Non-classifiable
9352 100% 11241 100% 1865 100% 13780 100% 17183 100% 10104 100% 1721 100% 887 100%

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Table 10
Summary Statistics of Partners' Equity Stake in Joint Ventures
All JVs JVs w/ Cross-border Participants
Equal Equal
JVs Mean Median N obs N obs % Mean Median N obs N obs %
Stake Stake
2-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 51.15 50 20785 =50% 14767 71.0% 51.18 50 14571 =50% 9919 68.1%
2nd participant's stake 48.85 50 20785 =50% 14767 48.80 50 14571 =50% 9919
3-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 38.10 33.3 3693 =33.3% 1332 36.1% 38.19 33.3 3012 =33.3% 1006 33.4%
2nd participant's stake 32.62 33.3 3693 =33.3% 1332 32.70 33.3 3012 =33.3% 1006
3rd participant's stake 30.07 33.3 3693 =33.3% 1332 29.92 33.3 3012 =33.3% 1006
4-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 31.05 25 1063 =25% 435 40.9% 31.09 25 861 =25% 320 37.2%
2nd participant's stake 25.19 25 1063 =25% 435 25.46 25 861 =25% 320
3rd participant's stake 22.39 25 1063 =25% 435 22.21 25 861 =25% 320
4th participant's stake 21.73 25 1063 =25% 435 21.56 25 861 =25% 320
5-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 27.11 20 370 =20% 140 37.8% 26.87 20 312 =20% 107 34.3%
2nd participant's stake 21.71 20 370 =20% 140 21.88 20 312 =20% 107
3rd participant's stake 18.32 20 370 =20% 140 18.29 20 312 =20% 107
4th participant's stake 16.64 20 370 =20% 140 16.61 20 312 =20% 107
5th participant's stake 17.06 20 370 =20% 140 17.07 20 312 =20% 107

Multi-regional JVs Domestic JVs

Equal Equal
JVs Mean Median N obs N obs % Mean Median N obs N obs %
Stake Stake
2-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 51.08 50 1672 =50% 1212 72.5% 51.05 50 5978 =50% 4672 78.2%
2nd participant's stake 48.88 50 1672 =50% 1212 49.01 50 5978 =50% 4672
3-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 37.18 33.3 239 =33.3% 96 40.2% 37.79 33.3 658 =33.3% 316 48.0%
2nd participant's stake 32.91 33.3 239 =33.3% 96 32.36 33.3 658 =33.3% 316
3rd participant's stake 30.42 33.3 239 =33.3% 96 30.80 33.3 658 =33.3% 316
4-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 29.98 25 74 =25% 33 44.6% 30.95 25 193 =25% 107 55.4%
2nd participant's stake 25.38 25 74 =25% 33 24.01 25 193 =25% 107
3rd participant's stake 22.59 25 74 =25% 33 23.36 25 193 =25% 107
4th participant's stake 23.34 25 74 =25% 33 22.28 25 193 =25% 107
5-participants JVs
1st participant's stake 25.28 20 29 =20% 13 44.8% 28.14 20 56 =20% 32 57.1%
2nd participant's stake 20.82 20 29 =20% 13 20.99 20 56 =20% 32
3rd participant's stake 17.93 20 29 =20% 13 18.61 20 56 =20% 32
4th participant's stake 16.87 20 29 =20% 13 16.82 20 56 =20% 32
5th participant's stake 18.94 20 29 =20% 13 17.05 20 56 =20% 32

47